In the context of flexible-list systems, André et al. tackled the puzzle of “why candidates spend time and effort striving to win preference votes when typically these votes make no difference between election and defeat” (2015, p. 1). They argue that scoring well in the previous election will lead to a better list position in the next one. Indeed, the party nomination process would take into account the preference votes obtained by a candidate in order to reward him (or punish him) in the next election – leading to a better position on the electoral list in the next election. This article replicates the analysis of the original article, but distinguish from it on three points in order to see if their conclusions are still valid: firstly, it will include data from 1995 to 2014 (where the original article is restricted to three elections). Secondly, the article does not take into account the last position on the list (“lijstduwers”) – while this is an important position in Belgium and can not be seen as a punishment. Finally, this article includes only the returning candidates in the districts where their party has obtained at least one seat from 1995 to 2014 - as if they have no chance on winning a seat, the nomination reward logic does not make sense. The research question of why preferences votes are still important, if they have quasi no effect on the outcome, will be approached by using three types of candidacies: eligible, marginal, and non-eligible ones.
Cogels, M. (2017). The impact of previous performance in the candidate selection process. Belgium: The State of the Federation, Bruxelles. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/57549