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Relay attacks are one of the most challenging threats RFID will have to face in the close future. They consist in making the verier believe that the prover is in its close vicinity by surreptitiously forwarding the signal between the verier and an out-of-eld prover. Distance bounding protocols represent a promising way to thwart relay attacks, by measuring the round trip time of short authenticated messages. Several such protocols have been designed during the last years but none of them combine all the features one may expect in a RFID system. We introduce in this paper the rst solution that compounds in a single protocol all these desirable features. We prove, with respect to the previous protocols, that our proposal is the best one in terms of security, privacy, tag computational overhead, and fault tolerance. We also point out a weakness in Tu and Piramuthu's protocol, which was considered up to now as one of the most ecient distance bounding protocol.
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Kim, C. H., Avoine, G., Koeune, F., Standaert, F.-X., & Pereira, O. (2008). The swiss-knife RFID distance bounding protocol. Information Security and Cryptology --- ICISC 2008. Published. ICISC 2008 : 11th International Conference, Seoul, Korea. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/228068