Meet-or-release and most-favored-customer clauses with price-quantity competition yield Cournot outcomes
(2005) Economie publique — Vol. 17, n° 2, p. 105-114 (2005)
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- Abstract
- It is shown that, in a well-defined market environment where demand is such that market revenue is decreasing in price, if all firms compete simultaneously in prices and quantities, and offer sales contracts which combine the meet-or-release clause with a most-favored-customer clause, then the industry sub-game perfect equilibrium will coincide with the Cournot solution.
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d’Aspremont-Lynden, C., & Dos Santos Ferreira, R. (2005). Meet-or-release and most-favored-customer clauses with price-quantity competition yield Cournot outcomes. Economie publique, 17(2), 105-114. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/249985 (Original work published 2005)