Technological Linkages and Efficient Location of Indivisible Activities : Koopmans – Beckmann and von Thünen Unified
Fujita, Masahisa;Thisse, Jacques-François
(1993) Journal of Urban Economics — Vol. 34, n° 2, p. 118-141 (1993)
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Fujita, Masahisa
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Thisse, Jacques-FrançoisUCLouvain
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Abstract
Consider a model à la Koopmans–Beckmann involving two indivisible and interactive firms, as well as a continuum of workers. Firm 2 uses labor, while firm 1 uses labor and good 2 produced by firm 2; both goods 1 and 2 can be exported, but good 2 cannot be imported. The land capitalization process, based on workers′ competition in a perfectly competitive land market, is used to design a noncooperative game between firms 1 and 2. The equilibria of this game always exist and are socially optimal. Various extensions of the basic model are also discussed.
Fujita, M., & Thisse, J.-F. (1993). Technological Linkages and Efficient Location of Indivisible Activities : Koopmans – Beckmann and von Thünen Unified. Journal of Urban Economics, 34(2), 118-141. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/65544 (Original work published 1993)