Inflicting injury through product quality: how European antidumping policy disadvantages European producers
(2001) European Journal of Political Economy — Vol. 17, n° 1, p. 101-116 (2001)
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- Abstract
- In this paper, we show how an industry characterized by vertical product differentiation may be affected by European antidumping policy. Using a two-stage model where quality choice is determined before price competition takes place, we show that EU antidumping policy that takes the form of price-undertakings protects domestic firms at the price competition stage, but is disadvantageous to domestic firms once the effect on quality choice is taken into account. European antidumping policies may therefore disadvantage European producers through reversals of quality ranking.
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Vandenbussche, H., & Wauthy, X. (2001). Inflicting injury through product quality: how European antidumping policy disadvantages European producers. European Journal of Political Economy, 17(1), 101-116. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(00)00030-6 (Original work published 2001)