Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
(2000) Social Choice and Welfare — Vol. 17, n° 4, p. 655-672 (2000)
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- In this paper we show in the context of voting games with plurality rule that the "perfect" equilibrium concept does not appear restrictive enough, since, independently of preferences, it can exclude at most the election of only one candidate. Furthermore, some examples show that there are "perfect" equilibria that are not "proper". However, also some "proper" outcome is eliminated by sophisticated voting, while Mertens' stable set fully satisfies such criterium, for generic plurality games. Moreover, we highlight a weakness of the simple sophisticated voting principle. Finally, we find that, for some games, sophisticated voting (and strategic stability) does not elect the Condorcet winner, neither it respects Duverger's law, even with a large number of voters.
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De Sinopoli, F. (2000). Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule. Social Choice and Welfare, 17(4), 655-672. https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000049 (Original work published 2000)