Alvarez-SanJaime, OscarUniversity of Valencia, Valencia, Spain
Author
Cantos-Sanchez, PedroUniversity of Valencia, Valencia, Spain
Author
Moner-Colonques, RafaelUniversity of Valencia, Valencia, Spain
Author
Sempere-Monerris, José JorgeUCLouvain
Author
Abstract
This paper is a contribution to evaluate structural and behavioral changes in railway passenger markets. The novel elements of our analysis are the following: (i) the consideration of intermodal and intramodal competition, (ii) the presence of public and private operators, and (iii) endogenous service frequency. After calibrating the model using actual data from two Spanish High Speed Rail lines, simulation exercises allow us to conclude the following. Privatization, whether entry occurs or not, would prompt an increase in prices and a reduction in the number of train services, eventually leading to welfare decreases, as compared with a regime where the incumbent rail operator remained public. Entry is found to be welfare improving only when it generates large increases in traffic. Otherwise welfare losses would materialize even though entry raised some efficiency gains.
Alvarez-SanJaime, O., Cantos-Sanchez, P., Moner-Colonques, R., & Sempere-Monerris, J. J. (2015). A Model of Internal and External Competition in a High Speed Rail Line. Economics of Transportation, 4, 178-187. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecotra.2015.05.004 (Original work published 2015)