Stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core

Bogomolnaia, Anna;Le Breton, Michel;Savvateev, Alexey;Weber, Shlomo
(2007) International Journal of Game Theory — Vol. 35, n° 2, p. 185-204 (2007)

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  • Bogomolnaia, AnnaRice University
    Author
  • Le Breton, Michel
    Author
  • Savvateev, Alexey
    Author
  • Weber, ShlomoUCLouvain
    Author
Abstract
In this paper, we consider a population represented by a continuum of individuals uniformly distributed over the unit interval that faces a problem of location and financing of public facilities under the equal share rule. We examine three notions of stability of emerging jurisdiction structures (stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core) and provide a characterization of stable structures.
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Bogomolnaia, A., Le Breton, M., Savvateev, A., & Weber, S. (2007). Stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core. International Journal of Game Theory, 35(2), 185-204. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0043-4 (Original work published 2007)