The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the television news scheduling game
(2008) Journal of Industrial Economics — Vol. 56, n° 2, p. 418-425 (2008)
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- Authors
- Abstract
- We characterize the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium of an extension of the "television news sheduling game" of Cancian, Bergstrom and Bills (1995) where viewers want to watch the first newscast broadcast after they return home. A fraction of the viewers record randomly one of the newscast to watch them in case they are too late. At equilibrium, neither of the two stations broadcasts its evening news in the first part of the evening and the density function is strictly decreasing.
- Affiliations
Université de la Méditerranée GREQAM Université de Toulouse Industrial Economic Institute
Citations
Jaskold Gabszewicz, J., Laussel, D., & Le Breton, M. (2008). The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the television news scheduling game. Journal of Industrial Economics, 56(2), 418-425. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/249492 (Original work published 2008)