In this paper we consider the security of the Misty structure in the Luby-Rackoff model, if the inner functions are replaced by involutions without fixed point. In this context we show that the success probability in distinguishing a 4-round L-scheme from a random function is O(m(2)/2(n)) (where m is the number of queries and 2n the block size) when the adversary is allowed to make adaptively chosen encryption queries. We give a similar bound in the case of the 3-round R-scheme. Finally, we show that the advantage in distinguishing a 5-round scheme from a random permutation when the adversary is allowed to adaptively chosen encryption as well as decryption queries is also O(m(2)/2(n)). This is to our knowledge the first time involutions are considered in the context of the Luby-Rackoff model.
Piret, G., & Quisquater, J.-J. (2005). Security of the MISTY structure in the Luby-Rackoff model: Improved results. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 3357, 100-113. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30564-4_7 (Original work published 2005)