Coalition-proof stable networks
(2020) , 25 pages
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- Authors
Luo, Chenghong 
- Abstract
- We propose the notion of coalition-proof stability for predicting the networks that could emerge when group deviations are allowed. A network is coalition-proof stable if there exists no coalition which has a credible group deviation. A coalition is said to have a credible group deviation if there is a profitable group deviation to some network and there is no subcoalition of the deviating players which has a subsequent credible group deviation. Coalition-proof stability is a coarsening of strong stability. There is no relationship between the set of coalition-proof stable networks and the set of networks induced by a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of Myerson's linking game. Contrary to coalition-proof stability, coalition-proof Nash equilibria of Myerson's linking game tend to support unreasonable networks.
- Affiliations
Citations
Luo, C., Mauleon, A., & Vannetelbosch, V. (2020). Coalition-proof stable networks (CORE Discussion Papers 2020/18). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/269073