Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates
(2003) Games and Economic Behavior — Vol. 42, n° 2, p. 183-207 (2003)
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- This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification, derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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Amir, R., Evstigneev, I., & Wooders, J. (2003). Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates. Games and Economic Behavior, 42(2), 183-207. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00541-9 (Original work published 2003)