Le principe de contradiction est-il un principe logique ? Łukasiewicz vs Aristote
(2011)
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- Authors
- Supervisors
- Crabbé, Marcel
- Abstract
- (en) In his monographThe principle of contradiction in Aristotle (1910), the Polish philosopher Jan Łukasiewicz (1879-1956) subjects the conception, the formulation and the proofs of the principle of contradiction developed by Aristotle, mainly in book Gamma of the Metaphysics, to a minute critique. Basing himself on the Meinongian theory of the object, Husserl’s Logical Investigations, non-Euclidian geometry and logical-mathematical antinomies, Łukasiewicz reformulates the principle of contradiction with further precision, showing, among other things, the close bond which exists for Aristotle between the understanding of this principle and the ontology of substance. He is led to affirm that the truth of the principle of contradiction cannot result from a logical demonstration, nor from an ontological theory, but rather from a practical-ethical necessity. In this capacity as a practical truth, the principle of contradiction constitutes the basic arm against lies and errors. Basing himself on the most recent developments of these questions, notably, by Graham Priest, our dissertation formulates a precise analysis of the contents of The principle of contradiction in Aristotle and shows the importance of the Lukasievitchian critique for a more authentic comprehension of a principle whose formulation, significance and stakes have seemed definitively fixed on Aristotle’s work.
- Affiliations
Citations
Djerrah, S. (2011). Le principe de contradiction est-il un principe logique ? Łukasiewicz vs Aristote. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/149556