Horizontal Concentration and European Wage Merger Policy
(1989) , 14 pages
Files
WP-8913.pdf
Open Access - Adobe PDF
- 903.54 KB
Details
- Authors
- Abstract
- The first section of this paper has discussed theoretical arguments and results of empirical studies intended to determine the ability of horizontal mergers to improve the productivity of business assets in the 1992 context. The main conclusion is that although mergers and takeovers could indeed lead to cost savings and efficiency gains, neither they nor empirical work provides any categorical arguments in favour of a presumption that these operations are generally efficient. Furthermore, even when they can be efficient, the corresponding gains must be compared with the effects of a possible increase in monopoly power. This leads to complex tradeoffs where the expected new industry structure following the merger, the degree of openness to international trade and the long-run dynamic performance linked with learning and technical change, are especially relevant aspects in the European context. The second section has shown that a worthwhile pragmatic approach has been adopted in both the application of Article 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty to mergers, as well as in the proposed new Regulation creating a prior notification of concentrations having a Community dimension. But this paper has also shown that several aspects require a substantial improvement.
- Affiliations
Citations
Jacquemin, A. (1989). Horizontal Concentration and European Wage Merger Policy (Working Papers Institut des sciences économiques 8913). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/281059