Putting Peirce's Anti-Scepticism Into Use: Considerations for Moral Epistemology

Dostie Proulx, Pierre-Luc
(2014) Applying Peirce 2 — Location: Helsinki, Finlande (22.April.2014)

Files

ConferenceApplyingPeirce_PLDP.pdf
  • Closed Access
  • Adobe PDF
  • 186.86 KB
Request a copy

Details

Authors
  • Dostie Proulx, Pierre-LucUCLouvain
    Author
Abstract
In this talk, I investigate one of Charles Sanders Peirce’s most insightful theses: his view on scepticism. Peirce’s approach to the subject is both brief and scattered. Although the considerations he developed in “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” (EP 1: 281) and “The Fixation of Belief” (EP 1: 107) have been significantly analysed, the corresponding developments in some subsequent manuscripts are practically unknown (especially CP 1.344, CP 5.391 and CP 6.498). The purpose of this presentation is twofold: after presenting some of the most interesting arguments found in these manuscripts, I turn to an analysis of the application of Peirce’s anti-scepticism for moral epistemology.
Affiliations

Citations

  • APA
  • Chicago
  • FWB

Dostie Proulx, P.-L. (2014). Putting Peirce’s Anti-Scepticism Into Use: Considerations for Moral Epistemology. Applying Peirce 2, Helsinki, Finlande. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/91435