Bankruptcy and the cost of organized labor: Evidence from union elections
(2018) The Review of Financial Studies — Vol. 31, n° 3, p. 980-1013 (2018)
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- Abstract
- Unionized workers are entitled to special treatment in bankruptcy court that can be detrimental to other corporate stakeholders, with unsecured creditors standing to lose the most. Using data on union elections, we employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of worker unionization on bondholders in bankruptcy states. Closely won union elections lead to significant bond value losses, especially when firms approach bankruptcy, have underfunded pension plans, and operate in non-RTW law states. Unionization is associated with longer, more convoluted, and costlier bankruptcy court proceedings. Unions depress bondholders’ recovery values as they are assigned seats on creditors’ committees.
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Campello, M., Gao, J., Qiu, J., & Zhang, Y. (2018). Bankruptcy and the cost of organized labor: Evidence from union elections. The Review of Financial Studies, 31(3), 980-1013. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx117 (Original work published 2018)