On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules

Goertz, Johanna M.;Maniquet, François
(2011) Journal of Economic Theory — Vol. 146, n° 4, p. 1464-1480 (2011)

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Abstract
We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates, efficient information aggregation is possible (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [5–7]).We show that this result does not extend to elections with more than two candidates. We study a class of simple scoring rules in voting games with Poisson population uncertainty and three candidates. No simple scoring rule aggregates information efficiently, even if preferences are dichotomous and a Condorcet winner always exists. We introduce a weaker criterion of informational efficiency that requires a voting rule to have at least one efficient equilibrium. Only approval voting satisfies this criterion.
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Goertz, J. M., & Maniquet, F. (2011). On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4), 1464-1480. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.001 (Original work published 2011)