Capital tax competition among an arbitrary number of asymmetric countries

Peralta, Susana;Van Ypersele, Tanguy
(2002)

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  • Peralta, Susana
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  • Van Ypersele, Tanguy
    Author
Abstract
This paper addresses the issue of capital tax competition among an arbitrary number of countries. Countries are allowed to be asymmetric not only in their population endowment but also in their capital endowment per inhabitant. National governments tax capital and labor in order to finance a public good. Asymmetric capital taxation arises at equilibrium leading to a distortion on the international capital market. We provide conditions for the existence of a Nash Equilibrium. We fully characterize how equilibrium taxes and welfare levels depend upon countries population and capital endowments.
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Peralta, S., & Van Ypersele, T. (2002). Capital tax competition among an arbitrary number of asymmetric countries (CORE Discussion Papers 2002/31). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/78269