L'eau en partage : activation des règles dans les rivalités d'usages en Belgique et en Suisse
(2005)
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- Authors
- Supervisors
- Varone, Frédéric
- Abstract
- Along the water stream, users are numerous and enter into competition for the appropriation and use of the resource (e.g. a dam upstream reduces the river flow and hampers navigation and cooling of industries downstream). The sharing out of water inside a given watershed produces rivalries, defined as struggles between different users for the resource allocation. This study aims at understanding how heterogeneous water users solve their rivalries. The analytical framework developed herein suggests that a resolution of rivalries comes out of a process of activation and confrontation of rules, i.e. property rights and public policies, between competing users. The result of this process, precisely the local arrangement, is defined as a set of decisions and actions taken in order to solve the rivalry. Rather than looking at the tangible forms of the local arrangements (e.g. contract, convention or case-law), these are analysed through two attributes, i.e. the degree of coercion and the distribution of cost between the involved users. The analytical framework lies on the hypothesis that the type of local arrangement concluded between users depends on the activated rules (either property rights or public policies), putting the handling of rules by users at its core. Users activate rules that grant them a status and defend their resource use against the rival user. Once activated, rules produce a configuration of confrontation presumably related to a single type of local arrangement. In other words, we advocate that success in the resolution of the rivalry is subject to a specific kind of local arrangement in each configuration of confrontation observed. This dissertation is autonomous, not belonging to any school of thought, but rather proposing an original analytical framework inspired by theories from new institutional economics, public choice and policy analysis. The method chosen for the empirical test is comparative and qualitative, according to a deductive approach. The six case studies, sequential and selected according to the approach of the 'most similar system design' are concentrated in two tributary river basins, i.e. the Vesdre river basin in Belgium and Val de Bagnes in Switzerland. The analytical framework puts in evidence the process of activation of rules, but also brings an understanding of the resolutions of rivalries. Empirical results validate the activation hypotheses, but invalidate the postulated link between the nature of rules activated and the type of local arrangement reached. Confrontation is not a confrontation between activated rules, but rather an actors' confrontation where users develop strategies, face constraints and own specific resources. Rule activation empowers the user in front of his rival and enables him to open negotiations or refer to a court. Hence, the kind of local arrangement depends on the degree of hostility between the users, the capacity of the initiator of the resolution to put forward a credible (judicial) threat and the ability of users to set a compromise that reduces the net cost of the arrangement. Besides, this dissertation reveals the importance of property rights activations in rivalries, as well as means of resolution as means of opposition to the implementation of public policies.
- Affiliations
Citations
Aubin, D. (2005). L’eau en partage : activation des règles dans les rivalités d’usages en Belgique et en Suisse. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/59725