Effets de réputation dans un problème de hold-up
(2011) Revue économique / Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales — Vol. 62, n° 3, p. 557-565 (2011)
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- We consider two economic partners involved in a long-run relationship where one of them, the seller, must choose to make a specicific investment or not. Once realized, the other partner, the buyer, can expropriate a part of the surplus. This leads the buyer to not make the investment. A recent literature shows that in dynamic situations there exists an efficient equilibrium (Che et Sakoviks [2004]). We explore reputation effects by introducing asymmetric information about one of the players' type. We show that only the seller can establish a reputation. In this case he invests in a suboptimal way in all equilibria. This information asymmetry can be made arbitrarily small. This suggests that dynamic considerations may not be a robust approach for efficiency in hold up situations, at least in this setting.
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Marlats, C. (2011). Effets de réputation dans un problème de hold-up. Revue économique / Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, 62(3), 557-565. https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.623.0557 (Original work published 2011)