Two-Sided Search and Temporary Employment
(2000)
Files
2000-11.pdf
Open Access - Adobe PDF
- 322.19 KB
Details
- Authors
- Abstract
- The objective of this paper is to model explicitly the possibility to form temporary matching in a model of two-sided search. The agents (workers and employers) differ by their human quality endowment. In a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents within their class. The introduction of a temporary market can have a positive impact on unemployment, but it may have a negative impact on low-skilled agents' utility. When a delay cost is introduced, this negative impact can be reduced especially if an education policy is implemented to decrease the heterogeneity of the human capital.
- Affiliations
Citations
Paolini, D. (2000). Two-Sided Search and Temporary Employment (ECON Working Papers 2000/11). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/33859