We study how firms design products and information when consumers have limited attention. Consumers either study fewer options for fit or browse to compare prices. Firms shape this trade-off: niche designs increase match-value dispersion, while mass-market designs compress it. In equilibrium, firms pair high prices with niche designs to induce studying, but set low prices with mass-market designs to spur browsing. Relative to full attention, firms use mass-market designs more, yet behavior polarizes---studying consumers are less price-sensitive and browsing consumers more---so competition may strengthen or weaken. Policies reducing dispersion (standardization or coarser information) more-robustly benefit consumers when attention is scarce.
Johnen, J., & Leung, B. T. K. (2026). Steering Attention: Product Design and Information with Limited Attention (LIDAM Discussion Paper CORE 2022/17). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/274814