Optimal enforcement of competition policy: The commitments procedure under uncertainty

Gautier, Axel;Petit, Nicolas
(2018) European Journal of Law and Economics — Vol. 45, n° 2, p. 195-224 (2018)

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  • Gautier, AxelUniversité de Liège, CORE and CESifo
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  • Petit, NicolasUniversité de Liège and University of South Australia
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Abstract
The introduction of a commitments procedure in EU antitrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003) has entitled the European Commission to extensively settle cases of alleged anticompetitive conduct. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement to identify the optimal procedure to remedy cases in a context of partial legal uncertainty (Katsoulacos and Ulph in Eur J Law Econ 41(2°: 255-282, 2016). We discuss in particular the merits of a policy of selective commitments where firms either take strong commitments or are investigated under the standard infringement procedure.
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Gautier, A., & Petit, N. (2018). Optimal enforcement of competition policy: The commitments procedure under uncertainty. European Journal of Law and Economics, 45(2), 195-224. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-018-9578-7 (Original work published 2018)