Parliamentary control of armed forces through the separation of civil and military powers
(2018) 10th World Congress of Constitutional Law - IACL/AIDC - “Violent conflicts, Peace Building and Constitutional Law” — Location: Séoul (18.June.2018)
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- et. al.
- Abstract
- Democratic control of the military can only be fully understood if we combine two different approaches of separation of powers. The formal theory of separation of powers identifies three branches vested with different functions – legislative, administrative and judicial – and prescribes a system of checks and balances between these branches. From this standpoint, the army is an integral part of the executive, much like any other administration. Parliamentary control is then justified as a natural and normal implementation of the principle of separation of powers designed in a parliamentary democracy. The oversight of the military relies on the same foundations as the oversight of any government services, and is practiced by ex post parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms such as questions and inquiries. This classical approach should be combined with a substantive theory of separation of powers. Such a perspective underlines the special features of the defence policy and military activities of the State. The armed forces are not only part of the administrative structure of the State. They are a precondition of a sovereign power, and a perpetual danger for the stability of democratic regimes. This is why some authors, and particularly a French lawyer, Maurice Hauriou, who wrote at the turn of the 20th century, conceptualised the principle of separation between civil and military powers that underlies the Constitutions of liberal democracies.
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El Berhoumi, M., Clarenne, J., & et al. (2018). Parliamentary control of armed forces through the separation of civil and military powers. 10th World Congress of Constitutional Law - IACL/AIDC - “Violent conflicts, Peace Building and Constitutional Law”, Séoul. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/174204