Majority support for progressive income taxation with corner preferences

De Donder, Philippe;Hindriks, Jean
(2003)

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This paper studies voting over quadratic taxation when income is fixed and taxation non distortionary. The set of feasible taxes is compact and self-interested voters have corner preferences. We first show that, if a majority winning tax policy exists, it involves maximum progressivity. We then give a necessary and suficient condition on the income distribution for a majority winner to exist. This condition appears to be satisfied for a large class of distribution functions.
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De Donder, P., & Hindriks, J. (2003). Majority support for progressive income taxation with corner preferences (ECON Discussion Papers 2003/02). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/36479