Crédibilité de la politique monétaire et libellé de la dette publique
(2002) Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles — Vol. 45, p. 37-66 (2002)
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- Authors
- Abstract
- (en) The mere existence of nominal public debt may create inflationary incentives. This model highlights the fact that public debt may not only affect the credibility of the fixed exchange rate regime, but it also examines possible consequences of high public debt levels when countries that previously belonged to a fixed exchange regime decide to create a monetary union and adopt the same currency. Their respective public debt levels and structures may then influence the credibility of their common central bank. In the absence of measures enhancing the credibility of their common monetary policy, the decision to share the same currency may even lead to an increase in inflationary incentives. Those reflections are related to recent debates relative to the construction of the European Monetary Union, with special attention paid to the Belgian case.
- Affiliations
Louvain School of Management Accounting & Finance
Citations
Gilson, N. (2002). Crédibilité de la politique monétaire et libellé de la dette publique. Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles, 45, 37-66. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/82442 (Original work published 2002)