Bargaining with endogenous deadlines
(2004) Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization — Vol. 54, n° 3, p. 321-335 (2004)
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- Abstract
- We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the deadline. We show that the equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become very patient, the unique outcome is always inefficient
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Citations
Mauleon, A., & Vannetelbosch, V. (2004). Bargaining with endogenous deadlines. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 54(3), 321-335. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.01.007 (Original work published 2004)