How Leaky is an Extractor

Standaert, François-Xavier
(2010) Proceedings of LatinCrypt 2010, Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America — Location: Puebla/Mexico

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This paper discusses the security of a leakage-resilient stream cipher presented at FOCS 2008, instantiated in a practical setting. Based on a case study, we put forward implementation weaknesses that can be exploited in a key-recovery attack. We first show that in our experimen- tal context (8-bit device, Hamming weight leakages, Gaussian noise), a successful attack against the investigated stream cipher has lower data complexity than a similar attack against an unprotected AES implemen- tation. We then analyze the origin of the observed weaknesses and relate them with the implementation of extractor that is used in the investi- gated stream cipher. We finally discuss the implications of these results for the design of leakage-resilient primitives and provide guidelines to improve the construction of FOCS 2008 and its underlying components.
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Standaert, F.-X. (2010). How Leaky is an Extractor. Proceedings of LatinCrypt 2010, Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, Puebla/Mexico. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/218836