[Strategic incompleteness in competitive market games]
(1999) 47th Annual Congress of the Association-Francaise-de-Science-Economique on Recent Developments in Economic Analyses — Location: PARIS(France) (24.September.1998)
Files
No attached file found for this publication.
Details
- Authors
- Abstract
- We study the correlated equilibria of competitive strategic market games, i.e., games for which pure Nash equilibria exactly implement the Walrasian equilibria. We show that Arrow-Debreu economies are strategically incomplete, even if markets are complete (in the usual, non-strategic sense). Moreover, public correlated equilibria exactly coincide with sunspot (competitive) equilibria induced by the strategic incompleteness of markets. Finally, it is much more difficult to complete markets in the strategically incomplete case than in the usual GN model.
- Affiliations
Citations
Giraud, G. (1999). [Strategic incompleteness in competitive market games]. Revue économique / Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, 50(3), 583-592. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/143107 (Original work published 1999)