A Note On Pareto-optimality in Differential Information Economies

Forges, F.
(1994) Economics Letters — Vol. 46, n° 1, p. 27-31 (1994)

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  • Forges, F.
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Abstract
A mechanism is posterior efficient if the agents' expected utilities, given the outcomes of this mechanism, can never be Pareto improved. A non-revealing (resp. completely revealing) mechanism is posterior efficient if and only if it is incentive interim (resp. ex post) efficient.
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Forges, F. (1994). A Note On Pareto-optimality in Differential Information Economies. Economics Letters, 46(1), 27-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)90073-6 (Original work published 1994)