The aggregation of preferences: can we ignore the past?

Zuber, Stéphane
(2011) Theory and Decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision sciences — Vol. 70, n° 1, p. 367-384 (2011)

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Authors
  • Zuber, StéphaneUCLouvain
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Abstract
The article shows that a Paretian social welfare function can be history independent and time consistent only if a stringent set of conditions is verified. Individual utilities must be additive. The social welfare function must be a linear combination of these utilities. Social preferences are stationary only if, in addition, all individuals have the same constant discount rate. The results are implemented in two frameworks: deterministic dynamic choice and dynamic choice under uncertainty. The applications highlight that the conditions are unlikely to be met by individual preferences, and that they severely restrict social preferences.
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Zuber, S. (2011). The aggregation of preferences: can we ignore the past? Theory and Decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision sciences, 70(1), 367-384. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9255-4 (Original work published 2011)