The minmax theorem for USC-LSC payoff functions
(1986) International Journal of Game Theory — Vol. 15, n° 4, p. 237-250 (1986)
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- Abstract
- The author's aim is to get a `general minimax theorem' whose assumptions and conclusions are phrased only in terms of the data of the problem, i.e., the pair of pure strategy sets /b S/ and /b T/ and the payoff function on /b S/*/b T/. For the assumptions, this means that one wants to avoid any assumption of the type `there exists a topology (or a measurable structure) on /b S/ and (or) /b T / such that ... ' For the conclusions, one is led to require that players have isin -optimal strategies with finite support, both because those are the easiest to describe in intrinsic terms, and because in any game where the value would not exist in strategies with finite support, all known general minmax theorems implicitly select as `value' either the sup inf or the inf sup by in effect restricting either player I or player II arbitrarily to strategies with finite support-so that the resulting `value' is completely arbitrary and misleading.
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Mertens, J.-F. (1986). The minmax theorem for USC-LSC payoff functions. International Journal of Game Theory, 15(4), 237-250. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/85421 (Original work published 1986)