



La relation entre Dieu et la création

Confrontation entre la *Somme théologique* de Thomas d'Aquin et la pensée de Charles Hartshorne (*Process thought*)

TOME IV. :

Bibliographie et documents annexes

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BIOGRAPHIE DE CHARLESHARTSHORNE PAR D.-W. VINEY

**BIOGRAPHIE DE HARTSHORNE ELABORE PAR
DONALD VINEY ET PUBLIE AU :** at
<http://www.harvardsquarelibrary.org/Hartshorne/Vineyindex.html>.

Several obituary notices appeared after Hartshorne's death, some of which contained erroneous information. By far the most accurate obituary was Ralph K. Charles Hartshorne (pronounced Harts-horne—as in "deer's horn") (June 5, 1897–October 9, 2000) was the 20th century's leading exponent of process theism. In his long career of more than 70 years, he vigorously defended the thesis that God presides over an everlasting universe as its eminent creative power and is supremely open to creaturely influence. Hartshorne navigated between what he considered the Scylla of traditional theisms and the Charybdis of atheistic humanisms. He maintained that his philosophy, which he called "neoclassical theism," is logically more coherent than these rivals, more sensitive to human and non-human values, and in better agreement with the sciences.

Hartshorne shared the atheist's objections to traditional theology, especially to the Thomistic conception of God as the unmoved mover. He criticized failure to rethink God as the "most and best moved mover." He found anticipations of neoclassical theism in the writings of numerous philosophers, of the East and of the West, and especially in the work of the 16th century reformer, Faustus Socinus. Hartshorne believed that Unitarians, in their focus on Socinus' anti-Trinitarianism, had failed to note the Italian's most significant theological innovation—God as both temporal and eternal, in different respects.

Early religious influences on Hartshorne were Quaker and Episcopalian. His paternal grandparents were Quaker but, for reasons unknown, became Episcopalian. His father, Frances Cope Hartshorne (1868–1950), was an Episcopal minister. His mother, Marguerite Haughton Hartshorne (1868–1959), was the daughter of a Protestant minister and granddaughter of a Swiss Protestant minister. Hartshorne grew up with a liberal Christianity: the Scriptures were inspired but not infallible; evolution and theism were not contraries; and divine love was more important than divine power. Hartshorne's father rejected the notion that God determines every detail of the universe—an absurdity, he felt, that leads to a quagmire of absurd defenses of evil and suffering. Hartshorne incorporated all these ideas into his philosophy. He distanced himself at an early age from Christian orthodoxy on the subjects of miracles, plenary inspiration of the Bible, the Incarnation, the Trinity, and rewards and punishments after death.

The second of six children, Hartshorne spent his childhood in Kittanning, Pennsylvania. In 1908 the family moved to Phoenixville. Later, he and his brother Richard attended Yeates Boarding School, 1911–15, in Lancaster County. (His brother Richard (1899–1992) became a well-known geographer and was, for many years, Treasurer of the First Unitarian Society of Madison, Wisconsin.)

At Yeates, Hartshorne read Chester A. Reed's *Song and Insectivorous Birds East of the Rockies*. The book sparked a life-long interest in ornithology. His twelfth book was *Born to Sing: A World Survey and Interpretation of Bird Song*, 1973. He also read Emerson's essays and Matthew Arnold's *Literature and Dogma*. After reading Emerson, Hartshorne resolved to "trust reason to the end." He characterized his response to Arnold's book as "almost like an explosion in my mind." Persuaded by Arnold's discussion, he abandoned any serious interest in Christology, even as the great commandments to love God wholly and to love one's neighbor as oneself never ceased to be central to his philosophy.

Hartshorne attended Haverford, 1915-17, a Quaker college. There he studied with the philosopher Rufus Jones. A careful reading of Josiah Royce's *The Problem of Christianity* convinced Hartshorne of the vacuity of self-interest theories of motivation. In his philosophy he put love of one's future selves on a par with love of others; he felt he could thus logically do justice to the injunction to love others as one loves oneself.

He served as a volunteer for 23 months in the Army Medical Corps in France, and then completed his formal education at Harvard, 1919-23.

During the Great War, while looking at a beautiful French landscape, Hartshorne was convinced that mere matter, devoid of feeling, is not a datum of experience but an abstraction from it. In his spare time he read H. G. Wells's *Mr. Britling Sees It Through* and William James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. These books set him to considering how he might ascribe finitude to God without diminishing divine perfection. At Harvard, W. E. Hocking convinced him that the perfection of omniscience requires that God know the past as settled and the future as partly to be settled by further choices. Unchanging in God is the formal attribute of omniscience: God always knows what exists and the manner in which it exists. By the time Hartshorne graduated—with a Ph.D. in philosophy and a minor in English literature—he had articulated an early version of what he would come to call dipolar theism: an understanding that God is, in different respects, changing and immutable.

As a Sheldon Traveling Fellow, 1923-25, Hartshorne studied with some of the century's greatest European philosophers, including Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. (In 1929 he reviewed Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*—in English, *Being and Time*—for *Philosophical Review*.) On his return to Harvard, Hartshorne was given Junior Faculty status. He was assigned to teach a class, to grade papers for Alfred North Whitehead (who arrived from England in 1924), and to edit the papers of C. S. Peirce. (Paul Weiss later joined him in editing the Peirce papers.)

In simultaneous engagement with Whitehead and Peirce, Hartshorne firmed up the main themes of his philosophy. With Whitehead and against Peirce, he understood nature as a theater of interactions among ephemeral centers of creative activity. With Peirce and against Whitehead, he understood the future as a continuum of possibility made definite by creaturely decisions in the present moment. With Whitehead and Pierce, he accepted the reality of chance, even for God. The reality of multiple centers of creative activity makes possible both cooperation and conflict, and also makes tragedy inevitable. Hartshorne diverged from Whitehead and Pierce in conceiving God's relation to the cosmos as analogous to the relation of a person to the cells of his or her body. Or, as he would later say, "The world is God's body."

In 1928 Hartshorne joined the department of philosophy at the University of Chicago. From 1947 to 1955 he held a joint appointment as professor at Meadville/Lombard Theological School, a Unitarian Universalist seminary.

In 1928 Hartshorne married Dorothy Eleanore Cooper (1904-1995), a Wellesley student he had met while at Harvard. Dorothy was raised attending Universalist churches and the couple wed at St. Paul's Universalist Church in Chicago. Hartshorne never ceased to thank his wife for her part in his career. She assisted him in countless ways, as editor, proofreader, correspondent, bibliographer and travel agent. The Hartshornes' only child, Emily Hartshorne Schwartz, was born in 1940.

Hartshorne considered himself primarily a philosopher, not a theologian. He was unhappy that he attracted more students from the seminary than from the philosophy program. In 1955 he moved to Atlanta to take a post at Emory University. In 1962, at the invitation of John Silber, Hartshorne moved to the University of Texas at Austin. The University named him Ashbel Smith Professor of Philosophy Emeritus.

Hartshorne published continuously from his early years in Chicago. He authored twenty books and more than five hundred articles and reviews. In later years he regularly wrote letters to the editor opposing, eg., equal time legislation for creation-science, high definition television and spanking and in support of, e.g., higher taxes, feminism and abortion rights.

Which of Hartshorne's many books should count as his "most important" depends on one's field of interest. As a historian of philosophy, in *Philosophers Speak of God*, 1953, in *Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers*, 1983, and in *Creativity in American Philosophy*, 1984, Hartshorne importantly called scholars' attention both to unnoticed insights of great thinkers and to great insights of unnoticed thinkers. In *The Logic of Perfection*, 1962, and *Anselm's Discovery*, 1965, he greatly elucidated the ontological argument for God's existence. *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism*, 1941, and *The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God*, 1948, are considered classics; these works incorporate the best of traditional ideas about God and avoid their worst defects. The professional philosopher might, however, consider most important his highly technical and most systematic book, *Creative Synthesis and the Philosophic Method*, 1970. Those who value lay access to philosophy might well think his most important work to be *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes*, 1984, written for a non-academic audience, or *The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Philosophy*, 1997. The latter, published in the author's 100th year, includes interviews with the philosopher which give the reader a sense of Hartshorne's charming personality, and also a fine editor's introduction to his thought. The UUA Department of Ministry includes, on its required reading list for students in preparation for the ministry, *Reality as Social Process*, 1953.

Throughout his career, Hartshorne traveled widely and often. He taught or lectured in Germany, France, Australia, Belgium, Canada, India, and Japan. He was a member of eleven professional societies, five of which elected him as president. An anecdote from 1974 illustrates the breadth of his reputation and the demand for his services. Persons from the philosophy department of the University planned to meet him at the Melbourne airport, but members of the Australian Ornithological Society heard of his impending arrival and whisked him away to their meeting. The philosophers eventually found and retrieved him.

Hartshorne did not always identify with a Unitarian congregation. In Chicago his daughter regularly attended services of the First Unitarian Church and once asked why he did not. Dorothy answered that he had more important things to do. In Atlanta and Austin he did attend UU services on a regular basis, at his wife's urging, and joined the church in Austin. He was fond of the sermons and befriended the congregations' ministers, perhaps especially Fred Wooden in Austin. The only churches Hartshorne supported financially in his adult life were Unitarian. In his last decade, he contributed less, when his wife was confined to a nursing home and he himself required assistance of a live-in companion.

In 1981 Hartshorne said in a sermon at the First Unitarian Church in Oklahoma City, "I hesitate to label myself Unitarian." He explained that he was not raised Unitarian and that

many of those to whom he felt closest religiously were in other churches, synagogues, and even a branch of Hinduism. He was fond of Peirce's expression "Buddhisto-Christian." For him the term referred to a blending of Buddhist teachings about dependent origination and the unreality of a permanent self with the central Jewish-Christian commandments to love God and others. The most inclusive love is love of God, for only God encompasses all "others." According to Hartshorne, "God's possession of us is our final achievement, not our possession of God."

Hartshorne assuredly expressed the spirit of Unitarians in his advocacy of freedom and reason and in his suspicion that exclusive loyalty to any book, church, or person is idolatrous. His liberal theistic philosophy is in keeping with the oldest and long standing traditions of Unitarianism and Universalism. He graciously accepted invitations to speak from the pulpits of even quite small Unitarian Universalist churches within driving distance of his University, e.g., in Beaumont, Texas, and he delighted those in attendance at a Unitarian Universalist Process Theology Network seminar at the Unitarian Universalist Association General Assembly in 1994 with his lively, extemporaneous answers to their questions, at age 97.

Hartshorne often quoted a line from a Jewish ritual, saying God will "endow our fleeting days with abiding significance." Fittingly, he died on Yom Kippur, a day of solemn prayer and reflection.

Hartshorne's philosophical papers and letters are deposited at the Center for Process Studies, in Claremont, California. This collection includes a list of letters to the editor of various newspapers, compiled by Randy Ramal and Donald Wayne Viney and e-mail from Emily Hartshorne Schwartz on her parents' relationship with Unitarian Universalism. Hartshorne's ornithological papers and letters are deposited at the Florida Museum of Natural History in Gainesville, Florida. Two collections of Hartshorne's letters have so far been published: *Hartshorne and Brightman on God, Process, and Person: The Correspondence, 1922-1945*, edited by Randall E. Auxier and Mark Y. A. Davies (2001) and "Charles Hartshorne's Letters to a Young Philosopher: 1979-1995," edited by Donald Wayne Viney, *Logos-Sophia*, Journal of the Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society (Fall 2001). The most extensive bibliography of Hartshorne's philosophical works—including books, articles, and reviews—is "Charles Hartshorne: Primary Bibliography of Philosophical Works," *Process Studies* (Fall-Winter 2001), compiled by Dorothy C. Hartshorne, revised and updated by Donald Wayne Viney and Randy Ramal. This contains over five hundred entries. The best bibliography of Hartshorne's ornithological works is Dorothy C. Hartshorne, "Charles Hartshorne: Primary Bibliography," in Lewis Edwin Hahn, editor, *The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne* (1991).

Hartshorne published a number of autobiographical pieces or articles from which biographical details can be gleaned. These include the following: "The Development of My Philosophy," *Contemporary American Philosophy: Second Series*, edited by John E. Smith (1970); "Charles Hartshorne's Recollections of Editing the Peirce Papers," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* (Summer-Fall 1970); "Pensées sur ma vie" or "Thoughts on my Life," *Bilingual Journal, Lecomte du Nouy Association* (Fall 1973); "How I Got That Way," *Existence and Actuality: Conversations with Charles Hartshorne*, edited by John B. Cobb, Jr. and Franklin I. Gamwell (1984); *The Darkness and the Light, A Philosopher Reflects Upon His Fortunate Career and Those Who Made It Possible* (1990); "Some Causes of My Intellectual Growth," *The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne*, Library of Living Philosophers, Volume XX, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn (1991); "Communication from Charles

Hartshorne," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association*, (November 1991); and "Thoughts on the Development of My Concept of God," *The Personalist Forum* (Fall 1998).

Chapter 1 of Eugene Peters' *Hartshorne & Neoclassical Metaphysics* (1970) contains the earliest biographical treatment of Hartshorne. Recently, the closest thing to a biography of Hartshorne is the entry by Donald Wayne Viney in *American Philosophers Since 1950*, volume 270 of the *Dictionary of Literary Biography* (2003). The electronic version of this article is at <http://www.harvardsquarelibrary.org/Hartshorne/Vineyindex.html>. Several obituary notices appeared after Hartshorne's death, some of which contained erroneous information. By far the most accurate obituary was Ralph K. M. Haurwitz's for *The Austin American-Statesman* (Wednesday, October 11, 2000).

ECHANGES EPISTOLAIRES ENTRE CHARLES HARTSHORNE ET CERTAINS THOMISTES.

Ces correspondances permettent de comprendre l'ambiance intellectuelle de l'époque des différentes publications de Hartshorne vers les années 50. Par rapport à la question de l'incommensurabilité/commensurabilité évoquée dans la thèse ces échanges épistolaires montrent bien comment face aux publications des théories de Hartshorne diverses réactions tenaient à confirmer la pertinence de la pensée de Thomas. Il est intéressant de remarquer que dans les discussions entre Hartshorne et Simon (voir lettre en français p. 35-38 des annexes,) la perspective de confrontation entre les deux systèmes est d'abord logico-analytique. Et en final Simon pose un problème de sous information chez Hartshorne sur la pensée thomasiennne. La question d'une lecture plus indépendante et critique des textes du maître médiévale se posait déjà aux premiers moments des investigations hartshorniennes.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
September 23, 1938

Dear Mr. Hartshorne:

I am sorry that a multitude of trivial things has prevented me from answering sooner your kind and suggestive letter of June 27.

Do you mean that God is *mutable* and imperfect? If so do you mean that God and the universe are somehow one, or that God is not self subsistent apart from creation, or that God and the universe are co-eternal?

The "sound and relatively new idea" which modern idealists have had appears from your letter to be a kind of panpsychism. You seem to hold that all animate and even inanimate things have reason and will. Isn't this view not only contrary to scripture (only man is made in God's image) but also contrary to the Facts of Life? Why do you believe that the attributes of God must be found in all creatures to a limited degree?

If, as you say, God has his attributes in an infinite degree, he must be infinite. If he is infinite how can he be imperfect, and if not imperfect, how mutable?

I am not a Thomist or a Neo-Thomist. But I believe that Thomas is worth reading and think you should read him more and more carefully before you go after him. For example, you are delighted that the Soczinis had the idea that God could not know indeterminate things as determinate. Thomas seems to me to say precisely this when he says that God can know contingent things only as contingent.

You argue that Whitehead has made the same criticisms of modern errors that Gilson has made and has done it better than Gilson. Do you think that what Whitehead has said about Descartes, Locke, and Leibnitz agrees with what Gilson has said about them? You indicate that Gilson and Maritain do not know of the contributions of Bergson, James, etc. But Maritain wrote a whole book about Bergson and has a chapter devoted to William James

Mr. Charles Hartshorne

- 2 -

September 23, 1938

and the new theology in the Reflexions.

Do you hold, as suggested in your quotation from Hume, that if the Divine Mind doesn't work in the same way that the human mind does, it is no mind at all?


I should not agree that Gilson admits that there was a profound mistake in Aristotelian and Thomistic physics. Here he seems to me to be talking only about the errors that Aristotle and Thomas made in physics as natural science; he is not talking about their philosophy of nature, which is continuous in doctrine, in principles and concepts, with their metaphysics and their natural theology.

Will you give me in a word the key to the last phrase in your letter: "the problem of modern thought"?

Forgive me for taking up so much of your time.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Charles Hartshorne
Department of Philosophy
Faculty Exchange



POMONA COLLEGE
CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
HOLMES HALL

November 21, 1964

Dear Professor Hartshorne:

Thank you for your kind note about my article in the Review of Religion. I have waited until now to answer, so that I could be sure about my plans to be in Chicago on the 27th of December. I will arrive early in the morning and leave for Baltimore about dinner time. I have no particular plans and, if you have some free time, would be delighted for the chance to talk with you again. When I arrive I will go to my friend, Frank Vanderhoof, to have breakfast there. If it would be convenient for you to leave a message with him, I could call you after arriving.

Perhaps we do agree basically; and I do soft pedal my issue with Thomas in the article, since in my thesis it occupied quite a section, and I felt that nothing could be gained by condensing it. As you know, before you can touch Thomas effectively, you have to deal with quite a few distinctions.

Thank you again for your note, and I will hope to see you on December 27.

Sincerely yours,

Fred Sontag

3437 Catalina Drive
Chamblee, Georgia
June 15, 1963

Dr. Charles Hartshorne
703 Park Place
Austin, Texas

Dear Dr. Hartshorne:

Thank you for your letter of May 30. I wanted to answer it right away but I was involved in a piece of work on Barth. I didn't want to mix the two up that much. I'm not sure that the ecumenical movement could take it. Let me see if I can make my point in writing. I am sorry it takes so many words.

1. God necessarily exists in himself.

'God' is a concept word. Among the set of characteristics for which this word 'God' is an abbreviation is the concept 'existence', or even better, 'necessary existence' - meaning the sole source of being and value. This sentence, as a potential statement, is meaningful, is capable of being stated, is capable of having a truth value at all, only if the presuppositions of the statement are fulfilled. One of these is that the sentence, when used for the purpose of making a statement, has a reference, be about something. The statement does not say it is about something. It presupposes this. If the presupposition is not met, we have no statement. This is why the existence of the reference of a statement is never a predicate in the statement, but is a presupposition of the statement. (See P.E. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory (Chaps 6 and 7) and his article "Referring"; and also Max Black's articles, "Presupposition and Implication", "Definition and Presupposition", and "Saying and Disbelieving".)

Thus the correct way to interpret # 1 above is, If 'God necessarily exists in himself' is a statement, if it has a reference, then it is about something, and it says that the reference of this statement necessarily exists in himself. 'Necessarily exists', of course, cannot say that the sentence is a statement, that it does have a reference, and nothing that this sentence implies can prove that has a reference, because sentences do not imply anything; only statements have meaning.

Aquinas puts it this way: "The above opinion (In the proposition God Exists, the predicate is either identical with the subject or at least included in the definition of the subject) arises from the custom by which from their earliest days people are brought up to hear and to call upon the name of God...As a result...it clings to (it) as something known naturally and self evidently...It does not follow immediately that, as soon as we know the meaning of the name God, the existence of God is known...No difficulty, consequently, befalls anyone who posits that God does not exist. For that something greater can be thought than anything given in reality or in the intellect is a difficulty only to him who admits that there is something than which a greater cannot be thought in reality." (Summa Contra Gentiles, Chap. 11, #1,2,3.)

Thomist

** no meaning to possibility of doing otherwise = freedom*

statement only if its presuppositions are fulfilled, i.e. if there exists a sun. Likewise, the expression "The sun is not shining now." Statements about creation are meaningful statements, for men or God, only if there be a creation. There is a necessary presupposition of all contingent statement whether one is a Thomist or not. The presuppositions of making statements, raising doubts, or asking questions is that there be things for statements, doubts, or questions to be about.

Now, what fundamental difference exists for the Thomist between saying that God creates the sun and God creates the present sunlight of the sun. All things and events are only on the presupposition that God created them. They have no being or value of their own. That God creates sunlight instead of shade today, that God creates one sun instead of none or two is a matter of God's freedom to create or not to create, to create that sort of creature instead of some other creation. Now, the eternal act of creating and the eternal act of knowing are one. Neither follows from God's essence. Only freedom does. There is no before this eternal act of creation and no after. There is no room here for any talk of contemplating alternatives before creating. God eternally, freely creates. Since there is no before or after to God's creating, there is no sense to saying that there were so and so possibilities before creating and so and so actuality after creating. All actuality, all being, all value is eternally and essentially in God. For God to freely and eternally realize his freedom to create a creation to participate in that being and value is not a passage from potency to act. "The sun is shining now" and "The sun is not shining now" are contingent possibilities relative to the rest of creation. Without creation both are senseless. Since there is no before creation there is no sense to talk of God's use of statements about creation before his eternal act of creation. Logically independent of statements about creation there are only statements about God's existence which is self evident to him and about his essence which are reminders of rules and therefore which God doesn't need to use. This is God's essential knowledge of himself.

Possibility and potentiality do not apply to the eternal absolute, to God. They apply only in the context of human concepts used within the context of creation. One can speak meaningfully of applying modalities to all references of all possible statements only if one strikes out as illegitimate all talk of eternal absolutes. As I see it this can be done (whether the absolute is Spinoza's or Aquinas' or Hegel's) only by pointing to the fact that we are here, we are not the absolute, and that a God, an absolute, would be a contradiction in terms for he would have executed meaningless effort in creating a world which can have no being or value of its own - it can be or be nothing which the absolute isn't already eternally in himself. No Good God could do such a wasted act.

Except for this last problem I see no contradiction in the Thomist's modal operators. The eternal absolute and his eternal freedom are absolutely immune from material threat in their eternal world. Contingent possibility makes sense only when used by creatures in created time. What isn't can't be known. If only God is, then there are no contingent possibilities, or impossibilities for there is no contingency. There is only God's necessary essence, his knowledge of his necessary essence, his eternal free act of not creating, his eternal act of knowing his eternal free act of not creating. There is no time passage from maybe creation and maybe not creation to not creation. There is only the one eternal act of realizing freedom in not creating. If there is God and his creation, then there is the eternal act of realizing freedom in the eternal act of creating all that is as it is and knowing it as it is. There was no previous maybe creation and maybe not

This is the point of Peter Geatch's article, "Form and Existence" Proc. of the Arist. Society, Vol. 55, 1954-55. We must see the separate meanings of 'exists' in (A) Cerberus does not exist. (B) Dragons do not exist. (C) "Simeon is not!" (Simeon does not exist.)

If a child was fearful that Cerberus would bite her, we would use (A) to tell the child that we were only pretending to refer to a dog where we were telling the Greek myth. In (B) we are saying that nothing at all is a dragon, there is nothing this predicate expression is predicable of. Explaining the meaning of a predicate expression in a sentence such as, "Dragons spit out fire.", or using the sentence in a piece of fiction, does not commit you to the acceptance of a reference for the subject of the sentence. The context can guarantee the fictional and non-referential use of the sentences. When Jacob said (C) he meant that Simeon was dead. Here 'exists' or 'is' is used as a predicate in a sentence used to make a statement about someone. It is the sense of exist that we mean when we say that an individual came to exist, still exists, no longer exists.

So with reference to the existence of God, Geatch concludes, "God is not (sense C) would have to be construed like "Joseph is not"; it would then suitably express the supposition that perhaps the world was made by an old superannuated God who has since died (a suggestion of Hume's). This is quite different from the atheist's "there is no God" (sense B). One would indeed wish to say that everlasting existence is part of the concept of a God; of Hume's senile creator one would wish to say that since he is dead now he never was God when he was alive. But saying this does not commit us to the fallacy of the Ontological Argument. It belongs to the concept of a phoenix that it should never die by accident and should want off old age with a bath of flames at regular intervals; so a dead phoenix is a contradiction in terms. But this does not mean that there must be a live phoenix. If there is a God, then he lives for ever; but we cannot determine from this whether there is a God."

This is Malcomb's point also. Only if you are satisfied with an entity that exists like $\frac{1}{2}$, zero, infinity, does in mathematics, can you prove a necessary existing being. The worshiper wants a material necessary being who exists. We don't want to know about the necessary existence of an entity that exists relative to a language game we play. We want to know about a being who exists in such a way that it is materially impossible that nothing can threaten his life. Logically necessary statements may tell us about logically existing entities but they tell us nothing about materially existing entities. This is because logically necessary statements aren't really statements but are markers reminding us of the rules of the language we are speaking. See Hlack's article "Necessary Statements and Rules".

2. Other characteristics contained in the set of characteristics for which 'God' is the abbreviation, are 'free', 'good', 'the sum total of all being and goodness', 'the passive potency', 'eternal', 'omniscient'.

3. That God is free means that it is not part of God's nature that he create or that he not create.

God's act of creation is not an act in time but an eternal act, and is not therefore a passage from potency to actuality because it is the expression of his freedom which is always actually his essence, and because what is created has no being and value of its own, but only through participation in the eternal unchanging being of God's essence.

* Save that there are some, on the other hand, levels.

creation, maybe this creation and maybe some other creation. There is only the eternal act of creating and knowing the creation.

We can say God might not have created any world; he might not have created this world. For God this knowledge is only the essential knowledge of his essential freedom and his eternal knowledge of his eternal act to create and to create this world.

Let me see if I can make this point using the language of your letter.
 P - "The sun is now shining" is contingent. It's contradictory is possible. (I am using this example rather than yours 'Elephants exist' because my example is stating something to be the case about something, whereas your example is really Geatch's B, a categorical prescription that statements about elephants can be made.) Now saying that P is contingent means that it is a statement, it is meaningful, it has a reference - the sun. Saying that its contradictory is possible is to say that it is neither a logically necessary statement nor a self contradictory statement. '-P' is possible means that it is a possible linguistic move in our language. "The sun is not shining" is stated assuming that its presuppositions are fulfilled - there is a sun of which we can at different times say it is shining and it is not shining. To say that P and -P are both possible is to say that neither is logically necessary, both are meaningful, not both are true but one is and one is not true.

'No contingent proposition can contradict any necessary proposition.' This holds of course only when talking of logically necessary propositions or statements. It also assumes that we do not merely have a claimant for status as a necessary proposition, but that this is really a necessary proposition, it is a flag for linguistic rules.

Q - "God knows that the sun is shining". Now, you say that -P contradicts Q. But this simply is not true. Q is not a logically necessary statement. It is true on conditions:

- That the statement has a reference (That there is a God who can know)
- That God has created this world for this sense of 'knows' is not God's essential knowledge of his essential nature but his eternal knowledge of his eternal act of creating and creating this world.

Therefore, the presuppositions of Q which make it meaningful, much less true or false, have among them a denial that -P is true, and with reference to the modality involved in the material necessity of God's eternal knowledge of his eternal creation, a denial that -P can possibly be true.

Also, -P does not contradict Q, because that -P is a possible linguistic move in our language game (that we can meaningfully assert at the same time P), does not contradict Q, for Q does not say that it is not a possible move in our language game to say "God does not know that the sun is now shining". What is prohibited is that we could honestly assert "God does not know that the sun is shining" for knowledge that we could not satisfy the presuppositions of this statement would prevent us from that move. If we understand what 'God' and 'know' mean here, then we will know that we can use them in assertions only by committing ourselves to defend the claim that there is a God, and there is -P to be known by God.

Father Vincent Smith is right. P and -P are both logical possibilities, we assume that the presuppositions of there being a sun are met (or if you have a more generic P, if there be a world, a creation), but this is basically a difference for men making statements in time; God with the necessity appropriate to his essence and to his eternal act of knowing being one with his eternal act

4. That God is omniscient means that God knows all that there is to be known.

If God were to make statements, then every statement made by God would be true and no statement which anyone could make and be true is a statement that God would not make. These would have to be statements made in an eternal act. God's act of knowing is not the passage from potentiality to actuality. It would be done eternally in his eternal knowledge of his eternal self.

5. If God were to make statements, these are the kinds of statements he could make: logically necessary statements; statements about himself; statements about creation.

Logically necessary statements are the limiting cases of statements in that they say nothing about anything. As tautologies they all say the same thing. Their function is to serve as flags reminding us of linguistic rules. To say "All bachelors are unmarried" is not to speak about a certain class of men, but to remind us that 'bachelor' can be substituted for 'unmarried man' in any and all expressions. A necessary statement can be used to remind us of how we can talk about a certain class of men if we assume here that there are some bachelors. God, being omniscient, would really have no need of necessary statements. They are simply aids to remind us of linguistic rules.

Some statements about God, for the Thomist, would also be necessary statement since 'God' is an abbreviation for all his characteristics, but this statement would not necessarily be only a pseudo statement, a linguistic reminder, for the Thomist might be using it together with the presupposition that the statement has a reference. The statement would then be reminding us of one of the characteristics that this reference has. If God were to use statement at all, then it would be impossible that necessary statements could be used without presupposing the reference, for the user of the statement is the reference. In this sense, then God's nature is self evident to him but not to us. By knowing the concept God knows its necessity. By knowing himself, he knows its material truth.

Statements about the created world are like this latter class of statements about God in that they presuppose a reference to be meaningfully saying something about something, but they are unlike statements about God in that the predicate is not included in the subject, they are not necessary, not flags for linguistic rules. Not all their predicates are essential attributes of the logical subject of the statement. From the human perspective in time things change their accidental properties. For God, however, these statements about created things are exactly like the statements he would make about himself, with one major difference. God's knowledge of himself is of his essence, and this knowledge is essentially himself. God's knowledge of his creation is identical with the act of creation. Both are eternal realizations of his essential freedom. Everything in creation is eternally as it is in the eternal act of creation and is known to be in an eternal act of knowing as it is eternally. Creation has no being or value save by participation in God's being and value. So by essentially knowing himself as he essentially is and by eternally knowing his eternal act of creation, his eternal act of realizing his freedom, God eternally knows all that is in creation. For God everything eternally is and is known to be, though not everything follows from his essence, creation follows from the eternal act of realizing his essential freedom.

Let's take the case, "The sun is shining now". This is not a logically necessary statement. It is not a statement about God. It is a meaningful


of creating, - both being one expression of his essential freedom, essentially known freedom, God necessarily knows his creation. God does not create by scanning logically possible worlds. Scanning is a time word and there is no processes that take time in God.

Yes, it is logically correct to say, "God might have eternally created a different world and thus eternally known in an eternal act of knowing this different eternal act of creation". But this is only to say what the Thomist is saying. God is free.

I admit that eternal acts make little sense to me, but I feel that the obvious contradiction, using the Thomist's own words, can be made with reference to the impossibility of supplying any reason why God might create a world totally empty of value and being, thus making possible the deduction of the statement that God is not Perfect for a Perfect person never performs a senseless act. It isn't just that the reason is a mystery. A mystery implies the possibility of an answer. Here no room has been left for any possible answer. I read a paper on this with Father Leo O'Donovan of Loyola of Baltimore at a seminar at a Danforth Conference 2 summers ago and he agreed with just about all that I said but then took refuge in the mystery of participation.

Let me say in closing that I have learned a great deal from you about the internal logic of the doctrine of God and am going to be using much of this in my dissertation, but I am also going to do a complete study on your use of modal notions with respect to God's existence in an attempt to show that our statements about God must be logically contingent but materially beyond possibility of alteration. I find no way to escape Malcomb's and Geatch's points. Thank you very much for your teaching.

Sincerely yours,



Henry L. Rif

UNIVERSITÉ D'OTTAWA

AVENUE LAURIER EST



UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA

LAURIER AVENUE EAST

OTTAWA, CANADA

Le 27 Mars 1953

Cher Monsieur Hartshorne,

Je remarque en effet avec plaisir que vous savez exprimer votre pensée en français avec une belle clarté. Permettez-moi de vous en féliciter très sincèrement.

Pour ce qui est du fond, je crois que nous ne progressons plus guère. Voici mes réflexions sur votre raisonnement tel qu'il figure sur votre feuille "une autre façon".

"P. Dieu sait que le monde existe." - Veuillez noter que l'objet précis de connaissance, c'est le fait de l'existence du monde.

"Q. Le monde existe." - Oui, comme fait. La logique ne demande rien de plus.

"R. Q est une proposition non-nécessaire."

Attention. "Q" pris comme exprimant un fait accompli, concret: est nécessaire.

C'est un fait indubitablement vrai que le monde existe.

Dieu le connaît comme existant. - Item pour le fait que je vois.

"Mais si vous faites signifier à "Q": le monde fait partie des êtres nécessaires par nature ou de droit, c'est-à-dire, il était inévitable que le monde fût posé dans l'existence: "je dis que cela dépasse la portée de "P", car en "P" il s'agit uniquement du "fait".

"S. Q se déduit de P." - Oui; mais, "Q" pris dans le 1^{er} sens seulement. Non dans le

"T" et "A": "Si P est nécessaire, Q l'est aussi dans le même sens" - C'est-à-dire dans le sens précis, dans la mesure exacte où "Q" se déduit de "P". Ici: comme fait.

"B. Mais selon R, Q n'est pas nécessaire.... C... Q affirme une chose contingente, qui n'existe pas nécessairement." - Veuillez remarquer comment vous glissez du 1^{er} sens de "Q" au 2^d. Il s'ensuit une équivoque, et l'illogisme.

Permettez-moi d'ajouter ceci, cher Monsieur Hartshorne.

Deux choses sont indubitablement: 1) beaucoup d'êtres sont contingents - 2) rien ne peut être contingent en Dieu. Ne rejetons ni l'une ni l'autre. Mais retenons

2 problèmes: 1) Comment Dieu connaît-il, sans contingence de sa part, les êtres contingents? - j'ai essayé de vous mettre sur la piste par mes comparaisons antérieures. (2^d faut les entendre positivement). - 2) Comment l'éternel, l'immuable peut-il, sans contingence de sa part ni temporalité, produire du temporel du changeant? - C'est qu'il est souverainement libre, ai-je dit sommairement.

Comme j'ai l'impression que vous cherchez à voir le fond des questions, je suggère de bûcher dans la I^{re} partie de la Somme théologique de S. Thomas la question 14, sur la science de Dieu, - la question 45, sur la création. - La lecture de Gilson "Le Thomisme" (5^e éd. Paris, Vrin) vous aiderait. - Et vous verriez qu'il y a là tout autre chose que des puérilités. - Sans doute remarquerez-vous que le problème philosophique de la connaissance commande tout.

Je deviens bavard, Monsieur Hartshorne. Excusez-moi. Et veuillez agréer mes respectueuses et cordiales salutations. S. M. Thomas

1224 East 57th St.
Chicago 37, Ill.
March 20, 1953

Cher Monsieur Simon,

Merci! Au moins j'apprends la Français un petit peu. Mais je ne peut pas trouvez que vous m'avez comprit. Vous ne parle pas, il me semble, de ce que j'ai dit, mais d'autres choses.

Quand une contradiction se deduit des suppositions definis, il faut abandonner au moins une de ces suppositions.

Ainsi:

1. Le monde existe non-necessairement.

(la meme) La proposition "le monde existe" est non-necessaire.

2. Tout en Dieu est absolument necessaire (Dieu n'a pas d'accidents)

3. En Dieu est la savoir que le monde existe.

4. De ~~l'etax~~ (3) se deduit ~~que~~ "le monde existe" (par ce que le savoir divine ne peut pas etre fausse).

5. Si P se deduit de Q, et Q est absolument necessaire, en ~~ban~~ P est egalement necessaire. (loi logique)

Conclusion A (selon 2) et 3): la savoir divine que le monde existe est absolument necessaire, ou (la meme chose) ~~l'etax~~ la supposition (3) est absolument necessaire.

Conclusion B (selon 4) et 5): si 3) est absolument necessaire, il faut que "le monde existe" ~~est~~ ^{soit} absolument necessaire.

Conclusion C (modus ponens): "le monde existe" est absolument necessaire

Contradiction entre C et la.

Si vous concédez les cinq suppositions, la contradiction s'ensuit. Quelle supposition voulez vous rejeter. Je veut savoir 1, ou 2, ou 3, ou 4, ou 5. Ou direz vous que Conclusion A, ou B, ou C ne se deduit pas?

Merci pour votre patience.

Je sult

Votre

Charles Hartshorne

UNIVERSITÉ D'OTTAWA

AVENUE LAURIER EST



UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA

LAURIER AVENUE EAST

OTTAWA, CANADA

Le 2 Décembre 1952

Monsieur le Professeur,

Serg. vous étions si je vous dis que j'ai lu attentivement votre article consacré à "La Philosophie de la Religion aux États-Unis", publié dans les "Études philosophiques" de janvier-juin 1952. Je me suis même dévoué à vous faire part de quelques réflexions qui me sont venues à l'esprit en méditant vos pages. Je me réfère particulièrement aux pages 53-55 de votre article.

1) Quelle "réalité" accordez-vous à l'abstrait ou "simplement réel", en tant qu'il se distingue du concret? - donc, à votre "existence", en tant que vous la distinguez de votre "actualité"? -

Comment - et ceci n'est sans doute qu'une question connexe à la précédente - comment la "nature seconde" dérive-t-elle des réalités particulières?

2) Selon vous, qu'est-ce qui fait la "richesse" de l'actualité? Serait-ce que la complexité notionnelle fait la richesse du relatif?

Ne doit-on pas soigneusement distinguer le plan notionnel et le plan des contours mêmes de l'actualité?

3) Le propos du dilemme de la page 55, ne doit-on pas dire que la condition, le conditionnement, si vous préférez, de la connaissance et de la chose connue, précisément comme présente au connaissant, est autre que le conditionnement du concret dans sa actualité? L'actualité de l'oreille qui vole au dessus de ma tête n'est pas de mêmes conditions que celles qu'il a comme présent à ma faculté. (La connaissance n'est pas fautive; parce que seule les conditions d'actualité changent, et, de plus, nous le savons fort bien.) Pourquoi, dès lors, ne pas comprendre d'après ce principe la connaissance que Dieu a du monde? Il connaît à sa manière, comme nous connaissons à notre manière; - elle varie à plus d'un titre, nous le remarquons aisément - les mêmes réalités de l'univers. Je ne vois pas que sa manière ne puisse pas être éternelle. Le Président élu connaît bien des choses qu'il, "si Dieu lui prête vie", deviendrait de l'actualité.

Le même principe permet de dire que Dieu s'intéresse à ses œuvres, en tant qu'elles sont intelligentes; à leur comportement aussi. Mais à sa façon qui est éternelle et enveloppe notre manière changeante de durer.

Monsieur le Professeur, je vous prie de ne voir dans ces lignes qu'une très réelle sympathie. Veuillez la croire bien respectueuse et bien cordiale de la part du prêtre que je suis. Sincèrement, (je suis français)

UNIVERSITÉ D'OTTAWA
AVENUE LAURIER EST



UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA
LAURIER AVENUE EAST

OTTAWA, CANADA

Le 22 Février 1953

Cher Monsieur Hartshorne,

Vous clairement le désaccord peut être prévenu dans le processus dialectique, puisqu'on sait où porter son effort.

Sans aucun doute, si Dieu sait que le monde existe, il est infailliblement vrai que le monde existe. Autrement dit, le fait que le monde existe est infaillible. — Mais remarquez : la conclusion porte uniquement sur le fait que le monde existe. La logique ne permet pas de dire comment l'existence appartient au monde : soit de manière contingente, soit de manière nécessaire et éternelle. — Dieu sait également que je vous écris ; c'est donc infailliblement un fait que je vous écris. Cependant, ce fait demeure bien un fait d'ordre contingent ; il est même très libre, comme j'en ai claire conscience.

Le qui est infailliblement vrai comme fait, peut être soit de nature contingente soit de nature nécessaire. C'est ainsi que la Connaissance divine infaillible de l'existence du monde n'empêche pas que cette existence, infaillible comme fait, appartient au monde de manière contingente. — Il faut, en effet, soigneusement distinguer le fait d'une chose et sa nature ou qualité. Un exemple du Président Eisenhower visait à illustrer cette vérité... sans confondre l'infaillibilité divine et la simple fermeté d'un plan humain arrêté.

Allons plus loin maintenant. Dieu peut concevoir et vouloir infiniment et immuablement, non seulement des choses éternelles, mais des choses temporelles et contingentes. — Il faut que chez Lui tout soit infaillible et immuable : autrement Il ne serait pas parfait, comme le pense à peu près toute l'humanité, y compris les philosophes. Mais comme vous-même actuellement, d'un seul regard de l'intelligence et d'un seul acte de volonté, pouvez voir et vouloir un plan couvrant de nombreuses années et comportant des éléments nécessaires et d'autres facultatifs ; ainsi Dieu, toutes proportions gardées, agit-il vis-à-vis de l'univers. — Peut-être voyez-vous maintenant pourquoi ma première lettre disait que les choses sont, chez Dieu, conçues et voulues par Lui, à la manière de Dieu, et réalisées selon leurs natures particulières... Un peu comme pour nos propres productions, *positis ponderis*.

Je vous prie d'agréer, cher Monsieur Hartshorne, mes respectueuses salutations.

Ym. Timony

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO 37 • ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
1010 EAST 59TH STREET

August 17, 1959

Professor Charles Hartshorne
1695 Ridgewood Drive, N. E.
Atlanta 7, Georgia

Dear Charles:

I was delighted to learn that your plans to go to Buenos Aires are going through and that you will be able to represent the Metaphysical Society. I have never been to Buenos Aires, but I have attended inter-American philosophical congresses and I have always found them interesting and stimulating. I am sure that you will find a great deal to interest you on the trip, and I shall look forward to hearing your report of your activities.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Dick

Richard P. McKeon

RPMcK:jea

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

DATE February 19, 1944

TO Mr. Charles Hartshorne

DEPARTMENT Philosophy

FROM Richard P. McKeon

DEPARTMENT Division of the Humanities

IN RE:

I read over the enclosed manuscript material which you gave me some time ago, and I was very much interested in the views in your disposition of the Thomists. I find, however, that I don't know enough about the problems you discussed to be able to tell whether you are right or wrong--maybe I'm not a theologian. Thanks for letting me see the material.

Duck

Dear Kim,

I've just noticed that my use of "matrix" might possibly have been picked up from McK. Only my purpose seems to have been quite different. The $4 \times 4 = 16$ items ^(p. 55-57) were not elements in a theory; each of the 16 stood for a single doctrine about just two subject-matters, God and what is not God, namely World, in a broad sense. Moreover the 16 doctrines are ^{or incomp/ible} all applications of one, or other, or both of ^{Just} two contrary ideas: necessary-contingent { or infinite-finite, simple-complex, independent-dependent, absolute-relative }.

No two of the 16 combinations are mutually compatible, and some one of them must be true, for some of the 16 cases are inapplications, including the 00.00 case in which neither God nor World has any modal status (if the contrast is necessary-contingent). I get the impression that McK. had nothing like this in mind. My own view about the modal contraries and God-World, is that the one true doctrine is NC.nc interpreted as God necessarily exists ^{and} also necessarily ^{but} has some world or other; God as well as World, has contingent aspects. The unity of the two modalities is called "actuality," not just existence, and essence-existence-actuality (the triad) is not reducible to essence-existence. All discussion of the ontological argument that does not think triadically (here I am a Peircean) is hopelessly crude, using an ax/for ^e ^{sc} dissection instead of a scalpel."

Is there anything like this in McK.?? I do make use of diagonals. The 4 by 4 square scheme I owe to a theologian at Colorado College, Joseph Pickle, ^{not to McK.} NC.nc is ^{logically} on a row, a ^{column} and a diagonal, each one of which has its logical advantages, hence there is a logical argument of some force for its unique truth. Not that mere logic settles the matter, for the single or double zero cases are excluded

CORRESPONDANCES ENTRE KARL POPPER ET CHARLES HARTHORNE

Cette rubrique des documents annexes contient des documents d'échanges épistolaires entre Karl Popper et Hartshorne. Par rapport à notre thèse ces documents fournissent des preuves historiques de la collaboration entre les deux penseurs et mettent au clair le contexte du recours hartshornien (bien que partiel) aux théories poppériennes de la falsifiabilité en rapport à la vérifiabilité. L'on comprend alors que la philosophie/théologie des propositions métaphysiques a priori et de la créativité chez Hartshorne faisait écho aux questions posées par Karl Popper en miroir avec la pensée de Carnap. Certaines données du chapitre sur la nature abstraite de Dieu, trouvent ici un des points de référence.

As from: Fallowfield, Manor Road,
PENNY, Buckinghamshire
(where I saw you last)

R.
Pope

until May 1st: 761 Houston Mill Road, N.E., Apt
Atlanta, Georgia 30329
(Phone: (404) 636-6582)

April 18th 1969

Dear Professor Heatsorne,

I am in Europe for a stay of six weeks, and of course I have been much of the time thinking about you and talking about you: it was here that I saw you frequently when I gave a course in 1956.

I am now writing to ask your help: a former student of mine, Nabil Shihaby (Ph.D. London), an Arab refugee from Palestine and an excellent Arab scholar, needs a teaching or research position in Arab philosophy, and I gather that

June 26th, 1959

Dear Professor Hartshorne,

I wish to thank you for your very kind letter of June 20th. It is a great pleasure to be so generously appreciated, but I always found you one of the most appreciative philosophers in the world!

I wished I would get more letters like this.

I agree with what you say about existential statements having no 'negative model', and that this is connected with Anselm.

May I ask you for something. There is a very good philosopher of science, and a really nice person, a Dr. Walter Yourgrau, looking for a job. He has a job for next year but nothing afterwards. He is a German refugee from Berlin, but

there is a department in your university which is devoted to Oriental Studies.

Shelaby was educated in the University of Alexandria, and worked there with Professor Affifi, a great scholar, and Dr Sabra, a former student of mine and now an outstanding historian of science, especially Arab science. ^{Shelaby} He came later to London (largely on my initiative - I had met him in Cairo) and got there a fellowship in the Warburg Institute, and his Ph.D.

For a year Shelaby has been working with me as my

Research Assistant (after being my student for about three years). He has done a considerable amount of travelling in the Warburg Institute. His English is perfect.

I am most anxious to help him getting a teaching post or a research fellowship in the U.S. There are no chances in England for him. If you could help by drawing the attention of your colleagues to him, I should be most grateful.



Shelaby's address is:
c/- The Warburg Institute,
Woburn Place,
London W.C.1.

Yours sincerely
K. R. Popper
(KARL R Popper)

a really good soul. If you hear of a possibility, please do remember him. He is 51, married, with three children. He has written a very good book on mathematical physics, and knows more about these things than most philosophers.

I hope you will take this as it is meant.

Yours ever,
Karl R. Popper



Professor Charles Hartshorne
1695, Ridgewood Drive N.E.

Atlanta, Georgia,
U.S.A.

Sender's name and address: K.R. Popper, Tollerfield
Warner Rd., PENN, Buckinghamshire
U.S.A.

AN AIR LETTER SHOULD NOT CONTAIN ANY
ENCLOSURE; IF IT DOES IT WILL BE SURCHARGED
OR SENT BY ORDINARY MAIL.

→ not to be cut

Chicago (where we are for a short st.
March 22nd 1963

Dear Professor Heartshorne,

Your letter reached us here this morning and I hasten to reply that, much as I should like to go to Texas next year, it will not be possible: I have been away too long this year, ask for another leave of absence so soon. But this is my only reason, and if opportunity offers I should like to come another time.

I felt 'immensely' cheered up by your finding my book 'immense'! Even though I do not write for applause, a little praise from the right quarters adds very greatly to the joy of living - especially when one has tried hard, and worked hard, to make everything as clear and lucid as possible. I am both pleased and proud about your praise, and if you find time, please write a few words like this to the ^{U.S.} publisher who, owing to the New York printers' strike is sadly lacking reviews. There are some English reviews, but they are very rare.

About Whitehead: of course you knew him personally, which makes a big difference. I only saw Mrs Whitehead once, and was charmed by her.

I was no doubt unfortunate in the way I made the acquaintance of his books. The first was the Home University Library Introduction to Mathematics (or a very similar title) which I found very disappointing after Principia Mathematica. The second was his Treatise of Universal Algebra which I read when doing my self technical work of somewhat similar nature; I knew of course that this book was superseded, but still, I was unimpressed even taking ^{its} date into account. The next was Process and Reality; and this was too much: ^{it made me} I can only remember Kant's anti-metaphysical outburst: how could a man claim all this wisdom?? And without bothering to argue? I am very ready to admit that Adventures of Ideas is a great book, and that Science the Modern World, though not great, is a good book. But could not read these without having phrases from Process and Reality ringing in my ear; and ^{made me a very badly vessel to receive Whitehead} this ~~spoiled~~ me, I at any rate it spoiled these books for me. Incidentally, in meeting Mrs Whitehead, I said that I had misgivings and she said at once: "I suppose it is that Process and Reality!" and went on to make herself strong reservations about this book which she said she could not really defend, explaining it by its history (which I forgot).

I wished I could start with Whitehead again, forget all about PaR! Many thanks again, and kindest regards

Yours sincerely, K. D. Brown

Apr. 1, 1963

Dear Professor Popper,

I have failed to find out the American publisher. Can you not send them this encomium? I am sure they will be glad to get it.

Obviously I am looking at the best aspects of your work in this. But one gets tired of always balancing good and bad. Also I think any faults in your work are less likely to be overlooked than in that of a lot of other people I can think of. You do not hide behind subtleties as some do, and also you are not as much in the fashion as some, with a crowd of others thinking almost exactly like you.

Your remarks about Whitehead were interesting. I agree exactly that Science is only a good, not a great book, and that Adventures is great. Introd. to Math. was meant as popular, anyhow I could not judge about that of Univ. algebra. So our difference comes down to Process. I partly see what your difficulties were. W. once laughed at himself for having thought ("only a mathematician would have thought") that he could state all his postulates at the outset (in Chapter II). He did not argue in that chapter. But arguments are scattered through the book on a number of points. Also the book is long and argument would have made it longer, granted that the whole set of ideas was to be set forth. I think he might well have said how he dealt with Kant's antinomies argument. Kant's criticisms of the theistic proofs are not too relevant, since those criticisms presuppose a kind of theism Whitehead has no wish to defend (and thinks absurd, not just unproven) as well as a number of assumptions about experience, science, and reality which from a Whiteheadian point of view beg all the questions right from the outset. It would have been nice if W. had explained this. But it can be explained, and his judgment was not so wrong that he could leave this to others.

I really believe that the theory of actual entities, creativity, and the primordial and consequent natures of God, will take centuries to evaluate adequately, at least as long as to evaluate Kant. It is really a much more nearly fresh start at metaphysics. Kant keeps all the categories, including the worst ones, only rejecting their claim to give noumenal knowledge. Whitehead rejects them all (substance, classical causality, God (in the Greek or neoplatonic sense found still in Kant), and ~~and~~ derives all his categories (except eternal objects I suspect) from experience and free examination of possibilities. Nothing is just taken over from tradition. Yet he knows pretty well what the traditions are. I know a lot better than he did as to both the traditions he rejects and those he follows, unknowingly for the most part in the latter case. And I can argue no end for most of his

decisions, many of which I came to previously and ~~firmly~~ by other paths. But I might never have come to the quantum notion of becoming — the notion of unit events rather than of a continuity of becoming — without Whitehead. Buddhists had it for centuries, but without the sort of clarity we in the West feel the need of. And they were too vague about the relations of events, they had nothing like Whitehead's marvellous theory of prehensions as binding all events to their predecessors and constituting the structure of the world in space-time.

(disapprovingly) from Process

You once/quoted/a passage about God in which it is said, somewhat too rethorically for my taste, that God is both creator and created, both transcendent and transcended, both simple and complex, both eternal and temporal, and so with the world. Now this sounds paradoxical, but it is quite possible to state it without contradiction by following out the "distinctions" of aspects to which the passage refers, without specifying what the distinctions are. Really it is the contrary view which is genuinely paradoxical, familiar though it is. To know something is to be effected by it, inability to be in part created by others is inability to know them (at least as free beings); and anything which was merely immutable or simple could only be utterly abstract and one-sided. W. is in the tradition, which he may scarcely have known as such, of the "dipolar" view of deity, in my opinion the only view that could possibly be right. The Greek admiration for the abstract and eternal misled the Church Fathers.

Anyhow, if the enclosed remarks about your work do any good I shall be glad.

But when do we see Postscript?

Sincerely

Mar. 15, 1973

Dear Sir Karl,

Your Objective Knowledge, like all your works from Die Logik der Forschung down, is very satisfying to me so far as I am equipped (not all the way) to follow your thought. You say so many right things so well.

Perhaps it would amuse you if I were to compare the four living or recent philosophers who mean the most to me with respect to their ideas.

P for Peirce K for Sir Karl W for Whitehead H for Hartshorne

- 1) Fallibilism -- all 4
- 2) Realism (in K's sense) -- all 4 (K and H the most free from apparent wavering)
- 3) Non-inductivism -- all 4, but K the most decisive, except that W and H claim reason for affirming, not only that no empirical generalization can be known to be true as it stands, but that none can be true over infinite time (in all "cosmic epochs")
- 4) Indeterminism in a strong sense -- all 4
- 5) Non-materialism, especially P, W, and H who assert a realistic idealism at most barely hinted at by K
- 6) Basic observation statements in science -- no definite disagreement but K the clearest, H accepts his account
- 7) Structure of subjective knowledge -- no definite disagreement, but W by far the most explicit as to aspects of bodily process, intuition or givenness (prehension) as the common element of memory and perception, abstracting from all interpretation or "symbolic reference", causal efficacy, feeling, etc.

K's denial of immediate knowledge is not in real conflict with W's prehension as immediate givenness because prehension as such is inarticulate, and is feeling rather than thought, hence not knowledge. If prehension could know itself it would be infallible knowledge of its data, but this is impossible. And while we prehension prehension this too is not knowledge. Moreover the direct data of prehension are not extra-bodily objects but the end result of the "signals" of course our you speak of in the sense organs or nervous system. Use of physiological data in perception is conditioned by evolution and memory, and the sensory process itself is adaptive.

Concerning W.H.Davis's Peirce's Epistemology

This work stresses aspects of Peirce to which justice has not hitherto been done. They are important aspects. The ms. is readable, and rather persuasive in its reasoning. I think it should be published, though perhaps not quite as it now stands.

My misgivings about the present form of the work are as follows

1) By collapsing induction into abduction the author seems to wreck the triadic structure which surely -- and I believe rightly -- meant a good deal to Peirce. Now I think that this loss of triadity is not necessary to the author's main thesis. For even on his account there is a third aspect of reasoning. Forming hypotheses, deducing consequences, and judging or testing hypotheses, deciding how seriously to take them and whether or not we need to find a better one, these seem to be three functions, not two. I incline to agree that induction is not the best name for the third.

2) I think the author is uncritical in accepting Peirce's enthusiasm for Synechism. For as Peirce presents this it is seriously ambiguous, and I hold partly quite wrong. Continuity has a number of meanings, and Peirce of all people should not have confused these, but in fact he did confuse them.

a) In the mathematical sense continuity implies an infinity of intermediaries between any two points or terms. But mathematics does not require that these be actual intermediaries, they can be ideal or mere possibilities. But Peirce holds that actual becoming is continuous, so that in a finite time we experience a literal infinity of feelings ^{in succession} and make an infinite number of inferences, though obviously not consciously. Yet on the other hand Peirce brilliantly treats possibilities as continuous and universals as continua of possibilities. It does not follow that actual becoming realizes an infinite number of possibilities in a finite stretch of space or time. And I defy anyone to find a valid argument in Peirce for this assertion. If continuity is the form of possibility the form of actuality should be different, and Peirce knows and we all know how discontinuous actuality is in many respects.

b) Continuity may mean internal relatedness, so that for instance

But there has to be a direct relation between experience and physiological conditions somewhere. For W, datum and direct condition of experience are two ways of saying the same thing, since for him it is prehension that explains causality as the necessity of the antecedent events for the succeeding events. This is not Hume's problem of causality, still less directly the problem of induction, for it gives no necessity for the future but only for the past. I have shown, I think, that this yields a qualified necessity for ^(some aspects of) the future, but this scarcely qualifies (3), and certainly not (1).

(3) ~~Empirical observation statements are exclusive, no definite disagreement, but not their least. H suggests, accounts and much more~~ explicit (for better or worse).

10) Natural and humanistic knowledge basically akin -- no definite disagreement, W and H the most explicit. (Heurath took this position

11) Demarcation -- broad agreement, H follows K as the most explicit but distinguishes two levels of metaphysical: (a) statements not humanly falsifiable (e.g. somewhere, sometime, such and such have existed) and (b) statements not falsifiable by any experience, human or non-human (e.g.) there are no experiences, or, God (if coherently definable) exists. As to (a), perhaps God could falsify them, but he could not falsify "God exists", or experience exist, nor even, I think, non-divine experiences exist. (a) might be called anthropomorphically unfalsifiable, (b) absolutely unfalsifiable.

12) Systematic consideration of categorial contrasts (nec.-contingent, unconditioned-conditioned, object-subject or experienced-experiencing, abstract-concrete, universal-particular or predicate-instance, earlier-later, etc.) Peirce's Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness and Whitehead's categories roughly agree with H's view here, but some ambiguities or vaguenesses are overcome. H holds that the key to (9) is here. He finds that the relations between the first and second terms in the pairs, if properly ordered, follow common principles through a long list of contraries, and that traditional metaphysics and theologies have been unclear or just wrong about these relations. Thus e.g., the absolute or independent cannot be more than an abstract aspect of the relative, or the necessary more than an abstract aspect of the contingent. (Explicated only in my Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method -- SCM, 1970) Nothing in all this definitely conflicts with anything K writes.

past experience is somehow immanent in present experience, an instance of "Secondness". This does not logically entail an infinity of actual intermediaries, but at most an ~~fix~~ infinity of possible, conceivable intermediaries. Whitehead asserts the immanence but sharply denies the actual infinity. And the author is very misleading in quoting Whitehead as seeming to agree with Peirce at this point. Both agree that there are real internal relations, and Peirce could have accepted Whitehead's denial of "simple location" (in clear implication he did accept it). But Whitehead is a thorough quantum man, holding out for the discontinuity or quantum character of all actual becoming ("epochal theory of time"). I think that the author must either not refer to Whitehead at all on this issue or state the comparison correctly. Nothing is more important for a Whiteheadian than the assertion of real jumps in becoming. Only a finite number of "actual entities" can occur in a finite space-time.

c) The denial of definite intuitions, definitely intuited as such, does not require the actual infinity of intermediaries. Infinite or finite, the point is they are not distinctly conscious. It is one thing to intuit or feel something and another to know the truth of a verbalized or otherwise symbolized judgment as to what is felt or intuited. Symbolization, conscious thought is a fallible process, and the two men agree rather well ~~that~~ on this. The alleged actual infinity is irrelevant, since the lack of consciousness suffices. Finite or infinite, we have no wholly distinct consciousness of a succession of experiences. This is the common element of the two theories and it is arguable that the infinity is of no real help and involves needless paradoxes. The very fact that the finitude or infinity is debatable shows the lack of distinct consciousness. What more is needed for epistemology?

d) That Peirce overrated his Synechism follows also from the ~~xxx~~ fact~~s~~ that he had the clear ambition to guide physics, microphysics especially, in its ab~~x~~ductions. But if he had succeeded quantum mechanics would still not have been discovered. It is just what he did not anticipate, even in vaguest principle. Yet if he had kept in mind the distinction between ideal and actual he should have anticipate it.

and I see no reason to doubt that I know both what they refer to as well as, thanks to science, a good deal about what it consists of. Above all, by ^{memory,} especially short-range, ~~so-called introspection,~~ ^{I know a variety of memory, sometimes} physical pleasures and pains, emotions of hope, fear, love, recollections and expectations -- in short, forms of mind in the broad sense. I have excellent reasons to attribute more or less different forms of mind to other people, and at least all the higher animals. None of these realities is merely a piece of language.

If mind requires language then babies have none of it. Who can believe that? They lack the rationality which language makes possible, but surely they suffer and have simple forms of memory, hope, and fear.

So far we have animal bodies which are besouled or minded. What then are these bodies besides forms of mind? Here we face two options seldom clearly recognized as such. Either bodies consist of parts wholly mindless, apart from the feelings and thinkings of an animal as a whole already referred to, ^{invisibly} or their minute constituents, say cells, which are highly organized self-active agents of change, have each their own more primitive kinds of mentality, so that the mind-body relations are mind-mind relations. It is hard to believe how few philosophers have faced this dilemma definitely and thoughtfully. Leibniz did, but in the Newtonian classical science of that time, when atoms were hard lumps and causal determinism was

unqualified, there was little chance he could give a plausible account of the sub-human, cellular, or still lower levels of mentality. In our time intellectual doors are opening through which we can enter a new era of metaphysics unfettered by determinism, a hard dualism of mind and mindless matter, or an absurdly reductive materialism. As the phenomena of heat are explained without phlogiston, so we can explain all the physical (spatio-temporal) phenomena without what, for ages, was called matter. Mind, fully generalized to cover a vast variety of kinds and levels, can do it all.

This view is no eccentricity of mine. An elite minority of physicists, biologists, psychologists, philosophers, theologians have for more than a century now inclined to versions of it. Even Sir Karl Popper has admitted he is not sure it can be refuted. The superb biologist Sewall Wright proclaimed it. We were close friends, but neither of us got the idea from the other.

Panpsychism is a misleading term for the doctrine, since it tends to be taken to mean that all things, for instance rocks or trees, at least feel. We psychicalists (my term) say ^{that} only active singulars, those which (as Plato put it) have self-motion, feel or think, but rocks and trees are minded or self-moved only in their constituents. The growing of trees is their cells' self-multiplication.

Buddhists are psychicalists in their slogan ^{"Mind Only."} The brevity shows what Whitehead called "the simplicity of genius." Sentient dynamic singulars, and their groupings, are all there are of concrete realities.

If mind only is correct, then deity also, if conceivable at all, must be the all-surpassing kind of self-activity or mentality. This does not, however, support classical theism, positing a bodyless, immutable, wholly independent or absolute actuality, and the rest of those allegedly sacred negations. On the contrary, we must return to Plato's cosmic Psyche of which all else that is concrete is the body. We can also appeal to Merleau-Ponty's doctrine that minds must be embodied. Not only does it not follow that these bodies must be made of some wholly mindless constituents but the whole scheme works far better if the constituents are also minded (so far as self-active) all the way down. Take my thumb, suppose it has a wound giving me pain. As few if any historians have told us (but Richard Zaner has shown it happened), Descartes eventually gave up his famous dualism by observing pain and noting that it was extended, hence by his criterion material, yet it was also mental. His entire scheme forthwith, in his judgement and ^{and surely Zaner's} mine, collapses. Peirce, James, Bergson, many others, would agree with this. Of course mind, experience, has spatiotemporal relations. Indeed Whitehead shows that his prehension concept is the key to causal relations by which the real "answer to Hume," on necessary causal connections can be given.

Descartes, like many others, missed something else about physical or bodily pain, its social structure. Is my pain only mine? It certainly is mine, but only as my body

is mine. And how is that? Here as so often there are more than two options. My body is a machine, it is a society of cells, it is both -- or rather, a society which does some of the work of a machine, as the heart is a pump and the brain (among more important things) a computer. Essentially it is a group of cells so organized (the central nervous system) that it has as a whole a mind of its own. A tree is also an organized society, but, lacking brain and nervous system, it has mind only in its living cells, which are its dynamic singulars or agents of change.

What occurs in the cells most directly involved in physical pains? Such pains are felt only, (and this doctors well know) when there is some damage to the cells in question. In shaving this is particularly evident. If cells feel, why should they enjoy being injured? What is my pain then if not my feeling of the suffering^s of some of my cells?

As if by magic people have managed to miss the significance of the cellular construction of the body. Visible organisms consist of invisible ones, if the former are minded why not the latter? But then the mind-body relation is ~~not~~ a mind-mind relation on two levels, and insofar social. Moreover, as Whitehead remarks, the relation is sympathetic. We feel our suffering cells, and thus their suffering becomes also ours. Innately we love them as integral to ourselves. If this is not a great ^{intellectual} discovery, what ^{is}? Anticipations of it are found in

Plato, Leibniz, Bergson, Peirce, and some little known lesser writers whose names I forget. Chiefly Whitehead is the discoverer. I had a social view of reality but had not, so far as I now know, applied it to the mind-body relation. I did emphasize sympathy and thought love the greatest single key to life, with the text, deus est caritas, the summary statement.

If anyone wants to deconstruct classical theism I have no objection, except to say the job has already been rather well done by many sceptics, and also by some neoclassical theists, beginning with the Socinians and including the present writer. Materialism and Cartesian dualism have also been deconstructed by many, including Sewall Wright and many others. Perhaps I am misusing "deconstruct," but it seems a slippery term at best. If it means we are often snarled up in a ^{verbal} web ~~which~~ which fails effectively to refer beyond itself, I agree. Plato knew that a long time ago. But if it means we cannot refer by language to the extra-linguistic then I see this as one more of the absurd exaggerations by which we philosophers often tease, play intellectual games with, and stimulate one another.

If the point is that all language is more or less abstract and cannot do full justice to concrete actuality, I fully concur. It is God who can know the concrete in its fullness; to do that is to be God. If the point ^{is} that human languages are hopelessly anthropomorphic, then the scope of, and criteria for, the adverb and ~~adjective~~ adjective in this pair

of words becomes the problem. I systematically avoid extremes. There is no good reason to suppose our comprehension limited entirely to our own species, even though we of course will never know ^{distinctly} the concrete qualities of canine, feline, avian modes of experiencing. Our grasp of the behavior and psychology of singing birds, to take an example in which I have some expertise, is not reasonably rated as zero, or as little better than it was early in this century. In fact it is far better. Bird song, whale song, gibbon ape and howling monkey song, ^{also insect and amphibian songs,} enable us to compare our musical behavior and experience to that of animals widely different from ourselves. My contention that these comparisons make sense and are ^{contributions} to comparative ethology and psychology has not been refuted; it has been accepted by some experts, ^{and ignored by the rest.} Music, it turns out, is not only much more univesally communicative as a language (in a broad sense of the term) than any language in the narrow sense, it is also much more universally found among animals as far down as amphibians and insects. Birds can pick up tunes from us, and we can feel aesthetic values, mostly very simple, primitive, all the way down. If there are experts on this point I am among them. Szöke, a trained Hungarian musician ^{and ornithologist} also Dvorsák, ^{the composer,} are two others, so far as birds are in question.

As for theism, I have given a rigorous proof of the proposition that classical theism, as postulated by Aquinas and many others, is one of a set of six, some would say

nine, doctrines, each definitely incompatible with the others, but logically so related that the falsity of one leaves the truth of the others an open question. The six (or nine) theisms belong to sixteen combinations of pairs of polar concepts of great generality, including necessary-contingent, absolute-relative, independent-dependent, as applied positively or negatively to two subject matters, God and everything else, say World. By combinatorial mathematics some one of the sixteen combinations must be true and the other fifteen must be false. Nontheistic views are included and are four of the sixteen. Four may be called acosmic--no nondivine realities, negating World.

So far, rigorous logic can take us. It cannot select the one true combination, thereby demonstrating fifteen falsities, but it can help us to make a reasonable decision. At least it defines the question exactly, and does this for the first time in the twenty-five centuries of sophisticated theological discussion in societies having science and philosophy. Plato began it and went much more deeply into it than most of his successors realized until rather recent times. The Book of Job shows what could be done without much science or philosophy in the modern sense, and its writer too was not deeply understood, unless by Jewish scholars, until quite recent times.

Based on the table, three arguments can be given supporting what I call neoclassical theism. They have

recognizable resemblance to some traditional theistic arguments but also significant differences from these, since they do, and the traditions did not, take into account the fifteen other ways the polar concepts can be asserted or denied of God and World. These new arguments support the theism I largely share with Whitehead, Berdiaev, and a good many others.

The results just outlined are highly abstract. Deity as concrete remains a mystery. We can only abstractly imagine what it would be like to love as God loves, while being both absolute in some respects and relative in others. That love in its highest form is not attributable to God I find incredible. "To sing the praises of love is to set a candle in the sun." The idea that relativity, or intrinsic relatedness to others is a weakness or deficiency is for me as false as an idea can be. Lack of such relatedness would *indeed* be a deficiency. Not only love entails relatedness, knowledge does also. Knowing X, whatever X may be, requires X, and Aristotle was entirely right when he said that knowledge involves dependence on the known. With admirable consistency he therefore denied that his unmoved mover knows any contingent things. The prejudice against dependence or relativity, from which Plato was partly free, overcame Aristotle in his philosophy of religion and ruined that subject tragically, almost ludicrously, as many I could name join me in holding.

Divine dependence is, of course, not dependence for

existence. Even we have qualities and relationships we could have ^{been} without and still ^{have} been ourselves. Leibniz, in denying this, only showed the extremism of his "rationalism," his supposed truism of sufficient reason, which contradicts freedom, negates contingency and thereby violates the Principle of Contrast (that contraries as universal as necessary and contingent belong together). It thus also deprives necessary of any meaning. The principle of contrast is not my invention.

In all of the above I ^{have been} doing little more than combining the insights of many others. The whole was new, the parts or elements were not. Have the deconstructionists any notion of these principles and this whole. If not they are in no position to judge its truth. I am not a believer in ^{what I call} refutation by convenient ignorance.

Especially important in judging the status of metaphysics is Popper's uniquely sharp definition of that study: the search for statements that no conceivable observation or experience could falsify. Such statements, if we can discover them, are either lacking in coherent meaning or they are necessarily true, could not be or have been false. Their coherence and meaningfulness are what logical analysis and consultation of

experience (phenomenology) may seek to determine, but granted the coherent ^{meaning,} their truth requires only their passing of Popper's criterion. If they meet ^{both} requirements they are necessary truths. It may well be that

deconstruction has important roles in these procedures.
Experience gives meanings, but the most abstract truths,
including metaphysical ones, are given only by thought.

Thomas Aquinas Selected Writings

Cette rubrique regroupe des photocopies des pages du livre de C. Hartshorne, *Thomas Aquinas Selected Writings*, London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., New York, E. P. Dutton and co. inc., edited by the Rev. Father M.C. D'Arcy. Unique texte de Thomas encore conservé dans les archives de Hartshorne au Center For Process Studies à la Claremont School of Theology (Claremont CA., USA), sine die, sine loco.

Cet ouvrage a été évoqué dans le tome III de la thèse, au titre :
B. L'interconnexion des catégories en théologie et philosophie thomasiennes

THOMAS AQUINAS



SELECTED WRITINGS

THOMAS AQUINAS, born 1225 of noble parents at Roccasecca near Naples. Joined the Dominican Order and became university lecturer at Naples and Cologne. Repeatedly refused high ecclesiastical honours. Died in 1274.

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THOMAS AQUINAS
SELECTED WRITINGS EDITED BY
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found again in respect of being. For in some composed of matter and form, the form fills the entire potentiality of matter; so that the matter retains no potentiality to another form, and consequently neither is there in any other matter a potentiality to this same form. Such are the heavenly bodies, which consist of their entire matter. In others the form does not fill the whole potentiality of matter; so that the matter retains a potentiality to another form; and in another part of matter there remains potentiality to this form; for instance in the elements and their compounds. Since, then, privation is the absence in substance of what can be in substance, it is clear that together with this form which does not fill the whole potentiality of matter, there is associated the privation of a form, which privation cannot be associated with a substance whose form fills the whole potentiality of matter, nor with that which is a form essentially, and much less with that one whose essence is its very being. And seeing that it is clear that there can be no movement where there is no potentiality to something else, for movement is *the act of that which is in potentiality*; and since evil is the privation of good; it is clear that in this last order of substances, good is changeable, and has an admixture of the opposite evil; which cannot occur in the higher orders of substances. Therefore the substance answering to this last description stands lowest both in being and in goodness.

We find degrees of goodness also among the parts of this substance composed of matter and form. For since matter considered in itself is being in potentiality, and since form is its act; and again since a composite sub-

¹ 3 *Phys.* i.

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stance derives actual existence from its form: it follows that the form is, in itself, good; the composite substance is good as having its form actually; and the matter is good, as being in potentiality to the form. And although a thing is good in so far as it is a being, it does not follow that matter, which is only being potentially, is only a potential good. For being is predicated absolutely, while good is founded on order, for a thing is said to be good, not merely because it is an end, or possesses the end; but even though it has not attained the end, so long as it is directed to the end, for this very reason it is said to be good. Accordingly matter cannot be called a being absolutely, because it is a potential being, whereby it is shown to have an order towards being; and yet this suffices for it to be called a good absolutely, on account of this very order. This shows that the good, in a sense, extends further than being; for which reason Dionysius says that *the good includes both existing and non-existing things*.¹ For even non-existent things, namely matter considered as subject to privation, seek a good, namely to exist. Hence it follows that matter also is good; for nothing but the good seeks the good.

In yet another way the creature's goodness falls short from God's. For as we have stated, God, in His very being, has supreme perfection of goodness. Whereas the creature has its perfection, not in one thing but in many: because what is united in the highest is manifold in the lowest. Wherefore, in respect of one and the same thing, virtue, wisdom, and operation are predicated of God; but of creatures, in respect of different things: and the further a creature is from the sovereign goodness,

¹ *De Div. Nom.* iv.

but also in respect of such things as are accidental thereto and belong to its perfection, as well as in respect of their proper operation, which also belongs to a thing's perfection.¹

13

THAT THINGS HAVE A NATURAL TENDENCY TO BE LIKE GOD FORASMUCH AS HE IS A CAUSE

It is clear from the foregoing that things have a tendency to be like God also in the point of their being causes of others.

For the creature tends to be like God by its operation. Now, by its operation, one thing is the cause of another. Therefore things tend to a divine similitude in this also, that they are causes of other things.

Again, Things tend to be like God, forasmuch as He is good as stated above.² Now it is out of His goodness that God bestows being on others; for all things act forasmuch as they are actually perfect. Therefore all things seek to be like God, by being causes of others.

Moreover, Order towards good, is itself a good, as we have shown above.³ Now everything forasmuch as it is the cause of another, is directed to a good: for good alone is caused *per se*, and evil is caused only by accident, as we have proved.⁴ Therefore it is a good to be a cause of others. Now in respect of any good to which a thing tends, that thing's tendency is to a divine similitude; since every created good is by reason of a share in the divine goodness. Therefore things tend to a divine likeness by being causes of other things.

¹ Cf. xxvii, ² xx, ³ lxxxiii, ⁴ x.

the more does the perfection of its goodness require to be manifold. And if it be unable to attain to perfect goodness, it will reach to imperfect goodness in a few respects. Hence it is that although the first and sovereign good is utterly simple, and the substances nearest to it in goodness, approach likewise thereto in simplicity; yet the lowest substances are found to be more simple than some that are higher; elements, for instance, than animals and men, because they are unable to reach the perfection of knowledge and understanding to which animals and men attain.

From what has been said, it is evident that, although God possesses His perfect and entire goodness in respect of His simple being, creatures nevertheless do not attain to the perfection of their goodness through their being alone, but through many things. Wherefore, although each one is good inasmuch as it exists, it cannot be called good absolutely if it lack other things that are required for its goodness: thus a man who being despoiled of virtue is addicted to vice, is said indeed to be good in a restricted sense, namely as a being, and as a man; but not absolutely; in fact rather should he be called evil. Accordingly it is not the same in every creature, to be and to be good: although each one is good, inasmuch as it exists; whereas in God to be and to be good are simply one and the same.

If, then, each thing tends to a likeness to God's goodness as its end; and a thing is like God's goodness in respect of whatever belongs to its goodness; and the goodness of a thing consists not merely in its being, but in whatever is required for its perfection, as we have proved: it is clear that things are directed to God as their end, not only in respect of their substantial being,

since it acts by participation of something and not by its essence. Therefore the first agent, which is God, has no admixture of potentiality, but is pure act.

Moreover, just as it is natural that a thing should act in so far as it is actual, so is it natural for it to be passive in so far as it is in potentiality, for *movement is the act of that which is in potentiality*.¹ Now God is altogether impassible and immovable, as stated above.² Therefore in Him there is no potentiality, namely that which is passive.

Further, we notice in the world something that passes from potentiality to actuality. Now it does not reduce itself from potentiality to actuality, because that which is potential is not yet, wherefore neither can it act. Therefore it must be preceded by something else whereby it can be brought from potentiality to actuality. And if this again passes from potentiality to actuality, it must be preceded by something else, whereby it can be brought from potentiality to actuality. But we cannot go on thus to infinity. Therefore we must come to something that is wholly actual and nowise potential. And this we call God.

THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO MATTER

From this it follows that God is not matter.

For matter, such as it is, is in potentiality.

Again, Matter is not a principle of activity: wherefore, as Aristotle puts it,³ efficient and material causes do not coincide. Now, as stated above,⁴ it belongs to

¹ 3 Phys. i. 6.

² 2 Phys. vii. 3.

³ xiii.

⁴ xiii.

MATTER

God to be the first efficient cause of things. Therefore He is not matter.

Moreover, for those who referred all things to matter as their first cause, it followed that natural things exist by chance; and against these it is argued.¹ Therefore if God, who is the first cause, is the material cause of things, it follows that all things exist by chance.

Further, Matter does not become the cause of an actual thing, except by being altered and changed. Therefore if God is immovable, as proved above,² He can nowise be a cause of things as their matter.

The Catholic faith professes this truth, asserting that God created all things not out of His substance, but out of nothing.

The sayings of David of Dinant are hereby confuted, who dared to assert that God is the same as primary matter, because if they were not the same, they would needs differ by certain differences, and thus they would not be simple: since in that which differs from another thing by a difference, the very difference argues composition. Now this proceeded from his ignorance of the distinction between difference and diversity. For as laid down,³ a thing is said to be *different* in relation to something, because whatever is different, differs by something, whereas things are said to be *diverse* absolutely from the fact that they are not the same thing.⁴ Accordingly we must seek for a difference in things which have something in common, for we have to point to something in them whereby they differ: thus two species have a common genus, wherefore they must needs be distinguished by differences. But in those things

¹ 2 Phys. viii. 18.

² 10 Metaph. D. 9, iii. 6.

³ xiii.

⁴ 1. Sum. Th. Q. iii. a. 8, r. obj. 3.

which have nothing in common, we have not to seek in what they differ, for they are diverse by themselves. For thus are opposite differences distinguished from one another, because they do not participate in a genus as a part of their essence; and consequently we must not ask in what they differ, for they are diversified by their very selves. Thus, too, God and primary matter are distinguished, since, the one being pure act and the other pure potentiality, they have nothing in common.

THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO COMPOSITION

FROM the foregoing we are able to conclude that there is no composition in God. For in every composite thing there must needs be act and potentiality: since several things cannot become one simply, unless there be something actual there and something else potential. Because those things that are actually, are not united except as an assemblage or group, which are not one simply. In these moreover the very parts that are gathered together are as a potentiality in relation to the union: for they are actually united after being potentially unitable. But in God there is no potentiality.¹ Therefore in Him there is no composition.

Again. Every composite is subsequent to its components. Therefore the first being, namely God,² has no component parts.

Further. Every composite is potentially dissoluble, so far as its composite nature is concerned, although in

¹ xvi.² xlii.

some there is something else incompatible with dissolution. Now that which is dissoluble is in potentiality to not-being. But this cannot be said of God, since of His very essence He is necessarily. Therefore there is no composition in Him.

Moreover. Every composition requires a compounder: for if there be composition, it results from several things: and things that are several in themselves would not combine together unless they were united by a compounder. If then God were composite, He would have a compounder: for He could not compound Himself, since no thing is its own cause, for it would precede itself, which is impossible. Now the compounder is the efficient cause of the composite. Therefore God would have an efficient cause: and thus He would not be the first cause, which was proved above.¹

Again. In any genus the more simple a thing is the more excellent it is; such, in the genus *hot*, is fire which has no admixture of cold. Therefore that which obtains the summit of nobility among beings, must be in the summit of simplicity. Now that which obtains the summit of nobility in things is what we call God, since He is the first cause, because the cause is more excellent than its effect. Therefore there can be no composition in Him.

Moreover. In every composite thing the good does not belong to this or that part but to the whole, and I speak of good in reference to that goodness which is proper to, and is the perfection of, the whole: thus the parts are imperfect in relation to the whole: thus the parts of a man are not a man, nor have the parts of the number six the perfection of six, nor do the parts of

¹ xlii.

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the other hand being has no quantitative extension, especially in a thing whose being is invariable, such as the heaven. Hence it does not follow that the power of being a finite body is infinite though its duration be infinite: because it matters not whether that power make a thing to last for an instant or for an infinite time, since that invariable being is not affected by time except accidentally.

The fourth objection is that the statement that what causes movement in infinite time must have an infinite power, does not necessarily apply to those movers which are not altered by moving. Because such a movement consumes nothing of their power; wherefore they can cause movement for no less time after they have moved for a certain time, than before. Thus the power of the sun is finite, and, because its power is not diminished on account of its action, it can act on this lower world for an infinite time, according to nature.

To this we reply that a body moves not unless it be moved, as we have shown. Therefore, supposing a body not to be moved, it follows that it does not move. Now in anything that is moved there is potentiality to opposites, since the terms of movement are opposite to one another. Consequently, considered in itself, every body that is moved is possibly not moved. And that which is possibly not moved, is not apt of itself to be moved for an everlasting time: and consequently neither is it apt to move for a perpetual time.

Accordingly the demonstration given above is based on the finite power of a finite body; which power cannot of itself move in an infinite time. But a body which of itself is possibly moved and not moved, and possibly moves and does not move, can acquire perpetual

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movement from some cause; and this cause must needs be incorporeal. Wherefore the first mover must needs be incorporeal. Hence according to nature nothing hinders a finite body, which acquires from another cause perpetuity in being moved, from having also perpetuity in moving: since also the first heavenly body, according to nature, can cause a perpetual circular movement in the lower bodies, according as one sphere moves another. Nor is it impossible, as the Commentator maintains,¹ for that which is, of itself, in potentiality to being moved and not moved, to acquire perpetual movement from something else, as he supposed it impossible as regards perpetuity of being. For movement is a kind of outflow from the mover to the thing movable, and consequently a movable thing can acquire perpetual movement from something else, without having it by nature. On the other hand, *to be* is something fixed and quiescent in a being, and consequently that which is, of itself, in potentiality to not-be, cannot, as he says, in the course of nature, acquire from something else perpetuity of being.

The fifth objection is that according to the above reasoning there does not appear to be more reason why there should not be an infinite power in a magnitude than outside a magnitude: for in either case it would follow that it moves in not-time.

To this it may be replied that finite and infinite are found in a magnitude, in time and in movement in a univocal sense, as proved,² wherefore the infinite in one of them removes a finite proportion in the others: whereas in things devoid of magnitude there is neither

¹ See above: *But the Commentator* . . . , p. 113.

² *Phys.* IV, 1; 6, II, 8.

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finite nor infinite unless equivocally. Hence the above course of reasoning has no place in suchlike powers.

But another and better answer is that the heaven has two movers.¹ One is its proximate mover, which is of finite power, and thence it is that its movement is of finite velocity. The other is its remote mover, which is of infinite power, whence it is that its movement can be of infinite duration. Thus it is clear that an infinite power which is not in a magnitude, can move a body not immediately in time; whereas a power which is in a magnitude must needs move immediately, since no body moves without itself being moved. Wherefore, if it moved, it would follow that it moves in not-time.

Better still it may be replied that a power which is not in a magnitude is an intellect, and moves by its will. Wherefore it moves according to the requirement of the movable and not according to the proportion of its strength. On the other hand, a power that is in a magnitude cannot move save by natural necessity, for it has been proved that the intellect is not a bodily force.² Wherefore it causes movement necessarily according to the proportion of its quantity. Hence it follows that if it moves anything it moves it instantaneously. In this sense then, the foregoing objections being refuted, proceeds the reasoning of Aristotle.

Moreover. No movement that proceeds from a bodily mover can be continuous and regular: because a bodily mover, in local movement, moves by attraction or repulsion, and that which is attracted or repelled is not disposed in the same way towards its mover from the beginning to the end of the movement, since at one

¹ Averroes, 12 *Metaph.* l. 4.

² See above: To this we reply . . . , p. 112.

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time it is nearer to it and at another time further from it; and thus no body can cause a continuous and regular movement. On the other hand the first movement is continuous and regular, as is proved.³ Therefore the mover of the first movement is not a body.

Again, no movement that tends towards an end which passes from potentiality to actuality, can be perpetual: since, when it arrives at actuality, the movement ceases.

If therefore the first movement is perpetual, it must be towards an end which is always and in every way actual.

Now such is neither a body nor a power residing in a body; because these are all movable either *per se* or accidentally. Therefore the end of the first movement is not a body nor a power residing in a body. Now the end of the first movement is the first mover, which moves as the object of desire;⁴ and that is God.

Therefore God is neither a body nor a power residing

in anything, according to our faith, it is false that the movement of the heavens is everlasting, as we shall show further on;⁵ it is nevertheless true that that movement will not cease, either on account of lack of power in the mover, or on account of the substance of the movable being corrupted, since we do not find that the movement of the heavens slackens in the course of time. Wherefore the aforesaid proofs lose nothing of their efficacy.

The truth thus demonstrated is in accordance with divine authority. For it is said: *God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth*,⁶ and again: *To the King of ages, immortal,*

³ 8 *Phys.* vii ff.

⁴ 4, xcvi.

⁵ Cl. xiii.

⁶ John iv. 24.

End in perfectible, cannot be wholly actualized

Moreover, Forms that are not predicated of subsistent things, whether the latter be taken universally or singly, are not single *per se* subsistent forms individualized in themselves. For we do not say that Socrates, or man, or an animal is whiteness, because whiteness is not singly *per se* subsistent, but is individualized by its subsistent subject. Likewise, natural forms do not *per se* subsist singly, but are individualized in their respective matters: wherefore we do not say that this individual fire, or that fire in general, is its own form. Moreover, the essences or quiddities of genera or species are individualized by the signate matter of this or that individual, although indeed the quiddity of a genus or species includes form and matter in general; wherefore we do not say that Socrates, or man, is humanity. Now the divine essence exists *per se* singly and is individualized in itself, since it is not in any matter, as shown above.¹ Hence the divine essence is predicated of God, so that we say: *God is His own essence*.

Further. The essence of a thing is either the thing itself, or is related to it in some way as cause: since a thing derives its species from its essence. But nothing can [in any way] be a cause of God: for He is the first being, as shown above.² Therefore, God is His own essence.

Again, that which is not its own essence, is related in respect of some part of itself to that essence, as potentiality to act: wherefore the essence is signified by way of form, for instance *humanity*. But there is no potentiality in God, as shown above,³ therefore it follows that He is His own essence.

¹ xvii. ² xvi.

³ xvi.

⁴ xvi.

⁵ xvi.

⁶ xvi.

⁷ xvi.

⁸ xvi.

⁹ xvi.

¹⁰ xvi.

¹¹ xvi.

¹² xvi.

¹³ xvi.

¹⁴ xvi.

¹⁵ xvi.

¹⁶ xvi.

¹⁷ xvi.

¹⁸ xvi.

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²¹ xvi.

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²⁶ xvi.

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²⁸ xvi.

²⁹ xvi.

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³¹ xvi.

³² xvi.

³³ xvi.

³⁴ xvi.

³⁵ xvi.

³⁶ xvi.

³⁷ xvi.

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³⁹ xvi.

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²⁴⁷ xvi.

²⁴⁸ xvi.

²⁴⁹ xvi.

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that in God there is nothing of potentiality, and that He is pure act.¹ Therefore God's essence is not distinct from His existence.

Again: Whatsoever cannot exist unless several things concur, is composite. Now no thing in which essence and existence are distinct from one another can exist except several things concur, to wit its essence and existence. Therefore every thing, in which essence and existence are distinct, is composite. But God is not composite, as proved above.² Therefore God's existence is His essence.

Further. Everything exists through having existence. Therefore nothing the essence of which is not its existence, exists by its essence, but by participation of something, namely existence. Now that which exists by participation of something cannot be the first being, because that in which a thing participates in order to exist, is previous to that thing. But God is the first being, to which nothing is previous.³ Therefore God's essence is His existence.

This sublime truth Moses was taught by the Lord: for when he asked the Lord: *If the children of Israel should say to me: What is His name? what shall I say to them?* the Lord answered: *I AM WHO AM.* . . . *Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: HE WHO IS hath sent me to you;*⁴ thus declaring His own name to be; HE WHO IS. Now every name is appointed to signify the nature or essence of a thing. Wherefore it follows that God's very existence itself is His essence or nature.

Moreover. The Catholic doctors have professed this truth. Por Hilary says: *Existence is not an accident in*

¹ xlviii.
² xlii.

³ xviii.

⁴ Exod. iii. 13, 14.

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God, but the subsisting truth, the abiding cause, and the natural property of His essence.¹ And Boethius says that the divine substance is existence itself, and all other existence proceeds therefrom.²

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THAT THERE IS NO ACCIDENT IN GOD

From this truth it follows of necessity that nothing can accrue to God besides His essence, nor anything be accidentally in Him.

For existence itself cannot participate in something that is not of its essence; although that which exists can participate in something else. Because nothing is more formal or more simple than existence. Hence existence itself can participate in nothing. Now the divine substance is existence itself.³ Therefore He has nothing that is not of His substance. Therefore no accident can be in Him.

Moreover. Whatever is in a thing accidentally, has a cause of being there; since it is added to the essence of that in which it is. Therefore if anything is in God accidentally, this must be through some cause. Consequently the cause of the accident is either the divine substance itself, or something else. If it is something else, this other thing must act on the divine substance; since nothing introduces a form, whether substantial or accidental, into some recipient, unless in some way it act upon that recipient; because to act is nothing but to make something to be actual, and it is this by a form. Wherefore God will be passive and invariable to some

¹ De Trin. vii. 11.

² Ibid. ii.

³ xlii.

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Agencies which is the cause of what has been decided above. Upon the other hand, the divine substance itself is the cause of the accident that is in it; then it is impossible for it to be its cause in receiving it, since then the same thing in the same respect would make itself to be in act. Therefore, if there is an accident in God, it follows that He causes that accident in one respect, and causes it in another, even as bodies receive their proper accidents through the nature of their matter, and cause them in so much as they are so that God, therefore, will be found to be the cause of which has been proved above.

Argument. Every subject of an accident is composed of matter as potentially to act, because an accident is a kind of form making a thing to exist actually according to accidental existence. But there is no potentiality in God as shown above. Therefore there can be no accident in Him.

Response. Everything in which something is actually is in some way divisible as to its nature, since an accident, by its very nature, may be in a thing or not in it. Therefore if God has something that is not in Him accidentally, it follows that He is divisible; the contrary of which has been proved above.

Further. Everything that has an accident in itself is not whatever it has in itself, because an accident is not of the essence of its subject. But God as whatever He is in Himself. Therefore, no accident is in God. The middle proposition is proved as follows. A thing is said to be found more excellently in the cause than in the effect. But God is the cause of all things. Therefore whatever is in Him is found in Him more perfectly. Now that which is most perfectly

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is found in God as in Himself, and is found in the effect more perfectly. Therefore, whatever is found in the effect is found in God as in Himself. But the accident is found in the effect as in its subject. Therefore, the accident is found in God as in Himself.

Response. It is stated that the accident is found in God as in Himself, and is found in the effect more perfectly. But the accident is found in the effect as in its subject. Therefore, the accident is found in God as in Himself.

Further. It is stated that the accident is found in God as in Himself, and is found in the effect more perfectly. But the accident is found in the effect as in its subject. Therefore, the accident is found in God as in Himself.

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the genus of accident; for an accident cannot be the first being and first cause. Nor can He be in the genus of substance; for substance that is a genus is not being itself, otherwise every substance would be its own being, and thus would not be caused by something else, which is impossible, as is clear from what we have said above.¹ Now God is being itself.² Therefore He is not in any genus.

Again, Whatever is in a genus differs as to being from the other things contained in the same genus; otherwise a genus would not be predicated of several things. Now all things that are contained in one same genus, must agree in the *whatness* of the genus, because the genus is predicated of all in respect of *what a thing is*. Therefore the being of anything contained in a genus is beside the *whatness* of the genus. But this is impossible in God.³ Therefore God is not in a genus.

Further, A thing is placed in a genus by the nature of its *whatness*, for genus is predicated of what a thing is. But the *whatness* of God is His very being.⁴ Now a thing is not placed in a genus according to its being, because then *being* would be a genus signifying being itself. It remains therefore that God is not in a genus.

That being cannot be a genus is proved by Aristotle as follows.⁵ If being were a genus, it would be necessary to find a difference in order to contract it to a species. Now no difference participates in the genus, so that, to wit, the genus be contained in the notion of the difference, for thus the genus would be placed twice in the definition of the species; but the difference must be something besides that which is contained in the notion of the genus. Now there can be nothing besides that

¹ xlii. ² xlii. ³ xlii. ⁴ xlii. ⁵ *Metaph.* lib. B.
Does not imply diff. *participat.*
in its genus? *Animality is*
life entirely

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which is understood by being, if being belong to the notion of those things of which it is predicated. And thus by no difference can being be contracted. It remains, therefore, that being is not a genus; wherefore it follows of necessity that God is not in a genus.

Wherefore it is likewise evident that God cannot be defined: since every definition is composed of genus and difference.

It is also clear that no demonstration is possible in regard to Him: because the principle of a demonstration is the definition of that about which the demonstration is made.

Someone, however, might think that, although the name of substance cannot properly be applied to God, because God does not subsist under (*substat*) accidents: yet the thing signified by that term is applicable to Him, and consequently He is in the genus *substance*. For substance is a *per se* being, and it is clear that this can be applied to God, from the fact that it has been proved that He is not an accident. But to this we reply,

according to what has been said, that *per se* being is not in the definition of substance. For from the fact that it is described as a *being* it cannot be a genus, since it has been already proved that *being* has not the conditions of a genus: and again from the fact that it is described as being *per se*, for this would seem to denote nothing else than a negation, since it is said to be a *per se* being, through not being in another, which is a pure negation. And this cannot satisfy the conditions of a genus, for then a genus would not express what a thing is, but what it is not. Therefore we must understand the definition of substance in this way, that a

¹ xlii. ² *Additional factor*
in species is to
further determine
it

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substance is *a thing to which it is fitting not to be in a subject*: the word *thing* being taken from its quiddity, just as *being* is from existence; so that the meaning of substance is that it has a quiddity to which it is fitting to exist not in another. Now this does not apply to God, for He has no quiddity besides His existence.¹ Hence it follows that He is nowise in the genus of substance; and consequently that He is in no genus, since it has been proved² that He is not in the genus of accident.

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THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORMAL BEING OF ALL THINGS

From the foregoing we are able to refute the error of some who have asserted that God is *nothing else than the formal being of everything*.³

For this being is divided into substantial and accidental being. Now the divine being is neither the being of a substance nor the being of an accident, as shown above.⁴ Therefore it is impossible for God to be the being whereby everything is formally.

Again. Things are not distinct from one another in that they have being, since in this they all agree. If, then, things differ from one another, it follows that either being itself is specified by certain differences added thereto, so that different things have a specifically different being, or that things differ in that being itself is attached to specifically different natures. But the former of these is impossible, because an addition cannot

¹ xxii.
² Sum. Th. Q. iii. a. 8.
³ xxv.

THE FORMAL BEING

x33

be attached to being in the same way as a difference is added to a genus, as already stated.¹ It remains, therefore, that things differ because they have different natures, to which being is attached in different ways. Now the divine being is not attached to another nature, but is the nature itself, as shown above.² If, therefore, the divine being were the formal being of all things, it would follow that all things are simply one.

Moreover. The principle is naturally prior to that which flows from it. Now in certain things being has something by way of principle: since the form is said to be the principle of being; and in like manner the agent which gives certain things actual being. Therefore if the divine being is the being of each thing, it will follow that God, Who is His own being, has a cause, and thus is not *per se* necessary being. The contrary of which has been shown above.³

Further. That which is common to many is not something besides those many except only logically: thus *animal* is not something besides Socrates and Plato and other animals except as considered by the mind, which apprehends the form of animal as divested of all that specifies, and individualizes it: for man is that which is truly an animal, else it would follow that in Socrates and Plato there are several animals, namely, animal in general, man in general, and Plato himself. Much less, therefore, being itself in general is something apart from all things that have being; except only as apprehended by the mind. If, therefore, God is being in general, He will not be an individual thing except only as apprehended in the mind. Now it has been shown above⁴ that God is something not merely in the

¹ xxv. ² xxii. ³ xv. ⁴ xlii.

intellect, but in reality. Therefore God is not the common being of all.

Again, Generation is essentially the way to being, and corruption the way to not-being. For the term of generation is the form, and that of corruption privation, for no other reason than because the form makes a thing to be, and corruption makes a thing not to be, for supposing a certain form not to give being, that which received that form would not be said to be generated. If, then, God were the formal being of all things it would follow that He is the term of generation. Which is false, since He is eternal, as we have shown above.¹

Moreover, It would follow that the being of every thing has been from eternity; wherefore there would be neither generation nor corruption. For if there were, it would follow that a thing acquires anew a being already pre-existing. Either then it is acquired by something already existing, or else by something nowise pre-existing. In the first case, since according to the above supposition all existing things have the same being, it would follow that the thing which is said to be generated, receives not a new being but a new mode of being, and therefore is not generated but altered. If on the other hand the thing nowise existed before, it would follow that it is made out of nothing, and this is contrary to the essence of generation. Consequently this supposition would wholly do away with generation and corruption: and therefore it is clear that it is impossible.

Moreover, The Sacred Doctrine refutes this error, by confessing that God is *high and elevated*,² and that He is *over all things*.³ For if He were the being of all, He would be something in all, and not above all.

¹ xv.² Job. vi. 1.³ Rom. ix. 5.

Those who erred thus are condemned by the same sentence as idolaters who *gave the incommunicable name*,¹ i.e. of God, to wood and stones.² For if God is the being of all it would be no truer to say *a stone is a being* than to say *a stone is God*. (*Quod sit in the life of God*)

Now there are four things which apparently fostered this error. The first was a wrong understanding of certain authorities. For they found Dionysius saying: *God. The being of all is the super-essential Godhead*,³ and from this they wished to conclude that God is the formal being of all things, not perceiving that this meaning is irreconcilable with the words. For if the Godhead were the formal being of all, it would not be above all, but in the midst of all, in fact something of all. Wherefore when he said that the Godhead is above all, he declares it to be by its nature distinct from all and placed above all. And by saying that the Godhead is the being of all, he declares that all things derive from God a likeness to the divine being. Moreover he elsewhere expressly proscribes their wrong interpretation where he declares that *there can be no contact with God nor mingling of Him with other things, as of point with line, or of the shape of the seed on wax*.⁴

The second cause of this error was defective reason. For since that which is common is specified individually but not by addition, they deemed the divine being, to which nothing is added, not to be some proper being, but the common being of all, not perceiving that the command or universal cannot be without some addition, though it be considered apart from any addition: for *animal* cannot be apart from the difference of *rational* or

¹ Vulg., names.² Wisd. of Sol. xiv. 21.³ Cael. Hier. iv.⁴ Div. Nom. ii.

THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORM OF A BODY

ACCORDINGLY, having shown that God is not the being of all, it can be proved in like manner that God is not the form of any thing.

For the divine being cannot be the being of a quiddity that is not its own being, as shown above.¹ Now that which is the divine being itself is no other than God. Therefore it is impossible for God to be the form of any other thing.

Further. The form of a body is not its very being but the principle of its being. But God is being itself. Therefore God is not the form of a body.

Again. The union of form and matter results in a composite, and this is a whole in respect of form and matter. Now the parts are in potentiality with respect to the whole: but in God there is no potentiality.² Therefore it is impossible for God to be the form united to any thing.

Again. That which has being *per se*, is more excellent than what has being in another. Now every form of a body has being in another. Since then God is the most excellent being, as the first cause of being,³ He cannot be the form of any thing.

Moreover, this can also be proved from the eternity of movement, as follows.⁴ If God were the form of a movable thing, since He is the first mover, the composite will be its own mover. But that which moves itself can be moved and not moved. Therefore it is in it to be either. Now a thing of this kind has not of itself indefectibility of movement. Therefore above

¹ Cf. xiii, xv.² xiii.³ xvi.⁴ xxii.

irrational, although we think of it apart from these differences. Moreover although we think of the universal without an addition, we do not think of it apart from its receptivity of addition: for if no difference could be added to *animal*, it would not be a genus; and the same applies to all other names of things. Now the divine being is without addition, not only in thought but also in reality; and not only is it without addition, but also without receptivity of addition. Wherefore from the very fact that it neither receives nor can receive addition, we should conclude rather that God is not common but proper being: since His being is distinct from all others for the very reason that nothing can be added to it. Hence the Commentator says¹ that the first cause, by reason of the very purity of its goodness, is distinct from others and, so to speak, individualized.

The third cause of this error is the consideration of the divine simplicity. For since God is the extreme of simplicity, they thought that if we make an analysis of all that is in us, the last thing, being the most simple, must be God; for we cannot proceed indefinitely in the composition of the things that are in us. In this again their reason was lacking, that they failed to observe that what is most simple in us, is not so much a complete thing as some part of a thing: whereas simplicity is ascribed to God as to a perfect subsistent being.

The fourth thing that might lead them into this error, is the expression whereby we say that God is in all things: for they failed to perceive that He is in things, not as part thereof, but as the cause of things, which is nowise wanting to its effect. For we do not say that the form is in the body in the same sense as we say that the sailor is in the boat.

¹ De Causis, prop. ix.

Go. D. 1. merely
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that which moves itself we must place something else as first mover, which confers on it perpetuity of movement. And thus God Who is the first mover is not the form of a body that moves itself.

This argument avails for those who hold the eternity of movement. Yet if this be not granted the same conclusion may be drawn from the regularity of the heavenly movement. For just as that which moves itself can both be at rest and be moved, so can it be moved with greater or less velocity. Wherefore the necessity of uniformity in the heavenly movement depends on some higher principle that is altogether immovable, and that is not the part, through being the form, of a body which moves itself.

The authority of Scripture is in agreement with this truth. For it is written in the psalm: *Thy magnificence is elevated above the heavens*; ¹ and, *He is higher than heaven, and what wilt thou do?* . . . *the measure of Him is longer than the earth, and deeper than the sea.* ²

Hence we are able to refute the error of the pagans who asserted that God was the soul of the heaven or even the soul of the whole world; ³ which led them to defend the idolatrous doctrine whereby they said that the whole world was God, not in reference to the body but to the soul, even as man is said to be wise in reference not to his body but to his soul: which being supposed they deemed it to follow that divine worship is not unduly shown to the world and its parts. The commentator also says that *this occasioned the error of the Zabian people*,⁴ i.e. of idolaters, because, to wit, they asserted that God was the soul of heaven.

¹ Ps. viii. 2.

² Vulg., *broader*.

³ Sum. Th. Q. iii. a. 8.

⁴ Job xl. 8, 9.
⁵ Metaph. xi.

OF THE DIVINE PERFECTION

Now although things that exist and live are more perfect than those which only exist, yet God Who is not distinct from His own existence, is universally perfect being.¹ And by universally perfect I mean that He lacks not the excellence of any genus.

For every excellence of any being whatsoever is ascribed to a thing in respect of its being, since no excellence would accrue to man from his wisdom, unless thereby he were wise, and so on. Wherefore, according as a thing has being, so is its mode of excellence: since a thing, according as its being is contracted to some special mode of excellence more or less great, is said to be more or less excellent. Hence if there be a thing to which the whole possibility of being belongs, no excellence that belongs to any thing can be lacking thereby.

Now to a thing which is its own being, being belongs according to the whole possibility of being: thus, if there were a separate whiteness, nothing of the whole possibility of whiteness could be wanting to it: because something of the possibility of whiteness is lacking to a particular white thing through a defect in the recipient of whiteness, which receives it according to its mode and, maybe, not according to the whole possibility of whiteness. Therefore God, Who is His own being, as shown above,² has being according to the whole possibility of being itself; and consequently He cannot lack any excellence that belongs to any thing.

¹ Sum. Th. Q. iv. a. 2.

² xlii.

*actual thing?
possible thing?*

CATEGORIES

[CHAP. 5]

therefore, established that in every proposition, of which either substance or a differentia forms the predicate, these are predicated univocally. (12) Substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the case of primary substance this is indisputably true; for the thing is an unit. In the case of secondary substance, when we speak for instance, of 'man' or 'animal', our form of speech gives the impression that we are here also indicating that which is individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is not an individual, but a class with a certain qualification; for it is not one/individual single/and a primary substance is the words 'man', or 'animal', are predicable of more than one subject.

Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality; like the term 'white', or 'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but species and genus determine the quality with reference to a substance: they signify substance qualitatively differentiated. The determinate qualification covers a larger field in the case of the genus than in that of the species; hence who uses the word 'animal' is herein using a word of wider extension than he who uses the word 'man'.

Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the contrary of a primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a contrary. Yet this character is not peculiar to substance, but is true of many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that forms the contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of 'ten', or of any such term. A man may contend that 'much' is the contrary of 'little', or 'great' of 'small', but of definite quantitative terms no contrary exists.

Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. To do that means by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly substance than another; for it has already been stated that this is the case, but that no single substance admits of varying degrees within itself. For instance, one particular substance, 'man', cannot be more or less man either than himself, or some other time or than some other man. One man cannot be more man than another, as that which is white may be more or less white than some other white object, or as that which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than some other beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to subsist in a thing in varying degrees at different times. A body being white, is said to be whiter at one time than it was before, or being warm, is said to be warmer or less warm than at some other time.

B 2^a 11-12.

Is it then of human?

CATEGORIES

13

that substance is not said to be more or less, that which it is, is not more truly a man at one time than he was before, nor is it said to admit of variation of degree. (13) Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. (14) Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. (15) Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. (16) Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. (17) Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. (18) Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. (19) Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. (20) Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. (21) Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. (22) Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. (23) Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. (24) Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. (25) Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. 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Is it then of human?

OPINION DE HARTSHORNE SUR THOMAS D'AQUIN ET L'EGLISE CATHOLIQUE.

En plus de ses positions publiées par rapport à la théologie révélée (Trinité, divinité du Christ, révélation, création...), quelques manuscrits de Hartshorne indiquent bien que dans son esprit, il existe un lien étroit entre la doctrine catholique et la pensée de Thomas d'Aquin. Certes, Hartshorne a toujours été respectueux vis-à-vis des religions. Il a collaboré avec un certain nombre de catholiques. Mais il restait toujours vrai que ses réactions contre certains principes thomasiens concernent aussi les domaines de la foi catholique qui les ont exploités. Pour autant qu'elles aient été acceptées par l'Eglise catholique durant des siècles, les idées thomasiennes remises en cause par Hartshorne ne peuvent qu'attirer l'attention du théologien de la révélation.

One great difference between the Roman Catholic Church and all the rest of Christendom is that the former has not only a creed, but a single, well-defined philosophy, which practically speaking functions almost as part of the creed. True, there are other traditions than the Thomist which have some vogue among the philosophically inclined members of the Church ~~of Rome, but these~~ ~~and the only~~ ~~others~~ ~~are~~ ~~little~~ ~~in~~ ~~evidence~~, they also differ usually but little from Thomism on most points, or where they do seriously differ they are suppressed (e.g., by the denial of permission to publish). When Catholic philosophers meet to discuss, they show a unanimity such as can be found nowhere else save in totalitarian circles. The question is, does this unanimity reveal the impersonality of reason and truth, or is there something artificial and political about it? Do these men agree because they see what is, the objective reality the same for all, or do they agree in spite of partly missing the reality, not necessarily less than the rest of us/^{do} but with a sort of unconscious agreement to collectivize their blind spots, as it were? My conviction is that the answer is both yes and no. I believe that the collective blind spots exist, but that the collective insights into truth are very great, and that while a considerably better philosophy is possible to Protestants, nothing is easier nor more common than for Protestants to seek a worse one than a member of the Roman Church would be allowed at large with. I believe that only in recent decades has a philosophy

been developed which makes radical improvements upon Thomism, without at the same time falling into radical errors from which Thomism was largely free. To ^{prove} ~~show~~ that the new doctrine really does avoid the pitfalls into which the history of modern philosophy seems to Thomists to ^{show that} ~~indicate~~ a non-Thomistic philosophy ~~is bound~~ to fall is no easy task. Philosophy shows non-Thomistic (and non-Aristotelian) philosophy is likely to fall is no easy task. I should like in this discussion to suggest some perspectives which would require further development to safeguard them against misunderstandings, but which ~~maintain the direction~~ which some of our greatest minds recent thinkers have thought some of our greatest ~~minds think~~ point the direction Protestant philosophy must follow to escape from its confusions and one-sidedness. (Among these minds are William James, Charles Peirce, A.N. Whitehead, W.P. Montague, Bergson. I do not say that any of these has given such an adequate, well-rounded expression to the doctrine as Aquinas gave to his tradition, but to reach such a consummation takes time. Most of the basic tenets I have in mind were ~~not~~ scarcely heard of even a century ago. Nevertheless, Whitehead is on most points an adequate exponent.)

There are basically three types of cosmology, which I shall call mechanism, societism, and dualism or a compromise between mechanism and societism. The universe is a society or a machine or a mixture of the social and the mechanical. Such a mixture I see in Aristotelianism and in Thomism. By the mechanical I mean that whose action is purely routine, devoid of individual initiative or caprice whose value lies outside itself in its use to other beings, and which cannot itself respond to values as such, ^{or} ~~which cannot~~ participate in the life of other entities, as for example by sympathizing

with their joy or sorrow and thereby making it to some extent their own. All these negations apply, the reader will perceive, to a machine as we ordinarily think of it. By a society I mean a group whose members are not purely routine in their ~~xxxixxxx~~ ^{behavior,} which themselves achieve value whatever use they may be to others, and which by achieving value thereby contribute value to each other through mutual participation. It should appear that society and machine are strictly contradictory of each other. Either the universe consists exclusively of machines, and then there are no societies, as I have defined them, or it consists exclusively of societies and then there are no machines, or it consists in part of societies and in part of machines (dualism).

Now it may seem obvious that machines exist, and that societies exist. Hence dualism seems obviously true, and this alone goes part of the way to account for the strength of Thomism, which seems really to admit societies and really to admit machines, whereas radical mechanism denies societies, though their existence seems apparent, and a radical societism would, it ~~xxxixxxx~~ ^{may be thought,} collide with ^{equally apparent} the fact that machines exist.

But do machines exist in the strict sense of our definition? Physics will not today guarantee that all the action in an automobile is routine, for quantum mechanics allows the view that the uniformity of action is statistical, and involves a certain possibility of caprice or lack of uniformity ^{behavior of the} in the/ultimate parts. And there have been high authorities in science and in philosophy who have held that even the least of physical individuals has some life and enjoyment of its own, and some sense of that of its neighbors.

True, the automobile does not enjoy, but the automobile is a huge swarm of swarms of molecules, and because a group as a whole has a life of its own ~~has~~ is no reason for denying life to the members of the group. Three men ^{standing} ~~sitting~~ in the same elevator have not ^{or individual life} one mind/belonging to the group of three, although each of the three has such an individual life.

What emerges from this is a startling conclusion of the first importance. The idea of a society includes that of the machine so far as there is any proof machines exist, or are even conceivable. This will be plain if we restate our definition of the machine, so as to retain only those features which are really needed. A machine is that whose action is almost purely (or largely or relatively, or statistically) ~~mechanical~~ routine, but not absolutely so, and whose value lies chiefly in its usefulness to other beings, and which as a whole, though ^{entirely} not in its ultimate parts, is devoid of life or the capacity to participate in the life of others. Routine, utility, lack of life and social responsiveness conflict with the definition of the social only if made absolute and exclusive. Every society has its routine for a society in which all was caprice, irregularity, and novelty, would be one in which not even caprice, irregularity, or novelty could be recognized, ~~There is no such thing as a purely mechanical society~~ or have any function. And a society in which nothing was of ~~the~~ value to anything except itself would be a contradiction in terms. The relatively mechanical is the social in one aspect, the absolute mechanical is a myth of reason, a mere limit of thought. On the other hand, the relationship cannot be reversed, whatever materialism

may say. A society is not a mere aspect of the mechanical. To have value in and for itself is something that no modification of the idea and of mere of routine ~~mechanical~~ behavior, can cover. Enjoyment is ultimate, underivable from spatio-temporal patterns of behavior alone.

From these relationships it follows that materialism is the taking of a myth of reason with full seriousness, and it follows no less that dualism is the taking of this myth with half seriousness. But the ~~myth~~ myth need not be taken seriously at all, except as a mere limit of thought. There may be all gradations of the more and more ~~more~~ mechanical, the less and less richly social, but the simply mechanical, the absolutely non-social, need exist only in the which "nothing" sense in ~~which~~ exists, as a shadow of the negating mind.

Modern "idealism" has fallen into many errors, justly stressed by Neo-Thomists, but it has been unanswered and unanswerable in its contention that the notion of mere dead, insentient matter is without foundation. The trouble has been the idealism itself has been real a dualism, a mixed or compromise doctrine, with marked elements of absolute mechanism. For instance, idealism has tended towards determinism, the notion that ~~mental~~ mental action is purely a routine affair, entirely predetermined by efficient or final causes.

Thomism shows the following features of mechanism, in the mythical sense. It admits determinism for a good part of nature, or at least fails clearly and adequately to reject it. It admits the not of entities both as wholes and in their parts without intrinsic life enjoyment, and mutual participation, although it declares that all being as such is "good", without telling us what good, apart from life and enjoyment, could intelligibly be. Above all, Thomism has a not social or a half-social view of the relationship between entities higher and lower in the scale of beings.

I shall take up these points in order.

As to determinism, Thomists are indeed relatively satisfactory. ~~Great~~ Professor La Plante tells us that even in physics causality does not mean absolute determinism. ~~xxx~~ Aristotle admitted ~~xxx~~ an element of chance due to the interaction of different causal lines. And of course Aquinas defended the notion of human free will in a sense incompatible with determinism. But still this tradition seems to lack any such powerful generalization of the idea of freedom as recent philosophy has effected, which shows that it is the essential nature of the future as such to be unsettled, that an individual event could not be implied by anything except an individual whole of which this event were a part, and that the whole/which includes ~~xx~~ events is retrospective not prospective, embracing the past but not the future. Future events do not, in their individuality, exist. / This idea is more adequately developed in ~~xx~~ recent metaphysics than it could be earlier partly because it conflicts with the old doctrine that God sees past and future alike from the standpoint of sheer eternity, a doctrine now widely rejected on many grounds. Also, in a generally dualistic philosophy, it is natural to exaggerate the distinction between man, who as a rational being enjoys freedom, together with and the animals ~~and~~ the inanimate, who may be machines or automata. What is not sufficiently appreciated is that rational freedom is a species of the genus of freedom, a very important and distinctive species but not the whole. In fact, it is obvious that after one has exercised his rational freedom, he still has to make a free decision which cannot be made by reason. Reason works between universals, but what we do is something individual. I may have reason to express gratitude, but no reason can be so definite and unique to the occasion as the actual tone of voice and the like of my utterance. With or without reason, each

event is unique and cannot follow from any general laws, or from the events which precede it. Yet in the book under consideration it is twice suggested that animals may be pure automatons, whose states, even conscious, are "determined very precisely by previous material contingencies." (E.g., Hauber, 49) And throughout the book there are suggestions that the idea of the new physics ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~

concerning the possibly free action of the smallest physical particles is to be viewed as showing the superficial character of physics rather than the existence of ^{partial} randomness in the real world.

Doubtless it is true that physics has no complete grasp of physical individuals, nevertheless philosophy has everything to welcome in the passing of the idea of an absolute physical routine.

More serious is the treatment of mind and matter. We are told that "mental facts are absolutely different from all other ones. . .

Nothing of which the mind is ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ aware can be confused with the ~~xxx~~ awareness of the thing." (Allers, 71).

Now of course, what one is aware of is not one's awareness of it.

But it may nevertheless be true that one is always aware of something that somehow has a life and mind of its own, if not as a whole then in its parts, or in the whole of which it is a part or aspect. Also, it is true that if by mentality we mean thought and the awareness of meaning, then besides mentality we must also recognize qualities of sensation and feeling, and a third aspect of striving or will.

But these are all within the psychica in the broad sense. And there is literally no evidence that any individuals exist which are entirely lacking in these psychic attributes. For religious philosophy to ~~ad~~

accept the idea of absolutely insentient individuals is absurd for reason pointed out by Campanella and other philosophers of the Renaissance, namely that since to enjoy, as well as to know and to exert power, are attributes of God, and since God is manifested in some degree in all His ^{creatures,} ~~world~~ there can be nothing utterly without feeling, knowing, or power. Only in this way can the immanence of God become a serious, straightforward doctrine.

But the most serious defect of Thomism is its failure to ~~max~~ appreciate the social structure of the part-whole relation, as exemplified in organisms, and in the universe as a socially organic whole, ~~xxxxxxx~~ a structure which is the key to the scale of beings from electrons to God. The nature of the lesser individual is to be included in individuals of a higher type, and this inclusion is social in character.

The electron is in the atom, the atom in the molecule, the molecule in the cell, the cell in

Electrons are or may be in atoms, atoms may be in cells, cells in multiple-celled animals, and these ~~xxx~~ in the universe, which may be more not less organic than ~~xxx~~ its parts. The universe is an affair of individuals within individuals. Aristotelianism is based on the doctrine that the essential nature of an individual is not ~~xx~~ or be included by to include/other individuals as such. And this is good common sense, ~~clear~~ the amazing fact is that the naked senses do not exhibit a single case of the embeddedness of individual in individual which science tells us is the general plan of the cosmos. The man we see, not the cell. ~~xx~~
The ~~size~~ we see, not the ~~elementary~~ system the lesser units within the molecule. And we do not literally and plainly see the universe in which all things else are embedded. The fact is that the senses simply do

not reach individuals as such except over a tiny portion of the cosmic range of types, that portion which runs from small insects to elephants. Outside this portion, all we see, or clearly feel by touch, are vast numbers of individuals blurred together by our feeble powers of discrimination into seemingly solid masses. Thus the notion of an individual substance as that which does not inhere in anything other than itself is true ^{enough} of the world as seen by the eye, but only because ~~xxxxxx~~ and in so far as the eye fails to see what is there.

Confronted by modern atomic and cell theories, which are as solidly established as almost any facts, what does ^(Atomistic) Aristotellianism do? In this book we can see the answer. It does the best it can to disguise the bad start its tradition has made upon this problem, short of taking a fresh start and correcting the initial error. We are told that the basic mistake of materialism is the denial of ^{or substantial} intrinsic/change. Material particles are regrouped, but in themselves remain what they were. Thus an electron is an electron, whether in the human brain or ~~xxx~~ in the ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ sun or in free space. On the contrary, ~~an~~ electrons within a larger system ~~is~~ "are there as so many levels of excitation" of the larger system, not as individual particles. (Marling, 45) Now on the social conception of the individual, naturally every change of environment, every entrance into a new group, changes the individual intrinsically, and if the change in environment is radical enough changes it substantially. But it does not follow that the individual is ever a mere property, energy level or what you will, of the group. There is no need to choose between the two forms of non-social view according to one of which the true individual is the larger whole, say the molecule or the man, and according to the other the true individual is the

microscopic part, the electron or the cell, in ^{individuality} ~~neither~~ base involving any social relations between part and whole. Social relations involve both intrinsic change and mutual interdependence, that is, some element of initiative or freedom on each side setting limits to the freedom on the other. Now nowhere in this book are we allowed to think that the body, for example, is literally a "society of cells" each of which has a social relation to the human personality. We are told rather that the parts of the body "have neither life nor existence of their own, no independent powers of action" and "of intrinsic necessity, all act exclusively for the benefit of the organism as a whole." (Meyer, 161) This is a mechanical conception, by our definition since it excludes freedom and initiative from the parts of the body.

Assuming that no individual can be in an individual, then of course the facts must be read in this way, or else in their way of materialistic atomism, according to which the body is nothing but a swarm of particles whose regroupings constitute all that is real of the man. But no fact compels ~~an~~ either interpretation. Granting that cells are largely, almost completely, controlled by the organism as a whole, it does not follow that this subordination is absolute. (Indeed, if cells act ^{some forms of} exclusively for the benefit of the organism/sickness ought not to occur.) The facts support no such absolutes as are here laid down. Again, we are told that ~~it~~ there is really no interaction between mind and body, for the parts of the body are matter already "formed" by mind, so that it is really the soul as in the matter acting upon itself. But according to the social view, every individual informs his neighbors, and when the neighbor acts upon me it might be said that I act upon myself for

there is something of me in the neighbor already. ~~We~~

We are told that one must choose between the Platonic view of mind and body as separate substances and Aristotelianism, holding that body is matter informed by mind. / ^(Allers, 83-4) there is, it is said no third possibility. No proof for this is offered. Why is it not a third view to hold that mind and body are neither simply different kinds of substances nor mere matter plus the soul as its form but rather a ~~soci~~ social organism whose highest member is indeed the informing soul of the whole society, but with many lesser "souls" in mutual interaction with each other and the higher soul, the totality of ^{lower} psyches being all the matter there is.

The closest to such a view found in this book is the doctrine of Hauber. This writer, a biologist, tells us that

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The Sixteen Ways of Thinking About God Categorically:

as Greatly Improved by Professor Joseph Pickle of Colorado College

Capital letters refer to God, lower case letters to what is not God or the World.

Rows

Columns / G

	I	II	III	IV
1.	A.a (1)	R.a (5)	AR.a (9)	O.a (13)
2.	A.r (2)	R.r (6)	AR.r (10)	O.r (14)
3.	A.ra (3)	R.ra (7)	AR.ra (11)	O.ra (15)
4.	A.O (4)	R.O (8)	AR.O (12)	O.O (16)
1.	N.n (1)	C.n (5)	NC.n (9)	O.n (13)
2.	N.c (2)	C.c (6)	NC.c (10)	O.c (14)
3.	N.cn (3)	C.cn (7)	NC.cn (11)	O.cn (15)
4.	N.O (4)	C.O (8)	NC.O (12)	O.O (16)

$$O.O \equiv OO.OO$$

Column

- I. God is in all respects absolute (necessary)
- II. God is in all respects relative (contingent)
- III. God is (in different respects) absolute (necessary) and relative (contingent)
- IV. God is impossible or has no status with respect to the two polarities

Row

1. World (what is not God) is in all respects absolute (necessary)
2. World is in all respects relative (contingent)
3. World is (in different respects) absolute (necessary) and relative (contingent)
4. World is impossible or has no status with respect to the two polarities

All combinations fourfold, no bipeds or Tripeds, on quadrupeds.

similar to universal complex, independent, infinite, independent

1. N.H. { God is in all respects Necessary
World is " " " "
2. N.C. { God ~~resp~~ in all resp. nec.
World in all resp. cont.
3. N.CN { God is in all resp. Nec.
World is { Nec. in some resp.
Contingent in others
4. N.O. { God is nec. in all resp.
Would not exist (impossible)
~~God~~ Contingent in all resp.
5. R.A. { World nec. in all
6. C.c. { God cont. in all
World contingent in all
7. C.CN { God cont. in all
World { Nec. in some
Cont. in some
8. C.O. { God fully cont.
Would not exist
9. NC.H { God { nec. in some
cont. in some
World totally necessary
10. NC.c. { God { nec. in some
cont. in some
World fully contingent
11. NC.CN { God { nec. in some
cont. in some
World { nec. in some
cont. in some
12. NC.O { God { nec. in some
cont. in some
World - impossible
13. O.H. { God impossible
World fully necessary
14. O.C. { God impossible
World fully contingent
15. O.CN { God impossible
World { Contingent in some
nec. in some
16. O.O. Both God & world impossible

Synonym
(Pantheism; Classical Theism [implicit])
(Classical Theism's explicit teaching
(on Atk 6))

(Classical theorem that says ω would most exist with some nice principles)

Classical Theism & Absolutism
(Bradley) Absolute Idealism

Necessitarian world with } i.e.
accidental God } cause
God just happens to exist & } i.e.
freely created world } Popperian
i.e. } free

(as cosmological arg.)
World necessarily exists, but
its contingent aspects (e.g. human
created God. (Taithard?))

Incoherent — what would incoherence
count in and if would fully acc;

~~And finally, we need to be~~
~~necessary, we need to be~~

God freely creates a ~~new~~ world
 (impl. ed. by Volsynskii Shawin, 2)

Patent-Taxen

Athletic ^{Necessitarianism} Determinism

Atrophic Induration (Accidents
injury)

Common sense
A Theist ^{is} would necessarily expect
to have contingent features
most acceptable form of extension (CS 27).