

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in their campaign against biopiracy. The actors deploying the strategies range from NGOs, international organizations, or states, who can use international fora to shame other states into complying with international norms. An example constitutes the annual meetings of the **International Whaling Commission**, where a coalition of anti-whaling states, together with anti-whaling NGOs, have sought over the last three decades to shame Japan into halting its commercial and scientific whaling activities.

Conceptually, "shaming" has been analyzed through both rationalist and constructivist accounts of international politics. Rationalist explanations focus on the material effects of shaming strategies, whether on their costs to actors who are shamed (Lebovic and Voeten 2009) or on their benefits to international cooperation (Franklin 2008). Shaming enters into the neoliberal institutionalist analysis of cooperation as a corollary to the interest-based analysis of reputation and the effect of the shadow of the future upon inter-state interactions (Hafner Burton 2008).

However, insofar as it involves complying with normative behavior, shaming beckons constructivist accounts that emphasize the intrinsic power of norms. Here, two lines of enquiry have been pursued successively; how shaming strategies operate, and why they are successful. With regards to the first, shaming constitutes the linchpin to "leverage politics" applied upon states (Keck and Sikkink 1988) or a key mechanism of their socialization into international norms. In seeking to understand why states actually respond to this form of leverage the second foregrounds the role of identities. States are sensitive to shaming because of the moral damage to their self-images and identities (Epstein and Barclay 2013).

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SOVEREIGNTY

Jean-Frédéric Morin

Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

Amandine Orsini

Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles, Belgium

"The Earth is one but the world is not" begins the Brundtland Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987: 27). Indeed, states are divided whereas the biosphere exists as a unit. This fact makes environmental politics an interesting case of reflection for the principle of sovereignty.

In the 1960s, during the decolonization process, developing countries insisted upon controlling their natural resources. Many were suspicious of the Western environmental intentions, fearing a form of neo-colonialism (see **Critical political economy**). In 1962, they strongly advocated for the adoption of the United Nations Resolution 1803 on the *Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources*, recognizing "the inalienable right of all states freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance with their national interests." Still today, developing countries frequently refer to this principle and make sure that negotiated texts explicitly recall it (Conca 1994; Hochstetler et al. 2000).

The idea of a full, exclusive, and supreme sovereignty might seem incompatible with the "common preoccupation of mankind," equally stated in numerous international agreements. Several environmentalists, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, feared that such behavior would impede environmental protection.

Under this line of reasoning, two options are frequently mentioned as means to limit sovereignty and favor environmental protection. The first consists in extending the **common heritage of mankind**. This would allow, for example, for the establishment of a global system of inspection and **taxation** for resources traditionally under state sovereignty. The second route for a post-Westphalian order is to increase the rights of non-state actors: **nongovernmental organizations, business and corporations, epistemic communities, or indigenous peoples and local communities** (Shadian 2010).

However, the supremacy of state sovereignty is not universally accepted as an impediment to environmental protection. International law already includes principles that limit sovereignty. Following the **preventive action principle**, for example, a state cannot use its territory in a way

that damages the environment of another state. It was politically endorsed by **summit diplomacy** in the Stockholm (1972) and the Rio (1992) Declarations, and legally recognized by the International Court of Justice (Sands 1995).

State sovereignty is additionally limited by international conventions, which often qualify sovereignty rights by assigning specific obligations to states (Schrijver 1997). The **Law of the Sea Convention**, for example, extends sovereignty rights to 200 nautical miles from the coasts but provides for environmental duties. This led some legal experts to affirm that sovereign rights "over certain environmental resources are not proprietary, but fiduciary" (Sand 2004: 48). Here, sovereignty is seen as a form of public trusteeship granted to states with specific obligations and limitations.

Other requirements also create conditions that push states towards cooperation and joint action. For instance, several environmental treaties prohibit trade with non-parties. The Montreal Protocol (see **Ozone regime**) bans imports, even from non-parties, of products containing substances that are harmful to the ozone layer. The **hazardous wastes regime** bans imports and exports of toxic wastes with non-parties. Consequently, a country whose firms produce sprays or process toxic wastes has a high incentive to respect these treaties (DeSombre 2005). Global interdependence prevents regulatory autarky.

With time, it appeared that sovereign rights could even consolidate environmental cooperation. As the **tragedy of the commons** suggests, a clear definition of rights can provide incentives for the **conservation and preservation** of natural resources. For example, the 1992 **biodiversity regime** and its 2010 Nagoya protocol placed genetic resources under national sovereignty, rejecting the common heritage principle that was formerly found in the 1983 FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources. Through their sovereign rights, states can now control the access to their biodiversity and ask biotechnology **business and corporations** to compensate for the use of their national genetic resources.

Arguably, concerning **effectiveness**, states are often the best actors to enforce and control environmental measures. Not only are they able to impose regulations, levy taxes, offer subsidies, and define education programs, they also have the political and legal capacity to challenge actors that damage their natural resources. Fish stocks are unsustainably fished and extra-atmospheric space hazardously over-polluted partly because of the lack of national sovereignty over these resources.

The debates between sovereignty as an obstacle or as a means for environmental protection could be somewhat resolved by breaking down the concept. Karen Litfin (1997) divides sovereignty into authority, control, and legitimacy. She argues that states engage in "sovereignty bargains" along these dimensions. For instance, tying emission targets to domestic ownership of green technology could increase autonomy but reduce legitimacy, while delegating emission targets to an internationally recognized scientific body (see **Boundary organizations**) could increase legitimacy but decrease autonomy. Here, sovereignty is not understood as an absolute attribute but as a multidimensional concept in constant flux, and in constant social redefinition (Conca 1994; Chayes and Chayes 1998; Hochstetler et al. 2000).

To further understand the complex interaction between the principle of sovereignty and environmental protection, it might be useful to differentiate environmental problems. The quality of scientific knowledge (see **Science**), the level of ecological interdependence, the availability of international institutions, and the type of national resources might affect the desirability for a strong sovereignty norm and the bargains settled between sovereignty dimensions. One hypothesis is that the protection of local resources benefits from the direct involvement of transnational and supranational actors, whereas transboundary resources are better protected when states guard their sovereign rights.

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SUMMIT DIPLOMACY

Arild Underdal

University of Oslo and Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, Norway

In the study of international relations, a "summit" is usually defined as a meeting involving heads of state or government (typically presidents or prime ministers) in direct face-to-face communication in the same room (Dunn 1996: 16f.). Meetings of this format have a long history, but Winston Churchill seems to have been the first, in 1950, to label them "summits."

Churchill used this label restrictively for (rare) meetings where the leaders of the Great Powers negotiated important high politics issues such as World War II strategies and peace settlements. Over the past three to four decades, summit diplomacy has expanded and become more institutionalized. Leaders of the most important states still meet in exclusive club-like settings, notably G8 and G20, but now they meet regularly, the "clubs" are larger, and their agendas are more diverse. Moreover, meetings of heads of state or government have become an integral component of the political system of several regional organizations including the European Union and the African Union, and of forums such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (see **Regional governance**). Most of these meetings cover multiple issues, but overall attention to environmental concerns seems to have been growing.

Today, two main types of summits play important but different roles in environmental governance. First, regional organizations such as the EU and club-like forums such as the G20 play more or less important roles in governing human activities that cause environmental damage. Environmentalists may dismiss the summits that take place in these settings as focusing on policies for economic growth and stability rather than on environmental protection. Yet, if we measure importance in terms of environmental consequences, summits that take place in these

settings and that focus primarily on economic issues will often—for better or worse—be the most important. The EU's importance is further boosted by its direct involvement in environmental policymaking and by its unique institutional capacity.

The other important type of summit is that called specifically to strengthen environmental governance. Most such summits take place in the context of UN global conferences and **regimes**. Prominent examples include the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development (also known as the Earth Summit), the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on **sustainable development**, and the 2012 Rio Conference on Sustainable Development. Here, the ideal is universal participation. The setting is traditionally dominated by environmental ministries, agencies, experts (often forming **epistemic communities**), and **nongovernmental organizations**. What these actors presumably have in common is a genuine commitment to environmental values—and a weak mandate to intervene in the human activities that threaten these values. The active involvement of heads of government or state may be thought of as particularly important to ensure that environmental values and policies in fact penetrate other policy domains. Available evidence confirms that meetings of leaders indeed can provide unique opportunities for enhancing environmental policies (see **Influential individuals**). The current institutional reform of the **Commission on Sustainable Development** is an attempt to take advantage of such opportunities. However, particularly in its present format of mega-gatherings with sprawling agendas and a rich flora of side events, global conference diplomacy can hardly provide a conducive setting for some of the most important leadership functions that summits are supposed to serve (Victor 2011).

Let us nevertheless begin on the bright side. First, global conferences often serve as an effective tool for raising awareness, setting political agendas, and simultaneously focusing the attention of governments and stakeholders worldwide on the same problem (Seyfang and Jordan 2002). All these effects are amplified, sometimes substantially, if the conference includes a summit attended by presidents or prime ministers of the most important states. In fact, preparations for such summits often lead to unilateral upgrading of a state's policies and/or its institutional capacity (Meyer et al. 1997). Second, summit diplomacy generates, particularly for the leaders involved, positive stakes in its own success. Summits thus provide windows of opportunity for environmental ministries, agencies, and NGOs to influence policy (Seyfang and Jordan 2002), and they usually end with some kind of joint declaration. Third, the active