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Employment models in social enterprises: does the mission matter for job quality, discrimination and motivations of workers in low-skilled positions?

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INTRODUCTION OF THESIS

This thesis is part of a larger research program (ARC) entitled “On the Fringe of the Labour Market: Social Production of Job (In)Security in the Post-industrial Society” that results from a dialogue between psychology, economics, and industrial relations and which focuses on the job quality of low-skilled workers. According to Muñoz de Bustillo (2009), job quality is defined by two dimensions: the first refers to employment quality, which corresponds to the characteristics of the employment contract (type of contract, wage, working hours, social benefits, etc.); the second refers to work quality, which covers the characteristics of the job itself and of the relational and physical environment in which the tasks are performed. Job quality is the outcome of different types of processes that take place at different levels: the institutional regime, the organization, groups, and individuals (Paugam & Zhou, 2007). Hence, this research program aims at providing an interdisciplinary and multi-level analysis of the processes of job quality for workers in low-skilled position. The contribution of this thesis to this interdisciplinary research is its focus on the “organization” level. The aim is to analyze the link between an organization’s mission—either for-profit or socially oriented—and the job quality of low-skilled workers. In a broader view, this thesis question the specificities of the employment models of socially oriented organizations compare to for-profit organizations with a particular focus on job quality, work motivation and issues related to discrimination at work.

The concepts used to describe organizations with social mission vary from one country to another: "économie sociale et solidaire" in France; "économie sociale" and "entreprise à profit social” in Belgium; “non-profit sector” in the US, “voluntary sector” in the UK, etc. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon tradition, most scientists who are rooted in the European tradition consider the "third sector" to include not only non-profit organizations (associations) but also cooperatives, mutual societies, foundations and even new forms of social enterprises or, in other words, all organizations whose primary purpose is not profit maximization for shareholders. Given that the purpose of this thesis is not to discuss the underlying issues with these different concepts, we made the choice to use the generic term of “social enterprise” (SE). For this research, we then define social enterprise as not-for-profit organizations that combine an entrepreneurial dynamic to provide goods or services with the primacy of their social aims.

Introduction

Private organizations with a social mission represent a consequent number of jobs[1] and are being established in increasingly diverse types of industries. Besides, employers and workers are starting to structure themselves in more visible and identifiable professional organizations. In this context, the existence of a specific employment model in SEs may be discussed, particularly with regards to job quality. Nowadays, this question is even of upmost importance because such organizations are more and more entering into competition with for-profit organizations (FPOs) and public organizations, notably by the creation of quasi-markets[2]. This type of regulation is in line with the new public management that leads public authorities to place SEs and FPOs in competition with each other (see Pollitt, 2007). In such a context of competition, the existence of a specific employment model in SEs may be discussed as it may lead to increasing pressure on SEs to isomorph for-profit organizations' (FPOs) practices in order to be more "professional" and competitive (e.g., Ebrahim, 2005 Weisbrod, 1998).

Many questions related to the comparative analysis between FPOs and SEs have already been discussed in economic literature (in terms of their efficiency, trust in their relationships with consumers, etc.). The question of job quality is, however, at the heart of recent works (e.g., Henry, Nassaut, Defourny, & Nyssens, 2009; Petrella, Maisonnasse, Melnik & Richez-Battesti, 2010) and remains a controversial issue. In fact, previous results do not identify a single type of job quality in SEs but rather a wide spectrum of practices (the heterogeneity of this "other economy" is probably as important as it is in the for-profit sector). Therefore, the question of the existence of a specific type of job quality (or, more generally, of the employment model) in SE requires deeper investigations.

The observed heterogeneity of practices within SEs may have several explanations. On the one hand, the type of industry or the type of job considered may have important consequences on job quality; however, most previous studies have not always given much consideration to these factors. Therefore, there is a need to isolate the effects of the

[1] The third sector represents 6.5% of the remunerated jobs in E.U. and 11.5% in Belgium (Monzon & Chaves, 2012).

[2] Even though the concept of quasi-market is far from being fully stabilized (Bode, 2007), researchers generally acknowledge that quasi-markets essentially create a division between the roles of financing and of providing social services. Quasi-markets have two main characteristics: 1) the consumer's power is channeled, either directly, through the allocation of subsidies – e.g. vouchers, budget allocation – to consumers who then pass it on to the provider, or indirectly, via a third party, for instance the social departments of local authorities, which are in charge of purchasing the services for consumers; 2) the State still contributes to financing the services and regulates them, but the provision of those services is open to various kinds of organization: public sector, social enterprises and for-profit organizations all compete on the market.

organization's sector (SE or FPO) on job quality from other effects such as the type of industry or the type of job provided. On the other hand, while the mission of FPOs is to maximize profit, there exists a diverse range of social missions in the SE sector (sustainable development, worker integration, to help elderly or vulnerable people, to fight against poverty or discrimination, etc.). Hence, beyond the sector, there is the question of the relationship between the social mission of an SE and job quality. In particular, the question to be investigated in greater depth is: Do SEs with different types of missions develop the same type of employment model?

Beyond job quality, another important element to take into account to understand the employment model in SE is workers' motivations. In fact, relying on insights from work psychology, economists know that motivation plays a central role at work. Besides, studying workers' motivations would allow a deeper understanding of the possible existence of job quality specificities in SEs as compared to FPOs, primarily for two reasons. First, SE employees are usually considered to be differently motivated than their counterparts in FPOs. In particular, SEs' workers are not only motivated by monetary rewards but also by providing help to others and to meet the social aims in which they believe (e.g., Lewis, 2010; Tschirqhart, Reed, Freeman, & Anker, 2008). In this regard, the labor donation theory highlights that SEs workers (especially managers and professionals) are more willing to work for lower wages than their counterparts in FPOs (e.g., Preston, 1989) because, for them, working towards a social mission is more meaningful and personally rewarding than working for profit maximization (e.g., Light 2002; Mirvis & Hackett, 1983). Consequently, SEs would be able to, if necessary, offer lower wages, thus affecting the job quality of their workers.

Second, a crucial concern for any type of employer is to implement a work environment or incentive structures that orient employee efforts towards the organizational mission and to reduce risks arising from information asymmetry and opportunistic behavior (e.g., Ben-Ner & Ren, 2015). Therefore, since the missions of FPOs and SEs differ (and because they employ workers with different types of motivation profile), one may expect that their incentives structure also differ (Borzaga & Tortia, 2006). For-profit organizations tend to use explicit rewards like pay-for-performance incentives, while SEs have interest to sustain and favor workers' motivations to work for a social cause, which might call for a work environment more shaped by altruism and social concerns (e.g., Speckbacher, 2013). Hence, SEs and FPOs should develop specific work environments and use different types of practices and

incentives, which in turn have an impact on job quality and, on a broader scale, on the employment model itself.

If a lot of theoretical and empirical studies related to workers' motivations in SEs have already been conducted, further investigation is still required to deeply understand the relationship between workers' motivations and job quality. First, while previous studies have identified SE workers as being more intrinsically motivated than their counterparts in FPOs, new research developed at the crossroads of psychology and economics indicate that SE workers are more driven by prosocial motivation, which is extrinsically regulated. Hence, more theoretical clarifications and empirical investigations about the nature and the regulation of the motivation of SE workers are required to avoid misinterpretation in the transposition of psychological theories (De Cooman, De Gieter, Pepermans, & Jegers, 2011). Second, previous empirical studies do not dissociate the selection effect from the exposition effect: Are SE workers differently motivated than their counterparts in FPOs because SEs attract workers with a different motivational profile, or because SE workers are exposed to a work environment that affects their motivations to work, or both? Third, more theoretical clarifications and empirical investigations are needed to understand the effects of managerial practices on workers' motivations in SE, such as how to nurture workers' motivation to work for a social mission. Fourth, the literature suggests that only highly skilled workers in SE are differently motivated than their counterparts in FPO, but no empirical studies have been dedicated to the motivation profile of low-skilled workers in SE to check that hypothesis.

Finally, literature on social enterprises and non-profit organizations suggests that SEs have built more ground in addressing the issue of discrimination at work. This hypothesis is based on three arguments: SEs share a number of social values/principles (Gibelman, 2000), attract an altruistic and mission-oriented workforce (De Cooman et al., 2011), and depend on public and voluntary resources (Leete, 2000). If it is true that SEs give more importance to issues regarding discrimination than FPOs, it would have important consequences on the job quality of people who might suffer due to discrimination, on the diversity management policy, and on affirmative actions developed at the organizational level, which might be considered as a structuring element of the SE employment model.

Empirical studies that compare SEs and FPOs with regards to discrimination already exist. However, most of these studies examine gender discrimination (e.g., Hallock, 1999; Shaiko, 1997; Steinberg & Jacobs, 1994) and are not interested in other forms of

discrimination, such as racial discrimination. This is problematic because the observation of there being less gender discrimination in SEs might be due to the fact that such organizations are more often in women-dominated industries than FPOs (e.g., Benz, 2005). Moreover, most of existing empirical studies focus on wage discrimination while the observation of less discrimination in wages might be due to the presence of less wage dispersion[3] in SEs than in FPOs (Faulk, Edwards, Lewis, & McGinnis, 2012) and then not be a good indicator of the presence of less discrimination in others types of practices. Therefore, the observation of less wage discrimination in SEs is not a sufficient argument for concluding that SEs have fairer practices than FPOs. In conclusion, there is a need for more empirical studies to focus on race, age or sex discrimination in other types of organizational practices (like hiring or promotion) in order to affirm that SEs are fairer in all practices and that they implement affirmative action more often than FPOs.

Therefore, this thesis aims is to question the specificities of the employment models of SEs that are competing with FPOs. Particularly, we are interested in job quality, work motivation and issues related to discrimination at work. We combine economic and psychological literature and methodologies to investigate these research themes.

Our thesis focuses on low-skilled positions. We decided to look at unskilled jobs because many industries in which SEs compete with other types of providers involve low-skilled tasks, especially in the social services industries. Further, unemployment remains high in the European Union—it had risen to 10% in 2013 (Eurostat, September 2013)—which has led to non-standard work arrangements and an increase in job precariousness (especially for low-skilled jobs). In addition, previous studies postulate that SE might have different types of job quality than FPO because they attract workers who are a priori motivated by the social mission of the organization (Frey, 1997; Narcy, 2009) while this assumption is possibly not adapted to the case of low-skilled workers.

The quasi-market of service-vouchers in Belgium that was implemented by that country's public authorities in 2001 is the empirical field for our thesis. This system is mainly designed to foster the development of regular jobs for low-qualified people in the

[3] The presence of less wages dispersion in SEs than in FPOs is justified by two main reasons. First, strong wage dispersion would stunt nonmonetary motivations by decreasing worker morale (e.g., Tortia, 2008). Second, the presence of an overall lower wage level in SEs as compared to FPOs decreases their opportunity to implement a high level of wage dispersion (Themudo, 2009). Indeed, the minimum level of wages fixed by law creates less opportunity for an enterprise with a lower remuneration level to scatter wages between this minimum wage level and its maximum wage.

housekeeping field where, until now, services have been mostly provided via the black market. This system works as follows: Any person who is interested in obtaining housekeeping services can buy vouchers. The client chooses an accredited provider and then a worker is sent to the client's house. Thus, the workers are hired by the providers, not by the households, which are clients of the providers (Defourny, Henry, Nassaut, & Nyssens, 2010). The services provided are related to housekeeping duties, strictly speaking (i.e. no care) at home or outside the home (ironing, household shopping, etc.). This quasi-market consists of more than 100,000 workers (over 97% women) and 3,000 enterprises, 47.4% of which are FPOs and 16.6% of which are SEs[4] (Gerard, Neyens, & Valsamis, 2012). In this thesis we rely on the organization's legal status in order to distinguish between for-profit providers and SEs. Providers with a legal status that unconstrained profit distribution pursue a mission of profit maximization while others are expected to pursue a social mission. To specify the type of social mission, we take into account the type of accreditation conferred by public authorities. There are two types of SEs: work integration social enterprises (WISEs) and home care services organizations (HCSOs). Accredited WISEs are social cooperatives that aim to create temporary or long-term jobs for the most disadvantaged workers. Accredited HCSOs are non-profit organizations that exclusively focus on serving vulnerable families and elderly people.

Table 1 – Provider typology in the quasi-market of service-vouchers in 2012

Sector	**For-Profit Sector**		**Social Enterprises**			**Public Organizations**	
Mission	Profit Maximization		Integration of low-skilled workers in the labor market	Home care to elderly and vulnerable people	Others	Integration of low-skilled workers in the labor market	Home care to elderly and vulnerable people
Type of Providers	FPOs	Natural person	WISEs	HCSOs	Others types of associations	Local employment agency (ALE), Public Center for Social Welfare (CPAS)	Services organized by Public Center for Social Welfare (CPAS)
Number of Organizations	47.4 %	16.3%	4.1%	12.5%		19.6%	
Number of Workers	63.2 %	3.4%	7.5%	13.1%		12.8%	

Source: « Evaluation du régime des titres-services pour les services et emplois de proximité 2011» (Gerard, Neyens, & Valsamis D., 2012).

[4] Public organizations and natural persons with salaried workers are also present in the quasi-market of service-vouchers, but we have not considered them because our objective is to compare SEs with FPOs (see Table 1).

From a methodological point of view, the quasi-market of service-vouchers offers then the opportunity to compare the employment models between FPOs and two types of SEs (one being worker-centric and the other user-centric) by considering organizations that belong to the same industry and which offer the exact same services (see Table 1). It is then possible to catch the effects on the employment model due to the organization's mission without any disturbance from other effects related to the industry or to the type of job provided. Moreover, it is likely to observe differences in job quality between the different types of service-vouchers providers since they have high power of decisions about job quality. Indeed and by contrast with other quasi-markets, the Belgian voucher system is slightly regulated, since almost no specific criteria are required regarding job's quality (and service) (Nassaut & Nyssens, 2009). The state seems to consider that a too restrictive regulatory framework could hamper the main objective of job creation. Job quality depends then more on the employer or the worker himself (through its ability to choose the right employer) than on public authorities. These elements are particularly important here since important asymmetries of information exist between the State and organizations (the first having difficulty to verify that the latter comply with the law, already low demanding, in terms of job quality) and between organizations and workers (the latter ignorant to some extent the quality of jobs provided by employers). Therefore, job quality may significantly vary between the providers. Nevertheless, providers face some constraints in determining job quality. The first of them is related to the price of the service-voucher (that represents one hour of work), set by the state at 9 euros. It is then impossible for organizations to set a higher price to finance high job's or/and service's qualities. Secondly, providers have the legal obligation to be affiliate to one joint committee (established bodies) composed from an equal number of representative organizations of employers and trade unions. One important mission of joint committees is to elaborate collective labour agreements notably about job quality that organizations have to respect. Finally, organizations are constrained by the regional and national labour law and notably by the minimum wage since housekeeping does not require legal qualification.

The thesis is composed of four chapters structured around the specificities of employment models in SEs compared to FPOs[5]. The first chapter examines the job quality of workers in low-skilled positions. The next two discuss the issue of motivation at work: first, from a conceptual point of view then by implementing a longitudinal study regarding the

[5] These chapters are articles that aims to be published in reviews (the first chapter is already published in Economie et Société [Socio-économie du travail, n°37] and the fourth chapter has been revised and resubmitted to Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly). Hence, some repetitions might occur between the four chapters.

evolution of the motivation of workers in low-skilled positions. Finally, the last chapter focuses on managers' prejudices towards immigrant workers and diversity management policies.

The aim of the first chapter is to contribute to the literature on social enterprise by analyzing the influence of organizations' missions on the quality of low-qualified jobs. The analysis is based on a questionnaire submitted to 600 workers from 47 enterprises and on a system of indicators elaborated to capture job quality. How the quality of employment should be investigated was the subject of much debate. Many composite indicators and indicator systems have been created but none seem able to measure job quality for every context and for every level of analysis (the world, a country, a region, an industry, etc.). For this study, we referred to the work of Muñoz de Bustillo (2009) and adapted it to the specificities of the service voucher quasi-market and SEs. To measure the different dimensions of job quality, we combined objective and subjective variables. In total, we selected 40 variables to represent 12 dimensions of job quality built through factorial analysis techniques.

Results indicate that the distinction between profit and not-for-profit enterprises does not explain all the differences that exist in terms of job quality across firms: the organizations' social missions also matter. FPOs usually implement a business model based on a cost-minimization policy; WISEs develop an employment model centered on the work integration of vulnerable workers, leading to high job quality and considerable support provided to these workers; and HCSOs develop an associative employment model focused on helping vulnerable clients.

The two next chapters study the motivations of SE workers. The first of these provides a theoretical contribution that focuses on two main objectives. First, it uses both economic and psychological literature to explore what exactly is the nature of motivation to work for an SE. We analyze the content of SE workers motivations as well as the concept of regulation of motivation based on the self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985). We suggest that the motivation to work in SE must no longer be seen as intrinsic, but rather as prosocial. Prosocial motivation refers to the willingness to help others by making "a difference" (Lewis, 2010; Tschirhart, Reed, Freeman, & Anker, 2008) and may be based on different types of extrinsic regulation (introjected–identified–integrated) but not on intrinsic regulation (Grant, 2008; Speckbacher, 2013). Second, this chapter proposes a reflection about the implications related to this new conceptualization in terms of managerial practices. More particularly, we discuss

the practices that SEs might use to attract and select workers motivated by their social mission on the one hand, and to sustain and favor their motivation over time on the other. We highlight that a work environment that promotes maintenance and development of workers' prosocial motivation and performance is characterized by: contact (direct and indirect) with beneficiaries, accessibility to information about the mission and beneficiaries, motivational job characteristics (such as autonomy, a variety of skills, task identity and significance, etc.) and positive organizational climates (recognition and organizational support, democratic participation and involvement in the decision process, and fair practices).

The third chapter is an empirical study that focuses on the influence of an organization's mission on the motivations of workers in low-skilled position. In the case of low-skilled jobs, the hypothesis that SEs attract workers who are motivated to help others and to meet some social aims in which they believe is challenged. Hence, we perform an empirical study in the quasi-market of service vouchers in Belgium to know if SEs attract workers to perform low-skilled jobs who have a different motivational profile than their counterparts in FPOs (selection effect). No significant difference was found. Our results are then not in favor of a selection effect. Nevertheless, some authors suggest that the work environment of SEs may have positive effects on their workers' motivations and on their adhesion to the social mission. Hence, we have compared the motivational profiles of the same workers after they have worked for eight months in their respective organizations. The results show that SE workers perceive higher value congruence with their organization's mission and are more pro-socially motivated than their counterparts in FPOs. In conclusion, we are able to affirm that there exists a positive effect in SEs on prosocial motivation and on the perceived congruence of values with the organization for workers in low-skilled positions (exposition effect).

The fourth chapter focuses on managers' prejudices towards immigrant workers, which is considered as a determinant of the presence of discrimination in practices like hiring or offering promotions. Hence, this chapter contributes to the SE literature in two ways: First, by focusing on race discrimination instead on gender discrimination and, second, by analyzing a predictor of discrimination in managerial practices instead of looking at discrimination in one particular practice (e.g. wage). Our results demonstrate that WISE managers are significantly less prejudiced towards immigrants than FPO managers, but no difference was found between HCSO and FPO managers. This final chapter also focuses on diversity management policies. While several authors have suggested that a multicultural approach of diversity that values group differences would improve relationships between workers with different ethnic or

cultural origins, few studies have empirically examined such a strategy at the organizational level. Our conceptualization of multiculturalism as a strategy to manage diversity inside the organization allows us to complement previous attempts to investigate the negative effect of valuing group differences in prejudice. In addition, our study is probably one of the first to elaborate a link between the mission of an organization and the implementation of diversity management policies. We had expected that SEs, and specifically WISEs, would be more likely to favor organizational multiculturalism than FPOs, but such a result was not found.

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CHAPTER 1

La qualité des emplois peu qualifiés dans l'ESS: la mission de l'entreprise fait-elle une différence?

(The quality of low-skilled jobs: does the mission of the organization matter?)

This article will be published in 2015 in the journal « Economie et Société (Socio-économie du travail) », number 37. It has been developed in the context of bi-annual small group meeting of French-speaker researchers that started in 2011 around the issue of job quality in social enterprise.

La qualité des emplois peu qualifiés dans l'ESS: la mission de l'entreprise fait-elle une différence?[6]

Résumé

Cet article a pour objectif de contribuer à la littérature sur l'économie sociale et solidaire en analysant le rôle joué par la mission des organisations sur la qualité des emplois peu qualifiés. Plus particulièrement, nous analysons la qualité d'emploi dans les organisations privées à but lucratif et dans deux types d'entreprises sociales (l'une avec une mission d'insertion, l'autre avec une mission d'aide aux familles et aux personnes âgées). Pour ce faire, nous construisons un faisceau d'indicateurs de la qualité d'emploi sur la base d'un questionnaire soumis à 600 travailleurs répartis dans 47 organisations du quasi-marché des titres-services belge. Les résultats montrent que le statut juridique n'est pas suffisant pour distinguer les différents modèles de qualité d'emploi ; il faut également tenir compte pour les organisations non-lucratives du type de mission sociale.

Abstract

The ambition of this article is to contribute to the literature on social (non-for-profit) enterprise by analysing the influence of enterprises' mission on the quality of low-qualified jobs. Particularly, we investigate job quality in for-profit organization and in two types of social enterprises distinguish by their mission (work integration social enterprise and home care services organizations). The analysis is based on a questionnaire submitted to 600 workers from 47 enterprises and on a system of indicators elaborated to capture job quality. Results indicate that the distinction between profit and non-for-profit enterprises does not explain all the differences in terms of job quality across firms: enterprises' mission also matters.

Mots clefs: entreprise sociale, qualité d'emploi, travail peu qualifié

Keywords: Social enterprise, Job quality, Low-skilled job

[6] This article has been written with Marthe Nyssens. It will be published in 2015 in a special issue (n°37) of the journal « Economie et Société (Socio-économie du travail) ». This special issue is focused on job quality in social enterprise and makes the synthesis of the works performed during the fourth past years by a group of researchers around that thematic.

1. Introduction

L'économie sociale et solidaire représente un nombre conséquent d'emplois[7] et recouvre une diversité de plus en plus grande de domaines d'activité. Les employeurs comme les salariés se structurent également progressivement en organisations professionnelles de mieux en mieux identifiées. Dans ce contexte, les éventuelles spécificités de leurs modèles d'emploi, en particulier, la question de la qualité de l'emploi, demandent à être interrogées d'autant plus que ces « entreprises sociales » (ES)[8] sont de plus en plus amenées à rentrer en concurrence avec les entreprises privées à but lucratif (EBL) et les organisations publiques.

La spécificité de la qualité d'emploi dans les ES reste une question controversée. Des salaires généralement inférieurs ont été mis en évidence par Frank (1996), Preston (1989) et Weisbrod (1983), mais pas par Ben-ner, Ren & Paulson (2011), Leete (2000), and Ruhm & Borkoski (2003), tandis que Mocan & Teikin (2003) ont même observé des salaires plus élevés dans les ES. Petrella, Maisonnasse, Melnik & Richez-Battesti (2010) ont montré, quant à eux, que les politiques de prévention des risques et la mise en place d'un dialogue social formel sont insuffisants dans le secteur de l'économie sociale et solidaire en France. Tortia (2008) a constaté que les ES italiennes offrent plus d'autonomie et de reconnaissance à leurs travailleurs que les EBL. Ben-Ner & Ren (2015) observent que comparativement aux EBL, les ES délèguent plus facilement un pouvoir de décision à leurs travailleurs mais qu'ils leurs offrent moins d'incitant monétaires et moins d'avantages sociaux. Finalement, Almond & Kendall (2000) et Preston (1990) ont montré que les travailleurs des ES ont accès à plus de formations, à un niveau plus élevé de flexibilité et à des taches moins répétitives que les EBL. En outre, les résultats de ces différentes études n'ont pas permis de dégager un modèle d'emploi unique dans les ES mais ont plutôt mis en évidence une hétérogénéité de pratiques. L'hétérogénéité de cette « autre économie » est très forte comme celle observée parmi les entreprises à but lucratif. La question des modèles d'emploi spécifiques aux ES est ainsi posée et nécessite de prolonger les réflexions quant à la distinction des effets liés à la mission

[7] Le secteur de l'économie sociale fournit un emploi rémunéré à 6,5% de la population active de l'UE-27, et entre 9% et 11,5% en Belgique et en France (Monzon & Chaves, 2012).

[8] Les vocables utilisés pour désigner ces dynamiques entrepreneuriales à finalité sociale diffèrent d'un pays à l'autre: « économie sociale et solidaire » en France, « économie sociale » « entreprise à profit social » en Belgique, etc. Contrairement à la tradition anglo-saxonne, la plupart des scientifiques ancrés dans la tradition européenne considère que ce « troisième secteur » englobe non seulement les associations mais aussi les coopératives, les mutuelles et de plus en plus de fondations voire de nouvelles formes d'entreprises sociales, ou autrement dit, toutes les organisations dont la finalité première n'est pas la maximisation du profit pour les actionnaires. L'objet de cet article n'est pas de discuter les enjeux sous-jacents à ces concepts. Notre étude empirique comprend deux types d'organisations: des coopératives à finalité sociale et des associations. Compte-tenu de la diversité des vocables suivant les contextes nationaux, nous avons fait le choix d'utiliser le terme générique d'entreprise sociale (ES) pour cet article.

de l'entreprise des effets liés, notamment, au domaine d'activité et au type d'emploi pourvu. Dans cet article, nous nous intéressons aux emplois peu qualifiés dans le secteur des services à la personne.

Nous nous penchons sur le cas des emplois peu qualifiés car d'une part, plusieurs domaines d'activité où les ES entrent en concurrence avec les autres types de prestataires, concernent des tâches dites « peu qualifiées », en particulier le secteur des services à la personne et, d'autre part, parce que la littérature qui analyse la qualité de l'emploi dans les ES, postule la plupart du temps que ces organisations attirent des travailleurs relativement qualifiés et à priori motivés par la mission de l'organisation (e.g., Frey, 1997a ; Narcy, 2009).

Le secteur des titres-services belge constitue le terrain empirique de cette recherche. Ce dispositif est un titre de paiement qui permet à des utilisateurs de régler une prestation de services de proximité qui relevait jusque-là essentiellement du travail au noir. Les services pouvant être prestés sont des services ménagers stricto senso (pas d'aide aux personnes), à domicile ou hors domicile (essentiellement du repassage en centrale). Ce secteur peut être qualifié de quasi-marché dans la mesure où les prestataires à finalité lucrative et non lucrative sont mis en concurrence et que le pouvoir d'achat des consommateurs s'exerce par l'attribution de titres de paiement, subventionnés par les pouvoirs publics. Ce quasi-marché concerne plus de 100.000 travailleurs (dont plus de 97% de femmes) et 3.000 entreprises dont 47,4% d'entreprises privées lucratives (EBL) et 16,6% d'ES parmi lesquelles des « entreprises d'insertion » (EI) et des « associations d'aide aux familles et aux personnes âgées » (AF)[9] (Gerard, Neyens, & Valsamis, 2012). Notons que l'emploi de gré à gré, et c'est une différence notoire avec le cas français, est interdit par la loi. En outre, ce système, en comparaison des quasi-marchés étrangers, est faiblement réglementé en ce qui concerne la qualité de l'emploi et du service (Nassaut & Nyssens, 2009). Ce quasi-marché constitue donc un champ empirique idéal afin d'analyser l'influence de la mission (EBL-AF-EI) d'une organisation sur la qualité des emplois peu qualifiés. Afin de pouvoir comparer la qualité d'emploi dans ces trois types d'organisation, nous avons soumis un questionnaire à 600 travailleurs titre-service (voir Encadré 1).

[9] Des organisations publiques (19,6%) et des personnes physiques (16,3%) sont également présents sur ce marché mais ils n'ont pas été repris en compte dans le cadre de cette étude dont l'objectif est de contraster ES et EBL.

Encadré 1 : récolte de données

Les données ont été récoltées dans 47 entreprises titres-services évoluant soit en Région Wallonne, soit à Bruxelles et plus précisément dans 18 EI, 18 EBL, et 11 AF. Les EI et les EBL ont été sélectionnées aléatoirement à partir de l'ensemble de la population d'intérêt. Le nombre d'AF présent sur le marché des titres-services étant beaucoup plus faible, nous avons proposé à l'ensemble de la population de participer à cette étude. 11 ont accepté. Une fois les entreprises sélectionnées, il a été proposé à l'ensemble de leurs travailleurs titre-service de participer à l'étude en remplissant un questionnaire. Les chercheurs se sont rendus dans chaque entreprise entre mars et novembre 2012 afin de s'assurer que les travailleurs répondent au questionnaire de façon adéquate et qu'ils ne soient soumis à aucune forme de pression de la part de leurs dirigeants. L'anonymat et la confidentialité étaient bien entendu assurés. L'échantillon final se compose de 600 travailleurs, et plus précisément de 341 en EI, 127 en AF et 132 en EBL. Le plus grand taux de participation dans les EI (37% contre 13,5% dans les EBL et 16% dans les AF), s'explique par l'organisation de réunions régulières qui regroupent l'ensemble des travailleurs et qui a donc facilité la participation à l'enquête.

L'objectif du questionnaire était de récolter des informations sur la qualité de leur emploi basée sur un faisceau d'indicateurs (voir ci-dessous). Des questions concernant leurs caractéristiques sociodémographiques et leur organisation ont été également posées (voir Tableau 2).

Dans la littérature qui analyse les ES, la mission est généralement appréhendée via le statut juridique: les prestataires dotés d'un statut juridique non contraint par rapport à la distribution des profits poursuivent une mission lucrative tandis que les autres sont supposés poursuivre une mission sociale. Néanmoins, pour les ES, le statut juridique non lucratif ne dit rien quant au type de mission sociale. Nous prenons donc également en compte le cadre institutionnel dans lequel les prestataires s'inscrivent et plus précisément l'agrément octroyé aux ES par les pouvoirs publics qui régule leur mission sociale sur le quasi-marché des titres-services. En effet, les prestataires titre-service poursuivant une mission sociale s'inscrivent non seulement dans la régulation quasi-marchande des titres-services mais aussi au sein d'une régulation qui peut être qualifiée de « tutélaire ». La notion de régulation tutélaire caractérise un mode de régulation publique où la production des services est encadrée par la puissance publique agissant ainsi comme « tutrice » du bénéficiaire. Elle s'inscrit dans des cadres

réglementaires, édictés dans des décrets régionaux ou nationaux, garantissant l'accès à des publics vulnérables (usagers pour certains, travailleurs pour les autres), à des services prestés par des organisations non lucratives tout en garantissant des normes d'encadrement et de professionnalisation. Cette régulation tutélaire qui se matérialise au travers d'agréments permet de distinguer deux types d'ES sur le quasi-marché des titres-services : d'une part, les entreprises d'insertion qui ont une mission sociale axée sur la création d'emplois pour des personnes particulièrement fragilisées sur le marché du travail, et d'autre part, les associations d'aide aux familles et aux personnes âgées qui offrent des services qui ciblent les familles vulnérables et les personnes âgées. En définitive, la mission des ES est déterminée non seulement par leur statut juridique d'organisation à but non lucratif (association ou coopérative à finalité sociale) mais aussi par leur cadre réglementaire de type tutélaire.

Cet article est structuré en fonction de deux objectifs: construire un faisceau d'indicateurs de la qualité d'emploi et le comparer en fonction de la mission de l'organisation (EBL-EI-AF). A partir de nos données, nous commençons par la construction du faisceau d'indicateurs. Ensuite, nous synthétisons les arguments avancés par la littérature relatifs aux différences entre EBL et ES du point de vue de la qualité d'emploi. Leur pertinence est discutée au regard du cas d'emplois peu qualifiés. Enfin, nous comparons, sur base de nos données d'enquête, ces indicateurs au regard des missions. Pour ce faire, nous mobilisons différentes méthodes statistiques, à savoir des comparaisons de moyenne, des régressions et une analyse de classification hiérarchique.

2. Comment construire un faisceau d'indicateurs de la qualité d'emploi ?

La façon dont la qualité de l'emploi doit être appréhendée a fait l'objet de nombreux débats. Bon nombre d'indicateurs composites et de systèmes d'indicateurs ont été créés mais aucun ne fait l'unanimité. Nous avons considéré les travaux de Muñoz de Bustillo (2009) comme un référentiel en l'adaptant aux spécificités du quasi-marché des titres-services et de l'ESS. Ces auteurs mettent en évidence, sur la base d'une analyse détaillée des forces et faiblesses de dix-huit indicateurs de la qualité d'emploi construits au niveau européen (comme par exemple les indicateurs de Laeken ou « the European Job Quality Index »), les dimensions qui doivent être considérées. Nous avons également choisi de créer un faisceau d'indicateurs et non un seul indice composite, ce dernier induisant une simplification trop

radicale de la réalité qui est par nature complexe et multidimensionnelle (Muñoz de Bustillo, 2009).

Afin de mesurer les différentes dimensions de la qualité d'emploi identifiées théoriquement, nous avons combiné variables objectives (de type dichotomique ou quantitative continue) et subjectives. Au total, nous avons retenu 40 variables pour représenter douze dimensions de la qualité de l'emploi.

Cinq dimensions ont pu être appréhendées à l'aide d'une seule ou deux variables (items). D'abord, la dimension salariale est mesurée par le salaire horaire brut. Ensuite, pour la dimension « temps de travail », nous prenons en compte non seulement les heures de travail prestées par semaine mais aussi la différence entre ces dernières et le nombre d'heures de travail souhaitées par le travailleur. Enfin, des construits créés et validés en psychologie (qui ont été traduits en français pour les besoins de cette étude) ont été utilisés pour mesurer les opportunités de carrière (Lievens, Van Hoye & Schreurs, 2005 ; α[10] =.77), l'autonomie au travail (Parker, 2003; α = .82) et l'intensité de la tâche (ou rythme et quantité de travail) (Notelaers & Veldhoven, 2001; α = .72). Ces construits sont composés de plusieurs affirmations pour lesquelles les travailleurs doivent marquer leur accord ou leur désaccord sur base d'une échelle de Likert[11] à 7 niveaux allant de 1 (« pas du tout d'accord ») à 7 (« tout à fait d'accord »). Le score obtenu par un travailleur sur ces dimensions est la moyenne des scores qu'il a attribués à chaque échelle du construit en question.

L'utilisation de plusieurs items s'est par contre avérée nécessaire pour obtenir suffisamment d'information quant aux 7 dimensions restantes : avantages monétaires ou en nature, sécurité d'emploi, flexibilité horaire, aspects relationnels, participation, développement des compétences et conditions matérielles de travail. Pour chacune de ces dimensions, nous avons utilisé la méthode de l'analyse factorielle afin de synthétiser les informations recueillies à travers un ensemble de questions. L'analyse factorielle permet de regrouper des items qui sont fortement corrélés, et qui sont donc censés partager un facteur commun, et de pouvoir ainsi calculer un score synthétique. Cette technique a été notamment employée par Petrella et al. (2010) dans le cadre de comparaisons sectorielles de la qualité d'emploi en France ou par Nicoletti, Scarpetta & Boylaud(2000) pour des comparaisons internationales.

[10] Alpha de Cronbach : mesure la fiabilité interne d'un construit. Il permet de déterminer si les différentes affirmations mesurent bien le même construit. Un alpha supérieur à 0.7 peut être considéré comme une bonne fiabilité interne.

[11] Échelle de jugement par laquelle la personne interrogée exprime son degré d'accord ou de désaccord vis-à-vis d'une affirmation.

Plus précisément, une analyse factorielle[12] est menée sur chacune des sept dimensions sur la base des réponses données par les travailleurs sur chaque items, préalablement normés, qui les composent (la méthode employée dépend des types d'items utilisés, Pagès (2002)[13]). L'objectif est, d'abord, de regrouper ces items en fonction de leur corrélation en un ou plusieurs facteurs afin de représenter un maximum de l'information initiale en un minimum de facteurs. Chaque facteur est défini par une combinaison d'items pondérée en fonction de leur saturation (« corrélation ») sur ce facteur. Plus de poids est attribué aux items qui saturent fortement avec le facteur. Un individu avec des résultats élevés sur les items qui saturent fortement sur un facteur sera alors caractérisé par un « score factoriel » élevé sur ce facteur.

Le nombre de facteurs retenu correspond au nombre de facteurs nécessaires pour expliquer au minimum 50% de la variance totale des items de la dimension. Les facteurs sont donc sélectionnés de façon séquentielle en fonction de la part de la variance qu'ils expliquent[14]. Après avoir identifié le nombre de facteurs à retenir et les items qui définissent chacun d'eux, le deuxième objectif est d'obtenir un indicateur unique de la dimension de la qualité d'emploi concernée. Quand plusieurs facteurs ont été retenus pour représenter une dimension de la qualité d'emploi, l'indicateur est la somme de ces facteurs pondérés en fonction de leur contribution relative à la variance expliquée de cette dimension[15]. Lorsqu'un seul facteur a été retenu, l'indicateur de cette dimension est son facteur.

Le tableau 1 répertorie les items qui ont été choisis pour décrire chaque dimension, les résultats des analyses factorielles par dimension et la façon dont chaque indicateur a été calculé. On observe qu'un seul facteur est suffisant pour représenter la dimension « aspects relationnels ». Dans les autres cas, deux facteurs sont nécessaires, ce qui semble indiquer que ces dimensions détiennent deux types d'informations distinctes. Pour ces dimensions, en plus de leur indicateur unique, leurs deux facteurs seront également analysés et interprétés de manière séparée.

En définitive, l'analyse factorielle permet de construire un indicateur par dimension de la qualité d'emploi qui met en exergue les caractéristiques discriminantes dans le quasi-

[12] Pour cette étape, toutes les observations avec une valeur manquante ont été supprimées.
[13] L'analyse en composantes principales est utilisée pour les dimensions représentées par des items quantitatifs. Quand la dimension est mesurée par des items catégoriels, l'analyse des correspondances multiples (ACM) est employée. Finalement, l'analyse factorielle multiple est utilisée quand la dimension est représentée à la fois par des items quantitatifs et catégoriels.
[14]Cette sélection se fait sur base de la valeur propre qui exprime en partie le pouvoir explicatif des facteurs. À noter, qu'un facteur doit avoir une valeur propre supérieure à 1 pour être pris en compte selon le critère de Kaiser. Ce critère n'est pas valide pour les ACM car les inerties projetées sont toujours comprises entre 0 et 1. Dans ce cas, les facteurs doivent avoir une valeur propre supérieure à 1/n, où n est le nombre de variables actives (Saporta, 2006).
[15] C'est-à-dire le rapport entre la valeur propre du facteur et la somme des valeurs propres des facteurs retenus pour cette dimension.

marché des titres-services. En effet, ces indicateurs donnent plus d'importance aux items (et aux facteurs) pour lesquels les résultats obtenus pour les individus sont les plus dispersés. Cette particularité de l'analyse factorielle devrait donc nous permettre d'identifier plus aisément les différences observées entre les différentes entreprises (ou individus) sur chaque dimension de la qualité d'emploi que si nous avions considéré une simple moyenne d'items pour construire les indicateurs.

Tableau 1 -- Résultats des analyses factorielles

Les conditions matérielles de travail		
Items	**Facteur 1** Environnement de travail, Ergonomie et risque d'accidents	**Facteur 2** Préventions des risques
	Poids des items	
Pas trop de bruits (L)	.16	.00
Pas trop chaud ou trop humide (L)	.20	.00
Pas de risques d'accidents (L)	.20	.00
Pas de positions douloureuses ou fatigantes (L)	.22	.00
Ne pas déplacer des objets lourds (L)	.21	.00
Mon entreprise exige que je porte un équipement de protection individuel (tablier, gants, etc.) (L)	.01	.29
Mon entreprise me fournit le matériel dont j'ai besoin (équipement de protection, etc.) (L)	.00	.38
Mon entreprise m'informe sur les risques liés à mon travail (L)	.01	.32
Poids du facteur	.62	.38
Critères de sélection		
Valeur propre	2.49	1.52
Variance expliquée (%)	31.12	19.04
Développement des compétences		
Items	**Facteur 1** Formations	**Facteur 2** Apprentissage par le travail
	Poids des items	
Les formations ne sont pas nécessairement en lien avec mon travail (L)	.30	.07
Participation à des formations lors des 12 derniers mois (L)	.39	.00
Nombre d'heures de formations reçues	.29	.00
Développement des compétences par le travail (échelle de Edwards, Scully, & Brtek, 1999 ; α = .86)	.02	.93
Poids du facteur	.63	.37
Critères de sélection		
Valeur propre	1.75	1.01
Variance expliquée (%)	43.68	25.19

Tableau 1 -- Résultats des analyses factorielles (suite)

Aspects relationnels		
Items	**Facteur 1** Aspects relationnels	
	Poids des items	
Possibilité de participer à des échanges avec les collègues (L)	.31	
Possibilité de participer à des échanges avec les managers (L)	.27	
Qualité perçue de la relation avec les collègues (échelle de Morgeson & Humphrey, 2006; α = .65)	.27	
Qualité perçue de la relation avec les managers (échelle de Barnett & Brennan, 1995; α = .91)	.14	
Critères de sélection **Valeur propre** **Variance expliquée (%)**	 2.12 53.15	
Participation		
Items	**Facteur 1** Participation directe et représentative	**Facteur 2** Organisation de réunions
	Poids des items	
Possibilité d'exprimer son point de vue librement (L)	.40	.00
Représentation syndicale (L)	.34	.00
Chaque décision importante est d'abord discutée par tous les membres de l'entreprise (L)	.26	.00
Organisation de réunions où la parole est donnée aux travailleurs (O/N)	.00	1.00
Poids du facteur	.57	.43
Critères de sélection **Valeur propre** **Variance expliquée (%)**	 1.15 38.61	 0.85 28.75
Sécurité d'emploi		
Items	**Facteur 1** Ancienneté	**Facteur 2** Type de contrat et Sécurité d'emploi perçue
	Poids des items	
Ancienneté (en mois)	.62	.01
Sécurité d'emploi perçue (échelle de De Witte, 2000; α = .70)	.25	.43
Premier contrat=CDI (O/N)	.13	.56
Poids du facteur	.51	.49
Critères de sélection **Valeur propre** **Variance expliquée (%)**	 1.09 36.36	 1.06 35.36

Tableau 1 -- Résultats des analyses factorielles (suite 2)

Flexibilité et horaires de travail		
Items	**Facteur 1** Équilibre travail/famille et pas de flexibilité exigée	**Facteur 2** Pas d'horaires atypiques
	Poids des items	
Nombre d'heures de travail fixe (O/N)	.11	.00
Horaires fixes (O/N)	.10	.00
Pas de changement dans le planning de travail (O/N)	.11	.00
L'entreprise n'exige pas de flexibilité (O/N)	.12	.00
Les usagers n'exigent pas de flexibilité (O/N)	.11	.00
Pas de travail en soirée (<18h) (L)	.00	.48
Pas de travail le week-end (L)	.00	.47
Équilibre travail/famille (échelle de Netemeyer et al. 1996; α = .87)	.45	.07
Poids du facteur	.67	.33
Critères de sélection **Valeur propre** **Variance expliquée (%)**	 2.03 40.71	 0.99 19.92
Primes/Avantages monétaires ou en nature		
Items	**Facteur 1** Primes et avantages en nature	**Facteur 2** Frais de transport
	Poids des items	
Accès à des primes	.49	.00
Accès à des avantages en nature (assurance-vie, prêt d'un véhicule, etc.)	.36	.28
Déplacements à la charge de l'employeur	.16	.72
Poids du facteur	.55	.45
Critères de sélection **Valeur propre** **Variance expliquée (%)**	 0.40 40.09	 0.33 33.00
(O/N) = variable dichotomique OUI/NON. (L) = échelle de Likert à 7 niveaux allant de (1) « Pas du tout d'accord » (ou « jamais ») à (7) « Tout à fait d'accord » (ou « toujours »).		

3. Pourquoi les ES devraient-elles offrir une qualité d'emploi différente des EBL pour des tâches peu qualifiées ?

La littérature avance trois arguments majeurs qui pourraient justifier une spécificité de la qualité de l'emploi dans les ES: (1) elles attirent des travailleurs intrinsèquement plus motivés; (2) elles utilisent des structures d'incitants spécifiques; (3) le facteur travail est au centre de leurs préoccupations éthiques. Reprenons les arguments un à un et discutons-en la pertinence pour le cas d'emplois peu qualifiés.

Tout d'abord, l'analyse de la qualité d'emploi dans les ES se réfère à un débat bien connu en psychologie des organisations qui porte sur l'analyse des motivations extrinsèques et intrinsèques (Schepers, De Gieter, Pepermans, Du Bois, Caers, & Jegers, 2011). En effet, les ES attireraient généralement des travailleurs qui sont plus intrinsèquement motivés que leurs homologues des EBL[16] (e.g., Narcy, 2009). Cette particularité des ES s'expliquerait par leur mission sociale et leur contrainte de non-distribution des profits (qui assure que l'effort des travailleurs est destiné, in fine, à poursuivre la mission sociale et non à rémunérer davantage les actionnaires) qui d'ailleurs justifieraient la présence massive de bénévoles dans ce secteur (Degli Antoni, 2009). À tâches et conditions de travail identiques, Devaro et Brookshire (2007) montrent que la mission de l'organisation reste une source de motivation, à condition bien sûr qu'elle réponde aux valeurs du travailleur. Suivant ce raisonnement, Frey (1997b), parmi d'autres, avance l'hypothèse que les travailleurs des ES retirent, pour des conditions de travail identiques, une plus grande satisfaction de leur emploi que leurs homologues des EBL. Des études empiriques ont confirmé cette hypothèse (e.g., Benz, 2005). Selon la «théorie du don travail» (Preston, 1989), si les travailleurs des ES sont plus satisfaits de leur emploi, toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs, ils devraient être prêts à travailler pour des rémunérations moins élevées. Les ES seraient donc en mesure d'offrir, si le besoin s'en faisait sentir, des salaires plus faibles à leurs travailleurs, ce qui affecterait négativement la qualité d'emploi.

Il faut néanmoins être prudent quant à l'application de cet argument au cas des travailleurs peu qualifiés, et ce pour deux raisons principales. Tout d'abord, au vu de leur salaire généralement faible (souvent proche du minimum autorisé), ils n'ont pas les marges

[16] Récemment, des travaux en psychologie ont mis en doute le fait de définir le contenu de la motivation des travailleurs des ES comme intrinsèque. En effet, selon des travaux menés en psychologie, ces travailleurs auraient la particularité d'être plus pro socialement motivés que leurs homologues dans les EBL (e.g., De Cooman et al., 2011; Francois, 2007; Francois & Vlassopoulos, 2008) alors que la motivation pro-sociale est régulée extrinsèquement et non intrinsèquement (Grant, 2007; Speckbacher, 2013) (voir le chapitre deux de cette thèse pour une discussion approfondie). Néanmoins, notre objectif n'étant pas centré sur la motivation au travail, cette discussion ne fait pas l'objet de cet article.

nécessaires pour renoncer à une partie significative de leur salaire. Ensuite, le type de tâche qui leur est généralement attribué serait à la fois trop éloigné de la mission de l'organisation et à trop faible portée sociale pour que son caractère social ne génère de satisfaction supplémentaire (Devaro & Brookshire, 2007). Des études empiriques (e.g., Roomkin & Weisbrod, 1999) ont confirmé que les salaires moins élevés dans les ES que dans les EBL concernaient les travailleurs qualifiés, remettant en cause l'application de la théorie du don de travail aux travailleurs peu qualifiés.

Ensuite, toute entreprise doit s'assurer que ses travailleurs adoptent un comportement cohérent avec sa mission (e.g., Ben-Ner & Ren, 2015; Borzaga & Tortia, 2006), soit en contrôlant son effort, soit en l'incitant. La politique incitative semble particulièrement opportune dans le marché du titre-service où l'employeur ne peut contrôler directement l'employé qui est, en général, au domicile du client. Dans cette logique, les EBL, dont la finalité est de maximiser le profit, devraient utiliser des incitants monétaires tels qu'une rémunération basée sur la performance financière ou l'offre d'opportunités de carrière liées à des promotions salariales. Toutefois, le dégagement de marges financières passe également par la minimisation des coûts ce qui implique un arbitrage avec la mise en place d'incitants coûteux. En ce qui concerne les ES, l'utilisation d'incitants monétaires est beaucoup plus problématique. En effet, il est souvent difficile pour les ES de construire une mesure quantifiable de leur performance (e.g., Leete, 2006). Cette constatation s'explique par leur mission sociale qui est souvent multidimensionnelle et moins tangible que la maximisation du profit et donc plus difficilement transformable en objectifs quantifiables (e.g., Speckbacher, 2003). Qui plus est, les incitants monétaires favoriseraient la motivation extrinsèque au détriment de la motivation intrinsèque (e.g., Frey, 1997b). Les ES auraient donc plutôt intérêt à favoriser la motivation intrinsèque de leurs travailleurs vis-à-vis de leur mission sociale. Donc, même si elles n'attirent pas spécialement des travailleurs plus intrinsèquement motivés, il s'agit de développer voire d'entretenir ce type de motivation. Un environnement de travail qui favorise la motivation intrinsèque se caractérise notamment par la perception par le travailleur d'un climat de travail équitable (e.g., Leete, 2006), ce qui implique notamment une politique de rémunération salariale équitable (Tortia, 2008) ou encore la possibilité pour les travailleurs de s'impliquer dans les décisions et le développement de l'entreprise (Mirvis & Hackett, 1983), ainsi que par une autonomie dans le travail et une forte diversification des tâches (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1997a ; Frey & Jegen, 2001).

Finalement, le troisième argument renvoie à la centralité du « facteur travail » dans l'éthique des ES. Les valeurs soutenues par les ES (finalité sociale, non-discrimination…),

entraîneraient le développement de pratiques qui visent non seulement la réalisation des objectifs de l'organisation mais aussi le bien-être du travailleur (Rothschild & Milofsky, 2006). Par rapport aux EBL, les ES sont donc plus susceptibles de mettre en œuvre des processus de travail, tels qu'une rotation du leadership ou des tâches à réaliser, et des structures qui favorisent « l'empowerment » et la participation des travailleurs et donc la qualité de l'emploi (Mastracci & Herring, 2010). Ces arguments sont également avancés par la littérature ancrée dans le champ de l'économie sociale et solidaire où les principes de démocratie économique et de primauté des personnes et du travail sur le capital dans la distribution des profits pourraient être révélateurs de leurs motivations à investir dans la qualité de l'emploi offert (Defourny & Develtere, 1999). Le fait que les ES ne soient pas soumises à un impératif de rentabilité leur permettraient également d'adopter un comportement moins réactif face aux changements de conjoncture économique et d'envisager leur relation avec les travailleurs sur le long terme en leur offrant une meilleure sécurité d'emploi (Steinberg, 2006). Plus particulièrement, la mission sociale de certaines de ces ES, dans le champ de l'insertion par l'économique, est spécifiquement la création d'emplois pour les peu qualifiés (Gardin, Laville & Nyssens, 2012). C'est notamment le cas des entreprises d'insertion (EI) présentes sur le marché des titres-services. Il semble, dès lors, logique qu'elles accordent une attention particulière à la qualité d'emploi. En l'occurrence, ces EI bénéficient de subventions supplémentaires à ce qui est prévu par la législation titre-service liées à leur agrément EI et qui se justifient par le profil particulièrement vulnérable de leurs travailleurs. Ces subventions doivent leur permettre de mettre en place un accompagnement personnalisé des travailleurs ainsi que des formations professionnalisantes. Le cas des AF est différent. En effet, la subvention régionale porte sur les services d'aide à domicile pour personnes vulnérables et non sur l'activité titre-service. Ce type de prestataire se trouve alors dans le même cas de figure que d'autres types de prestataires qui cumulent différents métiers et donc partagent des ressources (locaux, matériel, etc.) avec une activité complémentaire au titre-service. Il faudra prendre en considération dans l'interprétation des résultats que les EI bénéficient, comparativement aux EBL et aux AF, de ressources financières supplémentaires pour leur activité titre-service.

4. Les modèles d'emploi sont–ils différents suivant la mission des entreprises?

Nous retenons donc deux arguments qui pourraient amener les EI et les AF à offrir une qualité d'emploi peu qualifié distincte des EBL, à savoir l'argument de la spécificité des incitants en phase avec la mission sociale et celui de la centralité du facteur travail dans les

ES. Nous pensons également que le deuxième argument devrait être plus marqué chez les EI, de par leur mission centrée sur le travailleur fragilisé, et le premier argument plus marqué chez les AF, qui au vu de leur mission centrée sur l'usager fragilisé devraient porter une attention toute particulière à inciter leurs travailleurs à offrir un service de qualité. Nous ne serons par contre généralement pas en mesure de distinguer les effets des deux arguments précités sur chaque différence observée car une décision managériale résulte de la prise en compte de ces différents éléments dans leur ensemble. En conséquence, si des différences sont observées, notre objectif sera d'identifier les différents modèles de qualité d'emploi développés dans ces entreprises.

Avant de passer à l'analyse de la qualité d'emploi, nous décrivons les caractéristiques de l'échantillon (voir Tableau 2). L'échantillon est essentiellement féminin (98%) et la majorité des travailleurs peut être considérée comme pas qualifiée (48% sont sans diplôme) ou peu qualifiée (40% ont uniquement le diplôme d'étude de l'enseignement secondaire supérieur). Néanmoins, 13% de ces travailleurs ont un niveau d'éducation plus élevé ce qui est plus étonnant au vu du poste qui ne demande aucune qualification certifiée. Les EI, en phase avec leur mission d'insertion, engagent plus de travailleurs pas qualifiés, souvent sans emploi, alors que les EBL engagent un plus grand nombre de personnes très qualifiées (relativement aux compétences nécessaires) et d'origine étrangère[17]. Ces dernières sont moins présentes dans les AF qui ont peut-être plus de mal à les faire accepter au domicile de leurs usagers, plus âgés, voire fragilisés. Les travailleurs des AF sont également ceux qui ont le plus d'ancienneté dans l'entreprise, alors que ceux des EBL ne sont seulement présents, en moyenne, que depuis un peu moins de deux ans et demi. Cette observation s'explique par le fait que les AF existent, en moyenne, depuis plus longtemps. À l'inverse des EI, les AF ont également en moyenne nettement plus de travailleurs, ce qui s'explique par le fait qu'elles exercent plusieurs activités en dehors de leur agrément titre-service (aide-familiale, garde malade, etc.). Finalement, les EBL ont une plus grande proportion de travailleurs qui ont comme tâche principale le repassage en centrale ce qui est représentatif du marché puisqu'aucune AF ne dédie essentiellement son activité au repassage et que c'est très rarement le cas des EI.

[17] Ceci peut être expliqué, sur base d'observations qualitatives, par le fait que certaines EBL mettent en place des circuits de recrutement avec des pays tiers notamment avec des pays de l'Est de l'Europe.

Tableau 2 -- Caractéristiques de l'échantillon

	EBL	EI	AF	Anova p-valeur
N	132	341	127	
Caractéristiques de l'organisation				
Taille (nombre de travailleurs)	71.18 (56.87)	54.40 (22.33)	100.43 (75.21)	.000[BF]
Ancienneté (en mois)	63.39 (24.13)	75.75 (25.67)	107.35 (6.28)	.000[BF]
Localisation (Bruxelles, %)	26,52	5,55	0.00	.000[BF]
Caractéristiques du métier				
Tâche principale (%)				
Repassage en centrale	17	10	02	.001[BF]
Aide-ménager à domicile	83	90	98	
Type d'usagers (Likert7)				
Personnes en manque de temps	5.22 (1.40)	4.93 (1.37)	4.86 (1.54)	.112
Personnes âgées	4.72 (1.72)	5.22 (1.38)	5.54 (1.16)	.000[BF]
Personnes « handicapées »	3.16 (2.00)	3.98 (5.81)	4.35 (3.09)	.143
Ancienneté dans l'entreprise (en mois)	28.24 (22.05)	45.08 (30.76)	61.21 (31.81)	.000[BF]
Caractéristiques du travailleur				
Genre (% de femmes)	98	97	99	.309[BF]
Age (années)	38.61 (10.28)	39.69 (8.78)	40.77 (8.61)	.180[BF]
Education (%)				
< secondaire supérieure	40	54	37	.001[BF]
= secondaire supérieur	37	37	50	.041[BF]
> secondaire supérieur	23	09	13	.001[BF]
Origine (%)				
Belge	46	72	85	.000[B-F]
U.E.	24	20	10	.007[BF]
Hors U.E.	30	08	05	.000[BF]
En couple (%)	65	62	76	.024[BF]
Nombre d'enfants à charge	1.44 (1.33)	1.46 (1.25)	1.48 (1.10)	.968
Situation préalable (%)				
Au travail	45	25	44	.000[BF]
Sans emploi	51	70	52	.000[BF]
Étudiant	02	01	02	.414[BF]

[BF] En cas du rejet de l'hypothèse homogénéité des variances, la statistique de Brown-Forsythe a été considérée. Pour les variables continues, les écarts-types sont donnés entre parenthèses. Pour les variables dichotomiques, les résultats sont reportés en %. Les échelles de Likert sont à 7 niveaux allant de « jamais » à « toujours ».

Il est important de prendre en compte ces différences observées entre travailleurs et organisations et ce pour deux raisons. Tout d'abord, il s'agit de comparer des emplois équivalents notamment au niveau du type de tâche prestée ou du type d'usager. Ensuite, il faut s'assurer de comparer la qualité d'emploi pour des types de travailleurs similaires. Ce n'est qu'à ces conditions qu'on pourra isoler l'effet mission sur la qualité d'emploi des autres effets.

Le faisceau d'indicateurs construit ci-dessus va nous permettre de comparer la qualité d'emploi des travailleurs des EBL, des AF et des EI[18]. D'une part, nous comparons les scores obtenus sur chaque dimension de la qualité d'emploi par les aide-ménagères[19] en fonction de la mission de leur organisation. Les figures 1 à 3 reprennent les scores moyens[20] obtenus par chaque type d'entreprise sur les différentes dimensions. D'autre part, nous menons une analyse multivariée qui prend la forme de régressions OLS sur chaque indicateur de la qualité d'emploi (variable dépendante) avec comme variable explicative la mission de l'organisation dans laquelle l'individu travaille[21]. Ce choix nous permet de tester la présence de différences significatives entre les types d'organisation tout en contrôlant pour une série de caractéristiques individuelles et organisationnelles (voir Tableau 2). L'utilisation de régressions nous permet également de tenir compte du fait que certains individus de l'échantillon appartiennent à la même organisation et donc d'assurer l'indépendance des résidus. Les régressions sont présentées de façon synthétique du Tableau 3.1 au 3.3 et de façon détaillée de l'annexe 1 à 9. Si des différences significatives ont été observées, nous mènerons une analyse de classification hiérarchique pour confirmer que la mission est un déterminant structurant de la qualité d'emploi sur ce marché.

L'analyse de ces résultats nous amène à tirer les enseignements suivants.

EBL : Un modèle commercial basé sur une politique incitative ou de minimisation des coûts?

Selon la littérature, les EBL ont intérêt à développer une structure d'incitants qui motive extrinsèquement leurs travailleurs à fournir un effort maximum. Dès lors, comparativement aux ES, elles devraient offrir plus de primes et plus d'opportunités de carrière liées à des progressions salariales. Cependant, une politique de minimisation du coût salarial du travail

[18] L'ensemble de l'échantillon a été considéré en remplaçant les valeurs manquantes par la moyenne.
[19] Nous parlons d'aide-ménagère puisque 98% sont des femmes.
[20] Les scores obtenus sur les dimensions mesurées par une seule variable ont été normalisés afin de comparer des valeurs qui ont la même unité de mesure.
[21] Deux régressions sont réalisées par dimension. La première avec 2 variables binaires qui représentent respectivement l'affiliation à une EI et à une AF, ce qui permet donc de comparer les EBL avec les EI et avec les AF. Une deuxième régression avec 2 variables binaires qui représentent l'affiliation à une AF et à une EBL, est employée pour comparer les EI avec les AF (et avec les EBL).

peu qualifié peut également se justifier d'autant plus sur le marché des titres-services où le prix du service est fixé par le régulateur à 9 euros par heure de travail. En effet, d'une part, le fait de facturer à l'heure induit qu'un travailleur qui produit plus en une heure n'est pas plus rentable pour son entreprise[22]. D'autre part, la fixation du prix par les autorités publiques induit une impossibilité de faire payer une qualité de service supérieure; une aide-ménagère rendant un service de meilleure qualité n'est donc pas plus rentable. En conséquence, les EBL n'ont pas vraiment intérêt à maximiser la productivité de leurs travailleurs si ce n'est afin d'assurer une qualité minimum pour fidéliser leurs clients. Les résultats semblent confirmer que les EBL déploient, généralement, un modèle commercial basé sur une politique de minimisation des coûts puisqu'elles n'offrent pas de salaires plus élevés, ni plus de primes ou de meilleures opportunités de carrière (Figure 1, Tableau 3.1.). La plupart de ces entreprises n'ont qu'un simple rôle d'intermédiaire administratif entre le travailleur et le client. Par contre, cette relation de « type mandataire » permet au travailleur d'avoir un degré élevé d'autonomie dans la gestion de sa relation avec l'usager et une relation de qualité avec son superviseur (voir tableau 3.3. et la figure 3) liée au caractère plus « privilégié » de celle-ci qui se fait généralement avec une seule personne et non avec une équipe encadrante.

Figure 1 -- Salaire horaire, opportunités de carrière et avantages monétaires ou en natures



[22] Il faut nuancer ce propos pour les repasseurs en central, qui sont largement minoritaires sur le marché titre-service. En effet, le temps que prend le repassage d'une pièce est généralement déterminé a priori en fonction du type de vêtement. Donc, si les repasseurs traitent plus de pièces en une heure de travail que ce qui était initialement prévu, ils pourront facturer un prix qui équivaut à plus d'une heure de travail et sont donc plus rentables.

Les ES offrent–elles une meilleure qualité d'emploi ?

Figure 2 -- Participation, développement des compétences, conditions matérielles de travail, différences entre heures de travail souhaitées et heures de travail prestées



Les ES, quant à elles, offrent une qualité d'emploi généralement supérieure au regard de certaines dimensions[23] (Figure 2, Tableaux 3.2 et 3.3.) puisque d'une part elles utilisent des incitants qui favorisent la motivation intrinsèque de leurs travailleurs et d'autre part, elles offrent volontairement, de par la centralité du facteur travail dans ces organisations, un emploi de qualité. En effet, les résultats montrent que les ES organisent plus de réunions où l'ensemble de leurs travailleurs ont la possibilité de participer aux décisions et de donner leurs avis, ce qui est censé favoriser leur motivation intrinsèque. Les travailleurs des ES prestent également un nombre d'heures de travail hebdomadaire qui correspond mieux à leurs souhaits, contrairement aux travailleurs des EBL qui se voient obligés de prester un nombre d'heures plus adapté à la demande des clients qu'à leurs desideratas. En ce qui concerne le développement des compétences (voir tableau 3.2.), la distinction ES-EBL n'a, sans surprise, aucune influence sur l'apprentissage par le travail puisque les travailleurs exercent le même métier, à savoir essentiellement de l'aide-ménagère à domicile et du repassage en centrale. Par contre, les ES offrent plus de possibilités de formation que les EBL. Aucune différence

[23] On considère que les ES offrent une meilleure qualité d'emploi au regard d'une dimension uniquement dans le cas où à la fois les EI et les AF obtiennent un score significativement supérieur à celui obtenu par les EBL.

significative n'apparaît quant à la qualité de l'environnement de travail. Ce résultat était attendu puisque les aide-ménagères évoluent souvent au domicile de l'usager ce qui implique que, même si les entreprises peuvent avoir une influence sur les conditions matérielles de travail (fournir le matériel, un espace de détente/réunion, visiter le domicile de l'usager etc.), c'est bien l'état du domicile de l'usager qui est déterminant. Par contre, les EBL informent moins leurs travailleurs des risques d'accidents et de santé encourus de par leur activité.

EI et AF : qualité d'emploi homogène ou différenciée selon le type de mission sociale?

Si les ES présentent un certain nombre de similitudes dans leurs résultats, les EI et les AF, qui ont une mission sociale distincte, se différencient néanmoins sur plusieurs dimensions de la qualité de l'emploi (Figure 1 à 3 et Tableaux 3.1 à 3.4).

Figure 3 -- Sécurité d'emploi, Aspects relationnels, autonomie, flexibilité horaire, intensité.



Tableau 3.1. -- Régression (OLS) de la mission sur le salaire horaire, les avantages monétaires ou en natures, les opportunités de carrière

	Salaire horaire		**Avantages monétaires ou en natures**		Primes et avantages		Remboursement frais de transport		**Opportunités de carrière**	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)
EI	**0.01** **(0.03)**		**0.58*** (0.16)**		0.47*** (0.16)		0.72*** (0.25)		**0.17** **(0.19)**	
AF	**1.08*** (0.07)**	**1.00*** (0.07)**	**0.41* (0.22)**	**-0.17** **(0.10)**	0.12 (0.19)	-0.35** (0.13)	0.77** (0.31)	0.05 (0.11)	**0.52** (0.21)**	**0.35* (0.19)**
EBL		**-0.08** **(0.05)**		**-0.58*** (0.19)**		-0.47*** (0.16)		-0.72*** (0.25)		**-0.17** **(0.19)**
Contrôles	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

La régression (1) compare les EI et les AF avec les EBL et la régression (2) compare les AF et les EBL avec les EI. SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significatif à. * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. Les variables contrôles sont reprises dans le Tableau 2. Les résultats détaillés de ces régressions sont présentés aux annexes 1 et 2.

Tableau 3.2. -- Régression (OLS) de la mission sur les heures de travail, la participation et le développement des compétences.

	# Heures		**|#H prestées - #H désirées|** (R)		**Participation**		Directe et représentative		Réunions		**Développement des compétences**		Apprentissage par le travail		Formations	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(S)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)
EI	**-0.06 (0.32)**	-	**-1.16* (0.70)**	-	**0.47*** (0.12)**	-	0.17 (0.15)	-	0.96*** (0.12)	-	**0.43*** (0.09)**	-	0.11 (0.13)	-	0.89*** (0.10)	-
AF	**-3.70** (1.66)**	**-3.64*** (1.29)**	**-2.01** (0.81)**	**-0.85 (0.57)**	**0.43*** (0.14)**	**-0.04 (0.10)**	0.21 (0.18)	0.04 (0.11)	0.79*** (0.15)	-0.17 (0.14)	**0.13 (0.14)**	**-0.30** (0.13)**	-0.17 (0.18)	-0.28* (0.14)	0.56*** (0.17)	-0.33** (0.17)
EBL	-	**0.06 (0.32)**	-	**1.16* (0.70)**	-	**-0.47*** (0.12)**	-	-0.17 (0.15)	-	-0.96*** (0.12)	-	**-0.43*** (0.09)**	-	-0.08 (0.12)	-	-0.89*** (0.10)
Contrôles	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

La régression (1) compare les EI et les AF avec les EBL et la régression (2) compare les AF et les EBL avec les EI. (R) = Plus le score obtenu est élevé, moins l'emploi est de qualité. SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significatif à. * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. Les variables contrôles sont reprises dans le Tableau 2. Les résultats détaillés de ces régressions sont présentés aux annexes 3, 4 et 9.

Tableau 3.3. -- Régression (OLS) de la mission sur les conditions matérielles de travail, les aspects relationnels et l'autonomie

	Conditions matérielles		Environnement de travail		Prévention des risques		**Aspects relationnels**		**Autonomie**	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(S)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)
EI	**0.22** (0.10)**	-	-0.08 (0.11)	-	0.71*** (0.15)	-	**0.29** (0.13)**	-	**-0.36 (0.29)**	-
AF	**0.28** (0.12)**	**0.06 (0.09)**	0.01 (0.12)	0.09 (0.10)	0.74*** (0.21)	0.02 (0.20)	**-0.15 (0.19)**	**-0.44*** (0.16)**	**-0.12 (0.35)**	**0.24 (0.16)**
EBL	-	**-0.22** (0.10)**	-	0.08 (0.11)	-	-0.71*** (0.15)	-	**-0.29** (0.13)**	-	**0.36 (0.29)**
Contrôles	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

La régression (1) compare les EI et les AF avec les EBL et la régression (2) compare les AF et les EBL avec les EI. SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significatif à. * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. Les variables contrôles sont reprises dans le Tableau 2. Les résultats détaillés de ces régressions sont présentés à l'annexe 5.

Tableau 3.4. -- Régression (OLS) de la mission sur la sécurité d'emploi, Flexibilité horaire et Intensité

	Sécurité d'emploi		Ancienneté		CDI et sentiment de sécurité		**Flexibilité horaire**		Équilibre travail/ famille et pas de flexibilité exigée		Pas d'horaires atypiques		**Intensité** (R)	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)
EI	**0.43*** (0.09)**	-	0.37*** (0.08)	-	0.40*** (0.11)	-	**-0.09 (0.08)**	-	-0.16* (0.08)	-	0.05 (0.22)	-	**0.34 (0.22)**	-
AF	**0.27*** (0.09)**	**-0.16** (0.06)**	0.31*** (0.11)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.19 (0.13)	-0.59*** (0.10)	**0.17 (0.10)**	**0.26*** (0.07)**	0.09 (0.11)	0.25** (0.09)	0.33 (0.26)	0.28*** (0.09)	**0.17 (0.23)**	**-0.17 (0.17)**
EBL	-	**-0.43*** (0.09)**	-	-0.37*** (0.08)	-	-0.40*** (0.11)	-	**0.09 (0.08)**	-	0.16* (0.08)	-	-0.05 (0.22)	-	**-0.34 (0.22)**
Contrôles	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

La régression (1) compare les EI et les AF avec les EBL et la régression (2) compare les AF et les EBL avec les EI. (R) = Plus le score obtenu est élevé, moins l'emploi est de qualité. SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significatif à. * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. Les variables contrôles sont reprises dans le Tableau 2 (la variable contrôle « ancienneté dans l'organisation » n'a pas été utilisée dans les régressions du facteur « Ancienneté »). Les résultats

Les AF, dont la plupart existaient bien avant la création du marché des titres-services, développent un modèle associatif centré sur leur mission d'aide aux personnes dépendantes. Nos résultats montrent qu'elles sont particulièrement au fait des incitants (participation, autonomie, environnement de travail équitable, etc.) qui entretiennent la motivation des travailleurs par rapport à leur mission sociale. De ce fait, elles offrent notamment à leurs aide-ménagères une grande liberté d'action dans la réalisation de leur travail. En effet, ces dernières déclarent avoir plus d'autonomie dans leur travail que leurs homologues des EI et une plus grande liberté de choix quant à leur nombre d'heures de travail[24]. Les AF sont également celles qui offrent, dans un souci d'équité avec les aide-ménagères à caractère social (qui existaient avant l'entrée du système titre-service et qui perçoivent un salaire horaire supérieur à ce qui est observé en moyenne sur ce marché des titres-services), un salaire horaire plus élevé tout en essayant de leur garantir une sécurité d'emploi à long terme et ce même si un travailleur avec plus d'ancienneté représente un coût supplémentaire non négligeable pour l'organisation (certaines aides à l'emploi accessibles à tout type d'entreprise qui engage des chômeurs de longue durée s'éteignent après 3 ans). Par contre, les AF offrent moins de primes (une rémunération basée sur la performance favorise la motivation extrinsèque au détriment de la motivation intrinsèque) que les EI. Qui plus est, l'évolution de la réglementation du titre-service en termes de financement les a amenées, d'une part, à amoindrir leur rôle dans la triangulation de la relation de service entre usagers et travailleurs afin de diminuer leurs coûts et, d'autre part, à réduire progressivement leur activité titre-service suite à leur incapacité grandissante à maintenir des emplois et des services de qualité, ce qui induit un ressenti d'insécurité chez leurs travailleurs. Finalement, en ce qui concerne les opportunités de carrière des aide-ménagères, les AF sont les seules à pouvoir leur offrir de réelles promotions en interne de par leurs activités annexes. Néanmoins, les places sont limitées et les promotions sont conditionnées au suivi d'une formation conséquente que peu de travailleurs sont prêts à suivre.

Les EI, quant à elles, développent un modèle d'emploi centré sur l'insertion de travailleurs vulnérables, ce qui conduit à un emploi et un encadrement de qualité (nos résultats confirment donc que l'argument de la centralité du facteur travail est dominant). Cela se traduit notamment par une très bonne sécurité d'emploi puisque leurs travailleurs ne sont pas inquiets quant à l'avenir de leur emploi et qu'ils se voient généralement offrir un CDI comme premier contrat. Les EI mettent également en place un contexte propice au développement de

[24] Si les différences ne sont pas significatives, la tendance observée dans les résultats confirme nos observations de terrain. Qui plus est, les différences sont largement significatives dans les régressions sans variables contrôles (voir annexes 1 et 9).

relations de bonne qualité, et particulièrement en ce qui concerne les relations entre collègues. En effet, elles se doivent d'encadrer leurs travailleurs au plus près tout en favorisant un esprit d'équipe, ce qui passe notamment par l'organisation de réunions ou autres activités qui rassemblent l'ensemble des travailleurs et des superviseurs. Ensuite, si les ES offrent un nombre conséquent de formations, ce sont bien les EI qui offrent le plus de formations et les plus diversifiées grâce aux moyens financiers supplémentaires dont elles disposent. Ce sont également les seules à offrir des formations qui visent à améliorer les compétences des travailleurs dans une visée plus globale que la réalisation de leur tâche actuelle (manipuler un ordinateur, cours de langue, permis de conduire, etc.). L'employeur « EI » joue un vrai rôle d'intermédiaire entre l'usager et l'aide-ménagère, gérant de près la relation avec les clients. On observe donc bien une triangulation de la relation de service (Henry, Nassaut, Defourny & Nyssens, 2009). Par contre, cet encadrement des aide-ménagères peut être perçu comme rigide puisqu'il ne laisse pas beaucoup de place à l'autonomie du travailleur qui se plaint plus d'un équilibre délicat entre travail et vie familiale et d'un rythme de travail trop élevé. Finalement, si leurs travailleurs bénéficient de plus de primes et d'avantages que ceux des AF et des EBL, ils n'ont pas accès, contrairement à ce qu'on aurait pu s'attendre, à un salaire horaire plus élevé. Plusieurs explications peuvent être avancées. D'abord, les EBL et les EI sont dans la même commission paritaire qui fixe les salaires minimaux. Ensuite, il est normal que les EI veuillent avant tout garantir un encadrement de qualité afin d'aider au mieux leurs travailleurs précarisés à se (re)familiariser avec l'emploi et à se réinsérer sur le marché du travail de manière définitive avant de penser à offrir des salaires plus élevés.

La mission de l'entreprise comme seul déterminant de la qualité d'emploi ?

Finalement, nous avons eu recours à l'analyse de classification hiérarchique (sur base de la méthode d'agrégation de Ward[25]) qui permet de classer les entreprises, en différents groupes, en fonction des modèles observés de qualité d'emploi. L'usage de cette méthode permet de vérifier si le critère « mission » permet bien de distinguer les différents groupes.

L'emploi de cette méthode a nécessité un remaniement préalable de la base de données afin d'obtenir des résultats interprétables. Les observations ont été regroupées par entreprise, chacune d'entre elles se voyant attribuer un score, pour toutes les dimensions de la qualité d'emploi, correspondant à la moyenne des scores obtenus par leurs travailleurs. Cette opération a permis de réduire l'échantillon à 47 observations. L'analyse en classification hiérarchique a été effectuée sur base des scores normalisés obtenus par chaque entreprise sur

[25] Voir Morey, Blashfield, & Skinner (1983).

les douze dimensions afin d'identifier le nombre de groupes nécessaires pour distinguer les différents modèles d'emploi. Dans un second temps, cette méthode est réutilisée mais en précisant le nombre de groupes précédemment sélectionné, ce qui permet de classer chaque entreprise dans l'un de ces groupes.

Les résultats ont mis en évidence quatre modèles de qualité d'emploi. Tout d'abord, trois d'entre eux représentent effectivement les groupes identifiés théoriquement: un groupe composé de 10 AF, un groupe estampillé « EI » qui se compose de 16 EI et de 5 EBL et un groupe « EBL » qui se compose de 9 EBL, 1 EI et 1 AF. On observe donc que la composition des groupes n'est pas totalement homogène et plus particulièrement que 5 EBL font exception en offrant une qualité d'emploi supérieure à ce qui est majoritairement d'application dans ce type d'entreprise et à l'inverse, une EI semble ne pas remplir totalement sa mission d'insertion.

Le quatrième groupe se compose de cinq entreprises (sur 7) de l'échantillon qui offrent essentiellement un service de repassage en centrale, à savoir 4 EBL et 1 EI. Ces entreprises déploient un modèle de type « industriel » basé sur un contrôle de l'effort. En effet, puisque la tâche de leurs travailleurs se résume à repasser en centrale, généralement dans un timing précis et prédéterminé en fonction du type de vêtement traité, il est aisé, et moins coûteux, de contrôler l'effort plutôt que de l'inciter. Cette standardisation de la tâche peut expliquer que ces travailleurs bénéficient d'une moins bonne qualité d'emploi. Plus précisément, leurs conditions matérielles de travail semblent très mauvaises et le constat n'est pas meilleur en ce qui concerne leur sécurité d'emploi et leur niveau d'autonomie. Ils se plaignent également de leurs horaires, de leur nombre d'heures et du rythme de travail. Le type de tâche effectué a donc une influence primordiale sur la qualité d'emploi des aide-ménagères titres-services.

Ces résultats nous permettent d'affirmer d'une part, que la mission de l'entreprise est un déterminant important de la qualité des emplois peu qualifiés et, d'autre part, qu'elle n'est pas l'unique déterminant de cette qualité puisque nous observons une certaine hétérogénéité dans la composition des groupes et une influence majeure du type de tâche presté. Qui plus est, cette analyse semble indiquer que les résultats précédents n'ont pas été biaisés par la sur-représentativité des travailleurs d'une même entreprise au sein de l'échantillon.

5. Conclusion

Cette étude s'inscrit dans le contexte grandissant de la mise en concurrence des ES avec les EBL et dans le prolongement des travaux menés sur la qualité d'emploi dans les ES en se centrant sur l'emploi peu qualifié dans les services aux personnes. Un faisceau d'indicateurs de la qualité d'emploi a été construit pour saisir avec nuance la situation d'emploi « aux marges du marché du travail », ce qu'un indice seul n'aurait pas permis. Nous avons mis en évidence un effet mission. Si la plupart des études existantes comparent les EBL avec les ES, nous avons montré qu'il était essentiel de distinguer les ES en fonction de leur type de mission sociale encastrée dans des contextes institutionnels.

Tout d'abord, les EBL déploient, généralement, un modèle commercial basé sur une politique de minimisation des coûts. En conséquence, elles n'offrent pas de salaire plus élevé, ni plus de primes ou de meilleures opportunités de carrière. Les ES, quant à elles, utilisent d'une part, des incitants qui favorisent la motivation intrinsèque de leurs travailleurs tels que la possibilité de s'impliquer dans les prises de décision et, d'autre part, elles offrent volontairement, de par la centralité du facteur travail dans ces organisations, un emploi de qualité. Cependant, si les ES présentent un certain nombre de similitudes, les EI et les AF se distinguent sur plusieurs dimensions de la qualité d'emploi. Les EI, développent un modèle d'emploi centré sur l'insertion de travailleurs vulnérables, ce qui conduit à un emploi et un encadrement de qualité. Les AF, quant à elles, développent un modèle associatif centré sur l'aide aux usagers vulnérables. En effet, les AF sont particulièrement au fait des incitants qui entretiennent la motivation des travailleurs par rapport à leur mission sociale, sans doute de par leur longue expérience dans l'aide à domicile. Il faut néanmoins préciser qu'une certaine hétérogénéité dans les résultats a été observée et que, notamment, certaines EBL développent un modèle d'emploi très similaire à celui observé dans les EI. La mission d'une entreprise a donc une influence significative sur la qualité des emplois peu qualifiés mais elle n'est pas le seul déterminant de cette qualité puisque nous avons notamment observé une influence déterminante du type de tâche presté.

Cette recherche a donc montré que les ES offrent généralement un emploi de meilleure qualité que les EBL. Cependant, cette qualité a un coût. D'une part, un grand nombre d'AF ont décidé de ne plus étendre leur activité titre-service, voire de la réduire. En effet, compte tenu de la diminution des subventions et suite à l'augmentation de leur masse salariale relative à l'ancienneté accrue de leur main-d'œuvre, les AF éprouvent une difficulté croissante à faire face à leurs coûts tout en maintenant la qualité d'emploi et de service en phase avec leur

mission sociale. D'autre part, les EI bénéficient de subventions supplémentaires relatives à leur agrément. Ces dernières semblent totalement se justifier puisqu'elles sont les seules à même d'offrir un encadrement suffisant pour réinsérer une personne très peu qualifiée de manière adéquate. Toutefois, les postes offerts tant par les EI que les AF ou les EBL, ne constituent généralement pas un tremplin vers des emplois de plus haut statut, que ce soit dans l'entreprise (absence d'opportunités de carrière) ou hors de l'entreprise (manque de développement des compétences). Cette situation est réellement problématique puisqu'un travailleur avec une ancienneté de plus de deux ans représente un coût important, ce qui engendre d'une part, des difficultés financières pour la plupart des prestataires titres-services quand ils doivent faire face à une main-d'œuvre composée majoritairement de travailleurs avec ancienneté et, d'autre part, une incitation pour l'employeur à favoriser un taux important de rotation des travailleurs. Dans ce contexte, les choix qui vont être posés par les pouvoirs publics dans le cadre de la régionalisation de cette politique seront déterminants pour la qualité de l'emploi: va-t-on favoriser une politique de minimisation des coûts, à tout crin, au détriment de la qualité de l'emploi de personnes déjà très vulnérables sur le marché de l'emploi ou renforcer la régulation afin de faire tendre la qualité d'emploi de toutes les entreprises vers celle offerte par les ES?

Si le quasi-marché des titres-services offre de bonnes conditions pour l'analyse de l'effet de la mission sur la qualité des emplois peu qualifiés, le fait que le prix soit fixé par la loi contraint cette comparaison. Il serait intéressant de répliquer cette étude dans un secteur dans lequel les travailleurs peu qualifiés travaillent au sein de leurs entreprises et où évoluent des entreprises avec une certaine souplesse, d'une part, dans leurs choix d'investissement et, d'autre part, dans la fixation du prix.

Enfin, si cette étude constitue une étape nécessaire afin d'obtenir une vision d'ensemble, elle doit être complétée par des études complémentaires centrées sur une, voire deux dimensions de la qualité d'emploi afin de les analyser avec plus de précision et confirmer (ou infirmer) les premiers résultats. Plus encore, des éclairages qualitatifs pourraient permettre une meilleure compréhension des dynamiques à l'œuvre et des spécificités lorsqu'elles existent.

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Annexes

Annexe 1 – Régression (OLS) de la mission sur le salaire horaire, les opportunités de carrière et autonomie

	Salaire horaire				Opportunités de carrière				Autonomie			
	(1)		(2)		(1)		(2)		(1)		(2)	
	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)
Coefficient estimates												
Constante	10.43*** (0.04)	10.51*** (0.03)	10.17*** (0.05)	10.18*** (0.05)	2.34*** (0.13)	2.35*** (0.07)	2.79*** (0.27)	2.96*** (0.32)	5.35*** (0.20)	5.04*** (0.14)	5.13*** (0.30)	4.77*** (0.30)
AF	1.08*** (0.07)	1.00*** (0.07)	0.76*** (0.06)	0.75*** (0.06)	0.19 (0.19)	0.18 (0.20)	0.52** (0.21)	0.35* (0.19)	0.14 (0.22)	0.44** (0.17)	-0.12 (0.35)	0.24 (0.16)
EI	0.08 (0.05)	--	0.01 (0.03)	--	0.01 (0.19)	--	0.17 (0.19)	--	-0.30 (0.24)	--	-0.36 (0.29)	--
EBL	--	-0.08 (0.05)	–	-0.01 (0.03)	–	-0.01 (0.19)	–	-0.17 (0.19)	–	0.30 (0.24)	–	0.36 (0.29)
Localisation Bruxelles	--	--	0.10*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	–	--	-0.11 (0.25)	-0.11 (0.25)	–	--	0.14 (0.44)	0.14 (0.44)
Age	--	--	$-9.00e^{-06}$** ($4.40e^{-06}$)	$-9.00e^{-06}$** ($4.40e^{-06}$)	–	--	$-1.08e^{-05}$ ($5.63e^{-05}$)	$-1.08e^{-05}$ ($5.63e^{-05}$)	–	--	$3.83e^{-05}$ ($3.50e^{-05}$)	$3.83e^{-05}$ ($3.50e^{-05}$)
Femme	--	--	$2.84e^{-05}$*** ($9.57e^{-06}$)	$2.84e^{-05}$*** ($9.57e^{-06}$)	–	--	$-1.77e^{-04}$** ($7.03e^{-05}$)	$-1.77e^{-04}$** ($7.03e^{-05}$)	–	--	$3.11e^{-05}$ ($7.77e^{-05}$)	$3.11e^{-05}$ ($7.77e^{-05}$)
Nombre d'enfants	--	--	$4.75e^{-06}$ ($1.85e^{-05}$)	$4.75e^{-06}$ ($1.85e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-1.93e^{-04}$*** ($6.86e^{-05}$)	$-1.93e^{04}$*** ($6.86e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-1.08e^{-04}$** ($5.13e^{-05}$)	$-1.08e^{-04}$** ($5.13e^{-05}$)
Ancienneté travailleur (année)	--	--	0.12*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	--	--	$2.72e^{-05}$ ($7.82e^{-05}$)	$2.72e^{-05}$ ($7.82e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-1.98e^{-05}$ ($5.09e^{-05}$)	$-1.98e^{-05}$ ($5.09e^{-05}$)
Aide-ménager domicile	--	--	$-5.59e^{-06}$ ($7.35e^{-06}$)	$-5.59e^{-06}$ ($7.35e^{-06}$)	–	--	$7.75e^{-05}$ ($4.84e^{-05}$)	$7.75e^{-05}$ ($4.84e^{-05}$)	–	--	$1.54e^{04}$** ($7.03e^{-05}$)	$1.54e^{-04}$** ($7.03e^{-05}$)
Niveau scolaire	--	--	$1.19e^{-06}$ ($4.60e^{-06}$)	$1.19e^{-06}$ ($4.60e^{-06}$)	–	--	$3.51e^{-05}$ ($3.97e^{-05}$)	$3.51e^{-05}$ ($3.97e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-8.21e^{05}$** ($3.36e^{-05}$)	$-8.21e^{-05}$** ($3.36e^{-05}$)
Ancienneté entreprise (mois)	--	--	$4.37e^{-04}$ ($7.61e^{-04}$)	$4.37e^{-04}$ ($7.61e^{-04}$)	–	--	-0.01*** ($3.53e^{-03}$)	-0.01*** ($3.53e^{-03}$)	–	--	$6.30e^{-03}$* ($3.13e^{-03}$)	$6.30e^{-03}$* ($3.13e^{-03}$)
Taille entreprise	--	--	$-1.98e^{-04}$ ($2.36e^{-04}$)	$-1.98e^{-04}$ ($2.36e^{-04}$)	–	--	$2.77e^{-03}$** ($1.32e^{-03}$)	$2.77e^{-03}$** ($1.32e^{-03}$)	–	--	$-1.80e^{-03}$ ($1.19e^{-03}$)	$-1.80e^{-03}$ ($1.19e^{-03}$)
Usager: personne âgée	--	--	$7.09e^{-06}$ ($4.38e^{-06}$)	$7.09e^{-06}$ ($4.38e^{-06}$)	--	--	$-1.33e^{-05}$ ($2.32e^{-05}$)	$-1.33e^{-05}$ ($2.32e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-2.50e^{-05}$ ($3.16e^{-05}$)	$-2.50e^{-05}$ ($3.16e^{-05}$)
Usager: personne handicapée	--	--	$-5.94e^{-06}$ ($4.07e^{-06}$)	$-5.94e^{-06}$ ($4.07e^{-06}$)	--	--	$-2.35e^{-05}$* ($1.40e^{-05}$)	$-2.35e^{-05}$* ($1.40e^{-05}$)	--	--	$5.57e^{-06}$ ($2.18e^{-05}$)	$5.57e^{-06}$ ($2.18e^{-05}$)
En couple	--	--	$-6.22e^{-07}$ ($1.80e^{-05}$)	$-6.22e^{-07}$ ($1.80e^{-05}$)	--	--	$1.79e^{-04}$** ($6.95e^{-05}$)	$1.79e^{-04}$** ($6.95e^{-05}$)	--	--	$5.19e^{-05}$ ($4.76e^{-05}$)	$5.19e^{-05}$ ($4.76e^{-05}$)
Chômage	--	--	$-5.00e^{-06}$ ($8.33e^{-06}$)	$-5.00e^{-06}$ ($8.33e^{-06}$)	--	--	$-4.10e^{-05}$ ($4.77e^{-05}$)	$-4.10e^{-05}$ ($4.77e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-6.92e^{-05}$ ($6.31e^{-05}$)	$-6.92e^{-05}$ ($6.31e^{-05}$)
Origine hors U.E.	--	--	$-1.71e^{-07}$ ($3.46e^{-06}$)	$-1.71e^{-07}$ ($3.46e^{-06}$)	--	--	$-1.56e^{-05}$ ($9.76e^{-05}$)	$-1.56e^{-05}$ ($9.76e^{-05}$)	--	--	$9.33e^{-05}$ ($7.75e^{-05}$)	$9.33e^{-05}$ ($7.75e^{-05}$)
N	482[2]	482[2]	450[12]	450[12]	600	600	568[1]	568[1]	600	600	568[1]	568[1]

La régression (A) compare les EI et les AF avec les EBL alors que la régression (B) compare les AF et les EBL avec les EI. SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significatif à. * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.

(1) sans variables contrôles

(2) avec variables contrôles

[1] 32 observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations have not been considered in specifications with control variables.

[2] 118 workers have not accepted to give information about their wage.

Annexe 2 – Régression (OLS) de la mission sur les avantages monétaires ou en nature

	Avantages monétaires ou en nature				Primes et avantages				Remboursement des frais de transport			
	(1)		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*	
	(A)	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*
Coefficient estimates												
Constante	-0.30** (0.14)	0.13* (0.07)	-0.02 (0.19)	0.56*** (0.17)	-0.17 (0.13)	0.14 (0.10)	0.17 (0.20)	0.64*** (0.20)	-0.46** (0.17)	0.13*** (0.04)	-0.26*** (0.22)	0.47*** (0.17)
AF	0.17 (0.17)	-0.27** (0.12)	0.41* (0.22)	-0.17 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.17)	-0.47*** (0.15)	0.12 (0.19)	-0.35** (0.13)	0.57*** (0.19)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.77** (0.31)	0.05 (0.11)
EI	0.44*** (0.16)	--	0.58*** (0.19)	--	0.31* (0.17)	--	0.47*** (0.16)	--	0.59*** (0.18)	--	0.72*** (0.25)	--
EBL	--	-0.44*** (0.16)	–	-0.58*** (0.19)	–	-0.31* (0.17)	–	-0.47*** (0.16)	–	-0.59*** (0.18)	–	-0.72*** (0.25)
Localisation Bruxelles	--	--	0.02 (0.25)	0.02 (0.25)	–	--	-0.02 (0.26)	-0.02 (0.26)	–	--	0.06 (0.30)	0.06 (0.30)
Age	--	--	$4.39e^{-05}$** ($1.99e^{-05}$)	$4.39e^{-05}$** ($1.99e^{-05}$)	–	--	$5.19e^{-05}$** ($2.34e^{-05}$)	$5.19e^{-05}$** ($2.34e^{-05}$)	–	--	$3.41e^{-05}$* ($1.96e^{-05}$)	$3.41e^{-05}$* ($1.96e^{-05}$)
Femme	--	--	$-3.41e^{-05}$ ($3.05e^{-05}$)	$-3.41e^{-05}$ ($3.05e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-6.55e^{-05}$ ($4.01e^{-05}$)	$-6.55e^{-05}$ ($4.01e^{-05}$)	–	--	$4.10e^{-06}$ ($3.99e^{-05}$)	$4.10e^{-06}$ ($3.99e^{-05}$)
Nombre d'enfants	--	--	$-5.49e^{-05}$ ($3.56e^{-05}$)	$-5.49e^{-05}$ ($3.56e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-4.34e^{-05}$ ($3.51e^{-55}$)	$-4.34e^{-05}$ ($3.51e^{-55}$)	–	--	$-6.88e^{-05}$ ($4.37e^{-05}$)	$-6.88e^{-05}$ ($4.37e^{-05}$)
Ancienneté travailleur (année)	--	--	$-2.70\ e^{-05}$ ($1.88\ e^{-05}$)	$-2.70\ e^{-05}$ ($1.88\ e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-3.06e^{-05}$ ($2.74e^{-05}$)	$-3.06e^{-05}$ ($2.74e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-2.27e^{-05}$ ($1.71e^{-05}$)	$-2.27e^{-05}$ ($1.71e^{-05}$)
Aide-ménager domicile	--	--	$3.59e^{-05}$ ($4.81e^{-06}$)	$3.59e^{-05}$ ($4.81e^{-06}$)	–	--	$3.75e^{-05}$ ($4.33e^{-05}$)	$3.75e^{-05}$ ($4.33e^{-05}$)	–	--	$3.39e^{-05}$ ($5.72e^{-05}$)	$3.39e^{-05}$ ($5.72e^{-05}$)
Niveau scolaire	--	--	$-9.02e^{-06}$ ($2.48e^{-05}$)	$-9.02e^{-06}$ ($2.48e^{-05}$)	–	--	$1.63e^{-05}$ ($1.96e^{-05}$)	$1.63e^{-05}$ ($1.96e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-3.98e^{-05}$ ($3.26e^{-05}$)	$-3.98e^{-05}$ ($3.26e^{-05}$)
Ancienneté entreprise (mois)	--	--	$-6.85e^{-03}$*** ($2.21e^{-03}$)	$-6.85e^{-03}$*** ($2.21e^{-03}$)	--	--	$-8.69e^{-03}$*** ($2.72e^{-03}$)	$-8.69e^{-03}$*** ($2.72e^{-03}$)	–	--	$4.60e^{-03}$** ($2.03e^{-03}$)	$-4.60e^{-03}$** ($2.03e^{-03}$)
Taille entreprise	--	--	$2.12e^{-03}$* ($1.22e^{-03}$)	$2.12e^{-03}$* ($1.22e^{-03}$)	–	--	$3.01e^{-03}$** ($1.21e^{-03}$)	$3.01e^{-03}$** ($1.21e^{-03}$)	–	--	$1.05e^{-03}$ ($1.40e^{-03}$)	$1.05e^{-03}$ ($1.40e^{-03}$)
Usager: personne âgée	--	--	$-6.11e^{-06}$ ($1.57e^{-05}$)	$-6.11e^{-06}$ ($1.57e^{-05}$)	--	--	$7.48e^{-07}$ ($1.60e^{-05}$)	$7.48e^{-07}$ ($1.60e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-1.45e^{-05}$ ($2.00e^{-05}$)	$-1.45e^{-05}$ ($2.00e^{-05}$)
Usager: personne handicapée	--	--	$-6.88e^{-06}$ ($9.95e^{-06}$)	$-6.88e^{-06}$ ($9.95e^{-06}$)	--	--	$1.86e^{-06}$ ($9.86e^{-06}$)	$1.86e^{-06}$ ($9.86e^{-06}$)	--	--	$-1.75e^{-05}$ ($1.21e^{-05}$)	$-1.75e^{-05}$ ($1.21e^{-05}$)
En couple	--	--	$5.78e^{-05}$ * ($2.93e^{-05}$)	$5.78e^{-05}$ * ($2.93e^{-05}$)	--	--	$4.07e^{-05}$ ($2.66e^{-05}$)	$4.07e^{-05}$ ($2.66e^{-05}$)	--	--	$7.85e^{-05}$* ($4.13e^{-05}$)	$7.85e^{-05}$* ($4.13e^{-05}$)
Chômage	--	--	$-3.50e^{-05}$ * ($1.82e^{-05}$)	$-3.50e^{-05}$ * ($1.82e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-1.46e^{-05}$ ($1.96e^{-05}$)	$-1.46e^{-05}$ ($1.96e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-5.98e^{-05}$ ** ($2.48e^{-05}$)	$-5.98e^{-05}$** ($2.48e^{-05}$)
Origine hors U.E.	--	--	$1.65e^{-05}$ ($1.70e^{-05}$)	$1.65e^{-05}$ ($1.70e^{-05}$)	--	--	$5.14e^{-06}$ ($2.13e^{-05}$)	$5.14e^{-06}$ ($2.13e^{-05}$)	--	--	$3.03e^{-05}$ ($2.00e^{-05}$)	$3.03e^{-05}$ ($2.00e^{-05}$)
N	600	600	568[1]	568[1]	600	600	568[1]	568[1]	600	600	568[1]	568[1]

La régression (A) compare les EI et les AF avec les EBL alors que la régression (B) compare les AF et les EBL avec les EI. SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significatif à. * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.

(1) sans variables contrôles

(2) avec variables contrôles

[1] 32 observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations have not been considered in specifications with control variables

Annexe 3 – Régression (OLS) de la mission sur la participation

	Participation				Directe et représentative				Réunions			
	(1)		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*	
	(A)	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*
Coefficient estimates												
Constante	-0.34*** (0.07)	0.12* (0.07)	-0.34** (0.13)	0.13 (0.17)	-0.09 (0.09)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.15)	0.11 (0.19)	-0.76*** (0.09)	0.28*** (0.09)	-0.82*** (0.17)	0.15 (0.15)
AF	0.44*** (0.10)	-0.03 (0.10)	0.43*** (0.14)	-0.04 (0.10)	0.15 (0.12)	0.02 (0.11)	0.21 (0.18)	0.04 (0.11)	0.92*** (0.12)	-0.11 (0.12)	0.79*** (0.15)	-0.17 (0.14)
EI	0.46*** (0.10)	--	0.47*** (0.12)	--	0.12 (0.12)	--	0.17 (0.15)	--	1.03*** (0.13)	--	0.96*** (0.12)	--
EBL	--	-0.46*** (0.10)	–	-0.47*** (0.12)	–	-0.12 (0.12)	–	-0.17 (0.15)	–	-1.03*** (0.13)	–	-0.96*** (0.12)
Localisation Bruxelles	--	--	0.11 (0.13)	0.11 (0.13)	–	--	0.18 (0.15)	0.18 (0.15)	–	--	$-4.90e^{-03}$ (0.20)	$-4.90e^{-03}$ (0.20)
Age	--	--	$-1.57e^{-05}$ ($3.87e^{-05}$)	$-1.57e^{-05}$ ($3.87e^{-05}$)	–	--	$7.79e^{-06}$ ($3.88e^{-05}$)	$7.79e^{-06}$ ($3.88e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-5.46e^{-05}$ ($4.29e^{-05}$)	$-5.46e^{-05}$ ($4.29e^{-05}$)
Femme	--	--	$3.45e^{-05}$ ($3.29e^{-05}$)	$3.45e^{-05}$ ($3.29e^{-05}$)	–	--	$2.93e^{-05}$ ($3.19e^{-05}$)	$2.93e^{-05}$ ($3.19e^{-05}$)	–	--	$4.30e^{-05}$ ($3.93e^{-05}$)	$4.30e^{-05}$ ($3.93e^{-05}$)
Nombre d'enfants	--	--	$3.45e^{-05}$ ($6.00e^{-05}$)	$3.45e^{-05}$ ($6.00e^{-05}$)	–	--	$1.02e^{-05}$ ($6.34e^{-05}$)	$1.02e^{-05}$ ($6.34e^{-05}$)	–	--	$7.48e^{-05}$ ($5.79e^{-05}$)	$7.48e^{-05}$ ($5.79e^{-05}$)
Ancienneté travailleur (année)	--	--	$-2.35e^{-05}$ ($3.13e^{-05}$)	$-2.35e^{-05}$ ($3.13e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-5.79e^{-05}$ ($4.00e^{-05}$)	$-5.79e^{-05}$ ($4.00e^{-05}$)	--	--	$3.35e^{-05}$ ($2.90e^{-05}$)	$3.35e^{-05}$ ($2.90e^{-05}$)
Aide-ménager domicile	--	--	$-1.27e^{-05}$ ($2.45e^{-05}$)	$-1.27e^{-05}$ ($2.45e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-1.22e^{-05}$ ($3.23e^{-05}$)	$-1.22e^{-05}$ ($3.23e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-1.36e^{-05}$ ($1.65e^{-05}$)	$-1.36e^{-05}$ ($1.65e^{-05}$)
Niveau scolaire	--	--	$8.98e^{-06}$ ($1.68e^{-05}$)	$8.98e^{-06}$ ($1.68e^{-05}$)	–	--	$3.86e^{-06}$ ($1.90e^{-05}$)	$3.86e^{-06}$ ($1.90e^{-05}$)	–	--	$1.75e^{-05}$ ($1.79e^{-05}$)	$1.75e^{-05}$ ($1.79e^{-05}$)
Ancienneté entreprise (mois)	--	--	$1.16e^{-03}$ ($1.80e^{-03}$)	$1.16e^{-03}$ ($1.80e^{-03}$)	–	--	$1.37e^{-04}$ ($2.12e^{-03}$)	$1.37e^{-04}$ ($2.12e^{-03}$)	–	--	$2.88e^{-03}$ ($2.01e^{-03}$)	$2.88e^{-03}$ ($2.01e^{-03}$)
Taille entreprise	--	--	$-1.24e^{-05}$ ($7.74e^{-03}$)	$-1.24e^{-05}$ ($7.74e^{-03}$)	–	--	$-1.18e^{-03}$ ($8.80e^{-04}$)	$-1.18e^{-03}$ ($8.80e^{-04}$)	–	--	$-1.34e^{-03}$ ($9.66e^{-04}$)	$-1.34e^{-03}$ ($9.66e^{-04}$)
Usager: personne âgée	--	--	$1.54e^{-06}$ ($1.63e^{-05}$)	$1.54e^{-06}$ ($1.63e^{-05}$)	--	--	$4.36e^{-07}$ ($1.75e^{-05}$)	$4.36e^{-07}$ ($1.75e^{-05}$)	--	--	$3.38e^{-06}$ ($1.80e^{-05}$)	$3.38e^{-06}$ ($1.80e^{-05}$)
Usager: personne handicapée	--	--	$-3.76e^{-06}$ ($1.13e^{-05}$)	$-3.76e^{-06}$ ($1.13e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-7.66e^{-06}$ ($1.27e^{-05}$)	$-7.66e^{-06}$ ($1.27e^{-05}$)	--	--	$2.72e^{-06}$ ($1.11e^{-05}$)	$2.72e^{-06}$ ($1.11e^{-05}$)
En couple	--	--	$-3.27e^{-05}$ ($6.12e^{-05}$)	$-3.27e^{-05}$ ($6.12e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-6.14e^{-06}$ ($6.26e^{-05}$)	$-6.14e^{-06}$ ($6.26e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-7.67e^{-05}$ ($6.07e^{-05}$)	$-7.67e^{-05}$ ($6.07e^{-05}$)
Chômage	--	--	$1.21e^{-05}$ ($1.36e^{-05}$)	$1.21e^{-05}$ ($1.36e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-6.90e^{-06}$ ($1.58e^{-05}$)	$-6.90e^{-06}$ ($1.58e^{-05}$)	--	--	$4.36e^{-05}$** ($1.65e^{-05}$)	$4.36e^{-05}$** ($1.65e^{-05}$)
Origine hors U.E.	--	--	$2.17e^{-05}$ ($2.97e^{-05}$)	$2.17e^{-05}$ ($2.97e^{-05}$)	--	--	$3.29e^{-05}$ ($4.00e^{-05}$)	$3.29e^{-05}$ ($4.00e^{-05}$)	--	--	$3.24e^{-06}$ ($2.49e^{-05}$)	$3.24e^{-06}$ ($2.49e^{-05}$)
N	600	600	568[1]	568[1]	600	600	568[1]	568[1]	600	600	568[1]	568[1]

La régression (A) compare les EI et les AF avec les EBL alors que la régression (B) compare les AF et les EBL avec les EI. SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significatif à. * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.

(1) sans variables contrôles

(2) avec variables contrôles

[1] 32 observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations have not been considered in specifications with control variables

Annexe 4 – Régression (OLS) de la mission sur le développement des compétences

	Développement des compétences				Apprentissage par le travail				Formations			
	(1)		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*	
	(A)	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*
Coefficient estimates												
Constante	-0.32*** (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)	-0.56*** (0.13)	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.15)	-0.02 (0.17)	-0.70*** (0.05)	0.24** (0.09)	-1.17*** (0.19)	-0.28 (0.20)
AF	0.30** (0.12)	-0.17 (0.12)	0.13 (0.14)	-0.30** (0.13)	-0.06 (0.15)	-0.18 (0.14)	-0.17 (0.18)	-0.28* (0.14)	0.80*** (0.12)	-0.15 (0.14)	0.56*** (0.17)	-0.33** (0.17)
EI	0.46*** (0.08)	--	0.43*** (0.09)	--	0.12 (0.10)	--	0.11 (0.13)	--	0.94*** (0.11)	--	0.89*** (0.10)	--
EBL	--	-0.46*** (0.08)	–	-0.43*** (0.09)	–	-0.12 (0.10)	–	-0.11 (0.13)	–	-0.94*** (0.11)	–	-0.89*** (0.10)
Localisation Bruxelles	--	--	0.05 (0.21)	0.05 (0.21)	–	--	-0.09 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.24)	–	--	0.26 (0.23)	0.26 (0.23)
Age	--	--	$1.70e^{-05}$ ($3.02e^{-05}$)	$1.70e^{-05}$ ($3.02e^{-05}$)	–	--	$2.90e^{-05}$ ($3.85e^{-05}$)	$2.90e^{-05}$ ($3.85e^{-05}$)	–	--	$1.24e^{-07}$ ($2.95e^{-05}$)	$1.24e^{-07}$ ($2.95e^{-05}$)
Femme	--	--	$2.39e^{-05}$ ($2.81e^{-05}$)	$2.39e^{-05}$ ($2.81e^{-05}$)	–	--	$7.96e^{-06}$ ($3.65e^{-05}$)	$7.96e^{-06}$ ($3.65e^{-05}$)	–	--	$4.64e^{-05}$ ($3.70e^{-05}$)	$4.64e^{-05}$ ($3.70e^{-05}$)
Nombre d'enfants	--	--	$-1.02e^{-04}$*** ($2.60e^{-05}$)	$-1.02e^{-04}$*** ($2.60e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-1.35e^{-04}$*** ($3.30e^{-05}$)	$-1.35e^{-04}$*** ($3.30e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-5.61e^{-05}$** ($2.59e^{-05}$)	$-5.61e^{-05}$** ($2.59e^{-05}$)
Ancienneté travailleur (année)	--	--	$1.54e^{-05}$ ($2.43e^{-05}$)	$1.54e^{-05}$ ($2.43e^{-05}$)	--	--	$3.05e^{-05}$ ($3.68e^{-05}$)	$3.05e^{-05}$ ($3.68e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-5.81e^{-06}$ ($1.81e^{-05}$)	$-5.81e^{-06}$ ($1.81e^{-05}$)
Aide-ménager domicile	--	--	$-2.03e^{-06}$ ($2.98e^{-05}$)	$-2.03e^{-06}$ ($2.98e^{-05}$)	–	--	$2.14e^{-05}$ ($3.97e^{-05}$)	$2.14e^{-05}$ ($3.97e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-3.50e^{-05}$ ($2.24e^{-05}$)	$-3.50e^{-05}$ ($2.24e^{-05}$)
Niveau scolaire	--	--	$2.30e^{-05}$ ($1.38e^{-05}$)	$2.30e^{-05}$ ($1.38e^{-05}$)	–	--	$3.14e^{-05}$ ($2.03e^{-05}$)	$3.14e^{-05}$ ($2.03e^{-05}$)	–	--	$1.13e^{-05}$ ($1.09e^{-05}$)	$1.13e^{-05}$ ($1.09e^{-05}$)
Ancienneté entreprise (mois)	--	--	$4.09e^{-03}$** ($1.67e^{-03}$)	$4.09e^{-03}$** ($1.67e^{-03}$)	–	--	$9.58e^{-04}$ ($2.09e^{-03}$)	$9.58e^{-04}$ ($2.09e^{-03}$)	–	--	$8.50e^{-03}$*** ($2.73e^{-03}$)	$8.50e^{-03}$*** ($2.73e^{-03}$)
Taille entreprise	--	--	$-4.09e^{-04}$ ($1.12e^{-03}$)	$-4.09e^{-04}$ ($1.12e^{-03}$)	–	--	$7.69e^{-04}$ ($1.34e^{-03}$)	$7.69e^{-04}$ ($1.34e^{-03}$)	–	--	$-2.06e^{-03}$* ($1.15e^{-03}$)	$-2.06e^{-03}$* ($1.15e^{-03}$)
Usager: personne âgée	--	--	$-3.78e^{-06}$ ($1.22e^{-05}$)	$-3.78e^{-06}$ ($1.22e^{-05}$)	--	--	$9.01e^{-07}$ ($1.76e^{-05}$)	$9.01e^{-07}$ ($1.76e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-1.04e^{-06}$ ($1.53e^{-05}$)	$-1.04e^{-06}$ ($1.53e^{-05}$)
Usager: personne handicapée	--	--	$-7.19e^{-06}$ ($1.07e^{-05}$)	$-7.19e^{-06}$ ($1.07e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-2.22e^{-05}$** ($1.04e^{-05}$)	$-2.22e^{-05}$ ** ($1.04e^{-05}$)	--	--	$1.38e^{-05}$ ($1.66e^{-05}$)	$1.38e^{-05}$ ($1.66e^{-05}$)
En couple	--	--	$8.12e^{-05}$*** ($2.21e^{-05}$)	$8.12e^{-05}$*** ($2.21e^{-05}$)	--	--	$1.15e^{-04}$*** ($2.80e^{-05}$)	$1.15e^{-04}$*** ($2.80e^{-05}$)	--	--	$3.39e^{-05}$ ($2.30e^{-05}$)	$3.39e^{-05}$ ($2.30e^{-05}$)
Chômage	--	--	$5.51e^{-06}$ ($1.53e^{-05}$)	$5.51e^{-06}$ ($1.53e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-7.49e^{-06}$ ($2.92e^{-05}$)	$-7.49e^{-06}$ ($2.92e^{-05}$)	--	--	$2.38e^{-05}$* ($1.21e^{-05}$)	$2.38e^{-05}$* ($1.21e^{-05}$)
Origine hors U.E.	--	--	$-4.39e^{-05}$ ($1.87e^{-05}$)	$-4.39e^{-05}$ ($1.87e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-8.42e^{-05}$ ** ($3.25e^{-05}$)	$-8.42e^{-05}$ ** ($3.25e^{-05}$)	--	--	$1.26e^{-05}$ ($2.09e^{-05}$)	$1.26e^{-05}$ ($2.09e^{-05}$)
N	600	600	568[1]	568[1]	600	600	568[1]	568[1]	600	600	568[1]	568[1]

La régression (A) compare les EI et les AF avec les EBL alors que la régression (B) compare les AF et les EBL avec les EI. SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significatif à. * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.

(1) sans variables contrôles

(2) avec variables contrôles

[1] 32 observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations have not been considered in specifications with control variables

Annexe 5 – Régression (OLS) de la mission sur les conditions matérielles de travail

	Conditions matérielles				Environnement de travail				Prévention des risques			
	(1)		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*	
	(A)	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*
Coefficient estimates												
Constante	-0.15** (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.12)	0.15 (0.16)	0.07 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.07 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.20)	-0.50*** (0.11)	0.17* (0.09)	-0.31 (0.20)	0.40** (0.17)
AF	0.20** (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)	0.28** (0.12)	0.06 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.07 (0.10)	0.01 (0.12)	0.09 (0.10)	0.60*** (0.16)	-0.06 (0.15)	0.74*** (0.21)	0.02 (0.20)
EI	0.19* (0.10)	--	0.22** (0.10)	--	-0.11 (0.11)	--	-0.08 (0.11)	--	0.66*** (0.14)	--	0.71*** (0.15)	--
EBL	--	-0.19* (0.10)	_	-0.22** (0.10)	_	0.11 (0.11)	_	0.08 (0.11)	_	-0.66*** (0.14)	_	-0.71*** (0.15)
Localisation Bruxelles	--	--	0.12 (0.15)	0.12 (0.15)	_	--	0.15 (0.23)	0.15 (0.23)	_	--	0.06 (0.14)	0.06 (0.14)
Age	--	--	$-3.35e^{-05}$ ($2.54e^{-05}$)	$-3.35e^{-05}$ ($2.54e^{-05}$)	_	--	$-3.58e^{-05}$ ($3.49e^{-05}$)	$-3.58e^{-05}$ ($3.49e^{-05}$)	_	--	$-2.97e^{-05}$ ($2.56e^{-05}$)	$-2.97e^{-05}$ ($2.56e^{-05}$)
Femme	--	--	$2.93e^{-05}$ ($3.65e^{-05}$)	$2.93e^{-05}$ ($3.65e^{-05}$)	_	--	$-1.05e^{-06}$ ($5.20e^{-05}$)	$-1.05e^{-06}$ ($5.20e^{-05}$)	_	--	$7.89e^{-05}$*** ($2.88e^{-05}$)	$7.89e^{-05}$*** ($2.88e^{-05}$)
Nombre d'enfants	--	--	$2.65e^{-05}$* ($1.34e^{-05}$)	$2.65e^{-05}$* ($1.34e^{-05}$)	_	--	$-5.22e^{-06}$ ($2.23e^{-05}$)	$-5.22e^{-06}$ ($2.23e^{-05}$)	_	--	$7.82e^{-05}$*** ($2.29e^{-05}$)	$7.82e^{-05}$*** ($2.29e^{-05}$)
Ancienneté travailleur (année)	--	--	$1.12e^{-05}$ ($2.30e^{-05}$)	$1.12e^{-05}$ ($2.30e^{-05}$)	--	--	$3.72e^{-05}$ ($3.32e^{-05}$)	$3.72e^{-05}$ ($3.32e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-3.14e^{-05}$ ($3.26e^{-05}$)	$-3.14e^{-05}$ ($3.26e^{-05}$)
Aide-ménager domicile	--	--	$2.68e^{-05}$* ($1.65e^{-05}$)	$2.68e^{-05}$* ($1.65e^{-05}$)	_	--	$4.71e^{-05}$* ($2.78e^{-05}$)	$4.71e^{-05}$* ($2.78e^{-05}$)	_	--	$-6.35e^{-06}$ ($3.77e^{-05}$)	$-6.35e^{-06}$ ($3.77e^{-05}$)
Niveau scolaire	--	--	$1.86e^{-05}$* ($9.72e^{-06}$)	$1.86e^{-05}$* ($9.72e^{-06}$)	_	--	$1.30e^{-05}$ ($1.28e^{-05}$)	$1.30e^{-05}$ ($1.28e^{-05}$)	_	--	$2.76e^{-05}$ ($1.93e^{-05}$)	$2.76e^{-05}$ ($1.93e^{-05}$)
Ancienneté entreprise (mois)	--	--	$-7.71e^{-04}$** ($1.73e^{-03}$)	$-7.71e^{-04}$** ($1.73e^{-03}$)	_	--	$1.29e^{-04}$ ($2.10e^{-03}$)	$1.29e^{-04}$ ($2.10e^{-03}$)	_	--	$-2.24e^{-03}$ ($2.55e^{-03}$)	$-2.24e^{-03}$ ($2.55e^{-03}$)
Taille entreprise	--	--	$-6.50e^{-04}$ ($5.82e^{-04}$)	$-6.50e^{-04}$ ($5.82e^{-04}$)	_	--	$-5.84e^{-04}$ ($6.21e^{-04}$)	$-5.84e^{-04}$ ($6.21e^{-04}$)	_	--	-7.58^{-04} ($1.18e^{-03}$)	-7.58^{-04} ($1.18e^{-03}$)
Usager: personne âgée	--	--	$-2.98e^{-05}$** ($1.27e^{-05}$)	$-2.98e^{-05}$** ($1.27e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-3.32e^{-05}$ ($2.09e^{-05}$)	$-3.32e^{-05}$ ($2.09e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-2.42e^{-05}$* ($1.38e^{-05}$)	$-2.42e^{-05}$* ($1.38e^{-05}$)
Usager: personne handicapée	--	--	$-8.32e^{-07}$ ($7.84e^{-06}$)	$-8.32e^{-07}$ ($7.84e^{-06}$)	--	--	$-7.31e^{-06}$ ($1.14e^{-05}$)	$-7.31e^{-06}$ ($1.14e^{-05}$)	--	--	$9.75e^{-06}$ ($9.70e^{-06}$)	$9.75e^{-06}$ ($9.70e^{-06}$)
En couple	--	--	$-1.52e^{-05}$ ($1.18e^{-05}$)	$-1.52e^{-05}$ ($1.18e^{-05}$)	--	--	$2.35e^{-05}$ ($2.17e^{-05}$)	$2.35e^{-05}$ ($2.17e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-7.84e^{-05}$*** ($2.75e^{-05}$)	$-7.84e^{-05}$*** ($2.75e^{-05}$)
Chômage	--	--	$-1.98e^{-05}$** ($8.77e^{-06}$)	$-1.98e^{-05}$** ($8.77e^{-06}$)	--	--	$-2.94e^{-05}$ ($1.98e^{-05}$)	$-2.94e^{-05}$ ($1.98e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-4.09e^{-06}$ ($1.87e^{-05}$)	$-4.09e^{-06}$ ($1.87e^{-05}$)
Origine hors U.E.	--	--	$-2.86e^{-06}$ ($1.52e^{-05}$)	$-2.86e^{-06}$ ($1.52e^{-05}$)	--	--	$4.34e^{-06}$ ($2.41e^{-05}$)	$4.34e^{-06}$ ($2.41e^{-05}$)	--	--	$4.29e^{-07}$ ($2.33e^{-05}$)	$4.29e^{-07}$ ($2.33e^{-05}$)
N	600	600	568[1]	568[1]	600	600	568[1]	568[1]	600	600	568[1]	568[1]

La régression (A) compare les EI et les AF avec les EBL alors que la régression (B) compare les AF et les EBL avec les EI. SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significatif à. * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.

(1) sans variables contrôles

(2) avec variables contrôles

[1] 32 observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations have not been considered in specifications with control variables

Annexe 6 – Régression (OLS) de la mission sur la sécurité d'emploi

	Sécurité d'emploi				Ancienneté				CDI et sentiment de sécurité			
	(1)		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*	
	(A)	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*
Coefficient estimates												
Constante	-0.32*** (0.08)	0.12** (0.04)	-0.58*** (0.12)	-0.19 (0.12)	-0.39*** (0.08)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.87*** (0.12)	-0.50*** (0.15)	-0.24** (0.10)	0.20*** (0.05)	-0.27* (0.14)	0.12 (0.13)
AF	0.27*** (0.09)	-0.16** (0.06)	0.06 (0.09)	-0.32*** (0.07)	0.62*** (0.10)	0.19** (0.08)	0.31*** (0.11)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.53*** (0.07)	-0.19 (0.13)	-0.59*** (0.10)
EI	0.43*** (0.09)	--	0.38*** (0.08)	--	0.42*** (0.11)	--	0.37*** (0.08)	--	0.44*** (0.11)	--	0.40*** (0.11)	--
EBL	--	-0.43*** (0.09)	–	-0.38*** (0.08)	–	-0.42*** (0.11)	–	-0.37*** (0.08)	–	-0.44*** (0.11)	–	-0.40*** (0.11)
Localisation Bruxelles	--	--	0.12 (0.23)	0.12 (0.23)	–	--	0.20 (0.16)	0.20 (0.16)	–	--	0.05 (0.31)	0.05 (0.31)
Age	--	--	$-9.05e^{-06}$ ($2.35e^{-05}$)	$-9.05e^{-06}$ ($2.35e^{-05}$)	–	--	$1.19e^{-06}$ ($2.05e^{-05}$)	$1.19e^{-06}$ ($2.05e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-1.96e^{-05}$ ($3.42e^{-05}$)	$-1.96e^{-05}$ ($3.42e^{-05}$)
Femme	--	--	$-4.12e^{-05}$ ($3.97e^{-05}$)	$-4.12e^{-05}$ ($3.97e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-5.25e^{-05}$ ($4.74e^{-05}$)	$-5.25e^{-05}$ ($4.74e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-2.96e^{-05}$ ($4.10e^{-05}$)	$-2.96e^{-05}$ ($4.10e^{-05}$)
Nombre d'enfants	--	--	$7.58e^{-05}$*** ($2.07e^{-05}$)	$7.58e^{-05}$*** ($2.07e^{-05}$)	–	--	$7.60e^{-05}$*** ($2.72e^{-05}$)	$7.60e^{-05}$*** ($2.72e^{-05}$)	–	--	$7.56e^{-05}$*** ($2.42e^{-05}$)	$7.56e^{-05}$*** ($2.42e^{-05}$)
Aide-ménager domicile	--	--	$2.25e^{-05}$ ($2.16e^{-05}$)	$2.25e^{-05}$ ($2.16e^{-05}$)	–	--	$4.03e^{-06}$ ($3.02e^{-05}$)	$4.03e^{-06}$ ($3.02e^{-05}$)	–	--	$4.15e^{-05}$** ($2.04e^{-05}$)	$4.15e^{-05}$** ($2.04e^{-05}$)
Niveau scolaire	--	--	$-3.58e^{-06}$ ($2.07e^{-05}$)	$-3.58e^{-06}$ ($2.07e^{-05}$)	–	--	$7.08e^{-06}$ ($1.30e^{-05}$)	$7.08e^{-06}$ ($1.30e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-1.45e^{-05}$ ($3.02e^{-05}$)	$-1.45e^{-05}$ ($3.02e^{-05}$)
Ancienneté entreprise (mois)	--	--	$4.51e^{-03}$*** ($1.30e^{-03}$)	$4.51e^{-03}$*** ($1.30e^{-03}$)	–	--	$7.33e^{-03}$*** ($1.38e^{-03}$)	$7.33e^{-03}$*** ($1.38e^{-03}$)	–	--	$1.62e^{-03}$ ($1.38e^{-03}$)	$1.62e^{-03}$ ($1.38e^{-03}$)
Taille entreprise	--	--	$-1.82e^{-04}$ ($5.92e^{-04}$)	$-1.82e^{-04}$ ($5.92e^{-04}$)	–	--	$-6.81e^{-05}$ ($6.40e^{-04}$)	$-6.81e^{-05}$ ($6.40e^{-04}$)	–	--	$-2.99e^{-04}$ ($8.05e^{-04}$)	$-2.99e^{-04}$ ($8.05e^{-04}$)
Usager: personne âgée	--	--	$-1.73e^{-05}$ ($1.40e^{-05}$)	$-1.73e^{-05}$ ($1.40e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-1.82e^{-05}$ ($1.26e^{-05}$)	$-1.82e^{-05}$ ($1.26e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-1.65e^{-05}$ ($1.78e^{-05}$)	$-1.65e^{-05}$ ($1.78e^{-05}$)
Usager: personne handicapée	--	--	$1.88e^{-06}$ ($8.40e^{-06}$)	$1.88e^{-06}$ ($8.40e^{-06}$)	--	--	$8.27e^{-06}$ ($1.03e^{-05}$)	$8.27e^{-06}$ ($1.03e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-4.70e^{-06}$ ($8.58e^{-06}$)	$-4.70e^{-06}$ ($8.58e^{-06}$)
En couple	--	--	$-7.29e^{-05}$*** ($2.01e^{-05}$)	$-7.29e^{-05}$*** ($2.01e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-7.93e^{-05}$*** ($2.56e^{-05}$)	$-7.93e^{-05}$*** ($2.56e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-6.62e^{-05}$*** ($2.20e^{-05}$)	$-6.62e^{-05}$*** ($2.20e^{-05}$)
Chômage	--	--	$-1.14e^{-05}$ ($1.35e^{-05}$)	$-1.14e^{-05}$ ($1.35e^{-05}$)	--	--	$6.38e^{-07}$ ($1.94e^{-05}$)	$6.38e^{-07}$ ($1.94e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-2.38e^{-05}$ ($1.93e^{-05}$)	$-2.38e^{-05}$ ($1.93e^{-05}$)
Origine hors U.E.	--	--	$-1.52e^{-05}$ ($2.36e^{-05}$)	$-1.52e^{-05}$ ($2.36e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-1.01e^{-05}$ ($2.34e^{-05}$)	$-1.01e^{-05}$ ($2.34e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-2.04e^{-05}$ ($2.65e^{-05}$)	$-2.04e^{-05}$ ($2.65e^{-05}$)
N	600	600	568[1]	568[1]	600	600	568[1]	568[1]	600	600	568[1]	568[1]

La régression (A) compare les EI et les AF avec les EBL alors que la régression (B) compare les AF et les EBL avec les EI. SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significatif à. * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.

(1) sans variables contrôles

(2) avec variables contrôles

[1] 32 observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations have not been considered in specifications with control variables

Annexe 7 – Régression (OLS) de la mission sur la flexibilité horaire

	Flexibilité horaire				Equilibre travail/famille et pas de flexibilité exigée				Pas d'horaires atypiques			
	(1)		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*	
	(A)	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*
Coefficient estimates												
Constante	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.17 (0.13)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.24* (0.13)	-0.09 (0.14)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.17)	-0.01 (0.25)
AF	0.23*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.06)	0.17 (0.10)	0.26*** (0.07)	0.21** (0.09)	0.32*** (0.08)	0.09 (0.11)	0.25*** (0.09)	0.28* (0.15)	0.23** (0.09)	0.33 (0.26)	0.28*** (0.09)
EI	-0.06 (0.06)	--	-0.09 (0.08)	--	-0.11 (0.08)	--	-0.16* (0.08)	--	0.05 (0.16)	--	0.05 (0.22)	--
EBL	--	0.06 (0.06)	–	0.09 (0.08)	–	0.11 (0.08)	–	0.16* (0.08)	–	-0.05 (0.16)	–	-0.05 (0.22)
Localisation Bruxelles	--	--	0.05 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)	–	--	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.12)	–	--	0.20 (0.20)	0.20 (0.20)
Age	--	--	$-2.35e^{-05}$ ($1.59e^{-05}$)	$-2.35e^{-05}$ ($1.59e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-3.89e^{-05}$* ($2.23e^{-05}$)	$-3.89e^{-05}$* ($2.23e^{-05}$)	–	--	$7.64e^{-06}$ ($1.11e^{-05}$)	$7.64e^{-06}$ ($1.11e^{-05}$)
Femme	--	--	$3.79e^{-05}$ ($4.17e^{-05}$)	$3.79e^{-05}$ ($4.17e^{-05}$)	–	--	$4.11e^{-05}$ ($4.94e^{-05}$)	$4.11e^{-05}$ ($4.94e^{-05}$)	–	--	$3.13e^{-05}$ ($3.95e^{-05}$)	$3.13e^{-05}$ ($3.95e^{-05}$)
Nombre d'enfants	--	--	$-1.95e^{-05}$ ($4.19e^{-05}$)	$-1.95e^{-05}$ ($4.19e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-3.75e^{-05}$ ($4.07e^{-05}$)	$-3.75e^{-05}$ ($4.07e^{-05}$)	–	--	$1.71e^{-05}$ ($5.27e^{-05}$)	$1.71e^{-05}$ ($5.27e^{-05}$)
Ancienneté travailleur (année)	--	--	$-1.15e^{-05}$ ($1.47e^{-05}$)	$-1.15e^{-05}$ ($1.47e^{-05}$)	--	--	-2.45^{e-05} (1.98^{e-05})	-2.45^{e-05} (1.98^{e-05})	--	--	$1.48e^{-05}$ ($1.33e^{-05}$)	$1.48e^{-05}$ ($1.33e^{-05}$)
Aide-ménager domicile	--	--	$-1.79e^{-05}$ ($2.03e^{-05}$)	$-1.79e^{-05}$ ($2.03e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-3.30e^{-05}$ ($2.59e^{-05}$)	$-3.30e^{-05}$ ($2.59e^{-05}$)	–	--	$1.28e^{-05}$ ($1.63e^{-05}$)	$1.28e^{-05}$ ($1.63e^{-05}$)
Niveau scolaire	--	--	$-3.44e^{-05}$** ($1.56e^{-05}$)	$-3.44e^{-05}$** ($1.56e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-3.31e^{-05}$** ($1.32e^{-05}$)	$-3.31e^{-05}$** ($1.32e^{-05}$)	–	--	$-3.72e^{-05}$ ($3.62e^{-05}$)	$-3.72e^{-05}$ ($3.62e^{-05}$)
Ancienneté entreprise (mois)	--	--	$1.91e^{-03}$ ($1.48e^{-03}$)	$1.91e^{-03}$ ($1.48e^{-03}$)	–	--	$2.52e^{-03}$ ($1.52e^{-03}$)	$2.52e^{-03}$ ($1.52e^{-03}$)	–	--	$6.69e^{-04}$ ($2.63e^{-03}$)	$6.69e^{-04}$ ($2.63e^{-03}$)
Taille entreprise	--	--	$-6.15e^{-04}$ ($4.10e^{-04}$)	$-6.15e^{-04}$ ($4.10e^{-04}$)	–	--	$-3.09e^{-04}$ ($5.94e^{-04}$)	$-3.09e^{-04}$ ($5.94e^{-04}$)	–	--	$-1.24e^{-03}$ ($8.06e^{-04}$)	$-1.24e^{-03}$ ($8.06e^{-04}$)
Usager: personne âgée	--	--	$-1.97e^{-05}$ ($1.22e^{-0}$)	$-1.97e^{-05}$ ($1.22e^{-0}$)	--	--	$-2.18e^{-05}$ ($1.35e^{-05}$)	$-2.18e^{-05}$ ($1.35e^{-05}$)	--	--	-1.55^{-05} ($1.57e^{-05}$)	-1.55^{-05} ($1.57e^{-05}$)
Usager: personne handicapée	--	--	$-1.30e^{-05}$ ($1.03e^{-05}$)	$-1.30e^{-05}$ ($1.03e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-1.18e^{-05}$ ($1.06e^{-05}$)	$-1.18e^{-05}$ ($1.06e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-1.56e^{-05}$ ($1.56e^{-05}$)	$-1.56e^{-05}$ ($1.56e^{-05}$)
En couple	--	--	$1.88e^{-05}$ ($4.04e^{-05}$)	$1.88e^{-05}$ ($4.04e^{-05}$)	--	--	$4.28e^{-05}$ ($3.85e^{-05}$)	$4.28e^{-05}$ ($3.85e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-3.00e^{-05}$ ($5.37e^{-05}$)	$-3.00e^{-05}$ ($5.37e^{-05}$)
Chômage	--	--	$2.49e^{-05}$ ($1.87e^{-05}$)	$2.49e^{-05}$ ($1.87e^{-05}$)	--	--	$2.28e^{-05}$ ($2.18e^{-05}$)	$2.28e^{-05}$ ($2.18e^{-05}$)	--	--	$2.92e^{-05}$* ($1.72e^{-05}$)	$2.92e^{-05}$* ($1.72e^{-05}$)
Origine hors U.E.	--	--	$-8.69e^{-06}$ ($2.08e^{-05}$)	$-8.69e^{-06}$ ($2.08e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-1.93e^{-05}$ ($2.76e^{-05}$)	$-1.93e^{-05}$ ($2.76e^{-05}$)	--	--	$1.29e^{-05}$ ($1.86e^{-05}$)	$1.29e^{-05}$ ($1.86e^{-05}$)
N	600	600	568[1]	568[1]	600	600	568[1]	568[1]	600	600	568[1]	568[1]

La régression (A) compare les EI et les AF avec les EBL alors que la régression (B) compare les AF et les EBL avec les EI. SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significatif à. * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.

(1) sans variables contrôles

(2) avec variables contrôles

[1] 32 observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations have not been considered in specifications with control variables

Annexe 8 – Régression (OLS) de la mission sur les aspects relationnels et l'intensité

	Aspects relationnels				**Intensité** (R)			
	(1)		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*	
	(A)	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*
Coefficient estimates								
Constante	-0.14 (0.11)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.05 (0.19)	0.34** (0.15)	3.59*** (0.15)	3.80*** (0.14)	3.62*** (0.30)	3.96*** (0.30)
AF	-0.16 (0.17)	-0.50*** (0.14)	-0.15 (0.19)	-0.44*** (0.16)	-0.05 (0.17)	-0.26 (0.17)	0.17 (0.23)	-0.17 (0.17)
EI	0.35*** (0.13)	--	0.29** (0.13)	--	0.21 (0.20)	--	0.34 (0.22)	--
EBL	--	-0.35*** (0.13)	–	-0.29** (0.13)	--	-0.21 (0.20)	--	-0.34 (0.22)
Localisation Bruxelles	--	--	-0.21 (0.27)	-0.21 (0.27)	--	--	0.33 (0.27)	0.33 (0.27)
Age	--	--	$1.18e^{-06}$ ($3.52e^{-05}$)	$1.18e^{-06}$ ($3.52e^{-05}$)	--	--	$5.58e^{-05}$ ($6.34e^{-05}$)	$5.58e^{-05}$ ($6.34e^{-05}$)
Femme	--	--	$1.75e^{-04}$*** ($4.52e^{-05}$)	$1.75e^{-04}$*** ($4.52e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-2.98e^{-05}$ ($5.40e^{-05}$)	$-2.98e^{-05}$ ($5.40e^{-05}$)
Nombre d'enfants	--	--	$-5.70e^{-05}$ ($3.77e^{-05}$)	$-5.70e^{-05}$ ($3.77e^{-05}$)	--	--	$3.81e^{-05}$ ($7.25e^{-05}$)	$3.81e^{-05}$ ($7.25e^{-05}$)
Ancienneté travailleur (année)	--	--	$-3.85e^{-05}$* ($2.16e^{-05}$)	$-3.85e^{-05}$* ($2.16e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-1.43e^{-04}$ ($1.03e^{-04}$)	$-1.43e^{-04}$ ($1.03e^{-04}$)
Aide-ménager domicile	--	--	$1.70e^{-05}$ ($2.18e^{-05}$)	$1.70e^{-05}$ ($2.18e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-2.17e^{-05}$ ($8.23e^{-05}$)	$-2.17e^{-05}$ ($8.23e^{-05}$)
Niveau scolaire	--	--	$-3.62e^{-05}$ ($2.23e^{-05}$)	$-3.62e^{-05}$ ($2.23e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-3.17e^{-05}$ ($3.88e^{-05}$)	$-3.17e^{-05}$ ($3.88e^{-05}$)
Ancienneté entreprise (mois)	--	--	$3.59e^{-05}$ ($1.83e^{-03}$)	$3.59e^{-05}$ ($1.83e^{-03}$)	--	--	$-1.97e^{-03}$ ($3.22e^{-03}$)	$-1.97e^{-03}$ ($3.22e^{-03}$)
Taille entreprise	--	--	$-1.82e^{-03}$ ($1.76e^{-03}$)	$-1.82e^{-03}$ ($1.76e^{-03}$)	--	--	$-1.11e^{-04}$ ($1.09e^{-03}$)	$-1.11e^{-04}$ ($1.09e^{-03}$)
Usager: personne âgée	--	--	$-1.48e^{-05}$ ($1.55e^{-05}$)	$-1.48e^{-05}$ ($1.55e^{-05}$)	--	--	$1.53e^{-05}$ ($3.71e^{-05}$)	$1.53e^{-05}$ ($3.71e^{-05}$)
Usager: personne handicapée	--	--	$-6.87e^{-06}$ ($1.20e^{-05}$)	$-6.87e^{-06}$ ($1.20e^{-05}$)	--	--	$9.85e^{-06}$ ($1.59e^{-05}$)	$9.85e^{-06}$ ($1.59e^{-05}$)
En couple	--	--	$6.23e^{-05}$ ($3.93e^{-05}$)	$6.23e^{-05}$ ($3.93e^{-05}$)	--	--	$-5.43e^{-05}$ ($5.74e^{-05}$)	$-5.43e^{-05}$ ($5.74e^{-05}$)
Chômage	--	--	$-2.14e^{-05}$ ($2.16e^{-05}$)	$-2.14e^{-05}$ ($2.16e^{-05}$)	--	--	$1.75e^{-05}$ ($6.13e^{-05}$)	$1.75e^{-05}$ ($6.13e^{-05}$)
Origine hors U.E.	--	--	$-3.43e^{-05}$ ($3.24e^{-05}$)	$-3.43e^{-05}$ ($3.24e^{-05}$)	--	--	$2.02e^{-04}$*** ($5.31e^{-05}$)	$2.02e^{-04}$*** ($5.31e^{-05}$)
N	600	600	568[1]	568[1]	600	600	568[1]	568[1]

La régression (A) compare les EI et les AF avec les EBL alors que la régression (B) compare les AF et les EBL avec les EI. (R) = Plus le score obtenu est élevé, moins l'emploi est de qualité. SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significatif à. * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.

(1) sans variables contrôles

(2) avec variables contrôles

[1] 32 observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations have not been considered in specifications with control variables

Annexe 9 – Régression (OLS) de la mission sur les heures de travail

	Nombre d'heures				**Différence entre le # d'heures prestées et le # d'heures souhaitées** (R)			
	(1)		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*	
	(A)	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*	*(A)*	*(B)*
Coefficient estimates								
Constante	26.22*** (0.92)	25.99*** (0.71)	24.38*** (1.80)	24.32*** (1.59)	3.47*** (0.48)	2.49*** (0.35)	3.62*** (0.93)	2.46** (0.96)
AF	-3.64*** (1.15)	-3.41*** (0.99)	-3.70** (1.66)	-3.64*** (1.29)	-2.12*** (0.54)	-0.88** (0.42)	-2.01** (0.81)	-0.85 (0.57)
EI	-0.24 (1.16)	--	-0.06 (0.32)	--	-1.24** (0.59)	--	-1.16* (0.71)	--
EBL	--	0.24 (1.16)	_	0.06 (0.32)	--	1.24** (0.59)	--	1.16* (0.70)
Localisation Bruxelles	--	--	2.57* (1.50)	2.57* (1.50)	--	--	0.64 (1.03)	0.64 (1.03)
Age	--	--	$1.98e^{-04}$ ($3.80e^{-04}$)	$1.98e^{-04}$ ($3.80e^{-04}$)	--	--	$-3.40e^{-04}$** ($1.31e^{-04}$)	$-3.40e^{-04}$** ($1.31e^{-04}$)
Femme	--	--	$-5.63e^{-04}$ ($5.47e^{-04}$)	$-5.63e^{-04}$ ($5.47e^{-04}$)	--	--	$-6.76e^{-05}$ ($2.71e^{-04}$)	$-6.76e^{-05}$ ($2.71e^{-04}$)
Nombre d'enfants	--	--	$-1.89e^{-04}$ ($1.84e^{-04}$)	$-1.89e^{-04}$ ($1.84e^{-04}$)	--	--	$-6.63e^{-04}$** ($2.95e^{-04}$)	$-6.63e^{-04}$** ($2.95e^{-04}$)
Ancienneté travailleur (année)	--	--	$1.96e^{-04}$ ($2.64e^{-04}$)	$1.96e^{-04}$ ($2.64e^{-04}$)	--	--	$1.29e^{-04}$ ($9.65e^{-05}$)	$1.29e^{-04}$ ($9.65e^{-05}$)
Aide-ménager domicile	--	--	$-6.67e^{-04}$*** ($2.28e^{-04}$)	$-6.67e^{-04}$*** ($2.28e^{-04}$)	--	--	$2.12e^{-04}$ ($2.40e^{-04}$)	$2.12e^{-04}$ ($2.40e^{-04}$)
Niveau scolaire	--	--	$-1.00e^{-05}$ ($9.98e^{-05}$)	$-1.00e^{-05}$ ($9.98e^{-05}$)	--	--	$6.21e^{-05}$ ($2.27e^{-04}$)	$6.21e^{-05}$ ($2.27e^{-04}$)
Ancienneté entreprise (mois)	--	--	$2.55e^{-02}$ ($2.35e^{-02}$)	$2.55e^{-02}$ ($2.35e^{-02}$)	--	--	$2.19e^{-03}$ ($1.20e^{-02}$)	$2.19e^{-03}$ ($1.20e^{-02}$)
Taille entreprise	--	--	$-5.58e^{-03}$ ($8.48e^{-03}$)	$-5.58e^{-03}$ ($8.48e^{-03}$)	--	--	$-1.40e^{-03}$ ($3.93e^{-03}$)	$-1.40e^{-03}$ ($3.93e^{-03}$)
Usager: personne âgée	--	--	$1.12e^{-04}$ ($1.68e^{-04}$)	$1.12e^{-04}$ ($1.68e^{-04}$)	--	--	$2.29e^{-04}$** ($1.07e^{-04}$)	$2.29e^{-04}$** ($1.07e^{-04}$)
Usager: personne handicapée	--	--	$-7.96e^{-05}$ ($1.10e^{-04}$)	$-7.96e^{-05}$ ($1.10e^{-04}$)	--	--	$-1.70e^{-04}$*** ($4.98e^{-05}$)	$-1.70e^{-04}$*** ($4.98e^{-05}$)
En couple	--	--	$1.98e^{-04}$ ($1.25e^{-04}$)	$1.98e^{-04}$ ($1.25e^{-04}$)	--	--	$7.85e^{-04}$*** ($2.44e^{-05}$)	$7.85e^{-04}$*** ($2.44e^{-05}$)
Chômage	--	--	$3.80e^{-04}$** ($1.69e^{-04}$)	$3.80e^{-04}$** ($1.69e^{-04}$)	--	--	$-3.40e^{-04}$*** ($1.13e^{-04}$)	$-3.40e^{-04}$*** ($1.13e^{-04}$)
Origine hors U.E.	--	--	$1.70e^{-04}$ ($1.87e^{-04}$)	$1.70e^{-04}$ ($1.87e^{-04}$)	--	--	$-8.74e^{-05}$ ($6.54e^{-05}$)	$-8.74e^{-05}$ ($6.54e^{-05}$)
N	595[2]	595[2]	563[12]	563[12]	515[2]	515[2]	483[12]	483[12]

La régression (A) compare les EI et les AF avec les EBL alors que la régression (B) compare les AF et les EBL avec les EI. (R) = Plus le score obtenu est élevé, moins l'emploi est de qualité. SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significatif à. * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.

(1) sans variables contrôles

(2) avec variables contrôles

[1] 32 observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations have not been considered in specifications with control variables

[2] We have no information about the working hours of some workers.

CHAPTER 2

Workers' motivations and managerial practices in not-for-profit social enterprises

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Abstract

The literature has always pointed out that social enterprise (SE) worker have a specific motivational profile compared to their counterparts in for-profit organizations (FPOs). Usually, SE workers have been identified as being intrinsically motivated. Nevertheless, the interpretation of what covers intrinsic motivation remains ambiguous in the literature on SEs. Hence, the first objective of this article is to use both economic and psychological literature in order to understand the exact nature of motivation to work for an SE. We propose that rather than considering the motivation to work in SEs as intrinsic, it should be considered as prosocial. Further, the self-determination theory allows for the understanding that prosocial motivation may be based on different types of extrinsic regulation (introjected – identified – integrated) but not on intrinsic motivation. The second aim of this article is to propose a dicussion on managerial practices related to this new conceptualization. In particular, we discuss the practices that SEs might use, on the one hand, to attract and select workers who are motivated by their social mission, and on the other hand, to sustain and favor their employees' motivation over time.

***Keywords*:** Social enterprise, Prosocial Motivation, Extrinsic and intrinsic regulations, Incentives.

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1. Introduction

Nowadays, social enterprises (SEs)[27] are often led into competition with for-profit organizations (notably by the emergence of quasi-markets in the social services industries). However, SEs suffer from several competitive disadvantages. For instance, the attenuation of property rights in SEs creates difficulties in attracting resources from profit-seeking investors. In addition, some authors have highlighted a lack or weaknesses in incentive mechanisms in SE governance created by the absence of traditional shareholders (e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Nevertheless, the limitation constraint in profit distribution between shareholders could be a way to attract non-market resources as donations and grants (e.g., Hansmann, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983) and to be seen as more trustworthy by clients in situations of information asymmetry with regards to the quality of goods and services (e.g., Hirt, 1999; Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001; Weisbrod, 1988). Moreover, the competitive disadvantages of SEs may be also counterbalanced by their capacity to employ workers with larger ideological motivations (e.g., Mosca, Musella & Pastore, 2007), who are not predominantly motivated by monetary remuneration (e.g., Bacchiega & Borzaga, 2001) and who are ready to sacrifice a significant part of their wages to work towards a social mission in which they believe (e.g., Preston, 1989). SEs would thus be able, if necessary, to offer lower wages than for-profit organizations (FPOs). This possible cut in labor costs constitutes the main strength of SEs in order to be competitive in a market (e.g., Steinberg, 1990; Valentinov, 2007). In addition, both SEs and their workers are mission oriented; this may lead to a match between the organization and its workers' values and goals, which in turn lead to higher efforts and outputs from SE workers, and then economizes on the need for high-powered incentives (e.g., Besley & Ghatak, 2005). In consequence, it is of primary importance for SEs to understand why and by what their workers are motivated in order to develop a work environment that best suits the particular motivational profile of their workforce. This would allow SEs to attract ideologically minded workers who best match the organization's mission and to maintain high levels of motivation over time.

[27] The concepts used to describe organizations with social mission vary from one country to another: "économie sociale et solidaire" in France; "économie sociale" and "entreprise à profit social" in Belgium; "non-profit sector" in the US, "voluntary sector" in the UK, etc. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon tradition, most scientists who are rooted in the European tradition consider the "third sector" to include not only non-profit organizations (associations) but also cooperatives, mutual societies, foundations and even new forms of social enterprises or, in other words, all organizations whose primary purpose is not profit maximization for shareholders. Given that the purpose of this thesis is not to discuss the underlying issues with these different concepts, we made the choice to use the generic term of "social enterprise" (SE). For this research, we then define social enterprise as not-for-profit organizations that combine an entrepreneurial dynamic to provide goods or services with the primacy of their social aims.

The literature usually identifies SE workers as intrinsically motivated. According to psychologist researchers, intrinsic motivation refers to performing activities for their own sake, because they are inherently found to be interesting. However, the interpretation of what covers intrinsic motivation remains ambiguous in the literature on SEs. Indeed, most authors agree on the fact that SE workers are not only motivated by a task that is inherently interesting and satisfying; they also care about the social impact of their job. The ambiguity of intrinsic motivation comes from the fact that research on motivation in SE generally confuse (and does not clearly define) the content and the regulation of motivation. Recently, new research that is being developed at the crossroads of psychology and economics provides new insights about the motivation to work in SEs. These studies point out that the motivation to work in SEs is not intrinsically but extrinsically regulated, and that the content of SE workers' motivation is prosocial. In others words, SE workers are considered to be more pro-socially motivated than their counterparts in FPOs. Considering these approaches towards work motivation in SE is a crucial issue since earlier studies, which only dichotomously conceptualize intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation, lead to misinterpretation in the transposition of psychological theories (De Cooman, De Gieter, Pepermans, & Jegers, 2011), and implications for management remain ambiguous. For instance, the main recommendation in the literature about the practices to implement in order to encourage work motivation in SEs concerns job characteristics like autonomy or task variety (e.g. Frey, 1997). However, these practices (even if they may have a positive impact on the pleasure to perform the task) are not directly related on the workers' prosocial motivation.

Therefore, we structure our theoretical contribution according two main objectives. The first aim is to use both economic and psychological literature to make the point and to understand what exactly the motivation to work for an SE covers. We describe the content of SE workers' motivations by referring mainly to the works of De Cooman et al. (2011), Devaro & Brookshire (2007), Francois (2007), Francois & Vlassopoulos (2008), and Grant (2008), the regulation of the SE workers motivation based on the self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985), and the path through which workers are attracted to SEs thanks to the person-environment fit theory (Dawis & Lofquist, 1984; Edwards, 2008; Kristof, 1996). Once the motivation specificities to work in an SE are clearly identified, this chapter proposes to discuss the implications on managerial practices related to this new conceptualization. In particular, we discuss the practices that SEs might use to select workers motivated by the organization's social mission, and to sustain and nurture their motivation over time.

2. The content of the motivation or for "what" people work: From Intrinsic Motivation to Prosocial Motivation

In order to investigate the motivation of SE workers, economists have been inspired by the literature in the field of psychology, which distinguishes extrinsic motivation from intrinsic motivation. An activity that is performed to obtain a positive outcome (e.g. wage) or for the avoidance of negative consequences (e.g. to lose his job) is said to be extrinsically motivated. Conversely, an activity that is performed for its own sake, because it is inherently interesting, is said to be intrinsically motivated (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Frey 2000). Since these authors consider that SE workers have less motivation to work for monetary rewards (Bacchiega & Borzaga, 2001), which they define as "extrinsic", than their counterparts in FPOs, they have conclude that the motivation to work in SEs would be intrinsic (e.g., Crewson, 1997; Theuvsen, 2004). Nevertheless, this dichotomous approach of motivation is not able to explain with enough precision workers' behaviors (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000), especially in an SE context (De Cooman et al., 2011; Grant, 2007). This lack of precision has led to misinterpretation and to an absence of consensus about what the "intrinsic motivation" shared by SE workers covers.

The main popular interpretations of what might be the intrinsic motivation of SE workers come from Hansmann (1980), Preston (1989), and Rose-Ackerman (1996). First, Hansmann (1980) described those who are attracted to SEs as people who are motivated by the production of quality services. A very closed interpretation of this is given by Leete (2006) who suggests that SE employees are involved in providing goods and services in which they find intrinsic value. Secondly, Preston (1989) sees SE workers as being intrinsically motivated by the production of collective goods for the whole of society. This is similar to the definition given by Lanfranchi and Narcy (2008) who argue that SE workers choose their job because they judge it as socially useful or because they want to perform acts of generosity towards others. In the same vein, Frank (1996) considers SE employees as more intrinsically motivated by the social responsibility of their employment (i.e. SE workers want to perform work that is more morally palatable) and Mosca, Musella & Pastore (2007) describe SE workers as being "ideologically minded individuals". A third main interpretation is given by Rose-Ackerman (1996) who suggests that SE workers are motivated to work in organizations that give them the opportunity to promote their values and ideas. Indeed, following several authors (e.g., Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Callen & Falk, 1993; Handy & Katz, 1998), job applicants who must choose between an FPO and an SE tend to choose the SE

when its mission corresponds to their own values and goals. Finally, other authors have tried to combine these "different schools of thought" in an integrated definition, such as Benz (2005, p. 156) who sees SE workers as, "*intrinsically motivated by a desire to produce a quality service, to promote the ideas or the vision of the non-profit's mission , or to assist in the production of a public good they see as desirable for society at large (…) they are seen to enjoy satisfaction from the work and the work context itself*".

Hence, existing studies do not agree on the definition of what the motivation to work in SEs consists of. Nevertheless, most authors agree on the fact that SE workers are not only motivated by performing a task that is inherently interesting and satisfying, but that they also care about the social impact of their job. Indeed, it is the high social significance of working in SEs due to their social mission that can explain the differences observed in the motivation of workers in SEs and FPOs, all others things being equal, and not the nature of the task (a priori a SE worker has no reason to be more motivated by the nature of the task than an FPO employee doing the same task all others things being equal). In an attempt to clarify this confusion, Devaro and Brookshire (2007) recently made a distinction between intrinsic motivation derived from the task/the job itself (I play tennis because I like to do so) and intrinsic motivation derived from the organizational mission (I make lot of effort because I believe that my work is socially useful). They suggest a priori that compared to FPO workers, SE workers overall have more intrinsic motivation of the second type, provided that the organization's mission fits the worker's value system. According to social psychologists, the second type refers to a prosocial motivation defined as the desire to benefit or to make a positive difference in other people's lives (e.g., Grant, 2008). SE workers may then be considered as more pro-socially motivated than FPOs workers, all others things being equal (De Cooman et al., 2011; Francois, 2007; Francois & Vlassopoulos, 2008). Besides the argument that SE workers care about social impact, many of abovementioned arguments also highlight the importance for them to perceive a fit between their values and goals and those of the organization. This concept of person-organization fit and its importance in workers' attraction and motivation are presented and discussed in the fourth section of this paper.

As first conclusion, we provide arguments that lead us to clearly define the specific content (i.e. the purpose of individuals' actions) of workers' motivations in SEs as being prosocial. However, we still need to discuss and define the regulation of prosocial motivation. In order to further clarify the nature and the process of workers' motivations in SE, we will

then describe the regulation process based on the self-determination theory, and next clarify the type of regulation involved in prosocial motivation.

3. The regulation of the motivation or "why" people are motivated: Is prosocial motivation intrinsically or extrinsically regulated?

Regulation of motivation

A major determinant of the motivation is the "what" or the content of the goal that directs actions (Van den Broeck, Vansteenkiste & De Witte, 2008). Goals determine the objectives to reach and are set by the environment or the individual, and their intensity partially predicts the level of the outcome (Locke & Latham, 2002). However, beyond defining for "what" people act, the self-determination theory (SDT) aims to define "why" people are motivated to do what they do. Indeed, the level of the outcome depends not only on the strength of the "what" of the motivation, but also on the "why" or the "quality" of this motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Van den Broeck, Vansteenkiste & De Witte, 2008). In other words, by defining the "why" of the motivation, SDT describes the process of the regulation of the motivation. The regulation of the motivation corresponds to the interplay between internal (i.e. from the individual) and external forces (i.e. from the environment) that guide how individuals deal with their goals.

The first claim of SDT is that motivated behaviors are either intrinsically or extrinsically regulated. However, SDT suggests that extrinsic motivation can be subdivided into four components (external, introjected, identified and integrated), which differ from each other in terms of how contextual and environmental norms, values and pressures are internalized by individuals. The four types of extrinsic regulations then align along a continuum according to the degree of internalization of the causality of their work behavior (see Figure 1). In other words, they rank according to the extent to which the regulation of behavior is internalized and the extent to which the reason or purpose of an activity is absorbed into the inner self (Ryan & Connell 1989). If the behavior is not really internalized, the motivation is described as controlled (engage in an activity because it allows one to achieve a desired result or to avoid punishment or feelings of guilt); if it is highly internalized, the motivation is considered as autonomous (engage in an activity on a voluntary basis or with the feeling of having the choice). In general, autonomous motivations have been shown to lead to positive consequences ranging from the quality and quantity of the work done

(performance, effort, commitment) to an employee's own well-being (satisfaction, organizational trust). On the other hand, controlled motivations are supposed to impair psychological functioning (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gagné & Deci, 2005). Hence, the positive effect of motivation on individual behavior would not only depend on the intensity of the motivation but also on how this motivation is regulated.

Figure 1 - The Self-Determination Theory



Source: Deci & Ryan (2008, p. 17).
The types of regulation according to self-determination theory.

External and introjected regulations are considered as controlled motivation. External motivation exists when behaviors are performed to satisfy an external demand, to receive a reward that is contingent to the behavior, or to avoid punishment. Externally regulated behavior is very much what one would expect to see arise from deskilled jobs (Tremblay, Blanchard, Taylor, Pelletier, & Villeneuve, 2009). Introjected motivation appears when people behave in a manner that is socially accepted in order to feel respected by others and/or to avoid feelings of guilt or anxiety. Such controlled motivations are clearly not based on personal reasons, but more on a desire to get rewards by adopting behaviors that are externally valorized. In contrast with controlled motivations, identified regulation, integrated regulation and intrinsic regulation are seen more as autonomous motivation. Identified regulation corresponds to an identification of the importance of external (e.g. organizational) goals and values. Integrated regulation corresponds to a perfect fit between the individual's goals and values and those of his/her environment (e.g. organization). In this second type of regulation, values that guide the action are accepted and integrated in one's self-concept, i.e. they considered as an integral part of who one is and one's personal goals. Finally, according to the SDT, intrinsic motivation corresponds to engaging in an activity for its own sake,

because it is intrinsically interesting and enjoyable. Applying the SDT in a work context allow to understanding that controlled and autonomous extrinsic regulations emerge from a varying degree of (mis)fit between a worker's values or goals and organizational values or goals (i.e. mission) that are independent of the intrinsic regulation that has to do with the pleasure of performing the task and which is always autonomously regulated.

Regulation of prosocial motivation

Based on the Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 1980, 1985) and in accordance with the work conducted by some authors (e.g., De Cooman et al., 2011; Grant, 2008; Speckbacher, 2013), we do not consider anymore the prosocial motivation as intrinsically regulated but rather as a state of identified or integrated regulation or even introjected regulation[28]. Indeed, as Grant (2008) explains, pro-socially motivated workers are not doing task for the pleasure they get while doing it, but as a means to fulfill their core values in attaining their prosocial goals[29]. It implies also that a prosocial motivation is future-oriented and based on long-term goals, whereas intrinsic motivation is present-oriented and based on having an enjoyable experience while performing the task. Hence, workers could have a prosocial motivation, and an experience related to the task level that is pleasant or not. According to Burton et al. (2006), Grant (2008), and Speckbacher (2013), pro-socially motivated workers may even perform work that they perceive as involving painful effort, drawbacks or frustration, while intrinsically motivated workers feel naturally drawn towards completing their work. This new interpretation of the regulation of prosocial motivation is of great importance to SEs since the motivation of their workers will then no longer be perceived as being intrinsically regulated, but rather as being extrinsically regulated.

In this section, we have demonstrated that prosocial motivation is more an identified, integrated or even an introjected form (i.e. autonomous) of extrinsic regulation than a form of intrinsic motivation. Making this distinction between intrinsic motivation and prosocial motivation which is based on extrinsic regulation may have important consequences for managerial practices and incentives (e.g., Burton, Lydon, D'Alessandro, & Koestner, 2006; De Cooman et al., 2011; Günter, 2015), which we discuss in the next sections of this article.

[28] The external regulation of the prosocial motivation depends on the fit or the misfit between workers and organization's values. Hence, prosocial motivation has an introjected regulation when workers' values are not aligned with the prosocial values of their organization and an integrated regulation when values aligned perfectly. .

[29] or the goals of their organization when the motivation has an introjected regulation.

A first important consequence is that autonomous extrinsic regulation is the most efficient form of regulation of prosocial motivation while extrinsic regulation is highly autonomous when workers' values and mission are strongly aligned. This highlights the importance for SE of developing and sustaining a high level of fit between an employee's and the organization's values to favor autonomous prosocial motivation (while P-O fit has no direct effect on intrinsic motivation that is only determined at the task level). Hence, before we discuss what practices and incentives SEs may be used to positively influence the autonomous prosocial motivation of their workforce, we describe in the next section the work values theory and the importance of value congruency through the concept of person-environment fit. Using the same concept, we define conditions of compatibility between individual preferences and the type of job provided that lead to prosocial motivation. Finally, we highlight the importance of both person-environment fit at the job level and at the organizational level to attract pro-socially motivated workers in SEs.

4. Person-environment fit or how SE might attract and select the "right" worker

The concept of person-environment fit (PE fit) applied at work (Dawis & Lofquist, 1984; Kristof, 1996; Lewin, 1951; Schneider, 1987) refers to the congruence, match, or similarity between people and their environments (Edwards, 2008). PE fit in industrial and organizational studies is most often conceived through a person-organization fit (P-O fit) and person-job fit (PJ fit).

Person-organization fit

Person-organization fit is the congruence between workers and organizational values (Chatman, 1989; Edwards & Cable, 2009; Kristof, 1996). In this stream of research, values are defined as beliefs through which a specific mode of conduct is considered as preferable to its opposite (Chatman, 1989; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). It is important to consider work values because they guide individuals in their job search (Ros, Schwartz, & Surkiss, 1999). More precisely, people want to work for an organization with norms and values that fit with their own work values (Judge & Bretz, 1992; Maierhofer, Kabanoff, & Griffin, 2002).

Prosocial motivation is related to altruistic values[30], such as concern for others (De Dreu, 2006; Grant, 2007; Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004; Schwartz, 1992), empathy and helpfulness (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). Hence, pro-socially motivated workers give more importance into their altruistic values than workers with self-interested motivations (McNeely & Meglino, 1994; Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004; Penner, Midili, & Kegelmeyer, 1997; Rioux & Penner, 2001). We are not postulating that prosocially motivated workers—more specifically, SE employees—should only have altruistic values or that they cannot give importance to finding a job that they like to perform, but rather that their specificity, compared to their counterparts in FPOs, is to give more importance to their altruistic values.

Therefore, if some job applicants prefer to work for an organization with a social mission than in an FPO, it is mainly because they have altruistic values that match with the organization's values and goals. In other words, SEs are perceived as organizations that could, potentially, attract pro-socially motivated workers because such workers have values that fit with the organization's mission and values (e.g., Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Francois, 2000, 2007; Steinberg, 1990; Young, 1983). A second reason that explains why SEs are more likely to attract such workers than FPOs is due to their principle of profit distribution limitation among shareholders (e.g., Hansmann, 1980; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Roomkin & Weisbrod, 1999). Indeed, this constraint works as a signal of trust and gives more insurance that the workers' efforts will increase the quality or the quantity of the services and not be turned into the owner's profit (e.g., Francois, 2003, 2007; Francois & Vlassopoulos, 2008; Leete, 2006). In conclusion, pro-socially motivated workers are attracted to SEs because they place great importance on their altruistic values when they look for a job, while SEs offer a workplace where people have a stronger possibility to contribute to the public interest and to attain their prosocial goals (Lanfranchi & Narcy, 2008)[31].

[30] Different hypotheses have been studied regarding origins of the prosocial motivation (Batson et al., 2008; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005; Meier, 2006). Formerly altruistic values that drive prosocial motivation may be conceptualized as "pure." However, Andreoni (1990) introduced the idea of impure altruism. Hence, if the purest form of prosocial behavior are motivated by altruism, he can also be based on a more "selfish interest". Indeed, Grant (2008, p. 406) highlights that « *altruistic and egoistic motives may be complementary in the process of making a prosocial difference, as employees face opportunities to benefit not only others but also themselves through constructing valued relationships and identities*. » At least people acting pro-socially would enhance or protect their self- and social identity (Batson et al., 2008). In this thesis, we suggest that a prosocial motivation based on pure altruistic values would be more autonomous than a prosocial motivation based on impure altruistic values.

[31] Empirical proofs are notably given by Lyons et al. (2006) who found that not-for-profit workers place more value than FPO workers on contributing to society. De Cooman et al. (2011) also found in a study of 13 service

These results highlight the importance for SEs to provide accurate information about their mission and values in order to ensure the attraction of pro-socially motivated workers who fit with their mission. Researchers highlight that information sharing about organizational values (Cable, Aiman-Smith, Mulvey, & Edwards, 2000) and job roles (Wanous & Colella, 1989) with applicants occurs in the early stages of contact between workers and the organization, particularly during the recruitment and selection processes (Cable & Yu, 2007). In particular, the development of workers' perception of fit with the organization starts during the recruitment process (Cable & Judge, 1996; Judge & Bretz, 1992; Judge & Cable, 1997) corresponding to the information provided by the organization to attract new employees that best fit their social mission (Barber, 1998; Breaugh & Starke, 2000).

Person-Job Fit

Beyond P-O fit, we highlight the concept of person-job fit (PJ fit). PJ fit is usually studied through the needs-supplies fit and demands-abilities fit (Edwards, 2008; Kristof, 1996; Muchinsky & Monahan, 1987). Needs–supplies fit refers to the degree to which an individual's needs or expectations are fulfilled by supplies in the environment (French, Caplan & Harrison, 1984; Kristof, 1996; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman & Johnson, 2005). Demands–abilities fit refers to the degree to which environmental demands are fulfilled by an individual's capabilities (French et al., 1984; Kristof, 1996; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman & Johnson, 2005).

Workers' expectations and needs concern the wage but not only (e.g., Lazear & Shaw, 2007). Jobs are composed of a bundle of both monetary and non-monetary characteristics and, the non-monetary characteristics of a job might even be as much important as the remuneration for many workers (Leete, 2006). PJ fit is related to job characteristics on the one hand, and working conditions on the other hand. Job characteristics correspond to the characteristics of the task performed (autonomy, creativity and variability of the task, task significance, required physical effort, etc.) and of the physical and social environment within which it is performed while working conditions cover the contractual relationship between the employer and the employees (wages, type of contract, working hours, etc.). This distinction is crucial for conceptualizing the effects of PJ fit on outcomes (Edwards & Shipp, 2007). While

Belgian organizations that SE employees are more concerned about altruism and perceived a higher P-O fit than FPO employees.

PJ fit at every level leads to better job satisfaction, only PJ fit that is related to job characteristics (mainly to task characteristics) lead to higher intrinsic motivation (Lawler & Hall, 1970). We might also suppose that only PJ fit related to task significance leads in a direct way to more prosocial motivation. Indeed, task significance is defined as the degree to which an employee's work affects directly the health and well-being of other people and contributes to work motivation by enabling employees to experience their work as meaningful (e.g., Fried & Ferris, 1987; Hackman & Oldham, 1976; Katz, 1978). Research conducted by Grant (2007) confirms that idea by showing that the perceived impact of one's work on the others is an important psychological state to see prosocial motivation emerges.

The concept of PJ fit highlights that the workers' preference related to the job also guide individuals in their job search. People choose to work for an organization that provides them the job which fits the best with their preferences. The challenge for any kind of enterprise is then to attract workers by offering them a job that answers to their preferences. Hence, SEs should offer working conditions and job characteristics adapted to the preferences of pro-socially motivated workers in order to attract them and favor a high level of satisfaction. Person-job fit related to task significance seems particularly important to attract workers who are pro-socially motivated. Borzaga & Tortia (2006) confirm that the nature of the task is highly related to job satisfaction in SEs. Beyond task significance, some previous empirical studies give us indications about the preferences of SE workers. If they first see their work as a way to earn a living and to support their families; they give less importance to wages and career opportunities, and attribute a higher importance to the non-monetary aspects of the job than average workers (e.g., Borzaga & Tortia, 2006; Lyons, Duxburry & Higgins, 2006). In fact, they want to find a job that is fulfilling to them at both a personal and a relational level (Lyons, Duxburry & Higgins, 2006).

A priori and all others things being equal, there is no better PJ fit in SEs than in FPOs for pro-socially motivated workers. However, value congruence may have a positive impact on PJ fit (Edwards & Shipp, 2007). Indeed, according to Devaro & Brookshire (2007, p.331) "*... a positive social mission would naturally increase the 'task significance' of a job. Thus, even when tasks are identical in a given job in two different organizations, if one organization has a positive social mission and the other does not, task significance should be higher in the organization with the positive mission*." Hence, being pro-socially motivated by a social mission that fits one's value-based system has a positive effect on PJ fit by increasing task significance. Moreover, value congruence could positively impact demands–abilities fit at the

task level because it fosters communication and coordination (Adkins, Ravlin & Meglino, 1996), which increase people's abilities to fulfill demands (Motowidlo, 2003). Hence, the better congruence in altruistic values observed in SE workers may lead to a better PJ fit in SEs than in FPOs.

Person-environment fit, job satisfaction and the labor donation theory

The person-environment fit theory highlights that workers have a broader set of preferences and values than what is usually considered by Economics. First, workers have others preferences than their own leisure and consumption as it might be mentioned by the "homo economicus" abstraction. Second, workers should not be considered as exclusively selfish anymore. It is then important that organizations (in particular SE) take into account that workers have complex expectations that include the willingness to help the others and acting morally (Ben-Ner & Putterman, 2000).

In order to summarize the concept of person-environment fit and its attraction and motivational power, we use an adapted version of the utility function develop by Lanfranchi & Narcy (2008). The utility of an employee i to work in organization j depends on the following factors:

$$U_{i,j} = U\left(X_i, Y_{i,j}, E_{i,j}V_{i,j}, Z_{i,j}\right)$$

where X_i are individual characteristics of the workers i, $Y_{i,j}$ represents the working conditions related to the contractual relationship with the employer $E_{i,j}$ and the characteristics of the task to perform, $V_{i,j}$ represents the physical and social environment within which the task is performed, and finally $Z_{i,j}$ represents the opportunity for the worker to contribute to the public interest. The variable X_i highlights that the expectations about each of these components vary between individuals. For instance, workers attracted to SEs should give more importance to the opportunity to contribute to the society and less importance to monetary rewards than their counterparts in FPOs. Hence, a worker would be attracted by a job offer that fit the best with its expectations. All the components of the utility function are related to PJ fit (and then to job satisfaction) but, as previously mentioned, only a perceived fit in job characteristics ($E_{i,j}$ and $V_{i,j}$) has a positive effect on intrinsic motivation. A worker would be considered as pro-socially motivated by their job if they derive a strictly positive utility from the variable $Z_{i,j}$ (Lanfranchi & Narcy, 2008). This would be the case if they either perceive a fit between their altruistic values and the organization's values or if they perceive

(and valorize) that their task is inherently significant, or both. Hence, this utility function highlights that SE workers would derive satisfaction from working for a social mission in which they believe (Rawls, Ullrich, and Nelson, 1975; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman & Johnson, 2005; Verquer, Beehr, & Wagner, 2003). In other words, by supporting SEs, workers derive nonpecuniary utility from being able to act in accordance with their altruistic values and beliefs (Lanfranchi & Narcy, 2008; Valentinov, 2007). According to this argument, several authors (e.g., Frank, 1996; Leete, 2000) postulate that workers being in an SE would be more satisfied in their job than their counterparts in an FPO, all others factors being equal, provided that the SE's mission fits their value system. More formally, for two *i* and *k,* we can write:

$$\text{If } Z_{i,SE} > Z_{k,FPO}$$

$$\text{and } X_{i,SE} = X_{k,FPO}\ ,\ Y_{i,SE} = Y_{k,FPO},\ E_{i,SE} = E_{k,FPO}$$

$$\text{then } U_{i,SE} > U_{k,FPO}$$

Empirical literature has usually confirmed that SE workers are more satisfied than their counterparts in FPOs, all others things being equal, even at a lower wage level (e.g., Benz, 2005; Light, 2002; Mirvis, 1992). Further, the labor donation theory (Preston, 1989) highlights that if SE worker are more satisfied, all others things being equal, they would be ready to sacrifice potentially higher wages or benefits elsewhere to work within an organization that supports values that align with their own (Cheverton, 2007). In others words, SE workers (especially managers and professionals) would be ready to work for lower wages than their counterparts in FPOs (e.g., Preston, 1989, 1990; Rose-Ackerman,1996) because they find that working for a social mission in SEs is more meaningful and personally rewarding than working in FPOs (e.g., Lewis, 2010; Light 2002; Mirvis & Hackett, 1983). According to the labor donation theory, SEs enterprises have then the possibility to offer lower wages than FPOs[32]. More formally, if $X_{i,SE} = X_{i,FPO}$, $E_{i,SE} = E_{k,FPO}$ and $Z_{i,SE} > Z_{i,FPO}$

[32] The empirical literature is divided over the presence of lower wages in social enterprises. Indeed, if some empirical works validate this assumption (Frank, 1996; Preston, 1989; Weisbrod, 1983), the studies conducted by Devaro & Brookshire (2007), Leete (2000), Ben-Ner, Ren & Paulson (2011), and Ruhm & Borkoski (2003) could not prove the existence of a "wage penalty" to the detriment of workers being in social enterprises and Mocan & Teikin (2003) surprisingly found that social enterprises offered higher wages in the area of child care. These contradictory empirical results may have some theoretical explanations. Indeed, if social enterprises have legitimate reasons to offers lower wages, the theory of property rights predicts that social enterprises will pay higher wages than the for-profit sector (Lanfranchi & Narcy, 2008). According to this theory, the attenuation of

then SEs have the opportunity to offer less attractive wages than FPOs ($Y_{i,SE} < Y_{i,FPO}$), while at the same time attracting similarly skilled workers if the following condition still fulfilled for them: $U_{i,SE} \geq U_{i,FPO}$.

On the basis of the labor donation theory, Handy and Katz (1998) suggest then that one solution for SEs to select workers who best match the organization's mission is to offer lower wages because only those kind of workers would be ready to sacrifice a significant part of their wages to satisfy their prosocial motivation (adverse selection mechanism). Hence, if SEs offer lower wages than others types of organizations, highly pro-socially motivated workers will self-select themselves in SEs that best fit their altruistic values, while people who value more pay will seek employment in the for-profit sector (Lewis & Frank, 2002). To conclude, paying lower wages increases SEs' output by generating a negative adverse selection mechanism (Handy & Katz, 1998; Hansmann, 1980) and ensuring a higher probability to select workers that will put efforts through their values and duty fulfillment (e.g., Akerlof & Yellen 1990).

The SEs opportunity to attract workers who experience more job satisfaction than their counterparts in FPOs and who are ready to "donate" labor to work for a mission in which they believe is seen as one of the greatest strengths of the sector. However, this also introduces the challenge to develop a work environment that retains and motivates SE workers (Becker, Antuar & Everett, 2011). It is certainly not enough to correctly select people who present the best fit regarding values in order to obtain the highest motivation and performance at work; it is also important to maintain and favor the intensity of prosocial motivation and its autonomous character in their careers in those organizations. Hence, due to their specific contextual and economic constraints, SE managers are facing considerable managerial challenges in order to develop and maintain the highest motivation and performance of their employees.

5. What incentives should SEs implement?

Agency theory and pay-for-performance incentives

The necessity to implement managerial practices that sustain and develop worker motivation that aligns with the organizational mission is highlighted by the agency theory

property rights faced by social enterprises, due to their limitation in profit distribution leads to transform surpluses in the form of higher wages, according to a charitable or philanthropic act (Feldstein, 1971).

(Ross, 1973). An agent acts or works for the principal in a particular domain of decisions problems and then affects its utility, while the principal and agent are assumed to have conflicting interest. Principal-agent dilemma causes inefficient and poor performances in organizations in case of asymmetric information, i.e. when an agent undertakes to perform an action on behalf of a principal while the final result of the action depends on a parameter known to the agent but not to the principal. In other words, if workers are not fully monitored by the principal(s), they may decide to adopt opportunistic behaviors (e.g., given a lower level of effort or to deviate from the behavior expected by the principal). Hence, any type of enterprise must ensure that its workers adopt consistent behavior with its mission (e.g., Ben-Ner & Ren, 2015; Borzaga & Tortia, 2006), either by controlling or by encouraging their efforts. However, a total control of workers' behavior may be very costly—and often not possible—and would render delegation meaningless (Speckbacher, 2013). Another solution is to develop incentives structures that motivate workers to give a maximum effort and to adopt a coherent behavior with the organization's mission (e.g., Ben-Ner & Ren, 2009; Borzaga & Tortia, 2006). Pay-for-performance is the most well-known (and predominant in FPOs) type of incentive. It means that the agent (worker) remuneration would depend (partially) on the value of the outcome for the principal (Prendergast, 1999). Performance-based compensation allows for aligning the behavior of agents with the organization's objectives while increasing their efforts, which in turn increases productivity (Lazear, 2000; Speckbacher, 2013). However, if pay-for-performance seems to have a lot of advantages, the means through which it is achieved may be revealed as very complex (Becker, Antuar & Everett, 2011). Francois (2007, p. 729) argues that *"It is likely that many organizations do not use performance-related compensation because it is costly, difficult to implement, and perhaps even infeasible."*

Should SEs use pay-for-performance incentives?

For any kind of organization, the main conditions to be able to implement efficient pay-for-performance incentives is to have knowledge of relevant goals and to be able to formulate specific expectations towards workers, on the one hand, and to be able to observe and measure the worker's outcomes on the other hand (Gibbons, 1998; Kerr 1975). Those conditions are not usually met in SEs and making the link between mission and measure is a priori a critical issue (Kaplan, 2001). Indeed, it is hard to transform the SE's aim to provide collective goods into a quantifiable goal because such goals tend to be multiple,

multidimensional, ambiguous and less tangible than profit maximization (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990; Nair & Bhatnagar, 2011; Speckbacher, 2013; Theuvsen, 2004)[33]. In that case, establishing a quantifiable measure to reward performance can induce the distortion of the incentives by an excessive attention given to this quantifiable objective and an overemphasis on highly visible behaviors (Gibbons, 1998; Kerr 1975). For instance, the focuses of SE to provide quality services may be avoided by introducing a pay-for-performance system based on a quantifiable measure of worker outcomes by redirecting the worker's effort towards the delivery of a maximum quantity of services and not on the quality of services (Cerasoli, Nicklin, & Ford, 2014)[34].

Besides the fact that SEs are usually not able to implement a coherent system of incentives based on worker performance, such incentives seem to be not favorable in an SE context. Indeed, several theories highlight that pay-for-performance incentives negatively affect the workers' autonomous prosocial motivation. First, the introduction of the pay-for-performance incentives in SE possibly transforms loyal employees into income maximizing ones by displacing the content of their motivation. Hence, introduction of pay-for-performance incentives crowd-out the workers' prosocial motivation (François & Vlassopoulos, 2008). Benabou and Tirole (2006) underline this prediction by highlighting that the use of monetary incentives can trigger doubts about the altruistic reason for performing a task. Second, the cognitive evaluation theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985) puts forward that incentives that are perceived as controls negatively affect the worker's autonomy, which in turn reduces or eliminates the autonomous regulation of their motivation. Hence, introducing coercive and constraining incentives as pay-for-performance impairs self-determination because the locus of control shifts from inside to outside the worker (Frey & Jegen, 2001; Valentinov, 2007). Third, SE workers are supposed to share (or to be motivated by) the values and norms defended through the mission of their organization. Hence, whereas economic relationships that develop in FPOs depend directly on payment, social relationships that develop in SEs are more shaped by altruism and social concerns (Mosca, Musella & Pastore, 2007). In consequence, the relationship between SEs and their workers has a trust-based nature that calls for a more trust-based style of control than a pay-for-performance type of incentive (Heyman & Ariely, 2004; Speckbacher, 2013).

[33] Several authors confirm (e.g., Anthony & Young, 2002; Herman & Renz, 1999) that if SE workers are often familiar with the organization's mission, the implication for practical work remains largely vague.

[34] For example, offering doctors rewards related to the number of people they have treated in a given amount of time can motivate them to focus on the rewarded aspects of performance while cheating on quality, which is not contractible (Speckbacher, 2013).

In conclusion, it seems like SEs have no interest in using the incentive structures that are traditionally implemented in FPOs. Indeed, this literature review strongly emphasizes arguments against the use of pay-for-performance system in SEs, notably because the nature of their mission requires workers who are more motivated by social objectives than by monetary rewards (e.g., Hansmann, 1980; Rose-Ackerman, 1996). However, Theuvsen (2004,) points out that it is not reasonable to automatically apply these assumptions for all SEs due to the diverse and changing environmental conditions of the SE sector (Parsons & Broadbridge, 2004). For example, an SE that is not able to attract adequate workers who identify themselves with the organization's mission and who relies mainly on market resources may reasonably think to adopt certain types of pay-for-performance incentives provided that they have clear and measurable objectives that support performance differentiation. Nevertheless, we suggest that most SEs should not use pay-for-performance incentives. What then can they do to motivate their workers to give their maximum effort and to develop behaviors that are consistent with the organization's social mission?

SE and the emergence of implicit incentives

Incentives can take many different forms and be of different kinds: economic and noneconomic, monetary and nonmonetary (Borzaga, 2003). Merchant, Van der stede & Zheng (2003) highlight two main types of incentives: explicit and implicit. Explicit incentives refer to an enforceable contract which defines the conditions under which the reward is provided. In addition to wage and monetary bonuses, promotion and even job loss could be used as explicit incentives. Conversely, implicit incentives are not explicitly and contractually defined; they are more perceived as "relational contracts" or psychological contracts (Argyris, 1960; Rousseau, 1995). Such incentives are based on trust in receiving some kind of reward for the effort given and not on a contractual relationship. If we apply such broader vision of incentives, it is quite clear that incentives would be present in SEs even if they do not use formal performance mechanism or others related explicit incentives. Indeed, implicit incentives seem to usually exist in SE (Devaro & Brookshire, 2007)[35], and that for two reasons.

First, workers who identify themselves with the values and norms defended by their organization's social mission are already motivated to perform well in order to help the

[35] Importance of psychological contract in SE, especially the ideological form (Thompson & Bunderson, 2003), has been recently demonstrated (Roman, Battistelli, & Odoardi, 2014; Vantilborgh, Bidee, Pepermans, Willems, Huybrechts, & Jegers, 2011).

others. While pure extrinsically motivated workers in an FPO with no incentives schemes are not supposed to be motivated to give extra efforts (except to keep their job) because they cannot gain extra rewards by doing so, pro-socially motivated workers hired in an SE have to give some efforts if they want "to make the difference." In other words, the answer to extrinsic motivation is given by monetary rewards while the opportunity to work for a mission in which they believe is the appropriate answer to give to prosocial motivation. Mission motivations and monetary incentives are then considered as substitutes (Besley & Ghatak, 2005).

Second, Mosca Musella and Pastore (2007) highlight the role of implicit incentives that can be played by the trust-based relationship (with all the stakeholders) in SEs. Indeed, and as noted above, whereas economic relationships that develop in FPOs depend directly on payment, social relationships that develop in SEs are more shaped by altruism and social concerns. Such relational goods enable employees to experience their work as important and meaningful (Barry & Crant, 2000; Bradbury & Lichtenstein, 2000; Frey, 1997) but also provide a kind of implicit incentive: the more a worker produces (appropriate) efforts in the organization, the higher is the quantity of relational goods he obtains[36]. Hence, these external and internal relationships incite the workers to make a positive difference in the lives of all stakeholders (Grant, 2007). Mission-congruent behavior can, for example, be rewarded by the approbation of superiors, by social recognition and esteem of colleagues, or even by increasing self-esteem. Then, even behaviors not observable by managers can be rewarded on the condition that: "*coworkers (and the individual) have internalized mission-related behavior as a moral principle or norm (…) and understand (and agree) how different tasks contribute to promoting the overall mission*" (Speckbacher, 2013, p.14).

In conclusion, the matching between organizational and individual values decreases the likelihood for deviant behaviors (Nair & Bhatnagar, 2011). In other words, matching principals and agents on desired mission would increase efficiency without using high-powered incentives (Atwater & Dionne, 2007). On the one hand, these arguments suggest a lesser necessity to use explicit incentives in SEs than in FPOs (e.g., Akerlof & Kranton, 2005; Besley & Ghatak's, 2005; Gerhards, 2013). This gives a competitive advantage to SEs present in market characterized by high asymmetric information where it is complicated to implement efficient explicit or monetary incentives (Mosca Musella & Pastore, 2007). On the other hand,

[36] Research conducted on social networks indicates that interpersonal relationships may have a positive effect on work motivation but also on opportunities and resources at work (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Bandiera, Barankay & Rasul, 2010).

they also emphasize the importance of a good match between workers prosocial goals and organization's mission to achieve a better effort and output (Besley & Ghatak, 2005). The real challenge for SEs is then to attract and select people who best match the organization (Besley & Ghatak, 2005) but not to limit themselves to this. Indeed, SEs also have to develop practices that continuously direct, support and strengthen the matching through prosocial goals and a common understanding of each task's contribution to the overall mission achievement (e.g., Speckbacher, 2003), to ensure that implicit incentives are working properly. Grant (2007) underlines that aside from selecting people with calling orientation and altruistic values, it is also important to identify what practices managers may use to sustain their prosocial motivation to fulfill the organization's mission.

6. What practices SEs may use to sustain and strengthen their workers' autonomous prosocial motivation?

How SEs might improve the prosocial motivation of their workforce?

Research conducted by Grant (2007) show that prosocial motivation emerges through the experience of two psychological states: Affective commitment to the beneficiaries and the perceived impact of one's work on these beneficiaries (task significance). Indeed, both behavior-outcome contingencies ("perceived impact") and valuing the outcomes ("affective commitment") are critical in directing, sustaining and energizing the motivation (Staw, 1977; Vroom, 1964). The author identifies two practices that may have a positive impact on prosocial motivation through these two states: contact with beneficiaries and social information. He defines the contact with beneficiaries as the degree to which a job is relationally structured to provide opportunities for employees to interact and communicate with the people affected by their work. Without contact with beneficiaries, workers may have some difficulties to be aware of customer expectations and specifications (Hackman, 1990) and to see clearly how their efforts at work affect these beneficiaries. Conversely, if workers have the opportunity to interact with beneficiaries, feedback about their impact is provided by the beneficiaries themselves. This feedback, either positive or negative, confirms to workers that their work has the potential to affect beneficiaries (Grant, 2007). Further, Grant shows that the contact also positively affects the workers' affective commitment on beneficiaries. Without contact, even the most significant impact is impersonal and indirect while a job that is embedded in interpersonal relationship with beneficiaries can enable workers to care about

them. In definitive, contact with beneficiaries influences positively affective commitment to beneficiaries and perceived impact which in turn affect positively their prosocial motivation. In addition to the contact with beneficiaries, Grant highlights that social information about beneficiaries moderates the effect of contact on affective commitment to beneficiaries. In particular, social information about beneficiaries communicated by organizational and occupational ideologies affect the workers' reactions by shaping the ways in which workers evaluate the beneficiaries' beliefs, behaviors, group membership, etc. In conclusion, SEs have some interest, on the one hand, to foster the contact between their workers and the beneficiaries and, on the other hand, to provide positive social information about the beneficiaries through organizational and occupational ideologies in order to sustain and strength their workers' prosocial motivations.

How SEs might improve the autonomous prosocial motivation of their workforce through increasing their perceived P-O fit?

In addition to favoring the intensity of the prosocial motivation of their workers, we have highlighted that is also crucial for SEs to favor their perceived P-O fit. Indeed, and as mentioned before, the more workers' altruistic values fit in with the values of the organization, the more autonomous (and therefore efficient) will be the regulation of worker's prosocial motivation. This is even more important when we take into consideration that value congruence predicts job satisfaction, organizational commitment, job tenure and global performance (Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman & Johnson ,2005; Verquer, Beehr, & Wagner, 2003). Hence, the extent to which SE workers support their organization is closely related to the extent to which they perceive a high fit between their altruistic values and the organization's values (Valentinov, 2007).

We propose that an important factor to favoring the person-organization fit in SEs is the workers' perception of an organizational justice climate inside the organization. Indeed, it seems really important that SE employers are perceived as fair in order to develop and sustain workers' motivations in SE (e.g., Leete, 2006) through improving of the feeling of identification and congruence with the organization A fair climate provides good conditions to align goals of workers and those of the organization through managers (Korsgaard and Sapienza; 2002). Conversely, the unfair treatment of workers may induce a distortion of the relationship quality between workers or/and with leaders and managers. Another strategic importance of implementing a fair climate is because it improves the acceptance of a lower

wage level (Greenberg, 1990) that is usually the case in SE. Beside all these aspects, it has been empirically shown that people attract by SEs valorize fairness at work (Borzaga, 2009; Salim Sadruddin & Zakus, 2011) and desire an employer who is committed to fulfill social responsibility and to promote employee diversity (Lewis & Ng, 2013). We are then able to suggest that SE should develop an equitable work environment if they want to favor their workers' trust and commitment toward the organization (Salim, Sadruddin, & Zakus, 2012), as well as maintaining their perceived fit with the organization's mission and values. Developing a fair climate means implementing fair procedures and interactions as well as fair distribution of material and non-material rewards (Cropanzano, Bowen, & Gilliland, 2007; Gilliland, Steiner, & Skarlicki, 2003, 2015). Indeed, linking principal-agent theory and organizational justice theory, Korsgaard and Sapienza (2002) suggest that when principal implements governance's mechanisms (controls, monitoring, and compensation) through fair procedures and interactions, agent's perceived fairness, trust and cooperation would be improved (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). In SEs, implementing a fair and equitable work environment (e.g., Mirvis & Hackett, 1983) means implementing fair decisions and procedures regarding resource distribution, rules and policies that affect employees, treating employees with respect, and involving them in decision-making. In particular, fair wages or wage equity perception regarding gender, race and age seems really an important signal for SE workers to perceive fair treatment from employers (e.g., Leete, 2000, 2006; Pennerstorfer & Schneider, 2010; Rabin 1998). Fair wage can be interpreted as either a limitation of wage dispersion or insuring that wage reward the merit (to pay in proportion of the output). As it has been demonstrated above, a pay-for-performance system has not often its place in an SE. Moreover, according to Lazear & Shaw (2007), pay compression may produce higher productivity through greater teamwork, and reduce risks of denigrating coworkers. Hence, we suggest that the best strategy to adopt for SEs in order to sustain workers' motivations is to choose pay compression.

So far, we have conceptualized person-environment fit as depending mainly on the dispositional characteristics of workers (i.e. personality and values) that guide their job choices. However, fit could also emerge through socialization, which is a dynamic of mutual exchange between workers and their organizational environment (Schneider, 1987). Socialization then sheds light on a classic debate: fitting in versus making people fit (Kammeyer-Mueller, 2007). Moreover, organizational socialization systems predict role clarity (Ashforth & Saks, 1996; Kammeyer-Mueller & Wanberg, 2003), while it is crucial, in

any kind of organization, to sustain a good understanding of each task's contribution to the overall mission achievement in order to ensure that workers' efforts are well oriented and to avoid deviant behavior. This is even more important in SEs because it is essential to ensure the effectiveness of implicit incentives (see above).

One of the best ways to improve socialization is through mentoring practices (Chao, Walz, & Gardner, 1992; Ostroff & Kozlowski, 1993). SEs' leaders have notably to give feedbacks to their workers about their performances in order to identify together development opportunities. A positive and egalitarian subjective evaluation of workers performance provided by supervisors or mentors allows the creation of positive relational goods as implicit incentives (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1994) and to develop a good fit (Feij, Whitely, Peiro, & Taris, 1995; Kammeyer-Mueller, 2007; Ostroff & Kozlowski, 1992). According to Becker, Antuar & Everett (2011, p.267), "*The support of senior management, coupled with the genuinely consultative nature of development and implementation, and commitment to ongoing refinement based on feedback, facilitates a higher level of ownership, commitment, and, ultimately, accountability for all employees*.". Thus, looking for creating a best fit between leaders and members (workers) would be also a way to maintain and improve fit between organizational and workers values as well as strengthening role clarity (Atwater & Dionne, 2007). Besides leaders, coworkers also assume an important role by providing explanations about formal and informal objectives and practices, thereby facilitating workers processes of socialization (Kammeyer-Mueller & Wanberg, 2003; Morrison, 1993). We propose then that mentoring practices and interactions with colleagues improve the P-O fit through a socialization process and allow a better understanding of the behaviors and outputs that are valorized by the organization.

The "Economie Sociale" approach (Defourny & Develtere, 1999) and the EMES International Research Network approach of SE (Defourny & Nyssens, 2011) highlight the importance of democratic participative governance in SE. In particular, participative governance means democratic decision process in the general assembly and in the board (one person = one vote) and highlight the importance of the representation or the participation of the stakeholders (users, workers, donors, etc.) in the decision process. Hence, formal, but also informal, workers' participation is a practice often related to SEs. SE workers are then supposed to usually have the possibility to give their opinions and advices about important issues for the organization (e.g. in the general assembly of members, in board of directors, or in group meeting). This participative management has been shown to induce positive

motivation among the SE workforce (Borzaga & Tortia, 2006; Cawley, Keeping, & Levy, 1998; Lawler, 1990) and to favor a good adequacy in the long run between workers' (and all stakeholders') values and those defended by the organization (Lee & Bang, 2012), and that for three main reasons. First, participative management practices favor the process of socialization that allows making employees fit with the organization's mission. Second, important decisions and the future orientation of the firms may be influenced by the workers' opinions or decided collectively and have then more chance to fit with the workers' values. Finally, managers and leaders are particularly critical in keeping the SE's mission and ideology alive, and "*It is possible that with age, the purpose of the organization, its vision, and the idealism that held its members together may become diluted as leadership changes*" (Nair & Bhatnagar, 2011, p. 302). The participation procedure would reduce the possibility for leaders to deviate from the original mission without the stakeholders' agreement and then preserve from the potential negative effects of that shift on workers' P-O fit. In particular, a participative work environment is preserved from the adoption of practices belonging to the for-profit sector without any adjustment regarding SE specificities and missions (Cheverton, 2007). Beyond favoring the person-organization fit, we propose that participatory and high-involvement management would also favor a common understanding of the objectives of the organization and of the behavior to adopt and to attain those objectives.

How SEs might improve the autonomous prosocial motivation of their workforce through increasing their intrinsic motivation?

A final solution to favor the autonomous regulation of prosocial motivation is to sustain and reinforce the intrinsic motivation of their workers. Indeed, Grant (2008) found that workers experience prosocial motivation as a form of autonomous regulation when intrinsic motivation is high, but they tend to experience prosocial motivations as a form of introjected regulation when intrinsic motivation is low. Thus, it seems like different combinations of intrinsic and extrinsic forms of motivation are possible, but the best one to ensure the highest persistence and performance at work in SE would be an intrinsic motivation to do tasks associated with an autonomous regulation of the prosocial goal. This statement is in accordance with SDT (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gagné & Deci, 2005; Weinstein & Ryan, 2010) that highlights that high performance in terms of quantity and quality standards is reached when goals are autonomously regulated (i.e. an identified or integrated regulation of the motivation) and tasks are performed with pleasure (i.e. an intrinsic regulation of the motivation). To conclude, we are not postulating that SE workers have more intrinsic

motivation than their counterparts in FPOs, but that SEs have more interest than FPOs to favor the intrinsic motivation of their workers because it is positively correlated with autonomous prosocial motivation.

To improve workers' intrinsic motivation, it is possible to act at job level by designing job's characteristics that have motivational consequences. For instance, Humphrey, Nahrgang and Morgeson (2007) in a large meta-analysis showed that task characteristics—such as task identity, autonomy, skill variety—predict internal motivation (as well as job satisfaction). Nevertheless, the strength of a particular job characteristic on intrinsic motivation would depend on the worker's preferences. Thus, in order to increase intrinsic motivation in SEs, managers should take into account the PJ fit related to job characteristics when they recruit and select candidates but also when they manage and regulate workers' motivation. Empirically, it has been proved that job characteristics that favor intrinsic motivation are often present in SE and that they are valorized by their workers. Studies by Benz (2005) and Mosca, Musella and Pastore (2007) conclude that if the third sector workers are more satisfied with their jobs than their counterparts, it is also due to the presence of non-monetary benefits. Lanfranchi and Narcy (2008) and Borzaga and Tortia (2006) show that greater autonomy, less repetitive work, and the nature of the work contribute to explain why SE workers are more satisfied. Mirvis and Hackett (1983) also showed empirically that these SE workers have access to more autonomy and a greater variety of tasks than FPO workers.

7. Conclusion

The above literature review has highlighted a lack of complementarity and homogeneity between the different studies which discuss and analyze work motivation in SE context. Based on psychological and economics literature and on recent works dedicated to SE, we consider the content of the motivation to work in SE is prosocial (e.g., De Cooman et al., 2011; Francois, 2007; Francois & Vlassopoulos, 2008). Prosocial motivation refers to the willingness to help the others by making a difference (e.g., Lewis, 2010; Tschirhart, Reed, Freeman, & Anker, 2008). Pro-socially motivated workers are attracted in SEs because their altruistic values fit in with the values defended by the organization's social mission (e.g., Besley & Ghatak, 2005). The self-determination theory allows for the understanding that prosocial motivation may be based on different type of extrinsic regulation (introjected–identified–integrated) but not on intrinsic regulation (e.g., Grant, 2007; Speckbacher, 2013).

In other words, prosocial motivation may be a controlled motivation or a more autonomous motivation regarding its type of extrinsic regulation. The autonomous regulation of the prosocial motivation has to be fostered because it leads to various benefits from the quality and quantity of the work done. (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gagné & Deci, 2005). Finally, we suggest that a more autonomous regulation of prosocial motivation emerges when there is a strong match between an individual's values and organizational values (i.e. P-O fit) and when the worker is intrinsically motivated to perform his task (Grant, 2008).

Benefiting from pro-socially workers who perceive a high fit with the organization's mission is a central issue for SEs for three reasons. First, it is one of their main competitive strengths in a market (e.g., Steinberg, 1990, 2006; Valentinov, 2007). Indeed, the labor donation theory highlights that SE workers (especially managers and professionals) are ready to work for lower wages than their counterparts in FPOs (e.g., Preston, 1989) because they find that working for a social mission in SEs is more meaningful and personally rewarding than working in FPOs (e.g., Lewis, 2010; Light 2002; Mirvis & Hackett, 1983). Second, this particular workforce is essential for the successful functioning of most SEs (Hansmann, 1980; Handy & Katz, 1998) because the SEs difficulty to build quantifiable and meaningful measures of performance negatively affects the applicability of explicit incentives while the specificities of their workers' motivations and the trust-based character of the relationship between all the stakeholders increase the role playing by implicit incentives (Speckbacher, 2013). Third, and beyond the effort intensity, the direction of the effort is also crucial. Indeed, it is important that workers believe in (and understand) the organization's mission to behave in a coherent way with that mission. Therefore, most SEs have to rely on pro-socially motivated workers who perceive a congruence with the organizational mission.

The challenge for SEs is then how to attract and select a pro-socially motivated workforce who best fits with the organization's mission. First, SEs may favor perceived organizational fit of this workforce by displaying information about organization's mission. Second, they should implement practices that favor the PJ fit by answering to non-monetary preferences of their pro-socially motivated workforce. Regarding the selection issue, offering lower wages than FPOs is a good way to bring people to self-select themselves in the right organization. The more a worker matches with the organization's social mission, the more he is ready to "sacrifice" an important amount of wage. Hence, if SEs offer lower wages than FPOs, highly pro-socially motivated workers will prefer SEs that better fit their altruistic

values, while people who value pay will choose another type of organization (Lewis & Frank, 2002).

However, it is certainly not enough to correctly select people who present the best fit regarding values in order to obtain the highest motivation and performance at work. It is also important to maintain and to favor the intensity and the autonomous regulation of prosocial motivation. Actually, any enterprise must ensure that its workers adopt consistent behavior with its mission (e.g., Ben-Ner & Ren, 2015; Borzaga & Tortia, 2006), either by controlling or by encouraging their efforts. Regarding SEs, developing practices that sustain and favor workers' prosocial motivation growth is necessary since it is not always easy to attract people with values and motivation in perfect adequacy with the organization's mission (e.g., Devaro & Brookshire, 2007). Besides, it is important to prevent psychological contract failure which may have very particular negative consequences on workers' motivations and performance in SEs (Vantilborgh, Bidee, Pepermans, Willems, Huybrechts &, Jegers, 2014). A work environment that promotes maintenance or/and development of an autonomous prosocial motivation is characterized by: contact (direct and indirect) with beneficiaries, accessibility to information about the mission and beneficiaries, motivational job characteristics (such as autonomy, skills variety, task identity and significance, etc.) and positive organizational climate (recognition and organizational support, democratic participation and involvement in the decision process, and fair practices). Nevertheless, the literature put forward that all SEs should not be perceived as one equivalent entity; there exists some heterogeneity between SEs (Theuvsen, 2004), which may imply different management issues.

Proposition for future research

This review of literature makes the point about work motivation related to management issues in an SE context. Nevertheless, a greater number of empirical investigations are still necessary. First, no study has yet distinguished the selection effect from the exposition effect. Longitudinal studies are then required to dissociate those two effects that explain the presence of a more pro-socially motivated workforce in SE. Are SE workers more pro-socially motivated because they have a different motivational profile than workers attracted in FPOs or because they are influenced by their work context? Are these two explanations complementary? Second, empirical studies are needed to understand the different motivational dynamics between high qualified and low qualified staff. Indeed, the literature supposes that only highly qualified workers would be more pro-socially motivated in SEs than

in FPOs but empirical proofs are lacking. Motivational studies that focus only on low-qualified workers (or on workers in low-qualified position) in SEs are then expected. Third, the link between practices and autonomous prosocial motivation in the SE context has to be reinforced in future research. Studies analyzing the influence of incentives and managerial practices on worker motivation in the SE context has to be conducted in the future. Finally, future research would focus on the link between the specificities of SEs workers' motivation and workers' well-being, loyalty, effort and performance.

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CHAPTER 3

Are workers in low-skilled positions in social enterprises more pro-socially motivated than their counterparts in for-profit organizations? A longitudinal study in the quasi-market of service-vouchers

Are workers in low-skilled positions in social enterprises more pro-socially motivated than their counterparts in for-profit organizations? A longitudinal study in the quasi-market of service-vouchers[37]

Abstract

In the case of low-skilled jobs, the idea that social enterprises (SEs) attract workers who are motivated to help others and to meet the social aims in which they believe is challenged. Hence, we have performed an empirical study in the quasi-market of service-vouchers in Belgium to know if SEs attract workers to perform low-skilled jobs who have a different motivational profile than their counterparts in for-profit organizations (FPOs) (selection effect). No significant differences were found. Nevertheless, some authors suggest that the work environment of SEs may have positive effects on employees' motivation and on their adhesion to the social mission. We have then compared the workers' motivational profile between SEs and FPOs after they have worked for eight months in their respective organizations. The results show that SE workers perceive higher value congruence with their organization's mission and are more pro-socially motivated by social aims than their counterparts in FPOs. In conclusion, we are able to affirm that there exists a positive effect to be in SE on workers' prosocial motivation and perceived values congruence with their organization for workers being in low-skilled positions (exposition effect).

***Keywords*:** Social enterprise, Prosocial motivation, Low-skilled jobs, Incentives structure

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1. Introduction

According to the literature, one important characteristic of social enterprises (SEs)[38] is their capacity to attract workers who are not only motivated by monetary remuneration and are ready to sacrifice a significant part of their wages to work for a social mission in which they believe (e.g., Preston, 1989; Valentinov, 2007). These SE workers have always been identified as intrinsically motivated workers and not extrinsically. Extrinsic motivations are driven by rewards (like wages) while intrinsic motivation refers to activities performed for their own sake, because they are inherently interesting. However, most of the authors agree on the fact that the SE workers are not only motivated by a task, which is inherently interesting and rewarding; they also care about the social impact of their job. In others words, they are conscious and motivated about the social mission and values of their enterprise. Recently, new researches developed at the crossroads of psychology and economics provide new insights around the nature of the motivation to work in SE. These studies point out that the content of the motivation to work in SE is not intrinsic but prosocial (e.g., De Cooman, De Gieter, Pepermans, & Jegers, 2011; Francois, 2007; Francois & Vlassopoulos, 2008). The motivation to make a prosocial difference is defined as the desire to make a positive difference in other people's lives and to make the world a better place (e.g., Grant, 2007).

The presence of pro-socially motivated workers in social enterprises can be first explained by an attraction-selection phenomenon. In other words, social enterprises attract pro-socially motivated workers. From a theoretical point of view, Besley and Ghatak (2005) analyze the reasons explaining the specific matching of social mission-oriented employees with social mission-oriented employers. However, this argument could be discussed for people in low-skilled job (e.g., Devaro & Brookshire, 2007). Do SEs attract more pro-socially motivated workers than their counterparts in FPOs in the case of low-skilled jobs? This is the first question of this article. In particular, the aim is to know if SEs attract low-skilled workers with more prosocial motivation and higher values congruence with their new organization than their counterparts in FPOs ((self)-selection model).

[38] The concepts used to describe organizations with social mission vary from one country to another: "économie sociale et solidaire" in France; "économie sociale" and "entreprise à profit social" in Belgium; "non-profit sector" in the US, "voluntary sector" in the UK, etc. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon tradition, most scientists who are rooted in the European tradition consider the "third sector" to include not only non-profit organizations (associations) but also cooperatives, mutual societies, foundations and even new forms of social enterprises or, in other words, all organizations whose primary purpose is not profit maximization for shareholders. Given that the purpose of this thesis is not to discuss the underlying issues with these different concepts, we made the choice to use the generic term of "social enterprise" (SE). For this research, we then define social enterprise as not-for-profit organizations that combine an entrepreneurial dynamic to provide goods or services with the primacy of their social aims.

Second, the presence of pro-socially motivated workers in SE can also be explained by an exposition phenomenon. Indeed, social enterprises are supposed to implement a work environment and incentive structures that favor and sustain prosocial motivation and the workers' adhesion to the values defended by the social mission (e.g. Speckbacher, 2013) (exposition model). The aim of such an environment is to orient employee efforts towards the organizational mission. Therefore, SE workers' motivation can evolve positively over time, even if they are not pro-socially motivated when entering in their SE. However, this exposition effect has never been empirically proven, neither for skilled nor for low-skilled jobs. The second objective of this study is then to analyze the influence of being in an SE on the evolution of worker's (in a low-skilled job) prosocial motivation and values congruence (exposition model).

Empirically, this chapter focuses on the quasi-market of service vouchers in Belgium. This quasi-market is designed to foster the creation of regular salaried jobs for low-skilled persons doing housekeeping The services that are provided are related to housekeeping, strictly speaking (i.e. not care), at home or outside the home (ironing, household shopping, etc.). Even if the State contributes towards the cost, the provision of those services is open to all kinds of organizations: a variety of for-profit and not-for-profit providers (public and social enterprises) compete on the market. It works as follows: Any person willing to obtain housework services can buy vouchers and choose an accredited provider, which then sends a worker to the client's house. Workers are, therefore, hired by the providers and not directly by the households, which are clients of the providers (Defourny, Henry, Nassaut & Nyssens, 2010). This field allows us to compare FPOs with two types of SEs with different social missions. In this study, in order to distinguish between for-profit providers and SEs, we rely on their legal status. Providers with a legal status that unconstrained profit distribution pursue a mission of profit maximization while others are expected to pursue a social mission. To specify the type of social mission, we take into account the type of accreditation conferred by public authorities. There are two types of SEs: work integration social enterprises (WISEs) and home care services organizations (HCSOs). Accredited WISEs are social cooperatives that aim to create temporary or long-term jobs for the most disadvantaged workers. Accredited HCSOs are non-profit organizations that exclusively focus on serving vulnerable families and elderly people. Distinguishing between these two types of SEs, rather than considering them as equivalent, allows the observation of the "mission effect", and not only the "sector effect" (for-profit or not-for-profit). Further, considering an organization with a

social mission centered on members (workers in this case) compared to a social mission that focuses on users' well-being may have important implications in terms of work motivation. Indeed, it should be more easy to be pro-socially motivated to help a disadvantaged outgroup (elderly and vulnerable people) than to help one's own group (low-skilled workers). In order to compare workers' motivations between FPOs, HCSOs and WISEs, we collected data via a questionnaire submitted to the workers, one time before they started working for their new organization ((self-)selection assumption), another time eight months later (exposition assumption).

The paper is structured as follows: The first section is devoted to a literature review about work motivation in SE. The theory is discussed in line with low-skilled jobs. The second section is devoted to the methodological aspects. We describe the procedure of data collection, the sample composition and validity and how the concepts of motivations are measured. The third section presents and analyzes the results of the empirical survey. Finally, the fourth section provides concluding remarks.

2. Literature Review

SEs workers are pro-socially motivated to help others by making "a difference" (e.g., Francois, 2007; Francois & Vlassopoulos, 2008; Lyons, Duxburry & Higgins, 2006) and assign positive utility to contribute to society (e.g., Etienne & Narcy, 2010; Lewis & Ng, 2013). SEs attract such workers because they have a mission that is usually oriented to public interest and solidarity (e.g., Lanfranchi & Narcy, 2008) and are mainly active in socially oriented industries, such as health or education. In other words, if a pro-socially motivated person chooses to work for an organization with a social mission rather than for an FPO, it is most probably because his/her altruistic values[39]match the organization's values and goals (e.g., Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Ben-Ner, Ren & Paulson, 2011; Handy & Katz, 1998). Consequently, values congruence[40] between workers and the organization would be especially high in SEs since they attract workers that are sympathetic to and motivated by the organization's social mission (e.g., De Cooman et al., 2011; Devaro & Brookshire, 2007).

[39] Prosocial motivation is based on altruistic values (McNeely & Meglino, 1994; Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004; Penner, Midili, & Kegelmeyer, 1997; Rioux & Penner, 2001) like empathy and helpfulness (Penner et al., 2005), values of concern for others (Grant, 2007; De Dreu, 2006; Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004; Schwartz, 1992) and fairness (Lopes, 2008; Lyons et al., 2010). In the SE context, De Cooman et al. (2011) confirm in a study of 13 service Belgian organizations that SE workers are more concerned about altruism than FPO workers.

[40] Value congruence or the similarity between values of workers and the values of organizations refers to the concept of person-organization fit (Chatman, 1989; Edwards & Cable, 2009; Kristof, 1996).

Further, the limitation in profit distribution also implies that, compared to FPOs, SEs are more likely to attract pro-socially motivated workers (Hansmann, 1980; Roomkin & Weisbrod, 1999; Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Indeed, this limitation implies that SE employers have fewer incentives than their counterparts in FPOs to take financial advantage of their workers' motivations (Speckbacher, 2013). This works as a sign of trust and ensures that the workers' efforts will increase the quality or the quantity of the services and not be turned into the owner's profit (e.g., Francois, 2003, 2007; Leete, 2006). These SE features also justify the massive presence of volunteers in the third sector (Degli Antoni, 2009; Einolf, 2011).SEs worker would then be more pro-socially motivated than their counterparts in FPO.

Benefiting a pro-socially motivated workforce that perceives a high fit with the organization's mission is a central issue for SEs since it is one of their main competitive strength on a market (e.g., Steinberg, 1990, 2006; Valentinov, 2007). Indeed, the labor donation theory highlights that SE workers are ready to work for lower wages than their counterparts in FPOs (Benz, 2005; Preston, 1989, 1990; Rose-Ackerman, 1996) because they find that working for a social mission in SEs is more meaningful and personally rewarding than working in FPOs (Lewis, 2010; Light 2002; Mirvis & Hackett, 1983). SEs would, therefore, be able to offer lower wages to their workers than FPOs, all others things being equal. The use of lower wages by SEs is also justified by an adverse selection issue due to asymmetric information between the employer and the job seeker: how can one distinguish the most pro-socially motivated workers from the others? Handy and Katz (1998) highlight that the most effective and least expensive solution (in terms of both time and money) would be to offer lower pay compensation because only workers who are really motivated by the social mission will agree to give up a significant part of their wages to meet their altruistic values[41].

Nevertheless, we must be cautious about the application of these arguments to the case of people who have low-skilled jobs in SEs. First, given their generally low pay (often close to the minimum allowed), they do not have the necessary margins to give up a significant part of their wages to meet their prosocial motivation. Empirical studies (e.g., Leete, 2006; Roomkin & Weisbrod, 1999) confirm that the presence of lower wages in SEs than in FPOs concern mainly skilled positions, questioning the application of labor donation theory to

[41] The empirical literature is divided over the presence of lower wages in social enterprises. Indeed, if some empirical works validate this assumption (Frank, 1996; Preston, 1989; Weisbrod, 1983), the studies conducted by Devaro & Brookshire (2007), Leete (2000), Ben-Ner, Ren & Paulson (2011), and Ruhm & Borkoski (2003) could not prove the existence of a "wage penalty" to the detriment of workers in social enterprises; in fact, Mocan & Teikin (2003) surprisingly found that social enterprises offered higher wages in the area of childcare.

unskilled jobs. Regarding the quasi-market of service-vouchers, we observe in a previous study (Brolis & Nyssens, 2015) that workers in low-skilled position do not earn more in FPOs than in SEs. Second, low-skilled tasks are usually too far away from the organization's mission and have a weak social significance (Devaro & Brookshire, 2007). SE workers are then not usually able to perceive their social impact, which is essential to being pro-socially motivated as demonstrated by Grant (2007). Moreover, Henry, Nassaut, Defourny, & Nyssens (2009) suggest that low-skilled workers are often not able to clearly identify the mission of their organization. All these arguments imply that SEs may attract workers to perform low-skilled jobs who are not differently motivated than their counterparts in FPOs.

The first set of hypotheses, therefore, focuses on workers' motivations upon joining their new organization to start a low-skilled job. We analyze whether differences exist between newly hired workers from FPOs and SEs.

H1.1: Workers attracted by SEs to perform a low-skilled job do not perceive higher value congruence with their new organization than their counterparts in FPOs.

H1.2: Workers attracted by SEs to perform a low-skilled job are not more pro-socially motivated than their counterparts in FPOs.

However, if SEs might not attract workers who are differently motivated, they could influence the motivation of their workers in low-skilled positions over time. Indeed, any enterprise must ensure that its workers adopt consistent behavior with its mission (e.g., Ben-Ner & Ren, 2015; Borzaga & Tortia, 2006), either by controlling or by encouraging their efforts. By this logic, FPOs (whose purpose is to maximize profit) should use monetary incentives such as offering career opportunities related to promotions or wage compensation based on financial performance. Regarding SEs, developing practices that sustain and favor workers' prosocial motivation growth is also necessary since it is not always easy to attract people with values and motivation that are in perfect adequacy with the organization's mission. And even if SEs attract such workers, it is also important to favor prosocial motivation towards the social mission to encourage workers' effort and to prevent psychological contract failure (which may have very particular negative consequences on workers' motivations and performance in SEs (Vantilborgh, Bidee, Pepermans, Willems, Huybrechts, & Jegers, 2014). However, monetary incentives related to performance are particularly difficult to use in SEs since they are often not able to build an undistorted quantifiable measure of performance (e.g., Leete, 2006) because their social mission is

usually multidimensional and less tangible than profit maximization (e.g., Speckbacher, 2013). In addition, monetary incentives would promote extrinsic motivation—to be motivated by obtaining rewards such as income—at the expense of prosocial motivation (e.g., Francois & Vlassopoulos, 2008; Canton, 2005). In other words, these kinds of incentives allow to direct, control and strength the workers' effort but not to make emerge a motivation to accomplish the mission of the organization for itself through the perception of values congruence. Hence, SEs would benefit by developing incentive structures that favor the prosocial motivation in their workforce and promote their workers' perception about value congruence with the organization (exposition effect). A work environment that promotes the development of prosocial motivation in line with social mission is characterized by contact (direct and indirect) with beneficiaries and positive information about beneficiaries (Grant, 2007); motivational job characteristics such as autonomy, skills variety, task identity and significance (Deci & Ryan, 1980; Frey, 1997); a fair work environment with a particular focus on wage equity (Leete, 2000), the quality and the quantity of the relationship between all the stakeholders (Mosca Musella & Pastore, 2006); recognition, organizational support and feedbacks (Becker, Antuar & Everett, 2011), and democratic participation and involvement in the decision process (Cawley, Keeping, & Levy, 1998; Lawler, 1990).

The second set of assumptions of this paper is, therefore, related to the evolution of motivation once the workers have integrated within the company. The objective is to apprehend the impact of the incentive structure developed in the SE.

H2.1: Workers in low-skilled position in SE perceive higher value congruence with their organization compare to their counterparts in FPOs after having spent some time in their respective organization.

H2.2: Workers in low-skilled position in SE are more pro-socially motivated than their counterparts in FPOs after having spent some time in their respective organization.

3. Methodology and data

Data Collection

Empirically, this project focuses on the quasi-market of service vouchers in the French-speaking part of Belgium. In total, 52 organizations participated in this study. Data were collected via a questionnaire with the goal to compare worker motivations between work

integration social enterprises (WISEs), Home Care Services Organizations (HCSOs), and FPOs. Only housekeepers and ironers have been included in the study. Hence, workers with more qualified jobs were not considered. We started to collect data by assessing the nature of the newly hired employees' motivations in order to analyze whether differences exist between workers from FPOs and those from SEs. For that purpose, we submitted a questionnaire to all new workers over the period from April 2012 to October 2013. This questionnaire was submitted to them before their first day of work to ensure that their motivations had not been already affected by their new work environment. The confidentiality of their answers and their anonymity was, of course, guaranteed. The questionnaire included questions about work motivations, socio-demographic characteristics, the ability to identify the mission of their new organization, and about previous working experiment and status on the labor market. The final sample included 217 workers distributed into FPOs (77), WISEs (86) and HCSOs (54). Next, in order to observe workers' motivations evolution over time, we submitted the same questionnaire to the same workers eight months after their first day of work. Question about their work environment and job characteristics have been added to the questionnaire at this step. We chose a delay of eight months because, on the one hand, it seemed to be a sufficient period of time to observe an influence of a work environment on workers' motivations and, on the other hand, a larger delay would imply a high attrition bias since the workers' turnover rate is consequent in the quasi-market of service vouchers.

Measures

Prosocial motivation. We use the scale of Grant (2008) to measure prosocial motivation (see Appendix 1). This measure consists of three items for which workers indicate their agreement (or disagreement) based on a Likert scale of 7 levels from "do not agree at all" to "totally agree". The value used to measure prosocial motivation is the average score obtained on these three items. An example of an item is "I do this work to be useful to others". Cronbach's alpha of the 3-items scale is .86.

Person-Organization Fit. We apprehended value congruence between worker and organization by a single item developed by De Cooman et al. (2011): "I think my values are very close to those of my organization". Again, participants had the opportunity to indicate their agreement in relation to this statement on a Likert scale of 7 levels.

Sample composition and potential threats to the integrity of the experiment to test the exposition effect

First, we have to check if SEs attract the same type of workers in terms of individual characteristics than FPOs. Table 1 includes workers' individual characteristics for the full sample (217 workers) and compares individual characteristics, first between FPOs and SEs and next between FPOs HCSOs and WISEs. This was not the first experience as a worker in the quasi-market of service voucher for some of them (37%), but none of the workers had previously worked in a SE. The sample is predominantly female (98%) and the majority of workers may be considered as unqualified (55% have no diploma) or low qualified (36% have a diploma of higher secondary education). However, 8% of the workers have a higher level of education, which is surprising given that the position does not require any certified qualification. Unfortunately, (and as expected, since we were not able to randomize the different samples), there are some differences in the new workers' profile between the different types of organizations. Compared to FPOs, SEs hire more workers who were previously unemployed, supported by their efforts to find a job by a public body of insertion, and those with no previous experience on the quasi-market of service vouchers. The workers hired by FPOs also have fewer children and are more often of a foreign origin than in SEs. WISEs hire more unskilled workers (which is coherent with their mission) while HCSOs hire workers who live more often as a couple than any other types of organizations. As a result of these imbalances, we include workers' individual characteristics as control variable in our analysis, and present robustness checks to test the exposition effect by including fixed effect or by considering sub-samples relating to one particular individual characteristic (e.g. prior experience as housekeeper in the quasi-market of service vouchers).

Attrition is the second main issue observed in the panel data analysis. 174 workers participated in the second phase of the study. This corresponds to an attrition rate of roughly 20%. Attrition is slightly higher in SEs (23% in WISEs, 19% in HCSOs) than in FPOs (17%). Workers who did not participate in the whole process are those who left the organization before the second wave of the investigation or who have seen their organization felt into bankruptcy. Since the attrition rate is not negligible, it is important to ensure that total sample composition and groups' comparability have not been affected. Hence, we analyze the sample composition and compare the groups' composition in terms of individual characteristics after the attrition effect (N=174). Results are given in Appendix 2. We also performed a logit regression to ensure that the group comparability is not affected in terms of individual

characteristics. In particular, we regress a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the worker has not participated in step 2 (0 otherwise) on individual characteristics, on a dummy variable that represents the affiliation to an SE, and on interaction terms between the individual characteristics and the SE dummy. Results are given in Table 2. We reproduced the same type of specification to compare WISEs and HCSOs with FPOs. Results are given in Appendix 3. If the interaction terms are significant, it means that the groups' comparability is affected by the attrition effect. The attrition effect does not seem to have affected either the sample composition or the groups' comparability in terms of individual characteristics. Hence, the reasons of individuals' non-participation in the second step do not seem to be related to individual characteristics.

Table 1 – Workers' characteristics at the first step

	TOTAL	**FPO**	**SE**	**WISE**	**HCSO**
N (observations)	217	77	140	86	54
Gender (% of men)	0.03 (0.19)	0.04 (0.20)	0.01 (0.12)	0.02 (0.15)	--
Age	33.58 (9.55)	33.60 (9.90)	33.57 (9,39)	34.74 (9.38)	31.72 (9,19)
Education level[1]	2.41 (0.85)	2.59 (0.96)	2.32** (0.77)	2.20** (0.78)	2.50 (0.72)
< High School	0.55 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.58 (0.50)	0.64 (0.48)	0.48 (0.50)
= High School	0.36 (0.48)	0.35 (0.48)	0.37 (0.49)	0.32 (0.47)	0.46 (0.50)
> High School	0.08 (0.26)	0.14 (0.34)	0.05** (0.22)	0.04* (0.19)	0.06 (0.23)
Foreign origin[2] **(%)**	0.15 (0.36)	0.25 (0.44)	0.09*** (0.29)	0.10** (0.31)	0.07** (0.26)
Main task at work (%)					
Housekeepers	0.97 (0.18)	0.96 (0.19)	0.97 (0.17)	0.95 (0.91)	1.00 (0.00)
Ironers in the firm	0.03 (0.18)	0.04 (0.19)	0.03 (0.17)	0.05 (0.21)	--
Unemployed[3] **(%)**	0.69 (0.46)	0.59 (0.49)	0.74** (0.44)	0.74 (0.44)	0.74 (0.44)
Public Help[4]	0.24 (0.43)	0.17 (0.38)	0.28* (0.45)	0.28 (0.45)	0.28 (0.45)
Previous experience in the market	0.37 (0.48)	0.45 (0.50)	0.33* (0.47)	0.36 (0.48)	0.28 (0.45)
Family situation					
In couple (%)	0.51 (0.50)	0.42 (0.50)	0.54* (0.50)	0.48 (0.50)	0.65** (0.48)
Number of kids	1.32 (1.23)	0.94 (1,04)	1.49*** (1,29)	1.43** (1,19)	1.59*** (1,43)

N=217, all observation made in step 1. Standard deviations are given in brackets. Anova test (F-test) is performed to compare workers' characteristics between control group (FPO) and the treatment groups (SE-WISE-HCSO). P-value:*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. [BF] In case of variances homogeneity hypothesis rejection, Brown-Forsythe statistic was considered.

[1] Scale from 1 "primary school" to 5 " University or others higher education of the long type".

[2] People who comes from a country located outside from the EU-15.

[3] This dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the worker was unemployed before to take this job as housekeeper and 0 otherwise.

[4] This dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the worker has found his new job through the help of a public organization and 0 otherwise.

Table 2 -- Attrition effect on individual characteristics (FPO Vs SE), Logit regressions results

Coefficient estimates	Z_t
Constant	-1.12 (2.20)
SE	0.96 (2.46)
Age	-0.00 (0.04)
Education level	0.06 (0.46)
Foreign origin	-1.27 (1.01)
Unemployed	-0.29 (0.77)
CPAS/FOREM	0.21 (0.93)
Previous experience	-0.44 (0.81)
Couple	0.57 (0.85)
Number of kids	-0.53 (0.50)
Age x SE	-0.02 (0.05)
Education level x SE	-0.20 (0.50)
Foreign origin x SE	1.41 (1.20)
Unemployed x SE	-0.34 (1.05)
CPAS/FOREM x SE	0.23 (1.00)
Previous experience x SE	0.98 (0.92)
Couple x SE	-0.72 (0.97)
Number of kids x SE	0.64 (0.52)

N=209, all observation made in step 1 with no missing variables. Z_t is a dummy varaible that take he value of 1 when the worker has participated to step 2 (and 0 otherwise). P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.

4. Results

Selection effect

The literature review has highlighted that SEs are supposed to attract workers who are more pro-socially motivated than their counterparts in FPOs due to a self-selection effect. However, this finding may be challenged in the case of low-skilled jobs.

The first aim of this study is then to identify potential differences in the motivations of workers between SEs and FPOs when entering the organization. Specifically, the objective is to know if SEs hire workers who have more prosocial motivation and a perception of a better match between their values and their organization values. Therefore, we compare workers' motivations between SEs and FPOs before their first day of work, using the following regression:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 SE_i + \varepsilon_i \qquad (1)$$

where i denotes the individual. Y_i is the intensity of the motivation of individual i, SE_i is a dummy for the affiliation of individual i in an SE that controls for the comparability between FPO and SE groups in term of Y_i. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level. We use the same type of specification to compare the motivation of workers attracted to FPOs with the motivation of their counterparts attracted to WISEs and in HCSOs. The results are given in Table 3.

The results show no significant difference in terms of value congruence and prosocial motivation between FPOs and SEs workers and between FPOs and WISEs or HCSOs workers. Hence, it seems that SEs neither attract nor select workers with a motivation profile that would be specific compared to their counterpart in FPOs. Therefore, hypothesis 1.1 and 1.2 of non-self-selection effects cannot be rejected. Nevertheless, when adding individual characteristics in the values congruence regressions, the WISE coefficient becomes significant. We also observe that the fact to be unemployed before to get a job in this quasi-market is negatively and highly correlated to the perceived person-organization fit (see table 3) while WISE hire more unemployed people than FPO (see table 1). Therefore, in order to understand the mechanism behind such result, we reproduce the same design on two subsamples: the previously unemployed and the others (see appendix 4 and 5). Regarding the unemployed sub-sample, no selection effect is observed. At the opposite, we observe a high selection effect in WISE for the second subsample. It means that when WISEs hire a non-

unemployed person, they select people with high values congruence with the organization (and high prosocial motivation). In others words, when WISEs deviate from their initial mission of "hiring the most vulnerable people on the labor market", it is only to hire people who bring a real added-value to the organization[42]. If no difference is observed between WISEs and FPOs workers when we consider the full sample (without control variable), it is because WISEs hire more often unemployed people while such people seem to perceive less value congruence than the others.

Table 3 – Selection effect on motivation, regressions results

	P-O Fit (ologit)		**P-O Fit (OLS)**				**P-S motivation**			
	(1)	*(2)*	*(1)*		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*	
Constant	--	--	5.54*** (0.12)	4.77*** (0.61)	5.54*** (0.12)	4.65*** (0.60)	5.76*** (0.14)	5.33*** (0.66)	5.76*** (0.14)	5.32*** (0.68)
SE	0.35 (0.26)	--	0.15 (0.15)	0.26 (0.17)	--	--	0.09 (0.18)	0.10 (0.17)	--	--
WISE	--	0.47 (0.31)	--	--	0.27 (0.18)	0.37** (0.17)	--	--	0.08 (0.21)	0.11 (0.19)
HCSO	--	0.15 (0.29)	--	--	-0.04 (0.20)	0.06 (0.23)	--	--	0.11 (0.21)	0.07 (0.23)
Woman	--	--	--	-0.25 (0.39)	--	-0.21 (0.37)	--	-0.18 (0.49)	--	-0.17 (0.50)
Age	--	--	--	0.02** (0.01)	--	0.02** (0.01)	--	0.01 (0.01)	--	0.01 (0.01)
Education level	--	--	--	0.10 (0.10)	--	0.11 (0.10)	--	-0.01 (0.12)	--	-0.01 (0.11)
Foreign origin	--	--	--	-0.30 (0.28)	--	-0.31 (0.28)	--	-0.70*** (0.23)	--	-0.71*** (0.23)
Home Cleaning	--	--	--	0.30* (0.16)	--	0.37** (0.17)	--	0.37 (0.33)	--	0.37 (0.33)
Unemployment	--	--	--	-0.32** (0.15)	--	-0.31** (0.15)	--	-0.08 (0.15)	--	-0.08 (0.15)
CPAS/FOREM	--	--	--	0.12 (0.18)	--	0.12 (0.18)	--	0.09 (0.22)	--	0.09 (0.22)
Previous experience	--	--	--	0.27 (0.17)	--	0.26 (0.17)	--	0.43*** (0.12)	--	0.43*** (0.12)
Couple	--	--	--	0.20 (0.21)	--	0.23 (0.20)	--	0.22 (0.14)	--	0.22 (0.15)
Number of kids	--	--	--	-0.14** (0.07)	--	-0.14* (0.07)	--	-0.06 (0.07)	--	-0.06 (0.07)
N	217	217	217	209	217	209	217	209	217	209

Ordered logistic regression is considered regarding P-O fit. The others specifications are OLS regressions. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.

(1) SE Vs FPO

(2) WISE Vs FPO and HCSO Vs FPO

[42] Some interviews have been made with WISEs managers in order to check that result. They highlight that hiring an unemployed people is more financially advantageous for the organization. However, sometimes they prefer to hire an employed people because "he has the right values and the right vision" even if it is not cost-effective.

One reason identified by the literature to justify a non-selection effect of workers in low-skilled jobs regarding the organization mission is due to the asymmetry of information. Hence, we were interested in the ability of future workers to identify the mission of their organization among the following four options (see table 4):

Table 4 – Mission identification at first step

Workers	**WISE**	**HCSO**	**FPO**
N	86	54	77
Help no qualified persons to find a job (WISEs mission)	**5,49 (1.77)**	4,34 (2,14)	4,80 (1,95)
Given home support to elderly and vulnerable people (HCSOs mission)	4,89 (1,89)	**5,83 (1,61)**	4,92 (1,89)
Profit Maximisation (FPOs mission)	3,36 (2,03)	3,31 (1,95)	4,46 (1,89)
Given household service to people in employment (control mission)	5,28 (1,87)	5,40 (1,72)	**5,80 (1,61)**

For each of these possibilities, housekeepers had to indicate their agreement (or disagreement) to identify these as being the mission of their new organization on a Likert scale of 7 levels from "not agree at all" to "strongly agree".

For each of these possibilities, future workers had to indicate their agreement (or disagreement) to identify these as being the mission of their new organization on a Likert scale of 7 levels from "not agree at all" to "strongly agree". Table 4 describes the results. New workers of SEs identify clearly the mission of their new organization. Indeed, WISEs' new workers identify the aim to help unskilled persons to be employed as the primary mission of their new organization while whose of HCSOs believe that the main mission of their organization is to provide home support to dependent persons. Both types of workers also agree to say that the mission of their organization is clearly not profit maximization. By contrast, new workers from FPOs think, on average, that the main mission of their organization is to provide a service to people who work and not to make a profit (even though they are the one who attribute the highest score to this mission). This finding may be explained by the industry (usually service provided at the home and partially subsidized by the government) which brings most of the new entrants to perceive all service voucher providers as being of the "social" type. This may explained why we observe that the majority of new recruits seems to be relatively pro-socially motivated and to perceive (on average) a high congruence between their values and those promoted by the mission of their new organization (see Table 3).

Before starting the analyses of the exposition effect in SEs, we have yet to check if there is an ex-post selection effect. Indeed, some people who participated in the first stage of this study left their organization before having the opportunity to participate in the second stage of the investigation. It is then possible that the selection that was not observed at the entry in the organization has been made after some time spent in the organization. For example, it would be plausible that SE workers who stay in the organization for a long time are the most pro-socially motivated workers, while this is not the case in FPOs. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the total sample composition and groups' comparability have not been affected by attrition in terms of dependent variables. In order to evaluate this ex-post selection effect on dependent variables in step 1, we consider the following specification:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 SE_i + \theta_1 Z_t + \gamma_1 (SE \times Z)it + \varepsilon_i \qquad (2)$$

where *i* denotes the individual. Y_i is the intensity of the motivation of individual *i*, SE_i is a dummy for the affiliation of individual *i* in an SE that control for the comparability between FPOs and SEs groups, Z_i is a dummy that take the value of 1 if the individual has not participated to step 2 and that control for the attrition effect on the sample composition. The interaction term $(SE \times Z)i$ is a dummy that control for the attrition effect on the comparability between SEs and FPOs groups. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level. We use the same type of specification to analyze the attrition effect on the comparability of the FPO group with the WISE and HCSO groups. The results are given in Table 5.

The results show that attrition has neither affected the sample composition (all the coefficients of Z are not significant) or the groups' comparability (all the coefficients of the interaction terms are not significant). Hence, the different groups are still comparable in terms of dependent variables (all the coefficients of SE, WISE and HCSO are not significant). We even notice that the difference in perceived value congruence between new workers from WISEs and FPOs has decreased in our sample (coefficient of 0.17 instead of 0.27).

Table 5 – Attrition effect on motivations, regressions results

	P-O Fit (Ologit)		**P-O Fit** (OLS)		**P-S motivation**	
	(1)	*(2)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(1)*	*(2)*
Constant	--	--	5.54*** (0.15)	5.54*** (0.15)	5.73*** (0.15)	5.73*** (0.14)
Z_t	-0.18 (0.71)	-0.18 (0.72)	-0.00 (0.39)	-0.00 (0.39)	0.19 (0.31)	0.19 (0.32)
SE_i	0.21 (0.29)	--	0.10 (0.19)	--	0.15 (0.20)	--
$(SE\ x\ Z)_{i,t}$	0.71 (0.80)	--	0.22 (0.45)	--	-0.29 (0.38)	--
$WISE_i$	--	0.27 (0.36)	--	0.17 (0.23)	--	0.13 (0.22)
$HCSO_i$	--	0.12 (0.33)	--	0.01 (0.21)	--	0.17 (0.224)
$(WISE\ x\ Z)_{it}$	--	0.58 (0.83)	--	0.44 (0.45)	--	-0.26 (0.41)
$(HCSO\ x\ Z)_{it}$	--	0.19 (1.00)	--	-0.24 (0.53)	--	-0.33 (0.47)

N=217, all observation made in step 1. Regarding P-O fit, we use both ordered logistic regression (because the most adapted to the variable structure) and OLS specification (to be able to compare the coefficient magnitude with the other variables of interest in other OLS specifications). All the others specifications are OLS regressions. P-value : *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.
(1) SE Vs FPO
(2) WISE Vs FPO and HCSO Vs FPO

Exposition Effect

The literature highlights that the work environment of SEs sustains and favors employees' prosocial motivation and perception of values congruence. Regarding this argument, we expect to observe that to be in a SE has a positive effect over time on workers' prosocial motivation and value congruence. In that objective, we have to take into account that some (non-significant) differences in the motivational profile between the different groups have been observed at the first step. In that case, differences in step 2 between groups may not reflect the treatment effects (that is to say the real differences between treatments and the control groups in terms of motivation evolution between step 1 and 2). In order to control for these initial differences and to eliminate some effect of selection bias, we use a Difference-in-Differences estimation (DIFF in DIFF). This specification allows us to measure the treatment effect on dependent variable by comparing the average change over time in the dependent variable for the treatment group to the average change over time for the control

group. To do this, we considered two observations for each worker in the sample (the outcome at both first and second step). The following specification is considered.

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \gamma_0 SE_i + \theta_1 t_t + \gamma_1 (SE \times t)it + \delta X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{it} \qquad (3)$$

where *i* denotes the individual and *t* the period (step 1 or 2). $Y_{i,t}$ is the intensity of the motivation of individual *i* at time *t*. SE_i is a dummy for the affiliation of individual *i* in an SE (that capture the selection effect to be in SE, compare to be in an FPO, on the outcome). t_i is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the observation is made in step 2 (and 0 otherwise) and represents the average evolution in outcome for the control group. Finally, the interaction term $(SE \times t)it$ measures the effect of being in SE (compare to be in an FPO) on the outcome evolution (treatment effect). X_i is a vector of non-variant control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level. To be confident about the results while using a DIFF in DIFF specification require to believe that the identification assumption is respected, namely that the control group reproduces the counterfactual outcome trajectory that the affected units would have experienced in the absence of the treatment. In other words, we have to assume that the trends in worker motivations would be the same in all groups in the absence of treatment. It may be not the case if they are some differences between groups that affect the dependent variable. Since we observe some differences in individuals characteristics between FPO workers and the workers in the other groups (see Table 1), we use a second difference in difference specifications in which observable individual characteristics are controlled (results are given in Table 6). However, we still have to consider the existence of non-observed and non-measurable individual characteristics. Indeed, if omitted variables that compose the error term are correlated to the treatment, it created an endogeneity issue that in turn biased OLS estimator. Panel data allows for possibilities to deal with the omitted variables problem by using the fixed effect model. Hence, we use a within estimator to eliminate the effect of omitted time-invariant variables that causes the error term to be correlated with the repressors (the results are given in Table 6). We use the same type of specifications to analyze the effect to be in WISE or in HCSO (compared to be in an FPO) on workers' motivations (the results are given in Table 7). Note that fixed effect model cannot eliminate the effect of time-variant omitted variable.

Let us start by analyzing the results about the evolution of value congruence between workers and organization. We observe in Table 6 a positive effect from working in an SE on the evolution of values congruence. Indeed, the effect is largely positive and significant at 1%

in all specifications. The results presented in Table 7 that compare WISEs' and HCSOs' workers with their counterparts from FPOs confirm a positive effect of evolving in both types of SEs on values congruency. However, this positive effect is much higher on HCSOs' workers than on WISE workers. The treatment effect of being in HCSO is significant at 1% in four specifications and at 5% in the first specification, while WISEs treatment effect is smaller and only significant at 10%. Hence, these robustness checks confirm the previous results about the positive influence over time of being in any type of SEs (compare to be in an FPO) on values congruence.

With regard to prosocial motivation, we observe that the effect of being in SE is positive but only significant in the specification with fixed effect (see table 6). Nevertheless, we observe that the differences between the three specifications regarding the value of the coefficients of the interaction term are very small. The exposition effect is not observed in diff in diff specifications most probably because SE workers are different (than FPO workers) in some omitted individual variable(s) which induce a negative effect on prosocial motivation over time. The results listed in Table 7 show similar results with respect to HCSOs' workers. Hence, we may reasonably think that the presence of more pro-socially motivated workers at step 2 in HCSOs than in FPO is mainly explained by an exposition effect. By contrast, a positive effect of being in WISE on prosocial motivation is observed at the sample level but this effect is non-significant. Nevertheless, while we compare the workers' prosocial motivation at second step, we observe that WISEs workers have more prosocial motivation than their counterparts in FPOs after some time spend in the quasi-market of service-vouchers (appendix 6). Therefore, we can conclude that WISEs have more prosocial motivation than their counterpart in FPO in step 2 but we don't know if this observation is due to an exposition or selection effect at this stage.

Table 6 -- Exposition effect on motivations, panel data and DIFF in DIFF specifications (SE Vs FPO)

	P-O Fit (Ologit)		**P-O Fit** (OLS)			**Prosocial motivation**		
	(1)	*(3)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*
Coefficient estimates								
Constant	--	--	5.54*** (0.15)	5.61*** (0.09)	5.34*** (0.73)	5.73*** (0.15)	5.82*** (0.07)	5.40*** (0.69)
SE_i (γ_0)	0.19 (0.27)	0.46 (0.30)	0.10 (0.19)	--	0.26 (0.19)	0.14 (0.20)	--	0.09 (0.19)
time (θ_1)	-0.85*** (0.22)	-0.93*** (0.23)	-0.63*** (0.17)	-0.63*** (0.20)	-0.66*** (0.18)	-0.57*** (0.18)	-0.57*** (0.16)	-0.62*** (0.22)
$(SE \times time)_{it}$	0.89*** (0.32)	0.97*** (0.35)	0.67*** (0.23)	0.67*** (0.25)	0.70*** (0.24)	0.36 (0.22)	0.36* (0.20)	0.41 (0.26)
Woman	–	-0.77 (1.02)	--	–	-0.37 (0.64)	–	–	-0.02 (0.54)
Age	–	0.03** (0.01)	--	–	0.01 (0.01)	–	–	0.00 (0.01)
Education level	–	0.29* (0.16)	--	–	0.24** (0.10)	–	–	-0.05 (0.08)
Foreign origin	–	-0.47 (0.98)	--	–	-0.36 (0.24)	–	–	-0.31* (0.17)
Home Cleaning	–	-0.37* (0.19)	--	–	-0.34*** (0.12)	–	–	0.24** (0.11)
Unemployed	–	-0.36 (0.24)	--	–	-0.22 (0.15)	–	–	0.04 (0.13)
CPAS/ FOREM	–	0.38 (0.23)	--	–	0.17 (0.15)	–	–	0.01 (0.17)
Previous experience	--	0.20 (0.23)	--	–	0.19 (0.15)	–	–	0.32*** (0.10)
Couple	–	0.13 (0.20)	--	–	0.07 (0.13)	–	–	0.30*** (0.10)
Number of kids	–	-0.23*** (0.08)	--	–	-0.14** (0.05)	–	–	-0.05 (0.06)
N	174	171[1]	174	174	171[1]	173[2]	173[2]	170[12]

Regarding P-O fit, we use both ordered logistic regression (because the most adapted to the variable structure) and OLS specification (to be able to compare the coefficient magnitude with the other variables of interest in other OLS specifications). All the others specifications are OLS regressions. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.

(1) Without Covariates.
(2) Fixed Effect model
(3) With Covariates

[1] Three observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations (in step 1 and 2) have not been considered in specifications with control variables.

[2] One individual is an outlier and has its observation at first and second steps have been removed from the sample.

Table 7 -- Exposition effect on motivations, panel data and DIFF in DIFF specification (WISE Vs FPO ; HCSO Vs FPO)

	P-O Fit (Ologit)		**P-O Fit** (OLS)			**Prosocial motivation**		
	(1)	*(3)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*
Coefficient estimates								
Constant	--	--	5.54*** (0.15)	5.61*** (0.09)	5.37*** (0.74)	5.73*** (0.15)	5.82*** (0.07)	5.42*** (0.71)
WISE (γ_{01})	0.25 (0.34)	0.52 (0.33)	0.17 (0.23)	--	0.33 (0.21)	0.13 (0.22)	--	0.10 (0.21)
HCSO (γ_{02})	0.11 (0.30)	0.39 (0.36)	0.01 (0.21)	--	0.17 (0.23)	0.14 (0.25)	--	0.09 (0.24)
time (θ_1)	-0.85*** (0.22)	-0.93*** (0.23)	-0.63*** (0.17)	-0.63*** (0.20)	-0.66*** (0.18)	-0.57*** (0.18)	-0.57*** (0.16)	-0.62*** (0.22)
$(WISE \times time)_{it}$	0.69* (0.37)	0.74* (0.40)	0.49* (0.26)	0.49* (0.28)	0.52* (0.26)	0.30 (0.24)	0.30 (0.23)	0.35 (0.27)
$(HCSO \times time)_{it}$	1.17** (0.46)	1.30*** (0.51)	0.95*** (0.32)	0.95*** (0.28)	0.98*** (0.33)	0.46 (0.30)	0.46* (0.26)	0.51 (0.33)
Woman	–	-0.78 (1.03)	--	–	-0.37 (0.64)	–	–	-0.03 (0.55)
Age	–	0.03** (0.01)	--	–	0.01 (0.01)	–	–	0.0 0 (0.01)
Education level	–	0.28* (0.16)	--	–	0.23** (0.10)	–	–	-0.05 (0.08)
Foreign origin	–	-0.46 (0.39)	--	–	-0.36 (0.25)	–	–	-0.31* (0.18)
Home Cleaning	–	-0.40** (0.19)	--	–	-0.36*** (0.12)	–	–	0.22 (0.14)
Unemployed	–	-0.36 (0.24)	--	--	-0.22 (0.15)	--	–	0.04 (0.13)
CPAS/ FOREM	–	0.39* (0.23)	--	–	0.17 (0.15)	–	–	0.04 (0.15)
Previous experience	--	0.20 (0.23)	--	–	0.19 (0.15)	–	–	0.32*** (0.10)
Couple	–	0.12 (0.20)	--	–	0.07 (0.13)	–	–	0.29*** (0.10)
Number of kids	--	-0.24*** (0.08)	--	–	-0.14*** (0.05)	–	–	-0.05 (0.07)
N	174	171[1]	174	174	171[1]	173[2]	173[2]	170[12]

Regarding P-O fit, we use both ordered logistic regression (because the most adapted to the variable structure) and OLS specification (to be able to compare the coefficient magnitude with the other variables of interest in other OLS specifications). All the others specifications are OLS regressions. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.

(1) Without Covariates.
(2) Fixed Effect model
(3) With Covariates

[1] Three observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations (in step 1 and 2) have not been considered in specifications with control variables.

[2] One individual is an outlier and has its observation at first and second steps have been removed from the sample.

Finally, we have to perform some robustness checks in order to be confident about these results. First, some people in the sample had already worked in a FPO of the quasi-market of service-vouchers. It is then likely that their motivation has already been affected by working in this quasi-market. Therefore, their motivation has perhaps evolved differently during the time of our study than for new entrants in the quasi-market. Hence, we reproduce the same DIFF IN DIFF and fixed effect specifications to test the exposition hypothesis on sub-sample of workers who have no previous experience in the quasi-market of service vouchers (see appendix 7 and 8) to see if the results are affected. We do not observe anymore a significant effect of being in WISE on values congruence and of being in HCSO on workers' pro-social motivation. Nevertheless, the coefficients of the interaction terms (WISE x time and HCSO x time) are equivalent or higher than in the regression made on the full sample. Hence, the absence of significant effect must be probably due to the restriction of the sub-sample size (N=112). Second, since a (partial) selection effect has been observed in WISEs regarding people who were not unemployed, we do not know yet if the observed exposition effect in WISE is the consequence to be in a WISE or if it is only due to the fact that WISEs and FPOs do not hire exactly the same people. Hence, we reproduce the same DIFF IN DIFF and fixed effect specifications to test the exposition hypothesis on sub-sample of people who were unemployed before their actual job (see appendixes 9 and 10). For that subsample, the WISE exposition effect on values congruence is significant and stronger than for the full sample. Regarding prosocial motivation, the effect is also stronger and even becomes significant in the fixed effect specification. At the opposite, we do not observe an exposition effect on values congruence and prosocial motivation when we consider the sample of people who were not unemployed. Hence, it seems that the WISE exposition effect only exists for people who were unemployed and not for the others. Therefore, there are two reasons why WISEs employ workers with more prosocial motivation and higher values congruence than FPOs: they attract some workers who are more motivated (the one who were not unemployed) than in FPOs (selection effect, see appendix 5), on the one hand, and favor the development of the motivation of the others who were unemployed (exposition effect), on the other hand. Third, we take also into consideration the type of task to perform (ironer or housekeeper) which might impact the work motivation through time. We observe exactly the same results in the sub-sample of people who are mainly performing housekeeper task than for the full sample (see appendix 11 and 12).

What lessons can be drawn from these results? The workers in low-skilled jobs in SEs are more pro-socially motivated and perceive a better fit with their organization than their counterparts in FPOs after eight months of activity (see appendix 6). In HCSOs, those results are due to an exposition effect. By contrast, in WISEs, selection and exposition effects are both working. In others words, WISEs attract some people who are more motivated than their counterpart in FPOs and develop a work environment that positively influence the motivation of the others who are the most vulnerable workers, at the core of their mission.

However, some nuances should be given to these interpretations. Indeed, the observation of the positive effect of being in an SE is more explained by a decrease of the values congruence and prosocial motivation among workers in FPOs than by an increase in those aspects for SE employees (see Tables 6 and 7, and Figures 1 and 2). More specifically, the SEs' work environment allows more to keep high the adequacy of values and prosocial motivation of workers rather than increases these perceived match and motivation in the quasi-market of service vouchers. This unexpected result may be explained by the fact that, at first stage, all workers believe that they are going to work for an organization with a social mission while after some time spent in their organization, FPOs' workers realize that the primary motivation of their employer is to maximize profit (see table 8). Indeed, the pressure exerted by the search for profitability and cost minimization change the perception of FPOs' workers about the nature of the mission of their organization.

Another lesson delivered by these results is that the positive effects on workers' values congruence and prosocial motivation are more important in HCSOs than in WISEs (see Figures 1 and 2 and Table 7). This difference observed between the two types of SEs can be explained by two reasons. On the one hand, HCSOs develop a work environment that is more favorable to promote the congruence of values and prosocial motivation of their workers than WISEs (see Brolis & Nyssens, 2015). On the other hand, the HCSOs' mission is focused on users while WISEs have a mission focused on the workers themselves. These specificities might influence the workers' perception of the social mission. From the perspective of WISE employees, the mission of their organization can be seen as a way to promote their altruistic values but also (and perhaps mainly) as a way to have an employment and build their careers. In addition, some confusion appears with time in WISE workers regarding the perception of the mission of their organization. Indeed, they tend to confuse the mission of integration with a mission of services (see Table 8).

Figure 1-- Average evolution of workers' values congruence



Figure 2 -- Average evolution of workers' prosocial motivation



Table 8 – Mission identification at second step

Workers	WISE	HCSO	FPO
N	66	44	64
Help no qualified persons to find a job (WISEs' mission)	5,35 (1,50)	5,41 (1,63)	4,64 (1,34)
Given home support to elderly and vulnerable people (HCSOs' mission)	5,24 (1,50)	**6,21 (1,12)**	4,86 (1,34)
Profit Maximisation (FPOs' mission)	4,79 (1,60)	4,16 (2,29)	**6,00 (1,40)**
Given household service to people in employment (control mission)	**5,65 (1,25)**	5,93 (1,34)	5,22 (1,36)

For each of these possibilities, housekeepers had to indicate their agreement (or disagreement) to identify these as being the mission of their new organization on a Likert scale of 7 levels from "not agree at all" to "strongly agree".

Next, the results also show that the exposition effect to be in an SE is higher on values congruence than on prosocial motivation. Beside, workers' prosocial motivation decreases with time in average in all types of organizations (see Figure 2 and Table 8 and 9). The most likely interpretation of these results is that SE workers realize with time (like their counterparts in FPOs) – even if they still believe in the importance of the mission of their organization- that they have very few opportunities to have a real social impact by performing their tasks. Indeed, Grant (2007) shows that is essential for the workers to perceive their own social impact in order to be pro-socially motivated. There are two reasons in our sense that explain why workers in the quasi-market of service vouchers do not really perceive their social impact. First, as their task is strictly regulated, they can only provide home help and not care to elderly or vulnerable people. Moreover, they have very few contacts with the user, which is usually not at home when the service is provided while a regular contact with beneficiaries is essential for the perception by the worker of its social impact (Grant, 2007).

Before concluding, we try to identify the mechanisms that underline the exposition effect in SEs (and its higher intensity in HCSO than in WISE) on workers prosocial motivation and values congruence. In that objective, we compare the workers' job characteristics and work environment between each type of providers on the basis of 11 variables (see tables 9.1 and 9.2.): a 7-level Likert scale that measures the meeting frequencies with vulnerable users (old or disabled person); validated scales created in psychology to measure autonomy at work (Parker, 2003; 5 items; $\alpha = .87$), the quality of relationship with supervisors (Barnett & Brennan, 1995; 5 items; $\alpha = .96$) and colleagues (Morgeson & Humphrey, 2006; 3 items; $\alpha = .90$) and perceived job security (De Witte, 2000; 4 items; $\alpha = .72$); the 6 items scales of the European Survey on Working Conditions questionnaire about workers' participation (2010; $\alpha = .95$), a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the worker has already had access to a training in his organization (0 otherwise); the number of weekly working hours; the hourly wage; and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the worker has an open-ended contract (0 otherwise).

Table 9.1 Working environment and jobs characteristics (WISE vs FPO ; HCSO Vs FPO)

	Relation with supervisors	Relation with colleagues	Autonomy	Participa -tion	Training	Work family balance
Coefficient estimates						
Constant	6.70*** (0.75)	6.61*** (1.02)	5.68*** (0.69)	3.21** (1.54)	0.26 (0.40)	1.17* (0.61)
WISE	0.57* (0.29)	0.31 (0.34)	0.19 (0.23)	1.92*** (0.35)	0.41*** (0.09)	-0.07 (0.32)
HCSO	1.31*** (0.30)	1.12*** (0.40)	0.66*** (0.17)	2.88*** (0.38)	0.58*** (0.09)	-0.60** (0.28)
Woman	-0.53 (0.46)	-0.13 (0.75)	-0.39 (0.29)	-0.14 (1.46)	-0.01 (0.29)	1.36*** (0.28)
Age	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)
Education level	0.01 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.00 (0.08)	0.10 (0.12)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.26** (0.11)
Foreign origin	-0.45 (0.48)	0.09 (0.29)	-0.34 (0.23)	-0.27 (0.41)	0.07 (0.09)	0.19 (0.26)
Home Cleaning	-1.21*** (0.25)	-1.20*** (0.34)	-0.47 (0.60)	-1.15*** (0.28)	-0.32* (0.16)	0.36 (0.27)
Unemployed	-0.02 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.20)	0.22 (0.21)	-0.13 (0.23)	0.02 (0.07)	0.17 (0.21)
CPAS/ FOREM	0.29 (0.22)	0.11 (0.28)	-0.12 (0.20)	0.61* (0.35)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.18 (0.25)
Previous experience	-0.13 (0.23)	0.08 (0.22)	-0.07 (0.16)	0.27 (0.23)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.22)
Couple	-0.03 (0.18)	0.18 (0.20)	-0.13 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.27)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.19)
Number of kids	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.17** (0.08)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.08)	0.02 (0.03)	0.13* (0.07)
N	171	171	171	171	171	171

P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.

Three observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations (in step 1 and 2) have not been considered in specifications with control variables.

Table 9.2 Working environment and jobs characteristics

(WISE vs FPO ; HCSO Vs FPO)

	Perceived job security	Open ended contract	Weekly working hours	Hourly wage	Vulnerable users
Coefficient estimates					
Constant	4.78*** (0.85)	0.05 (0.25)	19.39*** (2.29)	10.64*** (0.13)	5.39*** (0.90)
EI	0.28 (0.17)	0.36** (0.14)	1.48 (1.33)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.44** (0.20)
AF	-0.22 (0.22)	0.23* (0.12)	0.49 (1.38)	0.18*** (0.07)	0.56*** (0.18)
Woman	0.70 (0.60)	0.26 (0.16)	3.75** (1.56)	0.10 (0.12)	0.15 (0.78)
Age	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)
Education level	-0.05 (0.11)	0.04 (0.04)	-1.05*** (0.38)	-0.07*** (0.03)	-0.13 (0.11)
Foreign origin	-0.07 (0.24)	0.00 (0.08)	2.25 (1.64)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.15 (0.24)
Home Cleaning	-1.10*** (0.17)	-0.12 (0.13)	1.82 (2.01)	−0.06 (0.08)	-0.30 (0.24)
Unemployed	0.09 (0.20)	0.02 (0.09)	-1.81* (0.90)	−0.11 (0.07)	0.15 (0.21)
CPAS/ FOREM	0.06 (0.24)	0.13 (0.09)	-1.01 (0.78)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.29 (0.26)
Previous experience	0.12 (0.16)	-0.03 (0.07)	1.04 (0.82)	0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.18)
Couple	0.13 (0.15)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.45 (0.92)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.21 (0.20)
Number of kids	-0.08 (0.06)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.30)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.08 (0.08)
N	171	171	171	171	171

P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.
Three observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations (in step 1 and 2) have not been considered in specifications with control variables.

We observe in tables 9.1 and 9.2. that both types of SEs workers have a better relationship with their supervisor(s), more possibilities to give their advice and to participate into decisions and a better access to professional training (we are not able to affirm with certitude that those observed differences between workers are the consequences of the organization's mission and not to individual differences but the reject of the selection

hypothesis makes us confident about those results). These SEs specificities might explain the observed exposition effect. Indeed, Mosca Musella and Pastore (2007) and Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy (1994) highlight the role of implicit incentives that can be played by the trust-based relationship in SEs. Moreover, best fit between leaders and workers improve the fit between organizational and workers values (e.g., Atwater & Dionne, 2007; Kammeyer-Mueller, 2007).Next, participative policies induce positive motivation among the SE workforce (Borzaga & Tortia, 2006; Cawley, Keeping, & Levy, 1998; Lawler, 1990) and favor a good adequacy in the long run between workers' values and those defended by the organization (Lee & Bang, 2012), and that for three main reasons. First, participative management practices favor the process of socialization that allows making employees fit with the organization's mission. Second, important decisions and future orientations of the firms may be influenced by the workers' opinions or decided collectively and have then more chance to fit with the workers' values. Finally, the participation procedure would reduce the possibility for leaders to deviate from the original mission without the stakeholders' agreement and then preserve from the potential negative effects of that shift on workers' perceived values congruence (Nair & Bhatnagar, 2011).

Some differences are also observed between HCSOs and WISEs. In particular, HCSOs workers benefit from a better relationship with their colleagues, a higher autonomy, a better work family balance and a lower number of weekly working hours (see table 9.1 and 9.2.). These observed differences might (partially) explain why the exposition effect on workers' prosocial motivation and values congruence is higher in HCSOs than in WISEs. As mentioned before, a positive relational climate has an important effect on person-organization fit. Next, higher autonomy at work might positively explain why HCSOs workers have more prosocial motivation. Indeed, autonomy is considered as one of the most important task characteristics to favor the SEs workers 'motivation (e.g., Frey & Jegen, 2001). What it is of most importance, is the fact that the HCSOs workers are most often in contact with vulnerable users while conversely WISEs workers have the least number of contacts with this type of users (see table 9.2). Indeed, Grant (2007) highlights that a high level of contact with the users of the service is crucial to sustain and develop prosocial motivation.

5. Conclusion

The social enterprise literature highlights that SEs attract workers who have values that fit with their social mission and who are more pro-socially motivated than their counterparts in FPOs. However, this assumption is challenged in the case of low-skilled jobs. We have

then performed an empirical study in the quasi-market of services vouchers to know if SEs attracts workers with a different motivational profile than FPOs. No significant difference was found. We have even go further by comparing FPOs with two type of social enterprises, one with a mission focused on users (HCSOs) and the other with a mission centered on workers (WISEs), and again no significant difference was found for the whole sample. However, it seems that such selection effect exists in WISEs when the sample is reduced to people who were not previously unemployed. In others words, when WISE do not hire a person who is unemployed, they select workers whose are highly motivated to achieve the organization's mission and who fit with the values defended by the organization.

Further, some authors suggest that the SEs' work environment may have positive effects on the workers' adhesion to the social mission and prosocial motivation (exposition effect). Hence, we have again compared the workers motivational profile between SEs and FPOs after that they have working eight months. The results show that SEs (WISEs and HCSOs) workers perceive higher value congruence with their organization and have more prosocial motivation than their counterparts in FPOs. In HCSO, those results are explained by an exposition effect. In WISEs, it's a combination of a selection and an exposition effects. Indeed, WISEs attract some people who are more motivated than their counterpart in FPOs and develop a work environment that positively influence the motivation of the others (who were previously unemployed and the core of the mission).

This article has also compared the work environment of the organizations in order to identify what can explain the differences in terms of the evolution of workers' motivation through time between SEs and FPOs. We observed that both types of SEs workers have a better relationship with their supervisor(s) and more possibilities to give their advice and to participate into decisions than their counterparts in FPOs. The literature identifies these work environment characteristics as positively correlated to SEs workers' motivation and values congruence. Differences between HCSOs and WISEs have also been observed regarding their work environment. These differences might explain why the exposition effect on values congruence and prosocial motivation is stronger in HCSO than in WISEs. On the one hand, HCSOs workers are most often in contact with vulnerable users while Grant (2007) highlights that a high level of contact with the users of the service is crucial to sustain and develop prosocial motivation. On the other hand, HCSOs' workers benefit from higher autonomy at work and better relationships with their colleagues while those characteristics of the work environment are seen as positively related to SEs workers' motivation and perceived values

congruence with the organization. In conclusion, these results highlight the crucial role play by the work environment in SEs on workers' motivation.

Those results are of first importance but we still have to discuss about the utility to make emerge such prosocial motivation for workers being in low-skilled job in SE. The labor donation is still inapplicable in the sense that low-skilled workers from SEs may not accept lower wages than their counterpart in FPOs (e.g. Leete, 2006). Indeed, Brolis and Nyssens (2015) show that SE employees in the quasi-market of service-vouchers have no lower wages than their counterparts in FPOs. Nevertheless, such pro-socially motivated workers should be ready to give higher efforts at work than their counterparts in FPOs, all others things being equal, because they perceive the importance of the social mission in which they adhere. Moreover, and beyond the effort intensity, the direction of the effort is also crucial. Indeed, it is important that workers believe in (and understand) the organization's mission to behave in a coherent way with that mission. Hence, benefiting from pro-socially motivated workers is essential for the successful functioning of most SEs (Hansmann, 1980; Handy & Katz, 1998). This is all the more important given that SEs are usually not able to build quantifiable and meaningful measures of performance and therefore to implement pay-for performances incentives efficiently (Speckbacher, 2013).

This article makes the point about work motivation related to low-skilled job in SE compared to FPOs. Nevertheless, numbers of empirical investigations are still necessary. First, no study has distinguished the selection effect from the exposition effect regarding work motivation in skilled job. Longitudinal studies are then required to dissociate those two effects that explain the presence of a more pro-socially motivated workforce in SE. Second, empirical studies are needed to understand the different motivational dynamics between high qualified and low qualified staff. Third, the link between practices and prosocial motivation in SE context has to be reinforced in future research. In others words, studies that identify the practices and the specificities of a work environment which are really important to sustain and favor workers prosocial motivation and perception of value congruence in SE are still required.

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Appendix

Appendix 1 -- 7 Likert Prosocial Motivation scale (Grant, 2008)

Why are you motivated to do your work? (Grant, 2008)	*Pour quelles raisons faites-vous ce travail ? (adapted French version)*
Because i want to help others through my work	Parce que je veux rendre service aux autres
Because i care about benefiting others through my work	Parce que je veux être utile pour les autres
Because i want to have a positive impact on others	Parce que je veux aider les autres

Appendix 2 – Workers' characteristics as the first step (after attrition).

	TOTAL	FPO	SE	WISE	HCSO
N (observations)	174	64	110	66	44
Sex (% mens)	0.02 (0.15)	0.04 (0.21)	0.01 (0.09)	0.02 (0.12)	--
Age	33.96 (9.64)	34.30 (10.09)	33.76 (9,41)	34.47 (9.33)	32.70 (9,55)
Education level[1]	2.43 (0.82)	2.59 (0.93)	2.35* (0.74)	2.23** (0.74)	2.52 (0.73)
< High School	0.54 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50)	0.62 (0.49)	0.48 (0.51)
= High School	0.38 (0.49)	0.51 (0.50)	0.40 (0.49)	0.36 (0.48)	0.45 (0.50)
> High School	0.08 (0.26)	0.14 (0.35)	0.04** (0.19)	0.02* (0.12)	0.07 (0.25)
Foreign origin[2] **(%)**	0.16 (0.37)	0.28 (0.45)	0.09*** (0.29)	0.11** (0.31)	0.07*** (0.25)
Main task at work (%)					
Housekeepers	0.97 (0.18)	0.95 (0.21)	0.97 (0.16)	0.95 (0.21)	1.00 (0.00)
Ironers in the firm	0.03 (0.18)	0.05 (0.21)	0.03 (0.16)	0.05 (0.21)	--
Unemployed[3] **(%)**	0.71 (0.46)	0.60 (0.49)	0.76** (0.43)	0.77 (0.42)	0.75 (0.44)
Public help[4]	0.23 (0.42)	0.16 (0.37)	0.26 (0.44)	0.29 (0.46)	0.23 (0.42)
Previous experience in the market	0.36 (0.48)	0.47 (0.50)	0.30** (0.46)	0.33 (0.48)	0.25* (0.44)
Family situation					
In couple (%)	0.49 (0.50)	0.41 (0.50)	0.55* (0.50)	0.47 (0.50)	0.66** (0.48)
Number of kids	1.28 (1.25)	0.98 (1,05)	1,45** (1,32)	1,35 (1,23)	1.61** (1,45)

N=174, all observation made in step 1. Standard deviations are given in brackets. Anova test (F-test) is performed to compare workers' characteristics between control group (FPO) and the treatment groups (SE-WISE-HCSO). P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

[BF] In case of variances homogeneity hypothesis rejection, Brown-Forsythe statistic was considered.

[1] Scale from 1 "primary school" to 5 "University or others higher education of the long type".

[2] People who comes from a country located outside from the EU-15.

[3] This dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the worker was unemployed before to take this job as housekeeper and 0 otherwise.

[4] This dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the worker has found his new job through the help of a public organization and 0 otherwise.

Appendix 3 -- Attrition effect on individual characteristics (FPO Vs WISE and FPO Vs HCSO), Logit regressions results

Coefficient estimates	Z_t
Constant	-1.12 (2.20)
WISE	0.14 (2.46)
HCSO	3.25 (2.95)
Age	-0.00 (0.04)
Education level	0.06 (0.46)
Foreign origin	-1.27 (1.02)
Unemployment	-0.29 (0.77)
CPAS/FOREM	0.21 (0.93)
Previous experience	-0.44 (0.81)
Couple	0.57 (0.85)
Number of kids	-0.53 (0.50)
Age x WISE	0.00 (0.00)
Age x HCSO	-0.13 (0.08)
Education level x WISE	-0.19 (0.59)
Education level x HCSO	0.01 (0.78)
Foreign origin x WISE	1.37 (1.25)
Foreign origin x HCSO	1.33 (1.85)
Unemployment x WISE	-0.24 (0.96)
Unemployment x HCSO	-0.84 (1.90)
CPAS/FOREM x WISE	-0.27 (1.05)
CPAS/FOREM x HCSO	1.62 (1.28)
Previous experience x WISE	0.81 (0.99)
Previous experience x HCSO	0.88 (1.13)
Couple x WISE	-0.59 (0.99)
Couple x HCSO	-0.79 (1.04)
Number of kids x WISE	0.74 (0.55)
Number of kids x HCSO	0.74 (0.57)

N=209, all observation made in step 1 with no missing variables. Z_t is a dummy varaible that take he value of 1 when the worker has participated to step 2 (and 0 otherwise). P-value : *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.

Appendix 4 – Selection effect on motivation, regressions results for people who were previously unemployed

	P-O Fit (ologit)		P-O Fit		(OLS)		P-S motivation			
	(1)	*(2)*	*(1)*		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*	
Constant	--	--	5.46*** (0.16)	5.28*** (0.58)	5.46*** (0.16)	5.11*** (0.54)	5.76*** (0.18)	6.85*** (0.55)	5.76*** (0.18)	6.94*** (0.54)
SE	0.17 (0.28)	--	0.07 (0.18)	0.18 (0.20)	--	--	0.04 (0.23)	-0.04 (0.21)	--	--
WISE	--	0.25 (0.30)	--	--	0.16 (0.19)	0.30 (0.19)	--	--	-0.03 (0.25)	-0.10 (0.22)
HCSO	--	0.03 (0.40)	--	--	-0.08 (0.25)	0.00 (0.25)	--	--	0.15 (0.25)	0.06 (0.24)
Woman	--	--	--	-0.79* (0.39)	--	-0.72* (0.38)	--	-0.99*** (0.29)	--	-1.03*** (0.29)
Age	--	--	--	0.01 (0.01)	--	0.01 (0.01)	--	0.00 (0.01)	--	0.00 (0.01)
Education level	--	--	--	0.09 (0.13)	--	0.11 (0.13)	--	-0.08 (0.15)	--	-0.09 (0.14)
Foreign origin	--	--	--	-0.21 (0.38)	--	-0.20 (0.39)	--	-0.73** (0.34)	--	-0.73** (0.34)
Home Cleaning	--	--	--	0.29 (0.21)	--	0.37* (0.20)	--	0.03 (0.38)	--	-0.02 (0.37)
CPAS/FOREM	--	--	--	-0.04 (0.22)	--	-0.01 (0.22)	--	-0.07 (0.24)	--	-0.08 (0.23)
Previous experience	--	--	--	0.25 (0.22)	--	0.27 (0.21)	--	0.36** (0.15)	--	0.35** (0.15)
Couple	--	--	--	0.26 (0.27)	--	0.30 (0.26)	--	0.28 (0.19)	--	0.26 (0.20)
Number of kids	--	--	--	-0.19** (0.09)	--	-0.19** (0.08)	--	-0.05 (0.08)	--	-0.05 (0.08)
N	151	151	151	145	151	145	151	145	151	145

Ordered logistic regression is considered regarding P-O fit. The others specifications are OLS regressions. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.
SE Vs FPO
WISE Vs FPO and HCSO Vs FPO

Appendix 5 – Selection effect on motivation, regressions results for people who were not previously unemployed

	P-O Fit (ologit)		P-O Fit (OLS)				P-S motivation			
	(1)	*(2)*	*(1)*		*(2)*		*(1)*		*(2)*	
Constant	--	--	5.67*** (0.19)	2.89*** (1.00)	5.67*** (0.19)	2.94*** (0.24)	5.77*** (0.19)	1.88*** (0.65)	5.77*** (0.19)	1.95*** (0.67)
SE	1.10** (0.45)	--	0.50** (0.24)	0.19 (0.25)	--	--	0.27 (0.26)	0.14 (0.23)	--	--
WISE	--	1.40*** (0.53)	--	--	0.70*** (0.24)	0.30 (0.24)	--	--	0.42 (0.30)	0.27 (0.24)
HCSO	--	0.65 (0.41)	--	--	0.19 (0.30)	0.03 (0.37)	--	--	0.02 (0.25)	-0.05 (0.39)
Woman	--	--	--	0.57 (0.37)	--	0.57 (0.35)	--	0.90** (0.33)	--	0.91** (0.35)
Age	--	--	--	0.03** (0.02)	--	0.03** (0.02)	--	0.03** (0.01)	--	0.02** (0.01)
Education level	--	--	--	0.17 (0.15)	--	0.18 (0.15)	--	0.16 (0.13)	--	0.17 (0.13)
Foreign origin	--	--	--	-0.83*** (0.28)	--	-0.83*** (0.28)	--	-0.90*** (0.28)	--	-0.91*** (0.27)
Home Cleaning	--	--	--	0.39 (0.44)	--	0.39 (0.45)	--	1.47*** (0.24)	--	1.48*** (0.24)
CPAS/FOREM	--	--	--	1.04** (0.40)	--	0.97** (0.40)	--	0.77* (0.42)	--	0.68 (0.42)
Previous experience	--	--	--	0.64** (0.26)	--	0.57** (0.28)	--	0.84*** (0.24)	--	0.75*** (0.25)
Couple	--	--	--	-0.25 (0.29)	--	-0.26 (0.30)	--	-0.07 (0.24)	--	-0.08 (0.24)
Number of kids	--	--	--	0.23* (0.11)	--	0.25** (0.11)	--	0.06 (0.16)	--	0.08 (0.15)
N	66	66	66	64	66	64	66	64	66	64

Ordered logistic regression is considered regarding P-O fit. The others specifications are OLS regressions. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.
SE Vs FPO
WISE Vs FPO and HCSO Vs FPO

Appendix 6 –Motivations at second step (WISE Vs FPO ; HCSO Vs FPO)

	P-O fit (Ologit)		**P-O fit** (OLS)		**Prosocial motivation**	
	(1)	*(2)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(1)*	*(2)*
Coefficient estimates						
Constant	--	--	4.91*** (0.22)	5.38*** (1.21)	5.16*** (0.11)	5.10*** (0.76)
WISE (γ_0)	0.88** (0.41)	1.30*** (0.43)	0.66** (0.29	0.87*** (0.29)	0.44* (0.26)	0.51* (0.29)
HCSO (δ_0)	1.18*** (0.34)	1.80*** (0.39)	0.96*** (0.27)	1.23*** (0.28)	0.61*** (0.16)	0.68*** (0.19)
Woman	–	-1.73 (1.60)	--	-0.49 (1.02)	–	0.06 (0.57)
Age	–	0.02 (0.02)	--	0.01 (0.01)	–	-0.00 (0.01)
Education level	–	0.45** (0.23)	--	0.30** (0.15)	–	-0.04 (0.08)
Foreign origin	–	-0.19 (0.55)	--	-0.29 (0.34)	–	0.15 (0.19)
Home Cleaning	–	-1.69*** (0.47)	--	-1.01 (0.21)	–	-0.10 (0.31)
Unemployment	–	-0.11 (0.31)	--	-0.06 (0.21)	–	0.02 (0.16)
CPAS/FOREM	–	0.40 (0.34)	--	0.16 (0.25)	–	-0.04 (0.15)
Previous experience	–	0.29 (0.26)	--	0.26 (0.18)	–	0.23* (0.14)
Couple	–	-0.32 (0.29)	--	-0.16 (0.18)	–	0.25** (0.12)
Number of kids	–	-0.16 (0.14)	--	-0.12 (0.09)	–	-0.04 (0.10)
N	174	171[1]	174	171[1]	173[2]	170[12]

Regarding P-O fit, we use both ordered logistic regression (because the most adapted to the variable structure) and OLS specification (to be able to compare the coefficient magnitude with the other variables of interest in other OLS specifications). All the others specifications are OLS regressions. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.

(1) Without control variables

(2) With control variables

[1] Three observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations have not been considered in specifications with control variables.

[2] One observation is an outlier (with a difference of minus 6 between step 1 and step 2 and has been removed from the sample.

Appendix 7 -Exposition effect on motivations for workers with no previous experience in the quasi-market, panel data and DIFF In DIFF specifications (SE Vs FPO)

	P-O Fit (OLS)			**Prosocial motivation**		
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*
Coefficient estimates						
Constant	5.40*** (0.23)	5.52*** (0.10)	5.98*** (0.71)	5.61*** (0.21)	5.67*** (0.09)	5.80*** (0.87)
SE_i (γ_0)	0.18 (0.27)	--	0.53* (0.30)	0.09 (0.25)	--	0.06 (0.27)
time (θ_1)	-0.63** (0.26)	-0.63** (0.27)	-0.67** (0.28)	-0.53** (0.21)	-0.53** (0.22)	-0.50** (0.21)
$(SE \times time)_{it}$	0.69** (0.30)	0.69** (0.32)	0.71** (0.32)	0.43 (0.26)	0.43 (0.27)	0.38 (0.27)
Woman	--	–	-1.11*** (0.39)	–	–	-0.19 (0.69)
Age	--	–	0.02 (0.01)	–	–	0.00 (0.01)
Education level	--	–	0.30** (0.14)	–	–	-0.12 (0.12)
Foreign origin	--	–	-0.09 (0.27)	–	–	-0.24 (0.25)
Home Cleaning	--	–	-0.61 (0.39)	–	–	0.29 (0.27)
Unemployed	--	–	-0.36 (0.24)	–	–	0.00 (0.21)
CPAS/FOREM	--	–	0.15 (0.18)	–	–	-0.07 (0.21)
Couple	--	–	0.08 (0.17)	–	–	0.17 (0.16)
Number of kids	--	–	-0.16** (0.08)	–	–	0.02 (0.06)
N	112	112	112	111[1]	111[1]	111[1]

Regarding P-O fit, we use both ordered logistic regression (because the most adapted to the variable structure) and OLS specification (to be able to compare the coefficient magnitude with the other variables of interest in other OLS specifications). The logistic regressions are not reported because the results (in term of significance) are exactly the same than for OLS regressions. All the others specifications are OLS regressions. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.

(1) Without Covariates.
(2) Fixed Effect model
(3) With Covariates

[1] One individual is an outlier and has its observation at first and second steps have been removed from the sample

Appendix 8 -Exposition effect on motivations for workers with no previous experience in the quasi-market, panel data and DIFF in DIFF specifications (WISE Vs FPO; HCSO Vs FPO)

	P-O Fit (OLS)			**Prosocial motivation**		
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*
Coefficient estimates						
Constant	5.40*** (0.24)	5.52*** (0.10)	6.06*** (0.71)	5.61*** (0.21)	5.67*** (0.09)	5.79*** (0.90)
WISE (γ_{01})	0.12 (0.31)	--	0.50 (0.31)	0.12 (0.28)	--	0.07 (0.29)
HCSO (γ_{02})	0.25 (0.29)	--	0.55 (0.35)	0.06 (0.32)	--	0.03 (0.35)
time (θ_1)	-0.63** (0.26)	-0.63** (0.27)	-0.67** (0.28)	-0.53** (0.21)	-0.53** (0.22)	-0.50** (0.21)
$(WISE \times time)_{it}$	0.56 (0.35)	0.56 (0.36)	0.59 (0.37)	0.39 (0.28)	0.39 (0.30)	0.36 (0.29)
$(HCSO \times time)_{it}$	0.87*** (0.31)	0.87** (0.38)	0.85** (0.35)	0.48 (0.34)	0.48 (0.32)	0.40 (0.37)
Woman	--	–	-1.13*** (0.39)	–	–	-0.19 (0.69)
Age	--	–	0.02 (0.01)	–	–	0.00 (0.01)
Education level	--	–	0.28** (0.13)	–	–	-0.12 (0.13)
Foreign origin	--	–	-0.10 (0.27)	–	–	-0.24 (0.25)
Home Cleaning	--	–	-0.62* (0.36)	–	–	0.29 (0.28)
Unemployed	--	–	-0.34 (0.23)	–	–	-0.01 (0.20)
CPAS/FOREM	--	–	0.15 (0.18)	–	–	-0.07 (0.22)
Couple	--	–	0.08 (0.17)	–	–	0.17 (0.17)
Number of kids	--	–	-0.16** (0.08)	–	–	0.02 (0.07)
N	112	112	112	111[1]	111[1]	111[1]

Regarding P-O fit, we use both ordered logistic regression (because the most adapted to the variable structure) and OLS specification (to be able to compare the coefficient magnitude with the other variables of interest in other OLS specifications). The logistic regressions are not reported because the results (in term of significance) are exactly the same than for OLS regressions. All the others specifications are OLS regressions. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.

(1) Without Covariates.
(2) Fixed Effect model
(3) With Covariates

[1] One individual is an outlier and has its observation at first and second steps have been removed from the sample.

Appendix 9 -Exposition effect on motivations for workers who were unemployed, panel data and DIFF in DIFF specifications (SE Vs FPO)

	P-O Fit (OLS)			**Prosocial motivation**		
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*
Coefficient estimates						
Constant	5.53*** (0.17)	5.46*** (0.10)	6.37*** (0.45)	5.79*** (0.19)	5.78*** (0.09)	6.62*** (0.57)
SE_i (γ_0)	-0.10 (0.22)	--	0.15 (0.21)	-0.01 (0.24)	--	-0.04 (0.22)
time (θ_1)	-0.68** (0.26)	-0.68** (0.26)	-0.69** (0.28)	-0.65** (0.26)	-0.65*** (0.22)	-0.72** (0.32)
$(SE \times time)_{it}$	0.89*** (0.32)	0.89*** (0.32)	0.90*** (0.33)	0.51* (0.30)	0.51* (0.27)	0.58 (0.35)
Woman	--	–	-1.50*** (0.20)	–	–	-0.93** (0.42)
Age	--	–	0.01 (0.01)	–	–	-0.00 (0.01)
Education level	--	–	0.28*** (0.10)	–	–	-0.03 (0.11)
Foreign origin	--	–	-0.11 (0.28)	–	–	-0.24 (0.24)
Home Cleaning	--	–	-0.49* (0.24)	–	–	0.20 (0.16)
CPAS/FOREM	--	–	0.13 (0.16)	–	–	-0.08 (0.18)
Previous Experience	--	–	0.34 (0.21)	–	–	0.37*** (0.11)
Couple	--	–	0.19 (0.15)	–	–	0.32*** (0.10)
Number of kids	--	–	-0.16*** (0.06)	–	–	-0.05 (0.07)
N	246	246	242[1]	246	246	242[1]

Regarding P-O fit, we use both ordered logistic regression (because the most adapted to the variable structure) and OLS specification (to be able to compare the coefficient magnitude with the other variables of interest in other OLS specifications). The logistic regressions are not reported because the results (in term of significance) are exactly the same than for OLS regressions. All the others specifications are OLS regressions. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.

(1) Without Covariates.
(2) Fixed Effect model
(3) With Covariates

[1]Three observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations have not been considered in specifications with control variables.

Appendix 10 -Exposition effect on motivations for workers who were unemployed, panel data and DIFF in DIFF specifications (WISE Vs FPO and HCSO Vs FPO)

	P-O Fit (OLS)			**Prosocial motivation**		
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*
Coefficient estimates						
Constant	5.53*** (0.17)	5.46*** (0.10)	6.39*** (0.44)	5.79*** (0.19)	5.78*** (0.09)	6.70*** (0.62)
WISE (γ_{01})	-0.04 (0.22)	--	0.22 (0.21)	-0.10 (0.25)	--	-0.11 (0.23)
HCSO (γ_{02})	-0.19 (0.33)	--	0.04 (0.32)	0.13 (0.29)	--	0.07 (0.26)
time (θ_1)	-0.68** (0.33)	-0.68*** (0.26)	-0.69** (0.28)	-0.65** (0.26)	-0.65*** (0.23)	-0.72** (0.32)
$(WISE \times time)_{it}$	0.71** (0.32)	0.71** (0.35)	0.72** (0.34)	0.51 (0.32)	0.51* (0.30)	0.58 (0.37)
$(HCSO \times time)_{it}$	1.17** (0.47)	1.17*** (0.39)	1.18** (0.49)	0.50 (0.36)	0.50 (0.33)	0.57 (0.40)
Woman	--	–	-1.51*** (0.20)	–	–	-0.96** (0.45)
Age	--	–	0.01 (0.01)	–	–	-0.00 (0.01)
Education level	--	–	0.27** (0.10)	–	–	-0.04 (0.11)
Foreign origin	--	–	-0.11 (0.28)	–	–	-0.24 (0.24)
Home Cleaning	--	–	-0.50** (0.23)	–	–	0.16 (0.20)
CPAS/FOREM	--	–	0.13 (0.16)	–	–	-0.08 (0.18)
Previous Experience	--	–	0.33 (0.22)	–	–	0.36*** (0.11)
Couple	--	–	0.19 (0.15)	–	–	0.31*** (0.10)
Number of kids	--	–	-0.16*** (0.06)	–	–	-0.06 (0.07)
N	246	246	242[1]	246	246	242[1]

Regarding P-O fit, we use both ordered logistic regression (because the most adapted to the variable structure) and OLS specification (to be able to compare the coefficient magnitude with the other variables of interest in other OLS specifications). The logistic regressions are not reported because the results (in term of significance) are exactly the same than for OLS regressions. All the others specifications are OLS regressions. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.

(1) Without Covariates.
(2) Fixed Effect model
(3) With Covariates

[1]Three observations have missing values in term of individual characteristics. Those observations have not been considered in specifications with control variables.

Appendix 11 - Exposition effect on motivations for workers working at the users' home , panel data and DIFF in DIFF specifications (SE Vs FPO)

	P-O Fit (OLS)			**Prosocial motivation**		
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*
Coefficient estimates						
Constant	5.53*** (0.15)	5.61*** (0.09)	5.02*** (0.73)	5.79*** (0.17)	5.85*** (0.07)	5.63*** (0.67)
SE_i (γ_0)	0.12 (0.19)	--	0.28 (0.21)	0.10 (0.21)	--	0.10 (0.20)
time (θ_1)	-0.68*** (0.17)	-0.68*** (0.21)	-0.70*** (0.19)	-0.63*** (0.21)	-0.63*** (0.16)	-0.62*** (0.22)
$(SE \times time)_{it}$	0.68*** (0.23)	0.68*** (0.26)	0.71*** (0.24)	0.40 (0.25)	0.40** (0.20)	0.39 (0.25)
Woman	--	–	-0.37 (0.63)	–	–	-0.02 (0.54)
Age	--	–	0.01 (0.01)	–	–	0.00 (0.01)
Education level	--	–	0.24** (0.10)	–	–	-0.05 (0.08)
Foreign origin	--	–	-0.35 (0.25)	–	–	-0.30 (0.18)
Unemployed	--	–	-0.22 (0.15)	–	–	0.04 (0.14)
CPAS/FOREM	--	–	0.15 (0.15)	–	–	0.01 (0.17)
Previous experience	--	–	0.19 (0.16)	–	–	0.32*** (0.10)
Couple	--	–	0.07 (0.13)	–	–	0.30*** (0.10)
Number of kids	--	–	-0.14** (0.05)	–	–	-0.05 (0.07)
N	168	168	168	167[1]	167[1]	167[1]

Regarding P-O fit, we use both ordered logistic regression (because the most adapted to the variable structure) and OLS specification (to be able to compare the coefficient magnitude with the other variables of interest in other OLS specifications). The logistic regressions are not reported because the results (in term of significance) are exactly the same than for OLS regressions. All the others specifications are OLS regressions. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.

(1) Without Covariates.
(2) Fixed Effect model
(3) With Covariates

[1] One individual is an outlier and has its observation at first and second steps have been removed from the sample.

Appendix 12 - Exposition effect on motivations for workers working at the users' home, panel data and DIFF in DIFF specifications (WISE Vs FPO; HCSO Vs FPO)

	P-O Fit (OLS)			**Prosocial motivation**		
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*
Coefficient estimates						
Constant	5.53*** (0.15)	5.61*** (0.09)	5.03*** (0.73)	5.79*** (0.17)	5.85*** (0.07)	5.64*** (0.68
WISE (γ_{01})	0.19 (0.23)	--	0.36 (0.22)	0.11 (0.24)	--	0.12 (0.22)
HCSO (γ_{02})	0.01 (0.21)	--	0.16 (0.24)	0.09 (0.26)	--	0.09 (0.25)
time (θ_1)	-0.68*** (0.17)	-0.68*** (0.20)	-0.70*** (0.19)	-0.63*** (0.21)	-0.63*** (0.16)	-0.62*** (0.22)
$(WISE \times time)_{it}$	0.46* (0.26)	0.46 (0.29)	0.49* (0.27)	0.32 (0.26)	0.32 (0.23)	0.31 (0.27)
$(HCSO \times time)_{it}$	1.00*** (0.15)	1.00*** (0.32)	1.02*** (0.33)	0.53* (0.31)	0.53** (0.25)	0.52 (0.32)
Woman	--	–	-0.38 (0.64)	–	–	-0.02 (0.55)
Age	--	–	0.01 (0.01)	–	–	0.00 (0.01)
Education level	--	–	0.24** (0.10)	–	–	-0.05 (0.09)
Foreign origin	--	–	-0.35 (0.25)	–	–	-0.30 (0.18)
Unemployed	--	–	-0.22 (0.15)	–	–	0.04 (0.14)
CPAS/FOREM	--	–	0.16 (0.15)	–	–	0.01 (0.17)
Previous experience	--	–	0.20 (0.16)	–	–	0.32*** (0.10)
Couple	--	–	0.07 (0.13)	–	–	0.29*** (0.10)
Number of kids	--	–	-0.14** (0.05)	–	–	-0.05 (0.07)
N	168	168	168	167[1]	167[1]	167[1]

Regarding P-O fit, we use both ordered logistic regression (because the most adapted to the variable structure) and OLS specification (to be able to compare the coefficient magnitude with the other variables of interest in other OLS specifications). The logistic regressions are not reported because the results (in term of significance) are exactly the same than for OLS regressions. All the others specifications are OLS regressions. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets.

(1) Without Covariates.
(2) Fixed Effect model
(3) With Covariates

[1] One individual is an outlier and has its observation at first and second steps have been removed from the sample.

CHAPTER 4

Do Social Enterprises Discriminate Less than For-Profit Organizations?

The Influence of Sector and Diversity Policies on Managers' Prejudice towards Immigrants

This article has been revised and resubmitted to Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly

Do Social Enterprises Discriminate Less than For-Profit Organizations? The Influence of Sector and Diversity Policies on Managers' Prejudice towards Immigrants[43]

Abstract

During the past 15 years, discrimination in work settings has become an issue. The social enterprises and non-profit literature suggests that social enterprises (SEs) have made more ground in addressing these issues than for-profit organizations (FPOs). Adding to this discussion, studies in the field of social psychology have suggested that a multicultural perspective for diversity management could be an underlying process. This present study examines the relationships between managers' attitudes towards immigrants and the organization's characteristics, namely organizational multiculturalism, the sector (i.e., FPOs and SEs) and the organization's mission (i.e., work integration social enterprise, home care services, and for-profit organizations). Managers (N = 122) from services vouchers organizations in Belgium took part in the survey. The results indicate that work integration social enterprises managers are less prejudiced than the FPOs and home care services organizations managers. Finally, the more the organization favors multiculturalism, the less prejudiced their managers are. These results are discussed in light of the previous literature on SEs and multiculturalism.

Keywords: social enterprise, discrimination, organizational multiculturalism, prejudice

[43] This interdisciplinary paper has been written with Marie Courtois, Ginette Herman and Marthe Nyssens. I am grateful to ARC and Cirtes members for their helpful comments and advices.

1. Introduction

Current European labor markets are characterized by an increasingly diverse workforce (Lemaitre, 2008). As discrimination still exists in many workplaces, the issue of integration is a central concern. Immigrant workers are less likely to be hired, promoted, and remunerated than non-immigrant workers (ILO, 2007). While researchers have paid increasing attention to this issue, the organizational characteristics that influence discrimination have been overlooked. To bridge this gap, this article focuses on two organizational characteristics that are likely to decrease discrimination: the organization's sector (i.e., social enterprises [SEs][44] or for-profit organizations [FPOs]) and the organization's diversity management policies. Therefore, the study presented in this paper integrates both psychological and economic approaches. It is often assumed that SEs discriminate against workers less frequently than FPOs (e.g., Leete, 2000), but empirical proof of this is missing. It has also been assumed that a multicultural approach to managing diversity that values group differences would improve relationships between workers with different ethnic or cultural origins, but more evidence is needed to support that claim. More precisely, this study examined the influence those organizational characteristics had on managers' prejudice towards immigrants, which is a good predictor of discriminatory behaviors (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010) and discrimination in their management practices (Choules & Guryan, 2008; Laouénan, 2014).

This study was conducted on the quasi-market of services vouchers in Belgium that was implemented by that country's public authorities in 2001. This system is mainly designed to foster the development of regular jobs for low-qualified people in the housework field where, until now, services have been mostly provided via the black market. This system works as follows: any person interested in obtaining housework services can buy vouchers. The user chooses an accredited provider and then a worker is sent to the client's house. Thus, the workers are hired by the providers not by the households, which are clients of the providers (Defourny, Henry, Nassaut, & Nyssens, 2010). The services that are provided are related to

[44]The concepts used to describe organizations with social mission vary from one country to another: "économie sociale et solidaire" in France; "économie sociale" and "entreprise à profit social" in Belgium; "non-profit sector" in the US, "voluntary sector" in the UK, etc. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon tradition, most scientists who are rooted in the European tradition consider the "third sector" to include not only non-profit organizations (associations) but also cooperatives, mutual societies, foundations and even new forms of social enterprises or, in other words, all organizations whose primary purpose is not profit maximization for shareholders. Given that the purpose of this thesis is not to discuss the underlying issues with these different concepts, we made the choice to use the generic term of "social enterprise" (SE). For this research, we then define social enterprise as not-for-profit organizations that combine an entrepreneurial dynamic to provide goods or services with the primacy of their social aims.

housekeeping duties, strictly speaking (no help to persons) at home or outside the home (ironing, household shopping, etc.). This quasi-market consists of more than 100000 workers (over 97% women) and 3000 enterprises, 47.4% of which are FPOs and 16.6% of which are SEs, including Work Integration Social Enterprises (WISEs) and Home Care Services Organizations (HCSOs) (Gerard, Neyens, & Valsamis, 2012)[45]. In this study, in order to distinguish between for-profit providers and SEs, we rely on their legal status. Providers with a legal status which unconstrained the profit distribution pursue a mission of profit maximization while others are expected to pursue a social mission. In addition, to specify the type of social mission of SE, we take into account the type of accreditation deserve by public authorities. Accredited WISEs are social cooperatives that aim to create temporary or long-term jobs for the most disadvantaged workers. Accredited home care providers are non-profit organizations that exclusively focus on serving vulnerable families and elderly people. From a methodological point of view, this quasi-market offers then a unique opportunity to test the relationship between the organization's sector (FPOs and SES) or mission (FPOs, WISEs, and HCSOs) and the managers' prejudice. Second, the high percentage of workers of foreign nationality[2] in this market (Gerard et al., 2012) allows us to analyze attitudes toward this criterion of discrimination.

This paper is structured as follows. In the first section, given the findings from the non-profit and social enterprise literature, we argue that, compared to FPOs, SEs are assumed to less frequently implement discriminatory practices. We also explain why investigating managers' prejudice can address some of the limitations of the previous studies. The second section presents the issue of discrimination from the social psychology framework. The third section discusses organizational multiculturalism as a strategy to manage diversity. The fourth section addresses the method used for the empirical survey while the fifth presents the study's results. The sixth section presents a discussion of the topic being studied acknowledges the study's limitations, and provides some concluding remarks about the need for future research.

2. Discrimination in Social Enterprises

According to the literature, SEs should discriminate less than FPOs. This hypothesis is based on three arguments: SEs share a number of social values/principles (e.g., Gibelman,

[45]The public (19.6%) and individuals (16.3%) are also present in this market, but they have not been taken into account in this study whose objective is to compare SEs (WISEs and HCSOs) with FPOs.

2000), attract a pro-socially motivated workforce (e.g., De Cooman, De Gieter, Pepermans, & Jegers, 2011), and depend on public and voluntary resources (e.g., Leete, 2000).

The first argument is based on the type of organizational culture. Behavioral norms more often rely on values, such as charity and caring, in SEs than in FPOs (Agarwal & Malloy, 1999). SEs are seen as being values-based organizations (Edwards & Sen, 2000) vehicles for building a more caring and more just society (Jeavons, 1994). In that context, they would prioritize ethical or moral values (Jeavons, 1992; Nair & Bhatnagar, 2011) and then voluntary and systematically seek to adhere to principles of affirmative action and nondiscrimination in their labor force practices (Gibelman, 2000; Maran & Soro, 2010). Consequently, in an SE, fairness and non-discrimination matter for their own sakes and for the organization's legitimacy (Pennerstorfer & Schneider, 2010).

Second, the literature highlights that SE workers are more pro-socially motivated than their FPO counterparts (e.g., De Cooman et al., 2011; Einolf, 2011). SE workers are not only motivated to reap their own monetary rewards but also to help other people (e.g., Lewis, 2010; Tschirhart, Reed, Freeman, & Anker, 2008). In this regard, the labor donation theory highlights that SEs workers (especially managers and professionals) are willing to work for lower wages than their FPO counterparts (Francois, 2007; Handy & Katz, 1998; Hansmann, 1980; Preston, 1989, 1990; Rose-Ackerman, 1996) because, for them, working for a social mission is more meaningful and personally rewarding than working for profit maximization (e.g., Lewis, 2010; Light, 2002; Mirvis & Hackett, 1983). This is the main competitive strength of SEs (e.g., Steinberg, 1990, 2006; Valentinov, 2007). Therefore, SEs have both to favor the attraction of pro-socially motivated workers and create a work environment that sustains their motivation over time (Bidee et al., 2013; Faulk, Edwards, Lewis, & McGinnis, 2012; Frey, 2000). To attain those objectives, SEs must ensure that the workers' perceptions about the congruency between their values and the values defended by the organization (see person-organization fit theory) are sustained. In addition to being an important decision criteria for the choice of a job in SEs (e.g., Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Ng, Schweitzer, & Lyons, 2012), the workers' perceptions of this value fit help avoid the possibility of work psychological contract failure, which may have very negative consequences on the workers' motivation in SEs (Vantilborgh et al., 2014). In order to sustain and favor value congruency between pro-socially motivated workers and SEs, it is important to develop a fair work environment since previous studies have shown that workers attracted to SEs valorize the perception of fairness at work (Borzaga, 2009; Borzaga & Tortia, 2006; Salim, Sadruddin, &

Zakus, 2011) and desire an employer who is committed to social responsibility and employee diversity (Lewis & Ng, 2013; Ng, Schweitzer & Lyons, 2012). In particular, fair wages or wage equity perceptions regarding gender, race, and age seem to be important in SEs (e.g., Benz, 2005; Leete, 2000, 2006; Pennerstorfer & Schneider, 2010). In fact, a strong dispersion of monetary remuneration would stunt nonmonetary motivations by decreasing worker morale (e.g., Tortia, 2008).

Third, the nature of the SE's financial resources could impact its ethical behavior. An SE's resources could come from trading activities, but also from public grants and voluntary resources (Nyssens, 2006). Resource dependence theory (e.g., Malatesta & Smith, 2014) notes that organizations that obtain resources from their environment have a dependent relationship with their resource providers. Therefore, an SE's dependence on public and voluntary resources induces external pressures that may influence the kind of objectives it sets and the practices it seeks to implement (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987). External funders usually expect SEs to enforce affirmative action (Meier, 2006), which in turn involves a wage structure that relies on little differentiation among workers (Brandl & Güttel, 2007) and less discrimination in practices like hiring and promotions (e.g., Leete, 2000). Moreover, SEs would place great importance on their public reputation (i.e., to be seen as a fair employer) in order to attract these non-market resources (e.g., Brown & Slivinski, 2006; Sargeant, 1999) or volunteers and high quality staff (Leete, 2006). Hence, reputational considerations should lead SEs to pursue a more equitable work environment, especially in terms of wage structure (Pennerstorfer & Schneider, 2010).

Beyond the above-mentioned arguments that suggest that SEs, in general, should be fairer than FPOs and thus less discriminatory, we also propose that an SE's mission has an impact. WISEs have two extra reasons to not discriminate against workers as compared to HCSOs. First, Becker (1957) highlights that customer prejudice may present an enduring source of labor market discrimination because it induces a trade-off for the organizations between fairness regarding workers and the satisfaction of their customers. WISEs would not choose to discriminate against their workers in order to meet their customers' expectations because they have a worker-centered mission to integrate the most vulnerable people into the labor market. Conversely, HCSOs would prioritize users' satisfaction because they have a user-centered mission to provide at-home help for elderly and vulnerable people. The second argument is related to market pressures. Beyond public and voluntary resources, SEs also depend on market resources and they are then embedded in market logic, which may induce

external pressure to copy or adopt the practices used in FPOs (e.g., Ebrahim, 2005; Weisbrod, 1998). In terms of discrimination, this mimicry could encourage SEs to recruit managers on the basis of their (economic) performance rather than on their ethical values. Lack of resources and profitability pressures could also induce SEs to not hire workers that users have some difficulty to accept (such as foreigners or men in the case of quasi-market services vouchers). However, WISEs would be less exposed to these market pressures than HCSOs because only WISES benefit from additional subsidies that the one that are provided by services voucher regulations and justified by the particularly vulnerable profile of their workers.

Some empirical research on discrimination that compares SEs and FPOs already exists. However, most of those studies only examine gender discrimination and they are not interested in other factors, such as racial discrimination. From a gender perspective, the results from several studies provide evidence that SEs offer women more opportunities for full-time, mission-critical, and leadership positions than FPOs (Hallock, 1999; Shaiko, 1997; Steinberg & Jacobs, 1994). Abzug, DiMaggio, Gray, Kang, and Ussem (1994) even found an increase in the number of women on SEs boards of directors. Second, many empirical studies have demonstrated that, controlling for individual characteristics (i.e., education, tenure, age), gender wage differences are smaller in SEs than in FPOs (Etienne & Narcy, 2010; Leete, 2000; Lewis & Faulk, 2008; Narcy, 2006; Preston, 1990, 1994; Preston & Sacks, 2010). Finally, it seems that SEs offer women better opportunities for skill development and less repetitive work than FPOs (Gibelman, 2000; Preston, 1990). From a sexual orientation perspective, lesbians and gays who are employed in SEs report fewer incidents of discrimination and harassment (e.g., Colgan, Wright, Creegan, & Mckeamey, 2009).

A few studies focused on discriminations based on ethnic or cultural origin. Preston (1994) found that black women in SEs have a significantly lower wage level and less prestigious occupational distribution than white women. Gibelman (2000) demonstrated a glass-ceiling effect in SEs for women of color who meet barriers when trying to increase their mobility or their wage level. Nevertheless, Leete (2000) and Preston (1990, 1994) demonstrated less wage differences between white men, white women, and racial minorities (controlling for individual characteristics) in SEs than in FPOs. This empirical evidence is too weak to draw strong results regarding racial discrimination in SEs compared to FPOs; therefore, more empirical investigations are required.

Moreover, most studies on discrimination suffer from at least two pitfalls. First, many studies compare SEs and FPOs from different industries while SEs are usually in industries in which a predominance of the workers are women (Benz, 2005). This suggests that the less frequent occurrence of discriminatory practices towards women observed in SEs may be due to an industry effect rather than to a mission or a sector effect. Second, most of existing empirical studies focus on wage discrimination while the observation of less discrimination in wages might be due to the presence of less wage dispersion between all workers in SEs than in FPOs (Ben-Ner, Ren, & Paulson, 2011; Faulk et al., 2012); thus it might not be a good indicator of the presence of less discrimination in others types of practices. The presence of less wages dispersion in SEs than in FPOs is justified by two main reasons. First, and as previously mentioned, strong wage dispersion would stunt nonmonetary motivations by decreasing worker morale (e.g., Tortia, 2008). Conversely, wage compression bolsters the SE workers' motivations (Leete, 2006). Second, the presence of an overall lower wage level in SEs as compared to FPOs decreases their opportunity to implement a high level of wage dispersion (Themudo, 2009). Indeed, the minimum level of wages fixed by law creates less opportunity for an enterprise with a lower remuneration level to scatter wages between this minimum wage level and its maximum wage. Moreover, Lazear, and Shaw (2007) argued that firms that pay a higher mean wage are expected to have more wage dispersion in order to use these higher wages to create monetary incentive. Therefore, the observation of less wage discrimination in SEs is not a sufficient argument for concluding that these organizations have less discriminatory practices and that they implement affirmative action more often than FPOs.

To overcome both pitfalls, we suggest a different, two-fold research path. We compare organizations that belong to the same industry, namely, the quasi-market of services vouchers in Belgium. We also focus on a general variable or indicator, namely managers' prejudice towards immigrants (such a variable has been widely developed in social psychology and will be presented in the next section), rather than investigating discrimination through a specific indicator, such as wage (which may not be representative of the level of discrimination in all practices). Beyond addressing these pitfalls, investigating prejudice allow us to avoid the issue of data availability about the workers' origin (origin is a criterion protected by law and, thereby, not easily accessible in surveys).

3. Social Psychology Framework for Discrimination and Intergroup Bias

In the psychological and intergroup relationships literature, scholars highlight the existence of an intergroup bias, defined as "unfair evaluative, emotional, cognitive, or behavioral response toward another group in ways that devalue or disadvantage the other group and its members" (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010, p. 1084).

According to the tripartite view of attitudes, there are, essentially, three types of biases: stereotypes (characteristics of the group), prejudice (evaluative or affective response), and discrimination (inappropriate treatment) (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010); these terms refer to the cognitive, affective, and behavioral components of the bias, respectively. The predominant view in social psychology states that attitudes towards immigrants (e.g., prejudice) predict discrimination (for a review, see Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010); this view has been empirically supported (Cuddy et al., 2007; Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996).

In the present study, we focus on the managers' prejudice rather than on workers' prejudice for two reasons. First, the workers in this quasi-market are more often in contact with their managers than with their coworkers. This is because these workers spend most of their time in the homes of the customers, which limits their contact with their coworkers. Second, managers control the resources of their subordinates and are often play a primary role in human resource management decision making (Chugh, 2004; Maran & Soro, 2010; Stinglhamber & Vandenberghe, 2004) while several of the organizational practices that are usually under their control can lead to discrimination.

As prejudice is a predictor of discrimination and because SEs should be fairer towards and less discriminating against workers than FPOs, we first expect that SE managers are less prejudiced than FPO managers.

H1a: Managers from SEs report less prejudice against immigrants than managers from FPOs.

The second part of the hypothesis is related to the different types of SE missions. We hypothesize that WISE managers are less prejudiced than their HCSO counterparts because WISEs have less of an interest in discriminating than HCSOs (see above). Two additional arguments strengthen this assumption. First, WISEs have a worker-centered mission to

integrate the most vulnerable people into the labor market, which is a population that usually consists of a high percentage of people of foreign origin (Gerard et al., 2012). Thus, a WISE is supposed to attract managers that are pro-socially motivated in order to help those individuals (including immigrants) to find a job. Second, thanks to the additional grants WISEs receive, they are able to organize more team meetings and one to one meetings and offer more training sessions than HCSOs and FPOs. Consequently, WISE managers would be prompted to have a closer relationship with their workers whatever their origin. The fact that WISE managers have more contact with immigrant workers than their HCSO and FPO counterparts would reduce their prejudice towards those types of workers. Such a prediction is based on the intergroup contact theory (ICT). This theory is widely accepted in social psychology and it is considered to be one of the most effective strategies to examine prejudice (Allport, 1954; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). ICT states that contact between groups, defined as a face-to-face interactions between members of different groups, decreases prejudice toward members of these groups (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Empirically, this theory has been significantly supported (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

H1b: Managers from WISEs report less prejudice than managers from HCSOs, who in turn are less prejudiced than managers from FPOs.

4. Diversity Climate in Organizations: A Multicultural Perspective

After considering the influence that an organization's sector and mission have on prejudice and discrimination, we focus on the organization's diversity management policy. Nowadays, organizations regularly implement policies and practices to manage diversity and capitalize on a diverse workforce (Bond & Haynes, 2014). Such organizational behaviors influence relations between workers from different cultural groups (Stevens, Plaut, & Sanchez-Burks, 2008) and offer advantages to organizations, such as decreasing turn-over and increasing creativity and innovation (Cox & Blake, 1991; Cundiff, Nadler, & Swan, 2009). Thus, some scholars have suggested a business case for diversity (Houkamau & Boxall, 2011; Kaiser et al., 2013; Kandola & Fullerton, 1994; Rutherford & Ollerearnshaw, 2002).

In the psychological and acculturation literature, diversity is conceptualized as an ideology and defined as *"implicit and explicit systems of ideas, meanings, and practices that suggest how groups should include and accommodate one another and how to best organize a diverse society"* (Plaut, Garnett, Buffardi, & Sanchez-Burks, 2011, p. 338). Theoretical

conceptualization and empirical studies have suggested that the issue of valuing group differences is the most integrated and effective strategy for managing diversity (Billing & Sundin, 2006; Bond & Haynes, 2014; Cox, 1991,1993; Ely & Thomas, 2001; Podsiadlowski, Gröschke, Kogler, Springer, & van der Zee, 2013; Shen, Chanda, D'Netto, & Monga, 2009). That strategy refers to the multiculturalism diversity perspective, which specifically states that prejudice is grounded in a lack of respect and knowledge about other groups (Rosenthal & Levy, 2010); thus, in order to reduce prejudice it is important to recognize and value group differences.

At the individual level, attitudes about multiculturalism have been shown to lead to equality and a feeling of confidence and trust among people that share a common setting (van der Noll, Poppe, & Verkuyten, 2010; Verkuyten, 2005). They promote the creation of a positive diversity climate and they are efficient at reducing ingroup bias in individuals (Bodenhausen, Todd, & Richeson, 2009; Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009; van der Noll, et al., 2010; Verkuyten, 2005).

A similar prediction could be made about the organizational level. Several typologies of diversity management suggest the importance of valuing group differences: the integration and learning perspective (Ely & Thomas, 2001; Podsiadlowski, et al., 2013), the multicultural perspective (Cox, 1991), the pluralism perspective (Cox 1993), and the special contribution and alternative values perspectives (Billing & Sundin, 2006). Although no empirical studies have specifically focused on investigating an individual's multicultural perspective defined as a type of diversity management, we found three studies that addressed a similar issue. The first study focused on a national setting (Guimond et al., 2013), the second study focused on older workers (Iweins, Desmette, Yzerbyt, & Stinglhamber, 2013), and the third study focused only on origin (Courtois et al., 2014). All three papers showed a negative relationship between multiculturalism and prejudice. On the basis on these initial findings, we investigate the role of multiculturalism from the perspective of individuals on prejudice, but as a strategy to manage diversity (i.e., organizational multiculturalism).

H2: Organizational multiculturalism is negatively related to the managers' prejudice.

Because of the business case for diversity (Houkamau & Boxall, 2011), all organizations, regardless of their sector and mission, are likely to implement diversity management strategies (Tomlinson & Schwabenland, 2010). However, based on the negative

relationship between organizational multiculturalism and intergroup attitudes, on the one hand, and the greater emphasis placed on a fair climate in SEs than in FPOs on the other hand, we speculate that SEs are more likely to specifically implement organizational multiculturalism to manage diversity rather than using another strategy. This exploratory hypothesis is also supported by other empirical and theoretical contributions. First, the integration and learning perspective has been already highlighted in a non-profit organization, whose mission is to respect the rights and the well-being of disadvantaged women (Ely & Thomas, 2001). Second, Capek and Mead (2006, in Feeney, 2007) have suggested that philanthropic organizations try to reach a *deep diversity*, which is defined as a "process of institutionalizing the difference [among staff] in the organizational culture" (p. 533). This definition is conceptually close to the individual multiculturalism or "integration and learning" perspectives. Third, despite the business case of diversity, non-profit organizations are also likely to manage diversity based on an equality principle. Tomlinson and Schwabenland (2013) showed that this is at least partially the case for SEs. Finally, if SEs are prone to promote a climate of equity, one crucial element would be that workers also perceive that justice is inherent in the organization. In that regard, Iweins et al. (2013) demonstrated that perceived organizational multiculturalism is related to perceived procedural justice. Thus, the organizational multicultural perspective of diversity management would be an efficient means by which to establish a fair climate. Therefore, we anticipate that organizations willing to promote fairness (i.e., WISEs and HCSOs) also favor more multiculturalism than other organizations (i.e., FPOs).

H3a: The organizational multicultural perspective is larger in SEs than in FPOs.

H3b: The organizational multicultural perspective is larger in WISEs than in HCSOs, which in turn is higher than in FPOs.

Reflecting what is labeled as a mediation process, it seems likely that SEs promote more organizational multiculturalism than FPOs and organizational multiculturalism is, in turn, negatively related to the prejudice of the organization's managers.

Concerning the organization's mission, we expect WISEs to implement more organizational multiculturalism policies than HCSOs and we expect HCSOs to implement more multicultural policies than FPOs (as formulated in H3b); moreover, we expect that organizational multiculturalism is, in turn, negatively related to prejudice. Figure 1 illustrates the hypothesized model.

H4a: Organizational multiculturalism mediates the relationship between the sector and the managers' prejudice.

H4b: Organizational multiculturalism mediates the relationship between the mission and the managers' prejudice

Figure 1 -- Hypothesized model



5. Methodology and Data

Participants and Procedure

Data were collected via an online survey distributed to the entire population of interest (811 managers) from services vouchers organizations in the French-speaking part of Belgium (including Brussels). The respondents were guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality and their participation was voluntary. Managers reporting an origin outside the European Union (E.U.) were excluded because this study focuses on intergroup relationships between non-foreigner managers (ingroup) and immigrants (outgroup) (despite the fact that foreign managers could discriminate against immigrants, the underlying processes are likely to be different than those for managers for whom immigrants are an outgroup). We chose the EU-based criterion rather than the Belgian-based criterion because workers outside of the EU are more likely to encounter difficulties when entering the labor market (CECLR, 2012; Ouali & Cennicola, 2013). Nevertheless, we controlled for the managers' origin in the subsequent analyses because it is possible that prejudice towards immigrants is different between Belgian managers and non-Belgian managers from the EU. The final sample is composed of 122 managers (response rate = 15%). Specifically, 63 managers are from FPOs and 59 are from SEs (41 from WISEs and 18 from HCSOs).

Measures

We used the seven-item scale from the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) to measure prejudice (α = .86) and the six-item scale from Iweins et al. (2013) to measure organizational multiculturalism (α = .79). Both are seven-point Likert-type scales, ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). As expected, the two-factor model fitted the data quite well ($\chi^2(64) = 104.49$, $p < .001$; $\chi^2/df = 1.63$; RMSEA = .07; CFI=.96; NNFI=.95) and this model best reflected the data structure (see comparisons in Table 1) Thus, this model was retained as the best depiction of our data. All the items load reliably on their predicted factors (all $t>1.96$), with standardized loadings ranging from .41 to .78 for organizational multiculturalism and from .25 to .82 for prejudice.

Table 1 -- Confirmatory Factor Analyses Fit Indices for Measurement Models

Model	χ^2	*Df*	$\Delta\chi^2$ (Δdf)	χ^2/df	RMSEA	CFI	NNFI
2-factor model (Hypothesized)	**104.49**	**64**	**---**	**1.63**	**.07**	**.96**	**.95**
1-factor model (MULT and PREJ = 1 factor)	351.19	65	246.70(1)***	5.40	.19	.81	.77

Note. N = 122. The results are described in the text. MULT = organizational multiculturalism, PREJ = prejudice; *df* = degrees of freedom; $\Delta\chi^2$ = difference in chi-square from the four-factor model; χ^2/df = chi-square goodness of fit to degrees of freedom ratio; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; NNFI = Non-Normed Fit Index.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

6. Results

To test hypotheses 1 and 2, we computed linear regression analyzes (ordinary least squares) following a two-step procedure. In the first step, we regressed prejudice on all of the predictors. In the second step, we kept only the significant predictors to further validate the results. Becker (2005) recommended computing analyses with and without control variables. Because no differences were observed between the results of the two steps, only the results of the first step are reported below.

Formally, the prejudice towards immigrants of a manager *i* being in an organization *j* can be rewrite as:

$$P_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Sector_j + \beta_2 Multi_{i,j} + \beta_3 X_i + \beta_4 Y_j$$

where $Sector_j$ is the sector affiliation (FPOs=0;SEs=1) of manager i and $Multi_{i,j}$ corresponds to the perception of manager i about the level of organizational multiculturalism used in his organization j. X_i and Y_j are control variables for the characteristics of the manager i and the organization j, respectively.

The sector regression analysis showed that education, sector, and organizational multiculturalism are significant predictors controlling for all other control variables (left section of Table 2). The participants with higher levels of education were found to be less prejudiced (B = -0.44, p = .001). As expected, the significant regression coefficient (B = -0.43, p = .068) of the dummy sector indicates that SEs managers are less prejudiced than FPO managers, confirming H1a. Finally, we observed that the more the managers reported that their organization has implemented organizational multiculturalism, the less prejudiced they were (B = -0.38, p = .001). These results confirm H2.

To analyze the effect of the organization's mission on prejudice, we first coded the mission following three dummies, which were introduced two-by-two into the analyses instead of the sector affiliation variable. The results indicate that education, mission, and organizational multiculturalism significantly predict prejudice (the left section of Table 3). As for the organizational sector, organizational multiculturalism and prejudice are negatively related (B = -0.36, p = .001), which reinforces H2. Concerning the effect of the mission, the results indicate that WISE managers are less prejudiced than their FPO or HCSO counterparts (FPOs, B=0.60, p=.016; HCSOs B=0.66, p=.052) and that there is no difference in the prejudice level between the HCSO and FPO managers (HCSOs, B=0.07, p=.848). These results partially support H1b.

In order to test the third hypothesis, we formally rewrite the organizational multiculturalism of organization j perceived by manager i as:

$$Multi_{i,j} = \alpha + \beta_1 Sector_j + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 Y_j$$

For our third hypothesis, neither the sector (B=-0.04,p=.839) nor the mission (any dummies) were found to be significant predictors of organizational multiculturalism (see Tables 2 and 3). Therefore, our third hypothesis is not supported.

Table 2 -- Regression coefficients testing the effects of the sector and our interest variables on organizational multiculturalism and prejudice (OLS)

	Prejudice		*Organizational multiculturalism*
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1
Predictor	*B(SE)*	*B(SE)*	*B(SE)*
Sector (SE)	-0.43(0.23)*	-0.47(0.20)**	-0.04(0.20)
Organizational Multiculturalism	-0.38(0.11)***	-0.38(0.11)***	
Women	-0.18(0.26)		0.05(0.22)
Age	-0.01(0.01)		0.01(0.01)
Education	-0.44(0.14)***	-0.44(0.11)***	0.04(0.12)
Belgian	0.15(0.37)		-0.37(0.32)
Job tenure	-0.02(0.03)		-0.04(0.03)
Brussels	-0.29(0.38)		-0.03(0.33)
Organizational size	$-5.39e^{-6}$(0.01)		0.00(0.00)
Constant	7.63(1.05)***	7.19(0.70)***	4.77(0.79)***
R^2	.25	.14	.05

Note. N = 122. SE = Standard Error. B = Unstandardized coefficient. Sector=1 for SE and =0 for FPO. VIF = Variance Inflation Factor.
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.

Table 3 -- Regression coefficients testing the effects of the mission and our interest variables on organizational multiculturalism and prejudice (OLS)

	Prejudice				*Organizational multiculturalism*	
	Step 1 WISE	Step 1 FPO	Step 2 WISE	Step 2 FPO	Step 1 WISE	Step 1 FPO
Predictor	*B(SE)*	*B(SE)*	*B(SE)*	*B(SE)*	*B(SE)*	*B(SE)*
FPO	0.60(0.24)**		0.64(0.22)**		-0.09(0.22)	
HCSO	0.66(0.34)*	0.07(0.34)	0.54(0.31)*	-0.10 (.30)	-0.19(0.30)	-0.10(0.30)
WISE		-0.60(0.24)**		-0.64(0.22)***		0.09(0.22)
Organizational multiculturalism	-0.36(0.11)***	-0.36(0.11)***	-0.36(.10)***	-0.36(0.10)***		
Women	-0.24(0.26)	-0.24(0.26)			0.06(0.23)	0.06(0.23)
Age	-0.01(0.01)	-0.01(0.01)			0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.01)
Education	-0.44(0.13)***	-0.44(0.13)***	-0.43(0.11)***	-0.43(0.11)***	0.04(0.12)	0.04(0.12)
Belgian	0.13(0.37)	0.13(0.37)			-0.37(0.32)	-0.37(0.32)
Job tenure	-0.03(0.03)	-0.03(0.03)			-0.03(0.03)	-0.03(0.03)
Brussels	-0.26(0.37)	-0.26(0.37)			-0.04(0.33)	-0.04(0.33)
Organizational size	$-5.82e^{-5}$(0.01)	$-1.00e^{-3}$(0.01)			0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)
Constant	7.46(1.04)***	8.06(1.01)***	6.90(0.71)***	7.53(0.69)***	4.80 (0.79)***	4.70(0.77)***
R^2	.28	.28	.16	.16	.05	.05

Note. N = 122. SE = Standard Error. B = Unstandardized coefficient. *VIF* = Variance Inflation Factor. P-value: * $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.

Finally, we followed the four steps suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) to test the mediation hypothesis (H4a and H4b). We found support for condition 1 (H1a, H1b) and condition 3 (H2) in the analyses presented above. However, the second condition is not validated (H3a, H3b). Based on the non-significant relationship between sector/mission and multiculturalism, it is possible to propose a moderation effect rather than a mediation effect. Indeed, we can expect that the relationship between sector/mission and prejudice would be different depending on the level of organizational multiculturalism. We tested the interaction between mission and sector, on the one hand, and multiculturalism on the other. None of these interactions were found to be significant.

7. Conclusion

Economic and social psychology literature highlight that both sector/mission and multiculturalism are related to organizational discrimination. On this basis, we implemented a study in the quasi-market of services vouchers to analyze the relationship between these two variables and managers' prejudice. We investigated the managers' prejudice towards immigrants as a predictor (or a proxy) of discrimination in the organization's practices.

In terms of sector affiliation, the literature highlights that SEs focus more on non-discrimination principles than FPOs. This is based on three arguments. SEs share a number of social values, attract a pro-socially motivated workforce, and partially rely on grants and voluntary resources for their funding. Our results demonstrate that SE managers are less prejudiced than FPO managers. We have also hypothesized that a difference exists between two types of SEs (WISEs and HCSOs) on the basis of the following arguments. In a WISE, the organization's mission places an emphasis on its own workers while in an HCSO the mission focuses on the users of the organization's services, which may sometimes imply a trade-off between implementation of fair practices towards workers and meeting the users' expectations. In addition, it is important to remember that WISEs receive additional public grants. While these extra grants allow WISE managers to more extensively supervise the organization's employees and, therefore, have more contact with foreign workers, they also ease market pressures. Our results demonstrate that WISE managers are significantly less prejudiced than FPO managers but no difference was found between HCSO and FPO managers. Finally, we observed that WISE managers are less prejudiced than HCSO managers. By way of explaining why HCSO managers have the same level of prejudice as FPO managers, it should be stressed again that HCSOs are probably exposed to more

competitive pressures than WISEs, which can affect their values and norm identity. This, combined with the HCSOs' user-centric mission, can explain why their managers have the same level of prejudice as FPO managers. One could also argue that the workers in this quasi-market are less likely to be pro-socially motivated due to the type of tasks they perform (housekeeping), but because our analysis concerns managers, the pro-social argument can still be considered.

In testing the organizational multiculturalism hypothesis, our study reaffirms that it has a positive effect on intergroup attitudes and goes beyond indicating the positive consequences of such a perspective implemented at an organizational level. While several authors have suggested the importance of emphasizing and valuing group differences in their classification of diversity management strategies in order to secure the benefits of a diverse workplace, few studies have empirically examined such a strategy. Our conceptualization of multiculturalism as a strategy to manage diversity has allowed us to complement the previous attempts to investigate the relationships between valuing differences and prejudice.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

This study has several limitations and future research needs to address those limitations.

First, given that the aim of the SEs is implementing a fair work environment, we expected that SEs, and specifically WISEs, would be more likely to favor organizational multiculturalism than FPOs, but such a result was not found. This might be due to the lack of awareness of the SEs regarding the benefits induced by favoring organizational multiculturalism. To partially palliate this gap, it could be relevant to further investigate which type of diversity management is implemented in SEs as compared to FPOs.

Second, although we controlled for the variables identified in the literature as being correlated with prejudice, the managers that participated in this study may be heterogeneous in terms of unobserved characteristics, which impacts their choice of type of organization. Consequently, the regression analyses may suffer from endogeneity bias[46]. Thus, we did not have the opportunity to identify clearly the source(s) of the presence of managers with less prejudice in the WISEs. On the one hand, those observations might be due to the (self-) selection of pro-socially motivated managers with less prejudice; on the other hand, the climate in the SEs might negatively influence the managers' prejudices.

[46]The available data does not allow for the possibility of finding a valid instrument. Hence, it is not possible to use a test to ascertain if the regression was affected by endogeneity bias.

Third, it is possible that our data suffer from social desirability bias. The issue of prejudice and discrimination remains sensitive in terms of the actual non-discrimination norm (Crandall & Eshelman, 2003; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). However, the computed data analysis follows a comparative approach, implying that if desirability bias does occur we can be reasonably confident that it occurs in the same way in each sector and mission. Thus, this bias should not influence our results.

A final limitation of this study is the fact that common method bias may have artificially inflated the correlation between our variables of interest. Nevertheless, a number of methodological and statistical precautions have been taken. Methodologically, the respondents were assured that their answers were anonymous and there were no right or wrong answers (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lu, & Podsakoff, 2003). Moreover, we obtained the measures of one predictor (i.e., sector and mission) and the criterion from different sources. The sector was provided by the organization's legal form and the WISE's accreditation and prejudice were self-reported using Likert scales. Statistically, the Harman's single factor test indicated that a one factor model provides a poor fit to the data (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Taken together, these precautions suggest that common method bias was not a major weakness of our research.

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CONCLUSION OF THESIS

Does an organization's mission matter for job quality, worker motivation and discrimination in the workplace in the case of low-skilled jobs? This has been the central question of this thesis.

This question is of upmost importance in a changing environment. Indeed, social enterprises (SEs) are, nowadays, more and more entering into competition with other types of providers. In such a context, the existence of a specific employment model in SEs may be discussed as it may lead to increasing pressure on SEs to isomorph for-profit organizations' (FPOs) practices in order to be more "professional" and competitive (e.g.; Ebrahim, 2005; Tuckman, 1998; Weisbrod, 1998). Moreover, many industries where SEs compete with other types of providers involve low-skilled tasks (especially in the service industry), while the literature that analyzes the specificities of the employment models in SEs postulate that these organizations tend to attract relatively skilled workers a priori motivated by the mission of the organization (e.g., Frey, 1997; Narcy, 2009).

This thesis has been then devoted to analyzing the specificities of the employment model of SEs in a context of competition with FPOs. We focused mostly on three important issues: the quality of low-skilled jobs, workers' motivations and, diversity management policy and managers' prejudices. All these issues are empirically investigated in the quasi-market of service vouchers in Belgium where all organizations employ a majority of low-skilled workers. This quasi-market allows us to compare SEs with FPOs on the one hand and two types of SEs with drastically different mission (one being worker-centric and the other user-centric) on the other hand. Our results demonstrate that both the sectors (SE and FPO) and the mission (WISES, HCSOs and FPOs) of an organization affect their employment models even if they are competing within the same market and providing the same services.

By deepening these issues, we believe that we have brought some new insights in terms of methodology and in terms of theoretical considerations and empirical findings regarding SEs employment models.

In terms of methodology

Firstly, we have constructed a multidimensional indicator of job quality thanks to factorial analyses tools. Factorial analyses have previously been used by Petrella,

Maisonnasse, Melnik and Richez-Battesti (2010) for sectorial comparisons of job quality in France and by Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (2000) for international comparisons. Factorial analyses allowed us constructing one indicator for each dimension of job quality, which highlights the discriminant characteristics in the quasi-market of service-vouchers. In fact, these indicators give more weight to the items (and factors) for which the results obtained by individuals are the most disperse. This allows us to identify more easily the differences between enterprises for each dimension of job quality.

Secondly, we have taken the original approach to not only compare FPOs with SEs but also to compare SEs with different missions. Indeed, most of empirical works which compare SE with FPO rely either on their legal status (for profit or nonprofit) in countries of Roman law tradition or on their fiscal status regarding tax on income in countries of common law. However, with a same legal or fiscal status, organizations can adopt various types of social mission. Therefore, we also distinguished organizations according to the type of social mission. This way to approach the distinctions between SEs seems relevant since we found a mission effect in all of our empirical studies.

Thirdly, we implemented a longitudinal study and performed multivariate analyses to compare workers' motivations between SEs and FPOs over time. This procedure has never been used to study motivation in SE. It has allowed us to dissociate the selection effect from the exposition effect to explain the presence of workers differently motivated in SEs than in FPOs.

Fourthly, we use the managers' prejudice towards immigrants as a predictor (or a proxy) of discrimination in the organization's practices instead of focusing on discrimination in one particular practice. Moreover, our conceptualization of multiculturalism as a strategy to manage diversity allows us to complement previous attempts to investigate the negative effect of valuing group differences in prejudice Furthermore, the positive link between a multicultural approach to managing cultural diversity and prejudice was not already directly test at the organization level.

In terms of new theoretical insights and empirical findings

Regarding job quality of low-skilled jobs

We have observed important differences in job quality of low-skilled jobs between FPOs and SEs. In addition, our results indicate that the distinction between profit and not-for-

profit enterprises does not explain all the differences in terms of job quality across firms: the type of organizations' mission also matters. First, FPOs usually implement a business model based on a cost-minimization policy. Consequently, they do not offer higher pay nor more premiums nor better career opportunities. Regarding SEs, they use incentives that encourage their workers' motivations to work for their social mission such as let to the workers the ability to get involved in decision making. They also offer intentionally better low-skilled jobs quality because of the centrality of labor in these organizations. However, if SEs have a number of similarities, WISEs and HCSOs differ on several dimensions of job quality. WISEs develop an employment model centered on the work integration of vulnerable workers, leading these vulnerable workers to benefit from better job quality and a lot of supports. HCSOs develop an associative employment model focused on helping vulnerable users. They are especially aware of the incentives that support the motivation of their workers to behave in line with their social mission. This is probably due to their extensive experience in the care industry.

Regarding workers' motivation

Firstly, we propose to not consider anymore the motivation to work in SE as intrinsic but rather as prosocial on the basis of psychological and economics literature and on recent works dedicated to SEs. Prosocial motivation may be based on different type of extrinsic regulation (introjected – identified – integrated). Integrated and identified regulations are considered as autonomous type of motivation while introjected is considered as control motivation. We argued that autonomous regulation of the prosocial motivation has to be fostered (in SEs) because it leads to various benefits from the quality and quantity of the work done We suggested that a more autonomous regulation emerge when there is a strong match between individual's values and organizational values (i.e. P-O Fit) and when the worker is intrinsically motivated to perform his/her task.

In order to ensure high autonomous prosocial motivation among their workers, SEs face several managerial challenges. The first challenge for SEs is about how to attract and select this kind of pro-socially motivated workforce who fit with the organization's mission. First, SEs have to display accurate and precise information about organization's mission and values to attract people who fit the best with the organization. Second, they should implement practices which answer to non-monetary preferences of such workers. Thirdly, they have to offer lower wage than FPOs, all others things being equal, to only attract workers who best fit

with the organization mission (only such workers would be ready to sacrifice a significant part of their wages to work for a social mission in which they believe). However, it is certainly not enough to attract and select people with the best fit regarding values. It is also important to develop a work environment which sustains and fosters the intensity and the autonomous regulation of prosocial motivation through various channels: contact (direct and indirect) with beneficiaries, accessibility to information about the mission and beneficiaries, motivational job characteristics like autonomy and task significance and positive organizational climate (recognition and organizational support, democratic participation and involvement in the decision process, and fair and equitable work environment).

Secondly, we empirically proved, on the quasi-market of services vouchers, that workers' motivations might be different between SEs and FPO and that even in the case of low-skilled jobs. Our results are not in favor of a selection effect at the entrance in SE. Nevertheless, we observe that when WISEs and FPOs hire workers who are not unemployed, WISEs attract or select workers with more prosocial motivation and higher values congruence with the organization. In others words, when WISEs deviate from their initial mission of "hiring the most vulnerable people on the labor market", it is only to hire people who bring a real added-value to the organization. Moreover, some authors suggest that the SEs' work environment may have positive effects on the workers' motivations and adhesion to the social mission. The results confirm that there exists a positive effect to be in SE on the evolution of workers' perceiving values congruence with their organization and on prosocial motivation. Indeed, we observed that SE workers perceive higher value congruence with their organization mission and are more pro-socially motivated than their counterparts in FPOs after having after spent eight months in their respective organizations. In HCSO, those results are explained by an exposition effect. In WISEs, it's a combination of a selection and an exposition effects. In others words, WISEs attract some people who are more motivated than their counterpart in FPOs and develop a work environment that positively influence the motivation of the others (who were previously unemployed and the core of the mission). These results are of great importance because such pro-socially motivated workers should be ready to give higher efforts at work than their counterparts in FPOs, all others things being equal, because they perceive the importance of the social mission in which they adhere. Moreover, and beyond the effort intensity, the direction of the effort is also crucial. Indeed, it is important that workers believe in (and understand) the organization's mission to behave in

a coherent way with that mission. It is especially the case in SE where pay-for-performance incentives cannot generally be used to influence workers to adopt the good behavior

This chapter has also compared the work environment of the organizations in order to identify what can explain the differences in terms of the evolution of workers' motivation through time between WISEs, HCSOs and FPOs. We observed that both types of SEs workers have a better relationship with their supervisor(s) and more possibilities to give their advice and to participate into decisions than their counterparts in FPOs. The literature identifies these work environment characteristics as positively correlated to SEs workers' motivation and values congruence. Differences between HCSOs and WISEs have also been observed regarding their work environment. These differences might explain why the exposition effect on values congruence and prosocial motivation is stronger in HCSO than in WISEs. On the one hand, HCSOs workers are most often in contact with vulnerable users while Grant (2007) highlights that a high level of contact with the users of the service is crucial to sustain and develop prosocial motivation. On the other hand, HCSOs' workers benefit from higher autonomy at work and better relationships with their colleagues while those characteristics of the work environment are seen as positively related to SEs workers' motivation and perceived values congruence with the organization. In conclusion, these results highlight the crucial role play by the work environment in SEs on workers' motivation.

Regarding discrimination issue

We demonstrate that WISE managers are significantly less prejudiced towards immigrants than FPO managers, but no difference was found between HCSO and FPO managers. We also observed that WISE managers are less prejudiced than HCSO managers. This potentially suggests that immigrant workers face a less discriminating work environment in WISEs than in others types of organization. WISEs have two extra reasons to not discriminate against workers as compared to HCSOs. First, they would not choose to discriminate against their workers in order to meet their customers' expectations because they have the worker-centric mission to integrate the most vulnerable people into the labor market. Second, WISEs would be less exposed to the market pressures than HCSOs because only WISES benefit from additional subsidies that the one that are provided by services voucher regulations and justified by the particularly vulnerable profile of their workers.

In addition, in testing the organizational multiculturalism hypothesis, our study reaffirms that it has a positive effect on intergroup attitudes and goes beyond indicating the

positive consequences of such a perspective implemented at an organizational level. More particularly, our results highlight that there is a negative relationship between the perception that organizations value differences and managers' prejudices.

Regarding employment models

The thesis as a whole brings us to the conclusion that SEs develop specific type of employment model compared with FPO even if they compete on a market with others types of providers. In particular, SEs offer low-skilled jobs of better quality, develop a work environment that influence positively their workers' motivations in a different way that is observed in FPOs and we give some indication about the possibility that they less discriminate immigrants workers. However, the distinction between SEs and FPOs does not explain all the differences in terms of employment model: the type of organizations' mission also matters. In fact, WISEs and HCSO definitely do not develop the same type of employment model even if some similarities exist.

In conclusion, all these chapters highlight that each type of organizations has its own strengths and weaknesses: Cost minimization for FPOs, quality integration in the labor market of vulnerable workers for WISEs and the capacity to create a management model directed towards the mission of providing home help to elderly and vulnerable people for HCSOs. Public authorities should be conscious about these distinctions among organizations if they want to favor the social and economic results of their policies notably in the case of quasi-market.

Beside these new insights and contributions, we acknowledge some limitations.

Firstly regarding the data reliability: for all three empirical chapters, we are dependent on the willingness of people to participate in the study. It might induce some selection bias. For instance, some enterprises have refused to participate to the study and most of them were FPOs. It might induce that the sample is not representative of all types of FPOs in the quasi-market of service vouchers. Moreover, some workers have not participated because they were not able to read or even to understand the questionnaire. It is then possible that samples do not include the most vulnerable workers.

Secondly, if the quasi-market of service vouchers offers good conditions for the analysis of the mission effect on the quality of low-skilled jobs, the fact that the price is set by law constrained this comparison. Moreover, apart WISEs, the degree of freedom of the others

providers are limited by their financial possibilities. Hence, it would be interesting to replicate this study in an industry where organizations operate with some flexibility in their investment choices and in pricing the services provided.

Thirdly, although we controlled for the variables identified in the literature as being correlated with prejudice, the managers that participated in this study may be heterogeneous in terms of unobserved characteristics, which impacts their choice of type of organization. Consequently, the regression analyses may suffer from an endogeneity bias. Thus, we did not have the opportunity to identify clearly the source(s) of the presence of managers with less prejudice in the WISEs. On the one hand, those observations might be due to the (self-) selection of pro-socially motivated managers with less prejudice; on the other hand, the climate in the SEs might negatively influence the managers' prejudices. Most probably, these two complementary effects are in action.

Finally, all of our empirical results regarding work motivation and job quality are only related to low-skilled jobs and no conclusions can be made for higher-skilled jobs. Indeed, in the case of high-skilled jobs, we might suppose that SEs attract a differently motivated workforce than FPOs. Moreover, these workers would have the opportunity to sacrifice a significant part of their wage to work for a social mission in which they believe (which is usually not the case of workers in low-skilled position).

Further perspectives can be drawn. We have only covered some specific aspects of employment models in SEs. This thesis leads to new questions and opens new ways to target these issues. Research perspectives have germinated as work proceeds. We have listed the following ones:

Regarding job quality and as mentioned before it would be interesting to replicate this study in an industry where organizations operate with some flexibility in their investment choices and, in pricing the services provided. Next, if our study is a necessary step in order to get an overall picture of the mission effect on job quality, it must be complemented by additional studies focusing only on one or two dimensions. It would allow analyzing more accurately and (dis)confirm our first results. Moreover, qualitative insights could provide a better analysis of the dynamics at work and a better understanding of the reasons why the organization's mission influences job quality. Finally, our results about job quality are only related to low-skilled jobs and no conclusions can be made for higher-skilled jobs. Hence, it

would be interesting to reproduce the same type of design, but this time with the objective to compare the quality of higher-skilled job between SEs and FPOs.

We have made important contributions regarding work motivation in SE in a comparison perspective with FPOs. Nevertheless, numbers of empirical investigations are still necessary. First, no study has distinguished the selection effect from the exposition effect regarding work motivation in skilled job. Longitudinal studies are then required to dissociate those two effects that explain the presence of a more pro-socially motivated workforce in SE. Second, empirical studies are needed to understand the different motivational dynamics between high qualified and low qualified staff. Third, the link between practices and autonomous prosocial motivation in SE context has to be reinforced in future research.

Regarding discrimination issues, we observed that WISEs managers are less prejudice towards immigrants than their counterparts in FPOs (and in HCSOs) but more empirical investigations are needed to understand why such result is observed and its implications. Indeed, it is still needed to dissociate the exposition effect from the selection effect: Do WISEs attract managers with less prejudice, or is it the climate in WISEs that negatively influence the managers' prejudices? Moreover, the link between managers' prejudice and the presence of discrimination in the management practices has to be deeper.

Finally, given that SEs would implementing a fair work environment, we expected that SEs, and specifically WISEs, would be more likely to favor organizational multiculturalism than FPOs, but such a result was not found. This might be due to the lack of awareness of the SEs regarding the benefits induced by favoring organizational multiculturalism. To partially palliate this gap, it could be relevant to further investigate which type of diversity management is implemented in SEs as compared to FPOs.

SEs have played and still play a major role in addressing social issues through economic activities around the world. There is still a large scope of exciting research questions about their employment model, which are in constant evolution while facing the challenge to preserve their specificities compared to FPOs. This is an essential issue for SEs in order to keep their ability to answer some (untreated) social dilemmas in a different way than FPOs or public organizations.