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Abstract

Over the past two decades, European societies have faced multiple crises with substantial economic consequences, including the 2008 financial crisis, the recent COVID-19 pandemic, and the subsequent Russian invasion of Ukraine, the latter of which caused an energy crisis and a surge in inflation. The resultant deterioration in objective socio-economic conditions at both the contextual and individual levels may have contributed to increasing subjective socio-economic insecurity, i.e., individuals expect their employment or financial circumstances to worsen in the future. Our study is the first to examine such subjective insecurity among younger adults in comparison to their older counterparts across the aforementioned crises across Europe. The experience of young people is of particular interest, due to their recent entry into the labour market and their position at the early stages of family formation. Equally important is how this experience varies across welfare regimes. We use Eurobarometer data from 2004 to 2023 across 28 European countries, employ linear probability models, and stratify the analysis by the welfare regime. Our findings indicate that social democratic countries appear to be the most effective in mitigating subjective insecurity across age and crises, compared to other welfare regimes. Overall, there has been an increase in subjective insecurity across all age groups during the respective crises, while younger adults are throughout less likely to exhibit subjective insecurity. Furthermore, we observe a tendency towards convergence in subjective socio-economic insecurity across age groups over time, suggesting a decline in general optimism among young Europeans in recent years.

Keywords

Subjective socio-economic insecurity; Young people; Crises; Age; Welfare regime; Europe

1 Introduction

The deteriorating and unstable employment and economic trajectories of individuals have drawn considerable attention in the context of globalisation and labour market flexibilisation. These objective changes in socio-economic conditions have been referred to as ‘insecurity’ (Ranci et al., 2021) at the individual level.¹ The 2008 financial crisis, with its far-reaching economic and labour market consequences, gave rise to the question of whether and how individuals expect their personal future circumstances to worsen. The downward future expectations have been analysed particularly in the context of *subjective* socio-economic insecurity (Mau et al., 2012).² The recent COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the latter of which resulted in an acute energy crisis and a surge in inflation across Europe, have contributed to further debate on subjective socio-economic insecurity.

The present paper examines the developments of subjective socio-economic insecurity among Europeans over the past decades across the aforementioned *crises*. In accordance with the conceptualisation of Mau et al. (2012), we employ the term ‘subjective socio-economic insecurity’ (or ‘subjective insecurity’) to denote the situation in which individuals expect a deterioration in their future employment and/or financial circumstances.

In the context of Europe, scholars have demonstrated widespread subjective socio-economic insecurity after the financial crisis, particularly in economically hard-hit countries (e.g., Akaeda & Schöneck, 2022; Lübke & Erlinghagen, 2014; van Oorschot & Chung 2015). In addition, subjective insecurity varies according to individual socio-economic status (e.g., Böckerman, 2004; Burgoon & Dekker, 2010; Chung, 2019; Mau et al., 2012): Lower-status groups are more worried about having future financial difficulties. Individuals with unemployment experiences or precarious employment (e.g., fixed-term contract) are more concerned about losing their jobs and feel more insecure about their future employment situation. In other words, there has been strong evidence indicating that subjective insecurity regarding one’s future is positively associated with objective insecurity regarding one’s past and present conditions.

In addition to the health consequences, the COVID-19 pandemic also had negative impacts on the national economies and labour markets worldwide, especially during the first year due to various lockdowns (European Commission, 2021; Soares & Berg, 2022). A number

¹ Alternative terms have also been used to describe the adverse socio-economic changes, e.g., ‘vulnerability’ (Ranci, 2010), ‘uncertainty’ (Mills & Blossfeld, 2006), and ‘precarity’ (Nau & Soener, 2019).

² Some scholars employed the term ‘perceptions’ (Akaeda & Schöneck, 2022) or ‘feelings’ (van Oorschot & Chung, 2015) of insecurity, which is equivalent to subjective insecurity.

of studies examined individual employment and economic changes (e.g., Almeida et al., 2021; Koczan, 2022), as well as subjective outcomes such as subjective well-being and mental health (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2023; Möhring et al., 2021) during the pandemic. Although not analysing subjective socio-economic insecurity per se, Fetzer et al. (2021) observed a substantial emergence of economic anxiety among individuals in the US shortly after the outbreak of the pandemic, caused by fears about the coronavirus.

To the best of our knowledge, only two studies have examined the trends over a longer time span to compare subjective socio-economic insecurity across different crises. Manning and Mazeine (2024) analysed the trends in subjective job insecurity in Germany, the UK, and the US in the past 30 years until 2018. Their study therefore only captured the potential impact of the financial crisis, revealing temporary increases in subjective insecurity after 2008 in the UK and the US, but not in Germany. In contrast, Wang (2024) illustrated in an additional descriptive analysis the changes in subjective employment and economic insecurity from 2004 to 2023 in Germany. The results indicated small rises in subjective insecurity after the financial crisis and the pandemic, and a substantial rise after the war outbreak. However, we lack deeper knowledge about these trends and the situation in different institutional contexts. Our paper aims to close this research gap. We investigate how subjective socio-economic insecurity has changed across different *European welfare regimes* during different periods of crisis over the past two decades.

The second contribution of this paper is to highlight that subjective socio-economic insecurity may vary considerably across *age*, which has been largely overlooked in extant literature. As outlined previously, scholars have identified higher subjective insecurity among individuals with higher objective insecurity in terms of unfavourable socio-economic conditions, such as unemployment, precarious employment, or lower income. Previous literature has also demonstrated that young people are more susceptible to such objective insecurity during their transition to adulthood (e.g., Green, 2017; Yeung & Yang, 2020). However, the extent to which the potential objective insecurity among younger adults can translate into higher subjective insecurity than that of their older counterparts remains unclear. In addressing this question, our paper examines subjective insecurity across different age groups.

We adopt the life course perspective (Mills & Blossfeld, 2006) to investigate how young people in transition to adulthood may exhibit subjective socio-economic insecurity differently from their older counterparts. Furthermore, we examine the extent to which European welfare regimes may moderate age-related differences in subjective insecurity, as well as the general impacts of the crises on subjective insecurity.

Empirically, we employ data from Eurobarometer surveys from 2004 to 2023 across 28 European countries, a unique data source that enables comparative analysis of subjective socio-economic insecurity across both welfare regimes and crises. The Eurobarometer comprises multiple surveys for each year. The specific timing of the two data collections in 2022 enables a separation between the period preceding and following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. Therefore, we can identify changes in subjective insecurity since the financial crisis, the pandemic (before the war outbreak), and since the war outbreak. Analysing these data, we aim to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of subjective insecurity across young and older Europeans in times of crisis, highlighting the moderating role of the welfare regime.

2 How subjective socio-economic insecurity varies across age, welfare regimes, and crises

2.1 Subjective socio-economic insecurity across age

The *life course perspective* is particularly relevant for understanding subjective socio-economic insecurity among young people in comparison to their older counterparts. On the one hand, younger adults, either in transition from education to work or in the early stage of their career, are unprotected by work seniority and lack of professional networks. Consequently, they are more affected by social structure changes (e.g., labour market flexibilisation) and/or adverse macroeconomic environments. As one of the most relevant works in the field, Mills & Blossfeld (2006) demonstrated ‘increasing uncertainty’ (p. 2) among young people in the context of globalisation, which further influences decisions regarding employment, partnership and parenthood.³ During periods of economic downturn, including the 2008 global financial crisis, younger adults also tend to encounter difficulties in securing favourable employment opportunities (Cantó et al., 2022; Yeung & Yang, 2020). This often resulted in a higher probability of unemployment and precarious employment, such as fixed-term and part-time contracts. Against this background, younger adults may also hold negative expectations about their future socio-economic circumstances, i.e., experience higher subjective insecurity than their older counterparts, particularly during periods of crisis.

On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that young people may exhibit lower subjective socio-economic insecurity regarding their future. First, younger adults may hold generally optimistic future expectations, viewing their current, more disadvantaged socio-economic conditions as a necessary foundation for their subsequent career and adult life

³ The authors coined the term ‘uncertainty’, which can be considered equivalent to ‘objective insecurity’ as we employ in our paper.

(Helbling & Kanji, 2018). They may exhibit lower subjective insecurity, even with more disadvantaged employment conditions. Second, given the generally unfavourable employment circumstances, particularly the matter of lower wages, younger adults are often perceived by employers as being ‘less costly’. In this regard, it would be easier for them to secure alternative employment if necessary. Therefore, younger adults may feel less insecure about their future. Finally, younger adults are less likely to have a partner or children, which may facilitate greater flexibility in terms of job and residential mobility. In particular, over the past decades, there has been a tendency among young people to postpone the timing of their departure from the parental home, as well as the establishment of partnership and family (Buchmann & Kriesi, 2011; Matysiak & Vignoli, 2024; Neels et al., 2024). This may further reduce their chance to experience subjective insecurity due to family- and children-related material burdens.

We conclude that two contradictory general hypotheses concerning subjective insecurity across age can be derived from the life-course perspective:

H1a: Younger adults are *more* likely to exhibit subjective socio-economic insecurity, compared to their older counterparts.

H1b: Younger adults are *less* likely to exhibit subjective socio-economic insecurity, compared to their older counterparts.

2.2 The moderating role of welfare regimes

Subjective socio-economic insecurity is shaped by individual expectations about their future, which are also influenced by the specific cultural or welfare regime context (Vignoli et al., 2020). Policies that facilitate the transition to adulthood, particularly the age-specific labour market policies and family policies, play a crucial role in influencing subjective insecurity among young and older groups.

We build primarily on Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999), identifying the *social-democratic*, the *conservative*, and the *liberal* welfare regime models.⁴ In the social-democratic model of the Scandinavian countries, the state carries out many functions of care traditionally performed by the family with a strong decommodification of services and universal policies favouring equality among citizens (Esping-Andersen & Palier, 2008). In liberal countries, including Ireland and the United Kingdom, private services are encouraged, and social coverage concerns only the most

⁴ Esping-Andersen (1999) classified countries according to two features: (a) the level of decommodification, i.e., the degree to which social services are provided as a right and without reference to the market and (b) the universalism of social policies (see also Arts & Gelissen, 2002).

disadvantaged groups. The conservative welfare regime is characterised by modest decommodification. In their degrees of policy decommodification and universalism, conservative welfare states (e.g., Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) appear in an intermediate position relative to the liberal and social-democratic countries.

In addition to the three classic welfare regime models, we take into consideration two further models in the European context. These are the *Southern European* model, a distinguished variant of the conservative model (Ferrera, 1996), and the *Central and Eastern European* welfare regimes (Fenger, 2007). Welfare provision by the state is relatively low in both types. Southern European countries are characterised by less generous, familialised welfare regimes. Central and Eastern European countries represent a range of post-communist countries with limited welfare expenditures and programmes.

National policies targeting young people and their transition to adulthood vary considerably according to the welfare regime. Regarding social security for unemployed young people, such as social assistance, unemployment benefits, housing support, and social security contributions, social democratic countries are among the most generous across all European welfare states. They provide benefits that amount to approximately 30 per cent of the average wage in the respective countries (OECD, 2024). Moreover, active labour market policies in Denmark and Sweden promote employment among young people, while simultaneously providing them with unemployment insurance schemes as a safety net (ibid.). For family-related policies, social democratic countries are distinguished by their accessibility and high coverage of formal childcare (European Commission, 2019). Furthermore, these countries implement generous policies for parental leave with remuneration, which can reach up to 100 per cent of the previous income in some cases (Dobrotić et al., 2024). In this regard, parents, particularly women, either young or not, are generally socially secured in social democratic countries.

As opposed to social democratic countries, Southern European, Central and Eastern European countries are predominantly among the least generous welfare states for young people (OECD, 2024). Family policies are also generally limited in these countries (Frejka & Gietel-Basten, 2016). Conservative welfare regimes also tend to exhibit a lower degree of generosity in comparison to social democratic countries (Rizzi & Rees, 2021). In addition, certain countries (e.g., France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) may exclude young people from accessing non-contributory benefits, such as guaranteed minimum income schemes (OECD, 2024). However, family cash benefits are higher in conservative countries than in social democratic countries. Finally, the generosity level of contributory benefits for young people,

such as unemployment insurance, varies substantially within the liberal countries: The United Kingdom is among the least generous, while Ireland stands out as one of the most generous.

The welfare regime, with its specific policies designed to assist young people in transition to adulthood may, in turn, serve to moderate the general age differences in subjective socio-economic insecurity that we expected (H1a & H1b), as outlined previously. Individuals from social democratic countries would feel less socio-economically insecure about their future, compared to the other four welfare regimes. Furthermore, social democratic countries ensure social security for young people in transition to adulthood and foster universal equality, a phenomenon less evident in the other welfare regimes. The extent to which age differences in subjective insecurity vary across welfare regimes may remain an empirical question. However, we expect that the social democratic model would substantially reduce age differences in subjective insecurity. This leads to our following hypothesis:

H2: Age differences in subjective socio-economic insecurity are *least* substantial in *social democratic* countries than in the other welfare regimes.

2.3 Welfare regimes during periods of crisis

To analyse subjective socio-economic insecurity in times of crisis over the past two decades, we focus on three different periods of crisis. These includes the 2008 *financial crisis*, the recent *COVID-19 pandemic* since early 2020, and *Russia's invasion of Ukraine* since early 2022. We focus on these three crises considering the similarities and differences in their consequences on national economies and/or labour markets. The pandemic had not only severe health but also economic and labour market consequences on a global scale, which is, to some extent, comparable to the financial crisis. The Russia-Ukraine war, in turn, caused an energy crisis and a surge in inflation across Europe. In general, we expect *increasing* subjective socio-economic insecurity during each of these crises. We emphasise the disparities among European countries in terms of their responses to the respective crises and the role of the welfare regime in mitigating these crises' impacts.

During the financial crisis, government responses were generally correspondent to the severity of the crisis's impact on each country (Helgason, 2019) and were largely consistent with each country's existing welfare regime (Blum et al., 2014). Consequently, in the majority of European countries, public expenditure on, e.g., family, exhibited modest growth during the year of the crisis or in the subsequent years (OECD, 2025). The exception is Southern European countries, where such expenditure remained almost negligible (ibid.), despite the fact that these countries, particularly Greece, were most affected by the financial crisis (Helgason, 2019).

Austerity measures became more pronounced in the second stage of the crisis for all European countries, such as the postponement of planned expansions, cuts to family benefits, and reductions in parental leave (Blum et al., 2014; Gauthier, 2010; Richardson, 2010). In light of these circumstances, we assume an increase in subjective socio-economic insecurity during the financial crisis across all European welfare regimes. A high level of subjective insecurity may persist for several years, particularly in Southern European countries.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, restrictive measures of mobility adopted by national governments were also somewhat related to the welfare regime (Egger et al., 2021; Rausis & Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, 2021). By the end of March 2020, fewer mobility restrictions have been observed in liberal countries. A low to intermediate level of restrictions was observed in social democratic and conservative welfare states, with the exception of Belgium, where measures were notably stringent. In addition, stricter restrictions were implemented in Southern European, and Central and Eastern European countries. Over time, there has been a shift from considerable variation in national responses at the onset of the pandemic toward greater convergence in policy choices (Rausis & Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, 2021).

The restrictive measures in response to the pandemic have had significant economic consequences, most notably reflected in a general increase in the unemployment rate across countries (Ebbinghaus & Lehner, 2022). Differences across countries should be linked to the implementation of job retention schemes designed to preserve employment and support firms in response to the pandemic. Such measures were widely adopted in conservative and liberal countries (Costa Dias et al., 2020; Ebbinghaus & Lehner, 2022). Benefiting from EU support (i.e., the SURE instrument), Southern European countries also adopted or expanded job retention schemes. In contrast, such schemes were less commonly used in Central and Eastern European, as well as in social democratic countries (Ebbinghaus & Lehner, 2022). Nevertheless, the generous welfare provision of the social democratic model was effective in mitigating the pandemic's socio-economic consequences (ibid.). Under these circumstances, the pandemic would have led to increasing subjective socio-economic insecurity among Europeans, similar to the financial crisis, with potential variations across welfare regimes.

The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war at the beginning of 2022 did not have direct economic or labour market consequences. However, the war may have increased subjective insecurity due to its life-threatening nature and consequences on the destabilisation of macro-structural contexts, while the pandemic is still ongoing. Furthermore, the war provoked an energy crisis, causing a surge in inflation across Europe. This should further intensify subjective financial insecurity.

In explaining cross-country differences in subjective socio-economic insecurity since the war outbreak, we first expect that the country's geographic proximity to Russia or Ukraine should play a role. We assume higher levels of subjective insecurity in the neighbouring countries, predominantly in Central and Eastern Europe, but also in Northern Europe such as Finland. In addition, discrepancies may become evident among welfare regimes in the reduction of reliance on Russian fossil fuels and the promotion of a transition towards clean energy in the broader context of climate change. Scholars posited that social-democratic countries should be better positioned to evolve a transition towards 'eco, ecological, or green states' (Bäckstrand & Kronsell, 2015). However, in social democratic countries, high levels of social performance are associated with substantial carbon and material footprints (García-García et al., 2022). This ambivalence between social welfare and energy transition may be further intensified by the acute energy crisis. From the citizens' perspective, this may, in turn, raise their subjective insecurity, particularly regarding their future financial situation.

In conclusion, we propose the following hypotheses regarding subjective socio-economic insecurity during different periods of crisis and the role of the welfare regime:

H3: Individuals are *more* likely to exhibit subjective socio-economic insecurity during periods of crisis, whereas the rise in subjective insecurity *varies* across crises and welfare regimes; it is particularly substantial in *Southern European* countries during the *financial crisis*.

H4: In *social democratic* countries, the rise in subjective socio-economic insecurity across different crises is overall *least* evident compared to the other welfare regimes; however, since the *Russia-Ukraine war*, the rise in subjective *financial* insecurity is more evident in social democratic countries.

3 Data and methods

We utilise individual-level data from the Eurobarometer surveys conducted between 2004 and 2023. Eurobarometer carries out multiple surveys each year. In particular, the Standard Eurobarometer is surveyed biannually, i.e., in spring and in autumn. For each survey, a cross-sectional, representative probability sample is drawn from each country or territory, predominantly in EU member states. Detailed information on all surveys used in the analysis is available in the technical appendix (Appendix B). We focus on respondents aged between 18 and 64 years and categorise them into four age groups: 18–24, 25–39, 40–54, and 55–64. The objective is to examine subjective socio-economic insecurity across the different age groups. We further exclude inactive individuals, including retired and house persons, since one of our

theoretical premises is that young people tend to have unfavourable conditions in the labour market. At the country level, we focus exclusively on the 27 EU member states and the United Kingdom to ensure the continuity of data over time. We employ the cross-national weights throughout our analysis. After data cleaning, the sample comprises a total of 701,216 individuals, ranging from 0.1 per cent in Malta to 16.5 per cent in Germany.

The Eurobarometer is a unique data source that includes the same measures of subjective socio-economic insecurity in its standard surveys and in some special surveys conducted additionally. This enables a comparative perspective on analysis across both country and time. We can identify changes in subjective insecurity during the different periods of crises that have occurred over the past two decades, i.e., the 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine war. In 2022, two surveys containing items of subjective insecurity took place: The first survey (EB96.3) was conducted from 18 January to 14 February, before the outbreak of the war, while the second one (EB97.5) was conducted after, from June to July. We differentiate the period before and after the war outbreak in 2022 from each other, and pool the data for each of the remaining years from 2004 to 2023.⁵ By undertaking this, we are able to disentangle the potential impact of the war from that of the pandemic on subjective insecurity.

In each survey, respondents were asked whether they expected their personal employment situation and their household's financial situation, respectively, to be better, worse, or the same in the next twelve months. The items capture both the employment and financial dimensions of subjective socio-economic insecurity. We define it as 'subjective employment or financial insecurity' when respondents expected the respective situation to get worse. Therefore, we employ two dichotomic dependent variables, denoting whether respondents exhibit subjective insecurity or not. Of all respondents, 12.3 per cent exhibit subjective employment insecurity and 17.6 per cent exhibit subjective financial insecurity.

In addition to the age group, which is our independent variable, we account for further individual socio-demographics that may play a role in influencing subjective insecurity. Table A1 in the appendix presents the summary statistics for all variables, overall and by age group. Among others, individuals' objective socio-economic conditions are measured by their occupation and education. As previously stated, we exclude retired and house persons from the analysis. We divide the remaining respondents into the following five occupational categories:

⁵ The sample size for each year varies considerably, between 1.9 per cent (2004) and 7.8 per cent (2009) of all respondents, depending on the number of included surveys each year. For 2022, each of the two surveys (before and after the war outbreak) constitutes approximately 2 per cent of all respondents.

white-collar workers, the self-employed, manual workers, unemployed persons, and students. We also include the unemployed and students in the analysis of subjective employment insecurity, as both groups, even though not working at the time of the survey, can expect changes in their future employment situation. Regarding education, we distinguish between respondents who have obtained tertiary education and those who have not. We include gender, marital status, and the presence of children (aged up to 14) in the household as further controls.

Despite the absence of specific measures of household composition, the Eurobarometer data contain information on the number of persons in the household aged over 14 and the number aged up to 14. Based on this information and respondents' marital status, we are able to roughly identify those who also live with people other than their children or spouse/partner. These other people are very likely to be parents for the two younger age groups (18–24 and 25–39), denoting potential co-living with parents. In a robustness check, we employ this measure to examine whether subjective socio-economic insecurity among the two younger groups is associated with co-living with parents.

At the country level, we group the 28 European countries by the welfare regime: social democratic, conservative, Southern European, Central and Eastern European, and liberal countries.⁶ We aim to investigate the extent to which the welfare regime may influence subjective insecurity across different age groups and periods of crisis. In addition, we conduct a robustness check to include three national indicators obtained from the Eurostat data, i.e., GDP per capita, inflation rate, and unemployment rate, and we account for changes in these indicators from 2004 to 2023.⁷ We test whether the potential differences in subjective insecurity across welfare regimes can be explained by changes in the national indicators due to the different crises occurred over the past two decades.

We estimate linear probability models and present results in terms of probability changes (Table 1) and predicted probabilities (all figures) in Section 4. Although our dependent variable is dichotomous, linear probability models should be favoured over logistic regression models, since the former produces unbiased and consistent estimates across models regarding the average effect of a variable on outcome probability (Mood, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010). We

⁶ Social democratic countries include Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), and Sweden (SE); conservative countries include Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), France (FR), Germany (DE), Luxembourg (LU), and Netherlands (NL); Southern European countries include Cyprus (CY), Greece (EL), Italy (IT), Malta (MT), Portugal (PT), and Spain (ES); Central and Eastern European countries include Bulgaria (BG), Czechia (CZ), Croatia (HR), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK), and Slovenia (SI); liberal countries include the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland (IE).

⁷ For the UK, Eurostat only provides data up to 2019. The Eurostat codes are *nama_10_pc* (GDP per capita), *prc_hicp_aind* (inflation rate), as well as *une_rt_a_h* and *une_rt_a* (unemployment rate).

estimate clustered robust standard errors to account for the correlation of observations within the same year and within the same country.

To test our hypotheses, we consider and interact with the different levels of our data – individuals, countries, welfare regimes, and time – in various ways. First, we conduct descriptive analysis to examine trends in subjective socio-economic insecurity across countries over the past two decades. Second, we investigate the overall age differences in subjective insecurity across countries and time, while accounting for individual covariates. In this general model, we include dummy variables for all countries and all years to account for the possibility that the population has different distributions across countries and years (Wooldridge, 2019). Furthermore, we interact age groups with time, thereby showcasing subjective insecurity among different age groups across different periods of crisis. Finally, we stratify the analysis by the welfare regime and test for each welfare regime the interaction between age group and time across countries. This enables us to address the role of the welfare regime in influencing changes of subjective insecurity over time and differences across age groups.

4 Results


4.1 Descriptive statistics: Subjective insecurity over the past two decades

Fig. 1 provides an overview of the levels and trends of subjective socio-economic insecurity from 2004 to 2023 across 28 European countries. The percentage of individuals feeling insecure varied from 8.4 to 15.9 regarding personal employment situation and from 11.4 to 29.8 regarding the household's financial situation.

Across all years, individuals felt on average more insecure about their household's financial than personal employment situation. In line with our general expectation, both subjective employment and financial insecurity increased since the financial crisis, the pandemic, and the Russian-Ukraine war, respectively. The increases across crises were similar in subjective employment insecurity, while the different crises seem to have impacted subjective financial insecurity to different degrees: Subjective financial insecurity increased substantially in 2008 and even more so in the summer of 2022, right after the war outbreak, leading to the peak over the past two decades. In summer 2022, almost one third of Europeans expected their household's financial situation to get worse in the next year, around 11 percentage points higher than the share in the beginning of 2022, prior to the war. In contrast, there was a relatively small increase during the pandemic, compared to the other two crises. Furthermore, increases in both subjective financial and employment insecurity were rather short-term, as the share of individuals who felt insecure already declined in the subsequent year,

though not fully returned to the pre-crisis levels. One exception was that, after the financial crisis, subjective employment insecurity continued to increase in 2009 and remained at a high level in subsequent years.

Fig. 1 Trends of subjective socio-economic insecurity, 2004–2023 across Europe



Notes: This figure illustrates the average share of individuals across 28 European countries (EU27 & UK) from 2004 to 2023 who expected their personal employment and their household's financial situation, respectively, to get worse in the next year; country dummies included; descriptive statistics using weights, 95% CI.

Taking these overall trends as a starting point, we examine in the following how subjective socio-economic insecurity among younger adults varies from that of their older counterparts. Furthermore, we investigate the role of the welfare regime in influencing the age differences.

4.2 Subjective insecurity across different age groups

In this section, we analyse age differences in subjective socio-economic insecurity across European countries over the past two decades. We examine the overall age differences across time and the extent to which the age differences may vary across different periods of crisis.

Table 1 presents the multivariate results on the overall age differences in subjective employment and financial insecurity, respectively. We include country and year dummies in all models. The results demonstrate that younger adults, particularly the youngest group aged 18–

24, are less likely to feel insecure about both their future employment and financial situation. Compared to individuals aged 40–54, the youngest group are 4.0 percentage points less likely to feel insecure about their personal employment and 6.6 percentage points less likely to feel insecure about their household's financial situation, as shown in columns (1) and (4). The second young group (25–39) are also 2.7 percentage points less likely to feel insecure about the employment and 3.6 percentage points less likely to feel insecure financially. In contrast, older adults aged 55–64 are 1.2 and 2.1 percentage points more likely to feel insecure about their employment and financial situation, respectively, compared to those aged 40–54. All these age differences are statistically significant at the one per cent level.

The coefficients of all four age groups did not change substantially and remained highly significant when including occupation (columns (2) and (5)) and further individual controls (columns (3) and (6)), i.e., education level, gender, marital status, and the presence of children in the household. This indicates that the age differences in subjective insecurity could not be explained by individuals' current occupation or other characteristics, although these characteristics play a role in influencing subjective insecurity. Among others, unemployed persons are particularly more likely to feel insecure: They are 10.0 and 9.6 percentage points more likely to feel insecure about their future employment and financial situation, respectively, compared to white collar workers (columns (3) and (6), $p < 0.001$). Self-employed persons, manual workers, and students are also more likely to feel socio-economically insecure than white collars. In contrast, high-educated individuals are less likely to feel insecure. Compared to married individuals or those who live with the partner, single individuals are less likely to feel socio-economically insecure, while divorced or separated ones are more likely to feel insecure. Women and individuals with small children in the household are also more likely to feel financially insecure. When accounting for these individual factors, younger adults are still less likely than older ones to exhibit subjective socio-economic insecurity. As displayed in columns (3) and (6), the size of the coefficients for the youngest group (-0.047 and -0.071, $p < 0.001$) are the second largest across all coefficients, following the coefficients for the unemployed.


Table 1 Determinants of subjective socio-economic insecurity across countries and time

	Personal employment			HH financial		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Ref. Age 40–54</i>						
Age 18–24	-0.040*** (0.002)	-0.049*** (0.002)	-0.047*** (0.002)	-0.066*** (0.002)	-0.076*** (0.003)	-0.071*** (0.003)
Age 25–39	-0.027*** (0.001)	-0.028*** (0.001)	-0.024*** (0.001)	-0.036*** (0.002)	-0.038*** (0.002)	-0.032*** (0.002)
Age 55–64	0.012*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.018*** (0.002)
<i>Ref. White collars</i>						
Self-employed		0.015*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)		-0.003 (0.002)	-0.005* (0.002)
Manual workers		0.031*** (0.001)	0.023*** (0.001)		0.035*** (0.002)	0.024*** (0.002)
Unemployed		0.107*** (0.002)	0.100*** (0.002)		0.105*** (0.003)	0.096*** (0.003)
Students		0.003 (0.003)	0.020*** (0.003)		0.003 (0.004)	0.028*** (0.004)
<i>Ref. No tertiary educ.</i>						
With tertiary educ.			-0.028*** (0.001)			-0.036*** (0.002)
<i>Ref. Male</i>						
Female			0.000 (0.001)			0.007*** (0.001)
<i>Ref. Married/liv. with partner</i>						
Single			-0.004* (0.002)			-0.009*** (0.002)
Divorced/separated			0.011*** (0.002)			0.022*** (0.003)
Widow			0.007 (0.005)			0.016** (0.006)
Other			-0.025*** (0.006)			-0.025** (0.008)
<i>Ref. No child. in HH</i>						
With child. in HH			-0.002 (0.001)			0.004* (0.002)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.033	0.042	0.044	0.035	0.043	0.045
Obs.	701,216	701,216	701,216	701,216	701,216	701,216

Notes: Linear probability models with clustered robust standard errors, weights applied; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Fig. 2 depicts the predicted probability of subjective socio-economic insecurity across different age groups from 2004 to 2023, illustrating age differences across different periods of crisis. We include country dummies and individual controls in the models. Confirming our previous findings, we observe a general pattern that the older the individuals, the more likely they are to feel insecure about their employment and financial situation. However, there has been a tendency towards convergence across age groups over time. The disparities among the age groups were most pronounced in 2004 and have since diminished, particularly in recent years and with regard to subjective financial insecurity. Furthermore, all four age groups experienced an increase in both employment and financial insecurity in 2008, 2020, and the summer of 2022, i.e., in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine war, respectively.

Fig. 2 Predicted probability of subjective insecurity by age group, 2004–2023 across Europe



Notes: Country dummies and individual controls (occupation, education, gender, marital status, and children in the household) included; weights applied, 95% CI.

In conclusion, our results reveal that, despite the potentially unfavourable employment situation, younger adults, especially the youngest ones (18–24), are less likely to exhibit subjective insecurity. The finding is consistent with our hypothesis H1b, thereby rejecting our hypothesis that younger adults are more likely to feel insecure (H1a). The observed age differences in subjective insecurity are not driven by other age-related life events such as getting married or having children. This lends support to our assumption that young people tend to hold generally optimistic views about their future prospects. Consequently, subjective insecurity

tends to rise with age. This association is evident in periods without as well as with crises, although all age groups are more likely to feel insecure during a crisis. The age differences in subjective insecurity, particularly subjective financial insecurity, have diminished over the past two decades. In light of the multiple crises in recent years, we assume that the younger generation may become less optimistic about their future, thereby resulting in a tendency towards convergence in subjective insecurity across age groups.


4.3 Age differences by the welfare regime

In this section, we investigate the extent to which age differences in subjective socio-economic insecurity vary across five different European welfare regimes. We run analysis for each welfare regime separately and include country dummies within each regime.

Fig. 3 illustrates subjective financial insecurity across different age groups for each welfare regime from 2004 to 2023, accounting for individual controls. Across all years, the figure demonstrates no substantial differences in subjective financial insecurity across age groups in social democratic countries. In contrast, the general pattern we found previously, i.e., younger adults are less likely to feel insecure than older ones, holds true in the other four welfare regimes. The age differences are particularly pronounced in conservative as well as Central and Eastern European countries, and less so in Southern European countries. Consistent with our previous finding, a tendency towards convergence across age groups over time is evident in these three welfare regimes. In liberal countries, we as well observe the expected pattern regarding the general age differences in subjective insecurity. The difference between the youngest group (18–24) and the other age groups remained relatively stable over time, though it is often statistically insignificant.

In social democratic countries, subjective financial insecurity among all age groups remained at a relatively low level and did not increase substantially until the summer of 2022, shortly after the outbreak of the war. The financial crisis and the pandemic appear to have had no impact on subjective insecurity in these countries. In contrast, there has been an increase in subjective financial insecurity during the respective crises in the other four welfare regimes. The increase was most substantial after the war outbreak and least during the pandemic in conservative, Central and Eastern European, and liberal countries. In Southern European countries, the financial crisis seems to have had a larger impact on subjective financial insecurity, compared to the other two crises. Notably, subjective insecurity increased again in 2012 in these countries, reaching its peak in the past 20 years. This could be attributed to the eurozone crisis, which hit Southern European countries most severely.

Fig. 3 Predicted probability of subjective financial insecurity by age group 2004–2023, stratified by welfare regime



Notes: Stratified analysis by welfare regime; country dummies and individual controls (occupation, education, gender, marital status, and children in the household) included in all models; weights applied, 95% CI.

The results are overall similar regarding subjective employment insecurity, as presented in Fig. A1 in the appendix. One deviating result is that subjective employment insecurity in social democratic countries remained at a low level across all years, including summer 2022, though a minimal increase was observed among the youngest group in the latter period.

Our results reveal that, in all welfare regimes except for social democratic countries, younger adults are less likely to feel socio-economically insecure. The results lend support to our hypothesis that age differences in subjective insecurity are least substantial in social democratic countries (H2). Furthermore, we provide evidence confirming our last two pairs of hypotheses (H3 & H4): All age groups were more likely to feel socio-economically insecure during periods of crisis, and the rise in subjective insecurity fluctuated across crises and welfare regimes. In particular, the rise was more substantial during the financial crisis in Southern European countries. Regarding subjective financial insecurity, the rise was more evident after the war outbreak in all other welfare regimes, including the social democratic countries. Nevertheless, the rise in subjective financial and employment insecurity across different crises was overall least evident in social democratic countries. To conclude, the welfare regime, as expected, plays a role in influencing subjective socio-economic insecurity during crises and the age differences in such insecurity.

5 Robustness checks

We acknowledge two relevant open questions derived from our findings. *First*, could the age differences in subjective insecurity be primarily driven by the phenomenon that younger adults are more likely to be socio-economically dependent on their parents? In addition to the potential financial support from parents, younger adults, in particular the youngest group (18–24), are more likely to live in the parental home, thereby reducing their economic burdens. Consequently, they may feel less socio-economically insecure when living with their parents, especially during periods of crisis. *Second*, could the differences in subjective insecurity observed across welfare regimes be more attributed to specific macro-indicators than the welfare regime itself? The crises over the past two decades have had a considerable impact on national indicators, such as GDP, inflation, and unemployment, which consequently influence individuals' subjective socio-economic insecurity (e.g., Akaeda & Schöneck, 2022), independently of their objective socio-economic situation. The development of the national indicators varied across different crises and countries, whereas the welfare regime plays a role in mitigating the impact of the crises. In this regard, the welfare regime may have a rather indirect influence on subjective insecurity.

We conduct robustness checks to address these two issues. Due to the data limitation, we can obtain only rough information on co-living with parents, based on data regarding the persons in the household and marital status, as described in Section 3. We utilise this as a proxy for socio-economic dependency on parents and conduct analysis exclusively on the two younger groups (18–24 and 25–39). Fig. 4 illustrates the results on the differences in subjective insecurity from 2004 to 2023 among younger adults living or not with their parents. For both younger groups, we find no substantial differences in subjective employment or financial insecurity across all years between those who live with their parents and those who do not. The only exception was observed in the summer of 2022: Compared to the beginning of 2022, the youngest group (18–24) was significantly more likely to feel insecure about both their employment and financial situation when not living with their parents. In contrast, subjective insecurity did not change substantially among those living with the parents. As a result, in summer 2022, the youngest group who did not live with their parents are significantly more likely to feel financially insecure than those living with the parents. There was still no significant difference between the two group regarding subjective employment insecurity. The results suggest that the Russia-Ukraine war may have more impacted the youngest ones who did not live with their parents. However, this impact seemed to be only temporary, as their subjective insecurity decreased substantially in 2023, back to the pre-war level. Overall, we find no evidence of a systematic pattern that living with the parents influences subjective socio-economic insecurity among younger adults.

In the second robustness check, we test subjective insecurity among younger and older adults over the past two decades for each welfare regime. We employ the same models as in Fig. 3 (Section 4.3), but we additionally control for three macro indicators obtained from Eurostat for respective countries in each year from 2004 to 2023: GDP per capita, inflation rate, and unemployment rate.⁸ For liberal countries, we obtain trends until 2019, as Eurostat did not provide data for the UK since 2020. As illustrated in Fig. 5, the results show that the trends in subjective financial insecurity across different welfare regimes remain highly consistent after including the macro indicators.⁹ Furthermore, the different patterns in the age differences between social democratic countries and the other four welfare regimes persist: In social democratic countries, we observe no substantial age differences in subjective financial


⁸ Fig. A3 in the appendix presents the trends in the macro indicators for each county, grouped by welfare regime.

⁹ The macro indicators also have an impact on subjective insecurity. However, controlling for these indicators only changes marginally the absolute values regarding the predicted probability of subjective insecurity among different age groups across time.

insecurity across all years. In contrast, subjective insecurity tends to increase with age in all other welfare regimes. The results are very similar with regard to subjective employment insecurity (see Fig. A2 in the appendix). Additional analysis reveals that changes in the macro indicators over the past 20 years have been overall similar across welfare regimes. As illustrated in Fig. A3, also social democratic countries were substantially impacted by the different crises, particularly in terms of rising inflation and unemployment, although the impacts may not be as substantial as in other welfare regimes. Notwithstanding this fact, subjective insecurity among individuals from social democratic countries remained at a low level across all age groups.


In summary, the robustness checks provide further support for our main findings. The general age differences in subjective insecurity cannot be explained by other age-related life events, including the phenomenon that younger adults tend to live with parents. In addition, differences in subjective insecurity across welfare regimes cannot be attributed to specific macro indicators or their changes over time. We conclude that the welfare regime can play a crucial role in mitigating subjective socio-economic insecurity and age differences in such insecurity during periods of crisis.

Fig. 4 Predicted probability of subjective socio-economic insecurity among younger adults living or not living with parents, 2004–2023 across Europe



Notes: Country dummies and individual controls (occupation, education, gender, marital status, and children in the household) included; weights applied, 95% CI.

Fig. 5 Predicted probability of subjective financial insecurity by age group 2004–2023, stratified by welfare regime, adding macro indicators



Notes: Stratified analysis by welfare regime, controlling for macro-indicators (national GDP per capita, inflation rate, and unemployment rate); country dummies and individual controls (occupation, education, gender, marital status, and children in the household) included in all models; using weights, 95% CI.

6 Discussion and conclusion

Our study contributes to the literature by examining subjective socio-economic insecurity among younger adults in comparison to their older counterparts during three different periods of crisis over the past two decades: the 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the latter of which provoked an energy crisis and inflation across Europe. Furthermore, we addressed the moderating role of European welfare regimes in influencing age differences in subjective socio-economic insecurity and the impact of the different crises on such insecurity. To this end, we conducted analysis using Eurobarometer data from 2004 to 2023 across 28 European countries. We focused on subjective socio-economic insecurity in terms of downward future expectations regarding one's personal employment and household's financial situation.

Our results demonstrated a tendency of subjective socio-economic insecurity to increase – rather than decrease – with age. This can be hardly explained by the employment situation or further events in transition to adulthood, such as getting married and having children. The general pattern that younger adults are less likely to feel insecure was evident throughout the observed period, also during the respective crises. The findings lend support to our assumption that younger adults generally hold more optimistic views about their future socio-economic prospects, even though they are more likely to encounter disadvantageous labour market opportunities when compared to their older counterparts.

In periods of crisis, all age groups exhibited heightened levels of subjective insecurity, with considerable variation across crises and welfare regimes. The rise in subjective employment insecurity was comparable across the three crises, while the rise in subjective financial insecurity was substantially smaller during the pandemic. Our findings indicate that the social democratic model should have played a most significant role in mitigating subjective employment and financial insecurity, and its age differences: We found substantial age differences in all welfare regimes except for social democratic countries. Moreover, subjective insecurity remained at a low level in social democratic countries. These differences cannot be attributed to specific macro-economic indicators (i.e., GDP, inflation, and unemployment), suggesting a role of the welfare regime itself in influencing subjective insecurity. Nevertheless, the Russia-Ukraine war, together with the energy crisis and inflation, appears to have served as an external shock to Europeans, including those from social democratic countries, resulting in a short-term rise in their subjective financial insecurity.

Our study is subject to some data-related limitations. *First*, it was not possible to fully account for the probability of younger adults remaining in the parental home, which may then

lead to a lower level of subjective insecurity. In a robustness check, we found no systematic evidence to suggest that living with parents plays a role in subjective insecurity among younger adults. However, based on the available data, we were only able to roughly differentiate between younger adults who live with their parents and those who do not. *Second*, due to the cross-sectional nature of the Eurobarometer, our study did not establish causal relationships between subjective insecurity and the respective crises, nor the developments of subjective insecurity from a longitudinal life-course perspective. Nevertheless, we identified age differences in subjective insecurity across European welfare regimes over the past two decades. Our findings provide important descriptive evidence on rising subjective insecurity across different age groups during periods of crisis, which are likely to be attributed to the respective crises.

In conclusion, despite of the potentially unfavourable labour market situation for young people in transition to adulthood, they hold more optimistic views about their future compared to their older counterparts, even during periods of crisis. However, it should be stressed that we observed a trend towards convergence in subjective insecurity across age groups over time. This may suggest a decline in general optimism among recent generations in the context of the multiple crises in recent years across Europe, including the pandemic and the war, as well as refugee crises and climate change. While this is beyond the scope of this paper, future research may focus on subjective insecurity across different cohorts to examine this phenomenon of convergence and potential mechanisms behind it. A further pertinent domain of research would concern the analysis of the consequences of the declining optimism among young people on their transition to adulthood, such as residential arrangements and family formation.

Compared to other European welfare regimes, the social democratic model appears to be the most effective in mitigating subjective socio-economic insecurity across age groups and periods of crisis. This can be attributed to its comprehensive social welfare, which serves to promote universal equality. In general, the welfare regime can play a crucial role in mitigating subjective insecurity in times of crisis, ensuring individuals' well-being that extends beyond objective factors of socio-economic insecurity.

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
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
Appendix A

Fig. A1 Predicted probability of subjective employment insecurity by age group 2004–2023, stratified by welfare regime



Notes: Stratified analysis by welfare regime, country dummies and individual controls included in all models; Using weights, 95% CI.


Fig. A2 Predicted probability of subjective employment insecurity by age group 2004–2023, stratified by welfare regime, adding macro indicators








Notes: Stratified analysis by welfare regime, controlling for macro indicators (national GDP per capita, inflation rate, and unemployment rate); country dummies and individual controls included in all models; using weights, 95% CI.

Fig. A3 Trends of macro indicators by country 2004–2023, stratified by welfare regime






GDP per capita (in 1000 Euros)



Inflation rate (in %)



Unemployment rate (in %)



Notes: Two-way scatter plots to illustrate trends of the respective macro indicators (GDP per capita, inflation rate, and unemployment rate) from 2004 to 2023 for 28 European countries (EU27 + UK), stratified by welfare regime.

Table A1 Summary statistics (in %) by age group

	18-24	25-39	40-54	55-64	Total
	10.9	37.7	37.9	13.4	100
	(N=58,620)	(N=249,585)	(N=275,406)	(N=117,605)	(N=701,216)
Subjective socio-economic insecurity					
Expect. personal employment sit. worse					
No	90.4	88.9	86.5	85.6	87.7
Yes	9.6	11.1	13.5	14.4	12.3
Expect. HH financial sit. worse					
No	87.0	84.0	80.6	78.9	82.4
Yes	13.0	16.0	19.4	21.1	17.6
Occupation					
White collars	18.8	40.2	40.4	36.9	37.5
Self-employed	3.2	10.3	14.5	17.6	12.1
Manual workers	34.2	33.5	34.8	33.6	34.1
Unemployed	19.9	12.0	10.2	12.0	12.2
Students	23.9	4.0	0.0	0.0	4.1
Tertiary education					
No	69.2	64.0	73.9	77.0	70.1
Yes	30.8	36.0	26.1	23.0	29.9
Gender					
Male	52.2	54.4	53.4	55.2	53.9
Female	47.8	45.6	46.6	44.8	46.1
Marital status					
Married/living with partner	32.5	68.0	75.4	73.3	67.7
Single	64.1	27.1	11.9	8.9	22.9
Divorced/separated	0.7	4.0	11.1	12.9	7.5
Widow	0.1	0.2	1.4	4.7	1.3
Other	2.5	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.6
Children <=14 in HH					
No	80.6	50.9	61.7	94.4	64.1
Yes	19.4	49.1	38.3	5.6	35.9

Notes: Weighted statistics across 28 European countries (EU27 + UK) and across years (2004–2023).

Appendix B: Overview of Eurobarometer Surveys (2004–2023) Included in the Analysis

- European Commission, Brussels. 2024. Eurobarometer 100.2 (2023). *GESIS, Köln. ZA8779 Datenfile Version 1.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.14363>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2024. Eurobarometer 99.4 (2023). *GESIS, Köln. ZA7997 Datenfile Version 1.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.14167>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2023. Eurobarometer 98.2 (2023). *GESIS, Köln. ZA7953 Datenfile Version 1.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.14081>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2023. Eurobarometer 97.5 (2022). *GESIS, Köln. ZA7902 Datenfile Version 1.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.14010>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2022. Eurobarometer 96.3 (2022). *GESIS, Köln. ZA7848 Datenfile Version 1.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13908>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2022. Eurobarometer 95.3 (2021). *GESIS, Köln. ZA7783 Datenfile Version 1.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13826>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2023. Eurobarometer 94.3 (2021). *GESIS, Cologne. ZA7780 Data file Version 2.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.14076>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2022. Eurobarometer 93.1 (2020). *GESIS, Köln. ZA7649 Datenfile Version 2.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13866>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2020. Eurobarometer 92.3 (2019). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7601 Data file Version 1.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13564>
- European Commission & European Parliament, Brussels. 2019. Eurobarometer 91.5 (2019). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7576 Data file Version 1.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13393>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2019. Eurobarometer 90.3 (2018). *GESIS, Cologne. ZA7489 Data file Version 1.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13254>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2023. Eurobarometer 89.1 (2018). *GESIS, Cologne. ZA6963 Data file Version 2.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.14082>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2022. Eurobarometer 88.3 (2017). *GESIS, Cologne. ZA6928 Data file Version 2.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13938>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2021. Eurobarometer 87.3 (2017). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6863 Data file Version 2.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13839>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2020. Eurobarometer 86.2 (2016). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6788 Data file Version 2.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13602>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2020. Eurobarometer 85.2 (2016). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6694 Data file Version 2.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13438>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2019. Eurobarometer 84.3 (2015). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6643 Data file Version 4.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13249>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2018. Eurobarometer 83.3 (2015). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5998 Data file Version 2.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13133>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2018. Eurobarometer 82.3 (2014). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5932 Data file Version 3.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13021>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2018. Eurobarometer 81.5 (2014). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5929 Data file Version 3.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12969>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2018. Eurobarometer 81.4 (2014). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5928 Data file Version 3.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12956>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2017. Eurobarometer 81.2 (March 2014). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5913 Data file Version 2.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12884>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2017. Eurobarometer 80.1 (2013). *GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5876 Datenfile Version 2.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12768>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2017. Eurobarometer 79.4 (2013). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5852 Data file Version 4.0.0.* <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12730>

- European Commission, Brussels. 2017. Eurobarometer 79.3 (2013). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA5689 Data file Version 2.0.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12718>
- European Commission, Brussels. 2015. Eurobarometer 78.1 (2012). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA5685 Data file Version 2.0.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12061>
- European Commission & European Parliament, Brussels. 2015. Eurobarometer 77.4 (2012). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA5613 Data file Version 3.0.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12049>
- European Commission. 2015. Eurobarometer 77.3 (2012). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA5612 Data file Version 2.0.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12050>
- European Commission & European Parliament, Brussels. 2014. Eurobarometer 76.3 (2011). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA5567 Data file Version 2.0.1. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12007>
- Europäische Kommission. 2014. Eurobarometer 75.4 (2011). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA5564 Data file Version 3.0.1. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11851>
- Europäische Kommission. 2014. Eurobarometer 75.3 (2011). *GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln*. ZA5481 Datenfile Version 2.0.1. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11852>
- Europäische Kommission. 2013. Eurobarometer 74.2 (2010). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA5449 Data file Version 2.2.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11626>
- Europäische Kommission. 2012. Eurobarometer 73.5 (Jun 2010). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA5235 Data file Version 4.0.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11432>
- Europäische Kommission. 2012. Eurobarometer 73.4 (May 2010). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA5234 Data file Version 2.0.1. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11479>
- Europäische Kommission. 2012. Eurobarometer 72.4 (Oct-Nov 2009). *GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln*. ZA4994 Datenfile Version 3.0.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11141>
- Europäische Kommission. 2012. Eurobarometer 71.3 (Jun-Jul 2009). *GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln*. ZA4973 Datenfile Version 3.0.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11135>
- Europäische Kommission. 2012. Eurobarometer 71.2 (May-Jun 2009). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA4972 Data file Version 3.0.2. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10990>
- Europäische Kommission. 2013. Eurobarometer 71.1 (Jan-Feb 2009). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA4971 Data file Version 4.0.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11756>
- Europäische Kommission. 2012. Eurobarometer 70.1 (Oct-Nov 2008). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA4819 Data file Version 3.0.2. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10989692>
- Europäische Kommission. 2013. Eurobarometer 69.2 (Mar-May 2008). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA4744 Data file Version 5.0.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11755>
- Europäische Kommission. 2012. Eurobarometer 68.1 (Sep-Nov 2007). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA4565 Data file Version 4.0.1. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10988>
- Europäische Kommission. 2012. Eurobarometer 67.2 (Apr-May 2007). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA4530 Data file Version 2.1.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10984>
- Europäische Kommission. 2012. Eurobarometer 66.3 (Nov-Dec 2006). *GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln*. ZA4528 Datenfile Version 2.0.1. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10982>
- Europäische Kommission. 2012. Eurobarometer 66.1 (Sep-Oct 2006). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA4526 Data file Version 1.0.1. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10980>
- Europäische Kommission. 2012. Eurobarometer 65.2 (Mar-May 2006). *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne*. ZA4506 Data file Version 1.0.1. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10974>
- Europäische Kommission. 2012. Eurobarometer 64.2 (Oct-Nov 2005). *GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln*. ZA4414 Datenfile Version 1.1.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10970>
- Europäische Kommission. 2012. Eurobarometer 63.4 (May-Jun 2005). *GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln*. ZA4411 Datenfile Version 1.1.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10968>
- Europäische Kommission. 2012. Eurobarometer 62.0 (Oct-Nov 2004). *GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln*. ZA4229 Datenfile Version 1.1.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10962>

Note: The harmonised Eurobarometer data 2004–2021 (see Russo, Luana & Bräutigam, Milena. 2023. Harmonized Eurobarometer 2004-2021. *GESIS, Köln. Datenfile Version 3.0.0*. <https://doi.org/10.7802/2539>) were not employed due to the absence of specific surveys and variables.

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