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MEDIOEVO

RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA MEDIEVALE

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PRESENTAZIONE

*[...] si cuius permittatur veterum libris quidvis pro arbitrio addere,
expungere, omnes omnium libri in dubium revocabuntur.*

*Theodorus Angelutius, Quod metaphysica sint eadem
quae physica nova sententia, Venetiis 1584, f. 4^r*

Le indagini sulla storia dei dibattiti circa la natura della metafisica e del suo oggetto costituiscono un caso esemplare della circolarità – problematica, poiché non sempre virtuosa – dei rapporti tra storiografia filosofica e teoresi. Il XX secolo ha visto la pubblicazione di studi di grande impegno concernenti le dottrine sulla natura della metafisica sviluppate dagli autori medievali e tardo-medievali (si pensi ai lavori di Albert Zimmermann, di Theo Kobusch e, in parte, di Ludger Honnefelder) e non sono mancate letture accurate delle tesi formulate, ad esempio, da Francisco Suárez (è il caso di Martin Grabmann e Frederick Copleston) o dagli autori protestanti (e si può ricordare a questo proposito Max Wundt). Ciononostante, non sono queste le opere che hanno maggiormente attratto l'interesse del pubblico dei "filosofi", né esse hanno modellato la pars valentior della storiografia posteriore. Un influsso ben più ampio è stato esercitato dalle rappresentazioni della storia della metafisica proposte da Martin Heidegger ed Étienne Gilson. Al primo si deve la tesi per cui la storia della metafisica risulta segnata, a partire perlomeno dall'età medievale, dall'accorpamento in un'unica scienza dello studio dell'ente in quanto ente (ontologia) e dello studio dell'ente primo (teologia razionale). Accorpamento funesto e ingiustificato, ad avviso del pensatore tedesco, e che egli riassume – risemantizzando un termine coniato da Kant – nella parola 'ontoteologia'. A Gilson si deve la tesi secondo la quale gli autori deuterostolastici (e specificamente Suárez) sviluppano un'ontologia "pura", ossia indipendente da ogni rapporto con l'effettivamente esistente; un'indipendenza che Gilson giudica nefanda.

Le letture della storia della filosofia proposte da questi due autori sono all'origine di una vasta saggistica che, per quanto all'interno del quadro interpretativo ora ricordato, ha ampliato il novero dei testi ritenuti meritevoli di

analisi, ha articolato, ricombinato e corroso i paradigmi "storiografici" originari e, soprattutto, ha tenuto vivo l'interesse per il tema dello sviluppo storico delle concezioni della natura della metafisica. Anche per questo il dibattito storiografico contemporaneo su questo argomento è, almeno in Europa, tutt'ora vivissimo. Sia qui sufficiente ricordare gli esiti del convegno "Metaphysica - sapientia-scientia divina: soggetto e statuto della filosofia prima nel Medioevo", tenutosi nel 2004 presso l'Università degli Studi di Bari e i cui atti sono stati pubblicati a cura di Pasquale Porro nell'annata 2005 della rivista «Quaestio», e i risultati del convegno "Nascita e trasformazioni dell'ontologia: secoli XVI-XX", tenutosi nel 2008 nuovamente presso l'Università degli Studi di Bari e i cui atti sono in corso di pubblicazione a cura di Costantino Esposito nell'annata 2009 della rivista «Quaestio».

Ciononostante, si può dubitare che i paradigmi interpretativi formulati da Heidegger e Gilson costituiscano una valida chiave di accesso alla realtà storica. La natura essenzialmente teoretica di quei paradigmi, l'esiguità delle basi testuali e documentali su cui essi si fondano, la loro incapacità di dar ragione di un numero sempre crescente di opere e dati suggeriscono di vedere in essi più due esempi di filosofia della storia che due ricostruzioni della storia della filosofia. Precisamente la volontà di non restare prigionieri di una storiografia governata da intenti teoretici e concentrata su pochi e predeterminati pensatori ha portato a dedicare due numeri di «Medioevo» alla storia delle dottrine sul soggetto/oggetto della metafisica. Il primo, concernente la storia della questione nel mondo arabo medievale, è stato pubblicato nel 2007 a cura di Cecilia Martini. Il secondo, dedicato allo sviluppo della questione nel periodo tra tardo medioevo e prima età moderna, è ora nelle mani del lettore. Entrambi i volumi intendono mettere a disposizione della comunità scientifica ricerche su pensatori e temi in precedenza solo parzialmente esplorati. Confidiamo che i saggi qui offerti portino alla luce la rilevanza storica di autori e dibattiti considerati fino a oggi "minori" e che contribuiscano a una rappresentazione più accurata, e per questo più interessante, della storia della metafisica.

MARCO FORLIVESI

CLAUS A. ANDERSEN

«METAPHYSICA SECUNDUM ETHYMON NOMINIS
DICITUR SCIENTIA TRANSCENDENS».
ON THE ETYMOLOGY OF 'METAPHYSICA'
IN THE SCOTIST TRADITION

INTRODUCTION

The title of this study is taken from a Scotist exposition of ontology from the middle of the 18th century (cfr. 4.1 below). At first sight it is no surprise that a Scotist should give this etymological explanation of '*metaphysica*', since Duns Scotus himself understood metaphysics exactly as a *scientia transcendens*. However, the history of the etymology of '*metaphysica*' within the Scotist tradition is complicated. The versions of this etymology are many. It is notable that this tradition was not taken into account in the influential paper by Hans Reiner on the interpretation of the title '*metaphysica*' from 1955. His aim was to trace the origin of the famous *Verlegenheitsbezeichnung* of metaphysics, whose proponents think that this science received its name simply because Andronicus of Rhodes, antique organizer of the extant writings of Aristotle, placed the books of Aristotle here in question "after physics".¹ Reiner found the origin of this historically important and until the present day, at least in classrooms, vivid explanation in the work of the Renaissance scholar Francesco Patrizi (1529-1597). However, along the

1. H. Reiner, *Die Entstehung der Lehre vom Bibliothekarischen Ursprung des Namens Metaphysik. Geschichte einer Wissenschaftslegende*, «Z. philos. Forsch.», 9 (1955), 77-99. Cfr. also Reiner's own interpretation of the origin of the title 'Metaphysics' in Id., *Die Entstehung und ursprüngliche Bedeutung des Namens Metaphysik*, «Z. philos. Forsch.», 8 (1954), 210-237, reprint in Fr.-P. Hager (ed.), *Metaphysik und Theologie des Aristoteles*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1969 (Wege der Forschung, 106), 139-174.

development and diffusion of this explanation other explanations of the title '*metaphysica*' still existed and even developed in their own way, as a look at the Scotist tradition clearly reveals.

The aim of this study is merely to investigate the etymology of '*metaphysica*' in the Scotist tradition. It is not a study of the development of metaphysics within the Scotist school over the centuries. But in so far as the way in which is spoken of metaphysics also reflects the understanding of this science, the history of its etymology does at least provide some material that would be relevant for such a study. To some readers it will also be a surprising documentation of the continuity of the Scotist tradition. I shall begin with recalling the etymological explanation of '*metaphysica*' in the prologue to Duns Scotus' *Metaphysical Questions*. After this, the immediate traditions of Duns Scotus' etymology are investigated. Then we turn to the etymologies of '*metaphysica*' in Scotist authors of the Baroque age. In a further step the etymologies of '*metaphysica*' in Scotist authors of the 18th century and later are investigated; in particular they are seen on the background of the general assimilation of the philosophy of Christian Wolff in academic philosophy on the European continent in this period. In so far as the last point is concerned, it seems to have been quite neglected in research so far. Therefore I shall finally at least document the shift in the metaphysical terminology and in the structure of this science as seen in some Scotist authors after the Christian Wolff reception in Catholic school philosophy of the 18th century.

I. THE VARIOUS VERSIONS OF DUNS SCOTUS' ETYMOLOGY OF '*METAPHYSICA*' IN THE PROLOGUE TO HIS *QUAESTIONES SUPER LIBROS METAPHYSICORUM ARISTOTELIS*

Let us briefly recall the context of the etymology of '*metaphysica*' in the prologue to Duns Scotus' *Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis*. The point of departure is the opening line of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, according to which «all men by nature desire to know». Duns Scotus explains that knowledge of the highest knowables (*maxime scibilia*) is most desirable. Highest knowable is on the one hand that without which other things cannot be known.

In this sense the most common concepts are highest knowables. On the other hand highest knowable is that, which can be known with the highest degree of certitude. These highest knowables are the first principles and causes. In both cases metaphysics – the most desired of the sciences – is about the highest knowable.² But it is only the first of these cases that leads to our etymology and to the explanation of metaphysics as *scientia transcendens*. Within this concept of metaphysics that which can be known with the highest certitude, the most knowable in the second sense, will indeed also be considered, but only via consideration of the most knowable in the first sense. Now, Scotus distinguishes between metaphysics that can be known in itself, «metaphysica secundum se scibilis», and metaphysics such as we know it, «sic eam scimus». Point of departure of the first kind of metaphysics is the first causes and principles of being, whereas metaphysics such as we know it begins with a consideration of the most common concept. What first offers itself to a «metaphysica secundum se scibilis», namely the first causes and principles of being, is drawn into the field of metaphysics «sic eam scimus» because it falls within the most common concept that is considered in this kind of metaphysics.³

The highest knowable in the first sense Duns Scotus understands with Avicenna as something most common, i.e. being as being and that which follows being as its property («ens in quantum ens, et quaecumque consequuntur ens in quantum ens»). There has to be a science, which considers such things, as Aristotle says in the fourth book of his *Metaphysics*. At this place Duns Scotus follows both Avicenna and Aristotle.⁴ There has to be such a science because the more particular cannot be known when the more common is not known in advance. If each of the particular sciences (i.e. every *scientia particularis*) is not to consider what is

2. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, Prologus, n. 16, ed. G. Etzkorn et al., The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure (NY) 1997 (Opera philosophica, 3), 7-8.

3. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Met.*, Prologus, n. 27, 13.

4. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Met.*, Prologus, n. 17, 8. Duns Scotus quotes Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, I, cap. 5, ed. S. van Riet, Peeters-Brill, Louvain-Leiden 1977, 31-32, and Arist., *Metaph.* IV, I, 1003a21-22.

most common, it is necessary that *one* universal science (*scientia universalis*) considers being and the properties of being (*transcendentia*).⁵ At this point Duns Scotus gives the following etymological explanation of '*metaphysica*':

Et hanc scientiam vocamus metaphysicam, quae dicitur a 'meta', quod est 'trans', et 'ycos' 'scientia', quasi transcendens scientia, quia est de transcendentibus.⁶

Due to the fact that the expression '*scientia transcendens*' can be read as a general headline of the metaphysical project of Duns Scotus – as notably seen in the research of Ludger Honnefelder⁷ – this explanation has received a lot of attention in 20th century research. As Allan B. Wolter put this very sentence at the beginning of his popular compilation of Duns Scotus' *Philosophical writings* it has for many students of medieval philosophy undoubtedly been the very first words they read of Duns Scotus.⁸

Let us here consider the etymological part of the explanation. The very formulation of it has caused some confusion. The apparatus of the critical edition documents that some manuscripts have '*physis*' or '*phicos*' instead of '*ycos*'. The edition of Maurice O'Fihely (Muiris Ó Fithcheallaigh, Mauritius Hibernicus, or Mauritius de Portu) from 1497 has '*physis*'.⁹ The text which Hugh MacCaghwell

5. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Met.*, Prologus, n. 18, 8–9.

6. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Met.*, Prologus, n. 18, 9.

7. Cfr. L. Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit* (Duns Scotus – Suárez – Wolff – Kant – Peirce), Felix Meiner, Hamburg 1990 (Paradeigmata, 9), cfr. in particular the introduction XV–XVI; Id., *Metaphysics as a Discipline: From the "Transcendental Philosophy of the Ancients" to Kant's Notion of Transcendental Philosophy*, in R.L. Friedman – L.O. Nielsen (ed.), *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400–1700*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 2003 (The New Synthese Historical Library, 53), 53–74, in particular 57.

8. Cfr. John Duns Scotus, *Philosophical Writings*, ed. A.B. Wolter, Nelson, New York 1962, 2.

9. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones subtilissime super libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis*, Prologus, in Id., *Quaestiones subtilissime Scoti in Metaphysicam Aristotelis, eiusdem De primo rerum principio tractatus, atque Theoremata*, ed. Mauritius de Portu Hybernicus, Venetiis 1497, f. 2^{rb}. This edition was issued again already in 1499.

(Hugo Cavellus)¹⁰ prepared for the Wadding edition of the *Opera omnia* of Duns Scotus (Lyon 1639) is based on the former edition and also has 'physis'.¹¹ The editors of the modern critical edition (Girard Etzkorn and his collaborators) decided for 'ycos'.¹² Another recent – uncritical – edition, the *Editio minor* (by Giovanni Lauriola), has 'phycos'.¹³ That the editors of the critical edition and of the *Editio minor* have decided for 'ycos' and 'phycos' and against the 'physis' version means that they have some reason to believe that the respective readings correspond to the authentic text of Duns Scotus. It is not at all the aim of this study to contradict this view. For our purpose it is enough to stress that all three versions are

10. On MacCaghwell's editing activities cfr. C. Giblin, *Hugh MacCaghwell OFM and Scotism at St. Anthony's College, Louvain*, in *De doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti. Acta Congressus Scotistici Internationalis Oxonii et Edimburgi 11-17 sept. 1966 celebrati*, vol. IV: *Scotismus decursu saeculorum*, Romae 1968 (*Studia scolastico-scotistica*, 4), 375-397, especially 391-394.

11. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones subtilissimae in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, Prologus, n. 5, in Id., *Opera omnia*, Lugduni 1639 (reprint Olms, Hildesheim 1968), vol. V, 507. Cfr. also John Duns Scotus, *Philosophical Writings*, 2. Wolter remarked: «The MSS read either *phicos* or *phycos*. The text is faulty here» (*ibi*, 165). Also É. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot. Introduction a ses positions fondamentales*, Vrin, Paris 1952 (*Études de philosophie médiévale*, 42), 185, decided for this reading and commented: «Si le texte suivant est correct, la connaissance du grec ne semble pas avoir été très précise dans les milieux où étudia Duns Scot». Gilson's comment seems applicable in all three cases, but unfortunately it does not provide us with any key to the terminology used by Duns Scotus.

12. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Met.*, Prologus, n. 18, ed. Etzkorn, 9. In her German translation of this passage M. Burger has adopted this reading (in M. Dreyer - H. Möhle, *Paradigmen des Philosophierens im Mittelalter. Kurseinheit 3: Johannes Duns Scotus*, Fernuniversität Hagen 1999, extensively quoted in M.B. Ingham, *Johannes Duns Scotus*, Aschendorf, Münster 2006 [Zugänge zum Denken des Mittelalters, 3], 47). Burger explains: «Das Suffix 'ycos', 'icos' dient im Griechischen der Bezeichnung der Zugehörigkeit zu einer Eigenschaft». This correct observation still does not seem to me to explain the precise use of 'ycos' in Scotus' text. Moreover the 'ycos' version of the etymology seems to me to intend the noun 'εἰκός'. This view is sustained by the general use of 'ycos' and 'icos' in later medieval scientific literature, especially as seen in Nicolas d'Orbelles (cfr. below). But as the background of the etymology really lies in the dark, other interpretations should be welcomed.

13. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, Prologus, n. 18, in Id., *Opera omnia. Editio minor*, vol. I, ed. G. Lauriola, Centro Studi Personalisti "Giovanni Duns Scoto" - Editrice A.G.A., Alberobello (Bari) 1998, 5.

found in the manuscripts and that it was the *'physis'* version which was handed down to the early modern period through the printed edition of Maurice O'Fihely.

Actually, the historical background of the etymological explanation of Duns Scotus really lies in the dark. All versions of Duns Scotus' etymology carry difficulties with them. It is strange that Duns Scotus should have spoken of *'ycos'* in this context. First of all, it is certainly a strange claim that the word *'metaphysica'* should be a combination of *'meta'* and *'ycos'* (i.e. the Greek noun *'εἰκός'*). Second, *'ycos'* seems to be mostly used not for 'science', but rather for 'probable proposition'. The apparatus of the critical edition, however, does provide evidence of the use of *'ycos'* in the sense of 'science' in medieval scientific literature,¹⁴ but as yet the combination of *'meta'* and *'ycos'* into *'metaphysica'* does not seem to have become known in any author before Scotus. The version chosen in the *Editio minor* would base itself on the Greek noun *'φῦκος'* ('eel grass', 'seaweed'). Possibly this is supposed to designate earthly science in a pejorative way. To my knowledge the combination of *'meta'* and *'phycos'* into *'metaphysica'* is not known from any other Latin scholastic source. Therefore the reading chosen in the *Editio minor* should be regarded as very doubtful. The last available opportunity, the one presented in the historical printed editions, has some more probability to it, because *'metaphysica'* is often interpreted as a combination of *'meta'* and *'physis'* (*φύσις*) in other Latin scholastic sources. Nevertheless, also this version is problematic

14. Cfr. the critical apparatus in Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Met.*, Prologus, n. 18, ed. Etzkorn, 9. For the use of *'ycos'* and *'icos'* in the 13th century see also J. Hamesse, *Les auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique*, Publications Universitaires, Louvain-Paris 1974 (Philosophes médiévaux, 17), 310. Cfr. also – in regard to the early works of Albertus Magnus – H. Anzulewicz, *De forma resultante in speculo. Die theologische Relevanz des Bildbegriffs und des Spiegelbildmodells in den Frühwerken des Albertus Magnus*, vol. II, Aschendorf, Münster 1999 (BGPhThM 53/II), 92–93. Let us add that in Laurentius de Londerio, *Quaestiones Physicorum*, I, q. 1 (edited in T. Dewender, *Das Problem des Unendlichen im ausgehenden 14. Jahrhundert. Eine Studie mit Textedition zum Physikkommentar des Lorenz von Lindores*, B.R. Grüner, Amsterdam-Philadelphia 2002 [Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, 36], 190, l. 88) an interesting interpretation of the title *'physica'* is found that involves both *'physis'* and *'ycos'*: «*physica dicitur a "physis" graece, quod est "naturale" latine, et "ycos" - "scientia", quasi "scientia naturalis"*».

because Duns Scotus directly translates the Greek word into '*scientia*', which is certainly not the meaning of 'φύσις' (though this interpretation of 'φύσις' was in fact proposed in a much later tradition, cfr. 4.2 below). Be that as it may, in the following let us focus on the tradition of the various versions of the etymological explanation of '*metaphysica*' within the Scotist school.

2. THE IMMEDIATE TRADITIONS TWO OF THE VERSIONS OF DUNS SCOTUS' ETYMOLOGY

Vis-à-vis the various versions of Scotus' etymology seen above, it brings some relief that only two of these versions of the etymological explanation of '*metaphysica*' have immediate traditions. Only two of the versions are known in Scotist metaphysical writings from the 14th century, at least as these are available in printed editions from the late 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century. Both traditions are also seen in Scotist metaphysical writings of the 15th century. The material presented in the following is representative, not exhaustive.¹⁵ Obviously, further findings are possible.¹⁶

2.1 In his *Quaestiones subtilissimae super duodecim libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis* Antonius Andreae († 1320) gives an etymological expla-

15. I did not find any trace of Scotus' etymology in the works of such distinguished Scotist authors as Trombetta, Tartaret, or Malafossa. This does not imply that it is not there. In the case of Tartaret and Malafossa, however, the reason probably is that they actually do not follow Scotus' idea of metaphysics as a *scientia transcendens*. This is easily seen in Malafossa, *Quaestio de subiecto metaphysicae* (cfr. the edition of this text in the present volume), nn. 27-28, where Malafossa, partly following Tartaret and Vigerius, directly rejects that metaphysics as a science of the transcendentals can be a real science in the strict Aristotelian sense. In this context Duns Scotus' etymological explanation would fit in rather badly.

16. It is also possible that manuscript research of the Scotist authors of the 14th century will reveal new aspects of the history of our etymology. The texts here presented were not standardized (except for Greek accents in them). Only obvious mistakes were corrected and the use of 'æ' and '&' modernized into 'ae' and 'et'. The following investigation is limited to our search for the etymology of '*metaphysica*'. For an inquiry on the subject of metaphysics in some of the works here examined cfr. M. Forlivesi, «*Quae in hac quaestione tradit Doctor videntur humanum ingenium superare*». Scotus, Andrés, Bonet, Zerbi, and Trombetta *Confronting the Nature of Metaphysics*, «*Quaestio*», 8 (2008), 219-278.

nation which is very close to the ‘*physis*’ version of the explanation of Duns Scotus. In his discussion of the real univocal concept of being as the object of metaphysics Antonius Andreae says:

Nam istam scientiam vocamus metaphysica quia dicitur a meta quod est trans et phisis quod est scientia quasi transcendens scientia quia est de transcendentibus.¹⁷

2.2 In comparison with Duns Scotus’ formulation of his etymological explanation of ‘*metaphysica*’, the version given by Nicolas Bonet († probably 1343) a little later is more independent than that of Antonius Andreae. In the first chapter of the first book of his metaphysics Bonet discusses the relation of metaphysics to the other sciences. The other sciences all consider terms resolvable to a first and irresolvable term and this term is the object of metaphysics. Bonet brings the ‘*ycos*’ version:

Notitia autem primi termini irresolubilis simpliciter metaphysica dicitur a metha quod est trans et ycos scientia, quia est de omnino prima quiditate transcendentem decem prima genera quocumque nomine exprimantur.¹⁸

2.3 In the 15th century we find the ‘*ycos*’ (or ‘*icos*’) version of Duns Scotus’ etymology of ‘*metaphysica*’ in the beginning of the metaphysical part of the *Cursus librorum philosophie naturalis secundum viam doctoris subtilis Scoti* by the French Scotist Nicolas d’Orbelles († 1472 or 1475):

17. Antonius Andreae, *Quaestiones subtilissimae super duodecim libros metaphysicae Aristotelis*, Venetiis 1481, I, q. 1, concl. 3, f. 3^{va}. For an investigation of the immediate context of this passage cfr. A. Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert*, Peeters, Leuven 1998² (Bibliotheca, 1), 329-339; St.D. Dumont, *Transcendental Being: Scotus and Scotists*, «Topoi», 11 (1992), 135-148, especially 140-142.

18. Nicolaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica*, I, cap. 1, in Id., *Quattuor volumina: Metaphysicam videlicet, Naturalem philosophiam, Praedicamenta, necnon Theologiam naturalem*, Venetiis 1505, f. 2^{ra}. Bio-bibliographical information is found in the older study by Martin de Barcelona, *Nicolas Bonet († 1343). Tourangeau, Doctor Proficius O.M.*, «Études franciscaines», 37 (1925), 638-657. Cfr. now also the important study by I. Mandrella, *Metaphysik als Supertranszendentalwissenschaft? Zum scotistischen Metaphysikentwurf des Nicolaus Bonetus*, «Rech. Théol. Philos. méd.», 75 (2008), 161-193.

Ista scientia dicitur a meta quod est trans et icos scientia: quasi transcendens scientia.¹⁹

2.4 Another source from the late 15th century is the *Lectura* on the first book on the *Sentences* by Paul Scriptor († 1505). Scriptor was a former student of Stephan Brulefer and later taught philosophy in the Franciscan *studium* in Tübingen. There he also had his work on the *Sentences* published. Scriptor's *Lectura* closely follows Duns Scotus' *Ordinatio*. The passage I quote below is not inspired by the etymology of 'metaphysica' in the prologue to Duns Scotus' *Metaphysical questions*. Obviously Scriptor is inspired by Duns Scotus' explanation in *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 3, q. 3. At that place Scotus says that metaphysics is more transcendent than physics because its object, being as being, is more common than those things which are known through the senses («alias metaphysica non esset magis scientia transcendens quam physica»);²⁰ In the third distinction Scriptor says:

Metaphysica est scientia transcendens, id est subiectum eius in nullo praedicamento est licet circumit omnia praedicamenta, tamen ipsa metaphysica est in genere qualitatis.²¹

Despite the difference regarding '*physis*' and '*ycos*' and despite doctrinal differences the quoted authors have an adherence to a partic-

19. Nicolaus de Orbellis, *Cursus librorum philosophiae naturalis secundum viam doctoris subtilis Scoti*, Met., I, q. 1, Basileae 1494, f. 70^{rb}. It is interesting to see that this author also knows of the broader traditional use of '*ycos*'; cfr. *ibi*, Prologus in *Ethicam*, f. 117^{ra}: «Dicitur autem ethica ab ethis quod est mos et ycos quod est scientia quasi scientia de moribus. Monastica dicitur a monos quod est unum. Yconomica vero ab ycon quod est ymago et norma quod est regula quia docet regulare familiam in qua sunt filii principales qui sunt ymago parentum. Politica vero dicitur a polis id est civitas». For some notes on the life and writings of d'Orbelles see E. Wegerich, *Bio-bibliographische Notizen über Franziskanerlehre des 15. Jahrhunderts*, «Franziskanische Studien», 29 (1942), 152-197, especially 174-178.

20. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ord.*, I, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 118, ed. Vaticana, vol. III, 73. The apparatus testifies several readings of this sentence in the manuscripts: *scientia magis transcendens* / *magis transcendens scientia* / *magis transcendens*.

21. Paulus Scriptor, *Lectura fratris Pauli Scriptoris ordinis minorum de observantia quam edidit declarando subtilissimas Doctoris Subtilis sententias circa Magistrum in primo libro*, In alma universitate Tuvingensi 1498, dist. 3, q. 3, f. 86^{va}. On life and writings of Scriptor see Wegerich, *Bio-bibliographische Notizen*, 182-187.

ular metaphysical project in common. This is Duns Scotus' project of metaphysics as a transcending science that considers the univocal concept of being as being or – as Bonet puts it – «the first transcendent quiddity» and the transcendentals. This is the main content of this special project of metaphysics. Therefore it does not surprise that the etymological explanation of '*metaphysica*' in late medieval philosophy outside the Scotist school has quite another tone.

Outside the Scotist school the etymology of '*metaphysica*' is typically used to stress the transcendence of this science in the sense of going beyond nature. Here the transcendence of the common concepts is also meant. But this motive plays a less significant role than in the Scotist authors. This can be seen in the etymologies of '*metaphysica*' given by, for example, Alexander Bonini of Alexandria,²² John Buridan,²³ and the Thomist John Versor.²⁴ Francis of Marchia is sometimes seen as an independent Scotist. His etymology of '*metaphysica*' lies within the non-Scotist tradition.²⁵ A comparison with authors from the 13th century shows the conformity of this tendency with metaphysics before Scotus. This is seen in

22. Alexander Bonensis de Alexandria, *In duodecim Aristotelis Metaphysicae Libros dilucidissima expositio*, II, Venetiis 1572, 36th: «haec scientia dicitur Metaphysica, hoc est super naturam a Meta, quod est supra, et Physis natura: ens inquantum ens non est ens naturale; quia in suo esse, vel in suo diffiniri non concernit res motas, vel materiae; quia si ens inquantum ens concerneret motum vel materiam in suo esse, omne ens esset in materia».

23. Joannes Buridanus, *In Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, I, q. 2, Parisiis 1518 (reprint Minerva, Frankfurt a.M. 1964), f. 4^{ra}: «metaphysica enim dicitur a meta, quod est trans, et physis, quod est natura, quasi transcendens naturam et scientias naturales». This etymology is very close to the '*physis*' version of Scotus and Antonius Andreae. However, Buridan does not understand '*physis*' as '*scientia*', which is the crucial point in our context.

24. Joannes Versor, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam Aristotelis cum textu eiusdem*, I, q. 1, Coloniae 1494 (reprint Minerva, Frankfurt a.M. 1967), f. 2^{ra}: «dicitur metaphysica inquantum considerat ens inquantum ens et ea quae sibi insunt, haec enim transcendunt naturalia».

25. Franciscus de Marchia, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, I, q. 1, ms. Paris, Mazarine, 3490, ff. 2^{rb}-4^{ra} and 47^{ra-b} (edited in Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*, 89¹⁷¹⁻¹⁸⁰): «metaphysica particularis subalternatur metaphysicae communi. [...] Sed differunt, quia una est divina, quia est de ente divino, alia vero est divina, quia probat ens divinum. Et utraque potest vocari metaphysica, licet diversimode, quia utraque transcendit metas physicae, quia utraque est de entibus abstractis, sed una positive, alia privative».

Albert the Great²⁶ and the metaphysical commentator known under the name of Richard Rufus.²⁷

2.5 One last source from the late 15th century is Gabriel Zerbi († 1505). In his eclectic *Quaestiones metaphysicae* from 1482 he draws both upon Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. Also Antonius Andreae is frequently quoted. In spite of this, it is clear that Zerbi's etymology of 'metaphysica' cannot really be seen in the line from the 'physis' version of Duns Scotus and Antonius Andreae. Zerbi's etymology, however, is worth quoting because he combines it with an element not seen in any of the etymologies quoted above. Zerbi adds a theory of a double meaning of 'physis'. According to this theory the word 'physis' means the same as 'natura', when 'y' is spoken short, whereas 'physis' with long 'y' means the same as 'nativitas', 'nascentia':

Metaphysica autem dicta est a meta quod est trans et phisis (quod grece idem est quia natura latine si primum y habeat breve, licet phisis sumpta pro generatione viventiumque nativitas vel nascentia dicitur habere primum y productum ut V. hujus q. iii) unde metaphysica quasi trans seu post aut ultra transcendens transphysica est seu vel post aut ultra phisica.²⁸

3. THE ETYMOLOGY OF 'METAPHYSICA' IN THE SCOTIST

CURSUS-TRADITION OF THE BAROQUE AGE

Now we turn to the fruitful 17th and 18th century Scotist tradition. It is surprising to see how differently the etymology of 'metaphysica' is understood in this period in comparison with the earlier

26. Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, I, tract. 1, cap. 1, ed. B. Geyer, Aschendorff, Münster 1960 (Opera omnia, 16/1), 2: «ista scientia transphysica vocatur, quoniam quod est natura quaedam determinata quantitate vel contrarietate, fundatur per principia esse simpliciter, quae transcendunt omne sic vocatum physicum».

27. [Richardus Rufus?], *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, Introductio, q. 8, ms. Oxford, New College, 285, 16, f. 195^{rb-va} (edited in Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*, 116⁹⁶⁻⁹⁸). On the disputed authorship of this text see the literature quoted in *ibi*, 32-33: «Dicitur [...] 'Metaphysica' a 'meta' quod est 'trans', quia ultra physicam».

28. Gabriel Zerbius, *Quaestiones metaphysicae*, I, q. 2, cap. *Est autem creatura*, Bononiae 1482, f. 11^{ra} (the parentheses in the quotation are mine). See also *ibi*, V, q. 4, cap. *Propter primum*, f. 138^{vb}: «phisis grece idem est quod natura latine si pro generatione viventium nativitas seu nascentia dicta accipitur habere primum y productum, si vero pro principio generationis habere primum y breve». On Zerbi and his Work on metaphysics cfr. A. Poppi, *Causalità e infinità nella scuola padovana dal 1480 al 1513*, Editrice Antenore, Padova 1966, 151-169.

tradition. First of all, within this study the 'ycos' tradition could not be traced beyond the 15th century. This is probably due to the fact that Maurice O'Fihely's edition of Duns Scotus' *Metaphysical Questions* from shortly before 1500 handed down the 'physis' version to the early modern period. The etymologies of the later Scotist authors, however, only seldom adhere to the 'physis' version in the strict sense. Typically they do not understand 'physis' the way Antonius Andreae understood it. Though Duns Scotus' prologue is still frequently quoted the explanation '*physis quod est scientia*' will only seldom occur (cfr. 3.6 and 3.14). This does not mean that the Scotists of the 17th and early 18th century all understand the etymology of '*metaphysica*' in the same way. Among themselves they differ decidedly regarding our question. Some of their proposals cannot even be regarded as typically Scotist. At first sight it is not easy to see any fixed traditions in this area. Let us therefore present the material in chronological order and then comment upon the apparent trends.

3.1 The *Rerum metaphysicarum libri tres ad mentem Doctoris Subtilis* from 1623 by the French Scotist Martin Meurisse (1584-1644) distinguishes itself from most Scotist metaphysical literature of the period in not being a part of a philosophical course. In the beginning of the work Meurisse gives an etymology of '*metaphysica*' that certainly does not belong to any of the two immediate traditions of Scotus' etymology. Meurisse knows of two explanations of the name '*metaphysica*'. The one refers to the order of the sciences, i.e. to the precedence of physics in this order. The other refers to the transcendence of metaphysics beyond the realm of physics because it considers that which can be found in the highest, i.e. divine, things:

Metaphysica dicitur, idest postnaturalis, quia licet ordine naturae Physicam praecedat, cum pertractet eorum cognitionem quae in natura primas obtinent; tamen ordine inventionis et doctrinae Physicam subsequitur; quia ea de quibus agit, post cognitionem rerum naturalium sunt inventa, et explorata cognita. Vel etiam (ut aliis placet) Metaphysica dicitur quasi transnaturalis, quia cognitionem rerum naturalium transcendit, et ea quae in altissimo rerum gradu posita sunt, considerat.²⁹

29. Martinus Meurisse, *Rerum metaphysicarum libri tres ad mentem doctoris subtilis*, Quaestiones prooemiales in Metaphysicam, q. 1, Parisiis 1623, 7. On career and writings of Meurisse see J.-B. Kaiser, *Martin Meurisse. Évêque de Madaure, Suffragant de*

3.2 The comprehensive *Expositiones et disputationes in XII libros Aristotelis Metaphysicorum, quibus doctrina Scoti magna cum facilitate illustratur* by the Paduan Scotist Filippo Fabri from Faenza (Faventinus; 1564-1630) was posthumously published in 1637. Also this work is not part of a philosophical course. It is structured according to the text of Aristotle, exposing and discussing the books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The work has a short disputation on the names of this science (*De inscriptione*). Fabri's discussion of the name 'metaphysica' is a direct scholastic answer to the Renaissance philological scholarship, especially to Patrizi's discovery that the title in question is not found in the very works of Aristotle.³⁰ Fabri's answer is that it does make sense to speak of 'metaphysica' regardless whether Aristotle did so or not. The name indicates the place of metaphysics in the order of the sciences, namely *post physicam*. However significant this answer is in its own right (as a scholastic reply to Patrizi), it can hardly be regarded a typical Scotist answer as it cannot be placed in any of the traditions of Duns Scotus' etymology:

Dicitur Met. quae est communis inscriptio, contra quam multum clamat Patritius in suis disputationibus peripateticis; sed dicamus nos, licet haec inscriptio facta non fuerit ab Arist. quod tamen non constat aperte, neque eam tali nomine unquam appellaverit; tamen iure posse sic appellari; quia ordine doctrinae est ultima, et est post physicam, quia ordo doctrinae vult, quod quae sunt faciliora cognita, et magis sensibilia, priori loco explicentur; at philosophia naturalis, est de rebus magis sensibilibus, et facilioribus, et ideo est prior ordine doctrinae et Met. posterior. At loquendo de ordine naturae Met. est prior, ut diximus; quia est de primis principiis, et de conceptibus communioribus omnium rerum, quae ordine naturae sunt priora.³¹

Metz 1584-1644, «Annuaire de la Société d'histoire et d'archéologie de la Lorraine», 32 (1923), 2-119; on his works especially 95-110.

30. Cfr. Reiner, *Die Entstehung*, 79.

31. Philippus Faber (Faventinus), *Expositiones et disputationes in XII libros Aristoteles Metaphysicorum, quibus doctrina Scoti magna cum facilitate illustratur*, Venetiis 1637, I disp. 2, 18^b. For some bio-bibliographical information on Fabri see the following works (although they do not focus on his commentary on the *Metaphysics*): M. Forlivesi, *Scotistarum princeps. Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673) e il suo tempo*, Centro Studi Antoniani, Padova 2002 (Fonti e studi francescani, 11), *passim*; C.B. Schmitt, *Filippo Fabri and Septicism: A Forgotten Defense of Scotus*, in A. Poppi (ed.), *Storia e cultura al Santo di Padova fra il XIII e il XX secolo*, Neri Pozza Editore, Vicenza 1976 (Fonti e studi per la storia del Santo di Padova, 3), 309-312; C.B. Schmitt, *Filippo Fabri's Philosophia naturalis Io. Duns Scoti and its Relation to Paduan Aristotelianism*, in C. Bérubé (ed.),

3.3 The *Cursus philosophicus* by Wadding's famous collaborator at the St. Isidor institute in Rome John Punch (1603-1672 or 1673) was first published in 1643. It contains a *Tractatus in metaphysicam*. In this short metaphysical treatise Punch explains the name of this science through its going beyond nature. The explanation is of a somewhat practical character. If metaphysics goes beyond nature it means that it is no task of metaphysics to consider nature or natural things (understood as the object of physics):

Per Metaphysicam, ut ex etymologia nominis patet, intelligitur scientia transnaturalis, id est quae transgreditur naturam, et in hoc distinguitur a Physica, quae est scientia naturalis, id est considerans naturam et res naturales, hoc est constantes natura, et pertinentes ad naturam, ergo Metaphysica non debet considerare naturam aut res naturales.³²

Another significant passage in the philosophical course of Punch is his final words in his discussion of metaphysics as a science. This discussion takes place within the treatise on logic. Here Punch proposes his doctrine that a science is a composit of several partial *habitus*. In the case of metaphysics this means that there is a certain *connexio* between the partial scientific *habitus* that adhere to either the immaterial substances or the most common concepts. This *connexio* allows us to distinguish these *habitus* from the *habitus* of

Regnum Hominis et Regnum Dei, Acta Quarti Congressus Scotistici Internationalis Patavii, 24-29 septembris 1976, vol. II: *Sectio specialis. La tradizione scotista veneto-padovana*, Societas internationalis Scotistica, Romae 1978 (*Studia scholastico-scotistica*, 7), 305-312; F. Volpi, *La "univocatio entis" secondo Filippo Fabri*, in Bérubé (ed.), *Regnum Hominis et Regnum Dei*, vol. II, 297-304.

32. Joannes Poncius, *Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*, *Tractatus in Metaphysicam*, disp. I, q. 2, n. 14, Lugduni 1659, 877. This etymology is confirmed in *ibi*, *Prooemium*, 875, where Punch says that metaphysics is *post-* or *transnaturalis* because it is «de rebus magis abstractis, et magis etiam perfectis». It is not clear in what sense he speaks of "most abstract" in this context. Cfr. also *ibi*, *Tractatus in octos libros Physicorum*, disp. I, q. I, n. 10, 375, where metaphysics again is contrasted to physics; here Punch calls metaphysics «transnaturalis vel supernaturalis scientia». For bio-bibliographical information see M. Forlivesi, "Ut ex etymologia nominis patet". *The Nature and the Object of Metaphysics according to John Punch*, in M.W.F. Stone (ed.), *From Ireland to Louvain: The Intellectual Achievements of the Irish Franciscans and their Contribution to Early Modern Philosophy and Theology*, Peeters, Leuven 2009 (*Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium*), forthcoming; M. Grajewski, *John Ponce, Franciscan Scotist of the Seventeenth Century*, «Francisc. Stud.», 16 (1976), 54-92.

other sciences and to unite them under one heading, namely that of 'metaphysica':

Quatenus sic convenirent inter se, et disconvenirent ab aliis scientiis, esset *Metaphysica* id est scientia transnaturalis seu excedens naturam, hoc est rem materiale[m] aut corporeale[m]. Has ergo scientias hoc nomine appellavit Philosophus, eas in unam classem redegit, qua vocavit *Metaphysicam*, hoc est aggregatum ex scientiis omnibus transnaturalibus; quare *Metaphysica* non debet comprehendere ullam scientiam de rebus corporalibus. Et hinc cessat difficultas illa, cur *Metaphysica* non solum agat de ente ut sic, sed etiam de aliquibus speciebus eius, u.g. de Angelis, non vero agat de aliis speciebus eius, nimirum de corpore naturali; ratio nempe est, quod per *Metaphysicam* intelligant Philosophi scientiam, quae agit de rebus non corporalibus ergo nulla scientia appellata *Metaph.* potest agere de corpore.³³

3.4 The influential two volume work *Disputationes ad mentem Scoti in duodecim Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros Metaphysicorum* by Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673) was first published separately in 1646-1647. In all later editions (1678, 1688, 1708, 1727, 1757) the work figures as the final part of the joint philosophical course of Mastri and Bonaventura Belluto. Mastri opens his work with an explanation of the several names of this science (*supernaturalis philosophia*, *naturalis theologia*, *universalis philosophia*, *sapientia*, and *prima philosophia*). Coming to the name 'metaphysica' itself Mastri writes:

Ratione tandem obiecti tum principalis, tum adaequati, communi nomine *Metaphysica* dicitur, quod ex Scot. in Prolog. qu. 9. *Metaph.* est Graecum nomen ex *Meta* compositum, quod significat trans, sive ultra, aut post, vel supra, quasi sit facultas res physicas in superioribus tomis traditas excedens, vel transcendens; quia tractat de Deo, et Intelligentiis, quae sunt abstracta per essentiam, ac de ente, aliisque rationibus transcendentibus, quae sunt abstracta (ut aiunt) per indifferentiam, ratione cuius abstractionis haec omnia rerum omnium physicarum ordinem superant, et in altiori rerum gradu constituuntur.³⁴

33. Poncius, *Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*, Tractatus de praedicabilibus, disp. 22, q. ult., n. 97, 306.

34. Bartholomaeus Mastrius, *Disputationes ad mentem Scoti in duodecim Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros Metaphysicorum*, Pars prior, disp. prooemialis in *Metaphysicam*, n. 1, Venetiis 1708. Cfr. also some passages later in the same disputation: «non solum Intelligentiae, sed etiam praedicata transcendentia dicuntur post naturalia, et post

Mastri explicitly quotes the prologue of Duns Scotus' *Metaphysical Questions*. His exact reference («ex Scot. in Prolog. qu. 9. Metaph.») is obviously wrong, though. We can also observe that Mastri explicitly states that '*metaphysica*' is a composite name, but Mastri only mentions the first half of the composition ('*meta*'). The text stresses metaphysics' going beyond nature. It is clear that on the reading of Mastri the second half of the name of this science would be '*physis*' in the sense of nature. That this is the meaning of the etymology given by Mastri is evidently seen if one compares his etymology with the one given two decades earlier by the Minor Regular Clerk Raffaele Aversa (1586 or 1589-1657).³⁵ Mastri has more or less directly taken over Aversa's version of the etymology (unless a third source of this etymology can be produced, of course). Mastri just omits the one half of the explanation and adds the reference to Scotus' prologue. Even this reference Mastri may have taken over from some Scotist source. At present this question cannot be settled.

Another point is worth highlighting. In the very name of metaphysics Mastri hears a twofold abstraction from matter. Compared to the realm of physics '*metaphysica*' is a *facultas excedens* or *transcendens* both because its primary object (which is God) abstracts from matter *per essentiam* and because its adequate object (which is being as being) abstracts from matter *per indifferentiam*. In this twofold abstraction lies a twofold transcendence. This means that for Mastri metaphysics is transcendent both because it considers God and the intelligences and because it considers being and the transcendentals.

physicam» (*ibi*, n. 41, 12); «hanc appellarunt Metaphysicam quasi trans Physicam, vel post Physicam» (*ibi*, n. 58, 17). On Mastri's life, works, and the editions of them see Forlivesi, *Scotistarum principes*.

35. Cfr. Raphael Aversa, *Philosophia metaphysicam physicamque complectens*, q. I, sect. I, Bononiae 1650 (microfiche IDC 1987), vol. I, 4: «Metaphysicae denique nomen graeco more compositum est, ex meta, quod est trans, sive ultra, aut post, seu supra, et physica iam explicata, itaque Metaphysica dicitur, quasi transnaturalis, sive supernaturalis: quia nimirum considerat illa, quae sunt ultra et super res materiales proprio nomine dictas naturales». Aversa's two volumes *Philosophia* was first published in Rome in 1625-27.

3.5 The French Scotist Claude Frassen (1620-1711), who had a long teaching career at the Sorbonne, first published his *Philosophia academica* in 1668. In the metaphysical part of this work Frassen gives an etymology of 'metaphysica'. His version of the etymology is very close to the first quote from Punch's philosophical course. The passage is interesting because the author uses the expression *scientia transcendens*. Like Punch, however, Frassen conceives this transcendence essentially as a going beyond nature:

Metaphysica secundum nominis ethimon dicitur scientia transcendens naturam, id est, cujus munus est speculari entia non naturalia, seu materia et forma corporea constantia: at plures entis species materia et forma constant; ergo eas Metaphysica non speculatur.³⁶

3.6 The Spanish Scotist Thomas Llamazares published his *Cursum philosophicus* in 1670. The work contains a treatise on metaphysics (*Tractatus in metaphysicam*). In the introduction to this part of philosophy the author first explains why it is called 'sapientia', 'philosophia', 'prima philosophia', and 'theologia'. Then follows an interesting explanation of the etymology of 'metaphysica'. Llamazares' etymology clearly lies within the tradition from the 'physis' version of Duns Scotus' etymology. In fact this version of Scotus' etymology is almost verbatim quoted. Accordingly, metaphysics is the *transcendens scientia* because it considers the transcendentals. Our Spanish Scotist further explains that the title 'metaphysica' not only can be explained in this way. A little surprisingly he states that the name is simply taken from the title that Aristotle gave this science (of course we know today and Aristotelian scholarship has known since Patrizi that Aristotle did not use this title). Now, according to Llamazares 'metaphysica' means nothing else than the science

36. Claudius Frassen, *Philosophia academica, quam ex selectissimis Aristotelis et Doctoris Subtilis Scoti rationibus ac sententiis*, Metaphysica, quaest. prooem., concl. 3, Tolosae 1676 (microfiche IDC 1987), 9. On the name of metaphysics Frassen also says in *ibi*, 2: «Notandum 1. Aristotelem primum fuisse Metaphysices Authorem quamquam hoc ipsi nomen non imposuerit, sed ejus discipuli: prior etenim inter antiquos Philosophos mentem ad spiritualia erexit ipsasque res materiales ab omni materia abstractas contemplari coepit». On life and works of Frassen cfr. B. Jansen, *Zur Philosophie der Scotisten des 17. Jahrhunderts*, «Franziskanische Studien», 23 (1936), 28-57; 150-175, especially 154-159.

that considers what follows physics, i.e. those entities that are free from matter. Though metaphysics is first explained in terms of the transcendence of the transcendentals, in the end it is simply understood as the science that follows physics in the order of «acquisition, generation or invention» of the sciences:

Ex quo etiam *Metaphysica* nominata est a *meta*, quod est *trans* et *Physis scientia* quasi transcendens scientia. Est enim scientia universalis, quae per se considerat omnia transcendentia. Vel aliter hoc nomen *Metaphysica* sumptum est ex inscriptione, quam Aristoteles suis *Metaphysicae* libris praescripsit Graece quidem, sed Latine idem est ac scientia, quae tractat de his rebus, quae scientias seu res naturales consequuntur: abstrahit enim haec scientia a sensibilibus seu materialibus rebus, (quae *Physicae* dicuntur) et res Divinas et a materia separatas et communes rationes entis, quae absque materia existere possunt, contemplatur, ideoque *Metaphysica* dicta est, quasi post *Physicam* seu ultra *Physicam* constituta. *Post* (inquam) non dignitate aut naturae ordine, sed acquisitionis, generationis, seu inventionis.³⁷

3.7 In his *Sol triplex in eodem universo id est Philosophiae cursus integer* from 1676 the Silesian Scotist Amandus Hermann († 1700), active in Prague, tried to integrate elements from the works of Augustine, Bernard, and Duns Scotus into one – mostly Scotist – philosophical course. As to the metaphysical part of this work the result is a strongly theologically oriented metaphysics that treats of being in its first part, of the angels in its second part, and of God in its third part. Already the etymology of ‘*metaphysica*’ given in the prologue is a sign of this orientation. Reflecting upon the names that Aristotle used for this science Hermann gives the following, for a Scotist rather untypical, etymology of ‘*metaphysica*’. Hermann’s etymology is supposed to justify the status of metaphysics as a *scientia supernaturalis*:

37. Thomas Llamazares, *Cursus philosophicus, sive Philosophia scholastica, ad mentem Scoti, nova et congruentiori addiscentibus methodo disposita*, Tractatus in metaphysicam, Prooem., Lugduni 1670, 450. On the philosophical work of Llamazares cfr. the few remarks in Jansen, *Zur Philosophie der Scotisten*, 165-166. We note in passing that in the copy held by the Biblioteca nazionale “Vittorio Emanuele” in Rome the word ‘*scientia*’ in the first line of the quotation has been corrected into ‘*natura*’ by a contemporary hand. Obviously already for an early reader of this work it was too strange a claim that ‘*physis*’ should mean science or science of physics. The ‘*physis*’ version of Scotus’ etymology really claims nothing else, though.

Imo alibi ab eodem dicta est *scientia supernaturalis*, et hoc ipsum Etymon nominis importat, ut significet idem, quod *supernaturalis Physica*; intellige, non quod non comprehendatur intra latitudinem intellectus objecti, secundum connaturalem attingentiam, sed quod multo nobilior et excellentior sit, quam Physica, quae cum sit scientia naturalis, Metaphysica dicitur scientia supernaturalis, utpote, quae veluti Aquila altissimis speculationis suae pennis, veluti Regina superexaltat se super omnem viribus naturae acquisibilem.³⁸

3.8 The French Scotist John Gabriel Boyvin († 1681) first published his *Philosophia Scoti a prolixitate, et subtilitas ejus ab obscuritate libera et vindicata* in 1678. In the prolegomena to the metaphysical part of this work Boyvin several times refers to the etymology of 'metaphysica'. First Boyvin gives an explanation of 'metaphysica' that certainly does not adhere to the Scotist tradition. Boyvin – correctly – observes that Aristotle did not use the (Latin) name 'metaphysica'. Then he – wrongly – adds that Aristotle called his work on metaphysics 'περὶ τὰ Μεταφυσικὰ' (it is questionable whether the Greek title suggested by Boyvin has ever been in use):

Nuncupatur *Metaphysica*, seu post naturalis, vel transnaturalis scientia, quoniam est scientia agens de rebus, quae physica et naturalia entia transcendunt; nomen autem istud, non ab Aristotele sed a philosophi interpretibus huic disciplinae imponitur; quia ipse hos libros inscripsit περὶ τὰ Μεταφυσικὰ, seu de rebus transnaturalibus.³⁹

Second, Boyvin twice gives an explanation of the etymology of 'metaphysica' that is much more Scotist in tone. The interesting thing about these quotes is that Boyvin here actually speaks of '*scientia transcendens*'. Boyvin does understand this expression in terms of metaphysics' going beyond nature, but in the sense of a science that considers being as being and the most common concepts:

38. Amandus Hermann, *Sol triplex in eodem universo id est Philosophiae cursus integer*, Metaphysica, prologus, Sultzbaçi 1676, 828. Cfr. on this work the indications in S. Soušedík, *Filosofie v českých zemích mezi středověkem a osvícenstvím*, Vyšehrad, Praha 1997, especially 218–219.

39. Joannes Gabriel Boyvin, *Philosophia Scoti a prolixitate, et subtilitas ejus ab obscuritate libera et vindicata*, Metaphysicae prolegomena, q. I, Venetiis 1701 (microfiche IDC 1987), II. On life and writings of Boyvin cfr. B. Baudoux, *De philosophia P. Ioannis Gabrielis Boyvin*, «Acta Ordinis Fratrum Minorum», 54 (1935), 24–32.

Deinde ens reale communiter acceptum est *scibile*; quia est demonstrabile per suas passiones, quae sunt *unitas*, *veritas*, et *bonitas*; sed ens reale in communi acceptum non est ab alia scientia scibile, quam a metaphysica, quae ex suo nomine est *scientia transcendens*, quia videlicet versatur circa *ens in communi*, et circa caetera *transcendentia*: ergo ens reale *ut sic* est adaequatum metaphysicae objectum.⁴⁰

Metaphysica vi nominis dicitur *scientia transcendens*, quia ipsa speculatur entia, non in Particulari, sed in communi, et universales eorum rationes, non descendendo ad naturas particularium.⁴¹

The most peculiar trait of Boyvin's treatise on metaphysics is that it contains a rather long (32 pages) *Digressio theologica* on the divine persons. This *Digressio* is inserted between the first (*De ente in communi*) and the second disputation (*De proprietatibus*). In our context this is only noteworthy because Boyvin actually justifies this theological digression with an appeal to Aristotle's understanding of this science. Needless to say, this is not really in accord with the two passages just quoted:

Cum scientia, de qua agimus, vocetur *transnaturalis*, et saepius ab Arist. nomen *Theologia* recipiat [...].⁴²

3.9 The native German Scotist Bernhard Sannig (1637-1704) taught philosophy and theology in Prague, notably in the seminar of the archbishop. His comprehensive *Scholae philosophiae Scotistarum* was published in 1684-1685. In the *Praefatio* to the metaphysical part of this work Sannig offers some explanations of the various names of metaphysics: '*prima philosophia*', '*naturalis theologia*' and '*domina et regina scientiarum*'.⁴³ But the very etymology of '*metaphysica*' is not given until

40. Boyvin, *Philosophia Scoti*, Metaphysicae prolegomena, q. 4, 16.

41. Boyvin, *Philosophia Scoti*, Metaphysicae prolegomena, q. 5, 19.

42. Boyvin, *Philosophia Scoti*, Digressio theologica, 74.

43. Cfr. Bernardus Sannig, *Scholae philosophiae Scotistarum*, Tractatus in Universam Metaphysicam, Praefatio, Neo-Pragae 1685, vol. III, 162: «Dignissima ac eminentissima totius Philosophiae pars acclamatur ab omnibus Metaphysica; unde a Philosopho lib. 4. Met. tex. 4. appellatur *prima Philosophia*, primitate nedum originis, et naturae; verum etiam dignitatis, et eminentiae. Et 6. Met. cap. 1. vocatur *naturalis Theologia*; eo quod DEUM, ac Angelos, quantum caecutienti adhuc intellectui pro hoc statu fas est, contemplatur. Et alibi ab eodem nominantur *Domina et Regina scientiarum*. Et a Scoto in *prooem. suae Met.* praeconizatur *Philosophia Theorica*; eo quod altissimas causas, et rerum

the beginning of the first distinction of the work. It is quite clear that this etymological explanation is simply taken over from Mastri's text (this even includes the mistaken reference to Scotus, cfr. 3.4 above):

Nota primo: hoc vocabulum *Metaphysica* est Graecum secundum Scotum in Prolog. q. 9. *Met.* compositum ex Ly *Meta*, quod significat *trans*, sive *ultra*, aut *post*, vel *supra*; et ex Ly *Physica*: eo quod ista facultas transgrediatur Scientiam naturalem, seu Physicam, agendo de rebus abstractis a materia; et quia ultra graditur haec Scientia eminentissima, quam Physicalis; cum contempletur etiam naturam DEI, Angelorum etc.⁴⁴

What Sannig here stresses is the abstraction from matter *per essentiam* – to use the terminology applied by Mastri – of God and the angels, i.e. the “things” considered in metaphysics. In another passage in the same distinction Sannig also uses the etymology of ‘*metaphysica*’ in an argument for a certain general metaphysical consideration of all quiddities:

Metaphysica secundum suum ethymon dicitur scientia transcendens naturam; id est, cujus munus est speculari entia transcendentia, cujusmodi sunt quidditates rerum in communi: Item *Metaphysica* (ut in progressu distinctionum, et quaestionum infra patebit) agit de ente secundum se, et ejus proprietatibus, de ratione substantiae ut sic, de substantia finita et infinita puta Deo, de ente creato, et increato, de accidente absoluto et respectivo, de ratione qualitatis, dependentiae etc., quae omnia sunt rationes, et quidditates communes rerum: Ergo *Metaphysica* agit de quidditatibus omnium rerum in communi, easdem speculando secundum rationem entis duntaxat.⁴⁵

principia speculetur». The quote from Scotus' «*proem. suae Met.*» really means Antonius Andreae's *Dilucidissima expositio in duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, Prooemium, in Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Opera omnia*, vol. IV, Lugduni 1639, 1; here metaphysics is called ‘*theorica philosophorum*’. It is remarkable that Sannig without any hesitation quotes this text as an authentic work of Scotus despite the dispute over the authenticity of this work that was already going on in the 17th century. On Sannig and his works some literature is available: A. Potempa, *Der Begriff des ens reale und seine Univokation nach B. Sannig (1637-1704)*, Diss. Breslau 1941, L. Novák, *Spor o pojem jsoucna v barokním scotismu*, Diss. Univerzita Karlova Praha 2003. For more general information see Jansen, *Zur Philosophie der Scotisten*, 152-154 and Sousedík, *Filosofie v českých zemích*, 219-225.

44. Sannig, *Scholae philosophiae Scotistarum*, Tractatus in Universam Metaphysicam, dist. I, q. I, n. I, 163.

45. Sannig, *Scholae philosophiae Scotistarum*, Tractatus in Universam Metaphysicam, dist. I, q. 5, n. I, 173. With some minor mistakes this passage was already quoted in Potempa, *Der Begriff*, 152.

3.10 The joint *Cursus philosophicus ad usum studentium totius Ordinis Minorum* of the two Spanish Scotists Petrus a s. Catharina and Thomas a s. Josepho was first published in 1692. The metaphysical part of this work leans heavily upon the metaphysical disputations of Mastri. In our context it is noteworthy that the Spanish Scotists have almost copied Mastri's – and indirectly Aversa's – etymology of '*metaphysica*'. What they omit is the abstraction theme. What they add is one more explanation of the name '*metaphysica*'. According to this explanation metaphysics is «*facultas metas Physicae facultatis transgrediens*». This explanation presupposes an interpretation of the Greek '*μετά*' in terms of the Latin '*meta*'. It is uncertain exactly where this version of the etymology of '*metaphysica*' comes from, though it has some resemblance with the etymology found in the works of Francis of Marchia and of the non-Scotist author of the 17th century Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz. Both Francis and Caramuel explained metaphysics as the science that goes «beyond the limits of physics».⁴⁶ Thus quite different elements come together in the explanation found in this Scotist work:

Nomine autem communi dicitur *Metaphysica*, et idem est, ac transgrediens physicam, est enim *Metaphysica* nomen graecum compositum ex *meta*, quod idem est, ac latine *trans*, *post*, vel *supra*, et ex *Physica*. Unde idem est *Metaphysica*, ac *facultas metas Physicae facultatis transgrediens*, eo quod *universalissima objecta contemplatur*.⁴⁷

3.11 In 1692 also the *Summa philosophiae scholasticae, et scotisticae* by the French Scotist Sebastian Dupasquier († probably in 1706) was first published. Numerous editions were to follow. Dupasquier often quotes and on occasions severely criticizes Mastri. Regarding

46. Cfr. Joannes Caramuel y Lobkowitz, *Praecursor Logicus complectens Grammaticam Audacem*, ed. R. Sarmiento, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt 1989 (reprint of the edition Frankfurt 1654), 92: «Ultra metas Physicas est alia scientia nobilior eminentiorque, quam Graeci vocant *Metaphysicam*, quae contemplatur Ens, et sub illo omnia Praedicamenta». Cfr. also Franciscus de Marchia, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, I, q. 1, as quoted in footnote 25.

47. Petrus a s. Catharina and Thomas a s. Josepho, *Cursus philosophicus ad usum studentium totius Ordinis Minorum*, Tractatus in Metaphysicam, Praeludium, Venetiis 1732 (microfiche IDC 1987), 522. On this work very little information can be found in Jansen, *Zur Philosophie der Scotisten*, 166–168.

the etymology of '*metaphysica*' Dupasquier first stresses metaphysics' going beyond the field of physics:

Metaphysica dicitur ex vocis etymologia, *scientia transnaturalis*, quia transgreditur quodam modo terminos scientiae naturalis; agit enim de rebus abstractissimis, et summis, et ideo purissimis, ac perfectissimis, et primis rerum principiis, quantum se se attollere potest humanum ingenium viribus suis naturalibus.⁴⁸

Here metaphysics apparently goes beyond physics because it considers the most abstract and highest (i.e. divine) things. But this is not Dupasquier's last word on the transcendence of metaphysics. A little later he focuses on the abstraction of the univocal concept of being. Also this abstraction guarantees the transcendence of metaphysics, but in another way. In so far as both elements are present in the metaphysics of Dupasquier we may say that he also holds the twofold transcendence that we saw in the quote from Mastri. The second way of transcendence also makes metaphysics transgress the realm of physics:

Igitur *Metaphysicae* nomine intelligimus eam scientiam, quae versatur circa ens in communi, et in abstracto, prout praescindit a materialitate, imo et prout est commune Deo, et creaturis, et ideo dicitur *transnaturalis*, seu transgrediens scientiam naturalem, qualis est ea, quae considerat ens corporeum, seu naturale, prout naturale est.⁴⁹

3.12 The Italian Scotist Giovanni Antonio Ambrosini published the first three parts of his *Enchyridion philosophicum* in 1689. In 1693 followed the fourth part, the one on metaphysics. In the beginning of this work the author brings an etymology of '*metaphysica*' that deviates from all other etymologies seen in this study, though it has some resemblance with the one seen in Petrus a s. Catharina and Thomas a s. Josepho. Ambrosini also interprets the Greek 'μετα'

48. Sebastian Dupasquier, *Summa philosophiae scholasticae, et scotisticae*, vol. II: *Metaphysica*, disp. I, q. I, Patavii 1705, 2. On Dupasquier see Jansen, *Zur Philosophie der Scotisten*, 159-164. Unfortunately Jansen had only the natural philosophy of Dupasquier at his disposal. The title page of the *Summa philosophiae* informs that the author is a retired professor of theology and former provincial of the province of St. Bonaventure.

49. Dupasquier, *Summa philosophiae scholasticae, et scotisticae*, vol. II: *Metaphysica*, disp. I, q. I, 3.

in terms of the Latin ‘*meta*’. He thus understands metaphysics as the one philosophical science that reaches the very limit (Latin ‘*meta*’) of philosophy because it considers the highest things and the first causes and principles. This very un-Scotist type of etymology clearly hints at the rather strong theological orientation in Ambrosini’s metaphysics (Ambrosini includes a longer treatise on God and the attributes of God in his metaphysics):

Metaphysica est nomen graecum ex *Meta* compositum, facultas scilicet alias omnes Philosophicas excedens, ad quam cum pervenerit Philosophus, jam videtur pervenisse ad metam, ad ultimum scilicet philosophiae; ipsa namque res altissimas, causas primas, primaque principia, ex quibus aliarum scientiarum principia pendent, contemplatur; agit (inquam) de Deo, quantum naturali lumini fas est; sermonem instituit de Intelligentiis separatis, necnon de rebus omnibus, saltem quoad praedicata generica, et transcendentia; unde non immerito Aristoteles eam appellat, naturalem Theologiam, supernaturalem Philosophiam, scientiam divinam, scientiarum Reginam, ac sapientiam.⁵⁰

3.13 One more source from the 1690’s is worth quoting. In 1696–1697 the native German Scotist Wolter Schopen († 1717) published a course on philosophy. The fourth part of this work is a treatise on metaphysics. It carries the interesting title *Metaphysica transcendens, sive disputationes scholasticae*. This seems to be the only Scotist work on metaphysics that expresses the peculiar transcendence of metaphysics in its title. The first part of the work treats of the most general concept of being. The second part gives an exposition of the doctrine of the categories. In effect this transcendent metaphysics is no more than a general and a categorical ontology. It has no traits of theology. Schopen also gives an etymological explanation of ‘*metaphysica*’. He points to the explanation found in Scotus’ prologue (probably Schopen simply repeats the reference found in Mastri in a general way). We could also expect that Schopen would explain the title he has chosen for his work through the etymology of ‘*metaphysica*’, but he does not:

50. Joannes Antonius Ambrosinus, *Enchyridion philosophicum universam Aristotelis philosophiam compendiose complectens juxta mentem Scoti doctoris subtilissimi*, pars 4: *Disputationes in Libros Metaphysicorum*, Prooemium, Neapoli 1693, 1–2.

Porro Metaphysica significat facultatem *post* aut *supra* Physicam tradi solitam, et finis ejus est speculari essentias rerum, et altissimarum praecipue causarum, teste Sco. in prol. qq. metaph.⁵¹

3.14 In 1735 the Austrian Scotist Crescentius Krisper (1679 or 1680-1749) published a one volume course on philosophy. The part on metaphysics is heavily, though not entirely, influenced by the doctrines of Mastri. In the explanation of the etymology of '*metaphysica*', however, Krisper goes beyond Mastri. Krisper directly quotes the '*physis*' version of Duns Scotus' explanation. Interestingly he does not omit the reference to Avicenna that also Scotus gave in context of his explanation of the etymology of '*metaphysica*'. This is remarkable because this element is hardly found in any other Scotist etymology. Thus it seems that Krisper has studied the text of Scotus both carefully and independently:

Advertendum est 1. juxta Scotum in Prologo ante 12. libros Metaphysicorum v. *nunc autem*. Metaphysicam secundum etymologiam dici a *meta* quod est trans, et *physis*, quod est scientia, quasi transcendens scientia, quia est de transcendentibus; nam constat communissima primo intelligi juxta Avicennam 1. Metaph. c. 5. dicentem: *ens et res imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non aquiritur ex aliis notioribus se*. Ideo sequitur, quod alia specialiora non possint cognosci saltem distincte, et clare, nisi illa communia prius cognoscantur, quorum cognitio in aliqua particulari scientia commode tradi non potest, quia qua ratione in una, eadem et in alia, cum ens et unum dicantur aequaliter de omnibus, et ita idem multoties inutiliter repeteretur; per consequens necesse est aliquam esse scientiam universalem, quae per se consideret transcendentia, et hanc vocamus Metaphysicam.⁵²

3.15 In 1739, just a few years after the work of Krisper, the one volume philosophy course by Marinus Panger and Kilian Kazenberger appeared in Ingolstadt. The fourth part of this work deals with metaphysics. It is one more example of the strong influence

51. Wolter Schopen, *Metaphysica transcendens, sive disputationes scholasticae*, Prol., disp. unica, q. 1, Nissae 1697, 1-2. On Schopen see Sousedík, *Filosofie v českých zemích*, 252-255.

52. Crescentius Krisper, *Philosophia scholae scotisticae*, Metaphysica universa, Prolegomenon 1, n. 1, Augustae Vindelicorum 1735, 4. On Krisper see Novák, *Spor o pojem jsoučna v barokním scotismu*, 14-15, 78-87.

from the metaphysics of Mastri. We see this already in the etymological explanation of ‘*metaphysica*’ given in the first lines of the first disputation. Like Sannig the two German authors have simply taken over the explanation found in Mastri (they even quote the mistaken reference to Scotus’ prologue). They have added the part of the explanation missing in Mastri. In their text ‘*metaphysica*’ is explicitly explained as a composition of ‘*meta*’ and ‘*physis*’. They have also added the expression ‘*transcendens scientia*’ that is found in Scotus’ prologue. The rest is evidently Mastrian:

*Nota, quod Metaphysica ex Doctore subtili in prolog. quaest. 9. sit nomen graecum, ex meta, quod significat trans, sive ultra, vel supra, et Physis, quod est Physica, compositum, quasi sit facultas, res physicas in superioribus Philosophiae partibus traditas excedens, vel transcendens, quia tractat de DEO, et Angelis, de ente, aliisque rationibus transcendentibus, et consequenter sit transcendens scientia.*⁵³

3.16 The *Cursus philosophicus scotisticus* of the Spanish Scotist Vicente González de la Peña was published in 1736-1743. The third part of the work (1743) contains a short treatise on metaphysics. The most significant authors of the *cursus* tradition of the 17th century are still frequently quoted. Authors of the secular “modern” philosophy on the other hand are completely ignored. Gonzales’ etymology of ‘*metaphysica*’ is supposed to explain the supernatural character of metaphysics. This science transcends “naturalness” as principle of movement:

*Metaphysica est nomen graecum, compositum ex duabus vocibus Meta, et Physis: quarum 1. significat trans, seu ultra: 2. naturam denotat, ut perinde metaphysica idem sonet ac scientia transnaturalis, seu res naturales transcendens, quatenus sc. ejus contemplatio versatur circa res abstrahens a naturalitate, nempe principio motus, modo inferius explicando.*⁵⁴

53. Marinus Panger - Kilian Kazenberger, *Philosophiae Aristotelicae Universae*, pars 4: *Metaphysica*, I, q. I, n. 1, Ingolstadii 1739, 1.

54. Vincentius Gonzales a Peña, *Cursus philosophicus scotisticus*, vol. III: *Tractatus unicum in Metaphysicam*, Praeludium, Salmanticae 1743, 281. The title page informs that the author, a Franciscan friar, is a theological doctor and holds a chair of philosophy in the *Salmantina Academia*.

In the metaphysical works of the Scotist authors from the 17th and 18th century examined above the etymological explanation of 'metaphysica' serves quite different purposes. It is frequently applied in order to justify the place of metaphysics in the order of the sciences, especially in relation to physics. This is either explained through metaphysics' place *post* physics in the order of the «acquisition, generation or invention» of the sciences (cfr. especially 3.6), which is really not a genuine Scotist motive, as is easily seen from the etymologies in the works of more or less contemporary non-Scotist authors such as Fonseca,⁵⁵ Suárez⁵⁶ or Goclenius;⁵⁷ or it is explained through metaphysics' transcendence of nature thanks to the immateriality of the object or the objects considered in this science.

This transcendence is explained in different ways. It is noteworthy that the two authors (3.6 and 3.14) who verbatim quote the 'physis' version of Scotus' etymology in accordance with Scotus and the earlier Scotist tradition understand the transcendence of metaphysics in terms of its considering being and the transcendental concepts. Mastri (3.4) allows for two ways of seeing the

55. Petrus Fonseca, *Commentaria in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*, Prooem., cap. 8, Coloniae 1615 (reprint Olms, Hildesheim 1964), vol. I, 35: «Inscripti porro sunt hi libri sive ab Aristotele, sive a Theophrasto, qui eius opera magna ex parte in ordinem digessit, nomine rerum de quibus agunt, τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ, hoc est, *post naturalia*: qua in oratione verbum, *post*, non ad naturae ordinem, sed inventionis referendum est: nam etsi haec tractatio continet scientiam eorum quae natura sunt prima: ea tamen post cognitionem rerum naturalium inventa sunt».

56. Franciscus Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, Prooemium, Paris 1866 (reprint Olms, Hildesheim 1965), vol. I, 2: «ex quo etiam *metaphysica* nominata est, quod nomen non tam ab Aristotele, quam ab ejus interpretibus habuit; sumptum vero est ex inscriptione quam Aristoteles suis Metaphysicae libris praescrispsit, videlicet: Τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ, id est, de his rebus, quae scientias seu res naturales consequuntur. [...] ideo *metaphysica* dicta est, quasi post physicam, seu ultra physicam constituta; post (inquam) non dignitate, aut naturae ordine, sed acquisitionis, generationis, seu inventionis; vel, si ex parte objecti illud intelligamus, res, de quibus haec scientia tractat, dicuntur esse post physica seu naturalia entia, quia eorum ordinem superant, et in altiori rerum gradu constitutae sunt».

57. Rodolphus Goclenius, *Isagoge in peripateticorum et scholasticorum primam philosophiam, quae dici consuevit metaphysica*, cap. I, Francofurti 1598 (reprint Hildesheim 1976), 3: «Metaphysica, quod post cognitionem rerum naturalium inventa sit: quasi scientia post naturalium: vel quod contineat doctrinam eorum, quae supra naturam sunt: quasi scientia supranaturalium».

transcendence of metaphysics. He explicitly follows the scheme of a twofold abstraction from matter. The influence of Mastri is easily seen in the works of the Scotist authors of the subsequent generations. Some of them (3.9, 3.10, and 3.15) even repeat or simplify his version of the etymology of '*metaphysica*' (including his inaccurate quote from the text of Duns Scotus) without mentioning their source. The quoted material offers a quite heterogeneous picture. However, besides all the other tendencies a certain competition between the old '*physis*' version and Mastri's version of the etymology of '*metaphysica*' can be perceived in the Scotist tradition of the 17th and 18th century.

Sometimes the etymology is directly used to justify the theological character of metaphysics (it is especially so in the case 3.7). At other times the Scotist authors make historical observations on the name '*metaphysica*' or they defend the use of this title vis-à-vis the discovery of Patrizi that Aristotle himself did not know of a science entitled '*metaphysica*' (3.2). In still other texts the etymology serves other purposes or it is interpreted in ways quite different from the more general tendencies. This is the case of Ambrosini (3.12), who understands metaphysics as the science that reaches the very limit (Latin '*meta*') of philosophy. In some authors the etymology of '*metaphysica*' appears in various contexts or it is even interpreted in ways contrary to each other. This at least allows for one general conclusion, namely that the one true meaning or the one true Scotist interpretation of '*metaphysica*' was never a disputed question in these authors. This makes the title '*metaphysica*' altogether *vague*. Nevertheless, another general conclusion is that the adequateness of the title '*metaphysica*' was never questioned.

Other titles were discussed as well, but the title '*metaphysica*' was never dismissed as it was by Patrizi and – for other reasons – by some authors in the 17th century Protestant tradition of school metaphysics. Some Protestant authors followed the Jesuit philosopher Benet Perera and made a sharp division between the general doctrine of being and the theological moments of metaphysics. These elements should not be considered in one, but in two different sciences. Some of these authors now also found '*metaphysica*'

an inadequate book title.⁵⁸ This discomfort with the name '*metaphysica*' is found nowhere in the Scotist authors consulted above.

At this point it is important to observe that the interpretation of the etymology of '*metaphysica*' does not determine whether an author in his metaphysics would actually deal with those contents implied by the given etymology. E.g. for Punch as well as for Frassen the etymology of '*metaphysica*' implies a consideration of divine things. Frassen in fact does bring a disputation *De nobilioribus speciebus entis* (with a section *De Deo* and another *De angelis*) in his metaphysics, but Punch does not. Similarly, when Mastri and Dupasquier more or less explicitly hold the twofold transcendence of metaphysics this also would seem to imply a consideration of divine things within metaphysics. Mastri only deals with this theme in brief. Moreover, he reserves a thorough treatment of this theme in his theological work. The same is seen in Dupasquier. Now, there is a common belief that the 17th century witnessed a divorce of first philosophy from natural theology. In order to determine the hitherto unexplored role of the Scotist authors in this development one cannot rely on their interpretation of '*metaphysica*'.⁵⁹

58. A general discomfort with the title '*metaphysica*' is clearly seen in the following book titles from the Protestant tradition of metaphysics: Goclenius, *Isagoge in peripateticorum et scholasticorum primam philosophiam*; Johann Amos Comenius, *Janua rerum reserata, Hoc est Sapientia prima (quam vulgo Metaphysicam vocant) ita Mentibus hominem adaptata*, Lugduni Batavorum 1681 (reprint Fink, München 1968); Johannes Clauberg, *Metaphysica de ente, Quae rectius ontosophia*, in Id., *Opera omnia philosophica*, Amstelodami 1691 (reprint Hildesheim 1968), vol. I. Reiner, *Die Entstehung*, 82, suggests that the discomfort with the traditional name of metaphysics seen in the titles of these and other works in the Protestant tradition is a sign of the slowly growing acceptance of the insight of Patrizi. In fact it seems more likely that the shift in the attitude towards the title of metaphysics does not originate in any philological concern for the historically correct name of this science. Those Protestant metaphysicians who sought alternative book titles for their works on metaphysics (sic) did so because they no longer accepted the idea of one science embracing treatment of both supernatural being and being in general. They turned away from the traditional title out of purely systematic concerns.

59. The value of Mastri's preliminary remarks on metaphysics for a systematical estimation of his metaphysics is discussed in recent Mastri research. P.R. Blum has stressed the implications of the etymology of '*metaphysica*' given by Mastri in the preface to his metaphysics. On the reading of Blum these preliminary remarks on the character of metaphysics combined with some further material allow for an interpretation of Mastri's metaphysics as a "natural theology" and as an essentially

4. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 18TH CENTURY AND LATER

Whereas the flourishing of the Scotist school in the 17th century is sometimes treated in literature as an established fact, the continuity of the tradition into the 18th century has largely been neglected. In the first half of this century the *cursus* tradition continues in the same style as before the turn of the century. We saw that above. What is surprising about 18th century Scotist philosophy, however, is not this continuity, but rather the way in which it from the middle of the century onwards first assimilates contemporary philosophy and then almost vanishes. Amidst this process the development of our etymology takes an unexpected turn. In this part let us present our scarce, but as it seems representative, material in the same way as before.

4.1 The *Ontologia et Pneumatologia seu Metaphysicae pars prior et pars posterior, juxta mentem doctoris subtilis Joannis Duns Scoti* by the (probably) Austrian Scotist Clemens König was published in 1753. The work is the second volume of a philosophical course beginning with a part entitled *Institutiones philosophicae in universam philosophiam peripateticam seu dialectica juxta mentem doctoris subtilis Joannis Duns Scoti* (1752). The work under consideration here is a short treatise on metaphysics, obviously intended for classroom use. Discussing the adequate object of metaphysics König also touches upon the etymology of ‘*metaphysica*’:

“modern metaphysics”. According to Blum Mastri’s metaphysics is “modern” because the double abstraction operative in Mastri’s etymology is (supposedly) not found in this form until 16th century aristotelianism; cfr. P.R. Blum, *La métaphysique comme théologie naturelle: Bartolomeo Mastri, «Ét. philos.»*, 57 (2002), 31-47; Id., *Astrazione per indifferenza: Bartolomeo Mastri all’inizio della metafisica moderna*, in M. Forlivesi (ed.), *Rem in seipsa cernere. Saggi sul pensiero filosofico di Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673)*, Il Poligrafo, Padova 2006 (Subsidia mediaevalia Patavina, 8), 223-236. Nonetheless M. Forlivesi, *A Man, an Age, a Book*, in Id. (ed.), *Rem in seipsa cernere*, 23-144, in particular 122, in my opinion correctly stresses the need also to investigate «the nature of the link which he [i.e. Mastri] conceives between separated being, transcendental being, and the object of metaphysics» in order to make general statements about the character of the metaphysics of Mastri. For a more detailed discussion of this I wish to refer to my dissertation under preparation on the metaphysics of Mastri and his Scotist contemporaries.

Metaphysica secundum Ethymon nominis dicitur Scientia transcendens, et objecta aliarum Scientiarum omnium sub ratione entis considerat: ergo objectum adaequatum Metaphysicae est ens in communi sub ratione entis. Cons. patet, quia Metaphysica dicitur transcendens, quatenus versatur circa objectum transcendens scilicet ens in communi, et ratio, sub qua Metaphysica objecta aliarum Scientiarum considerat, est ratio formalis objecti sui: ergo si Metaphysica etc.⁶⁰

Metaphysics is called '*scientia transcendens*'. It considers the objects of the other sciences in so far as these fall under the *ratio entis*. Its own adequate object is the transcendent *ens in communi*. In these lines we see a connection between the etymological explanation of '*metaphysica*', the question of the object of metaphysics, and the relation of metaphysics to the other sciences. This immediately recalls the context of Duns Scotus' etymology. König, however, also bears witness to one of the significant trends of 17th century etymologies of '*metaphysica*', namely the one (found in Mastri) that connects the etymology of '*metaphysica*' with the doctrine of a twofold abstraction or a twofold transcendence. In the foreword to his *Ontologia et Pneumatologia* König explains the two parts of this science. He names them in the manner of Wolffian school philosophy. Here König has recourse to the idea of the twofold transcendence of metaphysics, though he makes no mention of the theory of the twofold abstraction:

Ingredimur DEO auspice secretiora sublimioris scientiae penetralia, illius nempe, quae a multis Scientia generalis, quoniam prima disciplinarum omnium principia complectitur, a Philosopho etiam Theologia naturalis appellatur, quia de DEO ipso, quantum humanae rationis acies admittit, pertractat; communi tamen nomine Metaphysica vocitatur, quia Physicam tam nobilitate, quam universalitate objecti transcendit, quantum licebit, brevibus Metaphysicam hanc absolvemus, eandem in duas partes dividendo, quarum prior vocatur Ontologia, quia de ente generatim, ejus

60. Clemens König, *Ontologia et Pneumatologia seu Metaphysicae pars prior et posterior, juxta mentem doctoris subtilis Joannis Duns Scoti*, pars I, disp. I, q. unica, n. 9, Viennae 1753, 5. The title page informs that the author is doctor of theology from the University of Vienna. In his *Praefatio ad lectorem* the author promises a future treatise on general and particular physics. This part of the work was not available to me. It is doubtful whether it was ever published.

affectionibus et principiis disputat; posterior vero Pneumatologia, quia de Spiritibus, DEO nempe, Angelis et mente humana, quantum naturalis ratio patitur, agit.⁶¹

4.2 Another significant example of the development of Scotist metaphysics in the 18th century is the *Joannis Duns Scoti Philosophia nunc primum recentiorum placitis accomodata* by Carlo Giuseppe Bignamini (Carolus Josephus a S. Floriano). It was published in 1771. The second volume of this course bears the title *Tomus secundus Metaphysicam primam seu Ontologiam continens*. In the foreword to this tome the Italian Franciscan gives the following direct interpretation of the ‘*physis*’ version of Duns Scotus’ etymology of ‘*metaphysica*’:

Vocabuli vero *Metaphysicae* etymologiam aperiens Scotus Prol. Quaest. Metaph., *hanc scientiam, ait, vocamus Metaphysicam, quae dicitur a meta, quod est trans, et physis scientia, quasi transcendens scientia, quia est de transcendentibus*. Nec absona videatur haec Scotica nominis interpretatio: non enim *physis* vocabulum *naturam*, ut communiter accipitur, tantum significat; sed linguae graecae periti *ingenium* etiam, *indolem*, ac *scientiam* illud interpretantur. Transcendentia porro dicuntur, quae super omnia vagantur entium genera, suntque generalissimae illae notiones, quae rebus non solum disparatis, verum etiam contrariis simul conveniunt.⁶²

Bignamini wishes to adjust the Scotist philosophy to the philosophy of his 18th century contemporaries. Wolff and the Wolfian philosopher Baumeister are frequently quoted and the doctrines of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz are discussed. In this situation the author also finds time to interpret *Scotus*. Bignamini fully accepts the equation of ‘*physis*’ and ‘*scientia*’. This is only possible because he understands the Greek ‘*physis*’ in the sense of a spiritual faculty or talent, which connotations the word in fact does have. This science is transcendent because it considers the *transcendentia* (in Scotus’ text: «quia est de transcendentibus»). It is interesting

61. König, *Ontologia et Pneumatologia*, Prooemium, I.

62. Carolus Josephus a S. Floriano, *Joannis Duns Scoti Philosophia nunc primum recentiorum placitis accomodata*, vol. II: *Metaphysica prima seu ontologia*, Prooemium, Mediolani 1771, I. The title page of this work informs that the author is a strict observant of the Franciscan province of Milano.

that this recourse to the original text of Duns Scotus (in the available edition of the time, that of Ó Fihely/MacCaghwell/Wadding) is combined with an awareness of the Aristotelian scholarship as it had developed since the Renaissance. Immediately before the quoted Scotus interpretation Bignamini writes:

Metaphysicae nomini occasionem praebuit Aristoteles, vel is potius, qui Aristotelis volumina pene blattis exesa restauravit, lacunasque complevit, ac in ordinem materias redegit. Hic enim cum Libros, qui *Metaphysicorum* vulgo appellantur, inscripsisset *Ton meta ta physica*, scilicet *Eorum quae sunt ultra scientias seu res physicas*, priores Aristotelis Interpretes scientiam iis Libris contentam *Metaphysicam* nominarunt.⁶³

4.3 Let us finally quote a much later Scotist philosophy course. The *Cursus philosophicus ad mentem doctoris subtilis* by Cherubino Prezzolini (Cherubinus ab Abbatia S. Salvatoris) was published in 1904, i.e. in the wake of the revival of scholasticism. The second part of this course is entitled *Metaphysica generalis seu ontologia*. The foreword to this ontological part begins with an etymology of 'metaphysica'. Prezzolini also has recourse to the text of Duns Scotus, but in a much less distinctive way as in the explanation given by Bignamini:

Metaphysica etymologice spectata *scientia transcendens* dicitur, a graecis vocibus 'μετά' quod est *trans* et 'φύσις' quod est *natura* (*Prol. Metaph.* n. 5), tum quia causas praecipue altissimas rerum perscrutatur; tum quia transilit experimentalia et speculabilia considerat.⁶⁴

If we survey these quotes from the Scotist tradition of the second half of the 18th century and later it is not difficult to see some

63. Carolus Josephus a S. Floriano, *Joannis Duns Scoti Philosophia*, vol. II: *Metaphysica prima seu ontologia*, Prooemium, I. The words in Greek are transcribed in the text.

64. Cherubinus ab Abbatia S. Salvatore, *Cursus philosophicus ad mentem Doctoris Subtilis*, vol. I, *Metaphysica generalis seu ontologia*, Prooemium, Rome 1904, 213 (vol. II was published in 1905). Immediately after this quote the author gives the following explanation of the parts of metaphysics: «Quod ut clarius pateat *notandum* rationes rerum in *particulares* et *generales* dividi: priores constituunt naturam hanc vel illam, et sic propriae evadunt rei ut alteri tribui nequeant: u.g. ratio seu causa hominis: alterae vero communes sunt multis vel cunctis rebus. Ex quo enascitur divisio metaphysicae in *generalem* et *particularem*, prout vel ens in genere considerat, vel determinatum genus entis. De ente determinato agit cosmologia, psychologia et theologia naturalis: de ente vero in genere est *ontologia*, seu *metaphysica generalis*».

difference between this “very late” Scotism and that of the Baroque age. On the level of terminology one easily notes a shift from the middle of the 18th century onwards. It may not come as a surprise that a scholastic philosophy course from the beginning of the 20th century knows of a *General Metaphysics or Ontology* as that of Prezzolini does. After all, they were common titles in the mainstream scholasticism of the time.⁶⁵ But it is not at all self evident that Catholic school philosophy should come to use this terminology. A look at some Scotist authors of the 18th century reveals how this terminology was first employed in this tradition. These authors explicitly divide their works on metaphysics into *ontologia* and *pneumatologia* as is seen in König and other Scotist authors such as Giuseppe Antonio Ferrari.⁶⁶ The same is found in Carlo Giuseppe Bignamini with the slight difference that he decides to put his *pneumatica* or *pneumatologia* after the treatise on physics.

According to Bignamini this arrangement is due to proper method. Proper method reflects the order of dependence between the matters treated of in science. What is presupposed in later parts should be treated first. Much of what is treated of in physics is presupposed in pneumatology. Pneumatology itself treats of God, the human soul, and the angels. Thus pneumatology is annexed to physics, whereas ontology that is presupposed by all other sciences is treated first. Here metaphysics is actually divided in two parts. Bignamini explicitly speaks of a *metaphysica prima* (before physics in the order of the sciences) and a *metaphysica secunda* (after physics).⁶⁷

65. Another, more prominent, example is Pedro Descoqs, *Institutiones metaphysicae generalis. Éléments d'ontologie*, Beauchesne, Paris 1925.

66. Cfr. Josephus Antonius Ferrari, *Veteris et recentioris philosophiae dogmata Joannis Dunsii Scoti Subtilium Principis doctrinis accomodata*, vol. I, *Metaphysica*, Praeludium, Venetiis 1757, 325: «Metaphysicam [...] in duas partes distribuimus, quarum prior Ontologia vocatur, quae de Ente generatim, ejusdemque affectionibus, et principiiis disputat; posterior vero Pneumatologia, hoc est, Spirituum Scientia, dicitur, et Deum ipsum, Angelos, et spiritualem Homini Animam contemplatur».

67. Cfr. Carolus Josephus a S. Floriano, *Joannis Duns Scoti Philosophia*, vol. II: *Metaphysica prima seu ontologia*, Prooemium, 2: «Quia tamen recta methodus postulat, ut ea prius tradantur, quae ad posteriorum notitiam conferre possunt, cumque in Physicis Disciplinis multa occurrant, quae necessaria sunt ad ea facilius percipienda, quae

When we look for a cause of this shift it seems reasonable to turn to Wolffianism. Though the terminology 'ontologia' and 'pneumatologia' antedates Wolff,⁶⁸ this terminology does not seem to have had any wide reception in Catholic school philosophy before the reception of the philosophy of Christian Wolff from the middle of the 18th century onwards. This reception was slow, but steady. In Bavaria, for instance, the teaching of philosophy according to the Wolffian system was prohibited by the superiors of the order in 1752;⁶⁹ nevertheless in the following decades, especially after 1770, the influence of Wolffianism grew. This was mainly because of the influence from the nearby situated university of Ingolstadt, where the Wolffian Ickstat taught.⁷⁰

de Deo, Mente humana, et Angelis sunt demonstranda: idcirco eam Metaphysicae partem, quae de Spiritibus disserit, quamque *Pneumaticam*, et *Pneumatologiam* appellant, Physicae veluti aptiori loco subijciendam esse arbitramur: cujus rei uberiorem rationem in prolegomenis ad universam Philosophiam art. 4. ex Scoto in medium protulimus. Modo itaque eam dumtaxat Metaphysicae partem exhibemus, quae agit de ente in genere, cum genericae entis, ejusque affectionum notiones ad omnes disciplinas rite pertractandas necessario praerequirantur. Haec *Prima Philosophia*, ac *Ontologia* vulgo nuncupatur; nos vero pro suscepto instituto *Metaphysicam Primam* nominamus, alteram, quam Physicae subjiciemus, *Metaphysicam Secundam* appellaturi». In this text Bignamini refers to his own *Joannis Duns Scoti Philosophia*, vol. 1: *Logica*, In universam philosophiam prolegomena, a. 4, Mediolani 1771, 68-70.

68. Recent research has pushed the origin of the term 'ontologia' some years further back in comparison with the older view according to which it was coined by Goclenius in 1613: the term has been found in a work by Jacob Lorhard from 1606. Cfr. P. Øhrstrøm - S.J. Uckelman - H. Schärfe, *Jacob Lorhard's Ontology: A 17th Century Hypertext on the Reality and Temporality of the World of Intelligibles*, in 16th International Conference on Conceptual Structures, Springer Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg 2008 (ICCS 2008), 74-87; Id., *Historical and Conceptual Foundation of Diagrammatical Ontology*, in 15th International Conference on Conceptual Structures, Springer Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg 2007 (ICCS 2007), 374-386; M. Lamanna, *Sulla prima occorrenza del termine «Ontologia»*. Una nota bibliografica, «Quaestio», 6 (2006), 557-570; P. Øhrstrøm - J. Andersen - H. Schärfe, *What Has Happened to Ontology*, in 13th International Conference on Conceptual Structures, Springer Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg 2005 (ICCS 2005), 425-438; R. Corazzon, *The Development of Ontology from Suarez to Kant (1597-1781)*, [www.formalontology.it/history.htm].

69. Cfr. Th. Kogler, *Das philosophisch-theologische Studium der bayrischen Franziskaner. Ein Beitrag zur Studien- und Schulgeschichte des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts*, Aschendorff, Münster 1925 (Franziskanische Studien Beiheft, 10), 23-24.

70. Cfr. Kogler, *Das philosophisch-theologische Studium*, 24-31. Kogler (p. 27) further informs that the reception of the system of Wolff even paved the way for a certain reception of Kant in Franciscan philosophy teaching around 1800.

The example of the Franciscans in Bavaria seems to be representative. At least the quoted material confirms this picture. König writing shortly after 1750 takes over the new names for the philosophical disciplines, but he does not mention Wolff by name. Bignamini openly refers to Wolff, takes over the new terminology, and restructures the order of the sciences in a way very similar to that of Wolff in his Latin exposition of philosophy. Let us here just recall that the parts of Wolff's work are arranged in an order that allows the later parts to receive their principles from the earlier parts. This implies the following order of the philosophical disciplines: ontology, cosmology, psychology, and natural theology.⁷¹ The last two sciences also share the title '*pneumatica*'.⁷² In accordance with the proposed order of the sciences ontology begins with an exposition of the first principles, the principle of contradiction and that of sufficient reason. All other knowledge depends on these principles.

This suffices for an estimation of the place of Bignamini's *First Metaphysics or Ontology* in the history of philosophy. Its place is at the passage from traditional scholastic, in this case Scotist, philosophy to post-Wolffian school philosophy. In order to give the reader a further impression of the Scotist, but already post-Wolffian works on metaphysics by König and Bignamini their tables of contents are reproduced in an appendix to this study. In these tables we see how the elements of Duns Scotus' project of metaphysics are arranged in the final phase of the Scotist tradition.

It is here noteworthy that König and Bignamini are not singular figures. They are examples of a broader movement. Let us keep to the philosophy education within the Franciscan order

71. Christian Wolff, *Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere*, n. 99, ed. G. Gawlick - L. Kreimendahl, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1996 (Forschungen und Materialien zur Deutschen Aufklärung, I, 1), 108; Wolff's earlier work *Vernünfftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt, und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, Halle 1751 (reprint Olms, Hildesheim 1983; first published 1720), has a structure that is slightly different from that of the later work. One edition of Wolff's *Opera Latina* was published in Verona in 1735. This point is of importance for an understanding of the influence of Wolff upon Catholic school philosophy of the time.

72. Wolff, *Discursus praeliminaris*, n. 79, 86.

of the late 18th century. The *Institutiones philosophicae ad studia theologica potissimum accomodatae* (4 vols., 1759-1762) by the Franciscan Francis Jacquier and the *Praelectiones philosophicae ad usum recentioris physicae candidatorum ad s. theologiam aspirantium* (4 vols., 1780) by the Capuchin Maurice from Berona are examples of textbooks from this tradition. In these works one finds the same Wolffian terminology as in our two late Scotists. They also have more or less the same order of the sciences as in Wolff and Bignamini. But in these works one hardly finds any elements of Scotist doctrine any more, at least not in the form known from the elder *cursus* tradition. Moreover, both authors let their ontology begin with an exposition of the principles mentioned above. In general they proceed in a way very similar to that of Wolff. Both authors also propose a division of metaphysics into ontology and pneumatology. Jacquier divides metaphysics according to the definition of this science as «the science of being in general and the spirits». ⁷³ Maurice from Berona derives the division of metaphysics from the twofold abstraction from matter. He then grounds the division of pneumatics into psychology and theology on the existence of the two spiritual substances, the created and the uncreated. ⁷⁴

73. Cfr. Franciscus Jacquier, *Institutiones philosophicae ad studia theologica potissimum accomodatae*, vol. II: *Metaphysica*, Venetiis 1785, I: «*Metaphysica* definiri potest entis in genere, et spirituum scientia. Hinc dividi solet *Metaphysica* in duas partes, quarum prior agit de communibus entium affectionibus, et *Ontologia* dicitur; secunda vero *Pneumatica* vocatur, et ea quae de Deo, anima, nec non pauca, quae de Angelis lumine naturae novimus, complectitur. Utramque partem ita tractabimus, ut nihil quod utile sit praetermittamus, aut si quid praetermitti jubet praescripta brevitatis, illa tantum omitemus, quae in *Theologia* commodius ac uberius explicantur».

74. Cfr. Mauritius a Berona (Lucernas), *Praelectiones philosophicae ad usum recentioris physicae candidatorum ad s. theologiam aspirantium*, *Metaphysicae pars prima seu Ontologia*, Introductio, Basileae 1780, III-IV: «*Metaphysica* res duplici ratione a materia secretas attingit. [...] Hinc duplex enascitur *Metaphysicae* divisio, scilicet prima generalis, quae circa ens generatim sumptum versatur, et *Ontologia* audit; altera particularis, quae spirituales substantias ita perscrutatur, ut earum naturam, existentiam atque operationes mediante lumine naturali in aperto ponat atque declaret, haecque uno verbo *Pneumatologia* quasi *sermo de spiritibus* dicitur, cumque duae potissimum sint substantiae spirituales, creata una, et altera increata, ideo *Pneumatologia* in duas iterum subdividitur partes, nimirum in *Psychologiam*, quae spiritum creatum contemplatur, et in *Theologiam* naturalem, quae de Spiritu increato, Deo nempe Ter Optimo Maximo pro viribus naturalibus discurrit».

CONCLUSION

As was said in the introduction, the history of the etymology of ‘*metaphysica*’ within the Scotist tradition is highly complex. In this tradition the versions of the etymology are many. The origin of the etymology of Duns Scotus still lies in the dark, but in this study its later traditions have been highlighted. Here it is necessary to speak of traditions and not of one tradition. Both the manuscripts of Duns Scotus’ *Metaphysical Questions* and early Scotist authors such as Antonius Andreae and Bonet testify to various versions of Duns Scotus’ etymology. One of these, the ‘*phycos*’ version (which is held in the recent uncritical *Editio minor*), seems only to exist in some Scotus manuscripts. The ‘*ycos*’ version (the one held in the modern critical edition), seems to vanish completely during the 15th century, whereas the ‘*physis*’ version was printed in Ó Fihely’s edition of Scotus’ *Metaphysical Questions* from 1497. In this way the ‘*physis*’ version was handed down to the early modern period.

However, the 17th century Scotist authors consulted in this study know of several versions of the etymology of ‘*metaphysica*’. Duns Scotus’ ‘*physis*’ version is still quoted verbatim, though rarely. One interesting trend in this period, notably seen in Mastri, is to explain the transcendence of metaphysics according to a twofold abstraction from matter, meaning that metaphysics both transcendens nature because of its considering the *per essentiam* immaterial substances and because of its considering the *per indifferentiam* immaterial concept of being and the transcendentals. In context of this explanation of the etymology Mastri quotes the text of Scotus inaccurately. Both Mastri’s explanation and his inaccurate quote are repeated by some later Scotists.

The Scotist *cursus* tradition continues into the 18th century, but from the middle of this century onwards the influence of Wolfian philosophy on Catholic school philosophy also affects the teaching of Scotist metaphysics. Surprisingly, in this context of historical transition some so to speak “very late” Scotist authors consulted in this study (Clemens König and Carlo Giuseppe Bignamini) return to the almost forgotten tradition of Duns Scotus’ ‘*physis*’ version. They return to one version of Duns Scotus’ *Urtex*

and etymologically explain '*metaphysica*' in terms of a "transcending science".

In no sources investigated in this study the question of the title of the science of metaphysics was treated as a point of doctrine. In most sources, however, the explanation of the etymology of '*metaphysica*' figures as a strongly doctrine-related *modus loquendi* that as such – despite all deviations – bears witness to the long term continuity of the Scotist tradition and to particular traditions within this tradition.⁷⁵

APPENDICES

The tables are from the volumes in the former *Bibliothek Wissenschaft und Weisheit*, now at the *Albertus-Magnus-Institut*, Bonn. Only obvious mistakes were corrected and the use of 'æ' and '&' modernized into 'ae' and 'et'.

I. Table of contents from Clemens König, *Ontologia et Pneumatologia seu Metaphysicae peripateticae pars prior et posterior, juxta mentem doctoris subtilis Joannis Duns Scoti*, Ex typographia Kaliwodiana, Viennae Austriae 1753.

Series Disputationum et Quaestionum.

Partis primae,

Disputatio I. De natura, objecto et qualitatibus Metaphysicae.

Quaest. Unica: in qua solvuntur quaesita necessaria de Metaphysica.

Disputatio II. De natura entis generatim.

Quaest. I. An ens reale ut sic habeat conceptum unum tam formalem, quam objectivum?

II. An conceptus objectivus entis perfecte abstrahat ab omnibus inferioribus suis?

Disputatio III. De Passionibus entis.

Quaest. I. In qua solvuntur quaesita de passionibus incomplexis entis.

II. In qua solvuntur quaesita de passionibus complexis entis.

III. In qua solvuntur quaesita de identitate ac distinctione in communi.

IV. In qua solvuntur quaesita de distinctione reali.

75. The main part of this study was written at the Albertus-Magnus-Institut, Bonn; a six months stay at the Accademia di Danimarca, Rome, enabled the examination of further material. I am greatly obliged to both institutions. I should also like to thank Dr Marco Forlivesi for his attentive reading of this work.

V. An detur distinctio formalis vulgo Scotistica?

Disputatio IV. De ideais et principiis entis.

Quaest. I. An dentur aliquae ideae innatae?

II. Quod sit primum certe cognitionis principium?

Disputatio V. De entis creati essentia et existentia.

Quaest. I. An essentiae rerum sint aeternae?

II. Quid sit rerum existentia, et quomodo ab essentia distinguatur.

III. Quodnam sit individuationis principium?

IV. Quid sit subsistentia creata?

Partis secundae,

Disputatio unica. De DEO et substantiis abstractis seu Angelis.

Quaest. I. An et quomodo ostendi possit DEUM existere?

II. An DEUS immediate concurrat ad singula creaturarum opera?

III. An DEUS Physice praemoveat causas liberas ad operandum?

IV. An Existentia Angelorum naturaliter sit demonstrabilis?

2. Table of contents from Carolus Josephus a S. Floriano, *Joannis Duns Scoti Philosophia nunc primum recentiorum placitis accomodata, Tomus secundus Metaphysicam primam seu Ontologiam continens, Ex typographia Marelliana, Mediolani 1771.*

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Ontologiae Prooemium.

Ontologiae Liber I. de ente in genere ejusque affectionibus.

Sectio I. De primis ac generalibus cognitionis principiis.

Art. I. De principio evidentiae

Proposit. Unica. Rei evidentia ac intimum conscientiae testimonium sunt prima cognitionis principia in demonstratione ostensiva.

Contraria refelluntur momenta.

Art. II. De principio contradictionis.

Proposit. Unica. Principium contradictionis est primum cognitionis principium in demonstratione deducente ad impossibile.

Diluuntur objecta.

Art. III. De sufficientis rationis principio.

Proposit. I. Principium rationis sufficientis necessario dimanat a contradictionis principio.

Proposit. Ut rationis sufficientis principium locum generatim habeat in causis etiam liberis, pro ratione sufficienti accipiendum quoque est ipsum volentis arbitrium.

Proposit. III. Sufficientis rationis principio uti etiam oportet in rebus ad Fidem Divinam spectantibus, si pro ratione sufficiente

credendi statuatur vel immediata Dei revelatio, vel infallibilis auctoritas proponentis Ecclesiae.

Art. IV. De generali Scepticorum dubitatione.

Proposit. Unica. Plurima sunt, de quibus nulla ratione aut nonnisi fatue ac temere dubitari potest.

Pyrrhonistarum deteguntur cavillationes.

Sectio II. De generalissima entis notione.

Art. I. De entis essentia.

Art. II. De entium seu rerum possibilitate.

Proposit. I. Logica seu absoluta et primaria entium possibilitas a Divina Voluntate non pendet, sed est ipsius entibus intrinseca et necessaria.

Adversae partis momenta refutantur.

Proposit. II. Possibilitas formalis et intrinseca creaturarum non est quoddam esse verum essentiae, quod ab aeterno ipsae habuerint extra Deum.

Objectiones dissolvuntur.

Proposit. III. Omnes res possibles habuerunt ab aeterno aliquod esse diminutum et secundum quid in Mente Divina.

Art. III. De communissima entis praedicatione.

Proposit. I. Notio entis est communis univoce Deo et creaturae.

Proposit. II. Entis notio univoce etiam dicitur de substantia et accidente.

Oppositae librantur rationes.

Sectio III. De simplicibus entis affectionibus.

Art. I. De unitate veritate et bonitate entis generatim.

Art. II. De unitate entis Pantheistica.

Proposit. I. Scotus unitatem substantiae non solum in toto Universo, verum etiam in eadem natura specifica omnino rejecit.

Proposit. II. Pantheistica entis seu substantiae unitas est cum Supremi Numinis, tum mundanarum rerum naturae prorsus adversa, ac purum putumque Atheismum involvit.

Pantheistarum sophismata adaperiuntur.

Art. III. De Scotica entis unitate.

Proposit. I. Scotus nullum agnovit universale a parte rei independens ab intellectu.

Proposit. II. Reale idearum universalium fundamentum est realis quaedam unitas existens in re a numerica unitate distincta, in qua diversa individua conveniunt.

Vindicatur Scotus ab aliorum calumniis.

Sectio IV. De complexis entis affectionibus.

Art. I. De actu et potentia.

Proposit. I. Potentia obedientialis non est a potentia naturali creaturae essentialiter diversa.

Proposit. II. Potentia obedientialis in creatura ad ea tantum se extendit, ad quae illius naturalis potentia aliquam habet proportionem, et potentiam inchoatam.

Art. II. De identitate et distinctione.

Proposit. I. Admittenda est in creaturis formalis Scoti distinctio.

Proposit. II. Multa sunt in Deo, quae Scotica formali distinctione invicem discriminantur.

Scoti doctrina ab oppositis vindicatur argumentis.

Art. III. De essentia et existentia.

Proposit. I. Nullius entis existentia distinguitur realiter ab illius essentia.

Thomistarum dissolvuntur argumenta.

Proposit. II. Essentia atque existentia ejusdem entis neque formaliter ex natura rei invicem distinguuntur.

Art. IV. De necessitate et contingentia.

Proposit. I. Actuales creaturarum essentiae nec omnino necessariae nec immutabiles sunt.

Proposit. II. Possibiles creaturarum essentiae in abstracto, et quatenus tales mere consideratae, sunt necessariae et immutabiles; longe tamen minori immutabilitate et necessitate ac ea sit, quae Deo tribuitur.

Ontologiae Lib. II. De generalibus entis divisionibus.

Sectio I. De substantia et accidente.

Art. I. Explicatur substantiae et accidentis natura.

Art. II. De substantia individua.

Proposit. I. Substantia non fit individua per actualement sui existentiam.

Proposit. II. Individuationis principium repeti nequit ex sola materia quatenus est altera pars compositi.

Proposit. III. Nec quantitas, nec materia quantitate signata, est ratio sufficiens, cur plura individua sint in eadem natura.

Proposit. IV. Substantia fit individua per esse totius suae entitatis in ipsa, non in alio, sed separatim a quolibet.

Art. III. De principio indiscernibilium.

Proposit. I. Si duo forent entia quoad totam entitatem omnino invicem similia, adhuc invicem distincta et discernibilia essent.

Proposit. II. Multa entia omnino et ad amussim similia possibilia sunt, et a Deo creari possunt.

Proposit. III. Principium indiscernibilium nil aliud esse potest, quam perfecta identitas.

Leibnitianae partis refelluntur argumenta.

Art. IV. Discrimen exponitur inter substantiam et subsistentiam.

Proposit. I. Non omnis substantia individua propria donatur subsistentia.

Proposit. II. Omnes substantiae creatae, illae etiam, quae natura comparatae sunt propria donari subsistentia, hac ipsa queunt destitui potentia saltem Dei absoluta.

Proposit. III. Plures creatae substantiae, quae institutae sunt a natura peculiarem habere subsistentiam, ea carere possunt, ac aliena subsistere, naturali etiam virtute.

Proposit. IV. Subsistentia seu personalitas creata nihil reale et positivum superaddit naturae, sed formaliter accepta est quid mere negativum.

Sectio II. De causa et effectu.

Art. I. De notione causae generatim acceptae.

Proposit. I. Unus et idem numero effectus a duabus simul causis adaequatis eiusdem generis et ordinis profluere nequit.

Dubitandi rationes remonentur.

Proposit. II. Idem numero effectus, qui in praesenti causarum serie producit immediate ab una causa, potuisset, mutata ipsa serie, immediate produci ab alia causa ejusdem generis et ordinis, a qua nunc mediate solum procedit.

Enondantur difficultates oppositae.

Proposit. III. Nulla datur causarum series absque initio.

Art. II. De causis efficiente, finali, et exemplari.

Proposit. I. Si Deus necessitate suae naturae faceret quaecumque facit, nullum in Universo haberetur ens contingens.

Proposit. II. Si Deus necessario semper ageret, nulla causa secunda posset libere operari.

Art. III. De causis materiali et formali.

Proposit. I. Scotus materiam primam generalissime acceptam in corporalem et spiritalem non absurde divisit.

Resolvuntur objectiones.

Proposit. II. Materia prima sive spiritalis sive corporalis est vera substantia.

Proposit. III. Materia prima, etiam corporalis, universim accepta est quoddam veluti aggregatum infinitarum pene particularum, quarum singulae sunt ex se substantiae simplices et inextensae.

Argumentationes contrariae refelluntur.

Sectio III. De reliquis entium generibus.

Art. I. De ente simplici et composito.

Proposit. I. Dato ente composito, necessario admittendum est in eo aliquod ens simplex.

Proposit. II. Scotus minime docuit, totum sive compositum esse tertiam quamdam substantiam a partibus simul conjunctis realiter distinctam.

Art. II. De ente absoluto et relativo.

Proposit. I. Plures sunt relationes reales, quae ut sint ab actu mentis nostrae non pendent.

Proposit. II. Relatio non est aliquod accidens superadditum fundamento proximo et termino.

Proposit. III. Relatio creaturae ad Deum est essentiae creaturae realiter quidem, sed non formaliter eadem.

Art. III. De ente finitio et infinito.

Proposit. I. Ex entibus finitis, licet numero infinitis, infinitum fieri nequit.

Proposit. II. Plura entia, quae singula sint infinitae entitatis, minime sunt possibilia.

Proposit. III. Nulla quantitas infinite parva esse potest.

Art. IV. De ente permanente et successivo.