

What's Not to Loathe?

A Qualitative Study of the Factors Influencing Belgian Trade Unions' Positioning towards a Universal Basic Income

Floriane Geels, Marie-Laure Mulayi & Tijs Laenen



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Citation: Geels, F., Mulayi, M.L., & Laenen, T. (2023). What's Not to Loathe? A Qualitative Study of the Factors Influencing Belgian Trade Unions' Positioning towards a Universal Basic Income. SPSW Working Paper No. CeSo/SPSW/2023-01. Leuven: Centre for Sociological Research, KU Leuven.

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Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 21th Annual ESPAnet conference, Warsaw, in September 2023 and at the State of the Federation of the ABSP, Brussels, in December 2022. We would like to thank the participants for their valuable input. We also want to thank Yannick Vanderborght and the other members of the Basic Income in Belgium (BABEL) project for their valuable feedback.

Funding statement

This research was funded by the Belgian Federal Science Policy (grant number: B2/191/P3/BABEL).

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D/2023/1192/4
ISBN 9789067842440
EAN 9789067842440

Abstract

This working paper focuses on the position of Belgian trade unions towards the introduction of a universal basic income (UBI), a proposal attracting increasing attention due to major social changes that have weakened the efficiency of existing social protection mechanisms. Previous studies on the subject suggest that trade unions are not particularly supportive of this (potential) welfare reform and that their opposition is mainly driven by ideological and strategic motives. Yet, little empirical research has been done on the factors influencing trade unions' hostility towards the proposal. This study aims to fill this gap by adopting a multi-factor approach that considers the broader institutional, political and socio-economic context, unions' ideologies and values, and their organizational structure and relation to constituencies' attitudes. On the basis of in-depth interviews with prominent Belgian union leaders, we untangle how their official positioning is shaped by multiple, sometimes contradictory, considerations. We find that Belgian trade unions are concerned about the budgetary implication that implementing a UBI would entail as well as the uncertainty of politically tinted UBI proposals. They essentially want to maintain the current social insurance system and their prominent institutional role within that system. We also note that the rationale behind their opposition is shaped by their union-specific philosophical tendencies and their strong attachment to work. Finally, their constituencies' attitudes do not seem to affect their official positioning. On the contrary, we notice a top-down approach as they emphasize their role in "educating" their members about a UBI.

Keywords: welfare reform; universal basic income; trade unions; Belgium

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1 Introduction

Since the twentieth century, and especially in the post-war period, trade unions (TU) have been pillar actors of the construction of European welfare states. However, TU have increasingly faced criticism in recent years: some consider them to be less and less able to account for several subcategories of the population such as single parents, migrants or precarious workers. At the same time, structural changes have impacted the context in which their action takes place. The economic recession of the 1980s led to major societal transformations, challenging the certainties on which pre-industrial welfare states were built. Among other things, the emergence of “new social risks” such as precarious work or mass unemployment questions the ability of the system to protect large categories of the population (Carbonnier & Palier, 2022). Moreover, the development of austerity policies in several European countries aimed at minimizing social spending has increased the pressure to retrench the welfare state. As essential stakeholders of the welfare states, TU are striving to keep shaping the development of social policies (Hyman, 2001) and to secure the social *acquis*. This also implies that they remain cautious regarding reforms that could end up as retrenchment strategies. These new elements impacting the socio-political reality, along with labour market evolution, have led to a ‘disadjustment of the welfare state’ (Carbonnier & Palier, 2022). In this line, reforms are proposed in order to make welfare states more adapted to current social evolutions and context.

Among these, the proposal of a universal basic income (UBI) is the object of a growing scrutiny and both scientific and political discussions tend to take a more concrete turn (see for example De Wispelaere & Noguera, 2012; Geels, 2023). UBI, under its canonical form, can be described as a certain amount of money, granted to every member of a political community without counterpart obligation, and regardless of the person’s familial and financial situation. Three characteristics thus define UBI: its individuality (a cash income granted to an individual rather than a household), its unconditionality (no behavioral requirements) and its universality (all adult residents of a community are entitled to receive it) (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017; Dumont, 2022). However, the concept of UBI is multidimensional (Laenen *et al.*, 2022). UBI proposals can vary along different axes (such as their amount, financing and integration within the existing welfare system), hence there is no predefined form or design of UBI.

Specialized literature has mostly argued that TU are likely to oppose the introduction of a UBI, for various motives (Offe, 2009; Vanderborght, 2006; Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). The specified reasons are usually of both an ideological and a strategic nature, comprising for example the idea that a basic income would reduce TU’s collective bargaining power and goes against deeply valued work ethics. What is still generally lacking, however, is empirical research delving into the actual positions taken in by trade unions and their representatives as well as the factors driving it. The scarce available research has mostly focused on TU’s ideological opposition to (or support for) UBI (see Cigna, 2021 for an excellent example), thereby downplaying the fact that there will likely be multiple factors simultaneously contributing to their positioning. This working paper builds on the theoretical “Welfare Reform from Below” framework developed by Ebbinghaus & Naumann (2018) to uncover how TU’s positioning on UBI is influenced by (1) the broader (institutional, political and socio-economic) context in which TU operate, (2) their ideologies and values, and (3) their organizational structure and relation to their

constituencies' attitudes. In addition to the development of a multi-factor approach to study TU's positioning towards UBI, this paper contributes to existing scholarship by analyzing the (missing) link between the positions expressed by TU representatives and the attitudes held by TU members. Some have argued that the rank-and-file members might very well have different interests and opinions than the top leaders, prompted for example by the idea that UBI might increase workers' *individual* bargaining power at the expense of their *collective* bargaining power (Laenen, 2020). To date, however, we know very little about such potential disagreement between the head and the body and its implications for TU's positioning towards a UBI. The current paper aims to address this research gap by investigating how TU representatives respond to survey information about TU members' attitudes towards UBI in the setting of a qualitative in-depth interview.

In the following, we first present a review of the state of the art and explain how we apply Ebbinghaus and Naumann's theoretical framework to the specific welfare reform of UBI in the context of the Belgian welfare state. We argue that Belgium is a relevant case to consider because the different TU continue to play an important part in social policymaking (due to their institutionally embedded roles; Faniel, 2017; Van Rie *et al.*, 2011; Vandaele 2006), UBI has recently been discussed as a more serious welfare reform option (mainly in the French-speaking part of the country; see Geels, 2023), and it has high-quality survey data available on TU members' attitudes towards different UBI proposals (gathered as part of the Basic Income in Belgium survey, which purposefully over-sampled TU members; see Laenen *et al.*, 2023). Second, we provide more information about the collection and analysis of the in-depth interviews that were held with Belgian trade union representatives. Third, we build on these interviews to explore the role played by the main factors identified in the theoretical framework: the Belgian context, TU ideology and structure, and constituencies' attitudes. Finally, we summarize the main conclusions and reflect on the transferability of our findings to UBI proposals in other countries and to other welfare reforms.

2 Theoretical framework

2.1 State of the art: welfare reform, unions and UBI

The academic literature tackling trade unions' attitude towards welfare reforms is broadly divided in two streams. The first one refers to unions' sectionalism and labour dualisation and the second one concerns unions' revitalization strategies (Clegg *et al.*, 2010). The sectionalism stream posits that unions would defend their core membership's interests and leave behind 'outsiders' (Durazzi *et al.*, 2018; Ebbinghaus, 2007; Faniel, 2018). In this dualisation logic (Rueda, 2014), unions would have a 'sectional response', biased towards insiders (e.g., typically, male workers with long-term and stable employment) and oppose welfare reforms or policies targeted at outsiders (e.g., unemployed people, migrants, or the youth) by fear of competition of these workers with their members' base. On the other side, the revitalization stream conceives unions as strategic actors. The rationale is that unions would broaden their action and agenda beyond core membership interests for recruitment reasons (Ibsen & Tapia, 2022). They would thus be expected to adapt and opt for welfare reforms likely to bring them new members. However, some researchers adopt a more nuanced perspective and suppose that both logics can happen at the same time (Cigna, 2023; Clegg *et al.*, 2010). This paper will follow this perspective and favour the middle ground between sectionalism and revitalization. The reform studied here is the proposal of implementing a UBI.

Limited research has been conducted so far to investigate TU attitudes towards a UBI. Vanderborght's analysis (2006) showed that the reasons for unions' suspicion of UBI were linked to their work ethic and their fear of losing institutional power. The fact that UBI questions the centrality of paid work would make the balance of power unfavourable to unions. Exploring trade unions' positions in four different national contexts, he came to the conclusion that the institutions could influence their stance, but adherence from a majority of union members would still be hard to acquire due to the insider/outsider fracture (Vanderborght, 2006). Other UBI scholars emphasized the risk of weak support from unions to UBI in reason of their labourist philosophy (De Wispelaere & Noguera, 2012), or out of fear of responsibility and power losses (Offe, 2009). In the same vein, Van Parijs & Vanderborght (2017) expose that unions would dread that UBI could lower the general wage level, subsidize poor-paid jobs, and replace the whole social system. Unions also suspect that it would significantly affect their bargaining power as wages would not be central anymore and imply a more dispersed collective action (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017).


As Cigna (2019) argues, research on TU and UBI has tended to consider TU's dismissal of UBI proposals as common knowledge, overlooking the concrete reasons behind it. However, Cigna's research (2019; 2021) participated in filling this gap, empirically investigating the attitudes of various European TU towards a UBI. Four explanatory factors influencing the positions of unions in developed countries are identified: the national level of economic insecurity, unions' attachment to work ethic, their degree of institutionalization and the generosity of the welfare state. He argues that less institutionalized unions in weaker or 'deregulated' welfare systems facing economic precarity might be keener to support UBI than their counterparts in continental or Nordic systems, as they see the proposal as a potential improvement of their feeble welfare system. In contrast, 'continental' welfare states, such as Belgium, are deemed to oppose UBI for several reasons. On an idealistic ground, unions fundamentally reject the idea of a universal and unconditional

benefit because of their strong work ethic. On a more practical ground, they perceive UBI as a threat to their institutional power and as conducive to a more segmented and powerless workforce (Cigna, 2019; 2021). The corpus on unions' positions towards UBI thus still lacks empirically based research. As argued above, we also acknowledge a gap in research about the relationship between the head and the social base of unions and its impact on their positioning towards the reform. Besides, the influence of TU's own characteristics and of their surrounding context lacks thorough investigation.

2.2 Ebbinghaus & Naumann's theoretical framework revisited

This paper departs from Ebbinghaus & Naumann's (2018) analytical framework about the policy positioning of interest organizations (see annex 7.4 for the original framework). This framework distinguishes three factors that influence interest organizations' positions towards a specific (welfare) reform: the institutional and socio-economic context, the reform itself and public attitudes. Within the context of this research, we revisited this framework as presented in figure 2. In our revisited framework, we specify the three elements relevant to our study: the Belgian context, Belgian unionism and ideologies and TU's structures and relation to their constituencies' attitudes. We argue that each of these elements is related to the official positioning of Belgian TU towards a UBI.

Figure 1: Revisited theoretical framework



First, we essentially apply Ebbinghaus & Naumann's (2018) broad category of the institutional and socio-economic context to the Belgian context (indicated by arrow a). This category refers to the specific Belgian socio-political reality, composed of different societal actors operating within a similar institutional context that shapes their actions. Second, we added two novel elements, Belgian unionism and ideologies (indicated by arrow b) on the one hand, based on research by Cigna (2019; 2021) that suggests that TU positioning towards a UBI is influenced by their organizational characteristics. On the other hand, TU's relation to their constituencies' attitudes (indicated by arrow d) is inferred from Ebbinghaus & Naumann's (2018) suggested complex interplay between a 'logic of influence' and a 'logic

of membership'. The former pertains to the long-term interest of TU organizations seeking to safeguard their hardly acquired position as 'social partners' by actively participating in the development of social policy (Hyman, 2001). Within this strategic position, they will inform and mobilize their members - their constituencies - to advance their political agenda. For instance, this rationale manifests itself in strike actions or other forms of resistance in response to political decisions deemed to be unfavorable to them. Then, the 'logic of membership' refers to their constituencies' short-term (self-)interests that might differ from the greater purpose towards which TU are striving. This distinction is relevant because it highlights the ambiguity that can arise when operating as an intermediary organization between the political realm of policy making and public opinion (Ebbinghaus & Naumann, 2018: 4).

Trade unions in the Belgian context

Belgium is a Bismarckian (Esping-Andersen, 1990), or contributory welfare state. This means that social policies are historically based on workers' and employers' contributions. However, assistance mechanisms have also been integrated progressively. Some means-tested social allowances are now funded by public contributions (state subsidies, VAT receipts) to help people in need, regardless of their work contribution (Dumont, 2022). In Belgium, the so-called social partners (TU and employers' organizations) are institutionally designated to lead social negotiations, representing the interests of their members. This social dialogue model (Capron *et al.*, 2007) implies that TU and employers' organizations are also part of many interprofessional interests committees (Arcq & Blaise, 2007). From originally being dual, this model has progressively turned to a tripartite scheme by including the state in the negotiations. At the national level, federal authorities have the final say and the power to enforce a decision in case of non-agreement between social partners. The decision-making process between the state and interest groups is thus organized following this neocorporatist model (Schmitter, 1974).

TU remain major players on the political and institutional Belgian scene. In comparison with other OECD countries, the trade union density in Belgium stayed stable and relatively high for the last decades, as one out two employees is unionized (OECD Stats, 2022). Belgium has also been described as a *de facto* or partial Ghent system (Van Rie *et al.*, 2011): trade unions administer payment bodies of unemployment insurance, financed by social contributions. In the Ghent system, unions are responsible for managing unemployment insurance that allows them to 'recruit and retain union members within all occupational groups and retain unemployed workers' (Ibsen & Tapia, 2017). However, it is not a 'pure form' of the Ghent system because unemployment insurance is compulsory and there is an additional 'neutral' insurance fund, not linked to any unions (Van Rie *et al.*, 2011). Trade unions thus have strong institutional roles and might therefore be expected to oppose UBI for strategic reasons in the Belgian context. We will finally see that the economic and political contexts also influence some of their arguments (Section 4.1).

Belgian unionism and ideologies

The socialist trade union, the ABVV-FGTB was instituted as such in 1945, even if its history traces back to 1898 as the unionist commission of the former communist party. This trade union is especially influential in Wallonia, and its membership base amounts for 1,535,000 members (FGTB, 2022). The Christian union, the ACV-CSC, is the biggest union in Belgium with 1,6 million members (CSC, 2022) and is the strongest in Flanders. The first Christian union was born in 1886 but the ACV-CSC was officially established in 1912. Finally, the liberal trade union, the ACLVB-CGSLB, finds its roots in craft unions born in Ghent in 1857 (basis of the so-called Ghent system), inspiring the first strictly liberal trade

union in 1893, in opposition to the socialist and Christian nature of other unions (Faniel, 2018). After the emergence of a Flemish liberal union in 1920, the ACLVB-CGSLB took its current form 1939. It had 307,805 members in 2020 (CGSLB, 2022).

Belgian TU are integrated in a 'pillarized' society. The pillarization refers to the historic division of the socio-political context and the existence of three main pillars in Belgium: the Christian, the socialist and the liberal. They are defined as networks of organizations, including a political party, gathered around an identical ideological base (CRiSP, 2021). This implies that trade unions were historically close to their party counterparts, even if this tie has tended to fade along the years, to varying extent in each pillar (Delwit, 2021a). For example, the socialist union tends to maintain closer links to the socialist party, although being increasingly connected to the *Belgium's Party of Work (PTB-PVDA*, of Marxist obedience) (Delwit, 2021b) than two other unions have respectively with the liberal and Christian parties.

Besides, labour unions are highly visible in social movements and within civil society (Faniel, 2018) and act as political actors embracing ideological positions and values. If some of them are shared because inherent to their role as workers' representatives, such as the defense of solidarity, others depend on their respective philosophico-political line. This will be detailed in the analysis section (see Section 4.2).

Trade unions' structure and constituencies

It is interesting to note that Belgian confederations, unlike almost all political actors in Belgium such as political parties or interest groups, are still national and have centralized decision-making bodies. One of the reasons behind that is that their core interests concern competences that are still prerogatives of the federal level, such as social security or the defense of workers' rights (Fraussen *et al.*, 2017). However, the day-to-day organization is divided between linguistic sections and are influenced by different socio-political contexts from one side of the language frontier to the other.

The internal structure of trade unions is schematically divided between, on the one side, the confederation, interprofessional 'head' of the trade union, coordinating the actions of 'federated' levels, the finance, and the orientation of the whole movement. It is also the instance in charge of negotiations with the federal government and employers. Then, regional sections oversee the people's services, determined according to territorial divisions. Interregional committees, in line with the three Belgian regions (Brussels, Wallonia, Flanders) are in charge of dossiers linked to the regional prerogatives and sit in concertation councils. On the other side, professional *centrales* are gathered around activity sectors and are engaged in defending workers' rights in specific sectors. Traditionally, the professional side was more important within the movement (see for example professional branches having more votes in national committees, Boulet, 2013). However, this influence has tended to decrease with years as interprofessional national negotiations gained in importance (Boulet, 2013).

As for the relationship between TU organizations and their constituencies, previous research points to the importance of their members in the historical process of acquiring an institutionalized political and regulatory role and achieving gains in key policy areas (e.g., reducing working hours). One of their main sources of power lies therefore in the mobilization of their constituencies (Ibsen & Tapia, 2017). In return, TU commit to vigorously promoting the interests of their members at the various levels of bargaining

(Cigna, 2021). Ebbinghaus and Naumann (2018), however, suggest that TU organizations can take policy positions that are at odds with the interests of their members for strategic considerations. For example, in the case of the Statutory Retirement Age reform (SRA) (which consisted of raising the statutory retirement age to 67) and the introduction of the Statutory Minimum Wage (SMW) in Germany, TU ceased opposing a reform to the detriment of their (immediate) members' interests and/or opinions. This is because they considered this decision to be beneficial to them in terms of strategic outcomes (Klitzeke, 2018; Buss & Bender, 2018). In the case of the SMW, Buss and Bender (2013) explain this shift in stance as an indication of unions' willingness to expand their membership base by taking into account the needs of non-union members. This strategy corresponds to the 'dilemma of unions' which was advanced by Ibsen and Tapia (2017) and refers to the tension TU experience to advocate for the interests of their 'old' constituencies while also attracting a new clientele as "they have realized that the very same constituencies are no longer "enough" to secure a broad-based union movement and effective union action" (Ibsen & Tapia, 2017: 182). In sum, these examples clearly show that the positioning of TU towards a specific reform is highly dynamic and, in particular, subject to different and sometimes contradictory considerations between which they have to navigate.

The case of a UBI is evidently not comparable with the SRA or SMW reforms since this proposal has not reached the stage of policy implementation. Nevertheless, a similar confrontation of competing interests could arise, as several UBI scholars (Cigna 2021; Laenen, 2023; Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017) argue that a UBI could be a topic of interest from the perspective of TU members. They, for instance, point to its potential to increase the individual power of workers and to transform the nature of labour relations, giving workers the 'power to say no', an 'exit option' and refusing poorly paid jobs or detrimental work conditions (Vanderborght, 2006; Widerquist, 2013). A UBI could offer resources for collective actions such as strike funds (Raventós & Raventós, 2013; Vanderborght, 2006) and strengthen and unify the working class (Raventós & Raventós, 2013). However, other scholars (see for example Laenen, 2023) argue that TU members might also have good reasons to oppose a UBI because of, for example, its unconditional nature which is at odds with their strong work ethic. Overall, existing quantitative research on the attitudes of TU members towards a UBI is rather inconclusive as trade union membership has no consistent statistically significant effect (Parolin & Siöland, 2020: Vlandas, 2021: 63).

3 Methodology

We base our study of the positioning of Belgian TU towards a UBI on qualitative research. First, we conducted a thorough grey literature review in order to become familiar with unions' main arguments and positions in regards to UBI. This means that internal documents, press interviews, union websites or conferences wherein union officials intervened on the UBI theme were analysed. This first exploration of the three Belgian unions' positions towards UBI helped us to design our interview grids. The arguments presented in the internal documentation were made more explicit and developed during interviews. For this reason, we will mobilize interview quotes rather than grey literature elements in the paper. The second stage consisted of semi-structured in-depth interviews with a total of nine TU representatives from the different Belgian TU confederations. We contacted top leaders of these unions by email and favoured face-to-face interviews. The semi-structured configuration offers a double advantage: being minimally formalized, pre-designed questions enable us to grasp information on main interrogations of our research, but at the same time this guideline can be emancipated from, in order to react to the interviewee's answers with follow-up questions (Coman *et al.*, 2016).

The first wave of interviews took place at the end of 2022 with francophone representatives of the national heads of confederations. The grey literature analysis helped us design our interview grid (see annex 7.1), which was structured along two axes: first, the official position of the trade union on UBI, the reasons behind it and its link to the current system were explored. Second, the internal logic and relation between the head of the organization and the membership's attitudes were investigated. To this end, we presented their members' levels of support towards different UBI design features (see annex 7.3), following a multidimensional approach (Laenen *et al.*, 2022) and based on the BABEL survey (Laenen *et al.*, 2023). The latter is a large-scale opinion survey conducted in Spring 2021, to assess the extent to which support for the introduction of a UBI in Belgium is influenced by its policy design and predicted outcomes. For the survey, trade union members were purposefully over-sampled (N = 1000). For the first wave of interviews, we met the President of the socialist union (ABVV-FGTB) on the 29th of November 2022, the National Secretary of the liberal union (ACLVB-CGSLB) on the 30th of November 2022; and both the General Secretary and the Political Secretary of the Christian Union (ACV-CSC) on the 14th of December 2022. All the interviews lasted between 1h10 and 1h15, were held in French, were recorded and transcribed. They took place at the unions' respective headquarters in Brussels.

The second wave of interviews aimed at diversifying our sample. Indeed, even if unions are nationally centralized, the differences between socio-cultural contexts between the North and South of Belgium pushed us to interview Dutch-speaking leaders in order to reach a better diversity in the sample. Then, unions are not only composed of overarching national bodies, but also of sectoral and regionalized unions. To grasp the full picture of unions' diversified subgroups, we also needed to interview representatives of these *centrales*. The interview grid was adapted too: we included sections relating to the characteristics of their centrale, to their decision-making process, their affiliates, and to their self-assessed role in tomorrow's society (see annex 7.1). Focusing on these two profiles in the second wave allowed us to reach data saturation, as information we collected from these interviews began to be redundant with regards to our research questions. The interviews of this wave were held with the National Secretary of the ACV-CSC (10 May

2023), the President of Employees, Technicians and Managers union (SETCa - BBTK, ABVV-FGTB, 30 March 2023), the Vice-President of the SETCa-BBTK (ABVV-FGTB, 31 March 2023), the President of the General Centrale and of the East-Flanders regional centrale (ABVV-FGTB, 13 April 2023) and the National Secretary of the Employees National Union (CNE, ACV-CSC, 5 May 2023). Three of them were held in Dutch, the two others in French, and they took place in different Belgian cities (see annex 7.1 for interviews' information).

As for the content of these primary qualitative data, they were analysed through thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis allows for an iterative process combining inductive and deductive reasoning through back and forth between the qualitative data and the literature's findings (Paillé & Muchielli, 2021; Sabbe *et al.*, 2021). Our analytical journey was inspired by the abductive thematic analysis (Atkinson *et al.*, 2003; Thompson, 2022): this means that we both engaged with existing literature and raw empirical data to investigate our dataset and exert theoretical findings. Different steps composed this continuous thematization process (Sabbe *et al.*, 2021). As mentioned, we had a first round of interviews, which was followed by an inductive sequence of coding. Based on the data solely (fully transcribed interviews), striking quotes and main topics were identified during this sequence. It allowed us to pinpoint three streams of arguments used by interviewees to justify their opposition to UBI. The interview grid for the second round of interviews was built on the previous steps, and on the identification of gaps in our dataset. After having fully transcribed these four interviews, we worked on a common coding scheme. The coding categories were designed in a more deductive fashion, to a large extent based on the theoretical frame presented above. We tested a first version of this coding scheme which allowed us to refine the scheme and add elements that we retrieved from the second round of interviews. The final version of our coding scheme (Annex 7.2) was the result of this long iterative process between theory and empiricism resulting in coding categories of both inductive and deductive nature. Our revisited framework based on Ebbinghaus & Naumann (2018) thus guided the analysis and helped us structure the data, while the inductive approach allowed us to navigate the data with more flexibility and complement the analysis with unexpected results. We finally coded all our interviews following this scheme and extracted coding units by themes to facilitate our analysis.

As stated earlier, our analysis will explore how the Belgian context, TU's ideologies and TU's structures influence the positioning of Belgian TU towards the proposal of a UBI. To this end, we structured the following paragraphs in three categories based on our theoretical frame and our thematic analysis: TU and the Belgian context, TU's ideologies and TU's structures and relation to their constituencies. These three categories represent the factors that we described extensively in Section 2.2.

4 Results

4.1 Trade unions in the Belgian context

As touched upon, Belgian trade unions have an important institutional role and participate in social security's management and reforms. This section explores how the Belgian context, in its institutional but also socio-political and economic dimensions, influences unions' position.

First, in the context of neoliberal economic orthodoxy and budgetary constraint, unions assessed that UBI would not be financeable, insisting on the limited nature of public funds. In such circumstances, the UBI reform is deemed to be a waste of resources and that one could *'better spend this amount giving more to those who are in complicated situations rather than to those who aren't'*¹ (National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB). Assuming to be in a budget-neutral environment, leaders maintain that there would be 'a budgetary problem' (President ABVV-FGTB) because the transformation of current social protection funds into a UBI would either grant less than what is needed to live in dignity to some people (President ABVV-FGTB) or highly exceed current social spendings and create public deficit if its amount is more consistent (President SETCa - BBTK, ABVV-FGTB). The rationale of this pragmatic type of argument is that they assume it should be preferred to better use current resources rather than to 'dispatch' them to the whole population.

Then, it stands out from all interviews that each union confederation is highly attached to the social insurance principle and system. We witness here the importance of a solidaristic system and targeted schemes to best help those in need. The very features of UBI are objects of strong resistance. On the one hand, UBI's universal characteristic is deemed to contradict this principle of solidarity because everybody receives the same amount regardless of their specific needs: *'the difficulty with universal benefit or basic income is that it assumes that everyone is somewhat equal'* (National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB); *'we give money to people who do not need it'* (President SETCa - BBTK, ABVV-FGTB). On the other hand, unions reject this proposal contravening the logic of receiving according to one's needs and contributing according to one's means.

Besides, unions are organizations acting as workers' defenders and striving to maintain unity within the labour world. Their participation in various councils and social concertation institutions are the opportunity to voice their claims in favour of workers' rights and good working conditions. Unions care for the representation of workers' interests and UBI is seen as threatening this whole representative system: *'If that social security no longer exists, then the role of trade unions there will be completely eliminated. That also means workers will no longer be represented.'* (President of the General Centrale, ABVV-FGTB).

However, Belgian unions can also act as strategic players, and their opposition to UBI is informed by self-maintenance considerations too. We find the conscience here that their organizations' interests might be diminished if a UBI is to be implemented. It is particularly striking in the case of socialist TU leaders. They emphasize the importance of collective bargaining, and of the power relationship between labour and capital. In their view, the

¹ All translations from Dutch or French to English are ours.

implementation of UBI would be detrimental to the global balance of power, making it lean towards the 'capital side'. More specifically, unions would have more difficulties in their bargaining: *'progressively, the wage will decrease, and it will be difficult to pressure employers when they can already do minus 700€. It is already difficult to have workers in strike movements...'* (President ABVV-FGTB). The leader of the Christian Employees Union (CNE, ACV-CSC) is also conscious of the change in balance of power UBI might induce, as it would *'necessarily relativise unions' importance'*. The logic behind being that *'if labour becomes an additional revenue compared to basic income, then it seems logical that an organization defending working conditions, defending wage levels, defending dignity at work (...) proportionally, would become less important.'*

Similarly, TU act as strategic actors immersed in a competitive political environment. This means that they are also inclined to take some positions in relation to political parties' stances: *'the more there are political proposals, of course, really diverse on the topic, it provokes fuzziness about what we should discuss. (...) And thus it has a repulsive effect on our capacity to grasp this notion and try to work on it'* (General Secretary ACV-CSC). We observed that, despite their historic links to Belgian parties (Delwit, 2021a), unions tend to distance themselves from political reforms or proposals that could be perceived as retrenchment strategies. This is striking in the case of the UBI proposal of George-Louis Bouchez, President of the liberal party at the time of writing (see Geels, 2023). His design of UBI, a neoliberal type replacing most of the welfare structure, has a strong repulsive effect among unionists (President ABVV-FGTB; President SETCa - BBTK, ABVV-FGTB; National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB; President of the General Centrale, ABVV-FGTB).

In a nutshell, the position of the three confederations is to improve the social security system from within rather than implementing a UBI reform deemed to be either deleterious, *'source of aggravated difficulties'* (National Secretary CNE, ACV-CSC) or too unpredictable *'our position is that we are not in favour of basic income because there are a lot of uncertainties'* (Vice-President BBTK-SETCa, ABVV-FGTB). The organizations' leaders outline the fact that a UBI would not succeed in answering social needs, especially of the most precarious of society. Union leaders are in fact acutely aware of social protection's deficiencies and all of them have concrete proposals to reform and renew it. Some of these proposals are widely discussed and accepted, such as the de-familialisation of the system and the suppression of the co-living status, the need for better financing and strengthening structural resources of Belgian social security or a more automatic guarantee of social rights. Other proposals are more specific to one union. The Christian Union strongly advocates for more accessible and free of charge public services. Proposals relating to the socio-fiscal system are also championed: the liberal union claims for decreasing income tax and the socialist one pleads for increasing capital tax.

To conclude, unions do not strive to maintain the system *per se*, by fear of novelty, but they consider it to be a good apparatus to help people in need, assure people's social rights and contribute to the general wellbeing: *'We have an incredible social security system!'* (National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB), *'We still believe that the benefits have to be part of social security because a social allowance, whatever it is, creates rights and integrates people in the system.'* (General Secretary ACV-CSC). They would thus rather improve the existing system and add progressive welfare reforms within the current structure than implement a UBI, deemed to threaten not only their position but also workers' rights and precarious people's conditions.

4.2 Trade unions' ideologies

Belgian trade unions are also fundamentally shaped by norms and values. Indeed, their historical origin of pillar organization has always inclined them to endorse certain visions of society, and philosophico-political objectives to be followed. The union leaders recognize this political vision in their statements and claim the importance of defending main values: *'The CNE is (...) a union where the training and the ideology are relatively important.'* (National Secretary CNE, ACV-CSC). *'We have a vision of an integrative society, not just an individual sum'* (General Secretary ACV-CSC). *'I keep seeing ourselves [the organization] as a vehicle for progress'* (National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB). As detailed in our theoretical section, this ideological side is deemed to influence unions' positioning. Our analysis shows that values effectively play a role here.

Their opposition to UBI is thus of a normative nature too, informed by principled arguments. One core element of their argumentation, common to the three confederations, is the importance of solidarity and social cohesion. Union leaders consider UBI as precisely endangering their project of an inclusive and redistributive society: *'We have mechanisms of wealth redistribution towards targeted people, considered to be people needing the most society's solidarity, which I don't find with universal income.'* (National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB). *'We say that the amount should not be the same for everyone, but should be allocated depending on needs. It is actually about what inter- and intragenerational solidarity we, as a society, want.'* (National Secretary ACV-CSC). As mentioned in previous section, these values lead them to strongly advocate for the social insurance principle and specifically its contributory nature: *'insurance principle and solidarity principles are the bases of social benefits. [The principle] is to contribute together, to distribute it when we need it to people who need it.'* (President SETCa - BBTK, ABVV-FGTB)

As mentioned in the state of the art, we know from previous research that another reason of unions' reluctance towards UBI is their strong work ethic. The unconditionality of UBI is here the object of scepticism: *'the unconditional character is something quite tense'* (General Secretary ACV-CSC). The socialist union reckons it is *'still always good that people work'* (President of the General Centrale, ABVV-FGTB), and that *'there is an attachment (...) to the link to work'* (President ABVV-FGTB). Moreover, some of them fear for the quality of work and that UBI would be *'a trap regarding high-quality employment'* (President SETCa - BBTK, ABVV-FGTB). Yet, union leaders do not always apprehend work, understood as employment, the same way. Some representatives of the Christian Union seem to put in perspective this labourist philosophy, emphasizing work as activity rather than employment (General Secretary ACV-CSC), or mentioning that *'work takes too much space in people's lives'* (National Secretary CNE, ACV-CSC), while the National Secretary of the ACV-CSC still maintains that *'proper income comes first with labour. Of course, labour is not the only means of earning, but it should still be the first option'*.

Besides, the three union confederations also espouse specific principles linked to the pillar they belong to. The representative of the liberal union for example invokes his union as *'a liberal philosophy, in the historical sense'* and is the only one to mention the importance of *'individual solutions'* and of *'freedom'* (National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB). Paradoxically, these precepts have been used by UBI advocates, but do seem to lead the liberal union to a more favourable approach of UBI. Then, the rhetoric of labour versus capital and the social class fight is solely used by socialist union leaders. It also influences their positioning towards UBI, as *'to make "capital pay" is through social contributions. (...) It is a main socio-economic principle to which we're attached. This is capital participation'*. (President ABVV-

FGTB). UBI would, to them, impede to make the 'capital' participate in the social security system (Vice-President BBTK-SETCa, ABVV-FGTB; President of the General Centrale, ABVV-FGTB).

4.3 Trade unions' structure and relation to their constituencies

Regarding the influence of the unions' internal structure on their position towards a UBI, we note that all three federations stated that a UBI is not (yet) a subject of priority, meaning that they are not actively working on the matter. This could be one of the reasons why the various TU were hesitant to participate in this study. However, some unions already explored the proposal, e.g., when new political proposals were made or as a result of internal demand (National Secretary ACV-CSC; President BBTK-SETCa, ABVV-FGTB), which led them to be reluctant to the idea. In this process of defining their union position, the socialist union asserted that their point of departure was a form of democratic debate in which *'we start from an open discussion, blank sheet. We inform ourselves, let supporters and opponents speak. Arguments are weighted and then it is a matter of strategy'* (Vice-President BBTK-SETCa, ABVV-FGTB). This is also the case for the Christian union that organized focus groups and a 'debate and reflection day' on the UBI topic in 2017 and discussed the matter during their general Congress in 2019. During these events, they invited speakers with different views, and they concluded that a UBI is not *'the right solution'* for existing social problems (National Secretary ACV-CSC). As for the liberal confederation, they held a 'day of reflection' to exchange and define a position on the matter, leading them to maintain a cautious approach towards UBI (National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB).

We also find no significant regional differences between Dutch-speaking and French-speaking TU, in the sense that there is a 'consensus' among all interregional entities on UBI. This can be explained by their federal organizational structure that results in all decisions being made at the highest level and applied by all. This was confirmed by a statement from one of the officials: *'We are a federal center, we always take our position at the federal level. It is not excluded - we work very democratically, so with a vote based on membership. Ultimately, each department takes a position, but there it was very clear, both in the Brussels Region, the Walloon Region and in Flanders, the position was clear that we were not in favour of that'* (Vice-President BBTK-SETCa, ABVV-FGTB). A similar rationale is applied for the ACV-CSC and the ACLVB-CGSLB which, based on our interviews, did not differ in position towards a UBI.

With regards to the opinions of their constituencies, TU officials do not think a UBI is truly resonating among their members based on the contacts they had with them: *'It's not a topic of discussion'* (General secretary ACV-CSC). To find out what their members think, Belgian TU rely on the delegates to inform them about the daily concerns of their base. Delegates are elected officials who are active in various interprofessional sectors, and they act as liaisons between the base and the top of the unions. Their input is of great value as *'a union always works from the floor to the top. If I say something here (during the interview), I have to have a mandate for that and therefore a discussion on the floor has to happen'* (Vice-President BBTK-SETCa, ABVV-FGTB). If a delegate fails to translate workers' needs and concerns then *'they are simply not re-elected'* (President ABVV-FGTB). In this way, TU are certain to be in touch with their base, so the argument goes.

Nevertheless, the relationship between members and unions is very much reciprocal (as seen in Naumann & Ebbinghaus, 2018), as one interviewee puts it: *'It's a two-way street,*

isn't it? We need to hear the aspirations of workers in the sector, but our delegates, our permanent staff, also have a role to play in popular education and in convincing people of our messages' (National Secretary CNE, ACV-CSC). Unions are committed to informing and educating their members about their action plans and official positions, notably through campaigns, information brochures, seminars and leaflets. However, this does not guarantee that everyone is aware of the organization's activities. The various trade union leaders make a distinction between active and passive members (Vice-President BBTK-SETCa, ABVV-FGTB) based on the extent to which they are involved in TU activities. Despite the importance of translating their members' needs and concerns into concrete action plans, TU also recognize the need to take into account broader 'feelings' in the population (National Secretary ACV-CSC) through for instance opinion surveys.

Before presenting the results of the survey on their respective members' opinions (see annex 7.3), we asked union officials to reflect briefly on whether there is room for dissenting voices within their organizations. Specifically, we wanted to know the extent to which they thought there might be union members who held views different from the official ones. In this respect, TU officials are convinced that they are *'democratic organizations, where everyone can say what they want. There isn't someone who's going to say, "why did you talk about basic income?"'* (Political Secretary ACV-CSC). In this regard the Vice-President of BBTK-SETCa (ABVV-FGTB) states that *'members don't slavishly follow everything'*, but they are rather individuals who join unions for various reasons which is *'separate from discussions about a basic income'*. TU officials are thus aware that their organizational views may differ from the personal view of individuals. They also all reckon the topic of a UBI is an 'attractive idea' especially for low-income people, low-qualified people and/or precarious workers.

As we presented the survey results on their members' opinions about different types of UBI proposals (see annex 7.3 for the full results), we first observed a strong resistance to comment on the survey results among union officials. Although this research complies with scientific standards of opinion research, most of them openly challenged the validity and generability of the results. Nevertheless, they agreed to comment briefly on the various results suggesting a more supportive attitude towards the UBI idea among unionized respondents compared to non-union respondents (see annex 7.3). First, they indicated that a topic such as UBI should be the subject of more thorough discussions where they would provide a *'training'* to explain *'what is at stake'* (Political Secretary ACV-CSC), which would be followed by the pros and the cons of the proposal (General secretary ACV-CSC). We notice a similar reaction from the president of the General Central (ABVV-FGTB), who asserts that *'I'm sure if I explain to members what that means for our social security, they're going to react very differently'*. Second, we find that their response varies depending on the extent to which specific findings conform to the positions of their respective union. For instance, the National Secretary (ACV-CSC) reacts enthusiastically to the finding that her constituency is in favor of a UBI that includes newcomers in which she says that *'I am happy with this result. It means that our internal functioning is working well. We have an internal functioning of militants with or without official documents. We have made our positioning on undocumented migrants clear at congresses. So, perhaps we have succeeded in informing and sensitizing people sufficiently on this issue. I believe in that'*. In contrast, when asked whether these results would be the subject of further investigation or a change in position towards the introduction of a UBI, the president of the ABVV-FGTB, declares the following:

'No, we, trade unions, also have an important role to play in continuing education. So, for the time being, we're relatively, if not totally, convinced that, overall, it wouldn't be a step forward for the world of work. So, what I've taken from the graphs you've given - and what I'm going to do - is to approach the various regions - for training, it's really the regions, Liège-Waremme, Charleroi, La Louvière etc. I'm going to appeal to all the regions to say that as part of the training of delegates and the continuing education we provide, we need to put a little more emphasis on - so the aim won't be to brainwash - but at least put this back into the continuing education programs so that we can have exchanges with our affiliates on this subject, and so on.'

5 Conclusion and discussion

In light of growing societal and political debates on UBI, this working paper investigated how and why trade unions position themselves towards this welfare reform proposal in the Belgian context. Qualitative analysis of a series of in-depth interviews shows that most trade union representatives loathe the idea of introducing a UBI in the Belgian welfare state and loathe it for various reasons. As shown by prior research (Cigna, 2021), this opposition is to some degree ideological, as the interviewed representatives often argue that UBI clashes with the deeply valued work ethic and contribution-based logic of social insurance as well as with notions of need-based social solidarity. In addition to ideology, TU opposition to a UBI is also strategic, in the sense that the representatives indicate that its introduction would weaken workers' collective power, hence unions' power, as workers' representatives. Some of them fear that it would jeopardize their institutional position in the existing social security system, reduce their bargaining power, and some (mostly socialist representatives) say even tilt the balance of power completely over to the capital side of the class conflict. Additionally, Belgian TU oppose UBI as a strategic reaction to policy proposals from their political adversaries, most notably by the President of the francophone liberal party (Georges-Louis Bouchez of the *Mouvement Réformateur*). The ideological and strategic opposition is often complemented with more pragmatic arguments, mostly stating that a UBI would not be financially feasible in the context of budgetary constraint, and that proposals improving the system from within would be more efficient. Furthermore, the interviewed TU representatives were generally dismissive of the survey results that were presented to them, even though these show that their members are quite supportive of UBI. Indeed, the dominant response was to either discredit the survey (when the findings were not in line with the official TU position) or to call out the need to “educate” members on the issue of UBI and present why it would not be an improvement according to them (so as to bring them in line with the TU position).

These findings add important empirical insights to a predominantly speculative literature on the positioning of TU towards a UBI. As we demonstrated, this positioning is not just a matter of ideology (see Cigna, 2021), but is also driven by strategic and pragmatic considerations. With regard to the “Welfare Reform from Below” framework by Ebbinghaus & Naumann (2018), which formed the theoretical backbone of our qualitative analysis, we provide ample evidence that the broader economic, institutional and political context has a strong impact on Belgian TU's positioning towards a UBI. By contrast, constituencies' attitudes, another crucial factor in the framework, did not seem to affect TU's stance on UBI. In our view, this may be due to the specificity of the Belgian context and/or the reform proposal of UBI itself. Regarding the first, it is important to recall that Belgium has a relatively high and stable union density compared to many other European countries, as about half of all employees are members of a TU. This might imply that Belgian TU are less responsive to the attitudes of their members because they can “afford to lose” a few of them. In countries where membership is already very low, TU might be more eager to follow the opinions of their remaining constituency. This logic has been confirmed in research on political representation, showing that popular politicians and parties are less responsive to public opinion (for example Bernardi, 2020), but might apply to TU and their representatives as well. At the same time, it could also be that the TU representatives we interviewed were unresponsive to members' attitudes because “the signal” was not sufficiently loud and clear. Again, it is a common finding in the political representation literature that politicians are more responsive when the policy issue at stake is highly salient and public opinion is

very clear (for example Shapiro, 2011). According to the TU representatives, UBI was not a topic of concern for their rank-and-file members and they had experienced very little pressure from below to put the topic on the policy agenda. Whether this accurately reflects reality or (partly) constitutes motivated reasoning on the part of the representatives is unclear, but it does show that a presumed lack of salience of UBI among the membership base was given as a justification for being unresponsive to the survey results.

More broadly, the question arises to what extent the empirical findings and their theoretical implications are transferable to other contexts than the Belgian welfare state and to other welfare reforms than UBI. With regard to context, it seems likely that many of our findings “travel” well to other countries where TU remain powerful political actors due to a high union density rate and/or a strongly entrenched institutional role in the administration and regulation of social security. Indeed, we would expect to find similar ideological and strategic opposition to a UBI, and similar unresponsiveness to members’ attitudes in continental Europe or Scandinavian welfare states. In many other countries, where TU have fewer power resources (like in liberal or Mediterranean welfare states), it seems rather unlikely that they will strategically oppose UBI because it threatens to erode their institutional position. As shown by Cigna (2019; 2021), TU indeed appear to be somewhat more supportive of UBI in these countries, presumably because it could offer more income security in contexts of weak welfare states and deregulated economies. Nevertheless, these TU might have other strategic, ideological or pragmatic reasons to oppose a UBI that are similar to those of Belgian TU, such as calculated position-taking in response to policy proposals by political adversaries, a preference for a need-based rather than universal welfare system, and concerns regarding the financial and political feasibility of UBI.

Concerning the transferability of our findings beyond the specific case of UBI, it seems reasonable to expect that TU with large power resources would rather advocate for policy proposals improving current insurance and social assistance mechanisms, hence strengthening their position as “gatekeepers” of the social state. Their advocacy might thus, as in the Belgian case, point to reforms such as the individualisation and more automatic guarantee of social rights, rise of the social minima or more (and cheaper) public services. TU might tend to follow their constituencies’ aspirations and demands in regard to social needs to ensure they remain the main intermediary between the state and civil society. On the contrary, we expect that proposals that would radically alter the system or TU’s dominant position in it, such as an erosion of the contributory logic in favor of more means-tested allowances, the privatisation of public services or a change in their institutional prerogatives, would be strongly opposed. Consequently, if their members would lean towards such reforms, it is equally plausible that TU would disregard their attitudes. In light of these considerations, we recommend future research to investigate how TU and their representatives position themselves towards different types of welfare reform in different countries. In particular, we think further research is needed on how TU representatives respond to their members’ attitudes and how this relationship is influenced by the organization’s official position and the (perceived) salience of the reform proposal under consideration.

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7 Appendices

7.1 Interview background information

Table A1. Summary of respondent characteristics

Union	Interviewee's Position	Interviewee's Gender	Date	Location	Langage
ABVV - FGTB	President	Male	29/11/2022	Brussels	French
ABVV - FGTB, BBTK-SETCa	President	Female	30/03/2023	Brussels	French
ABVV - FGTB, BBTK-SETCa	Vice-President	Male	31/03/2023	Brussels	Dutch
ABVV - FGTB, General centrale	President	Female	13/04/2023	Ghent	Dutch
ACV - CSC	General secretary	Female	14/12/2022	Brussels	French
ACV - CSC	Political Secretary	Male	14/12/2022	Brussels	French
ACV - CSC	National Secretary	Female	10/05/2023	Brussels	Dutch
ACV - CSC, CNE	President	Male	05/06/2023	Nivelles	French
ACLVB - CGSLB	National Secretary	Male	30/11/2022	Brussels	French

Interview grid – first wave

This interview comprises two main parts: the first one concerns the position of the xxx union on the basic income proposal and its connection to the current social protection system. The second part addresses the potential internal debate within the union regarding this proposal.

Basic Income and Social Protection

1. How would you define a basic income?
2. What is the official position of the xxx union regarding the proposal to introduce a basic income, or universal basic income, in Belgium?
3. What is your personal position on this issue?
4. What are the main arguments that inform your union's position, and yours if it differs from the official one?
5. What do you identify as issues or shortcomings of the current social protection system? What solutions or measures do you recommend to address them? Do you believe that basic income could provide a solution, at least partially?
6. How would you define the role of your union in society today? And in the future? What role do you think the union could have in a society where basic income is implemented?

Internal Dynamics and Basic Income

7. Is there an internal debate within the union on this topic, and does it generate disagreements?
8. Are there differences between the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking branches of the union on this subject?
9. Do you think (part of) your members have an interest in the implementation of a basic income? What would their typical profile be ?
10. How do you think your members position themselves in relation to basic income? And do you take this into account in the official position?

Conclusions

11. Is there any internal documentation on the subject that you could share with me?
12. In conclusion, do you consider the idea of basic income to be on the Belgian political agenda today? Do you think a version of the idea could achieve relative consensus within the labor and/or political world? Under what conditions?

Interview grid - second wave

This interview consists of two main sections: the first one focuses on the position of the xxx union regarding the basic income proposal and the current social protection system. More generally, we will also discuss their opinion on other reforms to understand their stance on the current state of the social system. The second section addresses decision-making and internal functioning within unions and labor federations.

The Federation

1. Could you briefly describe your background and your current role within the trade union organization?
2. Can you describe the role of your labor federation?

Basic Income and Social Protection

3. Are you aware of the basic income proposal? If so, how would you define a basic income?
4. Does your labor federation have an official position regarding the proposal to introduce a basic income or universal basic income in Belgium?
 - A) Are there any discussions or debates on this topic, and if so, could you explain their nature?
 - B) Are there any potential differences between the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking sectors or between different professional sectors regarding this issue?
5. What are the main arguments that inform the position of your labor federation, and your own if it differs from the official one?
6. What do you identify as problems or shortcomings of the current social protection system? What specific areas do you focus on in your advocacy?
7. What measures or solutions do you recommend or advocate to address these issues? Do you believe that basic income could provide a solution, at least partially?

Internal Dynamics and Members

10. Are there any typical profiles among your members?
11. Do you believe you know your members' positions on social protection and their demands?
 - A) What are the main demands you identify coming from your members? How do you take their demands and opinions into account?
 - B) Do you think your members have a stance on the basic income proposal? If so, what would it be?

- C) Do you believe (some of) your members would have an interest in the implementation of a basic income? What would their typical profile be?

12. How do you formulate positions on social issues?

- A) How would you describe the relationship between your members and the leadership of the federation?
- B) How does the relationship between the federation and the head of the union work?

Conclusions


18. What are the main social challenges for your labor federation and your union in general?

- A) Do you implement specific elements to address these challenges?
- B) What role do you see for your labor federation in tomorrow's society ?
What role do you think labor organizations could have in a society where basic income is (or isn't) implemented?

19. Is there any internal documentation on the subject that you could share with me?

In conclusion, do you consider the idea of basic income to be on the Belgian political agenda today? Do you think a version of the idea could achieve relative consensus within the labor and/or political world? Under what conditions?

7.2 Coding scheme



7.3 Survey results regarding trade union members' support

Figure A1. Generosity dimension




Figure A2. Conditionality dimension






Table A3. Universality dimension



7.4 Ebbinghaus & Naumann's original theoretical framework

Figure 1: Interest organization's policy positioning



Source: Ebbinghaus & Naumann (2018)



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