
VUB


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
DEMOCRATIC FUTURES
RESEARCH CENTRE

- Formerly known as VUB POLI
- 50 brilliant heads
  - study contemporary democratic challenges
  - explore innovative solutions to improve democratic processes, making plans for a new kind of thing

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Fondation Francqui Stichting

VUB VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL



"How to organize democracy in divided societies?"

Lecture 3

Francqui Chair 2024-2025

VUB

3 April 2025

Min Reuchamps

UCLouvain

How to organize democracy in divided societies?

→ 2 questions

(1) Divided societies?

(2) How to organize democracy in… ?

With Belgium as a *textbook* example

Lijphart, A. (Ed.). (1981). *Conflict and coexistence in Belgium: the dynamics of a culturally divided society*. Institute of International Studies, University of California.

Caluwaerts, D., & Reuchamps, M. (2014). Deliberative stress in linguistically divided Belgium. In J. Ugarriza & D. Caluwaerts (Eds.), *Democratic Deliberation in Deeply Divided Societies. From Conflict to Common Ground* (pp. 35-52). Palgrave Macmillan.

Caluwaerts, D., & Reuchamps, M. (2015). Combining Federalism with Consociationalism: Is Belgian Consociational Federalism Digging its Own Grave? *Ethnopolitics*, *14*(3), 277-295.

Caluwaerts, D., & Reuchamps, M. (2020). Still Consociational? Belgian Democracy, 50 Years After 'The Politics of Accommodation'. *Politics of the Low Countries*, *2*(1), 28-50.

Caluwaerts, D., & Reuchamps, M. (Eds.). (2022). *Belgian Exceptionalism: Belgian Politics between Realism and Surrealism*. Routledge.

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Draw Belgium…

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Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Mediterranean Politics

ISSN: 1362-9395 (Print) 1743-9418 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmed20

Drawing Cyprus: Power-sharing, identity and expectations among the next generation in northern Cyprus

Ergün Özgür, Nur Köprülü & Min Reuchamps

To cite this article: Ergün Özgür, Nur Köprülü & Min Reuchamps (2017): Drawing Cyprus: Power-sharing, identity and expectations among the next generation in northern Cyprus, Mediterranean Politics, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2017.1404720

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2017.1404720

Published online: 22 Nov 2017.

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


Figure 10. Nicosia in the centre.




Figure 11. Nicosia in the North.

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


Figure 12. Union is good.



Figure 13. Separation is good.

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


Figure 14. Linguistic border.





Figure 15. No linguistic border.

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

Vrije Universiteit Brussel - Université catholique de Louvain
Draw your country 2016
Draw Cyprus

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Draw your country 2016

Draw Cyprus




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


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Draw your country 2016

Draw Cyprus



- people who lost their home
- ran away as fugitives
- left everything behind
- never got the chance to go back again, since other people are living at their place now.



Territory, Politics, Governance
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rtep20

Drawing Belgium: Using Mental Maps to Measure Territorial Conflict

Min Reuchamps[a], Dimokritos Kavadias[b] & Kris Deschouwer[c]

[a] Institut de sciences politiques Louvain-Europe (ISPOLE), Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

[b] Political Science Department, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium

[c] Political Science Department, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium

Published online: 25 Aug 2013.

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België Getekend
La Belgique dessinée


- With Kris Deschouwer and Dimoktrios Kavadias
- “Draw Belgium”
- In 2009 : 234 students ULiège
- In 2011 : 5269 students NL & FR
  - from higher education institutions
  - 3000 NL & 3000 FR
- Questionnaire:
  - Socio-demographics (gender, age, section, country of birth and languages spoken at home)
  - But also political attitudes and identities


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
Drawing Belgium

- Map (90%)

België








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
Drawing Belgium

- Conflict (10%)
- Union (3%) and disunion (1%)


N
F
BELGIË


ELIO
DI
RUPO
BOEM
BDW


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GENK
VLAANDEREN
CLUB
CERCLE
GENT
WESTELO
STVV
KORTRIJK
N.V.A
ZULTE
MECHELEN
ANDERLECHT
BRUSSEL
WALLONIË
CHARLEROI
B#V
STANDAARD
P.S


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
Drawing Belgium

- Symbols – ‘Belgian specialties’
  - FR & NL: 2%
- Belgian flag
  - FR & NL: 1%




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BIER
chocolade


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



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Drawing Belgium


- Language border…
  - FR: 50%
  - NL: 50%
- … and Brussels
  - Brussels correct
    - FR: 60%
    - NL: 55%
  - Brussels on the border
    - FR: 40%
    - NL: 45%



Mer du nord




Vlaanderen
BR
Wallonië

België




Flandre
BxL
Wallonie

België / Belgique




Table 5. Logistic Regression models: Effect parameters[a] for mapping variables, according to identification with national–sub-national entities, controlling for gender, knowledge and nationality.

	'Language border'				'Brussels on map'				'Brussels correct'				'Brussels through border'				'Brussels on border'			
	B	SE	Exp (*B*)	*β*	*B*	SE	Exp (*B*)	*β*	*B*	SE	Exp (*B*)	*β*	*B*	SE	Exp (*B*)	*β*	*B*	SE	Exp (*B*)	*β*
Gender (0 = Male)	.023	*.06*	1.02	.01	.095	*.06*	1.10	.05	−.513	*.09*	.60	−.26***	.363	*.10*	1.44	.22***	.527	*.14*	1.69	.10***
Political knowledge	.012	*.01*	1.01	.03	.018	*.01*	1.02	.05	.118	*.02*	1.13	.33***	−.118	*.02*	.89	−.40***	−.017	*.03*	.98	−.02
Nationality (0 = Non-Belgian)	.470	*.09*	1.60	.16***	.251	*.09*	1.29	.09**	.027	*.15*	1.03	.01	−.132	*.16*	.88	−.06	.524	*.23*	1.69	.07*
Brussels Institution (0 = Outside Brussels)	−.216	*.07*	.81	−.09**	.072	*.07*	1.08	.00	−.072	*0.11*	.93	−.03	−.012	*.12*	1.01	.01	.080	*.16*	1.08	.01
Identification (0 = B + FR or B + FL)																				
…only with FL	.526	*.13*	1.69	.13***	.112	*.12*	1.12	.03	0.148	*0.19*	1.16	0.04	−.139	*.21*	.87	−.04	−.015	*.29*	.99	.00
…only with FR	.123	*.13*	1.13	.03	.056	*.13*	1.06	.01	−0.083	*0.20*	0.92	−0.02	−.159	*.22*	.85	−.04	.533	*.26*	1.70	.05*
…only with Belgium	−.293	*.08*	0.75	−.12**	−.218	*.08*	.80	−.09**	−0.096	*0.13*	0.91	−0.04	.098	*.13*	1.10	.05	−.098	*.18*	.91	−.02
…with B + FR + FL	−.045	*.10*	0.96	−.01	.052	*.10*	1.05	.02	−0.177	*0.16*	0.84	−0.05	.151	*.16*	1.16	.05	.085	*.22*	1.09	.01
… with none	−.296	*.09*	0.74	−.10**	−.43	*.09*	.65	−.16***	−0.102	*0.15*	0.90	−0.04	.028	*.16*	1.03	.01	.−055	*.22*	.95	−.01
Intercept	−.368	*.13*	.84		−.301	*.12*	.74		−0.033	*0.20*	0.97		−.260	*.21*	.77		−3.712	*.31*	.03	
Adj. pseudo-R^2:	2.9%				2.2%				6.5%				4.8%				1.6%			
N:	4751				4751				2207				2207				2207			

See note 1 of Table 3.

[a]Beta's computed using MENARD (2004).

*Significance of effect parameters, based on Wald test: $p \leq .05$.

**Significance of effect parameters, based on Wald test: $p \leq .01$.

***Significance of effect parameters, based on Wald test: $p \leq .001$.

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(1) Divided societies?



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Chapter 7. Partitocracy and the future of Belgium

Revisiting Does Belgium (still) exist?

Christoph Niessen
Pierre Baudewyns
Stefano Camatarri
Jérémy Dodeigne
André-Paul Frognier
Min Reuchamps
Dave Sinardet

➔ Comparing FR & NL voters


➔ Comparing FR & NL candidates

on 3 dimensions:

(1) Left-right, (2) Ethno-territorial identities, (3) Institutional preferences

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A comparison of the left-right self-placement of voters and candidates in Flanders and in Wallonia from 2007 to 2019 (0-10 scale)



Thanks to Jean-Benoit Pilet based on 2024 electoral survey:

4,9-5,2

4,8-5,0

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
Ethno-territorial identities

Table 1. Wordings of three most prominent (sub-)national identity questions in Belgium (here from 2014).

Question	Answer options
Hierarchical question	
a) To which cultural or geographical entity do you feel belonging first and foremost? b) To which cultural or geographical entity do you feel belonging in the second place?	– Europe – Belgium – French-Community in Belgium – Flemish Region or Community – German-speaking Community – Walloon Region – Brussels-Capital Region – your province – your city or municipality
Linz-Moreno question	
Which of these affirmations corresponds most to your vision of yourself?	– I feel only Flemish/Walloon – I feel more Flemish/Walloon than Belgian – I feel as Flemish/Walloon as Belgian – I feel more Belgian than Flemish/Walloon – I feel only Belgian
Metric question	
Could you, for each of the identities below, indicate to what extent they apply to you? You can indicate this on a scale from 0 to 10, on which 0 signifies not at all, and 10 signifies a lot.	– Belgian – Flemish/Walloon

Sinardet, D., De Winter, L., Niessen, C., Dodeigne, J., & Reuchamps, M. (2025). Measuring (Sub)National Identities in Surveys: Lessons from Belgium. *Public Opinion Quarterly*.

Table 2. First choice for (sub-)national identities in Flanders and Wallonia based on the hierarchical question, in percentages (1975–2019).



n	1219	944	619	457	381	315	1391	1241	1294	742	880	662	800	337	911	1022

Source: (By research groups) 1975: AGLOP—GLOPO; 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1986: Régioscope (ULB-UCL); 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014: ISPO-PIOP; 2009, 2014: PartiRep; 2019: EOS-RepResent.

Note: Not all columns add up to 100, as a consequence of rounding.

Table 3. (Sub-)national identities in Flanders and Wallonia based on the Linz-Moreno question, in percentages (1995–2017).

Flemish respondents	1995	1999	2003	2004	2007	2010	2014	2017
Only Flemish	3.6	7	7.2	7	7.3	8	8.7	11.9
More Flemish than Belgian	23.1	22.4	23.3	29	27.4	27.4	18.4	23.5
Equally Flemish and Belgian	45.3	42.2	42.3	45	35.5	41.3	41.7	36.9
More Belgian than Flemish	17.2	13.3	15.1	8	17.0	12.4	8.0	14.4
Only Belgian	10.8	15.1	12.1	11	12.7	10.9	23.2	13.2
N	2088	2157	1202	517	1073		1002	604
Walloon respondents	**1995**	**1999**	**2003**	**2004**	**2007**	**2010**	**2014**	**2017**
Only Walloon	1.5	2.3	3.6	3	1.6	4.4	2.1	5.8
More Walloon than Belgian	9.4	11.3	8.3	11	6.1	5.0	6.9	10.4
Equally Walloon and Belgian	44.7	41.8	39.7	31	38.0	21.1	42.7	34.6
More Belgian than Walloon	25.3	22.0	18.3	13	19.9	22.8	11.7	19.2
Only Belgian	19.1	22.5	30.0	42	34.4	46.7	36.6	30.1
N	1223	1381	764	310		467	1004	396

Source: (By research groups) 1995–2014: same as Table 2; 2017: Belgian Tetris survey (Reuchamps, Dodeigne, and Perrez 2018).

Note: Not all columns add up to 100, as a consequence of rounding.

Table 4. (Sub-)national identities in Flanders and Wallonia based on the metric question, in percentages (2014).

Flemish respondents	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Belgian	1.8	1.3	1.0	2.9	2.1	9.5	7.7	17.4	22.9	11.4	22.0
Flemish	2.0	0.4	1.6	1.4	1.8	8.2	7.7	16.0	23.2	14.9	22.8
European	3.9	2.1	3.8	5.6	4.4	17.3	14.0	18.4	13.5	6.9	10.1
Walloon respondents	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
Belgian	0.6	0.3	0.4	1.1	0.9	6.6	4.5	9.0	18.8	14.2	43.6
Walloon	3.9	0.3	1.3	1.3	2.0	9.3	5.8	10.3	19.5	12.8	33.5
European	3.9	0.9	2.2	2.8	3.0	16.3	12.6	16.3	19.2	7.7	15.3

Source: PartiRep (2014).

Note: (Flemish respondents: n = 1000; Walloon respondents: n = 1018). Not all rows add up to 100, as a consequence of rounding.

Table 7.2. A comparison of the sense of political identity among voters and candidates in Flanders and in Wallonia from 2007 to 2014 (%)

	2007			2010			2014		
Flanders	***Voters***	***Candi-dates***	**Δ**	***Voters***	***Candi-dates***	**Δ**	***Voters***	***Candi-dates***	**Δ**
Only Flemish	7,3	22,1	-14,8	8,0	32,1	-24,1	8,7	14,9	-6,2
More Flemish than Belgian	27,4	29,3	-1,9	27,4	23,8	3,6	18,4	16,2	-2,2
As Flemish as Belgian	35,5	30,4	5,1	41,3	28,5	12,8	41,7	28,5	13,2
More Belgian than Flemish	17,0	9,2	7,8	12,4	12,5	-0,1	8,0	27,5	-19,5
Only Belgian	12,7	7,7	5,0	10,9	3,1	7,8	23,2	12,9	10,3
Wallonia	***Voters***	***Candi-dates***	**Δ**	***Voters***	***Candi-dates***	**Δ**	***Voters***	***Candi-dates***	**Δ**
Only Walloon	1,6	1,4	0,2	4,4	2,7	1,7	2,1	1,6	0,5
More Walloon than Belgian	6,1	7,0	-0,9	5,0	6,9	-1,9	6,9	5,4	1,5
As Walloon as Belgian	38,0	45,1	-7,1	21,1	54,9	-33,8	42,7	39,1	3,6
More Belgian than Walloon	19,9	35,9	-16,0	22,8	29,8	-7,0	11,7	32,2	-20,5
Only Belgian	34,4	8,9	25,5	46,7	5,7	41,0	36,6	20,7	15,9

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Institutional preferences

Table 1

MPs' and Voters' Preference on Devolution, Intra- and Inter-Linguistic Group Comparison

	Dutch-speaking group			*French-speaking group*			
	Mean	*SD*	*N*	*Mean*	*SD*	*N*	*Group differences*
MPs 2010	2.52	2.27	129	4.4	1.64	108	1.88
Voters 2009	4.36	2.31	1192	5.13	2.65	1080	0.77
Voters 2014	4.49	2.27	984	5.56	2.49	955	1.07
Diff. MPs/ Voters 2009	−1.84	−0.04		−0.73	−1.01		
Diff. MPs/ Voters 2014	−1.97	0.04		−1.16	−0.85		
Diff. Voters 2014/2009	−0.13	−0.04		−0.09	−0.16		

Source: MPs survey 2010 (authors) weighted by parliamentary representation, PartiRep voter surveys 2009 and 2014 weighted by age, gender and education.

Reuchamps, M., Sinardet, D., Dodeigne, J., & Caluwaerts, D. (2017). Reforming Belgium's Federalism: Comparing the Views of MPs and Voters. *Government and Opposition*, *52*(3), 460-482

TABEL 1. INSTITUTIONELE VOORKEUREN VAN DE PARLEMENTSLEDEN (ENQUÊTE 2014-2015 EN 2020-2021).

		2011			2014-2015			2020-2021			
		gemiddelde score	standaardafwijking	dominant scenario	gemiddelde score	standaardafwijking	dominant scenario	gemiddelde score	standaardafwijking	dominant scenario	verschil 2014-2020
NEDERLANDSTALIGE PARTIJEN	N-VA	0,4	0,8	defederalisering	0,6	2,6	defederalisering	0,5	0,8	defederalisering	-0,1
	CD&V	3,0	1,0	defederalisering	4,5	2,1	defederalisering	3,9	2,1	defederalisering	-0,6
	Open VLD	3,9	2,3	defederalisering	5,2	0,6	herfederalisering	6,0	1,7	herfederalisering	+0,8
	sp.a / Vooruit	4,4	1,5	defederalisering	5,8	1,8	herfederalisering	5,8	1,8	herfederalisering	0,0
	Groen	4,9	1,5	defederalisering	5,8	1,8	herfederalisering	6,2	1,8	herfederalisering	+0,4
	Vlaams Belang	0,0	0,0	defederalisering	0,4	1,7	defederalisering	0,1	0,6	defederalisering	-0,3
	PVDA	-		-	-		-	9	0,6	herfederalisering	-
FRANSTALIGE PARTIJEN	PS	4,8	1,9	defederalisering	5,2	2,0	herfederalisering	4,9	2,0	defederalisering	-0,3
	MR	3,9	1,4	defederalisering	5,7	2,0	herfederalisering	6,3	2,0	herfederalisering	+ 0,6
	cdH/Engagés	4,3	1,4	defederalisering	5,5	1,3	herfederalisering	7,3	1,4	herfederalisering	+1,8
	Ecolo	4,2	1,4	defederalisering	5,3	1,9	herfederalisering	6,2	1,9	herfederalisering	+0,9
	FDF / Défi	4,6	1,8	defederalisering	5,0	2,1	status quo	6,7	2,1	status quo	+1,7
	PTB	-	-	-	8,5	0,6	herfederalisering	8,5	0,6	herfederalisering	0,0

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Table 7.4. A comparison of the institutional preferences among voters and candidates in Flanders and in Wallonia from 2007 to 2014 (%)

	2007			2010			2014		
Flanders	***Voters***	***Candi-dates***	**Δ**	***Voters***	***Candi-dates***	**Δ**	***Voters***	***Candi-dates***	**Δ**
Pro region	42,3	56,5	-14,2	38,3	68,8	-30,5	43,4	54,9	-11,5
Status quo	17,1	20,6	-3,5	27,2	14,7	12,5	34,9	29,4	5,5
Pro Belgium	40,6	22,9	17,7	34,5	16,5	18,0	21,7	15,7	6,0
Wallonia	***Voters***	***Candi-dates***	**Δ**	***Voters***	***Candi-dates***	**Δ**	***Voters***	***Candi-dates***	**Δ**
Pro region	13,3	13,9	-0,6	15,7	20,3	-4,6	26,1	27,3	-1,2
Status quo	26,6	27,9	-1,3	32,0	41,6	-9,6	30,2	26,3	3,9
Pro Belgium	60,2	58,1	2,1	52,3	38,1	14,2	43,7	46,5	-2,8

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(2) How to organize democracy in divided societies ?



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Consociationalism

Lijphart, A. (1968). *The politics of accommodation: pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands*. University of California Press.

Lijphart, A. (1968). *Verzuiling, pacificatie en kentering in de Nederlandse politiek*. J. H. de Bussy.

Lijphart, A. (1968). Typologies of Democratic Systems. *Comparative Political Studies*, *1*(1), 3-44.

Four institutional criteria

- Grand coalition

-> Lecture 1 "Challenges and innovations in Belgian democracy"

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-> Lecture 1 "Challenges and innovations in Belgian democracy"

Some more suggestions (V.3)?

Facilitating government formation

Inspiration: forming a government is taking more and more time, at all levels → combination of stick and carrot

- **Individual stick** → First political party loses the negotiation leadership afer a fixed deadline
- **Collective stick** → All parties lose an increasing part of their public funding as times goes by without government
- **Individual carrot** → The x 'best' elected MPs (absolute number or penetration rate) become minister (as long as a formal government has not been formed)
- **Collective carrot** → Right of parliamentary initiative, with possibility of referendum/popular consultation

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Consociationalism


Lijphart, A. (1968). *The politics of accommodation: pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands*. University of California Press.

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Lijphart, A. (1968). Typologies of Democratic Systems. *Comparative Political Studies*, *1*(1), 3-44.

Four institutional criteria

- Grand coalition
- Proportionality



Source: Authors' calculations based on data extracted from the National Bank of Belgium (2019).

Figure 2 ***Share per government level (in %) in total government expenditure (1995-2018)***

Caluwaerts, D., & Reuchamps, M. (2020). Still Consociational? Belgian Democracy, 50 Years After 'The Politics of Accommodation'. *Politics of the Low Countries*, *2*(1), 28-50.

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Consociationalism

Lijphart, A. (1968). *The politics of accommodation: pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands*. University of California Press.

Lijphart, A. (1968). *Verzuiling, pacificatie en kentering in de Nederlandse politiek*. J. H. de Bussy.

Lijphart, A. (1968). Typologies of Democratic Systems. *Comparative Political Studies*, *1*(1), 3-44.

Four institutional criteria

- Grand coalition
- Proportionality
- Mutual veto rights
- Segmental autonomy

One cultural criterion

- Public passivity

-> Lecture 4 "Paradoxes of democracy and solutions from Belgium"

-> Lecture 2 "How to institutionalize permanent citizens' assemblies?"

-> Lecture 5 "Innovating democracy: international trends and Belgian examples"

Combining consociationalism with federalism

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In your own words and in ten lines, we invite you to describe Belgian federalism

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REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES, 2018
VOL. 28, NO. 2, 151–175
https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2018.1433663

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Check for updates

Changing your political mind: The impact of a metaphor on citizens' representations and preferences for federalism


Min Reuchamps[a], Jeremy Dodeigne[b] and Julien Perrez[c]

[a]Institut de sciences politiques Louvain-Europe (ISPOLE) Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium; [b]Institut de recherches TRANSITIONS & Département de sciences politiques, sociales et de la communication Université de Namur, Namur, Belgium; [c]Department of Modern Languages: Linguistics, literature and translation Université de Liège, Liège, Belgium

ABSTRACT

Federalism is often presented through metaphors, but little is known about the

La nouvelle répartition des compétences en Belgique



Le Tetris belge

De 1831 à 1970, la Belgique politique se réunnait à l'Etat central, les provinces et les communes. Sauf les prérogatives attribuées aux pouvoirs locaux, l'Etat s'occupait de tout. En 1970, le Constituant a créé de nouvelles institutions: les Communautés et les Régions. Et chaque réforme de l'Etat a été l'occasion de prélever des compétences à l'Etat (appelé désormais Etat fédéral) pour les attribuer aux pouvoirs fédérés. C'est le grand Tetris belge, où l'on voit l'étage du dessus qui se décompose peu à peu, morceau par morceau, au profit des autres pouvoirs.

Dans certains cas, le législateur transfère des blocs homogènes (comme l'Enseignement, attribué aux Communautés en 1988). Dans d'autres, il ne transfère que des éléments d'une compétence (c'est le cas de la fiscalité : le fédéral reste compétent mais accorde aux pouvoirs fédérés certaines prérogatives).

Désormais, on distingue ainsi trois types de compétences. Celles exclusivement exercées par l'Etat (la Défense, par exemple). Celles exclusivement exercées par les Régions et les Communautés (Enseignement, Urbanisme, Travaux publics, etc.) Et celles où chaque pouvoir a une possibilité d'intervention. Dans le domaine de l'Emploi, par exemple, l'Etat est compétent dans certains domaines (législation sur le chômage, par exemple) et les Régions sont compétentes pour d'autres (placement et formation des chômeurs).

(T.Bn)

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The Belgian tetris

From 1831 to 1970, Belgium came down to the central state, the provinces and the municipalities. Except for the prerogatives attributed to the local authorities, the State was taking care of everything. In 1970, the constituent power created new institutions: communities and regions. And every state reform has been the occasion to take competences from the state (from there on called the federal state) to attribute them to federal authorities. **This is the big Belgian Tetris**, where we see the **upper floor** that is falling apart (decomposing) , **block** by **block**, at the benefit of other authorities. In certain cases, the legislator is transferring homogeneous **blocks** (like education, attributed to the communities in 1989). In other cases, it is only transferring some elements of a competence (it's the case of the tax system: the federal state remains competent but assigned certain prerogatives to the federal entities). From now on, we therefore make a distinction between three types of competences. The ones that are exclusively exercised by the federal state (like Defense, for example). The ones that are exclusively exercised by the Regions and Communities (Education, Town planning, Public works, and so on). And the ones for which each power has a possibility of intervention. In the domain of employment, for instance, the (federal) State is competent for certain domains (unemployment legislation, for instance) and the Regions are competent for other ones (training courses of unemployed people).

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Experiment 1

INPUT

FREE DESCRIPTION TASK

POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE QUESTIONS

ATTITUDE

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS

Tetris metaphor (text and/or image)

In your own words and in ten lines, we invite you to describe Belgian federalism

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Experiment 1: four groups


	N	%	PK (0-5)	PI (0-10)	Gender (% Men)	Belgian (0-10)	Walloon (0-10)
Control	131	25.8	2.85	5.96	49.2	8.15	6.44
Full	131	25.8	2.88	5.88	47.7	8.61	6.84
Picture	120	23.6	2.90	5.67	41.8	8.76	6.63
Text	126	24.8	2.83	5.64	44.4	8.51	6.34
Total	508	100.0	2.87	5.79	45.9	8.50	6.56
Chi^2 test	-	-	$F_{(0.127)}=.078$ p=.927	$F_{(3.16)}=.551$ p=.648	$F_{(0.138)}=.554$ p=.646	$F_{(8.22)}=1.51$ p=.328	$F_{(6.237)}=0.458$ p=.712

Key: PK= political knowledge, PI=political interest

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Experiment 1: four conditions

Figure 1. Summary of the experimental research design and the causal mechanism



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Experiment 1: participants' representations

	G1 (Control group)	G2 (Picture +Text)	G3 (Picture only)	G4 (Text only)	Chi-square tests
History	5,0%	**12,8%**	0,6%	**25,8%**	(57.82, df = 3)****
Institutional	56,1%	**68,6%**	48,5%	**68,4%**	(19.274, df = 3) ****
Identity	**51,1%**	32,1%	21,5%	25,2%	(34.99, df = 3) ****
Linguistic	**7,2%**	3,2%	4,3%	2,6%	(4.45, df = 3)
Organization	61,9%	**66,0%**	46,6%	**65,8%**	(16.866, df = 3) ****
Dynamic	**40,3%**	19,9%	22,7%	18,7%	(23.27, df = 3) ****

Sig. codes: ****p<.000

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Experiment 1: participants' preferences

	Beta	Std. error	Pr(>|t|)	
(Intercept)	6.105	0.474	0.000	****
Gender	0.258	0.199	0.196	
Belgian	0.082	0.043	0.054	*
Walloon	-0.093	0.031	0.003	***
Political knowledge	-0.143	0.083	0.085	*
Political interest	0.124	0.045	0.006	***
Groups (Ref= control group)				
G2 (text + picture)	-0.469	0.265	0.077	*
G3 (picture only)	-0.248	0.273	0.365	
G4 (text only)	-0.658	0.267	0.014	**

N=481 observations


F-statistic: 3.894 on 8 and 462 DF (****)

R^2= 0.063, Adjusted R^2=0.047

Sig. codes: ****p<.000, ***p<.001, **p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Experiment 1: Findings


Image & text



Text



Image



Control

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The Belgian ~~tetris~~ federalism

From 1831 to 1970, Belgium came down to the central state, the provinces and the municipalities. Except for the prerogatives attributed to the local authorities, the State was taking care of everything. In 1970, the constituent power created new institutions: communities and regions. And every state reform has been the occasion to take competences from the state (from there on called the federal state) to attribute them to federal authorities. ~~**This is the big Belgian Tetris**, where we see the **upper floor** that is falling apart (decomposing) , **block** by **block**, at the benefit of other authorities.~~ In certain cases, the legislator is transferring homogeneous ~~**blocks**~~ **competences** (like education, attributed to the communities in 1989). In other cases, it is only transferring some elements of a competence (it's the case of the tax system: the federal state remains competent but assigned certain prerogatives to the federal entities). From now on, we therefore make a distinction between three types of competences. The ones that are exclusively exercised by the federal state (like Defense, for example). The ones that are exclusively exercised by the Regions and Communities (Education, Town planning, Public works, and so on). And the ones for which each power has a possibility of intervention. In the domain of employment, for instance, the (federal) State is competent for certain domains (unemployment legislation, for instance) and the Regions are competent for other ones (training courses of unemployed people).

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Experiment 2

TETRIS

TEXT

CONTROL





INPUT

In your own words and in ten lines, we invite you to describe Belgian federalism

Scale 0-10 institutional preferences

Socio-demographics

Experiment 2: Findings

TETRIS



TEXT




CONTROL

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TEXT
Political knowledge?


- **No effect**



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TETRIS
Political knowledge?

- **No effect** if **PK high**
- **Effect** on participants with **low PK**
- **The effect decreases if PK increases**



Your reactions?