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Risk, democracy and schizophrenia: the changing roles of citizens in risk policy-making putting GMO policy to the test

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For more than two decades, participatory mechanisms have often been invoked as quasi-policy instruments to counterbalance a deficit of legitimacy surrounding political representation. Scientific literature has widely investigated this process. Empirical studies have documented it. However, a blind spot remains. How does this process influence the role of citizens when they are called to sanction political decisions concerning risks, decisions to which they have been at least partly associated? This paper innovatively combines theories of democracy and sequential policy analysis to investigate the articulation of participation and representation when risk issues are regulated. This paper's theoretical reflection is documented through the example of GMO policy in Europe and, more specifically, in Belgium.

Keywords: risk; democracy; policy

Introduction

This article investigates the link between democracy, risk and public policy. Each concept owns a niche in the scientific literature. There is also a crossover between theories of democracy and policy analysis. Policy analysis often considers democracy to be a fundamental frame for public decisions. Weale (2007, 18–23) defines democracy as a regime where public policies depend upon the opinion of its citizens. Muller and Surel (1998, 33–41) show that such a relationship between citizens and decision-makers can be shaped in different ways. Representation focuses on the responsibility of the rulers, that is, the decision-makers selected by citizens. Participation conveys the principle of citizens being involved in the decision-making process.

The way democracy works is traditionally investigated by theories of democracy. The way we decide is partly explained by sequential policy analysis. It is of particular interest to combine both approaches regarding risk handling. When societal risk is at stake, it is particularly significant to think about risk at a macro level (how democracy works) and in practical terms (how we decide). Specifically, the literature on risk (Lidskog 2008; Taylor-Gooby 2006; Todt and Lujan 2008) highlights a deficit of democratic legitimacy inherent to risk policies. There are two possible causes for this: a decrease in the representativeness of the elected and disputes

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concerning the infallibility of experts, especially when a major mobilization of expert knowledge occurs and if experts contradict each other. Public participation has been implemented partly as a device to reduce this deficit of legitimacy when regulating societal risk. The relationship between blame avoidance and risk has been pointed out by Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin (2001) and Linz (2004).

In such a context, citizens potentially sanction decisions not only for the elected account but also in which they have (at least partially) been involved. In this article, we ask: can citizens be driven to a figurative state of schizophrenia and, if so, why do the elected continue to ask for citizens' participation in handling risk?

To answer such questions, we use genetically modified organism (GMO) decision-making process at the European and, more specifically, at the Belgian level as an empirical tracer. We focus on field trials of agro-food GMOs. The tension between representative and participatory democracy is followed through this particular case study for different reasons. First, it typifies a public policy on a societal risk (Jacob and Schiffino 2007). Second, the decision-making process has historically evolved from an expert-centered approach toward the use of participatory mechanisms. Third, a contest of the legitimacy and the representativeness of the rulers' decisions largely explains this evolution.

In a nutshell, the article's aims are threefold. First, this article calls on theories of democracy to trace citizens' involvement in drafting risk policies. In fact, the section entitled 'Combining sequential policy analysis and theories of democracy' outlines the theoretical backgrounds of the reflection. Second, through the example of the Belgian GMO policy, the article explores the complex relationship between citizens, rulers and experts when societal risk is regulated. To put the general reflection to the test, the section entitled 'Risk: enlightening citizens' and rulers' divergent perceptions of GMO policy' anchors the arguments in a situated historical construction. Third, the paper questions participatory mechanisms in the GMO policy cycle to empirically investigate the potentially schizophrenic character of it. The section entitled 'Policy analysis: does citizens' schizophrenia matter in the GMO policy cycle?' helps in concluding about the importance of the controversial dimension of the regulated risk.

Combining sequential policy analysis and theories of democracy

Three major democratic requirements dominate the construction of public policy: proximity, efficacy and accountability. These have been discussed in theories of democracy as well as in public policies.

The need for proximity is materialized by a redefinition of the boundaries and relationships between rulers and citizens (Pierre and Peters 2000). Until the end of the twentieth century, the state was the absolute and uncontested center of the policy process. In elitist models of democracy (Mills 1956), the prevalent logic of representation is reinforced by the central role of rulers. In such a perspective, citizens may choose the elites but democratic decisions are specifically made by the latter. Nowadays, rulers need to share their power with other participants in civil society. When Dahl (1961) challenges Mills' elitist theory, he entails a larger dispersion of power within society that helps us to better understand contemporary risk regulation. According to the concept of polyarchy, many individuals or groups may exert political influence on decisions. The diminishing of the state's hierarchical authority and the use of less coercive policy instruments today implement such potential power dispersion (Held 2007; Stoker 1998). Participation, combined with represen-

tation, aims to overcome citizens' disenchantment and the challenging of expertise that has appeared at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century.

A concern for efficacy and the appropriate use of resources (effectiveness) is another strong current that runs through contemporary democracies. This 'performance paradigm' (Hamel and Muller 2007, 131) is accompanied by the promise of better public services that are more clearly defined and more adapted to citizens' needs. In this context, emphasis is placed either on the quality of interventions and problem-solving or on the achievement of objectives. The managerial project, centered on performance measurement, increases short-term follow-up requirements and reconfigures the organization of public services. In elitist models of democracy, a managerial class (Burnham 1941) or policy entrepreneurs (Downs 1957) dominate(s) the cycle of policy decisions; thanks to administrative skills, scientific expertise and technical knowledge. Citizens play the role of consumers concerned with the satisfaction of their preferences. In such a perspective of value for money, contemporary participation may be too costly. Significantly, literature on participatory democracy (Bacqué, Rey, and Sintomer 2005; Blondiaux 2008) indicates that citizens' involvement in public policy is nowadays largely initiated by rulers. In the 1960s and 1970s, participation constituted more of a 'bottom-up' process by social movements for challenging public policies. After a slowing down of the participatory practice in the 1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s marked its return, but rather along a 'top-down' axis: a consultation of the citizens by the rulers, especially concerning environmental issues.¹

The third requirement may explain the maintaining of a 'polyarchian' regulation of risk through participation, despite the cost. Indeed, the third imperative of accountability combines the ambitions of the managerial project with citizens' need for proximity. Citizens are not satisfied simply with effective public services. They also expect public decision-makers and managers to be held accountable for their actions. These elements are tightly linked to the principle of responsibility for implementing public policy. We make the distinction between several types of imputability: electoral (or directly political: the sanction by the ballot box after preliminary accountability), legal (the responsibility assumed by rulers that once they are in charge, they become subject to the laws that govern their scope of activities) and social (respecting ethical norms). In this context, decision-makers need to show citizens (often through the media) that they have made 'good' decisions. This imperative of accountability encourages transparency in the decisional and administrative processes since citizens are no longer satisfied simply with the results, but are increasingly interested in the process. Literature on democracy (Chambers 2004) and risk policies (Weil et al. 2006) has devoted efforts to develop a link between transparency and efficacy.

This article discusses more broadly the link between democracy, risk and public policy as a response to the three aforementioned imperatives. The construction of public policy needs to position itself at the crossroads of participation (proximity) for a decision not only to be legitimate (imputability) but also to be effective (sanctioned at the moment of accountability).

What is intriguing, in terms of the policy cycle, is that citizens are often solicited at the beginning of the democratic process (agenda and definition), ultimately leading to the implementation and the evaluation of a program or a policy. Moreover, citizen participation is generally restricted to information or consultation

regarding risk issues so as to collect people's points of view.² The potentially low weight of citizens' intervention at the first stage of the policy cycle and/or through informal instruments, as well as the potentially light consequence (in terms of accountability) of participation, is intriguing.

This begs the question: why do rulers continue to ask for citizens' participation in handling risk? Participation, posing as the gauge of proximity, appears as a solution to deal with the erosion of two types of legitimacies. The first one is the erosion of primary legitimacy, by the inputs, that refers to the deficit of rulers' representativeness. Literature on democracy thoroughly investigates the deficit of representativeness of the elected and the disenchantment of citizens against a policy and/or a democracy (Rosanvallon 2006). The second is the erosion of secondary legitimacy, by the outputs, that questions the validity of rulers' decisions. Literature on risk society (Beck 1986; Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe 2001) analyzes a challenge of the alleged infallibility of experts who, up until the 1990s, acted as quasi-monopolistic adjuncts of policy decisions.

Otherwise stated, participation allows the elected to continue to adopt democratic decisions in a doubly complex context with regard to risk policies, a context which highlights their deficit of representativeness and the uncertainty linked to risk issues. Political decisions and scientific knowledge become controversial in uncertain situations. As rulers' legitimacy weakens, making citizens partial partners of the policy decision helps policy-makers to exit the deadlock of a complex decision. Gusfield (1981) has demonstrated that the manner in which participants define a problem influences the solutions offered by these same participants.³

Manin (1995) argues that representation is confronted with the metamorphosis of representative government rather than with a crisis as such. In the same way, we postulate that regarding risk policies, the tension between participation and representation results from a metamorphosis of the policy cycle. Participation within representative frames is designed to face, on the one hand, the deficit of representativeness of the elected and the controversy surrounding scientific knowledge, and, on the other hand, the context of uncertainty and complexity which is inherent to risk policies. Thus, linking participation and representation constitutes a new instrument of risk policies which challenges the imperative of accountability.

Risk: enlightening citizens' and rulers' divergent perceptions of GMO policy

With regard to the policy cycle, rulers hold the ultimate responsibility for democratic decisions. GMO policy illustrates that rulers may choose a top-down participatory process to involve citizens in the policy design when a complex and controversial issue is to be regulated, while keeping representation to safeguard regulation when divergent point of views from citizens, experts and rulers jeopardize the regulation.

Starting from the three major democratic requirements that dominate the construction of public policy (i.e. proximity, efficacy and accountability), we will now document this tension. The empirical material will focus on GMO field trials in the agro-food sector in Belgium (Varone and Schiffino 2007, 2004).

The need for proximity did not materialize until the end of the twentieth century in what concerns Belgian GMO regulation. The first stage of GMO policy (1983–1999) is characterized by a concentration of the decisional power in the hands of the rulers close to the experts (Schiffino 2004). Significantly, the scientific commu-

nity attributes the first GM plant to a Belgian researcher (M. Van Montagu from Ghent University). Experts' influence on political decisions is historically embedded in experts' good records. The two international conferences at Asilomar in 1973 and 1975, proving that experts care for risk ranking and can self-regulate, serve as an upstream safeguard. European Directive 90/220/CEE took eight years to be transposed into Belgian law (Royal Decree of 18 December 1998). Thus, during this first regulation phase, the Belgian Minister of Agriculture decides on a general legal basis and experts' recommendations, notably through the Biosafety Service.

Citizens' disenchantment and the challenging of expertise were triggered between 1999 and 2004. This change is the result of, at least, the mobilization of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) located in Belgium, the influence of French mobilization (notably the one by José Bové and his 'Confédération paysanne'), and the exposure of GMOs in the European media in general. In Belgium, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and 'Nature et Progrès' among others launched important information and mobilization campaigns. Belgian citizens participated in several illegal processes of rooting-up field trials. In this case, citizens distanced themselves from the risk policy and from the adopted decisions because they did not agree with them. They separated themselves from the rulers and put the entire responsibility of the decisions on the shoulders of the government.

The concern for efficiency and the appropriate use of resources (effectiveness) led the Belgian government to participate in a moratorium at European level until 2004. It aimed at taking into account citizens' demands that were voiced through non-conventional participation. In such a context, participation appeared to be costly. Multinational firms such as Bayer Crop Science or Monsanto decided to delocalize their R&D centres. Once the European Directive 2001/18/CE and, above all, the European Regulations 1829/2003 and 1830/2003 were adopted, the Belgian government could claim for the above-mentioned 'performance concern', as well as for transparency, and abandoned the moratorium.

A more polyarchian regulation of GMOs, linked to the accountability imperative of public action, developed between 2004 and today. In terms of electoral imputability, Belgian decision-makers have explicitly avoided regulating GMOs before elections were held. Regarding legal responsibility, the Royal Decree of 21 February 2005 mentions the civil liability of firms and research centers that organize the GMO field trials. In what concerns ethics, the Biosafety Service and, more generally, Belgian ministers have taken into consideration not only scientific arguments but also socio-economic and ethical issues (for instance, in 2010 during the Belgian presidency of the EU). It derives from the EU regulation that plans to obtain advice on ethical issues regarding the placing on the market of genetically modified food or feed. Transparency in the decisional and administrative process is enhanced not only by the information but also by the consultation procedure. Two citizens' panels were organized at the local level (in Gembloux and in Beernem in 2003). Moreover, the Royal Decree of 21 February 2005 gives citizens the right to look at the trials files online or on public display in their municipality. They then give their feedback to rulers within a defined period of time. This was implemented for the first time in 2007 for GM trees. The administration's report stated that most of the citizens and environmental NGOs that participated in the process opposed the field trial. Meanwhile, the GM trees trial was authorized.

What have we learned up till now from this empirical tracing of the relationship between citizens, experts and rulers? From 1983 to 1999, rulers relied on expert

advice. Neither of them is contested by the citizens. From 1999 to 2004, citizens distanced themselves from experts and criticized public decisions. EU and Belgian rulers reacted to this tension by adopting regulations that allow for plural expertise (ethical and socio-economic) and citizens' participation. Now, we will document the fact that rulers no longer rely on a monolithic expertise nor systematically follow citizens' advice.

Indeed, the limits of governing risk together may also result from a divergence between rulers and experts. In 2002, for the first time in the history of Belgian GMO regulation, the Minister of Public Health did not follow the Biosafety Agency recommendations. This happened again in 2007 when both the Minister of Public Health and the Minister of Environment opposed the GM trees trial. Citizens, experts and rulers can therefore be set against each other on the basis of scientific controversy. However, they cannot contest the legitimacy of the decision, especially during a contemporary period when rulers can account for it on the basis of a participatory process.

We should look not only at rulers-experts divergences or citizens-rulers opposition based on expertise controversy but also on internal divergences. Each category of actors can also be subdivided. The regulation of GMOs at the European level provides a good example. Experts are divided on the advantages and risks of GMOs. The Belgian scientific community is composed of scientists who oppose and others who support GMOs, the latter being considered as experts by the European Safety Agency. Civil society is reticent to support applications involving food but more open to pharmaceutical products. Moreover, the Flemish (citizens from North Belgium) are more supportive of GMOs as buoyant to the economic and R&D sector than the Walloons (citizens from South Belgium) who point out issues of biodiversity. In this context, European and Belgian decision-makers have passed from an attitude of encouragement of technology toward a precautionary decision-making process.

In sum, participation helps citizens to become partners in the preparation of a complex decision, in a context where differing views between citizens and rulers on risk policies are fed by uncertainty and where experts as well as citizens and rulers may diverge in their positions regarding the controversial issue. The opening of the representative decisional process helps in diminishing the probability of subsequent blockage. Therefore, the efficacy of the policy can increase: it can reach its goals. Democracy is reinforced: citizens have been associated with the decision-making process, agreeing or not with its output. Primary (democratic process) and secondary (output delivery) legitimacy can be reinforced. But could this lead to some form of citizens' schizophrenia?

Policy analysis: does citizens' schizophrenia matter in the GMO policy cycle?

An in-depth investigation of the democratic policy cycle on risk issues can bridge the gap between theories of democracy and policy even further. This section questions participation and representation at each stage of risk policies. Examples of the latter, thanks to Belgian GMO policy, are provided to illustrate the theoretical reflection.

Policy analysis often presupposes the existence of a problem, i.e. a gap between the situation as it exists and the situation as it is desired to be (Rezsohazy 1984), as the first step of the decision-making process. Problems can be placed on the political

agenda through the mobilization of various actors: political decision-makers and civil servants, media, pressure groups, scientists considered to be experts, citizens, etc.

Whether it is through intermediary bodies or through the direct participation of citizens, decision legitimacy can find itself heightened by the partnership of groups and individuals *at the emergence of problems*. A particular political agenda can be solely encouraged by politico-administrative actors themselves and would surely not be less legitimate for it. Policy entrepreneurs may diagnose problems and consequently manage risks 'on their own'. In some cases, experts play a key role.

In the case of GMO regulation, the problem (i.e. to shield field trials from negative consequences on environment and public health) is first set on the agenda by internal anticipation. Scientific decisions to rank risk during the 1970s or to create commissions for risk assessment have encouraged European and Belgian regulation on GMOs. This led to European Directive 90/220/CEE and the Royal Decree of 18 December 1998. The need to revise these norms was highlighted between 1999 and 2003. To exit from the deadlock situation of the moratorium, a second policy cycle was triggered. To answer to both the social mobilization and the pressure by the firms, EU State members adopted European Directive 2001/18/CE, Regulations 1829/2003 and 1830/2003.

Whoever the catalyst of the political agenda is, citizens generally expect a positioning on the part of the elected, whether they react with an authorization or an interdiction, a decision or a non-decision (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). In matters of risk, rulers are brought to put activities on the agenda that often incite distrust, even opposition, from citizens (field trials in our case study). There can be a political offer, on behalf of the elected, to inform citizens and to consider their points of view. This offer acts as a filter (Easton 1965) to favor the equilibrium of the political decision process.

At the second stage of the formulation and the adoption of a public program (subsequent to the emergence of the problem and the agenda planning stage), a target group is focused: this group is considered to be the cause of the problem, and their behavior must be modified to solve the problem. This designation depends on the politico-administrative actors. However, they can organize consultations: it seems even more significant for the elected, in a concern for effective and legitimate management, to partner with citizens. Directive 2001/18/CE, Regulations 1829/2003 and 1830/2003 target GMO producers, the latter being firms or research centers. But it is also interesting to point out that another directive (2003/35/CE) explicitly designates citizens as partners in the elaboration of public programs related to the environment. This allows citizens to issue observations and opinions when all options are still conceivable, before the adoption of decisions as such. Nowadays, citizens are consulted before field trials are carried out in Europe and, therefore, in Belgium.

As a politico-administrative program settles on policy objectives and policy instruments, the process is deeply embedded with a democratic handling of the problem. Indeed, it is then possible to choose between different policy procedures (representative methods such as expert commissions or parliamentary debates; or participatory methods: online forms, citizen panels, etc.). It is also at this moment when the divergence of views between citizens and rulers finds itself at a nodal point: will the elected go in the direction desired by the citizens if they diverge from the option that privileges the elected and/or the experts? The decision is as complex to make as the community of experts, groups of citizens and the rulers is divided.

As already stated, GMO trial procedures include internet and public displays in municipalities. On the GM trees file in 2007, divergences appeared between citizens' opinions and the Biosafety Agency's advice. Ministers themselves opposed each other through the media. A Flemish minister regulating scientific development opposed Walloon ministers regulating public health and environment. This highlighted the complexity of the decision to be made.

It is in the third phase of policy implementation where the first outputs of the policy will appear, as well as the (dys-)functioning of its (democratic) methods. The public policy appears then in its complexity: gaps in the implementation may arise. For instance, what is the impact of the labeling of genetically modified (GM) food products? Does it legitimately shift the weight of responsibility to consumers? In its preamble, the Aarhus Convention stipulates that access to information and participation leads to better decision-making and helps decision-makers to apply these decisions more effectively. To what extent do public powers today make citizens partners in the implementation of policies? Do they favor representative methods once the investigative stage of the problem gives way to that of its concrete resolution? In France, for example, Bill N°2002-276 (27 February 2002) recommends that public participation be organized during the elaboration of a project right up until the end of the public inquiry. This will prove to be decisive at the moment of accountability and in the process of imputability. The more procedures and decisions are transparent, the more the elected need to justify their decisions if they diverge from citizens' points of view as presented during the decision-preparation stage. If it is clear that policy implementation relies on the elected within the representative democracy framework, citizens' participation in the phases preceding implementation alter it. This is closely linked to the process of accountability.

Ultimately, evaluation is undoubtedly a step that contributes to the dynamics of public policy analysis. Indeed, it implies some sort of feedback on the initial problem. On the basis of evaluation, rulers can, if need be, redefine the program. The very perception of the problem can be modified. International regulators are not mistaken in this matter. Directive 2003/35/CE allows citizens to participate not only in the preparation but also in the modification or the re-examination of plans or programs in matters of waste, pollution by nitrates, air quality, etc.

GMO evaluation mainly consists of an ex-ante assessment on specific GMOs case-by-case. Evaluations are also carried out by scientists to document the effect of field trials and cultures on the environment and public health. Policy evaluation as such has resulted in new norms adopted at the European as well as the Belgian levels. Significantly, Regulation 1831/2003 states that '[i]t is recognized that, in some cases, scientific risk assessment alone cannot provide all the information on which a risk management decision should be based, and that other legitimate factors relevant to the matter under consideration may be taken into account'.

Here again, the link between representation and participation is rich with lessons. Evaluation affects, among others, the consequences of public policy on citizens. They are concerned from the start by the public policy and are mobilized by the information on this subject further along in the process. Thus, evaluation is no longer considered 'shop talk for experts', and there is an abundance of democratic, participatory and even emancipating evaluation approaches.

For the supporters of these approaches, evaluation should not simply be an instrument of transparency and accountability but should also permit the participation of those involved in the evaluation (Daigneault and Jacob 2009). However, in

this domain, the rhetoric and the intentions often go beyond concrete finalities, and the sectors in which they develop rarely focus on risk policies.

Conclusion

The main topic that is addressed here is how contemporary democracies can regulate risk issues within a representative model including participatory processes. Risk policies challenge decision-makers. Rulers have little certainty over risk. Scientific knowledge does not allow for it to be delimited. Layman's knowledge is reclaiming a moral right. The effects, even the object itself, of societal risk are often immaterial (that is true not only for genetic modifications, but also for electromagnetic waves, radioactivity, electric tension, viruses, etc.). Faced with this complexity, contemporary society has therefore proposed to further link participation and representation. The emergence of risk announces the return of citizens to the sphere of political decision-making. The representativeness of the rulers is in crisis, as well as expert infallibility and monopoly. Citizens are periodically invited to participate to help remedy this situation.

Even so, one solution (participation) to a double deficit (the erosion of the primary legitimacy and the questioning of expert infallibility) conveys a fundamental paradox: we need to combine citizen involvement with their right to imputability. If citizens have participated in a decision, should it not be more difficult for them to criticize it since they have been at least partially associated with it? The question is particularly accurate when divergent views arise between citizens and the elected and/or experts. In this sense, the indicator of legitimacy would not so much be participation as controversy.

In other words, a decision on a risk issue can be legitimate if it is made in closed policy venues in the absence of controversy; participation could also be limited to an exchange of information at the beginning of the public policy cycle. However, when controversy exists, a link between participation and representation is crucial. What matters is that citizens are made partners in the decisional process regarding controversies.

The decision itself only relies on public decision-makers. It is necessary to protect the imperative of imputability in democracy. Having citizens participate in the formulation of a problem or in its evaluation is to make them partners in the decisional process or, in other words, in the construction of policy (not its output). A decision can be legitimate if the decisional process has not been open to citizens. It can even reap gains in terms of efficacy (Chambers 2004). However, in this case, there should be no controversy, either on the decisional process (primary legitimacy, on the inputs) or on its results (secondary legitimacy, by the outputs).

Yet risk policies are a sector in which controversies are a crucial point. This would partly explain why citizens are particularly associated with risk policies at the beginning of the decisional process, for their preparation, or at the end of it, at the time of their evaluation. This would help to limit disruptions undergone by the political system because each actor would become a partner in the decision to be adopted and would personally intervene in the controversy.

At least two avenues of scientific inquiry remain. First, we propose testing the following hypothesis: in leaving the participatory approach, citizens recover their ability to take 'disciplinary action against' the rulers through traditional accountability. Experiments in participatory democracy underline the weak investment of

citizens when this option is rendered available. Many reasons could explain this weak investment: lack of time, withdrawal into the private sphere, lack of interest in collective choices, keeping distance from the elite whose legitimacy and efficacy are contested, etc. But authors such as Rosanvallon (2006) deconstruct the myth of the apathetic citizen, passive or disinterested. This article has shown that contemporary democracies settle institutional mechanisms and public policy procedures through means by which citizens are empowered to voice and to practice citizenship, though an intriguing consequence can be a citizens' schizophrenia.

A second finding goes in the same direction: the formulation of professionalized citizens around risk policies. Better informed, better trained and more communicative, citizens and groups invest in collective choices, especially when the latter concerns the environment or public health. Democracy is found to be vitalized: rulers, experts and citizens interact around controversial objects that public policy is brought about to regulate, in a concern for efficacy, and in preserving legitimacy, both of the decisional process and of its result (the decision) for which the elected need to be held accountable.

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Notes

1. See the Aarhus Convention of 1998, European Directives 2003/4/CE, and 2003/35/CE. Participation is less often implemented regarding finance, economics or social security issues. Significantly, European Directive 2003/35/CE states (Articles 2 and 3) that citizen participation is not applicable either to state defense needs or to civil emergency situations.
2. In fact, two major participatory methods coexist: those which, through referendums, compel decision-makers to follow citizens' communicated directions and those which, in the form of consensus conferences, citizen juries, deliberative surveys, forums, etc., help decision-makers to feel the pulse of civil society so as to determine the direction in which they must head via public policy.
3. This is not a reduction of participation to an 'instrumentalization' of citizens by the elected, but rather a way in which to understand the political context of the link between representation and participation.

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