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AUGUSTINE's *TIMAEUS* 41AB

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Illustration Title page: Pieter Brueghel, the Elder,

The Painter and the Buyer, circa 1565, Courtesy Albertina, Vienna.

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Augustine's Timaeus 41ab - Abstract

Contrary to P. Alfarec and the partisans of Augustine's conversion to any form of Plato(nism), this thesis is a textual proof that Augustine's Plato is a smart rhetorician who advocates Christian ideas. *Tim* 41 a7-b6 is the text *par excellence* Augustine borrows from Plato. Sixteen times of Augustine's application in the course of his writing is a projection upon the original of a Resurrection doctrine which is simply not there. His exegesis is exclusively based on Cicero's stocizing translation, and is seemingly directed at Porphyry who attacks the bodily resurrection also with sixteen arguments. Augustine is keen to teach but is not familiar with other numerous interpretations of this passage. None of the previous Neo-Platonists or Apologists who scrutinized *Tim* 41a7-b6 has ever attempted a similar reading. With such a creative yet biased treatment of sources Augustine could never convince any expert. His secret agenda is to convert a common literate man by means of a rhetorical reference to the pagan authorities.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost I offer my sincerest gratitude to my promoter, Prof. Jean-Michel Counet, who has supported me throughout this zigzagging adventure with his patience and tolerance whilst allowing me the room to work in my own way. I attribute the level of my Doctorate degree to his encouragement and effort and without him this thesis, also, would not have been composed. I appreciate many valuable suggestions from Prof. Jan Opsomer and Prof. Caroline Macé and especially from an inspiring example of a scholar Prof. Istvan Perczel, supervisor of my Master Thesis at CEU.

I have learnt a great deal from those who have worked with me over the years and gratefully acknowledge my debt to them. Special thanks to Prof. Peter De Mey, for letting me use the study facilities at Mauris Sabbé Library. Also, to my long-standing collegues in the Orthodox Training Centre (OVC) – Fr. Dominique Verbeke and Patrick Stangé for sharing provoking ideas with me.

Beyond Meta-Physics, beyond Plato and Augustine, I thank my parents for supporting me throughout all my studies and research at University. I treasure their love, charity and effort in my heart for everything they have done and still keep doing for me. It is hard for these two wonderful caring people to have both their children living across frontiers being for news always dependent on a long-distance call.

Above all, I should thank my wife, Judith, for her patience and forbearance whilst I have spent thousands of hours working on this project away from home. She has been always a wonderful companion with a great insight into many philosophical issues. Without her love and understanding, and especially for her enormous efforts to finalize this work the project would never have been completed.

I am grateful to my friends Benjamin Jones, Shamindra Herat, Fr. Isaak and especially Jeremy Pacht for the care with which they reviewed the original manuscript; and for conversations that clarified my thinking on this and other matters. Their long-standing friendship meant a great deal to me.

A month of residence at St. Silouan Monastery (Le Mance, France) in September 2011 enabled me to complete the preparation of this thesis in a difficult period of my life. The support and prayers from the community of St John the Baptist in Essex, England were gently in the background. Prof.

Fr. Paul Pellemans was invaluable for his spiritual guidance in and out the labyrinth in front of me.

I would also like to express my gratitude to my parents-in-law: John and Margit Hermans for letting me occasionally stay in their place and their care. With John, Professor emeritus in Chemistry, yet a true historian at heart and possessing an encyclopedic knowledge in many areas of humanities, discussion on Greek and Latin texts were of great motivation for me throughout.

In my daily life I have been blessed with a friendly and cheerful group of fellow parishioners: Nicolas-Jan, Luc, Françoise, Vitaly, Marina, Eddy, Christian and Agrippina who accommodated me with more time and attention than I had right to afford.

My deep gratitude to three people who passed away in the meantime who meant and will always mean a lot to me: fr. Symeon, fr Cyrill Crawford and Prof. Jos Decorte. I would have loved to see them present at my defence, today.

Victor Yudin

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EISAGOGE

Despite the fact that our title appears disturbingly technical, it is a rather common paradox: we find a bishop as an author of a text that he did not write. This will instigate perhaps a conspiracy against the church and a populist accusation of plagiarism which was an up-to-date reality already in Augustine's life-time. A more inspired reader may indulge into a similar hypothetical title, e.g. the *Gospel according to Newman,* as if we managed to exact the family roots to the fourth Evangelist, whose surname seems to reveal his new identity (*new man*).[1] Although the Christian name of the Oxford movement founder is indeed John,[2] nevertheless, he did not author the ancient Gospel, as there is simply a discrepancy of nineteen centuries[3] - even though each of these Johns was certainly a *new man* in their respective times. In fact, in this thesis we do not challenge the traditional *Timaeus* attribution to Plato; even so, we are still convinced that Augustine is an author of *Timaeus* in some sense. Despite the fact that he did not compose the entire dialogue, perhaps he wrote at least *Tim* 41a7-b6 after all. Curiously, the moment we start a discourse on a passage with some precision, things suddenly start taking shape, as if the unreal becomes real when it acquires recognizable features.[4] With our title we merely highlight that our thesis is on Augustine's peculiar personal reading of a complex, ambiguous and secretive text by another equally complex, ambiguous and secretive ancient author. What interests us indeed are Augustine's reasons: 'why' and 'how' did he choose to read in these ways these bits of Plato, and we ask ourselves whether or not his liberties are permissible – even for us in the 21st century. Some background will enable us to further clarify our intentions.

[1] In Antiquity introducing novelties was seldom a good sign. Cf pejorative expressions *recentiores Platonici* (Augustine, *de consensus evangelistarum* I, 23, 35.) and *viri novi* (Arnobius, Chapter Seven *infra*).

[2] Cardinal J.H. Newman (1801-1890) – a leader of the Oxford movement (cf. Zeno, D., *John Henry Newman: His Inner Life*, San Francisco. Ignatius Press. 1987).

[3] Similar time discrepancies shadow over our Thesis, e.g. Augustine polemicizing with Porphyry, who died a half a century before Augustine was born; as well as Augustine ignoring Proclus who was born after Augustine's death etc. Cf. Chapters One and Six *infra*.

[4] Similarly, the Greek gods do have their reality due to Hesiod's and Homer's narratives *inter alia*.

0.1. Motives

Shortly after Carlos Steel taught an inspiring course on *Timaeus* at KULeuven in 1998,[5] Jean-Michel Counet, the Promoter of my present project,[6] invited me to a conference in Namur, his native town, on the reception of *Timaeus* through the ages. We travelled to Namur in the company of Jan Opsomer exercising his prepared talk by means of a Plato-like dialogue.[7] This was when the thought of investigating Augustine's writings on the *Timaeus* first came to me. Although the Proceedings of the Conference in Namur were never published[8] yet another collection devoted to the same subject appeared shortly after it took place (*Reason and*

[5] C.Steel is an expert on all topics to relating to my research: Plato, the Neo-Platonists and Augustine. Steel has published numerous important papers on Plato's Timaeus alone: Steel, Carlos, *and The Moral Purpose of the Human Body" A Reading of "Timaeus" 69-72* in *Phronesis*, 2001, Vol.46 (2). Pp.105-128. Steel, Carlos, *Why should we prefer Plato's 'Timaeus' to Aristotle's Physics? Proclus' Critique of Aristotle's Causal Explanation of the Physical World*, in *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, 2003, Vol.46(S78), pp.175-187. Steel, Carlos, Proclus. *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus.* Volume III, Book 3, Part 1: *Proclus on the World's Body*, Dirk Baltzly (ed.). Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 2007.

[6] J.-M. Counet also gave a brilliant talk on the parallels between *Timaeus* and a medieval commentary on Hexameron narrative. Cf. Counet, Jean-Michel, *Interférences entre le Timée de Platon et le récit biblique de la création dans les commentaires In Hexaëmeron au XIIe siècle*, in *Etudes Classiques*, 2003, Vol.71(1). Pp.91-105. I also enjoyed working with Jean-Michel on the current project. One of the consequences of this co-operation was a workshop in Oxford in August 2011 on the Church Fathers vis-à-vis the Neo-Platonists. J.-M. Counet gave an extremely interesting presentation on the *Creative speech in Church Fathers*, which resonates with my own views on the Theologians in Chapter 6.

[7] J.Opsomer's academic curriculum also began with a Middle-Platonist's Commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*. Cf. J.Opsomer, *Geschiedenis van het Platonisme en Plato-exegese in Plutarchus' Quaestiones Platonicae* (Thesis). Leuven. KULeuven. 1994. Since then, his contributions to the subject have grown steadily, e.g. J.Opsomer, *Plutarch's De Animae Procreatione in Timaeo: manipulation of search of consistency?* in *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, 2004. Vol. 47. Pp. 137-162; Cf. later his *Timaeus* translation in *Lineas*, and his work on demiurgic procession in Proclus, cf. J.Opsomer, *Proclus on demiurgy and procession*, in *Reason and Necessity*: *essays on Plato's Timaeus*. Ed. Wright, M. R. London. Duckworth, 2000; and finally Cf. also Opsomer, J., *Who in heaven is the demiurge? Proclus' exegesis of Tim. 28C3-5*, in *Ancient World*. 2001, Vol. 32, Pp. 52-70.

[8] If not to count some articles in *Les Études Classiques* 71. 2003, first and foremost J.Opsomer, *La démiurgie des jeunes dieux selon Proclus*, in *Les Études Classiques*. 2003, Vol. 71. Pp. 5-49 (I am not sure what you mean here).

Necessity (ed. Wright)[9]), showing yet again how similar ideas often grow in different places simultaneously.[10] Jan Opsomer's contribution to this second volume on a related issue proved inspirational to me for the following reason.

In Namur Jan Opsomer presented a paper on Plato's 'young gods' read by Proclus, reading. Jan inspired me with the idea of investigating whether Proclus' young gods also found their way into Augustine's text, as a major part of Augustine's *civ.dei* is devoted to the problem of 'gods'. As we found out later, Augustine turned to this problem surprisingly earlier than Proclus, although he named these "gods" differently.[11] This became clear to us after we did some basic research on Augustine's account of Plato's *Timaeus*. This initial spade-work grew into the present piece of research.

We have always been intrigued by Augustine's failure to ever cite the Timaeus although he wrote several books about the creation of the world,[12] since *Timaeus* is Plato's great dialogue on this subject, but also because Augustine is considered a Platonist by many later commentators. Why does Augustine, the Platonist, take no interest in Plato's treatment of an issue that was central to his concerns? He does not even refer to Plato when he turns to the topic of creation, although his own treatment of it is comparable to, though also quite distinct from that of the Platonists and Christianity. In the light of these questions, my doubts about certain clichés often encountered in Augustinian studies grew.

As with many other scholars in this area, we, too, soon became increasingly interested in Porphyry's lost treatise, *Against the Christians*. Clearly, the greatest work ever written against the Christian doctrine has disappeared leaving very few traces behind.

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[9] Cf. *supra Reason and Necessity*: *essays on Plato's Timaeus*. Ed. Wright, M. R. London. Duckworth, 2000.

[10] Cf. on K.Popper *infra*.

[11] *dii minores*.

[12] *de Genesi contra Manichaeos*, *Confessiones* XIII, *de Genesi ad literam imperfectus liber*, *de Genesi ad literam*.

This work (if it ever existed) must have been a detailed examination of Christian teachings based on a serious study of the Bible by a philosopher well-trained in the tradition of textual analysis. In it he would have applied the same tools he used in his exegeses of Plato. Although some of Porphyry's arguments have come down to us, we still have no idea how their original form can be constructed out of the material at hand.

Interest in this lost work naturally increases upon reading Augustine because much of his argument is directed against it.[13] Unlike the philosopher of Macarius from Magnesia, whose identity remains an issue of considerable scholarly debate, Augustine's Porphyry was a real figure. Clearly, Augustine is the most significant source for the reconstruction of Porphyry's anti-Christian polemic. It is surprising that scholars have failed to address in sufficient detail the key Christian doctrines criticized by Porphyry.[14] Moreover, this doctrine is also the key theological issue under scrutiny in *civ.dei*. Indeed, it is *the* crux of Augustine's dispute with Porphyry, which makes its first appearance in Augustine's early work, *de consensu evangelistarum*.

It turned out that all these topics, viz., Augustine as an exegete of Plato's *Timaeus*; Proclus' young gods; the creation of the world in Plato and Augustine; and last but not least, Porphyry's critique against the resurrection in his lost treatise against the Christians, come together illuminatingly in a single passage of *Tim* 41ab. That same passage also gives us Augustine's 'Platonism' in a nutshell.

[13] His name appears *circa* sixty times just in *civ.dei* as well as sixteen times in his other works. Cf. J.O'Donell, *Augustine's Confessions*. Oxford. 1922. Vol. III, p.422.

[14] An exception is the recent article *Porphyre et Macarios de Magnèsie sur toute puissance de Dieu* in *Monogenes* by R.Goulet, in *Le Traité de Porphyre Contre les Chrétiens.* Paris. 2011. Pp. 205-235; R.Goulet, *Cinq nouveaux fragments nominaux du traité de Porphyre "Contre les chrétiens"* in *Vigiliae Christianae*, 2010, Vol. 64, part 2. Pp.140-159.

0.2. Intrigue

Porphyry's intrigue is a real *eisagoge* into the present research. This intrigue has two aspects: it is polemic in character on the one hand, and apologetic on the other.

First, as we have already mentioned, Augustine is the most trustworthy source of our knowledge about Porphyry's treatise *against the Christians*; another significant source remains anonymous.[15] The latter part of the 20th century spawned a discussion as to whether or not the Philosopher criticized by Macarius Magnes in his *Apocriticus* is Porphyry. This dispute also generated questions about whether the treatise against the Christians ascribed to Porphyry ever existed, and also about what sources Augustine's familiarity with Porphyry was based on.

There is a clear consensus among scholars as to whether Augustine's opponent is really Porphyry. This dispute is a fact, if we can call a dispute the mutual objections of two thinkers between whom the age discrepancy is no less than a hundred years.

The second topic of importance for us is the theme of methodology for contemporary Apologetics; of whether a serious discussion on faith is at all possible outside the church. Is it true that we cannot raise issues of faith with unbelievers? Is Porphyry right that it makes little sense to dispute with Christians, as they do not listen to arguments anyway?

Is it possible (or even necessary) to use Bible sources in a discussion with unbelievers and to treat these sources as authoritative? If possible, then in what context? If not, then why not, and what, if any, sources are permissible then? Augustine, as the great polemicist of his time, has extensive experience in these matters. What interests us is how relevant his vast experience is for any contemporary apologist.

Can we use it in one or another fashion, e.g. by looking for Christian elements in the earlier philosophical systems of Antiquity? Are we allowed

[15] In the collection by Berchmann R.M. out of eighteen authors, which are claimed to have quoted CC, only Augustine and Macarius Magnes occupy around 20 pages. Berchmann attributes fragments 165-210 to Augustine – even more than to Macarius. Cf. Berchmann R.M., *Porphyry against the Christians*. Leiden-Boston. Brill. 2005.

to read such elements into them? Can one use elements of these systems for polemic reasons in such a way that an argument seems to be convincing, even if after a detailed examination a chosen source appears to have little to do with the topic under discussion?

0.3. Objectives

The objectives of our research are twofold: *apophatic* and *cataphatic*. The apophatic objectives fall within the negative method of theology. This means that there are some important elements in the discussion, which are difficult, if not impossible, to formulate in words. Or perhaps it is somewhat too early to speak about a chosen topic for some reason. The cataphatic objectives, however, are expressible in words, and accordingly, we will attempt to express them so.

0.3.1. Apophatic Objectives

Let us briefly outline what we are *not* going to do in the present work, which is in fact not easy to specify. We are not going to research three seemingly obvious directions, which concern the topic discussed, because they each merit more extensive treatment than I am able to give it here. First, we are not going to examine the original *Timaeus* in light of Plato's other dialogues, nor will I be concerned with the scholarly commentary around it.

Secondly, we are not going to examine the biblical teaching on the bodily resurrection, nor the way it is interpreted by the Patristic tradition. Even Augustine's own commentaries on this topic are outside my research objectives. Therefore, and thirdly, this thesis is not a reconstruction of Augustine's teaching on the bodily resurrection, but of one aspect of it that is found in *Tim* 41ab and used in his polemics against the Platonists.

I seek the reader's kind indulgence as I am no scholar of Classical languages, and still venture to deal with rather complex linguistic issues. I am all too aware of my shortcomings in this department but there is no avoiding these difficulties when our enquiry strays into fields, which call for expertise in many different disciplines.

Second, although we are no professional exegete, we interpret texts of a theological character. Third, we are not a philosopher-analyst either in the sense that we do not belong to the camp of analytic philosophy, the predominant style in the Anglo-Saxon world. If this research qualifies as philosophy, it belongs to the continental tradition of philosophy, where the accent is on the depth of thought, rather than on the painstaking analysis of every element. Paradoxically, we still deal with textual analysis. At any rate, I beg mercy from the demanding reader for my limits, and yet urge him to be open to some valuable points, which we are convinced are present in the current thesis. Any *addenda* and even *corrigenda* are very much welcome.

0.3.2. Cataphatic Objectives

The topic we are dealing with is formulated in the spirit of modernity. It is also typical for the human sciences in the 20th century, which largely focuse on the linguistic issues. Sometimes our linguistic investigations take us to a depth where it is all too easy to lose one's bearings. We will also strive, in the course of these investigations, to throw some light on Augustine's interpretation of Plato's text.

Without using the original text by Plato, Augustine draws on a substantially altered translation by Cicero. Augustine's interpretation of this rather liberal translation is also quite loose, so that we soon find ourselves at quite some distance from the original text. The text ascribed by Augustine to Plato appears to be heavily loaded with the Stoic vocabulary. The terminology, content and context of this discussion are imbued with references to Stoicism. The aim of our research is manifold; however, the focus will fall, in the main, on the following six points.

First, we have to single out the reality and quality of Augustine's familiarity with Plato, not at the level of general cultural background, where Plato and Platonism indeed played a significant role, but on the level of particular texts taking one single text by Plato as an example: *Tim* 41ab.

Secondly, we ought to follow up Augustine's usage of *Tim* 41ab in his polemics with Porphyry on the subject of bodily resurrection, and also examine the consistency, but also the originality, of his arguments.

Third, we will attempt to evaluate (a) Augustine's reading of *Tim* 41ab from the point of view Plato's original text and (b) the methodology of Augustine's textual analysis, which he offers elsewhere.

Fourth, it is helpful to compare Augustine's interpretation of *Tim 41ab* with preceding interpretations of the same passage.

Fifth, it is also useful to follow up the adequacy of Augustine's interpretation with the preceding theological tradition of *Tim* 41ab reading.

Sixth, we have to clarify whether or not there are external influences upon Augustine's exegesis from the point of view of other philosophical and religious traditions.

0.3.3. Claims

By 'claims' we mean the main statements in our research, which were neither ignored nor accepted, or simply left in obscurity thus far. Let us now briefly single these statements out in discursive fashion.

On sixteen occasions Augustine cites a single passage from Plato as proof for the resurrection of the body. These citations, along with extensive commentary, were all directed against Porphyry and other Neo-Platonists.[16] For Augustine, this passage amply proves the omnipotence of the creator of the universe, who can grant resurrection of the body to anyone if he so chooses. Augustine's critique is itself quite remarkable. It is a unique case in history of such an interpretation of this passage. Yet, we will demonstrate in this research how closer scrutiny of Augustine's argumentation forces us to conclude that he could never have convinced a single Neo-Platonist,[17] simply because he was unfamiliar with their views

[16] The term 'Neo-Platonist' is relatively new. Augustine calls the Neo-Platonists by a general term 'Platonists' *Platonici*. Curiously, in *de consensu evanglistarum* we still find the expression *recentiores platonici* 'recent Platonists', cf. *de consensu 1. 22. 35 : 3.; civ.dei* I, 23, 35; VIII, 12: 17.. This *recentiones* is a pejorative reference to innovations these people introduce into Plato's doctrines, as we shall see, not necessarily constructive in Augustine mind.

[17] V.Yudin, *Refuting Porphyry with Plato: Augustine's reading of the Timaeus 41ab*, in *Studia Patristica* . Vol. XLIII. Ed. F.Young, M.Edwards, P.Parvis. 2006. Peeters. Leuven-Paris. Pp. 329-335; V.Yudin, *Refutando a Porphyrio mediante Platon: lectura agustiniana de Timaeo 41ab*, in Ed. E.A.E. Bendimez, J.Anoz. *Augustinus* 2007. Pp. 204-207; V.Yudin, *Apologia agustiniana de la resurrection, por medio de Timaeo 41ab de Platon*, in Ed. E.A.E. Bendimez,

concerning the status and powers of the demiurge. For all of them, this status was low and these powers limited. Augustine's reading does not tally with the Neoplatonic tradition. He extrapolates Christian doctrine to a passage originating from the Pre-Christian epoch.

In this present work we will attempt a thorough evaluation of Augustine's interpretation of *Timaeus* 41ab from within the context of his time. Of all Plato's writings, we argue that *Tim* 41ab is by far the passage best known to Augustine, and therefore highly representative of his familiarity with Plato's philosophy. He used it exclusively for apologetical reasons favoring Christianity. I argue that his interpretation of *Tim* 41ab is creative and mostly coherent, although his treatment of the subject matter lacks subtlety. It also evidences an inadequate grasp of Plato's philosophy, which he frequently uses to respond to Porphyry's attack on bodily resurrection. Augustine took this passage exclusively from Cicero's loose Latin translation of it, most probably through a *florilegium*, having little, if any, idea of its dissimilarities to the original text. We also argue that Augustine lacks a basic knowledge of the preceding tradition of interpretation of this passage, both Neoplatonic and Christian. Finally, we argue that his interpretation of *Tim* 41ab is partially, yet unintentionally, influenced by some elements of Stoic philosophy.

0.4. Methods and Tools

We have divided the methods that we have applied in this thesis into two sorts: ancient and modern methods, having concluded with *Instruments du Travail*, what the English call simply as *Tools*. We call 'ancient' the methods introduced and used in the epoch of the writers we have discussed. We call 'modern' the methods Descartes introduced at the beginning of the modern age under the rubric of scientific methodology.

The first and most conspicuous feature of ancient methods is that very few scholars in our own time would consider them appropriate methods of scientific inquiry. The second is that in some cases the elements of these

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J.Anoz. *Augustinus* 2008. Pp. 176-193; V.Yudin , *Porphyry against the resurrection in Augustine*, in *Studia Patristica* 2011. Vol L. Ed. A.Brent, M.Vinzent. Peeters. Leuven-Paris. Pp. 301-307.

methods form part and parcel of the whole material being analyzed. One difficulty in applying contemporary methods consists in the fact that our work is of an interdisciplinary character, drawing on disciplines like the history of Philosophy, Patristics, Dogmatics and Exegetics. Naturally, each discipline mentioned here has its own specific methods of inquiry.

0.4. 1. Ancient Methods

We seek to understand in what sense Augustine belongs to the tradition that came to be known as *Scholastics*, and also figure out the school within that tradition to which he has the greatest affinity: rhetorical, theological or Neoplatonic. One can understand such affiliations only after dealing with the working method of each particular method separately. It is important to understand whether Augustine uses them or not.

Over and above the methods of apophatic and cataphatic theological inquiry, that originate in the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus, we must deal with the methods developed and used by Plato, Cicero, Augustine, and partially Origen, in their philosophical and theological enquiries. Although ancient, these methods continue to be authoritative and exercise great influence on philosophy and theology of today. Therefore, it is inevitable that we deal with them in one form or other.

Plato developed *dialectics* as a method of philosophic inquiry, which aimed at ascending from the lower levels of earthly existence to its higher reaches with the help of *maieutics* (midwifery). It was a method of communicating with other members of the polis, designed so that each recognizes the truth with some correct guidance. Plato's Socrates is both gadfly and midwife. As gadfly, he does not allow citizens to slumber (over their opinions); as midwife, he helps his interlocutors through the labor of birthing the truth. Augustine's early philosophical pieces (of Cassiciacum) are composed in the form of a dialogue very like Plato's. In them we find that, although an etymological analysis is often at our disposal, it rarely provides a key to resolving the difficulties they raise. Etymology alone is like the sorcery of reading secret signs. In his exegesis of *Tim* 41ab, however, Augustine steers surprisingly clear of etymology.

Plato warns us that researching the topic of demiurgy is methodologically unrealistic. He says "To find the demiurge is hardly possible, but even having found him it is impossible to declare him to the people" (*Tim* 28 c5-6). Since contrary to Plato's warning, we still embarked on the subject of the demiurgy engaged in the process of speech, this project is doomed to fail: even if we managed to single out the aim of our inquiry, still the reader would never be able to grasp what it is about.

Plato claims that knowing the truth about the demiurge is incredibly difficult; even arriving at a true opinion about him, as best we can, is almost impossible for Plato. Yet there are many opinions on him, which we better not trust. These opinions appear in the world of becoming and will remain there. They cannot grasp the truth, but only passing insights on a passing reality. As the demiurge does not belong to this world, he cannot be approached by means of this world.

To tackle complex issues, Plato often employs allegories, which deliver the message of his philosophical system but in indirect fashion. E.g. *Allegory of the Sun* (*Republic* VI, 507c-509b), *Allegory of the Cave* (*Republic* VII, 514a-520a), *Myth of Er* (*Republic* X, 614b-621d), *Dyothima's Myth on Eros* (*Symposium* 201d-214d) i.e. Whether Plato's narrative *on the creation of the world* (*Timaeus* 29d-39d) is a myth remains unresolved since ancient times. Augustine's allegory of *Two Cities* in his most monumental treatise is comparable to Plato's use of allegory.

The latter issue complicates the methodology used to analyze elements of this narrative, of which *Tim* 41ab forms part. Due to the difficulty of representing Augustine's position on *Tim* 41ab, we also introduce a novel allegory – *Allegory of the Court Trial* (cf. *Exagoge*).

In Antiquity M.T.Cicero is one of the most significant rhetorical theoreticians.[18] Augustine came under his influence both through his education in the Carthago school of Rhetoric (Cicero was widely read there) but also through his own studies of Cicero's oeuvre, which resulted in his reading the now lost *Hortensius*,[19] the dialogue that embarked him on his spiritual search.

From a philosophical point of view the art of rhetoric was tantamount to sophistry, which is a philosophical position that equates truth with what people believe. In this light the truth appears to be totally subjective, as people may, and often do, believe many contradictory statements advanced by capable speakers. In such a system, the key feature is the technical element in the art of persuasion. This art is the ground for many professions such as law and politics. It is also an indispensible element in the training for these disciplines. Thus Rhetorics become an applied, as well as a vulgarized philosophy.[20] This rhetorical aspect plays a significant role in the present discussion, because the demiurge appears as a witty sophist but also because of the masterful use Augustine makes of the art of persuasion in his *City*.

Augustine was exemplary in the art of sophistry, having used it in all his polemics, not least in his polemic against the Neo-Platonists. This subjective element plays a significant role in our discussion. We have chosen to work with the allegory of the Court Trial mainly because the aim of the court trial is always to convince the jury, and success here is largely a matter of the attorney's ability.

In this work we partially use the methodological directory, composed by Augustine himself in his work on rhetorics with the title *de doctrina Christiana*. He is basing his views there on Cicero's methodology and suggesting that something of the kind be taken up by future generations of preachers.

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[18] M.T. Cicero , *De oratore libri III*. Kommentar von Anton D. Leeman, Harm Pinkster. Heidelberg . Winter, 1981-1996.

[19] In Madaura at the age of eleven Augustine read Cicero's *Hortensius* as the first treatise in philosophy which left a lasting impression on him. *Encyclopedia Americana*, Danbury. Grolier Incorporated, 1997. Vol.2. P. 685.

[20] E. Fantham: *The Roman World of Cicero's De Oratore*, Oxford University Press, 2007.

We treat *Tim* 41ab as if it were a sacral text (which indeed it was for the Neo-Platonists) out of respect for the tradition under discussion but also for its brilliant founder. Nevertheless, we realize that Augustine meant to apply his methodology first and foremost, if not exclusively, to biblical texts of the Christian tradition. Whether he thought it applicable to texts of pagan wisdom is uncertain.

Augustine was not alone in showing such rhetorical rigor. Origen, whom we also shortly touch upon in chapter six (on Theologians), also abstains from applying his preferred allegorical method of biblical exegesis to non-biblical texts. But his interpretation is somewhat simplistic and a bit too straightforward.

Porphyry, too, was also a methodologist of great importance in his time but also for generations to come: he was the writer who also wrote *Eisagoge* as a general introduction into logic (even though many scholars think that it is purely a commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*), which was a work of great significance in the Middle Ages. The methods of his work also influenced our research, albeit indirectly.

The title of our introduction is intentionally the same, whereas the title of conclusion (*exagoge*) is parallel to it:[21] first, in order to draw attention to the fact that it was Porphyry who started this all; secondly, in order to underline the confusion with the translation of this straightforward Greek word.

If our *eisagoge* is an introduction it is not yet clear what this introduction is an introduction to: that is to say, whether it is an introduction to Aristotle, to logic in general or to the universe of thinking. The ambiguity of the evident will be accompanying our work throughout.

[21] This structure has many a parallel: Xenophon's □νάβασις as ascension of the Greek army into Persia, and then Odysseus' κατά□ασις as a journey into the underworld , according to Homer (*Ilias*); *epistrophy* is one of the favorite Neoplatonic terms; the *return cycles* in Stoics, the *Ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen* in Niezsche (*Also sprach Zarathustra*, Zweiter Teil, 'Von der Erlösung'. P. 181).); Gospel's *return of the Prodigal* (Lk 10: 11-32). On a certain level this concerns the structure of our work: part One is our ascension with Augustine to the climax of his exegesis; part Two is a descent to the roots of his interpretation.

We will also deal with Porphyry's secret methodological principle according to which it is preferable in polemics not to mention your sources when criticizing your opponents for their internal contradictions. Augustine clearly learned this from Porphyry in the course of his discussion with him. Consider, for example, how when Augustine fights in favor of the Christian theory of resurrection he refers to Plato's text, not to the Bible or the Apologists.

0.4. 2. Contemporary Methods

In the apophatic sense we deal with some famous methods of philosophical and anthropological analysis, such as phenomenology, philosophic hermeneutics, constructivism and deconstructivism. Actually, we do not use them at all. In the cataphatic sense, at the outset, we attempted to use, as far it was possible, two methods of analysis: *historic-critical* and *textology*. In other words, *higher criticism* and *lower criticism* as these methods were known in the 18th century. We then move to some other research methods.

With regards to the elements of historical criticism (*historico-critical* method), it is important to define the *sensus literalis historicus* of the text in question. This is one of many very ambiguous, in some ways mystical, texts. Continuing this way, the project turns into a rather unrealistic mission.

One can already trace some elements of such a method in the Antiochean School of biblical exegesis, the most famous representative of which is John Chrysostom. We keep in mind the paradoxical title of our thesis, in the belief that it is the key to *Tim* 41ab, the meaning of which appears to be different in Plato, Cicero and Augustine (in fact this list is much longer as we shall see in part two).

The original text(s) interest us only in so far as (a) they are the grounds for Augustine's familiarity with *Tim* 41ab, and (b) they also exercised a certain influence upon his thought. However, this method is hard to use adequately in our work. It presupposes some principles, which obscure rather than clarify the difficulties we confront.

For instance, consider the following two basic principles: one affirming a unified and universal reality as present everywhere; the second

– the omnipresent accessibility of such a reality to human reason.[22.] Contrary to this, our text has aspects of a mystical character, therefore it is doubtful whether the reality, which this text is declaring is universal, to say nothing of being accessible to our research capacities. Plato also denies it,[23] and so this research expands far beyond the framework of this limited method.

Moreover, since we are dealing with a text of a partially theological and a partially philosophical character, we have to turn to some other non-biblical research methods.

Concerning the authors of the 'original versions' of *Tim* 41ab, the three great researchers of the last century are: Adolf von Harnack (beginning of the 20th century), Maurice Testard (mid 20th century), and Luc Brisson (end of the 20th century). All three of them had a substantial influence upon the present project. A. von Harnack on Porphyry and anti-Christian polemic,[24] M.Testard – on Cicero and Augustine,[25] and finally, L.Brisson - on Plato and Platonism, especially its *Neo*- version.[26]

[22] Soulen, Richard N., Kendall, *Handbook of biblical criticism* (3rd ed.). Louisville. Westminster John Knox Press. 2001. P. 78.

[23] *To find the demiurge is hardly possible, but even having found him it is impossible to declare him to the people.* (V.Y.). *Tim* 28c5-6.

[24] A. von Harnack, *Porphyrius, Gegen die Christen. 15 Buechen. Zeugnisse, Fragmente und Referate*, in Abhandlungen der koeniglich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. 1916. Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Nr 1. Berlin. 1916.

[25] M.Testard, *Saint Augustin et Cicéro*. Paris. *Etudes Augustiniennes*. 1958.

[26] L.Brisson, *Le même et l'autre dans la structure ontologique du Timée de Platon. Un commentaire systématique du Timée de Platon*. Academia Verlag. Sankt Augustin. Tuebingen. 1998.

In our epoch of critical editions a typical high value project ends up with a publication in two volumes: part one – publication of the original text, part two - commentary. E.g. a two-volume Le Monogénèse by R. Goulet,[27] a leading contemporary scholar on Porphyry's anti-Christian debate. Accidentally, our work also consists of two major parts: the first is a kind of immersion into the material, the second – is objectivising.

However, the majority of these editions deal with one larger, easily definable piece of work. For the method, as well as for the research material, another classical yet somewhat out-dated example is *Cicéro et Saint Augustin* by M. Testard. This publication is also two-volume clear-cut: one volume text, another volume – analysis.[28]

What was methodologically useful for us in M.Tesard's research was that its first part is dedicated to the material and also includes scattered extracts from Augustine's entire corpus,[29] which needs to be approached attentively. Another great inspiration for us was and still is Luc Brisson, one of the greatest scholars in Neo-Platonism.

Despite L. Brisson's mastery in modern studies, he trusts the Neo-Platonists' judgment on Plato surprisingly often. He believes they understood their origins better than anyone else throughout history, the majority of modern scholars included.[30] Following Brisson, we decided to turn to Augustine's contemporaries for an evaluation of Augustine's reading of *Tim* 41ab, thinking we will otherwise be projecting a vision from another epoch on to his work. We think it is somewhat unrealistic to look for an objective comprehension of such a secretive and ambiguous text, which may in fact be incomprehensible in the last analysis.

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[27] Macarios de Magnésie, *Le Monogénès*. Edition critique et traduction française par R.Goulet. Paris. Vrin. 2003.

[28] *Cicéro dans la formation et dans l'oeuvre de Saint Augustin*. Vol. I, in M.Testard, *Saint Augustin et Cicéro*. Paris. Etudes Augustiniennes. 1958.

[29] Especially volume II. *Répertoire des texts*, in M.Testard, *Saint Augustin et Cicéro*. Paris. *Etudes Augustiniennes*. 1958.

[30] This methodological principle of trust to the ancient sources is realized in an interesting fashion in his book on the *Big Bang theory*- from the point of view of *Timaeus* and the modern Physics. Part One is written by L.Brisson, Part Two by W.Meyerstein, a physicyst. Cf. *Inventing the Universe. Plato's Timaeus, the Big Bang, and the problem of scientific knowledge.* State University of New York Press. 1995.

Since the text which is the object of our study is a recorded speech, we partially deal with research results of the communication theory by Roman Jakobson, especially his seemingly obvious division of the communication system into *sender*, *receiver*, and *message*. On the level of *message* we also come across other components, such as *context*, *channel* and *code*, that profoundly affect communication, and the existence of which was previously ignored.[31] E.g. in communicating the resurrection theory the *fenix* figure has been borrowed from Egyptian mythology and extensively used in Christianity as a symbol of eternal revival, and subsequently became indispensible in delivering a resurrection message.[32] In *exagoge* we will also use an allegory of the *Court Trial* in attempt to convey the complexity of issues presented by this research. The importance of examining each of the elements of the speech separately comes forth in our study. The usual drawback with this theory for the present application is that R. Jacobson's research was meant for the human communication. The speech under examination was meant to be divine: addressed by God to the gods. This complicates and simplifies the issue in many ways, it is also the case with the *historic-critical* method, both of which have a bit of a positivist accent, which we can not afford.

Our research was also influenced methodologically by *The Golden Bough*, a classic of the 19th century by Sir James G. Fraser. In it, Frazer draws impressive culturological conclusions concerning the meaning and origins of religion on the basis of one single case, of the Greek priest-king at the Fane of Nemi, murdered ritually by his successor.[33]

J.G. Fraser's approach is a kind of key that opens all doors. According to Fraser, the treasure trove to be opened is religion; for us, it is Augustine's

[31] R.Jakobson, *The Framework of language*. Michigan: Ann Arbor. 1980. P.211.

[32] P.-A. Deproost, *Les métamorphoses du phénix dans le christianisme ancient,* in *Folia Electronica Classica* (Louvain-la-Neuve): 8 - juillet-décembre 2004, Louvain (Louvain-la-Neuve).

[33] Fraser, Sir James George, *The Golden Bough*. Dover. 2002. This methodology of expansion from a single case up to many-faced phenomenon allowed to turn a two-volume book (1890) into voluminous publication of twelve parts (1915).

Plato. Although my position is different from Fraser's, [34] which was taken up in the heyday of positivism,[35] we, too, have striven to make a single case study representative for a whole system. As Fraser believed one myth can unlock all religious phenomena, we also think that one passage from Plato may serve as a key to Augustine's Platonism.

Likewise Karl Popper, a great expert in the methodology of science, calls this an *inductive* as opposed to the *deductive* method of scientific discovery: the latter is the method of drawing scientific conclusions on the basis of an intimate knowledge of all cases that belong to the system, the former, the method of drawing conclusions on the basis of a limited number cases.[36] We also venture to draw certain conclusions concerning Augustine's Platonism based on his familiarity with one single passage from *Timaeus*. We also draw certain conclusions concerning the Neoplatonic-Christian polemic based on the examination of certain elements in a single theory: the doctrine of the bodily resurrection.

We apply a basic *ad hoc* methodological principle, also introduced by K. Popper, which refers to a driving force behind scientific discoveries. According to K. Popper, an *ad hoc* case is an element, which is objectively taken from and representative of the examined material, yet contradicting the acknowledged theories on any given subject matter.[37] An *ad hoc* element is the driving force behind many discoveries, as it tends either to dismantle an old system or confirm it at a deeper and more comprehensive level (e.g. I. Newton's Physics as it was superseded by A. Einstein's relativity theory).[38] Similarly, in our research we take the *ad hoc* case of Augustine's

[34] We came in touch with J.G. Fraser's book during the Soviet period when Russia was an atheist country, where such material was promoted as scientific with the intention of reducing religion to a mere cultural phenomenon.

[35] Accidentally, L.Feuerbach, who also created a sort of philosophy of religion after an anthropomorphic pattern, and thereby significantly influenced Marxist philosophy, also wrote in the time. Cf. L.Feuerbach, *Erläuterungen und Ergänzungen zum Wesen des Christenthums* (1846) and especially *Das Wesen der Religion* Leipzig. Druck der Spamerschen Buchdruckerei, 1913 (1846).

[36] K.Popper, *Logik der Forschung*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 1989.

[37] K.Popper, *All life is Problem Solving*, London: Routledge. 1999.

[38] Curiously, K.Popper's application of his theory became exemplary in the study of Plato, whom he declared as a proponent of totalitarian regimes, and enemy to his beloved open liberal society approaching closely Communist theory, whereas K.Popper also refused to call

Tim 41ab, which, although appearing at first glance to represent the whole system of Augustine's Platonism, actually raises serious questions about whether Augustine was really a Platonist.

Our methodology has also been deeply affected by Martin Heidegger's *culturology*, (which is only partially linked to his phenomenology and existentialism). One of his claims is that language is polluted by alien, philosophical terms that tend to obstruct or distort reality. For example, notions such as '*subject*', '*object*', '*truth*', '*art*' ,[39] marked by modernity through the influence of Descartes, brought us around to thinking in a certain predetermined fashion.

According to Heidegger, the first thinker of this kind in the history of European culture was Socrates, who created a rigorously determined terminological system. His disciple, Plato dogmatized this language of the frozen world of predetermined notions.[40] Platonism thus entered the scene as a significant philosophical school and way of thinking.[41]

It is easy to spot its representatives in accordance with their terminology, or more simply put, the way they express themselves. Not only are the Platonists of different periods, such as Porphyry, among them, but also many a Christian, Augustine being a case in point. This also happens via determined terminology to the philosophy of other thinkers. For instance, Cicero contemplates the world around him through a Stoic lens, whereas Augustine whose thinking is marked with his convictions, spots a hidden Christian message everywhere, even in pagan Antiquity.

Communism and Psycho-analysis as scientific theories simply because they are unfalsifyable and therefore the *ad hoc* case is not applicable to them at all, and thus they are in principle irrefutable. Cf. K.Popper, *Open society and its enemies*. London. Routledge. 1945. Vol. 1. Cf. Section 'The spell of Plato'. Curiously, also Porphyry came out with a similar argument against the Christians on the account of their indoctrinations, claiming that the Christians never listen to the argument. Cf. B.Proudon, *Le fragment 78 Harnack (101 Ramos Jurado) du Contra Christianos de Porphyre et la question de la "tolerance" chrétienne d'après Ex 22, 27* LXX. Pp. 183-205, in *Le Traité de Porphyre Contre les Chrétiens*. Ed. S.Morlet. Paris. 2011.

[39] M.Heidegger, *Was heißt Denken?* Reclam (1951–1952), Ditzingen 1992; M.Heidegger, "Die Frage nach der Technik", in Gesamtausgabe. Vol.7. 1949.

[40] M.Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 14. A. (1950–1959). 2007.

[41] Chr. Fynsk, *Heidegger: Thought and Historicity.* Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell university press, 1986.

A language, polluted with the terminology of a certain philosophical system, pushes us to think within the framework of a polluted system. Plato's terminology channels us to think *platonically*, Cicero's terminology makes us think *stoically*; likewise, Augustine's exegetical terminology initiates the reader into Christian circles. The seemingly free individual falls within a certain framework with its tricky linguistic traps.

Therefore, the detective work of a historian consists in exposing these language traps, set within the complex system of a determined terminology. The later Heidegger, although still a great connoisseur of the Greek and Latin Antiquity, is determined to read J. Hölderlin exclusively in *Schwabisch-Deutsch* as the language where he felt most free.[42] He calls for the liberation from these terminological fetters in the hope of catching a glimpse of his *Sein* reality with a fresh, childlike and unbiased look. We attempt to follow this path with a fresh, guided tour of *Tim* 41ab, not into *Kulturgeschichte* but the way it stands, without ideological and terminological fetters.[43] This text is in front of you.

[42] M.Heidegger, *Hölderlins Hymne »Der Ister«*, Gesamtausgabe .Vol. 53. 1942 (published 1984).

[43] R.Lutz, *Geschichtswissenschaft der Extreme. Theorien, Methoden, Tendenzen von 1900 bis zur Gegenwart*. C. H. Beck, München 2003. P. 233.

0.4.3. Tools

Besides the sources mentioned above, as well as the resources, which are to be found in the bibliography, we will presently mention a few key research tools, which these days are indispensible in our field(s).

First, we were working with the rich KULeuven and UCLouvain-la-Neuve library collections, first and foremost of the Theology Faculty (Maurits Sabbe bibliotheek) and the Institute of Philosophy (HIW) as well as the Augustine's Institute (Heverlee) both in the domain of Augustinian studies and the study of Neo-Platonism. This concerns both sources in original (*critical editions*) translations, as well as secondary literature, especially in *Corpus Christianorum*, *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* and *Sources Chrétiens*.

Secondly, in Augustinian Studies there is large number of tools for working with secondary literature, especially, an impressively accessible and modern specialized Encyclopedia *Augustine through Ages* (to the point, typically Anglo-Saxon) as well as an hitherto unfinished voluminous *Augustinus Lexicon* (expansive, typically German), out of which only the three first volumes have come out so far (not surprising considering the current economic climate).

Third, there are valuable Electronic resources available at our disposal: *TLG* (*Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*) on the Greek sources, and also *PLD* (*Patrologia Latina Database*) on the Latin ecclesiastical sources. These contain inexhaustive material, easily operatible with a search machine that allows identifying material within seconds. In the past this often required very hard labour, which also produced a number of great erudite scholars who, alas, have lost their importance these days.[44] In the time of the

[44] In the second part of the 20th century there was a domain of university projects, which were exclusively busy with the publication of *Concordances* – impressive collections of the parallels within the Bible as well as some other sources. These days these voluminous editions came in complete disuse: that what the entire university teams were busy composing for years, these days a computer search machine can achieve within seconds. E.g. *Synoptic Concordance to the Novum Testamentum Graece.* Five Volumes. Berlin, New York. De Gruyter. 1999. We expect that the year 2000 marks the end of this Concordance research times in a classical book form giving way to the electronic resources.

internet we naturally use the electronic resources such as *Google Books*.[45] Today not only dummies but also some scholars-debutants like myself, must pay tribute to *Wikipedia* for enabling a quick basic search into the unknown.

0.5. Structure

At the core, this research is dedicated to a single text, used for polemic purposes against Porphyry criticizing the Christians on the issue of bodily resurrection. Since there are always two biased parties in every polemic, in complete disagreement with each other, it is important to listen carefully to their positions, for finding out who is right and who is not, without drawing any overhasty conclusions.

This is what this research aims at. Nevertheless, we are not doing an evaluation on the basis of our own convictions, or an objectivizing analysis of the advanced arguments, but assessing two sometimes opposing traditions, to which Porphyry and Augustine as the main representatives of the polemic belonged respectively. But this turns out to be insufficient in due course because a third party also became intentionally involved.

Therefore, we have had to use another supplement to the polemic from the point of view of another 'objective' philosophical position, namely Stoicism, which entered the picture through Augustine's choice of translation.

The present study has the following structure. In general terms, it somewhat resembles a classical rhetorical discourse: initial *Challenge* (*preliminary chapter*), *Response* (*part I*), *Evaluation* (*part II*), terminating with *Post-Evaluation* (*conclusive chapter*). It also aims to obtain certain similarities with an interaction, described by Plato in our passage. A preliminary chapter presents Porphyry's attack on the Christian teaching of the bodily resurrection.

Part One is a presentation of Augustine's response to the accusations of an established Neo-Platonist with the help of one single quote from Plato, this being an ingenious move of an experienced polemicist. This part

[45] The main disadvantage of this is a lack of access to all sections of a requested source.

includes three chapters: material (*chapter two*), examination (*chapter three*), and the place of this examined material in Augustine's Platonism (*chapter four*).

Part Two is an attempt at evaluation of the examined material, introduced in Part One. We attempt at objectivizing the present polemic, without the need to enter our own, equally subjective opinions concerning the topic under discussion. We emphasized the philosophical and theological origins of the participants involved, namely, the Neoplatonic tradition of *Tim* 41ab exegesis (*chapter Six*), as well as its use by the theologians preceding Augustine (*chapter Seven*).

The key element in our evaluation is an assessment of Augustine's knowledge of Plato's original text but also of Cicero's translation into Latin (*chapter five*). In a post-evaluative chapter (chapter eight) we will examine the consequences of Augustine's use of the Cicero's stoicised translation for Augustine's interpretation. The *exagoge* will lead our way out with an Allegory summarizing our achievements. The reader will have to decide for himself whether or not we did a careful evaluation.

AUGUSTINE's TIMAEUS 41AB

PRELIMINARY CHAPTER:

CHALLENGE:

PORPHYRY VERSUS RESURRECTION TOWARDS AUGUSTINE P.27

1.0 .INTRODUCTION: BEGINNING P.27

1.1. THE NEO-PLATONISTS' ARGUMENTS AGAINST RESURRECTION ON: P.28

NATURAL ORDER (I)

DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE (II)

APOCALYPTIC SCENARIO (III)

MORAL OBJECTIONS (IV)

MISCELLANEOUS OBJECTIONS (V)

1.2. SOURCES: MACARIUS,AUGUSTINE, TIM 41 AB P.34

1.3. PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE POLEMICS P.38

1.4. CONCLUSION: OPENINGS P.41

Preliminary Chapter:
Challenge:
Porphyry versus Resurrection towards Augustine

1.0. Introduction: Beginning

In the workshop dedicated to Augustine's *City of God* at the XVth Patristics conference a hot debate was held around one of the surviving fragments attributed to Porphyry's book *against the Christians*.[1] Citing an Apollo oracle, Porphyry says that it does not make sense to debate with the Christians about their faith, as they do not listen to your arguments any way.[2] During the discussion the participants were sharply divided: one group supported Porphyry, the other was critical. It became clear that Porphyry touched a soft spot

In this chapter we will evaluate Porphyry's claim with regards to the discussion of one single Christian doctrine: the theory of resurrection.[3] We will examine Porphyry's criticism and Augustine's response. My thesis is that Augustine was only partially familiar with Porphyry's critique and that he found it more appropriate to cite Plato's *Timaeus* than the Bible in his response to the *paganus*.[4]

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[1] We deliberately put this 'title' in the miniscule letters since it could have been a descriptive one. When Augustine mentions Plato's book *on the creation of the world* (*de creatione mundi, ep. 102.8.*), he actually refers to the *Timaeus*, the dialogue dedicated to the creation of the world. Augustine does not mean that the title of the book is *On the creation of the world*. Plato never wrote a book with such a title, and Augustine must have known this, as he refers to the *Timaeus* title in other places. A similar story is also with Porphyry's book usually referred to as *Against the Christians*: perhaps *The philosophy from oracles* was a book *against the Christians*. The former also contains a section *on the descent of the soul* (*de regressu animae*), which was wrongly taken for the title of a book, as J.O'Meara convincingly proved it.

[2] "Forte magis poteris in aequa impressis litteris scribere aunt adinflans leves pinnas per aera avis volare, quam pollutae revoces impiae uxoris sensus" (XIX, xxiii, 7-10): "Perhaps you may more easily write in lasting letters on water, or spread light wings and fly like a bird through the air, than recall an impious wife who has once polluted herself (with a Christian faith – *v.y.*)". Augustine, *De civitate dei* (*infra* referred to as *civ.dei*) XIX, 23. Translation by G.G.Walsh, D.J. Honan. P. 236.

[3] Augustine, *civ.dei*, XXII, xviii.

[4] I have launched the discussion on this topic in my article in the *Studia Patristica* and tried to challenge the widespread opinion that Augustine was well acquainted with Plato

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the importance of *Tim* 41ab in Augustine's objections to Porphyry's theory of the resurrection of the body. It consists of three sub-chapters: in the first one we briefly reconstruct the main arguments against the resurrection of the body. We attempt to do so as systematically as possible by dividing the material into seventeen arguments grouped in five sections. In the second sub-chapter we deal with the two main sources for these arguments: Macarius Magnes and Augustine, attempting to demonstrate that the latter regularly uses *Tim* 41 ab in this polemics. In the third sub-chapter we do a preliminary evaluation of Augustine's polemics against the Neo-Platonists concerning the bodily resurrection.

1.1. The Neoplatonists's arguments against Resurrection

We will now briefly examine the Neoplatonist line of argument against the resurrection theory. The arguments that most probably stem from Porphyry, which I was able to identify, came down to us either from *Apocriticus* or *Monogenese* by Macarius Magnes[5] as well as from Augustine's oeuvre.[6] When we put the texts of these two authors next to each other, we can make a number of interesting observations. We will consider them in the following section. Since there is no scholarly consensus concerning the identity of the philosopher, criticized by Macarius, we will call him in anonymous fashion, the Philosopher, the way Macarius called him as well.[7]

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and Plato's way of thinking.Cf. V.Yudin, *Refuting Porphyry with Plato. Augustine's reading of* Tim*. 41 a-b*, in *Studia Patristica*, ed. F.Young, M.Edwards, P.Parvis (Leuven, 2004). Pp. 331-335.

[5] Macarios de Magnésie, *Le Monogénès*. Edition critique et traduction française par R.Goulet. Paris. Vrin. 2003. In fact, R.Goulet has a rather subtle position. He does not think that the text cited by Macarius consists of literal quotations from Porphyry, yet he admits that the arguments behind the quotations might well have Porphyry as a source. Vol. I. Pp. 134-135.

[6] Sermones 241, 242, epistula 102, de consensu evangelistarum I, de doctrina Christiana III, civ.dei XII, XIII, XXII.

[7] In fact, Macarius mainly names him as᾽ Ελλην, a Hellen, the Greek, thereby pointing out the pagan convictions of his opponent.

We identified seventeen arguments in connection with this particular doctrine. We grouped them in five following sections: objections concerning the natural order (I), objections against the divine omnipotence (II), objections against the apocalyptic scenario (III), moral objections (IV), and finally, miscellaneous objections (V).[8]

The majority of these arguments can be found in A. von Harnack's ever up-to-date *Porphyrius: Gegen die Christen*: *15 Büchen*.[9] Harnack's fragment 94 exclusively focuses upon the resurrection theory, and it is extremely intense contentwise.[10] For the sake of clarity we have split this fragment into ten major sections, each of them introducing a new argument. Furthermore, fragments 35, 64 and 88 in Harnack's division contain references to ἀνάστασις as well,[11] and therefore ought to be treated separately.

Let us examine the content of these arguments. The first set of objections concerns the natural order (I). First of all, since nature and its laws were established by God himself, they must be eternal and unchanging. However, the resurrection does not belong to this natural order. It is unnatural as it presupposes some kind of eternity of the flesh. Therefore it is impossible (I.1.).[12] Secondly, according to the resurrection theory, the natural order, which is established by God the creator, needs an improvement and alteration by means of resurrection.[13] It requires his personal intervention, since he is the only one who could achieve it. This means that the creator's universe, being the result of his own activity, is still imperfect, and he is expected to do the repairs. If he could not predict a possible flaw in his creation the creator must be imperfect too. This is absurd, therefore the resurrection theory is wrong (I.2.). Third, it is impossible to reassemble a body which has deceased and decayed a long time ago. For instance, imagine a body of a man who drowned in a shipwreck and was eaten by the fish. Then the fishermen caught and ate the

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[8] Cf. Infra: Addendix I for an overview of the argumentation in a scheme.

[9] Berlin, 1926: *infra* referred to as *CC*. In his study *Porphyry against the Christians* (Leiden-Boston, 2005), R.M. Berchman made an English translation of the fragments and classified them historically instead of doctrinally, the way it had been done by A. von Harnack. However, I doubt whether the new fragments Berchman added have much to do with *Contra Christianos*.

[10] Cf. also R.Goulet. Op.cit. Vol. II. Pp. 344-360 (fragment 220).

[11] The word ἀνάστασις and its derivatives appear ten times in Macarius's fragments from the Philosopher.

[12] *CC*, fr. 94: 7-13; *sermo* 242 (5).

[13] *CC*, fr. 94: 5 - 7.

fish. Next, the wild dogs attacked, killed and ate the fishermen. Finally, when the dogs died, the vultures came down and ate the decayed bodies of the dogs. Clearly, reassembling the body of the first man is an impossible affair, since it has changed locations five times, and it is scattered all over by now. Its re-assemblance is against the natural order. This argument has many variations, the one to which Agustine regularly comes back in the course of book XXII of civ.dei concerns the cannibalism, which happens in circumstances of extreme hunger. The question is whether or not the flesh of an eaten and consumed person could be possibly restored to its primal condition (I.3.).[14] Fourth, it is impossible for the creatures whose natural habitat is one particular element to inhabit the domain of another element. E.g. the fish inhabit water and cannot survive in the air or on earth. Neither can a cat fly or swim. Thus human bodies whose natural habitat is earth (first element) cannot reach into heaven (last element). Therefore, resurrection which requires such traversing of the elements is impossible (I.4.).[15]

Porphyry predicts a response to this set of arguments. "But you would say that nothing is impossible with God".[16] He realises that the reference to God's omnipotence must appear a sufficient reply. Therefore, he offers the second set of objections, this time refuting God's omnipotence (II). These consist of historical, mathematical and ethical arguments. According to the *historical* argument (II.1.), God cannot reverse past events. Two examples are offered: (a) God cannot make it undone that Homer was a poet; (b) he cannot bring it about that Troy should not fall.[17] God is not in control over the past. That what has happened has irreversibly happened. According to the *mathematical* argument (II.2.), God cannot alter the eternal laws of mathematics even if he wanted to. E.g. he cannot make 2x2=100 instead of 4.[18] Porphyry claims that the laws of mathematics are unchanging. God has to contemplate these laws himself. They are not in his power. The *ethical*

[14] *CC*, fr. 94: 8 - 23; *civ. dei*, XXII, 12, *civ. dei*, XXII, 20-21, *civ. dei*, XXII, 28.
[15] *CC*, fr. 35; *sermo* 242 (5), *civ.dei* XIII, 17; XXII, 4; XXII, 11.
[16] *CC*, fr. 94: 25-26.
[17] *CC*, fr. 94: 23-25.
[18] *CC*, fr. 94: 25-28; *de doctrina Christiana* 3, 38, 56..

objection (II.3.) asserts that God cannot become evil, even if he wishes so. Thus, being good by nature he cannot be evil.[19] He neither can sin (a), nor lie (b) nor deceive (c).[20] Therefore, he is not omnipotent.[21]

Section III includes three objections against the apocalyptic scenario: demiurgic, aesthetic and apocalyptic as such. The demiurgic objection (III, 1)[22] says that God, being the author of the universe as his creation, would not wish his work to be destroyed. That is what the Christians seem to claim in their theory of the end of the world. The aesthetic objection (III, 2) says that God would not want to have the most beautiful things to be destroyed. He would not want to stand by helpless watching the stars fall down, since nobody has ever imagined anything more beautiful than the starry sky.[23] The apocalyptic objection (III, 3) claims that the resurrection in the form perceived by the Christians, namely, as the resurrection of all ἀποκαταστάσις πάντων, *Acts* 21, dead and alive, all those who existed from the beginning of manhood, would cause a space shortage crisis.[24] There will be far too many people for the planet to accommodate than it would actually be capable of providing. Seeing these absurdities in the apocalyptic scenario, the resurrection, based on such a scenario, is impossible.

Section IV includes moral objections to the resurrection theory. In fact, we have already dealt with some objections of an ethical nature in section II concerning the creator's omnipotence. However, it was the ethics questioning our right to address the issues of the divine goodness. In this section we will deal with the issues concerning moral responsibilities of the humans. The objection IV.1. is about the idea of the resurrection of all. Resurrection, if it really takes place, must be viewed as a reward for the righteous life of a good man, and not of an evil man. It is wrong to speak about the resurrection of all bodies, as the Christians do. Perhaps a few worthy individuals deserve it. However, the majority of the people who die don't. Why then would God take care of bringing them all back to life? The resurrection of all contradicts divine goodness.[25] Therefore, it is

[19] *CC*, fr. 94: 24 – 95: 1.
[20] *civ.dei* V, 10, *civ.dei* XXII, 1, *civ.dei* XXII, 25.
[21] Note that the Philosopher does not claim the unchanging character of the moral laws, as the Judaeo-Christian tradition does. His focus is upon the divine goodness.
[22] *CC*, fr. 94.30 - 94.34.
[23] *CC*, fr. 94.32 - 94.32.
[24] *CC*, fr. 95.3 - 95.7.
[25] *CC*, fr. 94: 33 – 95: 2.

impossible. (IV.1.). The next objection also concerns moral criticism (IV, 2), this time in connection to another aspect. It affirms that the promise of resurrection and eternal life gives licence to a promiscuous life-style to those who believe it.[26] And indeed, why does one need to make an effort, if the outcome is the same for everyone, good or bad? If one does not have to do an effort, one usually does not. Or even worse, one chooses for a hedonistic life-attitude, embracing any kind of enjoyment that one comes across.

Section V includes four miscellaneous objections: different kinds of resurrection (V, 3)[27], trustworthy evidence (V, 1),[28] the reason for the popularity of the resurrection theory (V, 2),[29] and concerning prophecies (V, 4)[30].

Objection concerning different kinds of resurrection (V, 1) raises the issue of whether or not we are talking about the same notion, when we choose to apply it to different instances.[31] There must be at least two sorts of resurrection: the one of Jesus (a), and another of the rest of men (b). Jesus was born without the seed, so his case is completely different from those who were born with the seed of man, by the mechanism of the natural conception. The former case is unique, and therefore it is difficult to speak about its precise mechanism. In the latter case we also have to distinguish the resurrection of someone, like Lazarus (b2), whose resurrection followed four days after his death, and thus whose body was still in a relatively good shape, from the resurrection of someone like Nestor or Priam (b3), who died centuries ago, and whose bodies are already completely decayed. In the case *b2* the resurrection does not mean the restoration of the disintegrated body, whereas case *b3* implies precisely this. For the sake of classification I would add here another sub-argument, *b1*, which is not mentioned by the Philosopher: the case of a clinical death,

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[26] *CC*, fr. 88.
[27] *CC* fr. 94.10 - 94.17; *Ep.* 102. fr. 92. arg.1.
[28] *CC*, fr. 64.
[29] *CC*, fr. 25; *civ. dei*, XXII, 5, 7-8; XXII, 25.
[30] *Ep.* 102. Harnack fr. 92. arg.6.
[31] *CC* fr. 94.10 - 94.17; *Ep.* 102. fr. 92. arg.1.

namely, of someone who dies but a couple of hours later comes back to life. This type of 'death' does not really require a resurrection in the sense we are dealing with. This 'resurrection' is a kind of 'come back' to life without really quitting it. That is what makes the resurrection of Lazarus, who died four days and was buried before Christ brought him back to life, a real miracle.

The objection concerning trustworthy evidence (V, 21)[32] raises the issue of whether or not we can trust the evidence of the Gospel characters (a), as well as the textual evidence of its writers (b). Apparently, after his resurrection Jesus chose to appear to no-one better than "Mary Magdalene, a prostitute, who came from some horrible little village and had been possessed by seven demons, and also another Mary, probably a peasant woman, whose evidence is of no account".[33] The Philosopher questions whether these women were capable at all of relating their experience adequately. Was it really resurrection that they encountered, and not something else? Did they not project their expectations upon reality? Were they in an adequate psychological state of mind? This problem doubles if we remember the fact that those who spread the news about the resurrection were simple fishermen, who could not present the story correctly. Finally, the problem triples when we realize that the written evidence concerning the resurrection stems from the pen of someone who was young at the time of the events that took place and wrote them down much later; in the case of Luke and Marc we are dealing with the evidence of writers who were not present at the related events. Matthew was the only writer who was both educated (a tax collector) and present at the time of the described 'facts'.

Argument V.3. concerns Peter's sorcery, who supposedly used black magic to convince the crowd about the truth of the resurrection. It can be spotted not only in Macarius but also in *civ. dei*, XXII, 25. Argument V.4. criticising the truthfulness of the account on Jona's survival in the belly of a monster fish for three days (Jonah 1, 2) as a prophecy for the resurrection of Christ who survived in the belly of death for three days appears both in Augustine (Ep.102) and Macarius (arg.6, fr.92). Augustine finds its difficult that the great philosopher came up with such a primitive objection. That is why he says that it was advanced by 'another Porphyry'.

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[32] *CC*, fr. 64.
[33] *Apocriticus*. II, 12-15. J.R. Hoffman, p. 34; *Epistola* 102, 6, 32..

1.2. Sources: Macarius, Augustine, *Tim* 41ab

As we have already said elsewhere, the above-mentioned arguments against the bodily resurrection originate from two sources: Macarius Magnes and Augustine. However, nobody yet noticed the role of Plato's *Tim* 41ab in this polemics. A number of scholars ascribe them to Porphyry,[34] others object. [35] At any rate, these arguments are of a unique character, having been raised by a certain philosopher or philosophers against the Christians.

The interpretation presently attempted here is consistent, in our view, with the reconstruction of the philosophers' attack against bodily resurrection, based on a combined comparison of the two sources. Yet, not all the arguments coincide there. Almost half of them (8 out of 17) reappear both in Macarius and Augustine. [36] Some appear exclusively in Macarius,[37] others exclusively in Augustine..[38]We find the majority of them in Philosopher (15 out of 17) and more than half of them in Augustine (10 out of 17).

In the light of this analysis A.Harnack's selection still needs to be completed. For instance, the argument concerning traversing the elements surprisingly originates from the Philosopher, cited by Macarius' *Apocriticus* in fr. 35, but we can also find it in several passages by Augustine, both in his

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[34] A.Harnack, J.R.Hoffmann, R.M.Berchmann.

[35] F.Crafer, T.Barnes, P.F. Beatrice. The latter suggests that the entire Augustine's familiarity with Porphyry's anti-Christian stance comes from *de pholosophia ex oraculis*, and not directly from *CC*. In his view this treatise must be a kind of compendium from different Platonists, himself included. If this is correct, this may explain how it happens that Augustine is familiar with some objections against the resurrection but not with all of them. Cf. P.F. Beatrice, "Quosdam Platonicorum Libros: the Platonic readings of Augustine in Milan", in *Vigilae Christianae* 43 (1998): 248-81. More recently, Mark Edwards also argues against the existence of CC. M.Edwards, *Porphyry, Against the Christians*, in *Studies on Porphyry*. Ed. G.Karamanolis, A. Sheppad. London. 2007. Pp. 101-126.

[36] I, 1.; I.3.; I,4; I, 5; II, 2; II, 3; II, 2; IV, 2; IV, 4.

[37] I, 1.; I.3.; I,4; I, 5; II, 2; II, 3; II, 2; IV, 2; IV, 4.

[38] IV, 1; IV, 3.

sermones and *civ.dei*. This objection is Stoic, rather than Neoplatonic, in origin. We can also trace it back to the Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *de mundo*. It seems Porphyry did use it after all, although the argument is a bit rough for the subtle mind of a Neoplatonist. Argument V.3. concerns Peter's sorcery, who supposedly used black magic to convince the crowd of the truth of the resurrection. It can be spotted not only in Macarius but also in *civ. dei*, XXII, 25. A.Harnack did not notice that the objection concerning a trustworthy evidence (V, 21) concerns the resurrection evidence.

What is important is that the arguments from each group appear in both authors, since the main picture is present in each of them, each of them is close to the other.[39] E.g. I.3. and II.3. Argument I.3. on shipwreck (Macarius)/ cannibalism (Augustine) occupies the largest space: it appears at least thrice in Augustine, [40] and only once in Macarius,[41] yet in Macarius the passage is the longest.[42] This populist and somewhat vulgar argument has not been introduced by Porphyry: it has an ancient origin: the Apologists already dealt with it.

We consider the ethical argument against the divine omnipotence II.3, which is also of an ancient origin, [43] to be the most interesting one from the philosophical standpoint. It is at the focus of the Philosopher's discussion,[44] appearing numerous times in Augustine's *civ.dei*.[45] Yet, the latter discusses it not so much in his polemics on resurrection, as in his debate on necessity with the Stoics. [46] Nevertheless, Augustine's arguments used there equally apply to the resurrection theory.

Although both Macarius and Augustine lived and worked roughly at the same period,[47] we have no evidence of *Apocritucus'* translation into Latin. This simply means that Augustine had no direct knowledge of it. A

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[39] Macarius: all except IV.1 and IV.4.; Augustine: all except I.2., II.1; III.1., III.3., IV.5.
[40] *civ. dei*, XXII, 12, *civ. dei*, XXII, 20-21, *civ. dei*, XXII, 28.
[41] *CC*, fr. 94: 8 – 23.
[42] A quarter of the entire fragment on resurrection, fr 94 (A.Harnack), in R.Goulet, 24a, 3: 5-17.
[43] Cf. Athenagoras, *de resurectione*. ii; *de resurrectione*, v. The attribution of the last treatise, previously asigned to Justin Martyr, is under the discussion, cf. Whealey, Alice, *Pseudo-Justin's de resurrectione: Athenagoras or Hippolytus?* in *Vigiliae christianae* 60 no 4, 2006, p 420-430.
[44] *CC* fr. 94, section 7.
[45] *civ.dei* XXII, 1, *civ.dei* XXII, 25-27.
[46] *civ.dei* 5.10.
[47] End 4th century, end 4th century. Dating of Macarius' treatise, cf. Crafer (293-302), Goulet (375) Harnack (390), Neumann (403-410). Cf. R.Goulet, vol. I. pp. 57-65.

possible solution to this is A.Harnak's suggestion (shared by many scholars) that both Augustine and Macarius had Porphyry as the common source,[48] especially since Augustine mentions him specifically.

The Philosopher - Macarius' adversary - never refers back to Plato,[49] using the Bible as an exclusive source,[50] impressively using almost every book of the Bible. [51] In his argument he courageously advances into his enemy's territory, applying his bright skills to counterpart the textual testimonies. Augustine pays his in the same way, referring not so much to the Bible in his defence, as to Plato's *Timaeus*, especially *Tim* 41ab as the most frequently cited passage. The references to this passage appear in the discussion around six key arguments in more than half (6 out of 10) arguments, used by Augustine.

Augustine uses some of these arguments regularly, but he does not always apply the arsenal of *Tim* 41ab.[52] This means that the material Augustine draws from this passage adds weight to the argument, yet it is not irreplaceable. Clearly, Augustine needs a reference to an authoritaty for his adversary's source, which might potentially contain the discussed issue. Augustine singled such a source out keeping coming back to it all the time. And although not in all his works where Augustine responds to the philosophers' arguments against the resurrection of the body, there are references to *Tim* 41ab,[53] this passage retains its crucial importance for these polemics.

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[48] A. von Harnack's, Porphyrius: Gegen die Christen: 15 Büchen. Berlin, 1926.

[49] In the entire work of *Apocriticus* Macarius refers only once to Plato (*Republic* 426e. M 84, 24-25. Ibid.).

[50] The exception is made of few quotes from Herodotes (A 140, 22-24), Thucydides (A 140, 19-20) and Philostratus (A 72, 16-19). Ibid. P. 441.

[51] См. R.Goulet, *Index locorum*. Pp. 437-441.

[52] He does not do this e.g. in I.3. (*civ.dei* XXII, 12; *civ.dei* XXII, 20-21), I.4. (*civ.dei* XXII, 4, *civ.dei* XXII, 11), II, 3. (*civ.dei* XXII, 25-27), IV, 2 (*civ.dei* XXII, 5).

[53] II.3. discussion around the limits of the omnipotence (*civ.dei* V, 5), IV.1. on Apollonius of Tyana as the worthier candidate for resurrection than Jesus (*epistola* 102.5.32., *epistola*. 134.4.18.), IV.4. on Jona as allegory of the resurrected Christ (*epistola* 102.5.30-38).

Taking into account the fact that the Philosopher of Macarius neither refers to Plato in general, nor to this text in particular, there appears to be a disproportion of references. The adversaries prefer to deal with their opponent's source rather than to disclose their own source, as if mentioning their own source might make their position weaker. My current research aims at the figuring out these sources.

In the light of this analysis A.Harnack's selection still needs to be completed. For instance, the argument concerning traversing the elements[54] surprisingly originates from the Philosopher, cited by Macarius' *Apocriticus* in fr. 35 but we can also find it in several passages by Augustine, both in his *sermones* and *civ.dei*.[55] This objection is Stoic, rather than Neoplatonic, in origin. We can also trace it back to the Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *de mundo*.[56] It seems Porphyry did use it after all, although the argument is a bit rough for a subtle mind of a Neoplatonist.[57] Argument V.3. concerns Peter's sorcery, who supposedly used black magic to convince the crowd about the truth of the resurrection. It can be spotted not only in Macarius but also in *civ. dei*, XXII, 25. A.Harnack did not notice that the objection concerning a trustworthy evidence (V, 21) concerns the resurrection evidence.

[54] *sermo* 242 (5), *civ.dei* XIII, 17; XXII, 4; XXII, 11.
[55] *sermo* 242 (5), *civ.dei* XIII, *civ.dei* 17, *civ.dei* XXII, 4; *civ.dei* XXII, 11.
[56] *de mundo*, 2:5-10.
[57] This argument, however, can bring another shadow of doubt upon the attribution of the arguments, discussed by Macarius Magnes, to Porphyry, who was not a Stoic of any sort. It is not our objective in the present thesis to discuss this issue. Whether it was Porphyry indeed (A.Harnack, R.J. Hoffman, R.M. Berchman) or Hierocles (L.Duchesne, T.W. Crafer) or perhaps somebody else (T.Barnes) is an issue on its own.

1.3. Preliminary evaluation of the polemics

Augustine is at home with Porphyry's first set of arguments concerning the natural order. Not only the Neoplatonists but also the Stoics used them. Cicero's natural philosophy, being the main source of Augustine's acquaintance with the Greek Antiquity, is full with this train of thought. To some of these objections Augustine comes back time and time again. For instance, he turns to the discussion concerning the impossibility of traversing the elements ˙ ἀρχαί, στοιχεῖα (I.3.) on numerous occasions.[58] Clearly, it was either frequently raised by his audience, or it troubled Augustine personally.

As Porphyry predicted, Augustine refutes this entire set by referring to the divine omnipotence. If God established the natural order, he must be well beyond it. Even if resurrection of the dead is impossible, it will take place because the creator wants it to happen.

Throughout the discussion with Porphyry there is but one passage which appears prominently in Augustine. Curiously, it is neither a quote from the Bible,[59] nor from another Apostolic father or an Apologist but from Plato: Tim 41ab.[60] Clearly, Augustine views this passage as a powerful argument in defence of the Christian doctrine, which the pagans do not have a choice but to accept. Here is the text in question: [61]

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[58] *sermo* 242 (5), *civ.dei* XIII, 17; XXII, 4; XXII.

[59] It does not make sense to refer to the Bible anyway, as Porphyry does not accept its authority. On the contrary, he tries his best to discredit the Scriptures. He shows an extraordinary knowledge of its contents but uses it to ridicules its message, and to point out contradictions. Augustine does deal with the issue of the resurrection of the flesh in the New Testament, especially in *Cor* 15. Cf. Alflesh, *The belief in the resurrection of the flesh*.

[60] *sermo* 241.8 (1), *sermo* 242.5 (2), *civ.dei* XII.27 (3), *civ.dei* XIII.16-18 (4), *civ.dei* XXII. 26 (5).

[61] *CCL, vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P. 397. Cf. (C) and (η) *infra*.

You who rose from the seed of gods, of whose works I am progenitor and effecter, hearken: these are indissoluble as long as I summon (them), even though everything what is bound together can be dissolved; but it is not good at all to want to dissolve something what is bound together by reason. Since you rose, you indeed cannot be immortal and indissoluble; yet you will be neither dissolved, nor any fates of death will seize you, nor _ will they be mightier than my decision, which is a stronger bond for your perpetual existence than those (bonds) by which you were bond together	Vos qui deorum satu orti estis, adtendite. Quorum operum ego parens effectorque sum, haec sunt indissolubilia me invito, quamquam omne conligatum solvi potest; sed haudquam bonum est ratione vinctum velle dissolvere. Sed quoniam estis orti, immortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis; ne utiquam tamen dissolvemini, neque vos ulla mortis fata periment, nec erunt valentiora quam consilium meum, quod majus est vinculum ad perpetuitatem vestram quam illa quibus estis (tum cum gignebamini,) conligati

In this passage the demiurge, viewed as an analogue to the Christian God The Creator, delivers a speech to the gods of the Greek mythology who do not yet exist. They come into existence by means of his creative speech. He creates them with souls and bodies. And because they possess bodies these gods are mortal. Yet, the demiurge still decides them to be immortal, against the natural order of the world which he himself established. After all, his will is beyond this order. Now, as you see it, Augustine reasons, the demiurge is more powerful than the natural order, and even Plato, your master, is teaching this. Why cannot the demiurge make our mortal bodies immortal, especially if he wishes it so? We are also destined to become gods by participation because God the creator, who is the God by nature, wants it to happen. Thus, in Augustine's view, this reference to the divine omnipotence seems to be the end of the discussion.[62]

However, Augustine did not conclusively counter Porphyry. The latter was familiar with this argument. "You say that God is omnipotent. But is he?"[63] Here there follow the above mentioned arguments of the second set against the omnipotence of the creator (II), *cf supra*. Unfortunately, Augustine hardly responds to any of them within the context of the resurrection polemics, even though he is well familiar with the difficulty, as we will see it in the chapter on the Stoic presence in Augustine.

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[62] Cf. V.Yudin, Refutando a Porfirio mediante Platon: lectura agustiniana de 'Timaeo' 41 ab, in Augustinus (Madrid. 2007). Pp. 204-207.
[63] *CC*, fr. 94: 25-26.

As we discussed earlier, Porphyry uses three arguments against the omnipotence of the creator: historical, mathematical and ethical ones. The first two did not receive Augustine's treatment at all. The third ethical objection appears briefly in *civ.dei* XXII, 1 in a context, which has little to do with the present discussion. Augustine mentions a curious paradox, namely, that the most omnipotent God *cannot* lie.[64] This statement could have led him to a discussion of the possible limits of the divine omnipotence (according to a certain ethical principle god is limited in his powers). Yet, Augustine did not enter into this discussion. Moreover, there is no way one can claim that Porphyry is anywhere behind the scene. Augustine's ignorance concerning this set of arguments is strikingly innocent. Surely, he would not have been cornered by them, as he was certainly clever enough to find an appropriate response in each particular instance. E.g. in *de diversis quaestionibus 83* he treats the issue of the status of mathematical numbers.[65] This has directly to do with the discussion in question (mathematical objection). Nevertheless, in this passage Augustine does not make a necessary link to the divine omnipotence.

What is still more embarrassing is that *Timaeus* 41ab hardly contains the resurrection theory at all, although Augustine manages to read it into the text.[66] He achieved this by taking the passage out of the dialogue's context; and mainly by being at mercy of Cicero's free interpretative translation.[67] The opposition *summus deus–dii minores;* as well as *deus non*

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[64] *Deus omnipotentissimus… nec mentiri potest.* Cf. Augustin, *La cité de dieu* XIX-XXII. Ed. G. Bardy, trad. G. Combès. 1960. P. 524.

[65] *Quaestio* 46 is about Platonic ideas, but see also qq. 55-59, 61, 64 and 81 concerning the symbolism of numbers.

[66] V.Yudin (2004): p. 332.

[67] Cicero translated only the first half of the dialogue (on the creation of the world), and dropped out the second half (on the creation of man). Moreover, he made a monologue out of Plato's dialogue. The worse of all, he simplified and misinterpreted a number of crucial passages. There is no way you could grasp the *Timaeus* through Cicero's eyes adequately. Cf. C. Levy, 'Cicero and the *Timaeus'*, in *Cultural Icon*, ed. G.J. Reydams-Schils (Notre Dame, 2001).

factus – dii a se facti is regularly in use by Augustine,[68] while he comments *Timaeus'* contents. He aims at the analogy between Plato's demiurge creating the new gods (gods by grace) and the Christian god the creator (god by nature) who awaits us to become gods by grace in the life to come. The terminology and analogy, which Augustine decided to apply, is an interesting conjecture on its own but it is simply not in Plato's text. Plato does not speak about the resurrection either in this passage or elsewhere, either explicitly or implicitly. He also does not refer to the omnipotence of the creator either.

The largest problem with Augustine's reading of *Tim* 41ab in the context of the present debate is that he even does not suspect that according to Porphyry and other Neoplatonists the demiurge of the universe and highest god could be two different divinities. Yet, this had become a commonplace in the Neoplatonic school by the time of Augustine. E.g. in *de philosophia ex oraculis*, which Augustine keeps using all the time, Porphyry says that "the god worshipped by the Jews (and also by the Christians – *v.y.*) is the second god, the demiurge of all things".[69] This 'second' god the demiurge cannot be identified with the Christian god the creator, as he is subordinate to the first god, who does not condescend to a lowly business of the creation. You can perhaps talk about the omnipotence of the first god, but certainly not of the second one: his status is relatively low and his powers are limited. Thus appealing to Porphyry along with his students and claiming that they also believe in the omnipotence of the creator (demiurge) was at least a misunderstanding. Therefore, such an attempt to Christianise the intellectuals of a Neoplatonist kind was certainly doomed to fail.[70]

1.4. Conclusion: openings

Now, coming back to our initial quest to evaluate Porphyry's claim: do not argue with the Christians, as they do not listen to you any way: Porphyry was right and wrong at the same time. Augustine who made an attempt to respond to him tried his best. He had his limits. Sometimes he

[68] Notably in *sermo* 241 (8); *sermo* 242 (5); *civ.dei* XII, 27; *civ.dei* XIII, 18 (18), 19; *civ.dei* XXII, 25-26.

[69] Cf. Lydus, *De Mensibus* 4.53 p. 110 Wuensch, fr. 452 Stern.

[70] Here we will leave the question aside as to whether or not Augustine was sincere in his attempt to proselytise among the intellectuals. It is quite possible that his target was not so much his opponents as the hesitating audience, which runs for the winner. Cf. Chapter Three, section on Augustine's methodology *infra*.

does sound as someone who does not listen indeed. Yet, sometimes he does. What is clear is that we still did not receive an answer to the questions like: can God reverse the history, or can God sin?

Let us sum up what we have achieved. First, Augustine is familiar with some of Porphyry's arguments against the resurrection. Secondly, some of Porphyry's arguments survive exclusively in Augustine. Third, Augustine is not familiar with Porphyry's whole argumentation, or he pretends that he is not familiar with it, and therefore his response is not and cannot be completely convincing. Finally, Augustine made substantial use of Plato's *Tim. 41ab* in the resurrection debate against the Neoplatonists, first and foremost against Porphyry. However, his interpretation was rather inadequate due to his handicapped knowledge of the source. Instead of making his position stronger, this seems to have served him to the opposite.

AUGUSTINE's TIMAEUS 41AB

PART ONE
RESPONSE

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AUGUSTINE'S TIM 41AB

COHERENT EXEGESIS

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Part One.
Response:
Augustine's Tim 41ab coherent exegesis

Introduction to Part ONE

In Part One we examine the content and context of Augustine's *Tim* 41a exegesis. The study purpose of this Part is double: one is *inner*, another *outer*. The inner study purpose consists in a presentation of the material by Augustine which will be weighed in Part Two against the issue of the Latin translation, the reception of Tim 41ab by the Neo-Platonists and the Apologists Preceding or contemporary with Augustine.

The outer study aims at clarification independently from the correctness of Augustine's reading of *Tim* 41ab. We investigate the importance of this text in Augustine's *corpus* as a whole and its place in Augustine's general polemic with the Neo-Platonists. We look at the coherence and originality of the arguments. We want to pay special attention to significant flaws in Augustine's exegesis.

Part one consists out of three chapters. Each of them attempts to shed light on Augustine's familiarity with *Tim* 41ab, first by means of the raw material (Chapter Two), and then its examination (Chapter Three) and contextualization vis-à-vis some other Plato's passages (Chapter Four).

In Chapter One we turn to the initial intrigue why Augustine decided to use *Tim* 41ab. Since Augustine uses Plato's name next to the names of other Platonists, we identify the character of our passage Tim 41ab: is it analytic, systematic or rather polemic. We enquire into another ancient source, with similar argumentation. And finally we look at the main theme within which the whole discussion around *Tim* 41ab takes place.

In Chapter Two we look into all Augustine's passages containing *Tim* 41ab that we managed to identify in our research. We comment upon each of the cited texts. We define the main topics under discussion and a variety of topics connected to it.

Later, in Part Two we will use these topics to guide our reader through an evaluation based upon the approach towards this text by some other writers. We attempt to follow a development in the use of the terminology contained in this first presentation of the material.

In Chapter Three we examine Augustine's quotes from and commentaries upon *Tim* 41ab. First, we have a look at the adequacy of the main modern translations of *Tim* 41ab into the major European tongues. We reflect on as to whether or not there is a need of rephrasing the key terminology. Further on we go into the details of Augustine's major themes, in his discussion of and in connection with *Tim* 41ab.

In Chapter Four we clarify the importance of the *Tim* 41ab quotes and evaluate Augustine's familiarity with Plato's philosophy, first and foremost on the basis of the identified quotations. We compare Augustine's familiarity of *Tim* 41ab with another regularly cited text in his *corpus, Tim* 29 c3-4, which appears to be second in importance following the passage in question. We trace the similarities and differences in Augustine's treatment of these two Platonic passages. We clarify Augustine's precision in his quoting and interpreting of Plato, and estimate his effort in remaining within the framework of Platonism.

The content of this last chapter will be objectified by the points of view of some other prominent philosophers and theologians in Part Two.

AUGUSTINE's TIMAEUS 41AB

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Chapter Two:
Augustine's Tim 41ab:
coherent Material

2.0. Introduction into Augustine's Tim 41ab material

In this chapter we will attempt to present Augustine's material and his arguments based on his reading of *Tim* 41ab. Here we cite the English translation of all the passages from *Tim* 41ab that we managed to identify in Augustine's *corpus*. A new translation was needed, since it is impossible to grasp the problematic in question exclusively on the basis of already existing translations, even though these are many. We provided a translation for each passage with a commentary. It contains our retelling of the text in a contemporary wording supplied with the context of the text of what precedes it as well as what follows. We supplied our translations with our a system of enumeration with Greek letters and Arabic numbers in order to use this system for easier identification in the text. We introduced this system in order to facilitate identifying in the following section each particular idiom and thought, given that we are dealing with sixteen passages, distributed through several sermones as well as the *civ.dei*, none of which are directly linked to each other. Not surprisingly, this section is not systematic. It is not easy to follow Augustine's thought and we ask the reader to proceed with full attention.

Although *Tim* 41ab is of significant importance for Augustine, he neither wrote the passage himself, nor quoted it directly from its source, nor quoted it from an available translation in his days, the way it survived up until now. It seems to be a perfect harmony of a shared tradition with its creative reworking. Let us have a look at what the outcome is..

2.1. *Tim* 41ab: two 'originals', three texts

We are confronted with the text in question: *Tim* 41ab, originally written by Plato. But in fact we are not dealing with a single text only but with three texts: (A) Plato's Greek, (B) Cicero's Latin, (Γ) Augustine's Latin. The status of each of these texts is different, although each of them remains obscure in its own turn. Plato wrote (A), challenging posterity with a number of puzzles. Cicero provides us with (B), which is a rather personal interpretative translation, and far from making clear what Plato made obscure, only serves to further the confusion. Cicero's text is as unclear as Plato's text, although in its own way. Augustine provides an interpretation to Cicero's already interpretative translation (Γ), not realizing that (A) is not (B), although he remains convinced that it is so.

Let us briefly look at these three passages in my translation. We have noted in italics the major discrepancies of each subsequent text with the preceding text. The underscore (_) indicates the absence of a word in the subsequent text as compared with the preceding text.

(A) Plato (*Tim* 41a7-b6) [1]

Gods of gods, of whose works I am craftsman and father (of gods), the things which came by me into being are indissoluble even if I did not want it. On the one hand, everything that is bound is dissoluble; on the other hand, to want to dissolve that which is really beautifully harmonized and well off is proper to the evil one. Therefore, since you were born, you are neither immortal nor at all indissoluble; yet you will be neither dissolved, nor will you taste the fates of death; by my will you are favoured with an even better and more authoritative bond than those (bonds) by which you were joined together… (when you were born)….

Θεοὶ θεῶν ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, δι᾽ ἐμοῦ γενόμενα ἄλυτα ἐμοῦ γε μὴ ἐθέλοντος. τὸ μὲν οὖν δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν, τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ λύειν ἐθέλειν κακοῦ· δι᾽ ἃ καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ οὐδ᾽ ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν, οὔτι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριω τέρουλαχόντες ἐκείνων οἷς ὅτὲ γίγνεσθε συνεδεῖσθε. νῦν οὖν ὃ λέγω πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐνδεικνυμενος, μάθετε.

[1] Cf. *Platonis opera*, vol. 4, ed. Burnet, J. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1968. P. St III.17a-92c.

(B) Cicero (*tim* 40:4-13) [2]

You who rose from the seed of gods, of whose works I am *progenitor and effecter, hearken*: these are indissoluble as long as I summon (them), even though everything that is bound together can be dissolved; but *it is of no good* to want to dissolve something that is bound together *by reason*. Since you *rose*, you indeed *cannot* be immortal and indissoluble; yet you will be neither dissolved, nor any fates of death will seize you, nor will *a fraud* be mightier than my decision, which is a stronger bond for your perpetual existence than those (bonds) by which you were bound together (when you were born).

Vos qui deorum satu orti estis, adtendite. Quorum operum ego parens effectorque sum, haec sunt indissolubilia me invito: quamquam omne conligatum solvi potest, sed haudquam boni est ratione vinctum velle dissolvere. Sed quoniam estis orti, immortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis, neutiquam tamen dissolvemini, neque vos ulla mortis fata periment nec faus valentior quam consilium meum, quod maius est vinculum ad perpetuitatem vestram quam illa quibus estis (tum cum gignebamini) conligati

(Γ) Augustine (*civ.dei* XIII, 16: 25-34) [3]

You who rose from the seed of gods, of whose works I am progenitor and effecter, hearken: these are indissoluble as long as I summon (them), even though everything that is bound together can be dissolved; but *it is not good at all* to want to dissolve something that is bound together by reason. Since you rose, you indeed cannot be immortal and indissoluble; yet you will be neither dissolved, nor any fates of death will seize you, nor _ will *they* be mightier than my decision, which is a stronger bond for your perpetual existence than those (bonds) by which you were bound together _.

Vos qui deorum satu orti estis, adtendite. Quorum operum ego parens effectorque sum, haec sunt indissolubilia me invito, quamquam omne conligatum solvi potest; sed haudquam bonum est ratione vinctum velle dissolvere. Sed quoniam estis orti, immortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis; ne utiquam tamen dissolvemini, neque vos ulla mortis fata periment, nec erunt valentiora quam consilium meum, quod majus est vinculum ad perpetuitatem vestram quam illa quibus estis (tum cum gignebamini,) conligati.

[2]. Cf. M.Tulli Ciceronis, *Scripta quae manserunt omnia. De divinatione, de fato, Timaeus*. Ed. R.Giomini. Teubner. 1975. P.215. Cf. *infra* quote (η).

[3] *CCL, vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P. 397. Cf. *infra* (η).

As we can see, text (B) is a free translation from (A). Text (Γ) is a quotation from (B), yet these two are not identical. Either Augustine had a different version of Cicero's text, or he personally slightly altered it, or it was altered by a compiler of a *florilegium* which Augustine possibly used at this point. Text (Γ) is Augustine's most complete quotation from *Tim* 41ab. We come across it in XIII.17. The smaller sections from this quote, as well as allusions to sections preceding and following it occur elsewhere.

In fact, we focus primarily on text (Γ), since this is the text needed for our research. Paradoxically, two other texts, (A) and (B), provide some help. We have to remember that this extract is taken out of the original context: Augustine examines it from 'within'. In comparison with the original structure, it is an unfinished speech, addressed by a creator to his audience: gods. In the original the complete text of the speech is *Tim* 41a7-d3. We will deal with it in the first introductory part only.

This inner part is a speech which is inaugurated by an introduction (*Tim* 40d6-41a6) concerning the gods, to whom it is addressed. Together with the introduction it makes a linking section between two main parts of the *Timaeus* dialogue: on the Creation of the Universe (part One, *Tim* 30e1-40d5), as well as the Creation of Man (Part Two, *Tim* 40d6-92c10), introduced in the style of a dialogue (*Tim* 17a1-30e1), which is dedicated mostly to the story of Antarktida. The speech to the gods is in the middle of the dialogue (*Tim* 41a7-d3): it is a section on its own, since it does not fit into either of the two other parts.

Following the ancient tradition of text publishers,[4] I give short titles to Augustine's passages interpreting *Tim* 41ab. These titles do not belong to Augustine, yet they are also mostly Augustine's words, taken directly from the text.

It is curious to see Augustine's stubborn insistence that there is only one interpretation of this text possible, the one which he chooses to give. His interpretation is based on no knowledge of the exegetical tradition of this text, since he shows no acquaintance with the other numerous interpretations of this passage, and offers his own interpretation which stands completely on its own.

[4] E.g. PL 41.

2.2. Coherence Step One: Augustine's *Tim* 41ab quotes

In this section we will present Augustine's use of *Tim* 41ab. First, I will present my translation of the sixteen passages which directly or indirectly quote *Tim* 41ab. I will supply each of the translations with my commentary.

Augustine cites sections of *Tim* 41ab as many as sixteen times in the course of his oeuvre. He uses it in two groups of texts: *sermones* (I), and *civ.dei* (II). He uses it three times in two *sermones*: twice in *sermo* 241, and once in *sermo* 242. He also uses it thirteen times in *civ.dei*: IX.23, X, 31, XII.25, XII.27, XIII.16 (twice), XIII.17 (twice), XIII.18 (twice), XIII.19, XXII.25, XXII.26.

The present division into sixteen passages, even though it is correct, is in some sense arbitrary. All the passages *infra* constitue a part of the text, although they are not written as a direct commentary on *Tim* 41ab. The majority of them are somewhat sporadic in character. We find the most extensive discussion of *Tim* 41ab in *civ.dei* XIII, chapters 16 to 19: two quotes in each of these four chapters, i.e. seven out of sixteen – almost half of all the references. These quotes are not always comparable in length: texts (α), (δ), (ς), (θ), (ι) are short and tidy; quote (η) from *civ.dei* XIII is not only the longest but also surrounded by extensive commentary. The last quote (ιη) from book XXII is a cascade of short, frequently repeated extractions. This later text is the closest to the methods of modern exegesis. It also voices. the key issues around the *Tim* 41ab discussion.

Augustine is aware that the quote he cites originates from Cicero, cf. (η). He expresses no doubts as to the precision of the translation in front of him. He does not discuss the terminology of the original. Some of these texts literally render Cicero's quotes (e.g. (β), (γ), (ιη), (η)), while some others (e.g. (α), (δ), (ε), (ς), (ζ), (θ), (ι), (ια), (ιβ), (ιγ), (ιδ), (ιε), (ις)) retell the original in a rather free style. As a rule, the short extracts are not very precise, whereas the longer extracts include one or two precise quotes supplied with a commentary.

In principle, some of these quotes, such as (η), (ε), (ιγ), (ιη), could be sub-divided into sub-quotes, some others are combinable into bigger units, e.g. (α), (β) in *sermo* 241.8., then (η) and (θ) in *civ. dei* XIII, xvi, then (ι), (ια**),** (ιβ) in *civ. dei* XIII, xvii, and finally (ιγ) and (ιδ) in *civ. dei* XIII, xviii: all of them by two or three in the same chapter of the same work. Seven quotes from *civ. dei* XIII, chapters 16-19 can be considered as one single extract only.

As a result, we could arrive at a different number of quotes. The reason why we chose to separate these passages is because each expresses a different idea, and also because each is separated from another passage by a text that is at least as long as the quoted extract. In some cases, one could continue the quoted text, e.g. (ιη), or start quoting somewhat earlier, e.g. (δ), since these additional extractions concern the context of *Tim* 41ab in one way or another.

Let us proceed to the examination of the quotes in question.

1.2.1. *sermones*

The first three quotations from *Tim* 41ab appear in Augustine's Easter sermones 241-242,[5] delivered in the period between 405 and 410.[6] To a large extent these sermones are dedicated to the polemics with the philosophers concerning the resurrection of the body. Augustine initiated this polemic already in sermon 240, although the discussion there is mainly about the soul's immortality, a related but different issue. He emphasizes the fact that the philosophers (Plato in the first place) were able to figure out the idea of soul's immortality on the basis of pure reasoning,[7] whereas the idea of the resurrection of the body is exclusive to Christianity.[8]

The register of Augustine's Latin is informal in these sermones. Yet, he cites literally some sections of *Tim* 41ab. We should probably assume that he knew the text of *Tim* 41ab by heart. In *de doctrina Christiana* he makes a point of noting the importance of learning crucial texts by heart in order to master the content and to be capable of providing a valuable interpretation.[9] Judging from the abundance of his quotes from the Bible, we may say for a fact that he had excellent memorizing skills. Nevertheless, while referring to Plato he says *lego* – I read – in the sense of reading from a book in front of him. It is either a sign that he had Cicero's translation at his hand while interpreting it, or made a later edition of the text.

[5] The editors and translators of Augustine's Easter sermones often do not know where to place semones 241/242, as they do not seem to be exactly on the topic in question. Thus they simply skip these sermones. Cf. Augustin d'Hippone, Sermones pour la Pâques, ed. S.Poque. Sources Chrétinnes, 116. Paris. 1966.

[6] E.Rebillard, *Sermones*, in *Augustine through the ages. An encyclopedia*. Ed. A.Fitzgerald. Camridge UK. 1999. P.783; H.J. Frede, *Kirchenschriftsteller Verzeichnis und Sigel. 4. actualisierte Aufgabe. Vetus Latina* 1/1. Freiburg, 1995.

[7] The immortality of the soul is the soul is a subject of discussion in *de immortalitate animae*. The discussion there is hardly of Christian character. The word *deus* is mentioned only once in the entire treatise, the doctrine of the resurrection is not mentioned at all. Cf. R.Teske, *de immortalitate animae*, in *Augustine through Ages*. Ed. A.Fitzgerald. Pp. 443-444.

[8] *sermo* 240.1.1.

[9] *doctrina* II.15.22.

As we shall see, the style of writing in these sermones and the ideas expressed are somewhat more primitive than those we managed to identify in *civ.dei*. This indicates that most probably these sermones precede Augustine' commentaries on *Tim* 41ab in *civ.dei*. in time.

(α) Deus fabricator deorum in libro de constitutione mundi

sermo 241.8.[10]

α1 Why is that we find the same Plato,
α2 the master of them all,
α3 who refers to God
α4 in a certain book which he wrote
α5 on the creation of the world,
α6 God as a producer of gods,
α7 apparently producing celestial gods,
α8 all the stars, the sun and the moon?
α9 Thus he spoke about God
α10 as the creator of celestial gods;
α11 he says that
α12 the intellectual stars have a soul,[11]
α13 which may understand God,
α14 as well as the visible material bodies,
α15 which can be seen.[12]

Quid quod invenimus eumdem Platonem magistrum istorum omnium, in libro quodam suo quem scripsit de constitutione mundi, inducere Deum fabricatorem deorum, facientem scilicet deos coelestes, stellas omnes, solem et lunam? Dicit ergo Deum opificem deorum coelestium : dicit ipsas stellas habere animam intellectuales, quae intelligunt Deum, et corpora visibilia quae cernuntur.

In this text Augustine clarifies Plato's position with regards to the party he is in dispute with, the party which denies the resurrection of the flesh. He says 'Plato, the master of them all' (Plato(nem) magistrum istorum omnium). Who are 'those all'? The (Neo)-Platonists, the philosophers, the intellectuals? This is not yet clear, as in the case of sermo 241 he mentions not only Porphyry but also Pythagoras and all those who deny the resurrection of the body. Pythagoras lived before Plato, so he could not be a

[10] *Patrologia Latina (infra PL)*. T.38. Pp. 1138.

[11] '…dicit ipsas stellas habere animam intellectuales'. E.Hill translates this as 'he says that the very stars have intellectual souls', thereby implying 'intellectualles' instead of intellectuallem', which then correlates with 'animam', soul in Acc Sg. This is yet not in the text. However, what he makes of it sounds more natural to the text, to what Augustine has understood to belong to Plato. In *The works of St Augustine, Sermones; Part III. Vol. 7.* New York. P. 75. For instance, just one paragraph *infra* we read 'These stars which you can see are indeed bodies, but they have their own intellectual souls, and are gods'. So clearly, it is not the celestial gods who are intellectual but their souls.

Platonist of any kind. It is also doubtful whether the latter ever criticized the resurrection of the flesh. If so, the address is most probably towards Plato's followers, those who call themselves 'Platonists'.

What is nevertheless clear is that his respect towards these Platonists is rather limited, otherwise he would not have applied istorum (Masc. Gen. Pl. of iste – 'that of yours'), which is often used in a contemptuous sense, when applied to the party opposed in a dispute. Whoever they are, Augustine refers to Plato's authority, both in name and in argument.

Further on, Augustine refers to a 'certain' book by Plato on the creation of the world.[13] The way he mentions it does not make clear whether he is talking about the book with the title On the creation of the world, or whether the book he is commenting on has the creation of the world as its topic.[14] In the latter case it might be possible that the book has a different title. Augustine does not refer to the real but descriptive title, which indicates the content of the book but is not really appropriate (in a way, it is even misleading). This perhaps suggests he wishes to please the Christian audience, as they believed in the creation of the world; he certainly is not entering into a scientific discussion.

The very fact that he obscurely makes a (first) reference to a 'certain' (quodam) book implies that he does not think that the audience is familiar with it. He either does not think highly of the intellectual background of his listeners, or does not want them to be introduced to it.

The book de constitutione mundi, mentioned in this section of sermo 241,15 is Cicero's version of Plato's Timaeus. Augustine mentions Timaeus by title in de consensu evangelistarum, written in 399/400, which precedes sermo 241, written not earlier than 405.16 He again refers to the Timaeus title eighteen times in the course of civ.dei., and still one more time in contra Julianum.17 However, it is not obvious whether or not he was aware

[13] *in libro quodam suo quem scripsit de constitutione mundi. Sermo 242.8: …*

[14] The minuscules did not exist in Augustine's time. So the manuscripts could not possibly make the titles clear otherwise than contextually.

[15] Augustine uses expression *de constitutione mundi* twice in his ouvre : in *sermo* 241.8. and *civ.dei* XI, 34.

[16] P.-M. Hombert, *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne*. Paris. 2000. P. 641.

[17] C*iv.dei*: VI, 1; VII, 28; VIII, 9; IX, 23; X, 29; X, 31; XI, 21 (twice); XII, 12; XII, 18; XII, 24; XII 26 (twice); XIII, 16 (twice); XIII, 17; XIII, 18; XVIII, 10. In *Contra Julianum* II,7. Augustine quotes Ambrose's

that Timaeus and On the Creation of the World are one and the same book. Augustine could have understood it as the original title in Latin translation.

And indeed, each time he discusses the Tim 41ab, he either does not refer to Timaeus at all, or refers exclusively to the book on the creation of the world.

Augustine never questions the faithfulness of Cicero's translation of the Timaeus. He obviously finds it hard if not impossible to check it. Obviously, he did not hear any critique on this subject either.

By means of his uncritical reading Augustine introduces a number of Stoic doctrines into his 'Plato's collection'. Surprisingly, he does not discuss the fact that Plato's understanding of the universe's creation out of primordial matter differs in any sense from a Christian understanding of the universe's creation ex nihilo.

book *De philosophia contra Platonem philosophum*, attacking Plato's reincarnation teaching, only fragments of which have survived.

There is here still a major stress on the soul, the main capacity of which is intellectual, which is intellegere: to perceive. Perception here means both 'intellectual' perception – of God, and visible 'perceptual' - of material bodies. So the intellectual aptitude turns the soul in both directions: 'upwards' and 'downwards

(β) Deus fecit deos de corporali substantia

sermo 241.8.[18]

β 1 God is introduced by the same Plato
β 2 as speaking to the gods,
β 3 whom he made
β 3 out of corporeal substance,
β 3 and telling them among other things the following:
β 4 "Since you rose,
β 5 you cannot be immortal and indissoluble".
β 6 When they listened to that voice
β 7 they started shivering.
β 8 Why? Because they desired to be immortal
β 9 and did not want to die.
β 10 Therefore, in order to take away their fear,
β 11 he added the following saying:
β 12 "yet, you will be neither dissolved,
β 13 nor any fates of death will seize you,
β 14 nor will be mightier than my decision,
β 15 which is a stronger bond for your perpetual existence,
β 16 than those (bonds) by which you are joined together."
β 17 Here you go:
β 18 God gives assurance to the gods
β 19 who were made by him:
β 20 he gives them assurance of immortality;
β 21 he gives them assurance that
β 22 they may not quit the globes of their bodies.
β 23 Are you sure that
β 24 any kind of body is to be avoided?

Inducitur Deus a Platone ipso alloqui deos, quos fecit de corporali substantia, atque inter caetera dicere illis: «Quoniam estis orti, immortales esse et indissolubiles non potestis. «Jam ad istam vocem illi intremiscere poterant. Quare? Quia immortales esse cupiebant, et mori nolebant. Ergo ut eis auferret timorem, secutus adjunxit atque ait : «Non tamen dissolvemini, neque vos ulla mortis fata periment, nec erunt valentiora quam consilium meum, quod majus est vinculum ad perpetuitatem vestram, quam illa quibus colligati estis. «Ecce Deum dat securitatem diis a se factis: securitatem illis dat immortalitatis; securitatem illis dat, quod non reliquant globos corporum suorum. Certe corpus est omne fugiendum?

Augustine adds to the preceding passage that according to Plato God made celestial gods out of corporeal substance (*deos… fecit de corporali substantia*). Thus, there are two principles for those celestial divinities: God and a certain corporeal substance. Perhaps God made that corporeal

[18] *Patrologia Latina (infra PL)*. T.38. Pp. 1133-1138.

substance as well, but this is not clear from the context. At any rate, Augustine certainly does not claim that Plato's God made celestial gods out of nothing (*ex nihilo*).

Augustine alludes to the content of *Tim* 41ab, but directly quotes from it in Cicero's translation, with certain minor corruptions of the text (cf. Cicero ed.)

In *sermo* 241, v[19] Augustine preached on the occasion of Easter Tuesday, Augustine argues against Porphyry - the *magnus philosophus posterius…* and *fidei christianae acerrimus inimicus*,[20] who is particularly known for his doctrine *omne corpus fugiendum*.[21] As opposed to this, the Christian faith (*fides nostra*) praises the body, which is expected to become incorruptible and immortal.[22] As his major source Augustine surprisingly evokes the books of Platonists themselves (*libros vestros*), which contain statements representing the universe as a living animal that contains heavens, earth, oceans and all the elements as parts of its own body.[23] The only major difference between the body of the universe and our bodies is that the former is deprived of senses on account of the absence of any

[19] *Patrologia Latina*, Vol. 38. Pp. 1138 : 27-41.

[20] *sermo* 241,VII, 3. The first time Augustine mentions Porphyry by name is quite late in his life – in *De consensu evangelistarum* (399/400) . By that time he was already protected by his episcopal authority, so that nobody would dare to question his orthodoxy on the account of his Platonist sympathies. In fact, by that time those sympathies were almost gone, and his interactions with them took sharper angles. It is as if Porphyry changed his seat from the bench of Augustine's friends to that of his adversaries. Curiously enough, even the main subject of the book could have been provoked by Porphyry, who, having scrupulously read the gospels, found them fabulous and contradictory. Thus restoring the symphony between gospel stories was high on the agenda of any apologist of the time. The most furious (and witty) attack went against the idea of resurrection. Augustine is looking for common grounds for both the Christians and the Neoplatonists. He finds it in the demiurge' goodness, contrary to the Gnostic idea of the evil creator.

[21] This doctrine is the subject of Augustine's attack. Why, according to the Platonists, one has to flee one's body is explained in *sermo* 241, IV: Human souls undergo all sorts of suffering in this world. Those who conduct themselves impurely during their sojourn in this body will have to come back in another cycle, when they will be given another chance to attain to eternal bliss. The souls of the wise and the just will, on the other hand, fly to heaven and receive there their eternal joy. Oblivion of previous sufferings is the only reason why the souls of the wise return to the material world (Ibid. IV, 15). Thus, the state of happiness is a bodiless state. Body, if not a shackle, is certainly an obstacle on the path to salvation. Pythagoras, Plato and several others, Augustine claims (Ibid. VI, 5), adhered to this doctrine (although not without reservations on certain points). Porphyry was the one who took the most extreme position by considering body as something evil.

[22] Ibid. VII, 12.

[23] Ibid. VII, 22.

external object of perception.[24] The Platonists at times call the soul of the body of the universe Jupiter, at times Hecata, who rules the world as one single body.[25] In spite of being created (and thus having a beginning), the body of the universe will never come to an end.[26] It is eternal insofar as its soul also eternally inhabits it. In this way Augustine uses Plato's own arguments to undermine Porphyry's philosophy condemning everything that is corporeal: since this doctrine fails to apply to at least one single instance, the body of the universe, *ergo* the logic of mortality of everything that is corporeal equally fails. Augustine addresses Porphyry with a sarcastic remark: if your doctrine is correct, well, then kill the universe and let your Jupiter flee his body![27]

Augustine's point is fairly clear: he is setting out to prove that it is not the body *per se* which hinders eternal life but its corruptibility. This is a Christian doctrine – a fact disturbing for the Platonists, since they all despise Christianity as a religion of the crowd. The reply to this is again rhetorical: "You – Porphyry – should not be ashamed to agree with the Christians, as even your master – Plato (*magister istorum*) – had exactly the same opinion." Augustine refers to Plato's book *de constitutione mundi*,[28] which undoubtedly stands for the *Timaeus*. This treatise explains how the God-creator fabricated other divinities, namely celestial gods such as stars, the sun and the moon (…*inducere Deum fabricatorem deorum, facientem scilicet deos coelestes, stellas omnes, solem et lunam*). So, in the first place, God is a creator of the celestial gods (*dicit ergo Deum opificem deorum coelestium*). He likewise endowed them with intellectual souls capable of perceiving God, along with visible bodies.[29] Thus, God endowed them with corporeal and incorporeal substances (*inducitur Deus a Platone ipso alloqui deos, quos fecit de corporali substantia*…) when he addressed them with the words "Since you have a beginning you cannot be immortal and indissoluble".[30] Augustine says that as soon as they had heard this they

[24] Ibid. VII, 28.
[25] Ibid. VII, 30.
[26] Ibid. VII, 31.
[27] Ibid. VII, 39.
[28] Ibid. VIII, 4.
[29] Ibid. VIII, 9.
[30] Ibid. VIII, 30.

began to tremble (*eius auferret timorem*),[31] as if they could be emotionally affected. The created gods desired immortality, this way avoiding death. This was granted to them by God *by* the words that followed.[32] The means for breaching the natural law is the *consilium meum* – the creator's decision.[33] In this way God provided security to his creatures by giving them immortality (*ecce Deum dat securitatem diis a se factis : securitatem illis dat immortalitatis*), even if it was not theirs from the beginning. Their immortality would consist in the assurance that they would not have to quit their globes. If this is so, then Porphyry's doctrine *omne corpus fugiendum* does not make much sense, since God the creator does not want the created gods to get rid of their bodies.

Augustine's conclusion is that the resurrection of the flesh follows the same pattern, i.e., it is the result of God's care for his creation.[34]

[31] Augustine represents these divinities in such a way as if they could be emotionally effected. This is certainly not in Plato's text, as gods are neither supposed to have passions, nor is it clear whether they specifically had a wish of not dying. This is not in the text either. The demiurge's will is not identical with their own will.

[32] By speaking the words, immortality was granted.

[33] Ibid. VIII, 36.

[34] *Sermo* 241 was preached on Easter Tuesday in one of the years between 405 and 410. This sermon is the first time Augustine cites and comments on the demiurge's speech from *Timaeus* 41A. Despite this dating by A.-M. La Bonnardière (*Recherche de chronologie augustinienne*. Paris. 1965), we suggest that the dating can be shifted as far as 416, or even later. This I do for two reasons: (1) I think it unlikely that Augustine would cite Plato during the time he was writing *De genesi ad litteram*, (401-415), his major work on creation, since he never quotes Plato there; (2) the first time that Augustine enters into serious polemics with Porphyry is in book X of *civ. dei*. This book we may reasonably assume he finished before plunging into book XI, the year of working on which – 417 – is known to us from Orosius' prologue to the *Historiae adversus paganos*.

In this *sermo*, Augustine neither calls God a 'supreme God' (*summus deus*), nor does he call the gods addressed by God the speaker as the 'minor gods' (*dii minores*). The only sense that he adduces to these addressed gods is that they are celestial bodies: the stars, the sun and the moon. Moreover, all the celestial bodies have an intellectual soul (*animam intellectualem*), and they are made by God out of the corporeal substance (*corporali substantia*).

(γ) Deus non factus - dii a se facti :

sermo 242.7: 1-16.[35]

γ 1 But it is not possible, they say, -
γ 2 for the earthly body to be in heaven.
γ 3 Why not, if God wants it so?
γ 4 Answer against God and say:
γ 5 "God cannot".
γ 6 Do not you, pagan, say that
γ 7 God is omnipotent?
γ 8 Is it not so that in the book of Plato,
γ 9 which I presented you yesterday,
γ 10 we read that
γ 11 it is not the uncreated God
γ 12 who tells the gods created by him:
γ 13 'Since you rose,
γ 14 you cannot indeed
γ 15 be immortal and indissoluble;
γ 16 yet you will be neither dissolved,
γ 17 nor any fates of death will seize you,
γ 18 nor will they be mightier than my decision,
γ 19 which is a stronger bond for your perpetual existence
γ 20 than those (bonds) by which you were joined together."
γ 21 God turns everything back to his will,
γ 22 who is capable of doing the impossible.
γ 23 For does it mean anything else than that
γ 24 you cannot be immortal,
γ 25 but in order that you do not die I do this;
γ 26 even if it is impossible to do, I still do this.[36]

Sed non potest, inquiunt, esse terrenum corpus in caelo. Quid, si hoc velit Deus ? Responde contra Deum, et dic : Non potest Deus. Nonne et tu quicumque paganus, dicis omnipotentem Deum ? Nonne in libro Platonis, quod hesterno die demonstravi, legitur dixisse Deus non factus diis a se factis : « Quoniam estis orti, immortales quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis ; non tamen dissolvemini, neque ulla vos mortis fata periment ; nec erunt valentiora quam consilium meum, quod majus est vinculum ad perpetuitatem vestram, quam illa quibus estis colligati ? » Totum ad voluntatem suam redegit Deus, qui potest et quod impossibile est. Nam quid est alium, non potestis esse immortales, sed ut non moriamini ergo facio ; nisi et quod fieri non potest, ergo facio?

[35] *PL*, vol. 38. Pp. 1141.
[36]

In *sermo* 242 (chapter 5) Augustine continues the theme started on the previous day (*hesterno die*).[37] This time he sets out to refute the four major objections against resurrection, all of them most probably stemming from Porphyry. The first two concern the resurrection of Jesus: his need for food (1), and his stigmata (2). The last two concern the resurrection of babies (3) and the theory of natural place (4).

The first objection against Christians states that, even after resurrection, the human body must be corruptible, because it still needs food. Conversely, if it were not corruptible, it would not need food. This cannot be the case because Christ himself ate after his paradigmatic resurrection.[38] Augustine's response states that Christ ate out of power, not out of need.[39] Indeed, his power would have been less strong if he were not capable of eating. Even angels can take food if they choose to do so. This happened when three of them accepted Abraham's hospitality. [40]

The second objection ultimately concerns the beauty of the resurrected body. According to Augustine, if someone happens to lose a leg or get an ugly scar, these deficiencies will not affect that person's resurrected body. Augustine has Porphyry object that Christ did appear with his stigmata after his resurrection, thereby showing that the resurrected body will be in the same state as when it died. Augustine's reply continues within the same line: after his resurrection Christ came back with the wounds because he chose to do so:[41] he wanted to grant faith to Thomas who was in danger of losing it.

The third objection raises the problem of whether babies who die at a young age will receive the same bodies at their resurrection. Augustine claims that we have to keep in mind the promise that our bodies will be incorruptible.[42] The most probable solution, he states, in the absence of direct scriptural evidence, is that such babies will be resurrected as mature adults.[43]

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[37] i.e. on Easter Wednesday. *Sermo* 242, V, 6. It is obvious that Augustine did not prepare a sermon on Porphyry as an edifying example of spirituality. Yet he still dared to speak in public about the (Neo-Platonists during Easter week – a fact in itself quite extraordinary, as this period is especially reserved for commenting on Christ's appearances after his resurrection. This is the period of joy, not polemics.

[38] *Luke* 24:37-43.

[39] *Sermo* 242, II, 18.

[40] Ibid. II, 20.

[41] Ibid. II, 30.

[42] Ibid. III, 6.

[43] Ibid. III, 11.

The final objection concerns the theory of natural place, meaning that every element occupies its unique position in the order of the universe.[44] The heavens are considered to be made exclusively of ether, whereas body is mainly composed of earth. The Neo-Platonists claim that the latter cannot enter into the former, and therefore, resurrection is impossible. Augustine's remark to this is: "why not, if this is God's will? Would you dare to question God's omnipotence? Look again at this book of Plato." Augustine quotes the speech of the demiurge once more,[45] commenting this time that, in his address to the minor divinities, God refers to his absolute will which can achieve anything, even the impossible.[46]

At this point Augustine philosophizes about the sort of body God will grant in resurrection.[47] On the basis of his previous discussion he arrives at the concept of 'spiritual bodies' (*corpora spiritualia*).[48] For him the term 'spiritual' is in no way opposed to the term 'corporeal'. The pattern for it should be found in our present bodies: these are animated bodies (*animalia*) yet not souls (*animae*). In the same way the body that is called 'spiritual' is not pure spirit but will remain body.[49] The fact that it is called "spiritual" points to its readiness to serve the spirit. The dramatic opposition between body and spirit acknowledged by the apostle Paul (*Gal:* 5:17) will be resolved in the afterlife. The result of this marvelous work will be peace, perfect peace.[50]

[44] Ibid. IV, 22.
[45] Ibid. V, 8-14.
[46] Ibid. V, 15.
[47] Ibid. VIII.
[48] Ibid. VIII, 8.
[49] Ibid. VIII, 10.
[50] Ibid. VIII, 17.

1.2.2. *de civitate dei*

The second set of texts where Augustine uses the *Tim* 41ab passage is his monumental *The City of God* (*de civitate dei*).[51] There are ten citations (4) – (15) in the treatise ranging between book IX and book XXII, but mostly contained in book XIII. Now we will proceed to the examination of these texts.

(δ) De verborum controversia: dii, angeli, daemones, homines

civ.dei IX, xxiii, 1-9.[52]

δ 1 If the Platonists prefer
δ 2 to call them[53] 'gods'
δ 3 rather than 'demons'
δ 4 and count them among gods,
δ 5 they may say what they want.
δ 6 Plato, their founder and master, writes that
δ 7 these gods are created by the supreme God;
δ 8 the discussion with them concerns only words.
δ 9 If only they call them immortal
δ 10 because they are made by the supreme God,
δ 11 and not by themselves,
δ 12 then they also mean
δ 13 that they are made happy
δ 14 because they are united to God.
δ 15 They say what we say
δ 16 whatever word they use to call them.

Hos si Platonici malunt deos quam daemones dicere eisque adnumerare quos a summo deo conditos deos scribit eorum auctor et magister Plato dicant quod volunt; non enim cum eis de verborum controversia laborandum est. Si enim sic immortales ut tamen a summo deo factos, et si non per se ipsos, se dei a quo facti sunt adhaerendo beatos esse dicunt, hoc dicunt quod dicimus, quolibet eos nomine appellent

In Book IX, chapter xxiii of the *civ.dei*[54] Augustine comes back again to mention Plato as 'their master and founder'. Hereby he adds *auctor,* a 'founder' to a similar reference to *auctor* in *sermo* 241.8. (*Plato(nem) magistrum istorum omnium*), and bluntly refers to *Platonici*, the 'Platonists' by name.

Augustine discusses the meaning of the word 'god' as used in the plural both by the philosophers and the believers. He thinks that the Platonists do not contradict the Christians, as in fact they use this word to mean something different than gods. An example for that is drawn from Plato's *Timaeus* 41ab, where, according to Augustine, Plato, being their chief

[51] Infra *civ.dei.*

[52] *Sancti Aurelii Augustini de civitate dei. Liber I-X. Corpus Christianorum*, series *Latina (infra CCL), vol*. XLVIII. Ed. B.Dombart, A.Kalb. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P. 269.

[53] angels.

[54] *Oeuvres de saint Augustin*, 34. *La cite de dieu*. Livres vi-x. Notes par G.Bardy. Desclée de brouwer. 1959. P. 412.

and master (*eorum auctor et magister*), describes the gods created by the supreme god (*a summo deo conditos deos scribit)*.[55] He thinks that it is clear that Plato means something different than straightforward 'gods' in this passage.

Therefore, Augustine says that we should not argue about the words, since both Platonists and Christians mean the same, although they often apply different words to refer to the same reality. For the Platonists, the key concept used to define 'god' is the notion of 'immortality' (*immortalitas***)**[56] (a), mentioned by Plato in the cited text. This is indeed absolutely necessary yet not sufficient to define God for the Christians: someone who is not god can still be or at least become immortal. Augustine refers to two other characteristics, provided by Plato, that lead to the word discrepancy: (b) being created by the supreme God yet not having existence on one's own account (*a summo Deo factos, et non per se ipsos, sed ei a qui facti sunt*), and (c) being happy not on account of one's own nature but by uniting oneself to the creator (*adherendo beatos esse*).

The practice of using the word 'god' while referring to a different reality exists also in Judaeo-Christian tradition. Moreover, this tradition has certain parallels to Plato's expression 'gods of gods' from *Tim* 41ab. The Judae-Christianexpression contains singular instead of plural in the first word, thus 'god of gods', and not 'gods of gods'. The first expression deals with the monotheistic mindset, the second one with the polytheistic one.

Augustine provides four quotes from the Psalms as examples: (1) 'God of gods, the Lord has spoken' (*Deus deorum dominus locutus est*) (XLIX, 1)); (2) 'Let us confess to God of gods' (*Confitemini deo deorum*) (CXXXV, 2); (3) 'the great king over all the gods' (*rex magnus super omnes deos*) (XCIV, 3); (4) 'He (God) is terrible over all the gods' (*Terribilis est super omnes deos*) (XCIV, 4-5).

Augustine provides three possible readings of the plural 'gods' in the given context: according to him, it either refers to 'demons' (A), or to 'humans' (B), or to the 'angels (C).

[55] *civ. dei* IX, xxiii, 3.
[56] More precisely: *immortales* in 'Si enim immortales …'.

(A) The first possibility is that the word 'gods' may refer to 'demons'. What we have as an example for such a reading is the continuation of the last quote (4) from the *psalm* XCIV. It goes as follows: "Terribilis est super omnes deos, *quoniam omnes dii gentium daemonia, dominus autem caelos fecit*." That is to say that all the gods of the nations ('pagans') are demons. Psalm XCIV also gives the reason why its author considers these so-called 'gods' to be demons: these 'gods' did not create the heavens, whereas the true God did.[57] Here the psalmist accentuates the exclusivity of the Jewish nation in its relationship with the only true God. Their god is a true God: therefore he is to be called 'God', whereas the other 'gods' are mistakenly taken for gods; they are more idols than gods. This is why they ought to be understood as 'demons'.

Augustine admits that, even though the projection of the meaning 'demons' is correct in this particular case, we may not simply substitute the word 'god' by the word 'demons' in all the other passages. In fact, such a literally application would be wrong in first three instances, as it would place God in a position of being a head of the demons '*deus daemoniorum*', which is absurd, as it would degrade him to the status of a powerful demon, or even worse, a demon among other demons.

(B) 'The second possibility is to signify 'humans' by the word 'gods'. This notion should mean the 'people', in the sense of the people of God, who were addressed by God through the angels and prophets. Augustine is convinced that such people certainly deserve both immortality and beatitude. Augustine emphasizes the fact that here we do not speak about all humans but only about some of them, 'the people of God', meaning those who believe in God, and were chosen by Him. There is some kind of exclusivity in this usage. It becomes evident already through the expression 'God of gods', meaning that God is a true God to his people, since they recognize him as such. Those who do not recognize him as God may not be called 'gods' in the sense intended in the expression, 'God of gods' (*deus deorum*).

[57] This is one of the reasons why the psalmist often emphasizes the fact of God's creation of the universe.

However, Augustine says that 'some people object' saying that it is more dignifying to call the angels rather than humans by the denomination 'gods'. Augustine's response to this is that one possibility does not necessarily exclude the other, since we are also called to become equal to the angels in the resurrection (*quibus nos aequales futuros in resurrectione*). The fact that angels have both immortality and beatitude does not permit them to be called 'gods' in relationship to humans, even taken in the sense of the 'people of God' (*dii hominum in populo dei*). Thus we may not call the angels 'gods of gods' (*dii (1) deorum (2)*), as if intending to apply the precise wording of the initial demiurge's address from *Tim* 41ab. In doing so we refer to the angels by the first word 'gods' (1), in the nominative, and to the second as humans (2), by the word 'gods' in the genitive, but actually meaning them to be angels as the gods of the humans (*dii hominum in populo dei*). Yet, it would be wrong because it would imply that the angels are more important than the humans in the state of the resurrection. This would not be correct, since humans are equal to angels, and in no way lower than them in the state of the resurrection. Augustine proves the fact that humans are equal to angels in the state of resurrection with the following quote *I have said: you are gods, you are all sons of the Most-High* (*ego dixi, dii estis et filii Excelsi omnes*) (Psalm LXXXII, 6).

(C) The group of beings whose main task is to announce God's will to humans are to be called 'angels', according to Augustine. In certain contexts it is even more appropriate to read 'angels' where it stands 'gods'. Yet, there are clearly some other texts where it is completely inappropriate. None of the two plurals in the expression *dii deorum* ('gods of gods') (*Tim* 41a) can be understood as 'angels' for instance, *dii hominum* 'the gods of men', thus angels being understood as the gods of the men, thereby implying that there must be some sort of hierarchy: god(s)-angels-men.

However, some people (clearly Platonists, if we consider the context) think that these beings ought to be called 'gods' (*dii* - see *Tim* 41ab, as translated by Cicero) instead, because they are both immortal and happy. Augustine has already objected to this argument, saying that there must be more characteristics behind the notion 'god' than only 'immortality' and 'beatitude'. One can certainly be happy and eternal and yet not be god. This is exactly the case with angels.

Alternatively, some think that the beings announcing prophecies may also be called 'good demons' (*demones bonos*), and not merely 'demons' as we discussed above. This is what is also meant by the word *dii* in the above-mentioned psalm XCIV, namely, that the gods of the nations are not gods but demons. Augustine disagrees with that, because the demons may indeed be called immortal, but not really happy. Moreover, the name 'demons' is so detestable to Christians in the eyes of Augustine that we might better look for another, more appropriate expression. This expression is surely 'angels'.

In the end, however, although Augustine discusses all three possible interpretations of the two expressions, *deus deorum* ('god of gods') (biblical), and *dii deorum* ('gods of gods') (Platonic), namely, 'gods' (A), humans (B), angels (C), he personally adopts variant B. This not only fits his own theology but also his method of reconciling both biblical and Platonic traditions (at least where it is possible). He wants to say that not only Christians understand 'humans' where it stands *dii* ('gods') or/and *deorum* ('of gods'), but also Plato before them, contrary to the later Neoplatonic tradition.

This passage in book IX is the first one when Augustine uses the word *summus deus* in the context of the discussion around *Tim* 41ab. He does it without opposition to the concept of minor gods, *dii minores*, yet he emphasises that the gods are made by the supreme God (*a summo deo deos a se factos*).

(ε) **Anima aeterna sed non co-aeterna Dei:**
civ. dei X, xxxi. 10-25.[58]

ε 1 Why then speaking on these matters
ε 2 do not we prefer to believe the divine word,
ε 3 which we cannot follow
ε 4 in footsteps by the human intelligence?
ε 5 The divine word says that
ε 6 also the soul itself is not coeternal with God,
ε 7 but was created,
ε 8 and did not exist before.
ε 9 The Platonists then found
ε 10 the perfect excuse for themselves
ε 11 for not wanting to believe this:
ε 12 thinking the following:
ε 13 unless something always existed before,
ε 14 it could not exist afterwards.
ε 15 Nevertheless, Plato openly says about the world
ε 16 and the gods made by God in the world,
ε 17 that they began and have a beginning,
ε 18 yet they will not have an end.
ε 19 On the contrary,
ε 20 he insisted that they will remain in eternity
ε 21 by the almightiest will of the creator.
ε 22 They invented this understanding somehow as the truth,
ε 23 that this was not the beginning of time
ε 24 but the beginning of *its* substitution.[59]

Cur ergo non potius divinitati credimus de his rebus, quas humano ingenio pervestigare non possumus, quae animam quoque ipsam non Deo coaeternam, sed creatam dicit esse, quae non erat? *Ut* enim hoc Platonici nollent credere, hanc utique causam idoneam sibi videbantur adferre, quia, nisi quod semper ante fuisset, sempiternum deinceps esse non posset; quamquam et de mundo et de his, quos in mundo deos a Deo factos scribit Plato, apertissime dicat eos esse coepisse et habere initium, finem tamen non habituros, sed per conditoris potentissimam voluntatem in aeternum mansuros esse perhibeat. Verum id quo modo intellegant invenerunt, non esse hoc videlicet temporis, sed substitutionis initium. Sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes ex aeternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper ei subesset vestigium, quod tamen vestigium a calcante factum nemo dubitaret, nec alterum altero prius esset, quamvis alterum ab altero factum esset: sic, inquiunt, et mundus atque in illo dii creati et semper fuerunt semper existente qui fecit, et tamen facti sunt. «Numquid ergo, si anima semper fuit, etiam miseria eius semper fuisse dicenda est? Porro si aliquid in illa, quod ex aeterno non fuit, esse coepit *ex* tempore, cur non fierit potuirerit, ut ipsa esset ex tempore quae antea non fuisset? Deinde beatitudo quoque eius post experimentum malorum firmior et sine fine mansura, sicut iste confitetur procul dubio coepit ex tempore, et tamen semper erit, cum

[58]. *CCL*. Vol. 47. Brepols. Pp. 308-309.

[59] This *initium substitutionis* is rather obscure here. It is not clear whether it is a substitution of time, eternity, or of something else. After 'sed' we would expect an opposition to what preceded. The best meaning I can draw from it that the Platonists neither meant the beginning of time nor of eternity, but of something between the two of them. This would be similar to what Proclus meant when he spoke on the 'young gods': that they are neither eternal, nor temporal but eternal-temporal. In this sense they are a substitution of both time and eternity. Perhaps, both of time and eternity.

ante non fuisset

Speaking *de his rebus* – 'on these matters' (which have been discussed *supra* in the chapter), namely, concerning the soul's origin, eternity, temporality and implicitly, ideas – Augustine appeals *divinitati* – 'to the divine' (X, xxxi, 1). It is not entirely clear what this *divinitas* is. Is it God himself, or his word, his Scripture, his authority, his commandment? If it is any of these, why does not Augustine specify it? Most probably, he refers to all of these in collective sense.

Augustine advances the idea of the soul's creation directly by God. He changes from his previous Platonic position as it appears in *de immortalitate animae*,[60] where he argues for the soul's eternity within a creationist vision of the soul's origin.[61] According to Augustine's evidence, the (Neo)-Platonists objected to this on the basis of a definition of eternity. In his words, they think of eternity as a kind of infinitely extended temporality with neither beginning nor end, whereas he, without disagreeing with them on this matter, admits another kind of eternity with no end, yet with a beginning. Augustine's second type of eternity is, as it were, half of the Platonic eternity. If we cut an infinitely long thread in two, it will still remain infinite at one end. It seems that half of eternity is still eternity. Augustine claims that Plato shared these views. He refers to two accounts in *Timaeus*, one of which is on the creation of the world, another on the creation of gods in the world (*in mundo deos a Deo factos scribit Plato* X, xxxi.8.) (*Tim* 41ab). In both cases we deal with something (or someone)

[60] Actually, in these terms we can talk about the entire Cassiciacum period, when Augustine stayed with his friends on a villa, reading the books of the (Neo)-Platonists and engaging in philosophical discussions. This was also the period when he wrote a number of philosophical treatises, all of them of a Platonic nature. These are: *de immortalitate animae*, *de quantitate animae, soliloquia*, and to a certain extent, *de libero arbitrio*. *De immortalite animae* is a short treatise, very similar to Plato's *Phaedo*, in which Augustine is trying to come up with arguments in favor of the soul's immortality, such as 9.16.: soul is life therefore it is immortal, as it cannot lack itself.. . In *Retractiones1*.5. Augustine says that it was intended as a draft to complete *Soliloquia*. About ten years later he is fighting the views which he used to share not long ago. Now, he attributes these views exclusively to the (Neo)-Platonists. He does not mention the fact that he used to share these views himself, as if he does not want to be associated with the (Neo)-Platonists.

[61] In *de libero arbitrio*, which was written in the same period as *de immortalitate animae*, Augustine offers four different hypotheses of the soul's origin, giving a preference to none of the four. One is a traducionist hypothesis, another creationist, and the other two are two versions of the soul's pre-existence. At that time he was not really sure who is right: the (Neo)-Platonists or the Christians. Here, in civ.dei the preferences are clearly set.

who has a beginning, but no end (*Plato apertissime dicat coepisse et habere initium, finem tamen non habituros*… X, xxxi, 9). The fact of the world and the gods having no end does not depend on their nature, but on the creator's most powerful will (*potestissima voluntas* XXI.10.). Augustine implies that in a similar manner God also created the soul, so that despite its creation it will remain eternal (in the sense intended by Augustine), due to the Creator's will.

Augustine provides a Neo-Platonic objection against his own version of eternity. This concerns first and foremost the notion of beginning (*initium*). The beginning of time is not the beginning of another sort of eternity, since time is an imitation of eternity in the world of becoming.[62] Its beginning is an initiation of such an imitation. Everything that is in the world of becoming is bound in time. The celestial bodies – the 'minor gods' in Augustine's understanding of Plato – such as the stars, the sun and the moon, serve as a tool of calculation of time, as its measurement.[63] It would be probably incorrect to say that their beginning, their rising (*ortus*), as Augustine tends to see it, signifies the beginning of time, as it is hard to imagine time without the tools of its measurement. The celestial bodies are rather a kind of substitution of eternity. You can say that they are neither eternal, nor temporal, but somewhere midway between the two, eternal-non-eternal, as Proclus would formulate it later.[64] They represent eternity in time as a measurement of time.

Instead of the *initium temporis* (X, xxxi, 11, 28-29), the (Neo)-Platonists come up with the *initium substitutionis*, if we are to trust Augustine's laconic account (X, xxxi, 11). Augustine misreads their idealist presentation by providing a typical example concerning a footprint being set in eternity, and thereby not being preceded by a foot and dust (X, xxxi, 13-18). Augustine forgets that the (Neo)-Platonists are talking about the ideas and not about material realities placed in eternity. Indeed, it is hard to understand how a footprint can be set in eternity, the way Augustine formulates it. Clearly, the (Neo)-Platonists meant to speak about the ideas of foot, dust and footprint, each of them having an independent existence.

[62] Plato, *Timaeus*, 37d5.
[63] Plato, *Timaeus*, 37c5.
[64] *In Timaeo Platonis Commentaria*.

The idea of the footprint does not temporally originate from the idea of foot and dust, since time and temporality are not present in the world of ideas, whereas the footprint as an idea has its eternal existence. If we are to identify any sort of causality in the world of ideas, such causality does not depend on time. Everything that 'happens' there must be a-temporal, and thus eternal. Yet Augustine declines to mention that it is the idea of footprint of which the Platonists are talking here, not a material footprint placed in eternity. In fact, it would be an impossible project to set anything material into eternity, since everything material belongs to the world of becoming, and thus it must be mortal and corruptible.

In this text Augustine does not speak of the minor gods as celestial bodies, the way he did so in *sermones* 241-242, but rather as the gods created by God in the world (*quos in mundo deos a Deo factos scribit Plato* X, xxxi 9). Yet, who are these gods in the world? Augustine does not even mention a single Greek god in this context; we can therefore disregard as a possibility the list of traditional divinities given in the passage preceding the speech in question in *Tim* 41a7-b6. If not the traditional gods, who then are these gods in the world?

Augustine does not use the key opposition *summus deus-dii minores* any more here, excluding the crucial notions *summus* and *minores* – so typical for the previous exegesis –entirely from the discourse. What is left is the opposition *deus - dii facti (in mundo*). Augustine narrows his discourse closer and closer down to the comparison of these gods with humans, as both are created by God (*a Deo facti*). We just need either to drop the expression 'gods' while talking about these personages, or to ascribe the word 'gods' to humans. These two suggestions seem to be opposite in nature, but in a sense they both aim to achieve the same: an affirmation that both Plato and Christians talk about the same thing: created beings that receive eternal existence in their bodies. Which is what the consequence of the resurrection is.

(ç) **Persmissum sive Iussum to Quasi-Conditores**: *civ. dei* XII, xxv, 2-9.[65]

ç1 Those who believe their Plato,
ç2 believe that the whole of the living beings
ç3 were created as mortal,
ç4 among whom man occupies a recognized superior position
ç5 and is related to the gods themselves,
ç6 either by God's permission or by his command.
ç7 They believe that the living beings
ç8 are made not by the supreme God
ç9 who created the world,
ç10 but by the other minor (gods),
ç11 whom he himself also created.
ç12 If they would give up this superstition,
ç13 by which they think it is right
ç14 to seek where to perform mysteries
ç15 and offer sacrifices
ç16 to their so-called creators,
ç17 they would also easily give up
ç18 the error of this opinion.

Illi autem qui Platoni suo credunt non ab illo summo deo, qui fabricatus est mundum, sed ab aliis minoribus, quos quidem ipse creaverit, permissu sive iussu eius animalia facta esse cuncta mortalia, in quibus hommo esse praecipuum diisque ipsis cognatum teneret locum, si superstitione careant, qua quaerunt unde iuste videantur sacra et sacrificia facere quasi conditoribus suis, facile carebunt etiam huis opinionis errore.

In this chapter Augustine introduces a distinction between the supreme God (*summus deus*) and minor gods (*dii minores*) who are also creators, like the supreme Creator. He also addresses himself to the (Neo)Platonists, namely, those who 'believe their Plato'. This *credunt* 'they believe' is rather significant, since Augustine does not stress their conviction but rather their belief, as if it is the matter of religion.

He says that according to Plato, along with his followers, the supreme God (*summus deus*) created the world as well as the minor divinities. The latter created mortal animals, among whom man occupies a superior position, and he is also related to the minor gods (*in quibus homo esse praecipuum diisque ipsis cognatum teneret locum*). This is to say that the minor divinities created man as well, so that he holds a kind of kinship with them, because it is not the supreme God but the minor gods (*dii minores*)

[65] *Sancti Aurelii Augustini de civitate dei. Liber I-X. Corpus Christianorum*, series Latina *(infra CCL), vol*. 48. Ed. B.Dombart, A.Kalb. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P.381. OSA 35. P. 234

who created man. Yet, the whole realm of living beings is created either by God's command or by his permission (*permissu sive iussu eius facta*). In the end it is the supreme God who is a true creator. His creative role is manifested in his word, either as a direct command or as the giving of permission to a direct creation, which is performed by the minor divinities (and the details of which are not communicated by Augustine).

Thus, there is still a kind of multiplicity of creators of human beings. If we are to admit this, then we also have to start worshipping our creators, as the Platonists do, since our creators are also gods, even though they are minor gods.

Augustine disagrees with such a position. He claims that this belief is an attempt to justify the worshipping practices of those who follow, or better to say 'believe,' 'their' Plato (*illi autem qui Platoni suo credunt*, namely the (Neo)platonists), as if Plato can be 'believed' as compared to the sacred texts (in fact, the Neoplatonists did consider Plato to be 'divine', thus an object of worshipping practices). Augustine is convinced that if they were to get rid of these practices, they could also get rid of their belief. The logic he implies is the following: if you stop worshipping someone, then you also stop treating him as God. If you stop treating him as God then you would also stop considering him to be a creator. Thus belief follows from the practice. Stopping the practice excises the belief.

Augustine naturally considers the belief in minor gods as our creators to be wrong, since this belief assumes a multitude of creators, even though there may be a certain hierarchy among these minor gods. Augustine thinks that there is but one single creator of any sort of creatures however small or insignificant, and this creator is God, even though we cannot give the precise reason why it is so.

Thus, the expression 'minor gods' is either wrong, or should not be taken literally but figuratively. Augustine does not want to claim that this expression is wrong, because it occurs not only in the texts of the Platonists but also in Plato, and thus referring to Plato's authority would not make sense any more. Thus he assumes that it can be understood figuratively, for instance reading 'angels' under the expression 'minor gods'.

However, if we are to understand 'angels' under the expression 'gods' (cf. *supra* comments to (3C)), as the (Neo)Platonists sometimes do, then we still cannot call these gods 'creators,' any more than we could say that farmers are creators of their harvest.

At this point Augustine drops the discussion on the identity of the minor gods and their role as possible creators of humans. The discussion here is rather negative (*apophatic*) in nature, and not affirmative (*cathaphatic*), if we may use the later Dionysian vocabulary. Augustine manages to say what these minor gods are not, but he does not go as far as to say what they are. He says that they are neither gods, nor creators. That is what the Platonists claim them to be, according to him, and what Plato literally says in the text of *Tim* 41ab. Implicitly, Augustine suggests a re-interpretation of Plato, searching for a meaning in the text different from the literal one. Unfortunately, Augustine is not sufficiently explicit on this point.

The two possible implications of this discussion are: first, whoever they are and whatever they do, these 'gods' do exist; secondly, they might be angels, although even this is uncertain. The discussion seems to be unfinished, as the two following questions remain: (1) who are they (angels or some other entities)? and (2) what is their function?

One more crucial aspect of Augustine's interpretation here is that he identifies the 'supreme God's' speech as the primary cause of the creation of living beings, man included. Augustine uses two words for this process: 'permission' (*permissum*) and/or 'command' (*iussum*). He hesitates which one to apply (permissu *sive* iussu eius), when interpreting Plato's text. Both these words derive from verbs: *permissum* from *permitto – to let go, to allow, to permit*; and *iussum* from *iubeo – to order, to command*. Both these words reflect the nature of the supreme's gods action towards the so-called 'minor gods'. Both these actions are verbal actions. He either directly orders them to make living beings (*iussu*), or allows them (*permissu*) to do so. In neither of the two cases is he a direct cause of the creation of living beings. Yet in both cases he is responsible for their creation. The difference is perhaps in the initiative. If he commands, then he takes initiative himself; if he permits, he then gives allowance for the 'minor gods' in their initiative to

create living beings. Clearly, Augustine is not sure which of the two verbal actions Plato means. However, what is clear is that the creative word/speech is suggested, since both these words are used in the ablative, expressing instrumental action. This way, the Supreme God's word acts as the final cause for living beings. The intermediary causes, the so-called 'minor gods', are not really creators, but they act as if they were creators (*quasi-creatores*). They may be some sort of angels and they may assist in the creation of living beings, but in no way do they serve as their creative cause.

This is the first text where Augustine uses the expression *dii minores* ('minor gods'). It appears in opposition to *summus deus* ('supreme god'). Thus, the word *summus* ('supreme') receives a more precise meaning, a kind of synonym to 'major'.

(ζ) **Conditores: Summus Deus et dii minores**:
civ.dei XII. xxvii, 1-4.[66]

ζ 1 When Plato rightly wanted ζ 2 the minor gods who were created by the supreme God ζ 3 to be the producers of the rest of the living beings, ζ 4 so that they may obtain an immortal part from him[67] ζ 5 directly, while they[68] ζ 6 may attach the mortal part. ζ 7 This way he did not want them to be the creators ζ 8 of our souls but only bodies.	Ita sane Plato minores et a summo deo factos deos effectores esse voluit animalium ceterorum, ut immortalem ab ipso summerent, ipsi vero mortalem adtexerent. Proinde animarum nostrarum eos creatores noluit esse, sed corporum..

As has been mentioned in the discussion of the previous text, according to Augustine, Plato teaches that the supreme God (*summus deus*) created minor gods (*deos minores*) and taught them how to make other living beings.[69] He restricted them, however, by allowing them to make

[66] *CCL, Vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P.383. OSA 35. P. 240

[67] the supreme God.

[68] minor gods.

[69] Augustine's interpretation of the creation process, that the demiurge creates the souls of the living beings, whereas the minor gods create their bodies, is a simplified Platonism. The minor gods can be equally creators of bodies and souls – an opinion shared by the later Neoplatonists. See the section on Porphyry.

only the mortal parts of these living creatures, whereas the immortal part – the soul – he decided to attach personally. If we are to accept this interpretation, Augustine says, we have to choose between two implications: either the minor gods are responsible for the creation of our chains – bodies that are evil, with the consequence that we ought to stop worshipping our *quasi parentes*, as if they were parents, and accept that they are rather our true jailors – or Porphyry's doctrine of the body is wrong. Predictably, Augustine is in favour of both these statements and has an argument directed against Plato up his sleeve. He rebukes Plato for multiplying creators. Augustine concludes that one – omnipotent – creator would suffice to create all things both on earth and in heaven, and thus he would not need assistants. If the creation is seen as imperfect without the four kinds of living beings, the creator must have accomplished the task of creation not only by creating *kinds* of living beings, but the *virtual* creatures themselves.[70]

In this section Augustine shows familiarity with *Tim* 41cd, the second part of the demiurge's speech, which is the section following the text under scrutiny. Plato's demiurge says that he will personally attach a divine part to the living creatures, the part which will always remain immortal. He does not say, however, that thereby he means 'soul', the way Augustine clearly understood it. The demiurge orders the gods he is addressing to weave the mortal with the immortal. Yet, again, he did not say that they created bodies, entirely and exclusively, the way Augustine understood it in this passage by saying that he 'did not want them to be the creators of our souls but only bodies' *(animarum nostrarum eos creatores noluit esse, sed corporum* XII. xxvii, 1-4*)*. Augustine evidently projects his own views upon Plato, namely, that the soul is entirely immortal, and the body entirely mortal. He does not admit the possibility that the soul could be partly immortal, partly mortal, and if so, that the supreme God could be the creator not of the whole soul but only a part of it, that part which is immortal and 'divine'. Augustine avoids using the word 'divine' in this context, since it could compromise his attempt to approximate Plato's doctrine to the Christian one. If Augustine simply recounted that the supreme god attached a divine part, the way Plato formulated it even in Cicero's translation (*divina, tim* 41:8), then he would have allowed the idea of the soul being divine, and thus not really created. The identification of immortality with divinity is foreign to him. Augustine thought that such a doctrine is Manichaen in character: the divine soul seeking to become part of the divine. The trouble lies in the interpretation of immortality. For Plato,

[70] *civ. dei* XII, xxvii, 93.

as well as for the other Greek thinkers, immortality implies divinity. This is not so for Augustine.

The largest section in the interpretation of the *Tim* 41ab also appears in *civ.dei* book XIII, chapters xvi through xviii. Therefore, it requires major attention.

The longest passage from the *Tim* 41ab (*Cicero* 40:4-13), or indeed from any work by Plato ever cited by Augustine, appears in this chapter. We have used it in the introductory section of (Γ). The full version is as follows:

(η) **Invictissima Voluntas Dei :**

civ. dei XIII, xvi, 15-43.[71]

η 1 But as it is most evident, Plato predicts that η 2 the created gods will receive immortal bodies η 3 from the supreme God. η 4 He also introduces God, by whom they were made, η 5 as offering them a great benefice of staying η 6 with their bodies for ever, η 7 so that they may not be separated from them by death. η 8 Why is it so that those people η 9 in order to harass Christian faith η 10 pretend that they do not know what they do η 11 or even prefer to speak inconsistently against themselves, η 12 provided that they do not cease contradicting us. η 13 To make it clear, these are the words of Plato η 14 just as Cicero translated them into Latin, η 15 by which he introduces the supreme God η 16 addressing the gods made by him η 17 saying (the following):	Sed cum apertissime Plato deos a summo deo factos habere immortalia corpora praedicet eisque ipsum deum, a quo facti sunt, inducat pro magno beneficio pollicentem quod in aeternum cum suis corporibus permanebunt nec ab eis ulla morte solventur, quid est quod isti ad exagitandam Christianam fidem fingunt se nescire quod sciunt aut etiam sibi repugnantes adversum se ipsos malunt dicere, dum nobis non desinant contradicere. Nempe Platonis haec verba sunt, sicut ea Cicero in Latinum vertit, quibus inducit summum deum deos quos fecit adloquentem ac dicentem:
η 18 "You who rose *η 19 from the seed of gods,* *η 20 of whose works* *η 21 I am the parent and maker,* *η 22 hearken!* *η 23 These are indissoluble*	*Vos qui deorum satu orti estis, adtendite. Quorum operum ego parens effectorque sum, haec sunt indissolubilia me invito, quamquam omne conligatum solvi potest; sed haudquam bonum est ratione vinctum velle dissolvere. Sed quoniam estis orti, immortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles*

[71] *CCL, vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P. 397. OSA 35. P. 290. Italics in the rendered text are only used to make the text more legible and have no bearing on my argumentation.

η 24 as long as I summon (them), *η 25 even though everything that is bound together* *η 26 can be dissolved;* *η 27 but it is not good at all to want to dissolve something* *η 28 what is joined together by reason.* *η 29 Since you rose,* *η 30 you cannot indeed be immortal and indissoluble;* *η 31 yet you will be neither dissolved,* *η 32 nor any fates of death will seize you,* *η 33 nor will they be mightier than my decision,* *η 34 which is a stronger bond for your perpetual existence* *η 35 than those (bonds) by which you were bond together* *η 36 (when you were born)".*	*non potestis. Ne utiquam tamen dissolvemini, neque vos ulla mortis fata periment nec erunt valentiora quam consilium meum, quod maius est vinculum ad perpetuitatem vestram quam illa quibus estis (tum cum gignebamini) conligati.*
η 37 Here Plato says η 38 that gods are mortal η 39 due to the union of the soul with body, η 40 and yet they are immortal η 41 due to the will and decision of God, η 42 by whom they were made. η 43 Thus if it is a penalty for the soul η 44 to be united to whatever body, η 45 why does God address them η 46 just as if they were anxious to die accidentally, η 47 namely, to be separated from the body? η 48 Why does he give them assurance of their immortality, η 49 not according to their nature, η 50 which is composite and not simple, η 51 but according to his unconquerable will, η 52 by which it is possible to do so η 53 that neither the risen bodies die, η 54 nor the bodies joined together loosen, η 55 but will be preserved incorruptibly?	Ecce deos Plato dicit et corporis animaeque conligatione mortales et tamen immortales dei a quo facti sunt voluntate atque consilio. Si ergo animae poena est in quaecumque corpore conligari, quid est quod eos adloquens deus tamquam sollicitos ne forte moriantur, id est dissolvantur a corpore, de sua facit immortalitate securos, non propter eorum naturam, quae sint compacta, non simplex, sed propter suam invictissimam voluntatem qua potens est facere ut nec orta occident nec conexa solvantur, sed incorruptibiliter perseverent?

Augustine clearly states that he took this translation of Plato from Cicero (*nempe Platonis haec verba sunt, sicut ea Cicero in Latinum vertit* XIII, xvi. 23). This is the only passage where he mentions Cicero in connection with *Tim* 41ab, although here he does not say that the quote in question comes from *Timaeus*. This would be the appropriate place to do so, as this is the longest quote, which corresponds to Plato's *Timaeus* 41a7-b6 and Cicero's *Timaeus* 40.4-14. What is curious is that Augustine does not give

any sign that he has read the original. No single word in Greek is mentioned, and no possible discrepancies or possible mis-readings are referred to.

Here Augustine mixes up two separate oppositions which he was using before (1) *summus deus* (1a) – *dii minores* (1b) and (2) *deus non factus* (2a) – *dii a se facti* (2b). He uses the first element (1a) of the first opposition (1) in combination with the second element (2b) of the second opposition (2), making one pseudo-opposition (1a-2b) out of two true ones. In the course of the present discussion he mentions the expression *summus deus* twice (XIII, xvi: 16, 24), as well as mentioning four times different combinations of *dii a se facti* (*deos… factos* XIII, xvi, 16; *a quo facti sunt* XIII, xvi, 17; *deos quos fecit* XIII, xvi, 24; *a quo facti sunt* XIII, xvi, 34).

In reality, this means that Augustine abandons the other two elements ((1b) and (2a)) of the two oppositions: the two elements of the expressions *deus non factus* and *dii minores*. They indeed make little sense on their own even as technical terms. These were invented by Augustine in order to emphasise the opposition – *summus/minor*; *factus/non factus* – but they do not have an important function in the discourse. One can hardly use *deus non factus*, unless this expression is present in the context, since not many would think of God as created. Such an emphasis is needed only in two circumstances: either when someone denies it, or if there is a created god, or indeed gods, and so we need to make a clear distinction between 'created god(s)' and 'uncreated God'.

A similar observation is valid for the expression *dii minores*, yet even in a stronger sense. There can hardly be something/someone minor, unless there is also something/someone major. The comparison is clearly needed, as these words – 'minor' and 'major' – are closely related to each other. However, Augustine never uses the opposition 'minor' with 'major' as applied to gods. His unease is understandable, since the correlation must be of a comparable nature, as the major is not that far from the minor. Yet, it is not the case here.

On the one, hand, for Augustine the uncreated God is not comparable to the created gods. That is why he cannot use the opposition 'minor'-'major'. God the Creator is the only true God. He is superlative to all the rest, gods and humans included. Hence the expression *summus deus* – 'supreme God'. He is *super* – 'beyond' creation: the world and everything that is in the world. This expression is correlated not to one or few but to everything and everyone that is created, namely, everything besides himself.

On the other hand, the word 'minor' when used on its own without its opposition 'major', as it is the case with the interpretation of *Tim* 41ab by

Augustine, turns into a pejorative expression. This undermines the importance of the one to whom it is applied. It refers to the littleness, unimportance of the designated entity, almost depriving the one who is named in this way of his status, suggesting that the designation is incorrect. Thus, the *dii minores* – 'minor gods' – are hardly 'gods' at all. It is a question whether these are truly gods, whether the word 'god' is used adequately. This was the subject of discussion in book IX (4).

The result is a curious opposition (*summus deus* – *dii facti*), which does not look like an opposition at all, unless one is already familiar with the context of previous discussions. This means that Augustine is already at ease with this discourse, and has no problem expressing the main point of his interpretation. By now, he is also at ease with his reader, whom he expects to be familiar with the discussion.

Augustine pictures his opponents in an unfavourable manner, going as far as to accuse the (Neo)-Platonists of dishonesty, claiming that their hatred of the Christian faith is prior even to the consistency of their own position. They do not even mind contradicting themselves as long as they can still contradict the Christians. He says that these people pretend not to know what they do know.

The point of this 'secret' knowledge is the correct understanding of *Tim* 41ab, which is immediately cited. According to Augustine, this passage is on the incorruptibility of the body, when it is granted by the omnipotent will of God the Creator. God's great benefice (*magno beneficio*) to the gods is the promise that they will never die. Since death in the context of Antiquity was perceived as a separation of the soul from the body, then this means in Augustine's reading of Plato that the souls of gods will never be separated from their bodies. To avoid such a separation you need also to avoid bodily corruption, since the corruptible body cannot stay in eternity. It will simply fall apart at some point. So the problem is not the body as such – that which Porphyry meant by his *omne corpus fugiendum* – but the corruptible body. The big challenge is to turn the body into an incorruptible body. Having cited the *Tim* 41ab, Augustine explains the role of the divine will in the process of bodily preservation. He no longer calls it here 'omnipotent will,' as he does elsewhere, but this time an *invictissima voluntas* ('unconquerable will') (XIII, xvi, 53) and *voluntas atque consilium* ('will and decree') (XIII, xvi, 6). Speaking of the will as 'unconquerable' is peculiar. It singles it out as something unusual, so that we get an impression that an ordinary will is conquerable, that it is usually overcome, perhaps by another will. If so, then the implication is that there is a permanent combat of wills. Whether or not the will is stronger than another will, it still falls in combat at some point.

As we have seen, in this passage Augustine also identifies a divine 'decree' (*consilium*) with God's 'will' (*voluntas*): XIII, xvi, 35 (...*deos... immortales dei a quo facti sunt voluntate atque consilio*). He proceeds by dropping *consilium*, and using *voluntas* alone instead. Augustine chooses the voluntaristic manner of reading Cicero's *consilium,* which nicely stands for Plato's βούλευσις. Both *consilium* and βούλευσις imply some sort of democratic decision-making procedure (as βούλευσις stems from βουλή (vote), mostly in the form of a stone – white or black, depending on the position – placed into a voting-box, thereby contributing to the outcome of the elections). Augustine places this accent on will instead of council or decree not so much because he disagrees with Plato and Cicero, but simply because he has his own agenda in mind: there is nobody apart from God alone who he could ask for advice.

Another recurring theme is *timor mori* - the 'fear of death'. This comes up both in *sermo* 241 (2) ("*When they listened to that voice they started shivering. Why? Because they desired to be immortal and did not want to die. Therefore, in order to take away their fear, he added the following saying . . .*") and in *civ.dei* XIII.xvi. *("Thus if it is a penalty for the soul to be united to whatever body, why does God address them just as if they were anxious that they might die accidentally, namely, be separated from the body?"*). The minor gods tremble in the face of death: they do not want to die. Augustine implies that they make supplication before the supreme God.

The attribution of *timor* to the gods is Augustine's attempt to play them down, showing that they are indeed *minores*, 'minor', insignificant so to say, especially by attributing to them passions. The expression 'minor' here is pejorative, and not merely comparitive. These gods are already minor by the fact of being plural. Emphasizing their minor nature refers to their inferior status. In fact, the adjective 'minor' is similar to 'inferior' in the context of this discussion. Attributing to them *timor mori* is to show that they are mortal, as every mortal fears death. This is not a typical feature of gods. On the contrary, in the Greek context, the main characteristic of the gods is their immortality, and thus they do not have a reason for such fear. The one who cannot be afflicted by death would not be afraid of it. The main intention is to bring them as close as possible to men – to identify them with men.

(θ) **Concessus ne aliquando moriantur**: *civ. dei* XIII, xvi, 56-65.[72]

θ 1 And seeking how to repudiate the Christian doctrine,
θ 2 they attack the eternity of bodies,
θ 3 just as if there were contradictions
θ 4 in our seeking happiness for the soul
θ 5 and in our willing that she would exist for ever in body,
θ 6 as if she were bond by the chain of hardship.
θ 7 Their founder and master Plato says
θ 8 that the supreme God granted to the gods made by him
θ 9 a concession of never dying, namely,
θ 10 that they may not be separated from the bodies,
θ 11 by which they were joined together

Et quaerentes, quid in doctrina Christiana reprehendant, exagitant aeternitatem corporum, tamquam haec sint inter se contraria, ut et beatudinem quaeramus animae et eam semper esse velimus in corpore, velut aerumnoso vinculo conligatam ; cum eorum auctor et magister Plato donum a deo summo diis ab illo factis dicat esse concessum ne aliquando moriantur, id est a corporibus, quibus eos connexuit, separentur.

Here Augustine replies to the Neoplatonists' attack on the Christian vision of happiness (*beatitudio*). The Neoplatonists view a desire to preserve an eternal union of the soul with its body not as a happy state but as a state of hardship. For the Christians happiness consists in eternal union of the soul with the (incorruptible) body, whereas for the (Neo)-Platonists happiness is exactly the opposite: the eternal departure, disunion, of the soul from the body – hence the Porphyrian *omne corpus fugiendum*. For the Neoplatonists the problem is in the nature of the body, which cannot possibly remain incorruptible (which is Augustine's major claim): it is not eternal; moreover, it tends to disintegrate, attracting all sorts of diseases which lead to a fatal end. The eternal connection or even placement adjacent to (*eam (animam) semper esse velimus in corpore* XIII, xvi, 55) such an entity is an impossible project; the attempt to achieve this does not signify happiness but rather a prolonged suffering, which will end up ultimately in the same way: disintegration, disease, death.

Augustine claims that the Neoplatonists say this not because they believe what they say but because they seek to repudiate the Christian faith.

[72] *CCL, vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P. 398. *CCL, vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P. 398. Loeb 414. P. 190.

This is again an accusation in dishonesty much like that already advanced in the previous extraction (8), when the priority stays with refutation and harassment of the adversary, rather than with the consistency of one's own doctrine. According to Augustine, the Neoplatonists cannot honestly disagree with the Christian view on happiness because their founder and teacher Plato (*auctor et magister* XIII, xvi, 64) claimed exactly the same as the Christians claim: the eternal union of the soul to the body granted by the *summus deus.*

In reference to the text of *Timaeus* Augustine uses again a combined opposition (1a-2b): *summus deus* 'supreme God' (1a) – *dii facti* 'created gods' (2b), although as it is also the case with the previous section (8), the *summus deus* is to be identified with *deus non factus* (2a), wheraeas *dii facti* (2b) are to be identified with *dii minores* (1b). The use of (2a) and (1b) is implied.

In this passage Augustine continues to answer the Neoplatonist challenge of the Christian doctrine of the separation of the soul from the body as a punishment.

The Neoplatonists claim that the soul has to slough off its body in order to enter the sphere of the divine as if it were naked (*nuda*).[73] This is why the separation of soul from its body, although outwardly death, is in a sense an achievement. Augustine counters this by stating that it is not the body as such which is a burden but the corruptible body (*corruptibile corpus onerosum*).[74] The proof of this is *Timaeus* 41ab. The minor gods are said to be mortal due to the union of the soul with body, but by his decision the supreme God (*summus deus*)[75] grants them immortality.

No doubt the gods solicited their immortality, presumably because they feared death. The assurance against this fear is not their mortal nature, but God's unconquerable will (*invictissima voluntas*). In the end it is

[73] *civ. dei* XIII, xvi, 7.
[74] Ibid.11.
[75] Ibid. 18, 29.

He who vanquishes their mortal nature.[76] The question is why God endows them with bodies if existence in a body is a punishment.

Augustine attributes to Plato the views that the demiurge creator fashions the universe, as well as all other beings inside the universe. According to him, the creator personally attaches an immortal part to it, whereas the minor divinities created by him attach a mortal part to all living beings.

The curious thing is that although the expression *Christian doctrine* (*civ. dei* XIII, xvi, 65) served Augustine as a title of one his major treatises, hhe does not discuss the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh there.

(ι) S**ummus Deus - Mundus Deus – dii minores :**
civ. dei XIII, xvii, 4-9.[77]

ι 1 Thus, when the supreme God made another ι 2 what they consider 'god', ι 3 namely this world, ι 4 which was to be preferred to the other gods ι 5 who are inferior to it. ι 6 They also consider this world as animate, ι 7 possessing so to say a soul: ι 8 they assert it to be rational or intellectual, ι 9 secluded in a messy massive body…	Cum ergo deus ille summus fecerit eius alterum quem putant deum, id est istum mundum, ceteris diis, qui infra eum sunt, praeferendum, eundemque esse existiment animantem, anima scilicet, sicut asserunt, rationali vel intellectuali in tam magna mole corporis eius inclusa.

In this passage Augustine makes a comparison of significance between the world (*mundus*) and the gods (*dii*). He is aware of the fact that the (Neo)-Platonists consider the created world as a god, although he personally disagrees with this word usage (*putant deum*). He says that according to Plato, the *summus deus* made another god, namely, this world, and only afterwards made the other gods (an allusion to *Tim* 41ab), thereby showing his preference of the world to the gods, who are inferior to the world (*infra eum sunt*).

[76] Ibid. 45. Augustine likes this argument, which he attributes to Plato, with the only reservation that the speech of the creator could not have been delivered to the stars – these little discs (*orbiculos*). Ibid. 50.

[77] *CCL, vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. Pp. 398-399. … OSA 35. P. 292

Augustine presents a sort of hierarchy of Plato's divinities: the world is superior to the gods, whereas God the Creator is supremely superior to both the world and the gods. That is the reason why Augustine uses a superlative *summus* as applied to God the Creator, thereby showing that He is incomparably preferable to the other two classes. In fact, in this passage Augustine implies that neither the world nor the gods are really gods. He uses *putant deum esse* 'they think it is a god", implying that he, Augustine, does not share this opinion (cf. discussion in IX, xxii (3)), and talks about them in these terms conventionally just because Plato also does so. Moreover, if it is questionable whether the world may be called 'god', yet remains superior to the gods, then it is also questionable whether the 'gods' should themselves be described as gods. Perhaps they may be called *quasi*-gods, in a similar manner as Augustine calls them *quasi-creatores* elsewhere. Hence they become *quasi* creatures in two ways, both as gods and as creators, almost as if they were somehow fictitious. Augustine consistently calls them *dii minores* in a pejorative manner in many places, but not in this context. Here a terminological difficulty arises, since unlike in the case with the world, which we can simply call *mundus* ('the world') without adding *deus*, there is hardly such an option with the *dii* 'gods', as Plato does not use another word for them. This way they remain nameless, even though Augustine often understands them as 'celestial bodies'.

(ια) Universus Ignis:
civ. dei XIII, xvii, 19-32.[78]

ια 1 Imagine that someone would make
ια 2 a similar supposition concerning fire
ια 3 saying that the bodies used for the creation of celestial bodies
ια 4 should be returned to the universal fire?
ια 5 Would not the immortality, which
ια 6 Plato, speaking as if he were a supreme God,
ια 7 promised it to these gods,
ια 8 perish by the violence of this discussion?
ια 9 Is this here impossible, because
ια 10 God, whose will no force can conquer,
ια 11 does not want it, according to Plato?
ια 12 Thus what prevents God
ια 13 to be also able to do this concerning terrestrial bodies,
ια 14 since Plato confesses that
ια 15 God can make happen that neither what rose would die,
ια 16 nor what has been bound would be dissolved,
ια 17 nor what has been taken from the elements would be returned,
ια 18 and also that souls established in bodies would never quit them,
ια 19 and would enjoy immortality and eternal happiness with them?

Si quis hoc etiam de igne similiter adfirmetet dicat reddenda esse universo igni corporaquae inde sumpta sunt ut caelestia fierent animalia, nonne immortalitas quam talibus diis, velut deo summo loquente, promisit Plato tamquam violentia disputationis huius intercidet? An ibi propterea non fit, quia Deus non vult, cuius voluntatem, ut ait Plato, nulla vis vincit? Quid ergo prohibet ut hoc etiam de terrestribus corporibus Deus possit efficere, quandoquidem, ut nec ea quae orta sunt occidant nec ea quae sunt vincta solvantur nec ea quae sunt ex elementis sumpta reddantur – atque ut animae in corporibus constitutae nec umquam ea deserant et cum eius immortalitate ac sempiterna beatitudine perfruantur, posse Deum facere confitetur Plato ?

Chapters xvii and xviii again focuses on the Platonist theory of natural place, which on the surface does not admit the resurrection of the body, though not contradicting it on a deeper level. The starting point of the Platonists' critique is that the earth of which bodies are composed must return to earth, causing destruction of these bodies.[79] This frightening process can be stopped, according to Augustine, only by the supreme God (*deo summo*).[80] The body of the entire universe – Augustine surprisingly calls it 'Jupiter' – would make a striking example. Its soul, which spreads out from its centre by means of musical ratios, is perfectly happy within its massive body.[81] If it were not the case Jupiter would either have had to flee from his own body or be unhappy within it.[82]

[78] *CCL, vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. Pp. 398-399. Ibid. Pp. 292-294./Loeb 414. Pp.194.
[79] Ibid. xvii, 22.
[80] Ibid. 43.
[81] Ibid. 63. The soul of Jupiter as the tension of ratios through the universe is a thought-provoking idea. It sounds almost as if Augustine knew another text from *Timaeus* 47 D. This impression is

The theory of natural place equally forbids Christ and the saints to enter heaven, as their bodies are terrestrial, whereas heaven consists of ether.83 This problem can again be resolved with the help of God's almighty will (omnipotentissima voluntate),84 as alleged to have been stated by Plato. This will can preserve that which arose from perishing, and that which is bound together from disintegrating. The implication is that God's will can alter the natural order. Augustine finds a useful comparison of God to a craftsman who is able to make metals float on water, though naturally they would sink due to their weight,.85 So much better is God's skill as a craftsman, that he can make terrestrial bodies that nevertheless will enter heaven.86

Here Augustine questions whether the Creator's speech in Timaeus is not Plato's fiction. He clearly says that Plato put his own words in the supreme's God mouth (talibus diis velut deo summo locquente prommisit Plato - 'speaking as if he were a supreme God, Plato promised to these gods' XIII, xvii, 19). Augustine does not take this seriously as he is sure that Plato made this speech up. Otherwise how can Plato speak in the first person, when presenting God's words and his doings. As soon as he admitted this idea Augustine starts playing with several paradoxes, saying things like 'would not immortality perish by the violence of our discussion?'

In this passage Augustine shortly explains what he means by the expression invictissima voluntas ('uncoquerable will'), which he uses elsewhere. Here he says that 'no force (vis) can conquer God's will'. So the issue is not necessarily another will (voluntas) trying to conquer the divine will, but actually no force (nulla vis) whatsoever, the will probably included. In both cases an active agent is still implied since the text speaks about the act of conquering, victory (vincere). Yet, Augustine does not explain what force, what agent he has in mind. The context does imply some sort of

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incorrect, as this latter text does not treat the soul of Jupiter, but only that of the universe. It looks like Augustine reads this text through the eyes of a third party. Perhaps those of Porphyry, or of somebody else.

[82] Ibid. 79.

[83] Ibid. xviii.

[84] Ibid. 15.

[85] Ibid. 12.

[86] Augustine cites here a passage from *Tim* 45b most probably in Cicero's translation, which has not been testified elsewhere. This may mean that he had a copy of a more complete version of Cicero's translation of the dialogue, some parts of which were later lost. This fragment may probably fit in between Cicero's *Tim* XIII, 48 and XIV, 49, vol. I. This has been already identified by P.Courcelle in *Les Lettres grècques en occident*, p. 157, and later commented by M.Testard in *Saint Augustin et Cicéro*, II: *Répertoire des textes*, p. 59, and also G.Bardy, *La cite de Dieu, livrers XI-XIV*, 1959, pp. 300-301. According to R.Allers, the theory of the sight as a light coming from the eye was shared by many of Augustine's contemporaries. Cf. *Illumination et vérité éternelle*, in *Augustinus Magister*, I, p. 477.

opposition, perhaps an evil force or forces, yet it is not clear. Unlike another expression, omnipotentissima voluntas, used more regularly, which speaks about the general power of God's will being able to achieve anything, and does not presuppose an opposition, the invictissima voluntas along with its present brief explanation does. What Augustine wishes to say is that nothing prevents God from resurrecting bodies, there is no resistance for that whatsoever. It is just an issue of God's willing to do so.

Augustine makes a comparison with the Stoic position (without naming them explicitly), saying "if someone would make a similar supposition de igne - concerning fire" – especially when he refers universo igni – 'to the universal fire' – towards which corporeal beings have to be returned (reddenda). Now, if one speaks about one thing 'returning' to another thing, one would suppose that it originally came from there. Thus, the universal fire is both origin and destination of corporeal beings. Everything comes from the universal fire and returns to it. Moreover, even in this world of the mediation between these two points of burning the celestial beings consisting of the corporeal beings are to be accounted as having turned into celestial fire, which finally these bodies consist of.

The whole exposition concerning the universal fire strikes us by its materialistic position, which is typical for the Stoics, even though they also speak about God. Yet, according to them, God is identical with nature and reason, and in the end it consists of fire as an element. In fact, even the other basic elements seem to be reducible to the element of fire. Otherwise, the other material elements would have their permanent existence. God himself appears to consist of that primordial fire.

(ιβ) **Anima Iovis mundus est:** [87]

civ. dei XIII, xvii, 40-48.

ιβ 1 …for the soul to be happy,
ιβ 2 it should escape not only from the terrestrial body,
ιβ 3 but from every kind of body;
ιβ 4 they also say that the gods have a happy soul
ιβ 5 and yet it is joined to the eternal bodies,
ιβ 6 certain celestial bodies of fire,
ιβ 7 while the soul of Jupiter himself,
ιβ 8 which they identify with this world,
ιβ 9 is joined to all by the whole of corporeal elements,
ιβ 10 by which this messy totality of earth rises to heaven.
ιβ 11 Plato holds the opinion
ιβ 12 that this soul is spread from the very middle of the earth,
ιβ 13 which the geometricians call 'centron',
ιβ 14 through all its parts to the supreme
ιβ 15 and most distant sections of heaven,
ιβ 16 and is extended by means of musical ratios.
ιβ 17 According to Plato (*ut*),
ιβ 18 this world is the most blessed and eternal living being,
ιβ 19 whose soul keeps perfect happiness of wisdom
ιβ 20 and does not leave its own body,
ιβ 21 and whose body lives by the power of the soul in eternity,
ιβ 22 while the body that is not simple
ιβ 23 but composed of so many large bodies
ιβ 24 cannot hinder or retard the soul.

…ut beata esse possit, non terrenum tantum, sed omne corpus esse fugiendum et deos rursus dicentes habere beatissimas animas et tamen aeternis corporibus inligatas, caelestes quidem igneis, Iovis autem ipsius animam, quem mundum istum volunt, omnibus omnino corporeis elementis quibus haec tota moles a terra in caelum surgit inclusam. Hanc enim animam Plato ab intimo terrae medio, quod geometrae centron uocant, per omnes partes eius usque ad caeli summa et extrema diffundi et extendi per numeros musicos opinatur, ut sit iste mundus animal maximum beatissimum sempiternum, cuius anima et perfectam sapientiae felicitatem teneret et corpus proprium non relinqueret, cuisque corpus et in aeternum ex illa viveret et eiam quamvis non simplex, sed tot corporibus tantisque conpactum habetare atque tardare non posset.

[87] *CCL, vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. Pp. 398-399

There are two issues under scrutiny in this passage: the notion *omne* in Porphyry's much disputed claim concerning the bond between the soul and body, as well as Jupiter's identification with the world's soul.

Augustine once again comes back to a contradiction, which he attributes to the Neoplatonists: on the one hand, they support Porphyry's doctrine of the soul's escape from the body; on the other hand, they must agree with Plato that the souls of gods happily remain with their souls eternally joined to the celestial bodies. Augustine thinks that the two above-mentioned statements are not combinable: either one or the other is true. Either in order to achieve their happiness the souls of the celestial gods must flee from their bodies as well, or it should be possible that the souls are happy in their bodies, at least under some conditions, such as incorruptibility.

Augustine points out that the word *omne* – 'every' in Porphyry's dictum *omne corpus fugiendum* – refers to every kind of body, thus including both terrestrial (*terrenum*) and celestial (*coalestes*) kinds of bodies. Yet this projection does not appear to work, since the Neoplatonists do not wish to apply it to the celestial bodies, addressed by the speaking God in his speech (or so Augustine believes). Augustine's intention is to let the word *omne* get either replaced or supplied by the word 'corruptible', which is more suitable to Augustine's interpretation of Porphyry. And indeed, the problem with the body is exactly this: it wears away, gets sick, and eventually dies. But if it remained always in a perfect condition, it would not be necessarily to avoid the body. That is what Augustine claims as a Christian.

Once again Augustine does not forget to mention that the celestial bodies consist of some sort of fire (*quidem igneis*), which is what it makes them able to resist corruption. The *quidem* in this context distinguish the heavenly fire from an ordinary fire, which is commonly found in the world. The heavenly fire seems to be another, fifth element, of which the celestial bodies consist. One of its features is that it does not admit corruption. It is almost as if it is not a material element any more, as it does not allow of dissolution and death.

Augustine refers to the Neoplatonists' identification of Jupiter with the world soul. The very discourse concerning Zeus' (Jupiter's) role in the world's creation and management is clearly (Neo)-Platonic. Augustine is naturally not familiar with the identification of later Neoplatonists, particularly Syrianus and Proclus, of Zeus with the demiurge – the world's 'craftsman' and a minor god in the divine hierarchy. Yet he definitely shows familiarity with Plotinus' and Porphyry's positions concerning the demiurge, as has survived to us in *In Timaeo Platonis Commentaria*.

According to Proclus, Plotinus conceived the demiurge as double: one – down in the material world, the other – up in the world of ideas. The former's name is Zeus, the latter's Kronos. Apart from numerous renderings concerning Jupiter as the world-soul, Augustine also speaks about Kronos' status as the one above in the upper spheres in *sermo* 242.[88]

Further on, Proclus tells us that Porphyry conceived the demiurge as the world-soul. He does not specify whether Porphyry also gave the demiurge the name Zeus (Jupiter in Augustine), but it is very much likely, since Porphyry followed Plotinus as his teacher.

So, the identification of Zeus (Jupiter) with the world soul must have been Porphyry's position, as transmitted both by Augustine and later by Proclus. Augustine returns to this identification several times in the course of his polemics against Porphyry on the resurrection of the flesh, yet here we come across the most elaborate exposition of Plato's position concerning the world soul in Augustine.

Augustine faithfully renders Plato's presentation (the *ut* clause) on musical ratios by means of which the world soul is extended throughout the world body (*Tim* 34b-36e). Although Augustine specifically mentions Plato by name in this context, yet he neither refers to the title of the *Timaeus* dialogue, nor questions the attribution of Jupiter's name to the world-soul, which is not obvious. (At any rate, it is not explicitly mentioned by Plato.) However, Augustine innocently attributes to Plato the opinion concerning Jupiter. This is to say that most probably he knew this discourse via another source, probably Marius Victorinus' translations of Plotinus and Porphyry. We ought to exclude Cicero as a candidate for this transmission, since these

[88] *Cite it!*

ideas were not yet in currency at Cicero's time. Even the Middle Platonists, who came after Cicero, did not go as far as to identify Zeus with the demiurge, while distinguishing him from the top divinity. This feature was to become the trade-mark of the Neo-Platonists.[89]

ιγ) **Ars Humana et Occultus Modus Operationis Dei :**
civ. dei XIII, xviii, 8-19.[90]

ιγ 1 If then the human art could realize that
ιγ 2 the vessels made of metals
ιγ 3 by certain methods could even float,
ιγ 4 the metals which sink immediately
ιγ 5 when placed in water,
ιγ 6 how much more credible and efficient is
ιγ 7 the secrete mode of operation of God,
ιγ 8 by whose most omnipotent will, -
ιγ 9 Plato says, - neither things that rose (from the seed) can perish,
ιγ 10 nor things that are joined together can be dissolved,
ιγ 11 since it is even more miraculous
ιγ 12 that the incorporeal things are joined to the corporeal things
ιγ 13 than the corporal things[91] of some sort
ιγ 14 are joined to some corporeal things of some other sort.
ιγ 15 God can achieve it so
ιγ 16 that the earthly masses would not be pushed
ιγ 17 by any weight down into the abyss;
ιγ 18 God can also achieve it so
ιγ 19 that the most perfectly happy souls themselves
ιγ 20 place their earthly yet incorruptible bodies
ιγ 21 wherever they want,
ιγ 22 and move them in whatever direction they wish
ιγ 23 with the easiest placement and movement.

Si enim ars humana efficit ut ex metallis quae in aquis posita continuo submerguntur quibusdam modis vasa fabricata etiam natere possint, quanto credilius et efficacius occultus aliquis modus operationis dei, cuius omnipotentissima voluntate Plato dicit nec orta interire nec conligata posse dissolve, cum multo mirabilius incorporea corporeis quam quaecumque corpora (*corporea* Migne) quibusqumque corporibus copulentur, potest molibus praestare terrenis, ut nullo in ima pondere deprimantur, ipsisque animus perfectissime beatis, ut quamvis terrena, tamen incorruptibilia iam corpora ubi volunt ponant et quo volunt agant, situ motualiquis que facillimo

[89] John Dillon,*The Middle Platonism: a study of Platonism: 80 BC to 220 AD.* Duckworth. London. 1977. P. 17.
[90] *CCL, vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P. 400-401. B.Dombart, A.Kalb. P. 298.
[91] '*Corporally* things' – Migne.

In this passage Augustine continues to answer the objections to resurrection in connection to the theory of natural place, a line of argument which he began in *sermo* 242.5 (3) and continued in the previous chapter of book XIII. xvii (11) of *civ.dei*. According to this theory, the things made of a particular element are not able to enter the domain of another element. That is why earthly bodies do not belong to heaven, which consists of heavenly fire. In different places Augustine provides numerous arguments refuting this theory, mostly referring to the theory of divine omnipotence, as articulated by Plato (according to Augustine) in *Tim* 41ab.

In this particular passage Augustine turns to the demiurgic aspect of the discussion, affirming that the art/skill/technique is in a sense supernatural. It is supernatural, since it achieves results which are not at the disposal of mere nature. Skill is always needed to achieve something special. In a way, every skill seems to transgressnature, since a craftsman adds something of his own to the end result on top of the material he used. Human craftsmanship depends on various degrees of training, experience, talent and even circumstances. One can even say that the craft can vary in power. That is why mastery over nature can also vary, and yet there is no craft without some degree of victory over nature, or the discovery of a power which is usually hidden in nature. That is why craftsmanship implies a secrete mode of existence, which sooner or later might express itself in a mode of operation, covert or open. A craftsman often makes something that we are already used to, but perhaps it was not so the first time we had dealt with this thing. So it makes sense to ponder sometimes how craftsmanship is a supernatural-like skill. A good craftsman can make something which can astonish us by its novelty, as we did not think it was previously possible. A very good – 'creative' – demiurgic – craftsman can make something that might seem impossible. In this respect God the creator is the one who creates, the one who can be extremely creative, so innovative as to surprise our comprehension. He is a perfect craftsman, so he has a mastery of every skill to its utmost degree, including those skills which are neither known nor accessible to us humans.

Augustine compares human skill (*ars humana*) to the secrete mode of divine operation (*occultus modus operationis dei*). His point is that if man can transgress natural laws, so can God to a much more efficient degree.

Augustine remarks that the products made of metal sink in accordance with natural law. This has to do with the hierarchy of elements, as water occupies a higher position than earth. Therefore, earthly things should go down under water, the consequence of what we call these days the law of gravity. However, human skill can make metal vessels float on water without sinking. How much more credible and efficient, then, must be the potency of God, whose power can extend to the things which we consider miraculous, such as the resurrection of the flesh.

In this passage Augustine does not emphasize the divine omnipotence, as he often does so in other places, but rather shows that every craft, human or divine, is in a way supernatural. There is a secrete mode of existence in nature, which is brought into open by the secrete mode of operation. In this sense, every miracle seems supernatural, since we are not acquainted with its causes. So, God's doings are similar to the doings of a human craftsman, just as his (the Creator's) skills are craftier and more creative. God is indeed omnipotent, but in the sense that he can perfectly perform every skill, actual and imaginative. So, the accent here is not on the miraculous nature of God's doings, among which we should obviously count the resurrection of flesh, but on the divine perfect craftsmanship, which can make these things happen, not necessarily in transgression of nature, but perhaps in its affirmation, since God the Creator is the source of its existence. So, his nature is even more natural than that of what we usually call 'nature'.

(ιδ) **Omnipotentissima Voluntas Dei:**

civ. dei XIII, xviii, 43-53.[92]

ιδ 1 If the minor gods,
ιδ 2 whom Plato commissioned the making of human being
ιδ 3 among other terrestrial living beings,
ιδ 4 could remove, as he says,
ιδ 5 the quality of burning from fire,
ιδ 6 leaving the quality of emitting light
ιδ 7 which shines forth through the eyes;
ιδ 8 then should we doubt to concede to the Supreme God,
ιδ 9 of whom he[93] conceded the might and the will
ιδ 10 not to die for the things that rose),[94]
ιδ 11 and also to the diverse as well as dissimilar things,
ιδ 12 namely, the corporeal and the incorporeal,
ιδ 13 that are connected to each other,
ιδ 14 to be separated by no dissolution,
ιδ 15 that he also can take away
ιδ 16 the corruption from the human flesh,
ιδ 17 to whom he grants immortality,
ιδ 18 that he can retain its nature,
ιδ 19 and preserve the congruency
ιδ 20 of its forms and bodily members,
ιδ 21 and remove the sluggishness of its weight? [95]

Si dii minores, quibus inter animalia terrestria cetera etiam hominem faciendum commisit Plato, potuerunt, sicut dicit, ab igne removere urendi qualitatem, lucendi reliquere quae per oculos emicaret: itane Deo summo concedere dubitabimus, cuius ille voluntati potestatique concessit, ne moriantur quae orta sint (*sunt* B1b Migne), et tam diversa, tam dissimilia, id est corporea et incorporea, sibimet conexa nulla possint dissolutione sejungi, ut de carne hominis, cui donat immortalitatem, corruptionem auferat, naturam relinquat, congruentiam figurae membrorumque detineat, detrahat ponderis tarditatem

Augustine refers to *Tim* 41b saying that, according to Plato, God, due to his mighty will (*voluntati potestatique*), neither lets beings that are born perish, nor allows composite beings to dissolve.

As a point of reference Augustine here uses not only the content of *Tim* 41b but also *Tim* 45b. Augustine construes the following parallel: (a) if the minor gods (*dii minores*) are capable of withdrawing the power of burning from 'fire' in the eye, while leaving it with the power of emitting light, so that it shines through the eye (cf. *Tim* 45b); and (b) if the supreme God (*summus Deus*) is capable of preserving from death the things that have been born (*Tim* 41b2-b4); and also (c) if the supreme God (*summus Deus*) is

[92] *CCL, vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P. 400-401. ? Ibid. Pp. 300, 302.
[93] Plato.
[94] *orta sint (satu* – from a seed implied).

capable of preserving from dissolution the things that were composed of parts as different as body and spirit (cf. *Tim* 41b2-b4); then (d) we must accept that the supreme God could also operate upon the flesh of those whom he has endowed with immortality. God can do this in such a way that he may withdraw corruption, yet preserve nature by removing its burdensome weight and retaining its apparent forms and members.

Clearly, Augustine uses here again the argument of the potency of the creator, who has already revealed sufficient power to do things comparable to resurrection. If the minor gods are capable of doing things that seem to be almost impossible, whereas the supreme God is capable of doing things really impossible, why then should it appear unlikely that the supreme God would care for proving immortality and incorruption?

Besides the contextual usage of *Tim* 41ab, Augustine uses some expressions typical for Cicero's translation, such as (*satu) orta sunt*, 'those who rose (from the seed).' This expression appears twice in the case of the *Tim* 41ab translation, once with *satu*, another time without it, though *satu* is still implied.

At the end of this subchapter, Augustine promises to speak about the resurrection of the body by the end of the book. And that is what he indeed does at length in the last book of *civ.dei* (cf infra ις and especially ιη).

(ιε) Indissolubila vita cum suis corporibus et sinum deorum

civ. dei XIII, 19, 12-20.[96]

ιε 1 Yet nobody will dare to prefer the wise men
ιε 2 (whether those who are to die or already dead,
ιε 3 namely, those who are currently bodiless
ιε 4 or will quit their flesh),
ιε 5 to the immortal gods.
ιε 6 According to Plato,
ιε 7 the Supreme God promises to provide
ιε 8 with a function of an indissoluble life,
ιε 9 which is an eternal existence with their bodies.
ιε 10 Plato also thinks that the best way the humans live,
ιε 11 when they still lead an honest and pious life,
ιε 12 so that when separated from their bodies
ιε 13 they may be received in the bosom of their gods,
ιε 14 who never quit their own bodies

Neque enim quisdam audebit illorum sapientes homines, sive morituros sive iam morturos, id est aut carentes corporibus aut corpora relicturos, diis inmortalibus anteponere quibus Deus summus apud Platonem munus ingens, indissolubilem scilicet vitam, id est aeternum cum suis corporibus consortium, pollicetur. Optime autem cum hominibus agi arbitratur idem Plato, si tamen hanc vitam pie iusteque peregerint, ut a suis corporibus separati in ipsorum deorum qui sua corpora numquam deserunt recipiantur sinum

In the next chapter Augustine plunges into a discussion of re-incarnation, which is often the case in the course of *civ.dei*: he tries to contextualize the resurrection doctrine on the basis of its background in ancient Greek philosophy (cf. a similar case with chapter 26-27, book XXII; cf ιη *supra*). In this chapter, he introduces the new concept of the bosom of the gods (*sinum deorum*):

This passage, although being no direct extraction from either Plato or Cicero's version of *Timaeus*, again contains clear indications that Augustine is dealing with *Tim* 41ab. Appearing in the passage are the common figures of a 'Supreme God' (*Deus Summus*) and 'the gods' (*dii*) referred to twice, yet not as 'minor gods' in opposition to the *Summus Deus*; God's promise (*pollicetur*) of an eternal life; the word 'body' with several variations (*corpora, carentes*) and derivatives mentioned in the course of the discussion (six times within a few lines); and finally, a clear underlining intention of connecting this issue to the idea of bodily resurrection (especially a transgressed death in present and in the future).

[96] *CCL, vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P. 401.

This last point is significant: Augustine draws a parallel between the bodies of gods and the bodies of humans (*civ. dei* XIII, 19, 19-20), hinting that they are possibly identical. However, the notion of 'bosom' (*sinum*) is also common in the Bible, for instance when applied to the eternal paradise, where Abraham dwells with his progeny (notably, the story of poor Lazarus, Lk 16:23, also Ps 74:11, Isaiah 40:11), or indeed, to the Father's bosom. It is nevertheless curious that Augustine mentions (perhaps unintentionally) the bosom of gods at this point and not the bosom of the Father (a notion which he is not afraid to attribute to Porphyry elsewhere, cf. *infra* ις). He does not go as far as to speak of the bosom of the Supreme God (as he and not the Father is mentioned in this passage). In this case he might have said that the gods would also stay in the Supreme God's bosom with their bodies.

Remembering that Augustine mostly means simply 'celestial bodies' when he speaks about the gods in the context of *Tim* 41ab, by this notion of 'bosom' he might simply mean the 'stars', implying that in future life not only the earth but also the other planets and stars might be available as a resting place for resurrected bodies.

For his *Tim* 41ab exegesis, Augustine traditionally turns to the notion of a 'promise' of eternal existence (*aeternum consortium*), which he equates (*id est*) to the 'indissoluble life' both in the bodies of gods and the bodies of wise men. This equation is not self-evident, since a Platonist may claim that *aeternum consortium* must be a bodiless existence (a soul that has disposed off her body). Augustine diplomatically applies the expression 'wise men' (*sapientes homines*), instead of his preferred 'saints' (*sancti*), in order to stay within the confines of the platonic discourse, accessible to his opponents.

By this time Augustine is so much at ease with the use of *Tim* 41ab in his own version, that he fluently alternates the terminology mentioned in different places of the passage, e.g., he speaks about an *indissolubila vita* 'indissoluble life' instead of 'indissoluble bodies'. The application of the concept of 'indissolubility' to 'life' is peculiar. Standard usage is to speak of 'immortal life,' meaning life which does not cease, that is, does not die. The adjective 'indissoluble' has been applied (in plural) both by Plato (ἄλυτοι) and Cicero (*indissolubiles*) to things in general, which happen to be the 'bodies' of the gods addressed in the passage, which are also said to be mortal at first, yet becoming immortal.

Book XXII is the climax of the entire *civ.dei* treatise. Augustine fully employs all tools available to him. The accent is fully on the theory of resurrection.

(ις) **dii Deum patrem et regem perhorrescunt**

civ.dei XXII, xxv, 11-31.[97]

ις 1 This is still the God, whom
ις 2 (as I have already raised this issue elsewhere
ις 3 and certain to mention again),
ις 4 both Porphyry and the oracles of his gods confess,
ις 5 since he desires to prove that
ις 6 these divinities themselves stand in awe;[98]
ις 7 he glorifies him,
ις 8 naming him God the Father and King.
ις 9 … But on the issue of his omnipotence,
ις 10 due to which he did so many incredible things,
ις 11 we have already spoken a lot.
ις 12 If they want to find that he cannot be omnipotent,
ις 13 they have the following: I would say:
ις 14 He can not lie.

Ille est enim Deus, quem (sicut iam dixi aliquotiens, nec commonere me piget) confitente Porphyrio atque id oraculis deorum suorum probare cupiente ipsa numena perhorrescunt; quem sic laudavit, ut eum et Deum paterm et regem vocaret… Sed de omnipotentia ejus, qua tot et tanta facit incredibilia, jam multa diximus. Si volunt invenire quod omnipotens non potest, habent prorsus: ego dicam: mentiri non potest

The following passage contains a brief yet valuable allusion to *Tim* 41ab, along with a reference to some essential points in the doctrine of Porphyry , whom Augustine posthumously challenges in polemics.

This passage is clearly a comment on *Tim* 41ab: the emphasis is on God (*ille est enim Deus*), despite objections (*enim*), whom everyone confesses (Porphyry and his oracles included); reference is made to the multitude of divinities (*ipsa numina*) who stand in awe (*perhorrescunt*) in the presence of the God who is beyond them. However, the text does not contain a literal quote from *Tim* 41ab: it is rather something of Augustine's insight into Cicero's *Tim* 40: 8-9: the gods' reaction to the implied 'Since you rose, you cannot be immortal and indissoluble',[99] the text referred to twice elsewhere in a similar fashion .[100]

[97] *CCL, vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P. 852.

[98] in his presence.

[99] Sed quoniam estis orti, immortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis. *CCL, vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P. 397.

[100] Earlier in *sermo* 241.8. (cf. β), and later in *civ.dei* XXII. 26: 17-21 (cf. ις).

The text is evidence of how Augustine perceives the imagined reaction of the gods addressed by the speaker-god. The speaker-god first mentions the gods' mortality. According to Augustine, their reaction to this declaration is fear, the fear of death. Then the speaker-god calms them down by assuring them that they will not die, owing to his omnipotent will, which will reverse the natural course of events. However, this second part of Augustine's customary exegesis is absent in the present comment. What is also peculiar is that Augustine does not cite the *Timaeus* passage concerning the mortality of gods. He simply speaks of them as those who stand in awe (*perhorrescunt*) in the face of God, seemingly without a reason.[101] Perhaps they suspect that he will declare their mortality. That is what appears to cause their anxiety.

This is the second time (the first is in *sermo* 241.8, cf. β) in the context of Augustine's discussion of *Tim* 41ab that he refers to the gods' fear, here manifested as 'awe' and 'anxiety'. The first time it was about the fear of death; this time it is about the gods' awe of God, who is the Father and King.

In fact, Augustine is dealing with two different phenomena, described with two different expressions: (a) *timor auferre* (cf. β), (b) *perhorescere* (*hic* ιε). At first glance, these are mere synonyms referring to fear. However, fear has various aspects. It is one thing to fear losing something – money, possessions, job, children, (good) health, life, etc. But it is something else to fear the unknown, a type of fear that is often described as *anxiety*.[102] Still another sort of fear is a fear of God, an *awe*, which is the fear clearly referred to in this passage. Unfortunately, Augustine does not go further into a discussion of these differences.

The text also contains Augustine's polemic engagement with Porphyry, although it is not clear how Porphyry uses *Tim* 41ab:[103] Either Porphyry really used it against the Christians, or Augustine suggests Porphyry should have used it, or finally Augustine suggests that both Plato and Porphyry should have read it Augustine reads it as a Christian. He mentions Porphyry as follows.

First, Porphyry is specifically mentioned by name in connection with the *Tim* 41ab passage concerning the *gods*' *awe*; secondly, he is referred to as confessing God along with 'his oracles of gods' (*oraculi deorum suorum*,

[101] One may know this reason perhaps if one puts all relevant passages from various Augustine's writings next to each other, assuming that Augustine does not change his mind.

[102] Martin Heidegger has written insightful analysis of the distinction between 'anxiety' and 'fear' in *Was ist Metaphysiek*? 1929.

[103] Typically, the studies on Augustine focuse on the issue of universal salvation. E.g. G.Clarck, Porphyry and the universal way of salvation, in Studies on Porphyry Karamanolis, G.E. Sheppard, Anne D. R. London: Institute of classical studies, 2007.

which Augustine subsequently refers to as *numina*), which Augustine claims to have raised elsewhere (*sicut iam dixi aliquotiens*), meaning that either Porphyry wrote these oracles himself or he is busy interpreting the ones which existed before yet became important for him for some reason (thus *suorum*); thirdly, Porphyry seems to be going into personal meditations with God by glorifying him (*quem sic laudavit*)[104]; fourthly, by naming this God (*Deus*) with the expressions *Pater* (Father) and *Rex* (King).

The issue here concerns *oraculi deorum* ('gods' oracles'), also referred to as *numina* ('divinities'),[105] apparently cited or written by Porphyry.[106] The very first mentioning of Porphyry's name (*de concensu* I, 15) by Augustine is cited in connection to the oracle. Apparently, unlike many other enemies of Christianity, who play an ambiguous game, Porphyry is an honest philosopher who went to consult his gods on the subject of Christ, and got an answer: *laudare* – 'to praise' him. Augustine is not excited: this praise means little to him, saying that the demons also know Christ, but the gods of the pagan nations are demons.

The oracle Augustine refers to at this point could possibly belong to Porphyry's hand. Just before this passage (*civ.dei* XXII, 25: 9-11), following the line drawn earlier in the treatise (*civ.dei* XVIII, 53: 54.), Augustine shows familiarity with the ideas attributed to Porphyry that have come down to us in *Apocriticus* concerning Peter the Apostle's sorcery as the force behind many conversions to Christianity. This is a line of thought that was clearly popular at the time; it is to be noted that the philosopher criticized by Macarius Magnes charges Peter with responsibility for the death of Annanias and his wife Saphira (*Acts* 5:1-11; fragment 101 A.Harnack),[107] as well as for the death of his guardians in jail (*Acts* 12:18, fragment 102 A.Harnack). Peter is suspected of using means that border on magic. [108]

There is also a possibility that the oracle(s) in question are only cited, and possibly commented on, by Porphyry. The later Neoplatonists, especially from Jamblichus onwards, used to refer to and comment intensely upon the Chaldean and Orphic oracles on the matter of divine

[104] The inserted *sic* ('so'/'in such a way') plays down the importance of *laudavit*: perhaps Augustine means that Porphyry's way of glorifying God is precisely by naming him *Father* and *King*, even if Porphyry just refers to him this way without necessarily intending to glorify him.

[105] The notion *numina* is understandably frequently used in *civ.dei* : 36 times, as the treatise is dedicated to the polemics with pagan cults.

[106] G.Bardy, *La cité de Dieu, livres XIX-XXII*. Desclée. 1960. Pp. 676-677. P.Courcelle, *Les Lettres grecques en Occident*. Pp. 169-172 ; J.O'Meara, *Porphyry's Philosophy from oracles in Augustine*. Paris. 1959. P. 72-83.

[107] Macarios de Magnésie, *Le Monogénès*. Edition critique et traduction R.Goulet. Vrin. Paris. 2003. Vol II. P.149.

[108] Ibid.

utterances; these oracles were treated as equal if not superior to the works of Plato.[109] Augustine is also familiar with the Eritrean Sibillian oracles[110] and the oracles of Hacate,[111] as well as Apollo's oracles, which he cites at length in *civ.dei* as contradicting each other: the former treating Christ with devotion yet as a mere man, the latter claiming that he was a criminal justly condemned by righteous judges. Augustine's claim is that all of these oracles cannot really be divine as they do not agree with each on the matter of who Christ is.

This passage is a close if not almost literal equivalent to the one in which Augustine refers to Porphyry as the most noble bitter enemy of the Christians: *idem dues quem perhorrescunt numina paganorum, etiam este Porphyrio, nobilissimo philosopho paganorum* (*civ.dei* XIX 22). There too, the oracles, before being cited and commented on in the following chapter, are referred to as the *numina* which *perhorecunt*.

[109] We have many of those commentaries preserved in Proclus. Cf. L.Brisson, Safrey.

[110] which he quotes at length in *civ.dei* XVIII, 23 as a testimony of the recognition of the divinity of Christ, since the cited 'oracle' makes the word ΙΧΘΗΣ as an acrostic with the first letters of each line in the original Greek. This is to refer to the Christ as *Jesus Christ Son of God, Saviour*.

[111] Cf *civ.dei* XIX, 23. This chapter has a rather long discourse with quotes from Poprphyry and his oracles, especially the one that says that it is a waste of time of trying to discuss the truth with Christians.

Further on in this section there are implicit repercussions of the arguments raised by Porphyry against the resurrection of the bodies, as cited by Macarius Magnes in his *Apocriticus*. Augustine reformulates these arguments to his own liking. What he makes of them is the following:

a) that it is evil and unworthy of God to do such a thing as resurrect the dead.[112]

b) that God's omnipotence is limited, if not absurd, as he cannot lie (and die, cf book V).[113]

[112] The Philosopher under critique of Macarius Magnes says that the teaching on resurrection is silly for several reasons… that it is again silly to think that God would raise averyone form the dead, especially those who do not deserve to be resurrected, whose bodies are ugly and disproportionate. *Le monogégèse*, 24 a2: 1; 24b7:6.

[113] The argument is somewhat different, as the Philosopher cited by Macarius Magnes says that God is not evil even if he wanted to become so; he cannot commit a sin either. *Le monogégèse*, 24a6:21-23. Cf. R.Goulet. P.316. Yet, in essence this touches the same point of divine moral goodness and perfection: God cannot become immoral, ultimately evil, or not good in any sense, by coming a sin or another, e.g. lying or doing anything of the kind.

(ιη) **Quod est impossibile fuisse promissum**

civ.dei XXII, xxvi, 1-37.[114]

ιη 1 "But does not Porphyry say, - they say, -
ιη 2 that the soul in order to be happy
ιη 3 should escape from any kind of body"?
ιη 4 Thus it will lead to nothing,
ιη 5 when we say that the body is incorruptible,
ιη 6 if the soul is not happy,
ιη 7 unless it escapes from any kind of body.
ιη 8 I have already discussed this as much as it was possible
ιη 9 in the above-mentioned book,
ιη 10 so here I will just mention one point from there.

Sed Porphyrius ait, inquiunt, ut beata sit anima, corpus esse omne fugiendum. Nihil ergo prode est, quia incorruptibile diximus futurum corpus, si anima beata non erit, nisi omne corpus effugerit. Sed iam et hinc in libro memorato quantum oportuit disputaui; uerum hic unum inde tantum commemorabo.

ιη 11 Plato, the teacher of them all,
ιη 12 should amend his books
ιη 13 and say about their gods,
ιη 14 who he says are secluded in celestial bodies,
ιη 15 that in order to be happy
ιη 16 they will have to escape their bodies, namely, die.
ιη 17 However, the God, by whom they were made,
ιη 18 in order for them to be secured,
ιη 19 promised them immortality,
ιη 20 namely, to remain eternally in the same bodies,
ιη 21 which is not due to their nature,
ιη 22 but due to his prevailing decision.
ιη 23 There he[115] also refutes this
ιη 24 what they say concerning resurrection of the body
ιη 25 that it is not to be believed, since it is impossible.
ιη 26 Most clearly, according to the same philosopher,
ιη 27 when the God who is not made
ιη 28 promised immortality to the gods made by him,
ιη 29 he said that he will do the impossible.

Emendet libros suos istorum omnium magister Plato et dicat eorum deos, ut beati sint, sua corpora fugituros, id est esse morituros, quos in caelestibus corporibus dixit inclusos; quibus tamen Deus, a quo facti sunt, quo possent esse securi, inmortalitatem, id est in eisdem corporibus aeternam permansionem, non eorum natura id habente, sed suo consilio praevalente, promisit. Ubi etiam illud evertit quod dicunt, quoniam est inpossibilis, ideo resurrectionem carnis non esse credendam. Apertissime quippe iuxta eundem philosophum, ubi diis a se factis promisit Deus non factus inmortalitatem, quod inpossibile est se dixit esse facturum.

ιη 30 Thus Plato says that he spoke as following:

Sic enim eum locutum narrat Plato: "Quoniam

[114] *CCL, vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P. 853-854. *Loeb* 417. Pp; 344-346
[115] Plato.

ιη 31 "Since you rose,[116]
ιη 32 you indeed cannot be immortal and indissoluble;
ιη 33 yet you will neither dissolve,
ιη 34 nor any fates of death will seize you,
ιη 35 nor will they be mightier than my decision,
ιη 36 which is a stronger bond for your perpetual existence
ιη 37 than those[117] by which you were bond together".
ιη 38 If only the hearers are not as unreasonable,
ιη 39 as not deaf,
ιη 40 they cannot doubt that according to Plato,
ιη 41 God promised the impossible
ιη 42 to the gods who were made.
ιη 43 For when he says
ιη 44 "you cannot be immortal
ιη 45 yet you will be immortal
ιη 46 by my will",
ιη 47 what else does he mean than
ιη 48 "you will be something
ιη 49 what cannot be due to me who does it".
ιη 50 And so, according to the same Plato,
ιη 51 he who will raise the flesh
ιη 52 incorruptible, immortal, spiritual,
ιη 53 promised the impossible.
ιη 54 Why do they declare that
ιη 55 what God promised is impossible?
ιη 56 Why do they declare the impossibility
ιη 57 of what the world believed on the promise of God,
ιη 58 that the same world which was also sent forth to believe?
ιη 59 They declare all this
ιη 60 while we declare that
ιη 61 this will be done by God,
ιη 62 who even according to Plato does the impossible.
ιη 63 Thus, in order for the souls to be happy,
ιη 64 the body does not have to be avoided,
ιη 65 but to be retained incorruptible.
ιη 66 And in which incorruptible body
ιη 67 will they more suitably rejoice
ιη 68 than in the one in which they lamented

estis orti, inquit, inmortales esse et indissolubiles non potestis; non tamen dissolvemini neque vos ulla mortis fata periment nec erunt valentiora quam consilium meum, quod maius est vinculum ad perpetuitatem vestram quam illa quibus estis conligati."Si non solum absurdi, sed surdi non sunt qui haec audiunt, non utique dubitant diis factis ab illo Deo qui eos fecit secundum Platonem quod est inpossibile fuisse promissum. Qui enim dicit: "Vos quidem inmortales esse non potestis, sed mea voluntate inmortales eritis," quid aliud dicit quam "id quod fieri non potest me faciente tamen eritis"?

Ille igitur carnem incorruptibilem, inmortalem, spiritalem resuscitabit, qui iuxta Platonem id quod impossibile est se facturum esse promisit. Quid adhuc, quod promisit Deus, quod Deo promittenti credidit mundus, qui etiam ipse promissus est crediturus, esse impossibile clamant, quando quidem nos Deum, qui etiam secundum Platonem facit impossibilia, id facturum esse clamamus? Non ergo, ut beatae sint animae, corpus est omne fugiendum, sed corpus incorruptibile recipiendum. Et in quo convenientius incorruptibili corpore laetabuntur, quam in quo corruptibili gemuerunt?

[116] *Satu* – 'from (a) seed' – is implied.
[117] bonds.

In this passage Augustine says that he is shortly going to come back to the discussion, which he already exhausted in some previous book (*in libro memorato*). Most probably he means book XIII (another alternative to this *liber memoratus* is book XII), since he quotes it there as many as seven times out of sixteen in the course of his writing,[118] and also promised to come back to the issue of resurrection by the end of the treatise – as we see Augustine keeps his promise. He says that since he has sufficiently treated it before, he will underline just one single point of the discussion. The point is exactly the one, to which he regularly comes back, namely concerning the relationships between the supreme god and the minor gods. Apparently, he thinks that it is essential for the reader not to forget it.

As we see it, the fragment contains a set of quotes from *Tim* 41ab in book XXII, chapter xxvi. It consists of one larger citation (xxvi, 17-21; 25-27) followed by two interpretative extractions from it (*civ.dei* xxvi, 25-27; 26-27), and a comment by Augustine. In fact, it is a cluster of texts around *Tim* 41ab: in a way this is the closest Augustine gets to what a modern scholar would call textual analysis.

As if he has heard objections to his previous exposition, Augustine gives a response to Porphyry concerning the limits of the incorruptible body saying that the latter would not appreciate the body even if it were incorruptible. It is not sufficient for a being to be incorruptible, first and foremost it has to be happy. Yet, it cannot possibly be happy in a body, since every body has a tendency to disintegration in the forms of mortality and disjunction. That is why to achieve happiness a soul has to escape its body, whatever body it is. Their union is not natural, unless 'natural' means a temporary union in the world of becoming.

This time Augustine ridicules the Platonists not only by suggesting Porphyry's Jupiter should jump out of his body, - that is what he has done before (XIII, 17), - but also that Plato's minor gods should abandon their celestial bodies, i.e. die.

Augustine again uses a rhetoric aspect in this discourse, by equalizing 'quitting a body' with 'death': the first carrying a rather positive meaning for a Platonist, but a negative one for a Christian - at least according to Augustine. Death is something morbid, dark, frightening, and thus it is to be avoided. Socrates was indeed an exception, when he not only said that life is an art of dying, but also gave an example of having no fear of death. An ancient understanding of death as a separation of the soul from its body plays into Augustine's hand, because he fights death by wishing no

[118] Ph. Levine "translates" *in memorato libro* as "in the 13th book", which is simply not there literally. Besides the provided option Augustine could have also meant book XII.

separation of the soul from its body. Yet, Augustine does not realize that for a Platonist death, as the separation of the soul from its body, does not have to be avoided- on the contrary, perhaps it is even to be desired. Thus, Socrates' example of refusing to escape death and drinking a cup of poison is the one *par excellence*, and not at all an exception.

If Plato really wished the gods to quit their bodies, he would have to correct his own books, as he appears to be inconsistent dixit Augustine.[119] At one point he permits the demiurge to alter gods' mortal and dissoluble nature into immortal and indissoluble ones. At some other point he lets his followers claim that any kind of body is to be avoided. Why do we find this desire for corporeal immortality, if everything corporeal is to be avoided? Augustine claims that the fault is not that of Plato but of Porphyry. The two statements are indeed irreconcilable: the former is correct, the latter is wrong.

Augustine thinks that there is but one alternative to this: to enjoy the body that is given to you in this life. Further more, he undertakes an understandable, yet perhaps not very convincing step. He says that if one day you are to receive an incorruptible body, you would most probably choose the one in which you underwent so much suffering.[120] However, one can easily turn the same argument around saying that perhaps you would better choose for a body, in which you precisely never underwent any suffering, as suffering is not exactly something to remember with pleasure. Augustine's argument on this matter sounds a bit forced. Clearly, he wishes to achieve a Christian doctrinal statement but he does not make a sufficient effort to demonstrate that this statement is natural and also acceptable for a Platonist.

Once again Augustine reminds the Platonists about the omnipotence of the creator by referring to his speech addressed to other gods in a slightly abridged version. This time Augustine is somewhat more restrained in his tone, replacing the term 'supreme god' (*summus deus*) with 'uncreated god' (*deus non factus*), and the minor gods (*dii minores*) by the gods created by him (*dii a se facti*).[121]

The point Augustine is making is that God can do the impossible, not only according to the Christians, but also according to Plato. And it is clear from the speech of the non-created God to the created gods. If this God does the impossible by preserving their immortality and indissolubility against their nature, then he can also do something even more impossible, namely,

[119] *civ. dei* XXII, xxvi 9.
[120] Ibid. 40.
[121] Ibid. 17, 18.é

turning the mortal bodies of the humans into immortal, as well as the dissoluble into indissoluble.

The tricky thing is that Augustine confuses application to the gods with that to the humans, virtually mixing the two of them. Does the fact of the demiurge putting the nature upside down for the sake of the gods mean that he is willing to do the same for humans? Probably not. This does not have so much to do with his personal preference towards the gods, as rather with his own mandate, his limits. The demiurge declares that the world will not be perfect without the humans and the four other genera (…). Yet, he refuses to create them precisely for the reason he gave: because otherwise these beings will be also perfect, since everything what he creates, even simply comes in touch with becomes perfect. Yet, mortality and dissolubility are imperfections. That is why the demiurge does not deal with them in any way. If he would have created the humans himself they would have been perfect, immortal and indissoluble. In a word, they would not have been humans: they would not have been themselves. The synonym often used in Antiquity for humans is precisely this: mortals. Only the gods are immortal. An attempt to become immortal for humans is an attempt to surpass their nature.

The gods he creates have an intermediary nature between himself and the humans. They are perfect, since the demiurge created them. Yet, they also must be imperfect, otherwise they would not be up to the task of creating the mortals.

In book XXII chapters 27 and 28 following the discussion around *Tim* 41ab in *civ.dei* XXII, 26 Augustine discusses the issue of reincarnation as bordering on the Christian doctrine of resurrection.[122] First, in chapter 27 he objects to the reincarnation theories, demonstrating that their different versions contradict each other, sometimes quite radically. He provides examples of the versions which were put forward by Plato and Porphyry, each of them as if containing three elements: one correct one and two incorrect ones. Augustine says that if we take the better element from each of these reincarnation theories (understandably following Augustine's wishes) we will arrive at the correct 'reincarnation' version, namely, a resurrection theory.

Augustine's presentation goes as following: Plato (P) says that the human soul would reach the heaven after death, but would desire to return to an earthly body (PA); the body, it receives, might be a body of an animal

[122] In this respect particularly interesting Leo Scheffczyk, *Der Reinkarnationsgedanke in der altchristlichen Literatur.* Muenchen. 1985, which unfortunatly focuses almost exclusively on Neo-Testamental literature.

(PB), depending on the kind of life it had in a previous circle. In accordance with Plato's presentaoion there must be many circles of reincarnation process to follow (PC).

Porphyry (p) says that the human soul would reach the heaven after death, but would not wish to return to the body (pA), since it is better for the soul to avoid every kind of body (*omne corpus fugiendum*) [123] where it undergoes so many sufferings (pB); it will still come back to the earthly body (which is a punishment on its own), yet this body will be exclusively human(pC). Ideally, it would be good to root off the soul's involvement in the reincarnation process.

Augustine suggests to combine PA with pC thereby receiving the desired doctrine concerning the life of the soul in the body. This is: after death the human soul would reach the heaven, but would desire to return again to an earthly body (PA); it will still come back to the earthly body, yet this body will be exclusively a human one (pC).[124]

Thus, Augustine claims, if Plato and Porphyry would first agree with each other, they would get the correct doctrine, namely, the Christian doctrine of the bodily resurrection.

Augustine's suggestion is both hypothetic and not serious: Plato and Porphyry would have to be Christians in the first place, since who is going to instruct them on the matter of the right and wrong extructions of their theories? Three other possibilities of combining their doctrines on the life of the soul in the body (PA with pA; PB with pA; PB with with pB) do not agree with the Christian belief.

Augustine refers to certain Christians (*nonnuli nostri* XXII, 28, 1), whose names he does not mention, who think Plato had a view on resurrection similar to the Christian doctrine. As the exposition *supra* demonstrates Augustine does not share this position, although he rethorically explores it to his advantage. He claims that Plato's views on soul's destiny are closer to the Christian views than the views of his mistaken followers. Considering Plato's considerable authority among the philosophers and the intellectuals in general, his position may be used to correct the others and bring them to Christianity.

Augustine provides us with an illustration of exploring two narratives which include a return-from-death, accompanied with a special

[123] Only in *civ.dei* we come across this Porphyry's expression four times: II, 43; X, 29; XII, 26; XXII, 26.

[124] Augustine says that the reason why Porphyry did not accept Plato's reincarnation theory of the possible soul's return into an animal body was because he was ashamed to think that his mother might become a mule. XIII, 19 .

reincarnation story, all in favor of the Christian resurrection doctrine that we come accross in the following chapter (*civ.dei* XXII, 28). One of them is the myth of Er (*Republic*, 10.614), known to Augustine through the intermediacy of Cicero, as is often the case with Augustine's knowledge of Plato. Without retelling the story and even mentioning Er's name Augustine goes straight to Cicero's opinion on the matter, claiming that Plato's story should not be treated seriously, since he was in a playful mood while writing it. He still finds it worth mentioning, as on its own it supports the theory of resurrection.

Augustine retells another story from *Labeo*,[125] the contents if which are similar to the one presented in Plato's *Republic*. This is about two men who died on the same day and on their way to the underworld they met each other on a crossroad. At this point they were permitted to return to the world of the living, where they stayed friends until they died.

It is uncertain to what degree Augustine is familiar with Plato's myth of Er, whether or not he has enough grounds to draw a conclusion concerning the text. Since he refers straight to Cicero's opinion, it seems he trusts his source on the matter, that Plato does not actually mean the implications of what he says in *Republic* 10.614. Augustine is hardly familiar with the details of Plato's reincarnation theory, discussed in some other dialogues such as *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*. He attributes some of Plato's ideas to certain *genethliaci* – the astrologers who link the date of one's birth to the character of one's person, as presented by Marcus Varro in *On the race of the Roman People*. [126] Apparently, those *genethliaci* speak about *palingenesia*, by which they mean the return of the soul to its original body after four hundred fourty years following the departure of the soul from its body. It is peculiar that for this information Augustine refers to Varro and not Plato, as the latter had also similar ideas, and the former lived three hundreds years later than the latter.

2.3. Conclusion: Augustine's *Timaeus* 41ab Relative Coherence

In the four parts of this chapter we looked at the material from four different sides. In the first section we provided all Augustine's quotes from *Tim* 41ab we could find in English translation. Each quote was provided by a general name in Latin taken normally from the discussed passage, the discussion of the previous and the following text, as well as my commentary on the quotation. Due to the absence of a systematic representation of the material and certain difficulty to follow Augustine's

[125] civ.dei XXII, 28
[126] *Ibid.*

thought connected with this issue, we rearranged the material in the second section to a more or less systematic form. Taking into consideration that Augustine uses *Tim* 41ab in his polemic against Platonists, who were trying to refute the theory of the resurrection of the body, I provided the arguments of both parties in the third part: first, the arguments by Porphyry and the followers of his resurrectional theory; then Augustine's refutation of these arguments based on *Tim* 41ab interpretation. I end this chapter, presenting the material, with two methodological sections.

While commenting on the passage, Augustine does not say anything about the methodology of his approach. His reference to *The Doctrine* as his main methodological work is not very helpful, as he simply does not take into account most of the requirements which he himself defined, except for the priority of love in comparison to everything else, including historical facts and the accuracy of interpretation.

Augustine's interpretation of *Tim* 41ab is coherent and creative. It is easy to follow his thought. He considers all the elements present in the text for his goal: to prove the resurrection of the body. While doing so, he answers a series of wide spread objections of the resurrection theory of the time, that mostly were raised by Porphyry's followers. Augustine's originality is in using the text of a highly praised, yet pagan philosopher for the prove of this purely christian doctrine. His prove is cunning and delicate, although not without rhetoric and tricks.

However, to sum up some hermeneutical foundations of Augustine's approach towards *Tim* 41ab based on his analysis, we should note the following concerning the audience of his interpretation (1) and its purpose (2). Allow us to refer to the allegory of a court case that we already briefly mentioned and which we added as a humoristic part of the conclusion of our whole thesis.[127]

We can determine in fact two main audiences whom Augustine addresses: to one he makes an open appeal (A); the others (B) he addresses in a more hidden manner.

Openly Augustine seems to address the Neo-Platonists of his time. He sees them not so much as opponent-philosophers in a dispute, but rather as public prosecutors, whose point of view should be discredited. However these Neo-Platonists are not main the addressees of his discourse. While addressing the prosecutor Augustine is directing his arguments at the members of the jury who will pass judgment in the end. These are the potential readers (B1)of his *City of God* e.g. the Empire's intellectuals. These members of the jury will judge the charges against Christians who are held

[127]cf. supra: eisagoge and especially the last part of the exagoge)

responsible for the fall of the Empire and who endanger its ancient culture. In reality these jury members were the local intellectuals of Hippo (B2), some of whom had also heard Augustine's sermones 241-242 on Tuesday and Wednesday of the Bright week. These local jury members could be considered loyal and prejudice to a certain degree: Augustine as attorney can feel quite at ease.

The purpose of Augustine's interpretation – his defense - is three-fold. We find a refutation of the critique of the Christian teaching on the resurrection (A), a defense of validity of the teaching on resurrection (B),and a justification of being Christian and thereby an appeal for the conversion of intellectuals to Christianity (C). *Tim* 41ab is in the introduced allegory as a document brought to court by the attorney at a decisive moment. The document discredits the prosecutor as it has been created by his close relative. Although the prosecutor knows that it has nothing to do with the case, yet he is confident it will go unnoticed by his opponent and the members of the jury.

The attorney's explanation of the meaning of the document is very clear and convincing from the rhetoric point of view. But from the point of exegesis it is a different matter. First, as we have mentioned previously, Augustine analyses *Tim* 41ab only from inside, without any link to the preceding and the following passages of the Platonic dialogue. In other places he applies the same method - for instance while analysing the second most frequent passage from Plato – *Tim* 29 c3-4. Secondly, Augustine's analysis is based completely on Cicero's translation. There are no references to the original, neither to other translations that were available in his time. The author trusts the interpreter completely considering that he has not just done a good job translating but also has received a proper insight into the intricate text with its complex poetics. Augustine does not consider it necessary to analyze the concepts – we would say the 'technical terms' - in the text. Apparently, everything is clear to him, or at least he makes the reader believe it is the case.

AUGUSTINE's TIMAEUS 41AB

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Chapter Three
Augustine's Tim 41a7-b6 Examination

3.0. Introductory examination: Understanding Augustine's *Tim* 41 a7-b6.

This chapter employs as it were a magnifying glass, a tool, which helps to see certain vital, hidden details in our second look at the material – an examination. In the present chapter we will examine the following domains: *translation*, *themes*, *evolution* and *methodology*, which will be treated in the following four sections: (3.1.), (3.2.), (3.3.) and (3.4.).

The reader may be surprised to see a section (3.1.), dedicated to the comparision of our translation of Augustine's Tim 41ab. This post factum explanation is a justification for the additonal use to which it is put in chapters Five (on Cicero's translation) and Eight (on Stoic idioms) infra. The objective of our criticism in the translation section (3.1.) is not to demonstrate our superiority in the field of classical studies, but to highlight the priority of philosophical/theological expertise. On the basis of our Tim 41ab example we argue that making a competent translation requires more than the mastery of the language. We will emphasize the need for figuring out the message and background. We will demonstrate this with the help of the Stoic idioms we managed to distill from the text, which we will later treat in the last post-evaluation chapter on the Stoic presence, cf. infra Part Two.

The theme(s) section (3.2.) is related to the commentary section in Chapter Two, i.e., the material above, with an emphasis on the speaker. In its sub-section we shall focus upon two controversial issues concerning Jupiter (3.2.1.), and Omnipotence (3.2.2.).

The evolution section (3.3.) is dedicated to the evolution of Augustine's ideas in the course of his discussion. For this pupose we will use the summus deus-dii minores opposition, which until now we deliberately kept up our sleeve. We argue that the summus deus – dii minores opposition undergoes a certain development in Augustine both terminologically and contentwise. We will follow up the clarification process.

The methodological section (3.4.) also consists of two sub-sections: doctrinal (3.4.1.) and rhetorical (3.4.2.). We argue that there is a kind of a methodological ambiguity in Augustine's exegesis of Plato's Tim 41ab. We will also see how Augustine followed his own principles provided in his *de doctrina Christiana*.

We will attempt to identify the degree of Augustine's creativity, complexity and coherence in his presentation of Tim 41ab, as promised in previous chapter Two. At this point, we will nuance such issues such as divine omnipotence and the status of the speaker and the audience.

3.1. Rendering Augustine's Timaeus 41 a7-b6

We are using our own translation of all the sixteen passages from Tim 41ab dealing with Augustine's quotes and commentaries, cf. Chapter Two supra. A new translation is absolutely necessary, as it is not possible to understand the issues discussed on the basis of existing translations.

3.1.0. Rendering Justifications

We will render three justifications for the novelty of our reading.

The first reason in favour of a new translation is to word the context of discussion around Tim 41ab in a modern language. The text, as it stands, is confusing enough. The job of deciphering is made even harder by the presence of pseudo-ancient words and expressions, which only add to the confusion. E.g. 'ye', 'thee', 'thy', 'doeth', 'it must needs' (especially preferred by Dodds), etc. are completely outdated.

The second reason is inexact usage of the technical terms by the majority of translators. Many of them seem to find Augustine's terminology confusing. They end up 'improving the original', which is what Cicero also did with the text of Plato. That was also the way Augustine went about Cicero's translation. If we are to do the same with Augustine's presentation, we may end up further away from all these texts. We think we ought to stop this 'vicious' circle. We decided to let Augustine's word-usage stay as it is. He was himself a clever thinker. Perhaps he meant something by using the very words he used. So, in a way, we decided to liberate Augustine's word from the improvements. This way we may also understand better the background of the discussion and Augustine's intentions.

Third, many of these translations are inconsistent. Some of them translate the same word or expression one way in one passage, another way in another passage. They are either not attentive towards what Augustine is reputedly saying, or they do not think it has significance worth

respecting. We tried to be consistent throughout our usage. We think that these expressions have technical use and therefore they ought to be translated carefully and used consistently. This was easier to do in our case, since, unlike all the other translators, we deal with a relatively small amount of passages.

We were not trying to be difficult for difficulty's sake. Nor were we always dissatisfied with the existing translations. E.g. It is not easy to render Porphyry's famous motum omne corpus fugiendum into correct English, yet G.G.Walsh translated it quite adequately with 'the soul must escape from every kind of body' in his rather standard translation.[1] Yet, in our view some passages and technical terms ought to be revised, since they represent something of importance and an incorrect rendering could lead to misunderstanding.

There are a large number of translations of the civ.dei available in various languages. We chose just seven of them in an attempt to understand the tradition of reading this text through the lens of modern scholarship: there are four in English - since my present research is in English : those by M. Dodds, G.G. Walsh, Ph. Levine, R.W. Dyson;[2] there is one in French - another Roman language as the 'original' Latin: by G. Combès [3]; we have used one translation in a Germanic tongue, e.g. German, by W. Thimme[4] and finally seen my own origin a Russian translation by I.Mamsurov (И. Мамсуров) in order to have also a significant Slavic language present.[5] We

[1]G.G.Walsh, *The City of God, Book VIII-XVI.* Washington. 1963. Book X. P.172. However, as if to undermine the reader's trust, G.G.Walsh is not consistent with his translation, rendering the same expression by *a soul must be completely divested of any body*' in Book XXII, 26. He changes a definite article for an indefinite one (*the* for *a*), arbitrary adds an emphasizing adverb 'completely', and finally uses an allegorical 'divested' making us think of idea of the body as some kind of vestment of the soul. None of these is directly present in *omne corpus fugiendum*. Cf. Ibid. Books XVII-XXII. P. 491.

[2]M.Dodds, G.Wilson, J.J.Smith. *Augustine*, *The City of God*. The Modern Library. New York. 1950.

G.G. Walsh, G.Monaham, *Saint Augustine, The City of God*, Washington, *The Fathers of the Church*, Vol. 14-15. 1952. Ph.Levine, XII-XV (1966), W.Green XXI-XXII (1972), D.Wiessen (1988), *Augustine, City of God*. Loeb Classics. 414, 417. Cambridge (Mass), London. Ph.Schaff. *Saint Augustine's City of God*. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. Vol. II. 1979. R.W.Dyson, Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*. Cambridge Text in the History

[3]G.Combès, *La cite de Dieu*, Œuvre de Saint Augustin. 34-37. 1959.

[4]W.Thimme, *Aurelius Augustinus, Vom Gottesstaat.* Werke des Augustinus. Artemis. Reihe Antike und Christentum. Zuerich. 1955.

[5]*Августин, О граде Божием*. Пер. И. Мамсурова. М.: Путь. ***2000***. We decided not to use a rather outdated Russian translation of *civ.dei* from the end of the 19th c. Cf. *Августин*. *Творения*. / Пер. Киевской духовной академии (1879-1908, в 11 ч.). Т. 3,4. *О граде*

finally decided not to use a Dutch translation by J. Wytzes, due to its many, serious deficiencies.[6] We are confident that our selection proves sufficiently representative and satisfactory for our present purpose.

Several translations have become canonical translations. Some of them were not only republished but also re-edited by other translators in abridged and altered form. I am thinking here of the classical English translation by M.Dodds, a more modern English translation by G.G.Walsh and a French translation by G.Combès.

To understand the reception of civ.dei in modern European languages, we decided to deal with the most important technical vocabulary as well as the ambiguous expressions from the original, as interpreted by the translators. These are to be analyzed in the passage (1), and around the passage (2). Let us proceed to the first point.

Rendering Augustine's Tim 41 a7-b6 passage

We identified ten major difficulties in Cicero's text as cited by Augustine. These are: (a) satu orti estis, (b) adtendite, (c) parens effectorque, (d) me invito, (e) haudquaquam boni, (f) quoniam estis orti, (g) ratio(ne), (h) ulla mortis fata, (i) consilium meum, (j) (tum gignebamini).

Let us examine the differences and similarities between the above-mentioned translations concerning these major issues. Although these have been variously resolved by different translators, we have either given our own version or chosen a particular translation and provided a reason for doing so.

We translated *satu orti estis deorum* by 'you rose from the seed of gods'. Apart from Combès ('vous êtes de la race de dieux': la race for satu is clearly a miss), all the translators took this expression quite literally. First, they translated *satu* by 'stock' (Dodds, Walsh, Levine, Dyson, I.Mamsurov). Only Walsh and Thimme rendered it as 'seed/Saat', as we did. Secondly,

Божием - переиздание этого перевода в 4 т.: Сост. С. И. Еремеева. СПб, Алетейя — Киев, Уцимм-пресс, 1998.

[6]J.Wytzes, *Augustinus: De Staat Gods*. Kempen. 1947. This translation has too little value for our research, since it is drastically abridged in the most crucial for our purpose places. E.g. the book XIII – the crucial part of the discussion on Plato and Platonism - is skipped entirely. This tradition of reading civ.dei in an abridged accessible form is easy to understand: the treatise is written for the readers of its time: many parts seem not interesting to modern readers. On the other hand, this work can not be avoided, since it contains real theological pearls in certain parts. For this reason, it seems important to translate these very parts. But the choice will always stay personal; one piece might seem important for one interpretor, while for the other one it will be different.

deorum rightly turned into of gods. Yet, Dodds mistakenly renders *(satu) deorum* by 'divine (stock)'. Not only did he replace a plural noun by a singular adjective, but he also obscures the polytheistic presence as the source of gods. Possibly, Dodds made an attempt to Christianize both Plato and Cicero following in Augustine's footsteps. Yet this achieves little, and worse, it distorts their texts: one can hardly convert someone posthumously. Third, all the English translators rendered *orti estis* by 'sprung', since to say 'to spring from seed' is better English than 'to rise from seed', as we do. What these translators missed is the 'oriental' flavor of *ortus*. Our choice for 'rose' has to do with the usage of *ortus* for the 'rising of celestial bodies', for that is clearly what Augustine saw in this passage - as he identified the gods addressed by the speaking god with the celestial bodies. Mamsurov rendered it by *произошедшие* 'having originated': our original down-to-earth expression is rendered by a rather abstract translation.

We translated Cicero's *adtendite* by 'hearken', following the majority of other translators who use similar equivalents: 'give ear' (Walsh), 'give heed' (Levine, Dyson), 'gebt acht' (Thimme). However Dodds correctly used 'consider that' and later Combès also has 'considérez que' as well as Mamsurov's *обратите внимание на* (come up with an original idea) - rightly noticing that there was no punctuation in the early manuscripts. This way they went as far as to correct R. Giomini - the editor of the critical edition (CCL) - whose punctuation (a double dot in this case)[7] flags his interpretation. Seeing that an equivalent for Cicero's *adtendite* does not appear in Plato's original, this is an interesting solution. The flaw of this attempt consists in a missing link between *adtendite* and *ego* in Cicero, which seems to render these translations fluent through their own additions: that (Dodds), que (Combès) and на (I.Mamsurov).

We translated Cicero's *parens effectorque* by 'parent and maker', similarly to Walsh's version ('the parent and maker') with the tiny, yet significant difference of the absence of the definite article. This way we make a speaking god introduce himself with a proper name, 'parent and maker', and not as the only father and exceptional professional, as it appears in Walsh's version. In Latin there is no article - the majority of the Slavic languages are similar in this respect: it is perhaps easier to get around this issue in the Russian translation. In the majority of European languages one has to make a choice between inserting an article (either a definite or indefinite, which carry their own ramifications), or dropping it all together. Both options (with and without an article) are possible in

[7] CCL 48, p. 397: XIII 16, 25.

English, yet it is more natural to drop it here, since it is absent in the original. Plato did not use the article either, although he could have, since Greek allows for either usage.

A similar line of reasoning is applicable to some other translations, as their versions are also almost identical, deferring from each other exclusively by the use of articles. E.g., the way the god speaking is talking about himself in his initial address: δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε is rendered by 'parent and author' (Dyson) versus 'the parent and author' (Dodds). By dropping the article Dyson makes a proper name of this expression, whereas in using the definite article Dodds emphasizes the uniqueness of the speaker as the father and author: he is the father. Perhaps both are right, yet the article is absent in Plato's Greek, therefore, it is quite natural to drop it in English as well, although the uses of articles in Greek and English sometimes can vary substantially. As we will see later , Proclus makes a point of it, saying that, since the article is absent, this is a name, and the name is double.[8] Nevertheless, these translations are not from Greek but from Latin, a language without articles in the classical period. Therefore, Dodds' translation is equally justifiable: the need of dropping or adding an article depends on the context. In this case *parens effectorque* can indeed be translated both as 'parent and author' or 'the parent and author': although we think the former's raison d'être is more justifiable.

Moreover, we think 'maker' is more adequate for *effector* than 'author'. That is why I side more willingly with Walsh than with Dodds and Dyson. Indeed, there is no suggestion of authorship present in the Latin original. The accent is on someone who brings a cause to an effect. Dyson does a better job with his 'creator', yet this word is more suitable to render its Latin counterpart *creator*, for instance in translating Chalcedius' version at this point. Thimme's accent is on the proto-origin with his 'Urleber'. Combès clearly translates not from Cicero but directly from Plato at this point with, 'l'auteur et père', trying to correct Cicero's change of word-order. If so, this is not a translation but correction, a license Cicero, too, didn't hesitate to take with Plato in the first place.

Mamsurov went astray with *то что рождено и сотворено* 'that what is born and created' rendering *parens effectorque* with a neutral, instead of two clearly present masculine words. He curiously stripped the speaking god of his self-introduction both in Plato and Cicero.

We translated Cicero's *me invito* with 'as long as I summon (them)'. Again we are closer to Walsh's 'as long as I will them to be', and quite close

[8] *In Timaeo Platonis Commentaria*.

to Dodd's 'so long as I will it' and Dyson's 'for as long as I will it'. In a way these correspond better to Plato's verbose ἐμοῦ γε μὴ ἐθέλοντος than to Cicero's laconic yet more ambiguous *me invito*. The advantage of this set of interpretations is that they leave the speaking god in control of what is happening to the gods he created. At the same time he also lets them be 'otherwise' before he summons them. He also reserves the right to change their status. Yet, the obvious disadvantage of all these versions is that two Latin words are rendered by a long intricate expression. They also disambiguate Cicero's 'original'.

Levine runs into a simple contradiction within his own text by rendering me invito with his literal 'against my will'. - Frankly, I think this is a trap Cicero designed for those attempting to read his text too literally. - Thereby Levine misses Cicero's play of words in the context, the latter grasping adequately Plato's shrewd, almost but not quite self-contradictory wording. True, if we take the Greek of Plato,
ἐμοῦ γε μὴ ἐθέλοντος literally it means exactly what Levine makes of it. Yet, he does not translate Plato but Cicero, the latter correctly grasping an ambiguity of the original expression, which he adequately preserved by *me invito*. 'Against my will' is a mere simplification, mistakenly ridding the text of every ambiguity. And indeed, if we read the text the way Levine translated it, it seems that the gods became indissoluble against the will of the demiurge who made them. Thereby, it appears that the demiurge does things that he himself does not want, or achieves things that he cannot change. This may well be one of the possible readings of the text, which is present in Plato, and Cicero's version. However, it is not the only possible reading. It is certainly not the way Augustine read this text, since he always emphasizes the omnipotence of the creator, which Levine's version simply denies. It is curious to place 'car je le veux' (Combès) and *ибо такова Моя воля* 'since so is My will' (Mamsurov), which means just the opposite to what Levine makes of *me invito*. Thimme makes IT conditional by using 'if' (German: wenn) in his 'wenn ich's nicht will'.

(a) Further, by rendering Cicero's *haudquaquam boni* with 'it is not good at all' we provide a mere synonym to the existing translations: 'it can never be good' (Walsh), 'it is nowise good' (Levine) and 'it is by no means good' (Dyson). Dodds went too far with 'it is wicked', since it is questionable whether the denial of good (not good at all) may be taken as an equivalent to the affirmation of evil (wicked). Perhaps, the true meaning is somewhere midway between the two of them: neutral. Cicero did not use the word for it, whereas Plato did (ἐθέλειν κακοῦ). Combès turned this statement into a question 'mais quel bien aura-t-il?' Mamsurov got rid off any ethical connotation with *никоим образом* ' in no way' not rendering any moral connotation of Cicero's *bonum/boni* or Plato's κακοῦ. This is quite inattentive since these are key concepts for both the Platonists and the Stoics.

(b) We regarded *Tim 40.4* and *Tim 40.8.* in Cicero's translation as directly connected to each other, since *Tim 40.8.* is merely a shortened version of *Tim 40.4*, missing the word *satu*, which is nevertheless implied. Therefore we translated *satu orti estis deorum* with 'you rose from the seed of gods', and also *quoniam estis orti* by 'since you rose'. We remain alone in this vision, compared with other translators - e.g. 'seeing that ye have been born' (Dodds), yet we think it makes no sense to insist upon the difference. In Plato these two expressions - Θεοὶ θεῶν and δι᾽ ἃ καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε - have indeed little, if anything, to do with each other, yet at this point we ought to render Cicero's version, not Plato's, as in the former these are practically equivalent. Looking at Plato's original, to my mind, does not help so much but even deforms understanding, since Augustine did not read Plato but Cicero. The difference between Plato's and Cicero's texts is substantial at this point. Curiously, the other translators from Augustine's Cicero did not seem to have noticed this. They are inconsistent, translating similar expressions *(satu) ortis estis* and *ortis estis* differently in the scope of just a few lines. Although in the second quote *satu* is missing, otherwise the quote is identical with the first. Mamsurov is consistent, using a similar expression in both cases : *произошедшие* and *вы как получившие начало*, yet placing the accent on 'origin' and not on 'rising' or 'springing'. In the end, such a rendering loses the color of the original ('rising') thereby becoming somewhat abstract. We also chose to translate these similarly, as it stands in the text: first time as if it were with, the second time without, *satu*. True, without *satu* this expression means first and foremost "at the beginning'. That is what all the other translators opt for. Yet, we have to take into account also Cicero's philosophical taste.

(c) There appears to be a consensus in rendering Cicero's *ratio(ne)* literally with 'reason' - all English versions under consideration put it like that; 'raison' – Combès; 'Vernunft' – Timme; and 'разум' – Mamsurov. Plato's original is not heeded as it contains no reference to reason but to an εὖ, - ethical good. Mamsurov replaced this 'work of reason' in Cicero's original with a *соединено с разумом,* 'connection with reason', which is clearly a different matter. Something caused by reason must be completely rational/reasonable, whereas something connected or mixed with reason needs to be only partially reasonable. Thus Mamsurov turned something thoroughly wholesome into what is only partially so.

(d) We seem to be alone in rendering *ulla mortis fata* literally by any fates of death (what does that mean?). The translators found the greatest difficulty in rendering *fata*: 'decree' (Walsh), 'necessity' (Levine), 'doom' (Dyson), 'fatalité' (Combès), 'Todesschicksal' (Timme), *судьбы* (I.Mamsurov). Some turned the plural *fata* into a singular (uncountable), e.g. 'decree' (Walsh), 'necessity' (Levine), 'doom' (Dyson), 'fatalité' (Combès). Combès even went so far as to use this twice in one sentence, although there is no such repetition in Cicero's translation. Only those who used 'fates' for *fata* also went for the plural (Dodds, I.Mamsurov), even though its English rendering sounds a bit awkward. Yet, since the plural is present both in Plato and Cicero, it makes sense to use it, especially as Cicero's plural *fata* most probably, yet not necessary, relate to the divinities dealing with fate - as it is even more clearly so with Plato's Moiras, which cannot be used otherwise but as divinities' names.

(e) We translated *consilium meum* by 'my decision' literally following 'mein Beschluss' (Thimme) and '*Моё решение*' (I.Mamsurov). The expressions 'my will' (Dodds) and 'ma volonté' (Combès) are far too voluntaristic, placing too much stress upon the will, although they both exhibit consistency as mentioned above in (d), when similar expressions were applied - 'so long as I will' (Dodds), 'car je le veux' (Combès)). However, neither Plato nor Cicero showed such a far-reaching 'consistency'. This was not due to the lack of adequate vocabulary in Latin, as *voluntas* is a perfect match for 'will' and 'volonté'. There must be a reason why Cicero did not use it. The other three translations also emphasize some other aspects of the will: 'my purpose' (Levine, Dyson), 'my determination' (Walsh).

(f) We rendered *tum cum gignebamini* by **(**'when you were born'**)** , which looks like a slightly modernized version of 'when ye were born' (Dodds): 'ye' exchanged for 'you' and brackets inserted. What is important is that this assertion is of the generation of gods. In fact, the concept of generation has been also presented by Dyson although in a somewhat

cruder wording: 'when you were begotten' (Dyson), placing a bit too much of stress on the act of giving-birth. Two other versions directly used a noun for birth at this point: 'lors de votre naissance' (Combès), and *при рождении* 'at birth' (Mamsurov), while Cicero applied a verb *gignebamini*. Walsh and Thimme went for the authentically Platonic notion of 'becoming' with '…when you were brought into being' and 'bei eurer Erzeugung', 'generation' being an ambiguous alternative to the notion of birth. Levine took this position to its extreme with '…at the time when you were created'. Evidently, 'created' is a loose interpretative rendering of *gignebamini*. The notion of gods' creation, as well as their coming into being, refers to god-the-speaker's self-introduction as *effector*, which can be translated as 'creator'. Yet, Levine rendered *effector* as 'author', which does not elucidate his position. There is another problem with this sort of philosophically minded translations. If the speaking god is a creator of the other gods in this passage, who is He, then, father to? In this light, the use of the word *parens* appears completely unnecessary, whereas if one applies the notion of birth to the way the gods came into being, then the function of the speaking god as 'father' becomes clear. In this case, the other word *effector* signifying the speaking divinity corresponds to *operorum,* 'works'.

(g) Further on, apart from Walsh, Levine and ourselves, no other translators bracketed **(***tum cum gignebamini***)** in their versions, thereby attributing it to Augustine's quote. However, a number of manuscripts of the civ.dei appear without this expression, which most likely means that a later copyist projected this from Cicero's text.[9]

Rendering Tim 41 a7-b6 context

As far as the context of the quotes is concerned we have chosen to focus upon six technical expressions that concern our topic, and which play an important role in the reception of *Tim 41ab* by Augustine. These are: *summus Deus* (a); *dii minores* (b); *invictissima voluntas* (c);*(omni)potentissima voluntas* (d);*ars humana* (e); *and initium substitutionis* (f). These expressions are not only important, but also not easily definable in the context of their usage.

Besides these six terms, there is also a whole range of technical expressions that bear a definite sense, and yet we have not considered it important to discuss them in this chapter since there is almost no difference in their translation. The following expressions fall under this category:

[9] *CCL* 48, p. 397: XIII 16, 33-34.

Deus fabricator deorum,[10] *Deus non factus*,[11] *dii a se facti (conditos deos)*,[12] *quasi-conditores*,[13] *timor dei*,[14] *occultus modus operationis dei*,[15] *permissu sive iussu*,[16] *eorum auctor et magister Plato*.[17]

When we put all these expressions together, we can remark that four of these concern the figure of the speaking god, three of these concern the addressed divinities. Two of these expressions are about the general context of the discussion: the title of the cited book and the status of its author. The rest of the expressions are about the powers of the speaking god and the consequences of his actions. Nevertheless, we are not going to analyze these expressions according to these divisions, since the first two are closely related to each other, and formulated in relationship to each other. They make little sense if considered on their own. Therefore, I have placed them next to each other.

Let us have a brief look at the six crucial expressions.

***summus Deus* (civ.dei VIII, 23; civ.dei IX, 16; civ.dei IX, 23; civ.dei X, 14; civ.dei XII, 25; civ.dei XIII, 7; civ.dei XIII, 14; civ.dei XIII, 16; civ.dei XXII, 1).**

Although the editors both of PL and CCL put the first word of these expressions in Miniscule, and the second word in Majuscule, we chose to render this key expression somewhat differently as 'Supreme God', giving both words capitals. The German and Russian translators make an emphasis upon one physical dimension, height, in particular serving as the allegory of superiority. They translate *summus Deus* as 'the highest God': 'hoechtest Gott', *верховный Бог*. The expression 'supreme God', used by all the English translators as well as by Combès in French 'dieu suprème' is better nuanced, since 'supreme' is not just about the height, but primarily about supremacy, going 'beyond' all the others in different senses: starting from different directions and ending up with other dimensions of reality: physical, metaphysical, ethical.

There is the common issue of the use of capitals with the Majuscule and Minuscule for the S(s)upreme G(g)od, as well as the application of the definite article, in the context of Augustine's exegesis of Tim 41ab. Since this

[10] *sermo* 241.8.
[11] *sermo* 242 :5.
[12] *sermo* 242.5., *civ.dei* IX.23: 1. *civ.dei* X, 31 *:4; civ.dei* XIII 16 :42.
[13] *civ.dei* XII, 25, 8.
[14] *sermo* 241.8.
[15] *civ.dei* XIII, 18.
[16] *civ.dei* XII, 25:5.
[17] *civ.dei* IX, 23:3; *civ.dei* XIII, 16 :40.

difference in spelling did not exist in Augustine's time (everything was in the majuscule), it would be nothing but speculation to claim that he would have inserted one or the other. Yet, to a certain degree it makes sense to indulge in such speculation, as what is at stake here is not merely about spelling but also conceptual. So we have to figure out which of the two Augustine actually meant: the Majuscule lifts up the status of the speaking divinity, the Minuscule degrades it. The issue, if I am right in raising one, pertains to how Augustine saw the status of *(S)summus (D)deus* in the 'divine' hierarch. There are two words used in this expression: both of them have distinct significance, especially in relationship to each other. So we would have to consider the following: First, when Augustine cites Plato's *deus*, does he really take Plato seriously, namely, does he think that Plato speaks about the same divinity as Christians do? Secondly, seeing that Plato never applied an equivalent of the notion *summus* in the context of the Tim 41ab, it is not clear whether he implied any hierarchy. Quite to the contrary, it is obvious that Augustine found it important to formulate the relations between the speaking god and the addressed gods in terms of hierarchy, since he employed the notion summus as applied to the speaking *deus* as well as *minores* as applied to the addressed *dii.*

Yet, it still remains to be found whether Augustine perceived the notion *summus* in a comparative or superlative of sense. Although the expression itself is superlative, did he mean a hierarchy of more than two levels? If he did, it is interesting to find out what this hierarchy is within the cluster of dii minores?

Clearly, it must have something to do with the possibility of Augustine's Christian evaluation of Plato's texts. Thereby we will pass to the next issue.

dii minores (civ.dei XIII, 18; contra secundum Juliani I, 46 i.a.).

A similar problem arises around the expression *dii minores*. It appears frequently around the interpreted passage. We have translated it as 'minor gods'. In fact, our version is synonym with 'lesser gods', rendered by the majority of other translators (Dodds, Walsh, Levine, Dyson). Dodds and Walsh are not consistent in their translations alternating between the expressions 'lesser gods' and 'inferior gods', depending on context. None of these English translators use the expression 'inferior gods' exclusively the way Combès does in his French version. Combès opposes the exclusiveness of the supreme god to the general nature of the minor gods by applying a definite article to the former: 'le Dieu Suprème' and an indefinite article to the latter: 'des dieux inférieurs'. Thimme in German uses 'geringeren Goetter' (109) and Mamsurov in Russian applies *меньшие боги*, which are

complete synonyms with 'lesser gods'. In both cases the reference is not only to the minor status of these gods - which is the case with the expression 'minor gods' and 'inferior gods' but also, to the size, as if these gods can be smaller than the Supreme God. Curiously, such a usage makes sense in the context of the Greek polytheism, where gods seemed to have anthropomorphic features. It is yet a different matter when we apply such an understanding to the Christian texts and Augustine's reasoning. Since Augustine often understands these gods to be celestial bodies, it natural that they may vary in size.

***invictissima voluntas*, (civ.dei XIII, 16, 43).**

We chose to translate this quite literally as 'invincible will'. Ph.Levine renders *invictissima voluntas* as 'unconquerable will'. 'Unconquerable' implies someone's opposing intention to conquer, to occupy the adversary's territory, whereas 'invincible' does not imply this at all, although it does not easily give away its meaning due to its Latin root. Victory does not necessarily imply an occupation. The Russian army won the war against Napoleon in 1812, but it did not have any intention of occupying France. Germany also lost the WWI but the allies did not occupy its (full) territory.

***(omni)potentissima voluntas* (civ.dei X, 31 : 5; civ.dei XIII, 18, 10.).**

We translated this expression by 'almightiest will'. The alternative expression 'the most omnipotent will' is not as good, since it renders one word by three, and thus waters down the technical significance of the expression. Here Augustine emphasizes the exceptional power of the divine will twice: first, by putting *omni*-, and secondly, by adding a superlative. In fact, the use of a double superlative is redundant. In Latin it sounds as absurd as in English. If Augustine used it only once or twice, we could ascribe it to exceptional circumstances. However, he applies this expression numerous times in the course of his writings. Clearly he must be saying something by this. Perhaps, he wishes to emphasize God's power: not only that it exceeds everyone else's, but also that it is capable of performing any, even impossible, actions in accordance with his decision. This all is to prove that the resurrection of the body is possible for God precisely due to his omnipotence. In civ.dei XIII, 18, 10. Augustine uses a shortened form of the expression under the discussion - *potentissima voluntas*, which, linguistically speaking, is more natural than his preferred omnipotentissima voluntas, which, it seems, is its perfect synonym.

As we have already remarked, the expression *potentissima voluntas* refers to God's power that exceeds everyone else's: for a Greek or a Roman one god might be mightier than another one.18 Although this may be so, Augustine is claiming that there is a Supreme God, true God, identified already by Plato, who is the mightiest of all. Even so, this does not necessarily mean that the mightiest God is mighty enough to achieve everything he wants. Understandably, Augustine finds it important to add the second superlative as well, inserting omni- to the initial *potentissima voluntas.*

It is as if there are several almighty wills, among which the one of the Supreme God is the mightiest. Curiously, this makes sense since Plato mentions numerous gods, who have limited powers, whereas Augustine appears to admit them all as having an omnipotence of some kind, since he considers the omnipotence to be a necessary attribute of divinity. For a Greek immortality rather than omnipotence is the necessary attribute of (a) divinity.

All the translators under discussion in English, excluding Walsh, rendered *omnipotentissima voluntas* by 'allmighty will'. Walsh with his 'all-powerful will of God' appears to give Combès' French version 'volonté toute puissante de Dieu' a near identical twin. In Russian Mamsurov has watered it down with the rather plain *по воле Которого,* 'according to whose will' and he got rid off the superlative *(omni)potentissima* and the omni-present nature of the divine will, the last of which is present both in the original and in the other the translations.

Augustine applies the word *omnipotentissimus* not only to the divine will, as in the case of the discussion around our passage, but also directly to God and Creator. The notion of 'will' seems to be implied, since otherwise in what sense can one be omnipotent if not in the sense of the power of his will?

Apart from *omnipotentissima voluntas* (a), Augustine uses two other notions with *omnipotentissimus*: *omnipotentissimus Deus* (b),19 as well as *omnipotentissimus conditor/Creator* (c), [20] which Augustine uses interchangeably. Understanding *Deus* and *Creator* as synonym is natural in the Christian context, where the one God appears to be the unique agent of the world's creation. Nevertheless, in the pre-Christian and non-Christian context this is less straightforward. As we shall see, the Neo-Platonists

[18]It is not by chance that Augustine dedicated a large of the *civ.dei* to the discussion of the Greek and Roman polytheism in Varro and Cicero. Cf. especially book VI.

[19]*de beata vita* I, 4, *de divination daemonum* 1, *contra secundum Juliani* 1, 50.

[20]*civ.dei* XXII, 1.

subordinated the Creator within the hierarchy of divinities. The Gnostics went so far as to separate God and Creator on ethical grounds, claiming that God is good but the Creator is evil.

Note that this expression in its two variants - *omnipotentissimus Deus* and *omnipotentissimus conditor/Creator* - along with their derivatives) appears as many as twelve times in Augustine's corpus,[21] yet only thrice in civ.dei.[22] Nevertheless, the main discussion concerning the Creator's omnipotence takes place exactly there.[23]

The two notions of *ars humana* and occultus modus operationis dei are closely related to each other. One is about the human action, the other, about divine action. Augustine compares one to the other. Both have technical significance in the context of our discussion. Here we will focus only on the first notion.

***ars humana*, (civ.dei XIII, 18, 8).**

Unlike, the notion humana, unambiguously meaning 'human' and originating in Latin in this expression, the notion of *ars*, despite of having a similar origin, has been rightly interpreted by the translators in two ways: either as 'skill' (Dodds, Walsh, Levine) or 'art', 'Kunst', *искусство* (Dyson, Combès, Thimme, Mamsurov). We preferred the second translation. And indeed, although the choice is limited just by two words, the difference between their meanings is rather significant. M.Heidegger convincingly demonstrated that in Graeco-Roman world the difference between art ('Kunst') and skill ('Kunde') was linguistically not present at all and hardly

[21] *de beata vita 1:4; epistolae secundum ordinem temporis, epistola 113, enarratines in psalmos 87, de Scripturis, sermo 12:10, sermo 50:5, de diversis quaestionibus 2:1, de bono cojugali 1:2, de divination daemonum 1:1, de fide 1:3, de Trinitate 9:12, de peccatorum meritis I:3, contra secundam Juliani*, 1:1.

[22] *civ.dei* XXI, 9; *civ.dei* XXII, 1 ; *civ.dei* XXII, 26.

[23] *Jam enim satis superius disputavi, posse animalia etiam in ignibus vivere, in ustione sine consumptione, in dolore sine morte, per miraculum omnipotentissimi Creatoris: cui hoc possibile esse qui negat, a quo sit quidquid in naturis omnibus minatur ignorat. Ipse enim est Deus, qui omnia in hoc mundo magna et parva miracula quae commemoravimus, et incomparabiliter plura quae non commemoravimus, fecit, eademque ipso mundo uno atque omnium maximo miraculo inclusit. civ.dei XXI. 9 :48.*

Faciet hoc Deus omnipotentissimus ejus conditor. Promisit enim, nec mentiri potest; et quibus fidem hinc quoque faceret, multa sua, et non promissa, et promissa jam fecit. civ.dei XXII. 1 :13-14.

accentuated otherwise.[24] In Greek it was expressed by one single word τέχνη in Latin by *ars*. The problem with modern languages is just the opposite, as there does not seem to be one single word uniting these two notions. In translation we are bound to confront a choice between the two. This poses a question as to whether Augustine in writing *ars humana* in XIII, 18, 8, ment 'art' or 'skill'. It seems to us, he implied both, as the difference between the two of them concerns creativity, expressed in arts and not necessary in skill. By comparing the human *ars* with the divine *potentia* he is saying that both human art and human skill are capable of achieving something that is worth of admiring, and yet incomparably inferior to both divine skill and divine creativity. However, in speaking of *ars humana*, the accent is on human creativity, which is creative enough to impress our imagination, and somewhat less on human productivity, as it is expressed in skill. Augustine is saying that even a human being can be creative and artistic enough to make an impression on us, if he or she conquers nature. Creative art was an origin for craft, which overturns the order of elements and no longer surprises. Without the creative, artistic element, at least somewhere in the beginning of the process of navigation, there would not have been a surprise. That is why art is also a key to skill and not only vice versa.

Yet, since we had to make a choice, in our translation we went for 'human art', and not for 'human craftsmanship', or 'human technique'; seeing that human art looks almost identical with *ars humana*: the accent here is on the innovative, creative, miraculous nature of human performance, which in some respects is comparable to that of the divine art, skill, craftsmanship.

initium substitutionis (civ.dei X, 31:13).

This expression is a bit obscure. Its application is due to Augustine's rather poor attempt to express the causal relationships between the world of ideas and the world of physical objects. He must have had a vague idea about the way they interact in Platonism, since he did not mention either of these worlds directly. We translated it as 'beginning of (time's) substitution'. Actually, there is a small problem with the first world *initium* rendered by almost every translator as 'beginning', начало, 'Anfang' with the sole exception of Combès, who treats the whole expression as a single entity. It seems there is a sharp disagreement between the translators as to

[24] Heidegger, Martin "Die Frage nach der Technik", in Gesamtausgabe Volume 7. 1949:"The Question Concerning Technology", in Heidegger, Martin, *Basic Writings*: Second Edition, Revised and Expanded, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 1993).

the meaning of the second word in its present combination. *Substitutio* turns into 'cause' (Dodds, Dyson), into 'causal subordination' (Walsh), into 'a dependence '(Levine) and even в преемстве 'in succession' (Mamsurov). However, as far as the meaning of the expression as a whole is concerned, the majority appears to be in agreement. First, they all, following Augustine, deny the relation to time - which is not at all evident. Secondly, they emphasise upon an initiation into some sort of succession, the beginning of causal relations - although in case of Levine with his 'beginning of a dependence' it is a bit unclear. There is a hierarchical element present in Walsh's and Combès' translations: the first speak about a 'subordination', the second about 'un être sous-jacent à un autre'. Both speak about a certain hierarchy, where the first element depends on the second. Yet, Combès, unlike Walsh along with all the other translators, drops the idea of 'a beginning' entirely. However, he and Thimme apply a descriptive translation: as 'ursachtlichen Anfang' (Thimme) is a kind of 'originating beginning', while 'un être sous-jacent à un autre' (Combès) 'one being subordinated to another one'.

3.1.1. Rendering Conclusion

We had a dual aim in this section. On the one hand, we wanted to show how the tradition of reading our passage has influenced the translations. It is absolutely obvious that every translation is an interpretation given in light of what one has been translating. The reading of one or other translation follows not only the author but also the interpretor. We can see this in Cicero's translation but also in the way it influenced Augustine's specific understanding of this text. We could also see this on the basis of modern translations of Augustine (serious interpretative editions take place there as well, in spite of the fact that Augustine's style is less complex than that of Plato, and the methods of modern translations are far more advanced than the ones used by Cicero two thousand years ago). On the other hand, since we are studying the context of Tim 41ab discussion by Augustine, we tried provide reasons for our own preferences in our reading of the text, as suggested in this chapter. We did this on the basis of comparising sixteen concepts and expressions (ten from the passage translated and six referring to this text). In the introduction to this chapter we offered three reasons for the preference of our understanding of this passage from Augustine and the context in which it is read.

The first reason in favour of a new translation was to word the context of discussion around Tim 41ab in a modern language. We see no necessity to improve the language or to make it pseudo-antique. Such

poetic improvements conceal the meaning of the text. If one prefers ancient languages, let him turn to Latin. We used modern English instead because of its straightforwardness, which is obviously preferable in this case.

The second reason is inexact usage of the technical terms by the majority of translators. We tried to stay as close as possible to Augustine's terminology. For instance, we translated *ars humana* as 'human art', and *dii minores* as 'minor gods' – the kind of rendering that first comes to everyone's mind but which cannot be agreed upon quite so easily, since here too we come across les faux amis, as the same words usually have more meanings in ancient languages than in the modern ones. And this is certainly also the case here. We have translated the word *satus* in the most important expression *satu orti estis* as 'seed' (a), even though none of the English interpreters do so, since this word in this case is completely out of place - especially Plato's original mentions no such word. Thimme comes to our aid using the German 'Saat', together with the notion of translating not Plato's original but a Cicero's translation, which paradoxically serves as the original for our context of determining Augustine's understanding. This can help us in the future to make the presence of stoic idioms in this polemic clear, since it was the stoics who implied the theme of *seed reasons*, which was transferred to Augustine partially due to them and partially due to Cicero.[25]

Even the usage of articles (definite, indefinite or none) and lower or upper case letter plays a major role in the forming of the concepts, both in general and in the analysis of our text in particular. For instance, the difference between 'parent and maker' and 'the parent and maker' determines whether we are speaking of the status or a proper name. To illustrate the usage of capitals one can take the example of *summus Deus* in the critical edition. It has been rendered as *S(s)upreme G(g)od* in all variations. Each of the four variations would mean a different thing, but we chose 'Supreme God' as most fitting. Yet, we would not be surprised if a Platonist came up with a correction to such a reading of Plato's demiurge. Deviations in interpretation are inevitable since there are no articles in Latin at all, added to which is the lack of the usageof lower and upper cases in ancient manuscripts.

The rule of staying as close to the original as possible should be used very carefully, taking into consideration that we are dealing with a complex semi-poetic text. For example, in (d), Cicero's *me invito* cannot be translated literally, as Levine has done with his literal 'against my will', as this can cause serious complications for the textual interpretation, where

[25] Cf. Infra : last chapter on Stoic presence.

the Creator, in such a translation, limits himself by estrangement from his creation that is no longer in his power.[26] We used an expression that seems opposite instead: 'as long as I summon (them)'.

Third, many of these interpretors are inconsistent, either because they do not trust Augustine's consistency, or simply because they forget how they translated one or another expression previously. We respect Augustine's consistency in general, and the size of our work allows us to remember the previous instances of our translation. We think that these expressions have technical use and therefore they ought to be translated carefully and used consistently. M.Dodds and G.G.Walsh translate *dii minores* either as 'minor gods' or as 'inferior gods'; this way the readers might get an impression that it has to do with two separate classes of gods. Similarly, constantly returning to Porphyry's slogan - which is important both for Porphyry and Augustine- G.G.Walsh translates 'the soul must escape from every kind of body' in one place, while 'a soul must be completely divested of any body' in another. The reader might think that Porphyry and Augustine relate to a different problematic in these texts, as, for example, the second translation might refer to the allegory of dressing a connotation which is absent in the first one. In the end it becomes clear that no allegory is used in either case.

Last but not least, the current discussion represents not so much the improvement of existing translations, but rather a discussion of other interpretations of the text, that actually helps us better understand the subject dealt with.

3.2. Recurrent Themes in Augustine's Tim 41 a7-b6

It is not difficult to figure out the main themes in Augustine's exposition as he comes regularly to the same issues. It is customary for him to touch upon a topic at some point, and then return to it again and again in the course of the same treatise, and sometimes in some other treatise as well, without ever fully exhausting it. We can trace this pattern in his discourses on the origin of the soul, the original sin, the free will etc. So it is with his sporadic commentaries on Tim 41ab too. Augustine launches the

[26]As K.Marx introduced the noton of *alienation* (*Entfremdung*) of the product from its producer – the proletariat owning the product but having no rights to it. Marxist concept of *alienation* became classical in political economy and social philosophy. In *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus* dem Jahre 1844 K.Marx identified as many as four types of social alienation. Cf. K. Marx und F. Engels, Werke, Ergänzungsband, 1. Teil, S.465-588, Dietz Verlag, Berlin (DDR), 1968. However, the phenomenon we are dealing with does not fall under his categories.

discussion on Tim 41ab rather superficially in sermons 241 and 242. In civ.dei he briefly touches upon it in books IX, X and XII. His most elaborate exposition is found in book XIII, by the end of which he promises to come back to it by the end of the treatise. And that is what he finally does in book XXII, which the summit of his interpretation of the passage in question.

As is often the case, Augustine is quite repetitive, and at times rather plain in his exposition of Tim 41ab. He appears to believe that repeating a thought several times would better enable him to impress it upon his readers. Even in this context there are a number of recurrent expressions, which he uses time and time again. E.g. *Plato auctor et magister eorum / summus deus / dii minores/ deus non factus / dii a se facti / invictissima voluntas* etc.. This is not at all surprising since Augustine was not set the task of writing a Timaeus commentary, the way it was done in the Neoplatonist tradition of the time. There is still a development in his thought, although it lacks sophistication at times.

Augustine identifies *summus deus* (the 'supreme God') with the Universe's Creator. As we shall see below, he also identifies Jupiter (Zeus) with the soul of the universe. Unlike the Neoplatonists, he does not identify Jupiter with the speaker.[27] Jupiter did not appear where he was expected to in Augustine's exposition. What remains persistent all the way through is the opposition *summus deus – dii minores*, which appears to be a commonplace in Augustine's interpretation of Tim 41ab. This concerns first and foremost the first member of the equation: the Supreme God Creator

3.2.1. Speaker and Jupiter

In the Nominative alone Augustine mentions Jupiter's name 47 times in 7 works, out of which it appears 40 times in civ.dei.[28] Although we find a lot of interesting material also in de consensu, his opinion on the main Greek-Roman divinities is expressed primarily in this work. This is not surprising, as this treatise is an apology of the Christian teaching against the accusation of bringing about the downfall of the Roman Empire, one of the key elements of which was the desuetude into which its religion, wherein Jupiter occupies a key position, fell. The interpretation of the pagan theology of Jupiter also plays a significant role for Augustine in his critique of the Roman cults and his understanding of the ancient philosophy. He is up-to-date with the pagan sources, especially Cicero (Tullius), Virgil and

[27] cf. Chapter Six on the Neoplatonists *infra*.
[28] *PLD* search engine.

Varro.[29] Augustine is familiar with the myth of Jupiter's origins: that his father is Saturnus (Chronos),[30] his mother Rea,[31] his brothers Neptunus (Poseidon) and Pluto,[32] and his wife, Juno.[33] He knows the myth recalling a goat feeding Jupiter, when his mother hid him from his father's wrath when he was a baby.[34] That he is carrying the shield of Aegide,[35] and that the Capitoline Hill is dedicated to him in Rome.[36] That the kingdom of Heaven earlier belonged to his father, but Jupiter managed to take it away by a coup and by castrating his father. Augustine discusses the details of Jupiter's relations with some other divinities, such as Juno and Janus.[37]

The role and status of Jupiter as divinity is also crucial for Augustine's presentation on the speaker in Tim 41ab as well as for his (mis)-understanding of the Neo-Platonists. However, in the context of Tim 41ab, Augustine speaks about Jupiter in one sense exclusively: as a parallel between this divinity and the universe. Augustine comes up with two versions: in (α) he identifies Jupiter with the universal soul,38 whereas in (ιβ) he equals Jupiter's soul with the universe.[39] This treatment is somewhat confusing and perhaps deliberately so. Let us have a brief look at these different accounts.

In (α) Augustine explains that the Platonists, especially Porphyry, claim that this universe is a large animal (*animal*). The soul (*anima*) of this animal is its vivifying principle, which is sometimes refered to as Jupiter, sometimes as Hecate.[40] It is also described as the universe's soul ruling the universe (*animam universalem mundum regentem*).[41] The body of this animal is quite peculiar, as it does not seem to need senses: as a totality of everything what has material existence it has nothing outside it to be

[29] O'Daly, *Augustine's critique of Varro on Roman religion*, in A.Sommerstein (ed.), *Religion and Superstition in Latin Literature*, Nottingham Classical Studies, 3. Bari. 1996. Pp. 65-75.

[30] *civ.dei* II, 15.

[31] *de consensu* I, 23.

[32] *civ.dei* II, 15.

[33] *civ.dei* III, 10: 1-2.

[34] *de consensu* 1, 23, 31.

[35] Ibid.

[36] *de consensu* 1, 23, 35.

[37] *civ.dei* VII, 10.

[38] …et ipsam animam mundi vocari Jovem... *sermo* 241, 7.

[39] ιβ 8 which they identify with this world, ιβ 9 is joined to all by the whole of corporeal elements, ιβ 10 by which this messy totality of earth rises to heaven (translation V.Yudin, *infra V.Y.*).

[40] …et ipsam animam mundi vocari Jovem, vel vocari Hecatem, id est, quasi animam universalem mundum regentem... *sermo* 241, 7.

[41] Ibid.

sensed. Yet, it has an intellect (intellectum),[42] whose function is to strive after God. This animal is eternal: it will never die.[43]

According to Augustine, if we follow Porphyry, who desdains every kind of body (omne corpus fugiendum), we must also let Jupiter, who is this world's soul, quit his body.[44] Moreover, if one has to avoid every, and not merely some kinds of, body (not just *corpus fugiendum*, but *omne 'corpus' fugiendum*), Jupiter's own body must be treated as exception. Augustine is radical: if we follow his thought, he suggests we must let Jupiter die - suicide is clearly hinted at- although this stands clearly in opposition to the Neoplatonic vision of suicide.

Both passages are linked, according to Augustine's reading of the Neolplatonists, to Jupiter being recommended to leave his body, which happens, in this case, to be the universe. In case (ιβ) he demands precision, saying that Porphyry, like all Neoplatonists, says that the body's corruptibility is not the only problem (Augustine keeps returning to this point in his objections)45. According to Porphyry, who, it seems, preempted Augustine's objections, the problem is the body as such (whether corruptible or incorruptible), therefore, one has to avoid any kind of body. Porphyry links this to the soul's beauty, which is immaterial and incorruptible: if the soul wishes to be beautiful it must avoid any kind of body, even if it were eternal and incorruptible. Augustine again suggests Jupiter to jump out of the bodies of heaven and earth, yet this time he suggests he should do so taking with him the gods who inhabit the bodies of other heavenly bodies.[46]

Later, in *Retractiones*, Augustine explains the meaning of the expression omne corpus fugiendum as the desire for avoiding sufferings, which comes into the picture through the bodily senses that serve as

[42] …habere tamen intellectum, haerere Deo… *Op. cit*.

[43] Si ergo aeternus est mundus, et sine fine manet mundus, et animal est mundus; anima ista semper tenetur in mundo: certe corpus est omne fugiendum? Quid est quod dicebas, Corpus est omne fugiendum? Ego dico beatas animas incorruptibilia corpora semper habituras. Ibid.

[44]Tu qui dicis, Corpus est omne fugiendum, occide mundum. Tu dicis ut fugiam de carne mea: fugiat Jupiter tuus de coelo et terra. Ibid.

[45] ιβ 1 …for the soul to be happy, ιβ 2 it should escape not only from the terrestrial body, ιβ 3 but from every kind of body; ιβ 4 they also say that the gods have a happy soul ιβ 5 and yet it is joined to the eternal bodies, ιβ 6 certain celestial bodies of fire… (*V.Y.*).

[46]…quod deos suos posse asserunt in corporibus igneis, Jovemque ipsum regem eorum in omnibus corporeis elementis? Nam si animae, ut beata sit, corpus est omne fugiendum, fugiant dii eorum de globis siderum, fugiat Jupiter de coelo et terra: aut si non possunt, miseri judicentur. *civ.dei* XIII, 17, 2.

external organs.[47] The universe, even if it were an animal, does not have external organs of perception, and therefore, it does not undergo sufferings. Therefore, the recommendation to quit Jupiter's body is not appropriate, since this animal is the most beautiful one. Why quit it? However, Augustine doubts whether its beauty is comparable to the beauty of the soul.

Thus, the idea of comparing Jupiter to the universe in civ.dei XIII (ιβ) undergoes a slight alteration. Augustine says that the Neoplatonists use the name Jupiter for this universe, not Jupiter for the soul of this universe, the way we find it so in sermo 241.8.

The entire universe is drained through and through of its soul but also of the element most appropriate to it, so that the entire earthly mass entends to the most remote parts of the universe. According to Augustine's Plato, to our mind, Jupiter's soul is distributed throughout the Universe beginning from the center of the earth by means of musical ratios.[48] This universe is also a happy and eternal animal, whose body is animated with the soul, which never quits it, whereas the body consists of innumerable, separate bodies.

Two cited passages provide us with slighly different accounts of Jupiter in Augustine's exposition: the first is idealistic, the second, materialistic: one 'Neoplatonic', the other 'Stoic'. In (α) Jupiter is the soul of the universe, whereas in (ιβ) the soul of Jupiter is the universe itself.[49] At the first glance, Augustine is simply confused as to the exact relationship between Jupiter and the universal soul. In both cases he inextricably links the universe with Jupiter, but in the first case he talks about the universal soul, in the second, about the soul of Jupiter. And it is not clear whether the one is identical to the other.

In (α) he evidently narrates the sources, which are in front of him, since he is clearly reading their books,[50] as he writes. In the second passage Augustine simply says what he makes of the Stoic Jupiter (with no reference), although it is clear that he took these ideas from Cicero. Augustine's inconsistency is not a slip of the pen, but possibly a deliberate attempt to confuse the reader. We find a similar discourse with a similar inconsistency concerning Jupiter already in *de consensu*. First, he claims

[47] *Retractiones*, I, 3. Also in *Retractiones* (II, 31.) Augustine says that he wrote a book against the pagans on the request of a certain friend, who was troubled by six questions, among which the first is dedicated to resurrection. Cf. *Quaestiones expositae contra paganos, numero sex*.

[48] *civ.dei* XIII, 17. Pay attention that we mean here the earth, not the universe, although Augustine oten understands these two intercheangebly.

[49] Jovis autem ipsius animam, quem mundum istum volunt. *civ.dei* X, 17, 2.

[50] libros vestros lego… *sermo* 241, 7, 7.

there that Jupiter is the universal soul, whereas a few pages later he suggests another dilemma: either Jupiter is a heavenly body, or he is a spirit filling both heaven and earth alike.[51] So, we are still left with a uncertainty as to what Jupiter is: the spirit (*animus*), the soul (*anima*), or the body (*corpus*) of this Universe. The first two evidently have to do with a vivifying principle, the last, does not. Yet, Augustine is not particularly consistent on this issue. It seems as IF he does not really care, as he disagrees with both these positions. So, naturally, he has no wish to defend either.

It is not surprising that Augustine runs into terminological confusion (or possibly, deliberately woos it). He makes the notions of spirit and soul interchangeable. He regularly applies the Christianised expression heaven and earth from the book of Genesis instead of the notion universe in this context, even though he is perfectly aware of the fact that the universe contains both the earth and the physical heavens, while the last also includes all the heavenly bodies.

Augustine is interested in the question of whether or not the universe has a soul. But he is somewhat careful about expressing his opinion on the matter. He thinks that an opinion on this matter must be well-grounded, yet does not search for the grounds himself. The question remains unresolved due to his persistent interest in Jupiter's status and role. He is not really interested in either of them, in the last analysis, as he does not believe in Jupiter.

Nevertheless, he is quite familiar with the fact that there are different attitudes towards Jupiter in various philosophical schools. For instance, citing Virgil on the issue of the identification of Jupiter with ether, Augustine draws attention to the inconsistency of the author of GeoRgica: sometimes he follows the Platonists, who claim that God is spirit, some times he follows the Stoics, who claim that god is some sort of body. It is of little importance whether or not Augustine is up to date concerning those whom he calls 'Recent Platonists' (*recentiores Platonici*).[52] If by that expression he means those we now call Neoplatonists these days, there is time correxion needed. They did not exist at the time of Virgil, whereas the Platonists who existed at the time possibly had different ideas. In his exposition of the theology of Jupiter, Augustine appears to deal with Virgil mostly, sometimes following the 'Recent Platonists', sometimes the Stoics. At the same time he grasps pretty well that on the issue of whether God is

[51] At vero secundum istam novellam interpretationem, quam veteres eorum si habuissent, mirum si Ciceronem Varronemque latuisset, Saturni filium Jovem dicunt, tanquam ab illa summa mente profluentem spiritum, quem volunt esse velut animam mundi hujus, omnia coelestia et terrena corpora implentem. *conseensu* I, 23, 35.

[52] *consensu* I, 23, 35.

spirit or body, these two schools have opposing views. It is clear that if we are to confuse the views of these two schools (idealism with materialism), the way Augustine does, one would hardly arrive at a consistant picture. Perhaps, Augustine attempts to demonstrate that the matter is pretty confusing. Therefore, in the context of the discussion around Timaeus it is not always clear what exactly Augustine is saying about Jupiter. He refers to Pythagoras, Plato, Porphyry and abstractly 'I am not sure, also those who are alike'.[53] He is clearly speaking about Pythagorean-Platonic tradition at large, ascribing identical views to them, whereas the views he is dealing with at this point are probably of a later origin. Augustine projects the opinion of one Platonist on the entire preceding Platonic tradition.

We find the most plausible origin for Augustine's opinion concerning the relations between Jupiter, the soul and the universe in *de consensu*, where he refers to Cicero and Varro saying that Jupiter is a spirit (spiritus), who proceeds from a higher Intelligence (Saturnus) as his father.[54] Now he is a kind of soul filling in the entire universe and everything that is there: the earth, the moon, the sun and the rest of the celestial bodies (*omnia coelestia et terrena corpora implentem*).[55] This presentation ideally fits with Virgil's (whom he informally calls *Marro*) formula regularly cited by Augustine: *Jovis omnia plena,* 'Everything is full with Jupiter'. The Greeks also often use a similar phrase from the Orphics.[56] The universe, which is a huge massive body, has a soul as intelligible life, which rules the universe the way each animal is vivified by its soul.

Augustine uses Virgil's phrase *Jovis omnia plena* - 'Everything is full with Jupiter' six times in the course of his writing, explaining it in a pantheistic spirit: Jupiter is present always and everywhere.[57] All the other gods of the Greek and Roman Pantheon are nothing else but Jupiter's images. Jupiter fills everything by turning into anything at his whim. He is a thought, a spirit, a body. He is also both soul and spirit, which procedes from some overabundant Intelligence (which is χρόνος - *Saturnus*).[58] He is

[53] Hic sapiens, hic philosophe, hoc est, in terra (verbi gratia, Pythagoras, Plato, Porphyrius, et nescio quis alius ipsorum), quare philosopharis? *sermo* 241.6.

[54] …Saturni filium Jovem dicunt, tanquam ab illa summa mente profluentem spiritum, quem volunt esse velut animam mundi hujus, omnia coelestia et terrena corpora implentem. *consensu* I, 23, 35.

[55] Ibid.

[56] *Zeus is the beginning, Zeus is the middle, everything comes from Zeus*. Proclus, *Theologia Platonica* VI, 8.

[57] *consensu* I, 23, 35; *civ.dei* IV, 9; *civ.dei* IV, 10; *civ.dei* VII, 9.

[58] At this point Augustine demonstrates a surprising erudition with the Greek etymology: Erubuerunt hinc philosophi eorum recentiores Platonici, qui jam christianis temporibus fuerunt; et Saturnum aliter interpretari conati sunt, dicentes appellatum χρόνον, velut a

also a soul filling the universe, whereas Janus is its body.[59] Yet, in another sense, being identical with Janus, he is also the body of the universe as well as all the bodies included therein.

Various divinities rule the domains of different elements. Thus, the domain of Juno is air,[60] the domain of Jupiter is ether.[61] Ether is the element, of which the heavens consist, which is a kind of liquid fire.[62] Jupiter rules over the heavens. Ether is also one of his names. Everything in the heavens consist of ether, for instance, the gods and their thrones.[63] The souls purified by the theurgic rituals will dwell in the ether meadows among ether gods. Jupiter is *pater omnipotens* – the omnipotent god,[64] beyond all the rest. An example of his omnipotence is that he is capable of coming down from heaven into this world of bodily elements, pouring down ether as rain, and rendering fruitful the chosen womb of a happy girl.[65] Although Jupiter originates from Saturn, as he is his son, the Greeks, just as much as the Romans later, thought it right to call the former as the first, eternal God and the king of gods. It is not by chance that the Capitoline Hill is dedicated to Jupiter, not Saturn.[66] Jupiter grabed power from Saturn, who once was the supreme god. He has now abdicated and is forced to wonder around. Artists always depict him with a covered head, as if he wishes to hide his identity. Earlier Saturn was a king, but now he is an old vagabond, whose name is not spoken from fear of Jupiter's wrath. Augustine points out a number of paradoxes connected to this cult. His first asks, what is the reason behind the eternal god originating from the god of time, whereas the latter is the father of all gods, and therefore, all these so-called 'gods' obviously have a temporal origin? His second remark is that, in accordance with the tradition, god the son casts down his father and even castrates him,

satietate intellectus, eo quod graece satietas χόρος, intellectus autem sive mens vo□ς dicitur: cui videtur suffragari et latinum nomen, quasi ex prima latina parte et graeca posteriore compositum, ut diceretur Saturnus, tanquam satur esset, vo□ς. *consensu* I, 23, 35

[59] Num igitur ita dicturi sunt Jovem animam mundi, ut Janus sit corpus ejus, id est iste visibilis mundus? Hoc si dicunt, non erit quemadmodum Janum deum dicant; quoniam mundi corpus non est deus vel secundum ipsos, sed anima mundi ac partes ejus. *civ.dei* VII, 9, 2.

[60] *sermo* 197, 6.

[61] …ipse in aethere sit Jupiter, ipse in aere Juno.... *civ.dei* IV, 9; Cur ergo aether datur Jovi, aer Junoni? *civ.dei* IV, 10.

[62] *sermo* 242, 6.

[63] *consensu* I, 23, 31.

[64] *civ.dei* IV, 10.

[65] Tum Pater omnipotens fecundis imbribus Aether, Conjugis in gremium laetae descendit (Vigil, *Georgica* lib. 2, vv. 324, 325.), in *consensu* I, 23, 31.

[66] Romani tamen, qui non Saturno, sed Jovi Capitolium condiderunt; vel aliae nationes, quae Jovem praecipue supra caeteros deos colendum esse putaverunt... *consensu* I, 23, 36.

this being an act of violence in the most primitive sense. And at the same time he does not mind the worship of his cast down competitor as a god.[67] Augustine sees the origin of Jupiter worship in the promotion of the cult of dead heroes, the way it also happened with Romulus after his death. AugustinE links Jupiter's cult to a legendary religion, for which he reserves but little respect.

Analyzing different aspects of Jupiter, Augustine sets himself two tasks: on the one hand he is drawing a parallel between Jupiter as the supreme divinity of the Greek-Roman pantheon and the Christian God aiming to demonstrate that both the Greek and the Roman cults had a notion of a unique divinity. On the other hand, as if contradicting himself, he tries to demonstrate that it is almost impossible to draw such a parallel, since the Christian God is hardly comparable with the other divinities, and must not be considered so. Therefore, Jupiter also belongs to this group of false divinities.

With regard to the first task, Augustine attempts to draw a parallel: on the one hand, the Platonic, supreme God addresses the minor gods, on the other hand, God the Creator brings his progeny back to life by means of resurrection. It is not by chance that the editor of Patrologia Latina, who is not an expert in the issue, when summing up Augustine's discourse on Jupiter, names him as a supreme God, thereby correctly expressing a tendency present in the text, but also going overboard.[68] Augustine is a bit more subtle than that, although he too is very close to making similar claims.

In fact, the first task is an exaggeration. Augustine does not think that Jupiter is equal to the Christian God in any sense, although one may attempt a certain comparision. Augustine refers to Varro who claims that Jupiter is equal to the God of Jews,[69] and therefore the Jews must also worship Jupiter.[70] At the same time Varro thinks that Jupiter may carry the name of any divinity, for instance Saturn, Janus or even Juno or Hecata. Augustine adds another contribution to this hypothesis saying that since Jupiter may coincide with Saturn, whose day of worship is Saturday, this is yet another proof of Jupiter's significance and the Jewish God being one and the same.

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[67] *consensu* I, 23, 38.

[68] *civ.dei* IV, 9, title.

[69] Varro autem ipsorum, quo doctiorem apud se neminem inveniunt, Deum Judaeorum Jovem putavit… *consensu* I, 22, 30; si Deum Israel Jovem putant, sicut Varro scripsit. *consensu* I, 27, 42.

[70] Merito ergo et Varro Jovem opinatus est coli a Judaeis… *consensu* I, 23, 31. Curiously, Augustine also finds a biblical ground for this opinion in *Jerem*. XXIII, 24: quia dicit per prophetam, ***Coelum et terram ego impleo***.

Varro's understanding is typical for the Greek-Roman, eclectic perception of religion, where the gods of various religions are understood as varieties of one and the same divinity from the Greek Pantheon. In civ.dei IV, 10, 23, Augustine demonstrates how, different Roman divinities, for example, Juno and Janus, are also seen as the other faces of Jupiter by the Romans. In sermo 241.7, Augustine refers to the Platonists who identify Jupiter with Hecata, both being identical with the universal soul, or better, are seen as the male and female principles in the universal soul.[71]

Jupiter, who is a male divinity, coincides with Juno, his siser and girlfriend, as a female divinity. Augustine discusses the following words by Valerius Soranus: "Juppiter omnipotens regum rerumque deumque progenitor genetrixque deum",[72] who views Jupiter as omnipotent, as both male and female principle. Thus, even according to the belief of the Romans, Jupiter supercedes both male ond female principles, therefore, he should not be associated specifically with either of them.

Augustine is ready to accept this thought only conditionally saying that there is the supreme God, the cause of the universe who is also its manager. Augustine concludes that in a way this reasoning is right: as the intellectual Roman citizens seem to speak about one unique God through a multitude of names and appearances.

Augustine places the opinion of the Neoplatonists concerning Jupiter within the pagan tradition, where the name of Saturn was understood as time (χρόνος), and in Latin as years overflood (saturetur annis), both of which aim at the same.[73]

In *de consensu* Augustine refers to the philosphers, recent Platonists, who also consider the relations between Saturn and Jupiter. Their approach also seems to be linked to the meaning of names and their etymological origins. Commenting on the meaning of Saturn (Greek χρόνος), Augustine explains that it means exactly the same as "satisfied intelligence" both in Greek and Latin. The only difference is that in the Greek version one uses two Greek words (χόρος and νοῦς), whereas in Latin the equivalent word is a Latin translation of the Greek word (*satus* for χόρος), while the second

[71] …et ipsam animam mundi vocari Jovem, vel vocari Hecatem, id est, quasi animam universalem mundum regentem, et unum quoddam animal facientem. *sermo* 241, 7.

[72] *civ.dei* VII, 9, 2.

[73] At this point Augustine demonstrates a surprising erudition with the Greek etymology: Erubuerunt hinc philosophi eorum recentiores Platonici, qui jam christianis temporibus fuerunt; et Saturnum aliter interpretari conati sunt, dicentes appellatum χρόνον, velut a satietate intellectus, eo quod graece satietas χόρος, intellectus autem sive mens νο□ς dicitur: cui videtur suffragari et latinum nomen, quasi ex prima latina parte et graeca posteriore compositum, ut diceretur Saturnus, tanquam satur esset, νο□ς. *consensu* I, 23, 35.

word remains Greek (νοῦς). The final version is a combination of Latin and Greek words (*satus* и νοῦς), therefore Saturnus.74

Augustine refers to Porphyry, claiming that he calls Jupiter 'God the Father and King' (*et Deum patrem et regem*) ις.[75] Citing Porphyry, Augustine also says that vices and ignorance could only be purified by the paternal Intelligence (πατρικὸν νοῦν, *id est, paternam mentem*),[76] clearly implying Jupiter's Intelligence. As Universal Soul, Jupiter coincides with Hecate.

In Hecate's oracles, cited by Porphyry in civ.dei XIX, 23, 3, Augustine speaks neither about Hecate's identification with the Universal soul, nor with Jupiter's identification with Hecate. This identification appears later in the Hellenic period of the Chaldean oracles, which Augustine discusses in civ.dei XIX in the context explaining the status of Christ. This makes us think that Augustine is possibly dealing with Hecate's cult, as he identifies both Hecata's, and the Chaldean oracles, in Porphyry's oeuvre. He does it in the context of his examination of Hecata's and Apollo's oracles on Christ in civ.dei XIX, 23. Possibly, Augustine is working on civ.dei XIX during the Bright Week, when he delivers sermo 241. In both case he uses Chaldean oracles and Porphyry, who cite Hecate's and Apollo's oracles.

Thus, the detailed descriptions of the universe in texts (α) and (ιβ) come from Timaeus: the universe as a beautiful animal (Tim 34a10), the musical proportions of its mechanism (Tim 34b-36e), the universe's body as having no senses and having no need of them (Tim 33c-d). The identification of the universal soul with Jupiter clearly originates from Porphyry.[77] Identification of the universal soul with Hecate originates from the Chaldaen Oracles as a quote from Porphyry in civ.dei XIX, 23.

3.2.2. Speaker's Omnipotence

There is little to be said about the speaker's character in this speech in the way Augustine goes around him. It seems he is completely identical with the Christian God the Creator. We will not go into the Augustine's pure theology, as it has been sufficiently studied in the scholarship. One feature of the speaker's character which is constatntly in use in the context under discussion stands out: his omnipotence. This

[74] Ibid.

[75] ις 1 This is still the God, whom ις 2 (as I have already raised this issue elsewhere ις 3 and certain to mention again), ις 4 both Porphyry and the oracles of his gods confess, ις 5 since he desires to prove that ις 6 these divinities themselves stand in awe;[75] ις 7 he glorifies him, ις 8 naming him God the Father and King *civ.dei* XXII, 25.

[76] *civ.dei* X, 28.

[77] Cf. Proclus, *In Timaeo Platonis Commentaria* 5.324.18.

feature is crucial to Augustine's discussion of Tim 41ab, since it serves multiple purposes in proving the resurrection of the dead.

This is a key quality in Augustine's discussion of Tim 41ab, since it is the main reason for his varied discussions of this passage, serving exclusively as proof for bodily resurrection. The main issue to deal with in the process is the issue of the divine omnipotence.[78]

Nevertheless, Augustine prefers to engage in a retorical dispute on this issue rather than to deal with it seriousely in the process of discussion on Tim 41ab in its various contexts (cf. the half of the texts under the scrutiny (γ), (ε), (η), (ια), (ιγ), (ιδ), (ις), (ιη)). Augustine claims that both Christian and pagan teachings contain some elements of the belief in divine omnipotence. "And you pagan, don't you also believe that God is omnipotent?"[79] - This question he raises so vividly is rhetorical. He seems to have no doubt that any pagan, and especially Porphyry (*nonne et tu*), when challenged in dispute, believe in divine omnipotence, which Augustine's Plato turns to discusses here.

Augustine gives several examples of how God manifests his omnipotence. He employs it in order to let the earthly body pass into the ethereal heavens;[80] he also employs it for the celestial bodies that have had a beginning not to reach their end, but stay eternally in their bodies;[81] he employs it for something that is put together not to disintegrate but to remain for ever; he also employs it to keep somebody who is born from dying, since, according to Plato, the uncreated God promises eternal life to the divinities he creates. In fact, God promises them the impossible: it is impossible that fishermen convince philosophers of a truth, such as bodily resurrection, yet bodily resurrection is a fact. It is impossible that the

[78] G.Madec examines various aspects of divine omnipotence in Augustine. Cf. G.Madec, *Le Dieu d'Augustin*. Paris: Cerf. 1998.

[79] **Deo volente fit quod alias fieri non potest.** Sed non potest, inquiunt, esse terrenum corpus in coelo. Quid, si hoc velit Deus? Responde contra Deum, et dic: Non potest Deus. Nonne et tu quicumque paganus, dicis omnipotentem Deum? Nonne in libro Platonis, quod hesterno die demonstravi legitur dixisse Deus non factus diis a se factis… *sermo* 242, 5, 7.

[80] Cf. *supra*.

[81] ε 9 The Platonists then found ε 10 the perfect excuse for themselves ε 11 for not wanting to believe this: ε 12 thinking the following: ε 13 unless something always existed before, ε 14 it could not exist afterwards. ε 15 Nevertheless, Plato openly says about the world ε 16 and the gods made by God in the world, ε 17 that they began and have a beginning, ε 18 yet they will not have an end. ε 19 On the contrary, ε 20 he insisted that they will remain in eternity ε 21 by the almightiest will of the creator. ε 22 They invented this understanding somehow as the truth, - ε 23 that this was not the beginning of time ε 24 but the beginning of *its* substitution. (*V.Y.*). *civ.dei* X, 31.

majority of men believe in resurrection, it is a fact nevertheless.[82] In general, many things happen due to divine omnipotence, Augustine repeatedly observes.

In a number of passages Augustine compares the power of people, minor gods and the Supreme God. He gives examples of how God is more powerful than other beings. At the same time he demonstrates that both people and gods are capable of doing things, which may appear impossible to others. Due to human art, vases made of metal float on water (ιγ).[83] The gods mentioned by Plato are capable of letting light come forth from the eyes of men. Either of these seems impossible, yet it happens. The Supreme God must be even more powerful than the minor gods and human masters.84 He may, and indeed, does things that are even more impressive.

As already mentioned, Augustine insists in several passages that God is capable of doing the impossible.[85] Because Augustine comes back to this issue again and again, one gets the impression that he wants to prove that God does the impossible, in connection with bodily resurrection as well. This is the main purpose of our present discourse

It is curious how the impossible is made to happen. According to Augustine, it comes about through the secret ways of divine action, or more precisely, through ways beyond human comprehension. This secret way is somehow comparable to human art (*ars humana*) (ιγ),[86] which also contains a secret hidden from the majority. Not surprisingly, even the majority thinks that human art has a secret, if not magic, aspect. The secret behind divine action, however, is hidden from everyone, not just the majority, unless God decides to reveal it to someone..

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[82] *civ.dei* XXII, 5.

[83] *civ.dei* XIII, 18.

[84] ιδ 1 If the minor gods, ιδ 2 whom Plato commissioned the making of human being ιδ 3 among other terrestrial living beings, ιδ 4 could remove, as he says, ιδ 5 the quality of burning from fire, ιδ 6 leaving the quality of emitting light ιδ 7 which shines forth through the eyes; ιδ 8 then should we doubt to concede to the Supreme God, ιδ 9 of whom he[84] conceded the might and the will ιδ 10 not to die for the things that rose. (translation *V.Y.*). *civ.dei* XIII, 18.

[85] ιη 62 who even according to Plato does the impossible (*V.Yudin*).

[86] ιγ 1 If then the human art could realize that ιγ 2 the vessels made of metals ιγ 3 by certain methods could even float, ιγ 4 the metals which sink immediately ιγ 5 when placed in water, ιγ 6 how much more credible and efficient is ιγ 7 the secrete mode of operation of God, ιγ 8 by whose most omnipotent will, - ιγ 9 Plato says, - neither things that rose (from the seed) can perish, ιγ 10 nor things that are joined together can be dissolved, ιγ 11 since it is even more miraculous ιγ 12 that the incorporeal things are joined to the corporeal things ιγ 13 than the corporal things of some sort ιγ 14 are joined to some corporeal things of some other sort (V.Y.). *civ.dei* XIII, 18.

Augustine advances this discourse with one idea in mind: to prove the possibility of the resurrection from the dead, the mechanism of which remains secret. Augustine does not claim that the resurrection is achievable by any human effort, however significant it may be. On the contrary, it is impossible for a human being. Human beings are not able to bring this about, but nor are any other beings. But what is impossible for man is possible for God. If God decides in favor of resurrection, it will take place against the odds. It is clear that God is in favor of resurrection as he has already brought it about in the past, and first and foremost, in the resurrection of Christ, his ascension to the heaven, and finally the resurrection of the dead. These acts belong to the realm of the impossible, and yet, through God's will they take place. It is impossible that fishermen, who never studied, would convince highly erudite philosphers about the truth of resurrection. The fact remains, however, that it already took place. Many philosophers already believe it. But it is impossible that the world believes such impossible things. Yet, Augustine says, the world believes it already. God promised future resurrection. Therefore, according to Augustine, the resurrection will take place through divine omnipotence.[87]

There is a small, yet all important, nuance in the difference between a potence (let it even be a quite impressive one) and omnipotence. The difference between these two is crucial. There are many who are capable of many achievements, yet there seems to be no one who can do everything.

How much potency is needed to achieve the resurrection from the dead? Is omnipotence at stake or does a potency of high degree suffice? Does one need to be God to achieve the resurrection from the dead, or is it within the power of other beings aswell?

Although having pinpointed the superiority of divine potency in comparision with human potency,[88] Augustine is yet to demonstrate divine omni-potence, which he keeps emphasising. The step from a comparative to the superlative is not evident. One can make many comparisions ascending from the bottom of the scale, even reaching great heights in this wise, without ever reaching the top. It is also not evident that omni-potence is needed to bring resurrection about, that in fact some high degree potence does not suffice. What is there in resurrection that needs an overflow of power?

Clearly, resurrection requires a potency that super-cedes the laws of nature, hence a supernatural potency, which again is not omnipotence, if

[87] *civ.dei* XXII, 5.
[88] *civ.dei* XIII, 18.

omnipotence is understood as potency to bring anything about. According to Augustine, such a supernatural potency is a kind of omnipotence.

There is still a clarification needed as to what exactly omnipotence is. From the discussion of Tim 41ab one can reach two different conclusions: either it is a supernatural capacity that allows miracles (one of which is resurrection) (1), or it is an ability reaching any and every deed imaginable (2). Unfortunately, Augustine does not deal with this distinction overtly. Although both definitions seem to be admissible in the contect of the discussion of Tim 41ab, in other places he has discussions that virtually do not admit of the second reading (cf. ις).[89]

Meanwhile, in the course of his discussion on Tim 41ab, Augustine interchangeably uses both these arguments in rather populistic form. This consists of two simple steps: "God is omnipotent, so he can do whatever we can imagine" (1), therefore, "he can (and will) achieve bodily resusrrection" (2).

Augustine neither turns to the issue of omnipotence out of respect for the philosophers with whom he is dealing, nor out of his own meditations on the matter, which we came across in other texts, especially in civ.dei. This is a sign that Augustine's polemic with the Neoplatonists is hardly a real one. If it were real he would have to engage in a subtle discussion, which requires precision. He hardly even touches upon the aspects of omnipotence that he personally considers problematic. His aim is to convince the intellectuals who happened to be in his church at a service during the Bright week. This audience certainly had a lot of respect for the Neoplatonists, without necessarily having read them.

However, Augustine realizes that there are serious flaws in his simplistic presentation. He is familiar with the paradox of God restricting his own omnipotence, without loosing it but transferring it to another dimension. Augustine provides as many as eight examples of such a restriction, three of which also occur in civ.dei V.10. These are: (1) seeming restriction of divine omnipotence by necessity (*sub necessitate ponimus*), when the divine life is viewed as necessary, and divine providence as necessary;[90] (2) God can not die (*mori non potest*), (3) God can not make mistakes, (*falli non potest*);[91] (4) God can not lie, deceive (*mentiri non*

[89] *civ.dei* XXII, 25.

[90] Ad hoc nobis est ejus omnipotentia necessaria. Nam universae creaturae ad hoc erat necessaria, ut crearetur. *sermo* 213, 1, 1.

[91] The difference between God and man is strikingly simple: God cannot make mistakes, whereas man does make mistakes. In criticizing the Skeptics, Augustine arrives at his famous formula, which later influenced Descartes' cogito argument: if I am mistaken I exist… *civ.dei*

potest),[92] (4) God can not sin (*non potest peccare*),[93] (5) God can not deny himself (*negare se ipsum non potest* 2 Timothy 2: 13),[94] (6) he can not change himself (*non potest mutari*), (7) he can not become insignificant (*non potest miser fieri*), (8) he can not be overwon (*non potest vinci*).[95] Curiously, the list of restrictions to divine omnipotence is even longer than Porphyry's (cf. preliminary chapter supra).[96] In the last text, while ennumerating restrictions on divine omnipotence, Augustine says that these restrictions do not make him less powerful, but rather the contrary: they make him especially powerful. If God could perform all these activities, this would have been a sign of his impotence.[97] The realisation of such possibilities weakens the agent rather than makes him stronger. If God would die, really die as God and not as man, that would be a disaster for all humanity. If God could be mistaken, he would not be omni-scient.[98] If God could deceive, he would be a vicious being, while vice is not a feature of

XI, 28. G.O'Daly, *Augustine's philosophy of Mind. London, Berkley*. 1987, pp. 162-171; Menn, S, Descartes and Augustine. Cambridge. 1998.

[92] ις 9 … But on the issue of his omnipotence, ις 10 due to which he did so many incrediable things, ις 11 we have already spoken a lot. ις 12 If they want to find that he cannot be omnipotent, ις 13 they have the following: I would say: ις 14 He cannot lie. (V.Y.). *civ.dei* XXII, 25.

[93] Nam ego dico quanta non possit. Non potest mori, non potest peccare, non potest mentiri, non potest falli. Tanta non potest: quae si posset, non esset omnipotens. *sermo* 213, 1, 1.

[94] Inde ergo jam accepistis, meditati estis, et meditati tenuistis, ut dicatis: Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem. Deus omnipotens est: et cum sit omnipotens, mori non potest, falli non potest, mentiri non potest; et, quod ait Apostolus, ***negare se ipsum non potest***. Quam multa non potest, et omnipotens est: et ideo omnipotens est, quia ista non potest. Nam si mori posset, non esset omnipotens; si mentiri, si falli, si fallere, si inique agere, non esset omnipotens: quia si hoc in eo esset, non fuisset dignus qui esset omnipotens. Prorsus omnipotens Pater noster peccare non potest. *de symbolo*. 1.2.

[95] Unde admonemur Deum omnipotentem, non hoc solum quod ait Apostolus, ***Negare seipsum non potest,*** sed multa non posse. Ecce ego dico, et ejus veritate dicere audeo, quod negare non audeo: Deus omnipotens non potest mori, non potest mutari, non potest falli, non potest miser fieri, non potest vinci. *sermo* 214, 4.

[96] R.Goulet reassembles several passages of the Adversary (suspected Porphyry) where he criticizes the divine omnipotence. R.Goulet shows even points where the Adversary appears to contradict himself, saying that God can everything but he does not wish to do everything. That is why he submits himself to the natural order (IV, 2, 4). In another place (IV, 24, 5-6) he says that God cannot everything. There are things which he cannot do even if he wished so. In the end, the position of the Adversay is also quite subtle. Cf. R.Goulet, *Porphyre et Macarios de Magnésie sur toute-puissance de Dieu*, in *Le Traité de Porphyre contre les Chrétiens*. Paris: Études augustiniennes. 2011. Pp. 214.

[97] Ibid.

[98] R.Grabowsky admits such a possibility in *The All-present God: A study in St Augustine*. London: Herder. 1954, p.31.

omnipotence. If God could sin, he would break the precepts he introduced, and thus show the limits of his own laws, by his own failures to keep them. Each of these five features is a sign of the limits to omnipotence, not of its proof. If the absence of these featres does not negate divine omnipotence, then it makes sense to find out what it actually signifies. According to Augustine, it consists in the realization of the divine will: God wills and his will becomes reality.[99]

Nothing happens without his blessing or approval of some kind, nor ever happened against his deliberation. He is not capable either of making faults, or deceiving, or lying, or indeed sinning. There is no external necessity forcing him to make certain decisions, and thereby super-ceding him in any way.

Therefore, such a refusal does not make him weaker, nor less powerful. On the contrary, a realized wish to lie, or to deceive, or to make a mistake, or to sin, or to die or to be subject to an external necessity would deprive him of his omnipotence.

Augustine's solution to this paradox is typical for his voluntaristic approach, which emphasizes the free will, and especially the divine free will. Omnipotence, according to Augustine, implies perfect freedom, the freedom to act and achieve any desired result, to possess the full capacity to achieve anything. His definition of free will would fit the formula: "I can do whatever I want", and not "I can do whatever *it* is possible to imagine", which in practice means "I will do anything what the others want from me". This last formula is not about freedom, but slavery.

God, for Augustine, is first and foremost a willing agent: his will supercedes the wills of everyone else. No will can possibly super-cede His.[100] Augustine refers to Plato in support of this line of reasoning. This world is a universe of wills, which are always in strife. Yet, there is one will that super-cedes all these other wills, the will of the creator. Augustine names God's will as an invincible will, but without providing a satisfactory commentary upon the matter. It is not evident why Augustine speaks about the will of the creator within the context of victory. God does not have to participate in the strife in which all other wills participate, nor in their competition. Augustine neither provides an explanation why the unconquerable will must be omnipotent, nor what the link between being victorious and being omnipotent is. Nevertheless, such a link must exist. If omnipotence consists in the undeniable fulfillment of the will, then this will

[99] *civ.dei* V, 10.

[100] η 51 … according to his invincible will… *civ.dei* XIII, 16. Augustine uses this *invictissimam voluntatem* as a characterisation of the divine will.

cannot be subject to something or somebody: neither to external necessity, nor to somebody's will, nor to the sum of all wills. Such an omnipotent will is invincible.

The voluntaristic formula of omnipotence permits speculation not only on the subject of the divine, but paradoxically even on human, omnipotence. The human being is also omnipotent when his will fully realizes itself. Therefore, the art of human willing consists in aiming at all feasible objectives, and not what is unachievable. Curiously, Augustine does not apply this definition to the discussion of bodily resurrection, for which he uses Tim 41ab. Instead of discussing the matter seriously, he prefers to employ his rhetorical skills in dispute, where the aim is to win the dispute, not necessarily convince his opponent.

Curiously, here we can trace the influence of Stoic thought, where the role of the sage occupies a crucial position. The sage is detached from passions, and therefore he is in full control over his life and its circumstances. He does not fill his life with unreasonable desires: on the contrtary, he wishes exclusively for what can be achieved in accordance with reason and nature.[101]

Despite the limits of the present discussion, Augustine is still at home with the problematic of omnipotence. For instance, while examining the Triune Godhead in the Treatise on the Gospel of John, he chooses divine omnipotence as the key feature. Yet, as is often the case, he provides no explanation of what this omnipotence amounts to. The expression the Omnipotent God almost turns into a cliché in his writing. Not surprisingly, he sees little problem quoting Virgil «pater omnipotens» on Jupiter with very little exegesis on the matter.[102]

[101] Accidentally, Augustine's discussion concerning omnipotence as a realized deliberation occurs in the context of the discussion of Stoic sage who is the only one who obtains knowledge. *civ.dei* V, 10.

[102] *consensu* I, 23, 31.

3.3. Evolution of Augustine's Tim 41 a7-b6 summus Deus – dii minores opposition

Augustine's exegesis on Plato's Tim 41ab has not been chrystal clear to him from the beginning. Here too, he undergoes a certain development,[103] both terminologically and contentwise. Naturally, it also effects our estimations concerning datations (what's that?) correspondences between sermones 241-242 on the one hand, and civ.dei on the other.[104] We shall proceed with the examination of this significant aspect.

The most striking example of Augustine's development is his persistent use of the opposition summus deus - dii minores in his attempt to render δημιουργὸς (parens effectorque in Cicero) and the δαίμονας (Lares in Cicero), or the young gods, the way this notion is often explained by scholars.[105] Neither summus deus nor dii minores are traceable in Cicero, nor indeed have equivalent expressions in Plato. These expressions are the fruit of Augustine's creative reading of the text, a license that he has every right to exercise. In fact, Augustine would be completely justified in his interpretation of Timaeus, were the length of this dialogue reduced to the passage Tim 41ab. His reading presents a paradigmatic example of how easy it is to take one passage out of context, and use it with a view to promoting one's own ideas. The examination of the textual evidence, which survives in Augustine's writings (cf chapter four supra), proves that his knowledge of the dialogue, aside from this one passage, is very limited.

We will presently focus on one particular aspect of Augustine's exegesis, which is largely due to Augustine's reading of Cicero's translation. This concerns Augustine's use of *summus deus* to render the demiurge, and his *dii minores* to represent the gods created by the demiurge. We will trace

[103] The basic oppositions Augustine uses are not simplistic. They often undergo dialectical development. M.Hollingworth emphasizes the presence of *the civitas dei* within *civitas mundi* as a pilgrim city, guided by God' Will beyond its earthly stations. M.Hollingworth, *The Pilgrim City. Saint Augustine of Hippo and his innovation in Political thought.* New York, London: T. and T. Clark. 2010. P. 198.

[104] Unfortunatly, P.-M. Hombert, does not take into consideration of correspondance between civ.dei and sermons 241-242 on the basis of his Augustine's Plato use. P.-M. Hombert, *Nouvelles recherché de chronologie Augustinienne*. Paris: Études augustiniennes, 2000. Cf. Part Two: *La date des sermons.*

[105] Cf. J.Opsomer, *La démiurgie des jeunes dieux selon Proclus*, in *Les Etudes Classiques* 71 (2003), pp. 5-49.

a certain development even within a short space of the present work as to when Augustine employed this opposition.

First of all, this opposition does not appear elsewhere in Augustine's corpus outside his discussions around Tim 41ab. Its use represents his personal reading of Plato, and subsequent Platonism, mostly represented in the discussion with Porphyry.

Secondly, Augustine's use of these terms and their opposition undergoes a certain development. We will divide it into three following sections: 1) sermons 241, 242; 2) civ.dei XII-XIII; and 3) civ.dei XXII. This development is both historical and doctrinal. It is historical, because books XII-XIII were written at least a few years earlier than book XXII.[106] The dating of sermons 241 and 242 partly depends on the interpretation of its contents, which intertwines with the contents of certain parts of the civ.dei. Augustine preaches these sermons in the context of Easter, although it is not clear in which year they took place. These sermons must have been written some time before civ. dei XII, because while interpreting Tim 41ab he does not use the *summus deus – dii minores* opposition, which eventually becomes the cornerstone of his further commentaries on this passage.

3.3.1. Initiation into *summus Deus–dii minores* opposition with *sermones* 241-242

The development, with which we are dealing, is also doctrinal. The use of terminology in sermons 241 and 242 is rather primitive, but in some ways more authentic than that found later on. *Deus fabricatorem deorum* is all what we get for our opposition. The word *fabricator* stands for the δημιουργὸς. Yet, for the πατήρ we get nothing better than the blunt deus. The relations between the *deus* and *dii* are expressed exclusively in terms of creation, and not in terms of hierarchy or superiority.

According to Augustine's sermo 241 (8) *deus* creates the *dii* out of some corporeal substance (*de corporali substantia*),[107] but we are left to puzzle out exactly what this primordial corporeal substance is. We do not know whether it preexists the deus, or it is created by him as material to mold into other gods. The catalogue of *dii* is strictly cosmological: stars, the moon, the sun, in two words they are the *dii caelestes*. The traditional Greek

[106] We know that book XV (which is surely posterior to books XII and XIII) was written around 425 just after *Heptateuchum* and *Locutiones*, whereas the final XXII book of the treatise was accomplished by 427. Cf. A.-M. Bonnadière, *Recherches de chronologie augustinienne.* Paris. 1965.

[107] Inducitur Deus a Platone ipso alloqui deos, quos fecit de corporali substantia… P.1138. *PL.*38.Paris. 1841.

gods are not mentioned among them at all. The celestial gods that came into existence possess body but also an intellectual soul.

Further on, sermon 242 (5) is a curious mixture of Platonic, Stoic and Christian ideas. It puts an even stronger emphasis on the fact of creation from which we get the opposition between *deus non factus* and *dii a se facti*.[108] The first is a non-created god, the other ones are created by him. Apparently this is not necessarily a deliberate distinction. It still has to be made overtly, otherwise the word god/deus turns into a rather misleading notion. It is applied to different realities, which have little in common with each other. Deus does not have a body and yet he is a far more powerful god than the dii, whom he endowed with bodies. Each of these dii consists of a body and a soul, and all of them have strictly limited powers.

Augustine's discussion in sermo 242 is on the issue of whether or not the terrestrial body of a human being can enter heaven, the fiery substance that does not allow the presence of other substances. This position, which according to Augustine is absurd, deprives the *dii* of a possibility of entering the heavens as well. Worst of all, this logic seems to ignore the powers of the creator. *Deus non factus* is not just a craftsman. He is an almighty god.[109] His powers (*omnipotentia*) are not limited in any way by the laws of the natural order. *Hoc velit deus* is the command of top priority. His *voluntas* is a law unto itself:[110] the law that surpasses all other laws. This is the law that remains a mystery to us, as it is not disclosed otherwise but through his actions. Therefore, nothing can stop him from letting terrestrial bodies enter into fiery heaven, since indeed *hoc velit deus.*

3.3.2. *Development:summus Deus – dii minores* opposition in *civ.dei*

The first reference to Tim 41ab occurss in civ.dei IX, xxiii, 1-9. 111 Augustine speaks about a terminological relativism, if not confusion, saying that the application of some words of importance, even such as gods, angels and demons are often arbitrary. He is convinced that, at core, the Platonists

[108] Nonne in libro Platonis… legitur dixisse deus non factus diis a se factis…. P. 1141. *PL*.38.

[109] Nonne et tu quicumque paganus, dicis omnipotentem deum? *Ibid.*

[110] Totum ad voluntatem suam redegit deus, qui potest et quod impossibile est. *Ibid.*

[111] δ 1 If the Platonists prefer δ 2 to call them 'gods' δ 3 rather than 'demons' δ 4 and count them among gods, δ 5 they may say what they want δ 6 Plato, their founder and master, writes that δ 7 these gods are created by the supreme God; δ 8 the discussion with them concerns only words (*V.Y.,* cf. chapter two, passage δ *supra*), from *Sancti Aurelii Augustini de civitate dei. Liber I-X. Corpus Christianorum*, series *Latina (infra CCL), vol*. XLVIII. Ed. B.Dombart, A.Kalb. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P. 269.

understand these realities just the way Christians do.[112] The proof is that even Plato speaks about the gods created by the Supreme God. Now, Augustine wants to say that since these 'gods' are created, they are not gods, and the words are applied incorrectly. He understands that the Platonists follow the ancient definition of gods as immortals. Personally, Augustine prefers to call some of these creatures angels, others demons. If they may be called gods, they are definitely not gods in the same sense as the Supreme God is called God. Augustine does not apply the word minor (minores) to the angels and demons here, although he effectively implies it: the idiom Supreme God is made more poignant in opposition to minor god(s). But the terminology is still in the process of being developed.

In civ.dei XII-XIII we find the most elaborated use of the references to Tim 41ab. At this point, Augustine develops a remarkably independent line of reasoning. Yet, he stops right before plunging into the issue of bodily resurrection. Instead, he announces the continuation of his argument, which we find indeed later, in book XXII.

In literal terms, civ. dei XII, 27 mentions the summus deus – dii minores opposition for the first time.[113] Augustine does this partly on the basis of the previous discussion, as already in sermo 242 *summus deus*, the supreme god, who was previousely named *deus non factus*, now is the one who possesses the supreme will. He introduces *dii minores*, 'minor gods' not only as *facti dii* but precisely as the gods whose will is negligible as compared to the will of their maker. Interpreting Tim 41ab in the context of civ.dei book XII, Augustine places an accent on the creation of man. The *dii minores* made the human body, and yet it is still the *summus deus*, who is responsible for the immortal part – the soul, that human beings receive directly from him.[114] Curiously, Augustine now objects to the scheme, which he himself projected on Plato. He claims that it is in vain that we split the source, as the Platonists do, for bodies and for souls. In his opinion there is but one source for human souls and bodies: the very same *summus deus*. In this way Augustine completely marginalizes the importance of dii minores, who basically loose their raison d'être. Their role turns to be so minor that you start wondering whether they are really gods – a suspicion clearly instigated by Augustine.

[112] We will evaluate this judgment in Chapter Six on the Neoplatonists *infra*.

[113] Ita sane Plato minores et a summo deo factos deos affectores esse voluit animalum ceterorum… *La cité de dieu*. Livres XI-XIV. Paris. 1959. P. 240.

[114] … ut immortalem partem ab ipso summerent, ipsi vero mortalem adtexerent. Proinde animarumn nostrarum eos creatores noluit esse, sed corporum. *Ibid*.

As we have seen in chapter two, *civ.dei XIII*, 16 contains the largest single quote from Tim 41ab.[115] In a further commentary the expression summus deus appears four times within the scope of two pages. The greatest achievement of the discussion in this part of the treatise is the realization that the body as such does not necessitate mortality. The example to follow is the bodies of the dii minores, who received a special favour from the summus deus, namely, the favour of never dying. In the end these gods receive immortal bodies, which are free from the stain of corruption. It turns out that the problem is not so much the body per se, but the corruptible body. The question is how to turn a corruptible body, received at birth by every single human being, into an incorruptible one. Evidently the source cannot be but one: the *voluntas* of the *summus deus*.[116] The human bodies are of no exception, as also the dii minores receive corruptible bodies at the beginning. The deliberating power of the *summus deus* is what turns corruption into incorruption. Thus the main issue slightly changes direction: namely, whether the *dii minores* receive an exceptional favour of incorruptible body, and whether this favour is bestowed on other beings as well. Augustine is certain that the latter is the case.

In chapter 17, civ.dei XIII Augustine singles out one of the *dii minores* in order to clarify some aspects of the given opposition with the *summus deus*. The chosen example is Jupiter whom he identifies with the entire universe. It is worth mentioning that here Jupiter is listed among *dii minore*s for the first time, as in sermons 241, 242 one gets an impression that, according to Augustine, Plato had been speaking exclusively about celestial bodies, and not about traditional Greek gods. Although this god is one of the *dii minores*, he is still superior to all the rest, in the sense that the universe contains many other gods and celestial bodies: sun, moon, stars, planets. Their bodies make part of his body, but without exhausting it. Like the other minor gods, Jupiter also possesses a rational soul. In this sense his soul does not contain the souls of all other gods. Jupiter's body is made of four elements; it is also musically arranged into ratios. Like the bodies of other dii minors, his body receives immortality from the summus deus' decision, but not as the result of his, Jupiter's, nature. In fact, his body was doomed to die, just as the body of anyone else. His immortality is the result of a special favor granted by the summus deus. Augustine has already

[115] Starting from *Vos qui deorum satu orti estis*… up until *conligati,* in *La cité de dieu*. Livres XI-XIV. Paris. 1959. P. 288.

[116] Non propter eorum naturam, quae sit compacta, non implex, sed propter suam invictissimam voluntatem, qua potens est facere, ut nec orta occidant nec conexa solvantur, sed incorruptibiliter perseverunt. *Ibid*. P. 290.

discussed this favor in the preceding chapter.[117] His final plea in this chapter addressed to the Platonists is a challenge: don't be so sure that the *summus deus* grants this special favour to Jupiter and the rest of the *dii minores*, and but not to humans. After all, there is no more divinity in these gods than in humans. Alternatively, one can say that humans also make part of the *dii minores*, and thus the promise of immortality has to extend towards humans as well.[118]

In chapter 18, civ.dei XIII, Augustine tries to prove that the natural order does not stand above the will of God. Even the *dii minores* are capable of reversing the natural order. While making a man they made alterations to the qualities of fire, which is one of the four elements. They removed the quality of burning from it, leaving the quality of brightness in the eyes of humans instead. This resulted in one of the five senses - sight. Now, if the minor gods are capable of achieving such an impressive result, surely the *summus deus* can do at least as much, if not better.[119] In fact he already does so by saving the mortal bodies of the dii minores from mortality, and composite bodies from disintegration. He effectuates this result by the simple application of his will. If he just turned his attention to humans, he would certainly remove corruptibility from them and allow their bodies into heaven. Should it happen, then the heavenly fire, as the only element present there, would burn the other terrestrial elements. In fact this would not be news, since the minor gods already do a similar thing with the sight of the man, where the only material element left is fire.

In chapter 19, civ.dei XIII Augustine adds that the summus deus not only saves the bodies of the dii minores from mortality and corruption, but also promises them an eternal union between their soul and body.120 In

[117] *civ.dei* XIII, 16.

[118] cum igitur suspicionibus suis ista permittant, cur nolunt credere, diuina uoluntate atque potentia inmortalia corpora fieri posse terrena, in quibus animae nulla ab eis morte separatae, nullis eorum oneribus adgrauatae sempiterne ac feliciter uiuant, quod deos suos posse adserunt in corporibus igneis Iouemque ipsum eorum regem in omnibus corporeis elementis? *Ibid.* P. 296.

[119] si di minores, quibus inter animalia terrestria cetera etiam hominem faciendum commisit Plato, potuerunt, sicut dicit, ab igne remouere urendi qualitatem, lucendi relinquere quae per oculos emicaret, ita ne deo summo concedere dubitabimus, cuius ille uoluntati potestatique concessit, ne moriantur quae orta sint, et tam diuersa, tam dissimilia, id est corporea et incorporea, sibi met conexa nulla possint dissolutione seiungi, ut de carne hominis, cui donat inmortalitatem, corruptionem auferat, naturam relinquat, congruentiam figurae membrorumque detineat, detrahat ponderis tarditatem? Ibid. P. 300.

[120] …diis inmortalibus anteponere, quibus deus summus apud Platonem munus ingens, indissolubilem scilicet uitam, id est aeternum cum suis corporibus consortium, pollicetur. *Ibid*. P.304.

traditional thought the moment of death is marked by the departure of the soul from the body. This is mostly due to the body's poor condition, which disqualifies it from serving as a vehicle for the immortal soul. Naturally, if the body is in perfect condition, the soul does not have to leave it any more. Therefore, the promise of an union between soul and body is comparable to the promise of eternal life. This promise is announced to the dii minores, and Augustine again extends it to humans.

3.3.2.1. *civ.dei* XXII – *dii minores* as *homines in resurrexione*

The new turn in book XXII in the interpretation of the *summus deus - dii minores* opposition is that Augustine puts it explicitly at the service of the issue of bodily resurrection.

Thus, in chapter 25 he says that even Porphyry and other Platonists recognize the deus non factus as a supreme god (summus deus), because in their view he is the god before whom all the dii minores tremble.[121] Thereby these divinities accept his absolute superiority. To his status as craftsman of the Universe, the Platonists also add his status of father and king.[122] According to Augustine, this line of thought is shared with Christians. Anyone who applies his reason will understand the necessity of this addition, since if the fabrication of the universe were the only function of the deus non factus, then his omnipotence would not make much sense, because the creation of the universe, despite its uniqueness, requires a certain skill. Thus it must be recognized as nothing more than one of many other crafts. Given that it is an extraordinary craft that belongs to one craftsman alone, it is still a mere craft, and thus should be taken as a matter of narrow specialization. Contrary to this limited technique, the omnipotence presupposes a universal specialization, namely, the craftsman must be master of every possible existent and non-existent craft. Ultimately he can do anything you can imagine. Resurrection of the dead must also be subject to this craftsmanship. The authority as king and father exist amidst other functions of this omnipotent god. In fact, in many ways both these qualities are superior to any craftsmanship, although Augustine does not go into further details.

In chapter 26, book XXII, Augustine summarizes his discussion on the summus deus – dii minores opposition by repeating that the functions of deus non factus are not reducible to the fabrication of dii a se factos. His

[121] ille est enim deus, quem - sicut iam dixi aliquotiens, nec commonere me piget - confitente Porphyrio atque id oraculis deorum suorum probare cupiente ipsa numina perhorrescunt. *Ibid*. Livres XIX-XXII, p. 676.

[122] …quem sic laudauit, ut eum et deum patrem et regem uocaret. *Ibid*.

capacities reach far beyond this, since he also has the right to overrule the natural order (established previously by his own effort). His right to alter the natural order implies that he can do anything what we may consider to be impossible,[123] as the realm of possibility marks the limits of natural order. From what is beyond this order, Augustine singles out his ability to raise up an incorruptible body, a body both immortal and spiritual.[124] By mentioning 'spiritual' body here, Augustine points in the direction of something crucially new, especially hard, if not impossible, to grasp within the scope of the Neoplatonic perspective.

3.4. Augustine's *Tim* 41 a7-b6 Methodology

We will briefly turn to the methodology of the textual approach on the basis of principles introduced by Augustine. He defines these principles in his treatise on methodology with the title de doctrina Christiana, the three first books of which were written in 396, well before the the polemic started on the issues raised in our discussion. It would be natural to expect from Augustine that he would apply these principles also in his own writing. As we can see the title says that this treatise is about the Christian teaching. Yet, the main accent of this treatise is not on the content, but on methodology of the exposition on Christian teaching,[125] especially through preaching and catechism.

Some scholars claim that in de doctrina Christiana Augustine is busy with composing a treatise on Christian retorics.[126] If this true, he has some special tasks of forming the Chrisian orator, with an accent on the word 'Christian', meaning that a Christian orator is of an unique kind in the liberal arts generally. Obviously, Augustine does not wish to repeat what has been already said in similar courses on rhetorics, such as Cicero's. [127] Augustine's accent is on specifically Christian aspects in the theory of eloquence.

[123] "Vos quidem inmortales esse non potestis, sed mea uoluntate inmortales eritis," quid aliud dicit quam "id quod fieri non potest me faciente tamen eritis"? *Ibid*. P. 680.

[124] Ille igitur carnem incorruptibilem, inmortalem, spiritalem resuscitabit, qui iuxta Platonem id quod inpossibile est se facturum esse promisit. *Ibid*.

[125] G.Ripanti presents a clear scheme of Augustine's presentation in de doctrina Christiana on p. 55 in G.Ripanti, *Agostino teorico dell' interpretazione*. Brescia: Paideia. 1980.

[126] R.P.H. Green, *Introduction*, in Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1995, p. xx.

[127] *de doctrina Christiana* IV, 1-2., *infra* cf. *doctrina*.

3.4.1.Augustine's *Tim* 41 a7-b6 Doctrinal Aspect

From the beginning of the treatise, Augsustine speaks about the need of having the right motives when delivering a sermon, saying that the preacher must strive first and foremost for love (charitas).[128] In case such a desire contradicts historical facts or the most obvious literal sense of the text, then one ought to neglect these historical facts as well as the literal sense, and stick to the Christian insight instead. Augustine regularly cites the apostle Paul, who says that love supercedes everything, even Christian virtues and talents, like the gift for languages and the talent to teach. Therefore one ought to strive for love first and foremost. Because love is not a matter of speculation, but is founded upon certain dogmas, such as a belief in resurrection, scientific statements, which attempt to undermine faith, must be overlooked.

Chapter 19-20 in book III are dedicated to the doctrine under discussion: the theory of resurrection. These chapters are short. They concern the rules, which are not so much methodological in character, as doctrinal axioms. These do not analyse the doctrine but state it in the form of a wholesome truth.

Although in *de doctrine Christiana* the discussion is about a methodological approach to the treatment of the Christian texts, especially the Scripture, Augistine lays down the grounds for the Christian exegesis as a whole. However, he does not always apply his own methodology when needed.129 Let us give a few examples.

First, the demand to have a basic knowledge of the original languages, among which Greek and Hebrew occupy a privileged position. Latin does not suffice. Language knowledge is not reduceable to a couple of standard phrases or technical terms, such as Alliluya, Hosana and Amen in Hebrew.130

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[128] *doctrina* 1, 41, 62.

[129] In the preface to doctrina Augustine sets three kinds of critics: those who do not understand his advice; those who do not apply his exposition and those who consider it unnecessary. *docrina*: *praefatio* 2:3-4. Clearly, he himself belongs to either of the latter groups. R.P.H. Green (1995), pp.2-3.

[130] *doctrina* 3.11.16.: The great remedy for ignorance of proper signs is knowledge of languages. And men who speak the Latin tongue, of whom 540 are those I have undertaken to instruct, need two other languages for the knowledge of Scripture, Hebrew and Greek, that they may have recourse to the original texts… in some languages there are words that cannot be translated into the idiom of another language. And this happens chiefly in the case of interjections, which are words that express rather an emotion of the mind than any part of a thought we have in our mind. And the two given above are said to be of this kind,

Contrary to this statement, Augustine is not familiar with the Greek of Tim 41ab. He is neither familiar with its tricky Grammar, nor with its precise terminology. He has no idea that the text may contain a few tricky expressions, which are hard to translate, such as demiourgos, with its pejorative implication of craftsman, a kind of a blue-collar worker. Augustine replaces Cicero's effector, which is in front of him, with his Christianised version of creator. Had Augustine known about the notion of demiourgos and its connotations, he would not call the main character of the speech the Supreme God, which is accompanied by a number of consequences that have little, if anything, to do with Plato.

Secondly, in case we did not master the original languages, or our knowledge of them is too elementary, we have to consult a few translations and make comparisons with the aim of figuring out the meaning of the original as best we can.[131]

Augustine failsto live up to his requirements. He uses Cicero's Latin translation of Timaeus exclusively. He is not familiar with another translation by Calcedius, which existed in his time.

Third, Augustine claims that every language contains certain technical expressions and idioms, which are not translatable.[132]

Clearly, Augustine has in mind the Greek language, with its rich culture and exclusive vocabulary. There are also a few idioms in Tim 41ab, which are hardly translatable into any other language. E.g. idiom δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε (*Tim* 41a7), which has the fixed significance of a certain divinity of lower status in the Neoplatonic school of a certain period.[133] Since Cicero altered this idiom, first, altering its word order (*parens effectorque* instead of *effector parensque*), and secondly, changing the nuances in terminology (*effector* instead of δημιουργὸς, *parens* instead of πατήρ, *fata* instead of μοίρας,, etc.),[134] Augustine confronts a very different picture to the one Cicero confronted. The latter introduced

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Racha expressing the cry of an angry man, *Hosanna* that of a joyful man. But the knowledge of these languages is necessary, not for the sake of a few words like these which it is very easy to mark and to ask about, but, as has been said, on account of the diversities among translators.

[131] *doctrina* 3.14.21. we should consult and compare several translators.

[132] *doctrina* 3.14.21. either a word or an idiom, of which the reader is ignorant, brings a reader to a stop. Now if these belong to foreign languages, we should either make inquiry about them from people who speak those tongues, or if we have leisure we should make an effort to master these languages ourselves.

[133] Cf. Chapter Six on the Neoplatonists *infra*.

[134] Cf. Chapter Five on Cicero's translation *infra*.

Stoic idioms into his translation, such as ratio, satus,[135] idioms which were absent in Plato's text, whereas some other notions, such as εὖ and κακοῦ, present in the text were simply removed.

We will cite the fourth example in its integrity at this point: hasty and careless readers are led astray by many and manifold obscurities and ambiguities, substituting one meaning for another; and in some places they cannot hit upon even a fair interpretation. Some of the expressions are so obscure as to shroud the meaning in the thickest darkness.[136]

The original text is indeed quite obscure, but Cicero's translation is as at least as obscure as the original. Also Augustine's interpretation of this translation brings little clarification to the text. To the contrary, it introduces a new understanding, which is expected to bring light to some, but actually confuses others.

Fifth, the art of rhetoric has rules, which may lead people astray into false

beliefs, or at least ones that are not shared by the speaker.[137] Yet, sometimes even the false beliefs contain true statements, just as some true beliefs contain false statements. [138]

In his discussion around Tim 41ab, Augustine makes full use of his training in eloquence. Although he is convinced of his right objectives, he still comes up with simplifications, which his opponents consider false. Elsewhere he also acknowledges that his claims require modification.[139] The claim concerning divine omnipotence in this passage seems to be evident. Augustine emphasizes this not only when he speaks to his reader but also to the Platonists. Yet, for the latter, this approach is wrong for several reasons: notably in light of the demiurge's low status and the restriction upon the divine to perform evil actions. Augustine is partially familiar with this argumentation and agrees with it in some sense, as he briefly mentions restrictions on divine omnipotence in ις 9 -14, and more substantially throughout his other writings.[140] Nevertheless, he avoids

[135] Cf. Chapter Five on Stoic idioms *infra*.

[136] *doctrina* 3.6.7.

[137] *doctrina* 3.36.54. There are also certain rules for a more copious kind of argument, which is called *eloquence*, and these rules are not the less true since they can be used for persuading men of what is false; but as they can be used to enforce the truth as well, it is not the faculty itself that is to be blamed, but the perversity of those who put it to a bad use.

[138] *doctrina* II, 33.51.

[139] Cf. section on recurrent Themes.

[140] *sermo* 213, 1, 1; *de symbolo*. 1.2; *civ.dei* XXII.

discussing it around the text in question, rhetorically coming back to straightforward banalities.

In the course of his work on Tim 41ab, Augustine does not take any of the above-mentioned rules into account, if to exclude a required doctrinal discussion on resurrection.[141] There are two possible explanations for such a seeming negligence: first, in de doctrina Christiana Augustine plunges into explanations of the rules for exegetical treatment of the Bible, and not of the texts of pagan antiquity. However, the Platonists consider Plato's Timaeus as well as some other dialogues to be sacred texts, just as Christians consider the Bible sacred. To their way of thinking, Plato cannot be corrected, as his every word is true: therefore, the search for the truth begins and ends with Plato.

Augustine is familiar with these Platonists' sensibilities. He knows that they address Plato as 'divine', at least as a semi-god.[142] It is not accidental that Augustine refers to Plato's text in his polemic with the Platonists, not to the text by any other philosopher like Aristotle or Pythagoras. He is far too aware of the weight of Plato's authority, as he attempts to use it for his own purposes as much as possible. Augustine applies the argument ad auctoritatem, which formally works in the same manner both for the Platonists and Christians. The difference is the content: the Bible and Plato's corpus.[143]

Another difference between the Tim 41ab discussion and de doctrina Christiana exegesis is that we deal with Augustine's sporadic examination of the text, and not a systematic treatment of a chosen text. Augustine rarely applies his methodology even to the Bible. A real preacher in action, such as Augustine in sermones 241-242, cannot possibly take into account all the aspects of the exegetic approach. The possibility of being carried away with a discussion irrelevant to the occasion is ever present.[144] That is why demands of this kind are hardly applicable to Augustine's analysis of the Tim 41ab.

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[141] doctrina *I, 15:* Resurrectione et ascensione Christi fulcitur fides, excitatur judicio.

[142] Semideus autem ille Plato… *civ.dei* II, 14, 2. Cf. also discussions on the issue in Chapter Six on the Neoplatonists *infra*.

[143] Although Augustine counts several doctrines overlapping Neo-Platonism with Christianity, especially in *civ.dei* VIII, still a true Christian has to be *uiterlijk* anti-Platonist. Therefore, a convert from Platonism ought to temper his earlier convictions to open himself to a deeper meaning. J. Van Oort, *Jeruzalem en Babylon. Een onderzoek van Augustinus' de stad van God en de bronnen van zijn leer der twee steden (rijken).* Utrecht: Boekencentrum. 1986. P. 45.

[144] In *sermones* 241-242, dedicated to the Easter theme, Augustine spends almost half of discourse on pagan philosophy.

Augustine's *Tim* 41 a7-b6 Rhetorical aspect

A few cicumstances of Augustine's polemic against the Platonists invite us to touch upon the rhetorical aspect of the discussion. This aspect concerns two issues: the issue of the true speaker of the speech, and the issue of whether or not this polemic is real.

Concerning the Neoplatonists, we have to keep in mind that both in sermones 241-242 and in civ.dei, where Tim 41ab is cited, Augustine does not really address the Neoplatonists, but intellectuals in general – the intellegentia of the decadent Roman Empire, the main addressee of the civ.dei. They, and not the philosophers of a certain school, will decide whether or not the Christians are responsible for the fall of the Roman Empire, and what exactly now weakening the formerly powerful Empire.[145]

Porphyry's followers are among the accusers of Christianity, whereas Augustine assigned himself the role of defender. The discussion is partially philosophic, partially rhetoric.[146] The purpose of the debate is not to convince the opponent, but to the convince the audience, especially the jury. Therefore, we should not take the arguments of the defender at face value, keeping in mind that he is not unbiased. His purpose is to win the court case. This is the way it goes with sophists, and later rhetors, politicians and lawyers.[147]

We illustrate such a reading of the resurrection topic from the point of view of Plato's passage with three examples: first, the issue of Tim 41ab legacy in the context of the polemic against the Neoplatonists; secondly, shifting the accent from the issue of resurrection, as life after death, to the issue of immortality, not necessarily implying a factual death and its overcoming. Finally, there is this strange unaccomplished state of the key discussion concerning the Creator's omnipotence. The latter includes the issue of a content and also the subject of divine omnipotence.

First, as to the legitimacy of the reference to Tim 41ab: Augustine rebukes the Platonists for their ignorance and their lack of comprehension concerning one of the key texts belonging to their teacher and the founder of their school. If Augustine is convinced that Plato's Timaeus is dedicated to the issue of bodily resurrection, it is then quite natural to check out

[145] Cf. P.Courbelié, *La justice dans la Cité de Dieu*. Paris: *Études augustiniennes*. 2004, p. 393 (*Augustin et sac de Rome*).

[146] J.von Heyking claims that Augustine's common discouse is not worldy, yet here, in *civ.dei*, he fully engages in a pastoral activity. The purpose of his rhetoric is to 'tame the inordinate love for political glory'. J.von Heyking, *Augustine and Politics as longing in the world*. Columbia and London: The University of Missouri Press. 2001. P. 21.

[147] Cf. P. Courbelié, op.cit. *supra*, p. 369 (*Augustin avocat*), p. 398 (*Augustin intercesseur*).

possible commentaries by the Platonists on Tim 41ab. Augustine should have admitted that the Platonists also gave it thought. The argument that the Platonists missed out on, or misunderstood, this issue is not convincing. Anyone can level such accusations against anyone, even against the Christians, Augustine included, saying that he did not notice one or another biblical text of importance,[148] with one single idea in mind, to attack Christians. A statement of that kind carries considerable weight, but only when it is accompanied by a familiarity with the works of Christian writers, where the cited text is relevant to the issue at hand.

Secondly, Augustine's definition of the present issue is not always well formulated. Even if we admit that his reading of Timaeus is right, still his argument concerns not so much the resurrection of the body, as its immortality. The resurrection means not just the eternal life of the body, but its eternal life after a real death, this being not just a mere separation of the soul from its body, but possible decomposition of the bodily elements. The eternal life of the body as well as the soul in the body is a key aspect of the resurrection theory, but it is not the only one.

Third, the main argument in favour of the bodily resurrection, raised in the polemic against Porphyry, still remains unresolved. Augustine's argument concerns divine omnipotence. Augustine uses it regularly in the context of the Tim 41ab discussion.[149] However, Porphyry already provided us with several insightful objections to this argument. Surprisigly, in the course of his Tim 41ab discussion, Augustine keeps going his way as if no objection was ever raised against his argument. But it is still clear, from the passages under discussion (cf 16), that Augustine is familiar with some aspects of Porphyry's objections; and he responds to Porphyry's other objections in his other works, such as de consensu and de doctrina.

This question, besides all the rest, concerns two key aspects: the content, as well as the subject, of divine omnipotence. As to the content, Augustine agrees that God can neither lie nor die. Elsewhere he claims that God can neither deceive nor sin. This way Augustine appears to refute a simplistic version of divine omnipotence using objections already advanced by his opponent. In de consensus, Augustine carries his argument concerning divine limits even further. He sticks to his claims concerning divine omnipotence, even though he agrees that God cannot do certain things. Omnipotence consists in bringing about anything the omnipotent,

[148] E.g. a number of texts from the Old Testament, which seemingly contradict the divine precepts given to Moses. The collective murder of the inhabitants of Jericho by the Jews led by Jesus Navin at the time of conquering the Promised Land. Augustine discusses these problems in Quaestionum in Heptateuchum libri septem. VII, 2.

[149] *civ.dei* XXII, 1, *civ.dei* XXII, 27 but in a most develped form in *civ.dei* V, 10.

divine agent desires, and not in realizing anything others may demand of him.[150] The key to divine omnipotence is the issue of God's free will. Augustine perceives this world, as the Universe of willing subjects. It is often the case that the will of an agent is an obstacle to the realization of a project advanced by another willing agent. In the universe of willing agents, the will of an agent is sometimes realized, sometimes not. But the will of the Supreme God is always realized. This is one of the reasons why Augustine calls it invictissima voluntas. The victorious will, id est the will that always wins over all willing agents, is the will that achieves anything at whim. The key to divine omnipotence is that God is the only agent in the entire universe, who has such a will.

The issue of divine omnipotence has another problematic aspect, which is about identifying the agent of divine omnipotence. Who is actually omnipotent, if we admit omnipotence? Augustine's claim: it is the Supreme God, the Creator of the world and gods, which is what, he claims, Plato says.

According to Augustine, the Supreme God and Creator of the universe and of gods is one and the same agent. According to the Neoplatonists, these two are quite different: the creator of the universe and of gods is not the supreme divinity but a rather lower divinity in the divine hierarchy, who thereby is quite remote from the one who can be considered as the Supreme God in the divine hierarchy of the Neoplatonic system.

Why doesn't Augustine seriously address the issue of divine omnipotence? - Certainly not because he is not able to: after all he is a mighty thinker. Moreover, he touches upon this issue in de consensu.[151] He is not afraid to engage in a dispute with the Neoplatonists: after all he is a brilliant polemicist (cf. his famous polemics against the Pelagianists and the Donatists). - Most probably Augustine avoids an in-depth discussion of divine omnipotence because he is not dealing with the real Neoplatonists, who are actually interested in such a debate. His readers are not the Platonists, but the local intellectuals of the kind present at the service of Bright Week in Hyppo, the listeners of his 241-242 sermons. They are physicians, lawyers and teachers – in a word, the people who heard of Plato and the Platonists but not necessarily read any of their compositions: possibly, they have heard about some elements of Platonism retold in some standard handbooks (cf. The section on Minucius Felix in Chapter Seven infra). To convince people of this kind requires a certain technique, which includes a few vivid images, mentioning the right names, using a technical

[150] *consensu* 1.35.
[151] Ibid.

term at the right moment, and finally using a known quote with elegant ease.[152]

A frustrating nature of Augustine's discourse in civ.dei is that it is not always clear who he is talking to. He constantly changes the addressee. We never know whether it is the Neoplatonists, intellectuals, or Christians.[153]

3.4. Examination Conclusion

As we have seen supra, the present chapter consists of four sections covering the following areas of examination: translation (3.1.), themes (3.2.), evolution (3.3.) and methodology (3.4.). The discussion in each section brought some insight into the comprehension of Augustine's Tim 41a7-b6.

The objective of our criticism in translation section (3.1.) was not to demonstrate our superiority in the field of classical studies, but to accentuate the priority of philosophical/theological expertise. We did not claim that we accomplished a better translation of the passages under examination on the basis of our superior Greek, Latin and English. On the contrary, we admire the skill of many translators working in several languages, and are grateful to have had their work at hand. Our only point is that it is not sufficient to master the language in order to accomplish a correct translation. We are convinced that one ought to master the message and background behind the scene as well the text's context. Just as Cicero's Greek did not help him to provide a better translation to Plato, Augustine's Latin did not help him fully grasp exactly what Cicero's text was about. Similarly, many translators tend to lack mastery over the context of Augustine's discussion around Tim 41ab. Inter alia, none of them managed to express the secret importance of Stoic idioms that entered, via Cicero's

[152] Adams neatly distinguishes the terms *civitas* and *popolus* in Augustine. He thinks that *civitas* has strong thological connotations, which the term *populus* lacks. There is an opposition *civitas dei* to *civitas diaboli*, but no opposition *populus dei* to *populous diabolic.* In fact, *populus* is a kind of indistinguished mass of the (Roman) citizens who will still have to chose their way: either with God or without. Briefly, *polulus* must be distilated down to a *civitas* of some kind, preferably Christian. J.D. Adams, *The Populus of Augustine and Jerome.* New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1971. P. 23-24.

[153] M.C. Preus analyzing Augustine's *de natura et origine animae* attaches deep metaphysical and psychological importance to Augustine's eloquence and silence that appear otherwise as a matter of discourse. Not the nature of the soul but also strive for an eternal life in resurrection are discussed in the context of eloquence and silence. M.C. Preus, *Eloquence and Ignorance in Augustine. On the Nature and Origin of the Soul*. Atlanta: Scholars Press. 1985. P. 124.

rendition, into Augustine's thought and, paradoxically, assisted him to arrive at Christian conclusions.[154]

The following theme(s) section (3.2.) is somewhat related to the commentary section in Chapter Two (material) supra. This section focuses upon the speaker (3.2.1.), along with two rather controversial issues on Jupiter (3.2.1.), and Omnipotence (3.2.2.). Although Augustine deals with these issues in various places quite exhaustively, they still remain unresolved in his controversy with the Neoplatonists on resurrection. Augustine plays around with Jupiter's mythology and demonstrates a familiarity with Jupiter's importance in Neoplatonist theology,[155] and yet he never enters the main discussion on the identification of the speaker with Jupiter, as we shall see infra in Chapter Six on the Neoplatonists (especially Porphyry, Iamblichus and Proclus).

However, the most problematic issue of the whole thesis (both Agustine's and mine) remains the issue of the speaker's omnipotence. In several Tim 41ab cited passages, Augustine refers to a populist version of the divine omnipotence: God as capable of achieving any, even an impossible, task, hence the resurrection turns out to be possible, despite being against natural laws. He claims that Porphyry and his followers share this view with Christians. It is neither correct, nor Augustine himself is to be considered a partisan of this populistic version of omnipotence. Ealier Porphyry already undertook a refutation of such omnipotence.[156] Moreover, Augustine is familiar with some of Porphyry's objections (God can neither die, nor lie, nor deceive, nor be subject to necessity), therefore he modifies his omnipotence theory elsewhere in accordance with his preferred voluntaristic vision: omnipotence consisting in the exhaustive realization of one's will.

The evolution section (3.3.) focuses on the summus deus-dii minores opposition, which is one of the grander themes in Augustine's Tim 41ab exegesis, which we deliberately did not discuss. We should keep in mind that one of the key methodological principles we apply in the present research is induction, not deduction.[157] To describe more adequately a phenomenon, we focus intensely upon one representative case, without examining each and every case. We argued that the summus deus – dii minores opposition underwent a certain evolution in Augustine both terminologically but also contentwise.

[154] cf. chapters Five and Eight *infra* on Cicero and Stoic idioms.

[155] Jupiter as the universal soul, apparently, a reference to the lost Porphyry's commentary on *Tim* 41ab.

[156] Cf. chapter one *supra*.

[157] cf. *Eiagoge*, section 'methods and tools' *supra* on K.Popper.

Terminologically, Augustine initially did not apply the majority of components of this expression, which appear neither in Plato nor in Cicero. These notions serve his own Christian objectives in the exegesis both in sermones and civ.dei. First, he did not apply any specific adjectives to deus and dii (the most basic opposition running through the entire discussion), then moved to another milder opposition deus non factus-dii a se facti, which being intentionally Christian is not used in the original either, but still fits into the Platonic context (3.3.1.1.).[158] Gradually, adjective summus (deus) enters the scene without the minores opposition really showing itself, although it is implied. Finally, the main opposition receives its full interpretative range.

Contentwise, the first term of the opposition – speaker: summus deus - does not undergo exegetical development, whereas the second term – dii minores – went through several evolutionary stages. Augustine aways identified the speaker with the Christian God, the almighty Creator of the universe. Augustine never doubted that for the Platonists of his epoch the identification supreme God – almighty – creator of the universe is a threefold, incorrect equation.[159] As to the addressed divinities, Augustine doubts the adequacy of the application gods, intending these characters to be first celestial bodies (the sun, the stars, the planets) (3.3.1.2.), then celestial beings (angels and demons) (3.3.2.1.), and finally humans in the resurrection to come (3.3.2.2.). The latter interpretation belongs properly to Augustine's train of thought, whereas the former two is just a tribute to a running discussion. Augustine's evolution of ideas allows us to conclude that sermons 241-242 were written somewhat earlier than even the first reference to Tim 41ab in civ.dei IX, due to a more primitive terminology and rather simple content (no mention of either summus deus– dii minores opposition, as well a primitive identification of the addressed dii with the celestial bodies). Clearly, a similar procedure can be applied to the other elements of the Augustine's Tim 41ab discussion

The methodological section (3.4.) also consists of two sub-sections: doctrinal (3.4.1.) and rhetorical (3.4.2.). We argued that there is a kind of a methodological double-play in Augustine's exegesis of Plato's Tim 41ab. On the one hand, Augustine completely contravenes the general requirements he introduced in his handbook on methodology,[160] having neither checked

[158] However, as we shall see in chapter six on the Neoplatonists *infra*, the developed Neoplatonism viewed the addressed gods as generated children by the father-speaker, and not made. Cf. section on Proclus.

[159] The speaker is neither *summus*, nor *omnipotens*, nor the Universe Creator is *summus deus*, cf. chapter on the Neoplatonists *infra*.

[160] *de doctrina Christiana.*

his ideas against the original nor alternative translations nor terminology. His perfect excuse is that Tim 41ab is not a biblical text: this suggests that Augustine does not see it as necessary to treat pagan sources seriously despite all the means available to him.[161] On the other hand, Augustine accomplishes his own true objectives: doctrinally (3.4.1.), he defends the Christian resurrection theory (the importance of which he also declares in doctrina). Rhetorically speaking (3.4.2.), he exquisitely manipulates a pagan text in yet another polemic. Augustine masterfully shifts the debate from a pretended attempt at convincing the opposition (Porphyry and his followers) to address the general reader of the civ.dei: a hesitating Roman intellectual, who is a potentinal parishioner attending his services and preaching, such as what took place in Bright Week semones 241-242.[162]

To conclude, although Augustine's presentation of Tim 41ab is creative, complex and coherent in its own right, it still lacks nuances on the issues such as divine omnipotence, the status of the speaker and the audience. These issues will be the stuff of our discussion in Part Two where we evaluate the present discussion.

[161] Which will fire him back in the long run, meaning that the Platonists do not take him seriously either, as none of them ever refered to the authority of his present discussion, as it is not serious indeed from the point of view of the Neoplatonic discourse.

[162] As G.Madec rightly remarks that according to Augustine, the Platonism accomplishes itself in Christianity. G.Made, *Angelus*, in *Augustinus Lexicon* (ed. C.Mayer). I/1-2. 1986, p.308.

AUGUSTINE's TIMAEUS 41AB

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AUGUSTINE'S TIM 41AB COHERENCE WITH AUGUSTINE'S PLATO

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Chapter Four:
Augustine's Tim 41ab
coherence with Augustine's Plato

4.0. Introductory Curiosity.

The present chapter concerns Augustine's use of Plato's dialogues and his references to them and to Plato's name. Our goal is to demonstrate both the exclusiveness and representativeness of Augustine's *Tim* 41a7-b6 in and for his Platonism. The means to achieve it are through the examination of certain key passages as well as the use of comparative statistics with the assistance of the *Patrologia Latina* database. To the rich scholarly material on the issue we will add an in-depth examination of a single text of Plato's, the one Augustine knew best. We aim to demonstrate an absolute exclusivity of *Tim* 41ab in Augustine's works. However, we discuss this text directly very little, preparing the ground for further comparisons. In this chapter we attempt to clarify Augustine's familiarity with Plato. We will do so by advancing from a more general point of view down to something very specific. We emphasize the significance of a single text, extensively commented upon by Augustine in several places. The following step is to advance more general claims.

In my view, it is crucial to identify the most representative text in Plato's *corpus*,[1] upon which Augustine comments extensively. Having examined Augustine's discussion of such an authoritative and representative text, we will arrive at a somewhat more advanced idea of Augustine's Plato: how well he knows his doctrines and how he treats them. This will enable us to judge Plato's influence upon Augustine.

There are two main aspects of Augustine's Plato: his general familiarity with Plato's philosophy, and his knowledge of particular texts on which he chose to comment. Here we will focus mainly on the second, textual aspect of Augustine's Plato.

This chapter consists of three sections: the first section concerns the presence of Plato's dialogues in Augustine's entire *corpus*; the second section is on Augustine's use of one single Plato's dialogue *Timaeus,* as Augustine's most preferred Plato's dialogue; the third section is about *Tim*

[1] In *Eisagoge supra* we pinpointed that J.G. Frazer found a key to the whole religious phenomenon with one single rite of a sacrificial killing of a priest by his follower.

29c, which is the second of Plato's passages holding importance for Augustine. This was transmitted from Plato to Augustine through an intermediary source and commented upon by Augustine in several places. Paradoxically, although the present chapter is dedicated to Augustine's Plato, it barely deals with *Tim* 41ab directly. Yet, it still singles out its singular importance vis-à-vis the rest. Our task here is rather humble: to demonstrate what Augustine understood in Plato's philosophy through the sources available to him.

4.1. Augustine's Plato.

Plato is one of Augustine's favorite authors. His name appears 114 times throughout 19 of Augustine's treatises. Augustine refers to Plato even more frequently than to Virgil (77 times in 15 works) or Varro (94 times in 9 works), and almost as frequently as to Cicero (149 times in 29 works).[2] We should bear in mind that Cicero is Augustine's favorite pagan writer, and influenced him throughout his life.

The *status quaestionis* of Augustine's Platonism we find in R.Crouse intensive article.[3] Frederic Van Fletteren claims that Augustine knows Plato exclusively through secondary sources, among which he mentions Varro, Virgil, Cicero, Apuleus and Porphyry.[4] We would like to amend this claim by narrowing it down to Cicero as a single preferred source as far as the textual knowledge is concerned. Although the number of references to Plato and Cicero are comparable, the references to Cicero are of higher quality. Augustine is intimately familiar with Cicero's texts, and the same cannot be said about his familiarity with Plato. All of Augustine's quotes from Plato originate directly from Cicero, suggesting that he is familiar with the texts of the former exclusively *via* the works of the latter. Thus, every one of Augustine's quotes from Plato is first and foremost a quote from Cicero, which is based not only on Cicero's translation but also on the latter's thought, world outlook, and his interpretation of Plato. This is as true of the *Timaeus* as of Plato's other dialogues.

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[2] cf. *Patrologia Latina Database.* Leuven: KULeuven Limo access, June 2012.

[3] R.Crouse, '*Pauci mutatis verbis': St Augustine's Platonism*, in *Augustine and his critics* (ed. R.Dodaro, G.Lawless). London: Routledge. 2000.

4 F.Van Fletteren, *Plato*, in *Augustine through Ages. An Encyclopeadia*. Ed. A.Fitzgerald. P. 651. Porphyry, who is particular focus of our work, could not be the source for Augustine's knowledge of Plato since Augustine could not read Porphyry's Greek. Marius Victorinus plays a similar transmission role here as does Cicero in regards to Augustine's Plato. Cf. P.Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*. Paris: Études augustiniennes. 1968.

Often scholars ascribe to Augustine familiarity with a number of Plato's doctrines, making very few references to precise passages in Plato.[5] Even if the judgment of these scholars is correct, Augustine is not always aware that he is dealing with Plato, and not with some other author, This is evident in his treatment of the following topics, among others e.g.: the ideal state, ruled by the philosopher-king, the allegory of the cave, and the myth of Er, God Creator of the universe, who is excited about his creation; the universe having a beginning but no end; endlessly repeated cycles of existence; the eternal and unchangeable world of ideas; the universal soul; the soul's immortality; the tripartite division of the soul into intelligence, higher desires and lower passions; the purification of the soul by four civic virtues (prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice); the truth contemplatable by a prepared intellect; the reminiscence of truth; the four material elements (earth, water, air and fire) ordered in a particular hierarchy.

5 The research on Augustine's Platonism has started as early as in the beginning of the 20th century by P.Alfarec, who claimed that Augustine's first true conversion was to Neoplatonism, which provoked a sparkling research with a wide range of diverse positions. The climax of discussions came around the mid 50s. This was particularly expressed in the Proceedings of the International Conference dedicated to Augustine's Neoplatonism: *Augustinus Magister*. Paris : *Études augustiniennes, Collection des études augustiniennes. Série Antiquité.*; Vols. 1-2. *Communications*. Vol. 3. *Actes*. 1954-1955. Also cf. R.Crouse, '*Pauci mutatis verbis': St Augustine's Platonism*, in *Augustine and his critics* (ed. R.Dodaro, G.Lawless). London: Routledge. 2000; M.R.Barnes, *Plato, Platonism*, in *Encyclopedia of Early Christianity*. Ed. E.Fergusson. 2nd. Ed. New York. Garland Publishing. 1997, pp. 923-28. E. von Ivanka, *Plato Christianus. La Réception critique du Platonisme chez les Pères de l'église*. Paris. press universitaire de France. 1990; W.Aalders, *Plato en het christendom. Over het Griekse en het christelijke en het ideologische denken*. Den Haag. J.N. Voorhoeve. 1984; R.J. O'Connell, *Augustine's Platonism*. Villanova: Villanova University Press.1984; M.T. Clark, *Marius Victorinus Afer, Porphyry, and the History of Philosophy*, in *The Significance of Neoplatonism.* R.B. Harris (ed.). Norfolf. State University of New York Press. 1976. Pp. 265-275; Ch. Boyer, *Christianisme et Néoplatonisme dans la formation de saint Augustin*. Rome. Officium libri catholici. 1953; M.P. Garvey, *Saint Augustine: Christian or Neoplatonist? From his retreat at Cassiciacum until his ordination at Hippo*. Milwaukee. Marquette University Press. 1939; R. Jolivet, *Saint Augustin et le Néoplatonisme Chrétien*. Paris: Denoêl et Steele. 1932. P. Alfarec, *L'evolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin*. Vol. I: *Du manichéisme au Néoplatonisme*. Paris: Nourry. 1918. The conclusive statement of *status quaestionis* is the remark by A.Smith that it seems that the precise nature of Augustine's Platonism will never be resolved. Cf; A.Smith, *Porphyrian Studies since 1913,* in *Austieg und Niedergang der roemische Welt*, II. Berlin-New York: W. de Gruyter. 1987, p. 770.

Curiously, F.Van Fletteren ascribes some views to Plato he never had, e.g. intuition of the truth *hic et nunc*, the expression that *the gods do not meddle in human affairs*; the demons lifting up human prayers to the gods, and then bringing back the gifts of the gods which are granted to the humans.[6] In our view, it is of crucial importance / vital to look not so much into Augustine's familiarity with Plato in general, but into his familiarity with Plato's texts.

Augustine's attitude to Plato underwent a major change during his lifetime. In his early dialogues he is so excited about Plato that he cannot even mention his name without paying a compliment or two: *Plato, a wise man and the best erudite among the people of his time*;[7] *the most noble among the disciples of Socrates;*[8] *the most noble philosopher*,[9] etc.

However, Augustine's enthusiasm for Plato gradually waned. In reading Augustine chronologically, we find that his mentions of Plato become progressively less flattering. Plato is at first characterised as *the most noble philosopher,* then demoted to *a/the noble philosopher Plato*, and finally reduced merely to *a philosopher*. In the end, Augustine stops mentioning even the fact that Plato is a philosopher, confining his compliments simply to Plato's name.

Thus, in *civ.dei*, where Augustine mentions Plato's name most frequently (80 out of 114 times) he mostly refers to him merely by name without supplementary adjectives.[10] (Augustine's discussion of Labeo's opinion on whether Plato is a semi-god is not serious. Augustine uses it with rhetorical purpose in order to refute the semi-divine status of Romulus and Heracle, who he says must yield to Plato's semi-divinity).[11]

Augustine provisionally adopts Labeo's point of view in order to prove that the latter's views are not convincing. Augustine makes sarcastic

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6 F.Van Fletteren, *Plato*, in *Augustine through Ages. An Encyclopedia*. Cambridge. 1999. P. 651.

7 Plato vir sapientissimus et eruditissimus temporum suorum… *contra academicos* 3.17.37.

8 ...nobilissimus discipulorum ejus Plato… *de consensu* 1.7.12.

9 ...nobilissimus philosophus Plato… *de consensu*. 1.35.53.

10 E.g. *civ.dei* 1.22., VIII, 8; XIII, 18.; XXII, 28, *inter alia*.

11 Quid est ergo quod semideus Plato non semideis, sed deis, et hoc bonis, illa oblectamenta, quia judicat turpia, tam constanter audet auferre? *epad 8.13.* Hunc Platonem Labeo inter semideos commemorandum putavit, sicut Herculem, sicut Romulum: semideos autem heroibus anteponit, sed utrosque inter numina collocat. *civ.dei 8.14.2.* Semideus autem ille Plato et talium deorum libidini restitit, et ab indole Romanorum quid perficiendum esset, ostendit... *civ.dei* 2.14.2.

remarks concerning Plato's *wisdom* in the account of worshiping gods. The same happens concerning the gods' kindness not matching Plato's kindness.[12] Finally, Augustine calls Plato the *founder and teacher* (δ, θ, ιη) of the Platonic school,[13] although sometimes when he speaks about the (Neo)-Platonists (*recent Platonists*) Augustine adopts a pejorative tone.[14] Since he poeticizes with the Platonists, as those who apostatize their teacher, this compliment turns out to be somewhat dubious. Their novelties seem to bring little good, only distortions.

The discussions concerning Plato's life, doctrine and influence appear in 58 extracts throughout Augustine's *corpus*.[15] 32 of these passages are from *civ.dei*,[16] the other 26 are broadly distributed throughout the remainder of his corpus.[17] It is clear that numerically speaking *civ.dei* is the main treatise in which Augustine discusses Plato in general and *Timaeus* in particular. However, the fact that Augustine never cites from or comments upon the original Greek text suggests he was not familiar with it. He never speaks of having opened this dialogue for examination or simply for a read. This remark also concerns Augustine's knowledge of Plato's other dialogues: obviously, Augustine neither read none of them in the original, nor did he comment their vocabulary, nor their possible incorrect or ambiguous readings in Latin translation. This does not mean that

12 *civ.dei* 8.21.

13 ...eorum auctor et magister Plato... *civ.dei* 9.23.1., 13.16.2. …istorum omnium magister Plato, *civ.dei* XXII, xxvi, 1-37.

14 From *eurum* (δ, θ) to *istorum* (ιη). Cf. *supra*.

15 cf. *Patrologia Latina Database.* Leuven: KULeuven Limo access, June 2012. Search engine.

16 *breviarium ad psalmos*. Ps. 86.; *soliloqia*. I.iv.9.; *contra academicos*. II.xvii.37.; *epistolae secundum ordinem* I.iii.1.; *epistolae secundum ordinem* II. cxviii.3.16-17. ; *epistolae secundum ordinem* II. cxviii.3.20.; *de doctrina christiana* II.xxviii.43.; *de vera religione*. ii.2.; *de vera religione*. iii.3.; *de vera religione*. iii.5.; *de consensu evangelistarum* I .vii.12.; *de consensu evangelistarum* I. xxxv.53.; *ennarationes in psalmos*. ciii.3.6.; *sermo* CXL *ad populum*. 5.; *de scripturis, sermo* LXVIII.5.6.; *de diversis quaestionibus. de ideis.* XLVI.; *de utilitate credenda* vii, 17.; *contra Faustum* XX, ix.; *de trinitate* XII, xvi; *de baptismo* VI, xlii, 87.; *contra Julianum* IV. xv.75.; *contra Julianum* IV. xv. 76.; *contra secundam Juliani* I. cxvi.; *contra secundam Juliani* VI, xxiiб *retractiones* I. iii. 2.; *retractiones*. II. iv. 2.

17 *breviarium ad psalmos*. Ps. 86.; *soliloqia*. I.iv.9.; *contra academicos*. II.xvii.37.; *epistolae secundum ordinem* I.iii.1.; *epistolae secundum ordinem* II. cxviii.3.16-17. ; *epistolae secundum ordinem* II. cxviii.3.20.; *de doctrina christiana* II.xxviii.43.; *de vera religione*. ii.2.; *de vera religione*. iii.3.; *de vera religione*. iii.5.; *de consensu evangelistarum* I .vii.12.; *de consensu evangelistarum* I. xxxv.53.; *ennarationes in psalmos*. ciii.3.6.; *sermo* CXL *ad populum*. 5.; *de scripturis, sermo* LXVIII.5.6.; *de diversis quaestionibus. de ideis.* XLVI.; *de utilitate credenda* vii, 17.; *contra Faustum* XX, ix.; *de trinitate* XII, xvi; *de baptismo* VI, xlii, 87.; *contra Julianum* IV. xv.75.; *contra Julianum* IV. xv. 76.; *contra secundam Juliani* I. cxvi.; *contra secundam Juliani* VI, xxiiб *retractiones* I. iii. 2.; *retractiones*. II. iv. 2.

Augustine is ignorant as to the importance of examining the key vocabulary for a correct comprehension of a text. On the contrary, he perfectly understands this importance, as in his advanced age he regularly comments certain difficult terms, sometimes even larger extracts from the Greek Gospel. He treats the pagan writers often in a similar fashion: e.g. he comments the difficulties of transmitting the Greek notion *ideas* in Plato's teaching with the notions of *formae, species, rationes* into Latin.[18]

4.2. Augustine's *Timaeus.*

In Augustine's *corpus* we detect no traces of Calcidius' famous translation of *Timaeus* into Latin.[19] Augustine's silence raises the issue of the correct dating of the text, since Augustine seldom misses a Latin source of his time.[20] The only source of Augustine's familiarity with *Timaeus* is Cicero's Latin translation. Augustine acknowledges this while quoting the longest passage from Plato that has come down to us, saying *haec sunt verba sicut ea Cicero in latinum vertit.*[21] He cites a number of these quotes literally,[22] while venturing to paraphrase the other passages with his own words.[23]

The first person to notice Augustine's multiple quotations from *Timaeus* was G. Bardy, who spotted no less than three of these quotes (in *civ.dei* XIII, 16; *civ.dei* XXII, 26; *sermo* 242.8. and in an allusion in *civ.dei* XIII, xviii.1), thereby asserting Plato's significant influence upon Augustine .[24] Yet, a year before G.Bardy another publication had appeared (cf. *infra*), initiating the spade-work of identifying the basic quotes , albeit unfortunately providing next to no commentary.

In his two-volume classic book *Saint Augustin et Cicéro,* M.Testard noted that Augustine cites *Timaeus* thirteen times, seldom referring to the source, in the following places: : *de trinitate* IV, 18.24, *de consensu* I, 35.53.,

18 *de diversis quaestionibus* 83: 46. According to Augustine, if we are to translate the word *rationes* back into Greek, we will arrive at λόγοι, instead of *ideas.* This is to say that the initial translation is incorrect.

19 Although P.Courcelle admits other alternatives in *Les lettres grècques en Occident*. P.157.

20 The facts concerning Calcidius, his life and his *Timaeus* translations are rather obscure. E.g. John Dillon following Waszink rightly raises a doubt as to whether Calcidius was ever a deacon (or even a Christian at all) with the Spanish bishop of Cordoba, who was a papal legate on several councils. Isididor of Sevilla – an encyclopaedist of his time, is as silent as Augustine about Calcidius. Cf. J.Dillon, *The middle Platonists.* Chapter on Calcidius.

21 *civ.dei* 13.16.

22 (β), (γ), (η), (ιη).

23 Cf. (α), (δ), (ε), (ς), (ζ), (θ), (ι), (ια), (ιβ), (ιγ), (ιδ), (ιε), (ις).

24 Augustin, *La cité de Dieu XI-XIV*. *OSA* 35. Paris. 1959. Note 33 par Bardy, G.. P.519.

civ.dei VIII, 11 (twice), *civ.dei* XI. 21 (twice), *civ.dei* XII, 27, *civ.dei* XIII, 16, *civ.dei* XIII, 18. (twice), *civ.dei* XXII, 11, *civ.dei* XXII, 26., *sermo* 241.8.[25] M.Testard also detected that Augustine took these extracts from the following places in Cicero's translation of *Timaeus*: III, 8 (twice); III, 9: 15; IV, 13; IV, 13- V, 15; V, 15; VIII, 28- IX, 29; XI, 40-41 (five times); XIII, 48-XIV, 49.[26] These correspond to the following passages in the original: *Tim* 29c (twice); *Tim* 29[e]; *Tim* 31b; *Tim* 31b-32a; *Tim* 32a; *Tim* 37b-38d; *Tim* 41ab (five times); *Tim* 43a-46a.[27]

Thrice we find the *Timaeus* title (*de consensu* 1.35.53., *civ.dei* VIII, 11; *contra Julianum* II.7.19). It appears in one of his early works (*de consensu*, 399/400) and in two later ones of *circa* 421/422 (*contra Julianum* 1, 46; civ.dei VIII, 11, 2). Clearly, *Timaeus* occupied a significant place in Augustine's thought throughout his life. He did not forget the *Timaeus*, despite his later change of attitude towards Plato.

Sometimes Augustine refers to Plato's treatise on *the creation of the world*, formulating the context in such a way that it is somewhat unclear whether he uses the phrase to refer to the work's title or as a short description of its content. Hereby he certainly implies *Timaeus*, although seldom names it. This creates the impression that he does not know this dialogue at first hand, even in translation. Yet, in *civ.dei* VIII, 11.2. he juxtaposes the two 'titles'.[28] This makes it clear that *on the creation of the world* is a description, which Augustine needs to use in the course of his discussions with some other writers, such as Porphyry.[29]

Since only the first half of this *Timaeus* is about the creation of the world, this title is not completely justifiable. At any rate, the most advanced quote, from *Tim* 43b-46a/ *tim* 13.48.-14.49, which appears in *civ.dei* XIII.18, is not even the mid-dialogue. Had Augustine known the whole text of the dialogue he would probably have given it a different descriptive title, such as *on the creation of the world and man*, or simply *on creation*. This is not at all surprising, since Cicero's translation, as it has come down to us, also contains only the first half of the dialogue (*Tim* 27a-47b), and there is no

25 M.Testard. Paris. 1958, p. 135.

26 Ibid. Pp. 58, 59, pp. 135-136.

27 cf. *Patrologia Latina Database.* Leuven: KULeuven Limo access, June 2012. *Search engine*.

28 In Timaeo autem Plato, quem librum de mundi constitutione conscripsit, Deum dicit in illo opere terram primo ignemque junxisse manifestum est autem quod igni tribuat coeli locum. *civ.dei* 8.11.2.

29 *De regressu animae* being a descriptive title of *De philosophia ex oraculis*, convincigly proven by John Meara in *Poprphyry's Phylosophy from Oracles in Augustine*. Paris. Études augustiniennes. 1959.

sign that he ever made the full translation, leaving the impression that Augustine is not familiar with the second half of the dialogue.

Sometimes while citing *Timaeus* Augustine is so liberal in his interpretation that he simply avoids referring either to the title, or to the author, again using obscure descriptions. For instance, in *de Trinitate* IV, 18, 24 Augustine indirectly refers to Plato as one of the Greek *sages*, thus deliberately avoiding Plato's name. The ambiguity of his attitude to *Timaeus* and its author persists over many years.

It is difficult for us to form a correct appraisal of Augustine's Plato through Cicero, simply because Cicero's translation is not fully preserved. Some of Augustine's quotes serve as a source for the reconstruction of some of the lost passages in Cicero's version of *Timaeus* – for instance, *tim* VIII, 28- IX, 29: *Tim* 37c10[30] and *tim* XIII, 48- XIV, 49.: *Tim* 45 b3-4.[31] Nevertheless, W.Ax in his critical edition of Cicero's *Timaeus* translation is wary of using any of these quotes in the body of the main text, placing them entirely in the *apparatus*.[32] He has little trust in Augustine's style of quoting as it is indeed not always literal. Since the original is missing, it is hardly possible to verify his accuracy.

It is clear from M.Testard's collection that Augustine quotes from and comments on only the mid-section of *Timaeus*: 29c2-43b4, and then only in small portions. The largest part of the dialogues is outside Augustine's scope of examination, especially the introductory section *Tim* 17a-29c2 and the final section *Tim* 43b4-92a, this being the larger second part on the creation of man. Moreover, there are also significant lacunas in Augustine's commentary in the mid-section, especially *Tim* 32b112-37c11.

In reality, Augustine uses just two significant sections of the dialogue: *Tim* 29c2-32b11 (1), and *Tim* 37c10-43b4 (2). Curiously, the second section is identical to *Tim* 41ab. The extracts *Tim* 37c10 and *Tim* 43b3-b4 stand on their own, *civ.dei* XXII, 26; *sermo* 242.8. concluded by an allusion in *civ.dei* XIII, xviii.1.[33]

In five cases out of thirteen M.Testard refers to a single passage, which Augustine cites from Cicero's translation: *tim* XI, 40-41 (*Tim* 41ab): *civ.dei* XII.27; *civ.dei* XIII.16; *civ.dei* XIII.18; *civ.dei* XXII.26; *sermo* 241.8. Among the identified passages this single quote is cited in 38 % of cases. Although

30 M.Tullius Cicero, *Fasc. 46. De divinatione/ De fato/ Timaeus.* Ed. W.Ax. Stutgardt. Teubner. 1977, p. 172.

31 Ibid. P. 184.

32 Ibid. In both cases: p. 172 and p. 184.

33 Augustin, *La cité de Dieu XI-XIV*. *OSA* 35. Paris. 1959. Note 33 par G.Bardy, p.519.

M.Testard makes no comment on the subject,[34] it is clear from his collection that no other passage of Plato occupies as significant a place as Cicero's *tim* XI, 40-41 corresponding to the original *Tim* 41ab. A half century has passed since M.Testard's publication. Computer search programmes allow us to arrive at a fuller picture of Plato's presence in Augustine's *corpus*. Indeed, there are more cases of Augustine citing Plato than M.Testard was able to spot. Nevertheless, the basic picture remains identical to the results of the initial research: the balance of *Tim* 41ab presence vis-à-vis *Timaeus* as a whole along with Plato's other passages is largely in favour of *Tim* 41ab. With the assistance of the computer means and a careful reading of the texts we have managed to increase the number of identified quotes from the initial five (cf. G.Bardy) to sixteen (cf. chapter two *supra*). The present research therefore shows that Augustine uses *Tim* 41ab more times than the total number of Augustine's quotes M.Testard managed to identify from the entire *Timaeus* (sixteen times against thirteen).[35] We just worded the conclusion already implicitly present in M.Testard, having completed his findings with with more exhaustive material.

Besides significant ancient commentaries, both by the Neoplatonists and Christian theologians (cf. Chapters Six and Seven *infra*) there was some direct interest into *Tim* 41ab in the modern scholarship by Th.B. de Graff (1941) and C. Partenie (1991) with a half a century gap,[36] yet with no role allotted to Augustine's interpretation. A modern tradition of running commentaries on Plato's *Timaeus*, almost as extensive as the Neoplatonist, dedicates no room to Augustine's exegesis either.[37] In his book on Augustine and Greek Philosophers with identical title J.Callihan dedicates no single line to *Tim* 41ab.[38] Augustine appears of little importance as a commentator to the commentators. Clearly, he is not treated as an expert on Plato of any kind. Nevertheless, within Augustine's *corpus* this exegesis is

34 In volume One containing the commentary on Plato's presence in Augustine. Pp. 155-175.

35 cf. *Patrologia Latina Database.* Leuven: KULeuven Limo access, June 2012. *Search engine*.

36 de Graff Thelma, *Timaeus 41a*, in *Classical weekly* 35, 1941-42, pp. 244-45; Partenie, Cataline*, Sur le Timée 41 a7-8*, in *Studii Clasice* 27, 1991, pp. 77-81.

37 There are sections in running commentaries on *Timaeus*, such as Th.-H. Martin, R.D. Archer-Hind, Taylor, A.E, F.M. Cornford. Cf. Th.-H. Martin, *Etudes sur le Tiée de Platon*. Paris. 1871, repr. Paris: Vrin. 1981; R.D. Archer-Hind, *The Timaeus of Plato*. London: Macmillian. 1888, repr. New York: Garland. 1980 Taylor, A.E. *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*. Oxford: Claredon Press. 1928, repr. 1962; F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology. The Timaeus translated with a running commentary*. London: Routledge. 1937 with numerous reprints afterwards. Pp. 140-42 on *Tim* 41a.

38 J.Callihan, *Augustine and Greek Philosophers*. Villanova: Villanova University Press. 1967.

prominent. We shall return to the evaluation of this passage in Part Two *supra*.

Direct and indirect references to *Tim* 41ab account for almost a quarter (13/58, or 24%) of Plato citations in Augustine (i.e., in Augustine's entire *corpus*), and 36% (13/36) of Plato citations in *civ.dei*, the last treatise of Augustine's and the one most intensively citing Plato.[39] Furthermore, the longest quote from Plato in Augustine (*civ.dei* XIII, 16) is drawn from *Tim* 41ab. No other passage in *Timaeus* or elsewhere in Plato's dialogues receives comparable attention (*Tim* 29c 3-4 is cited four times less than *Tim* 41 a7-b6 4/16, thus 25 per cent correspondence). Thus, we conclude that *Tim* 41ab is the most cited and commented passage of Plato in Augustine's text, which also clearly most significantly marked Augustine's train of thought. The frequency of mention of the passage suggests or is consistent with the view that the passage left a special mark on Augustine's thought.

Two passages, *Tim* 29c2 and *Tim* 31b10, that regularly appear in Augustine are also of interest to us. The first of these passages appears both in *de consensu* 1.35.53. and in *de Trinitate* IV.8.24. In both these treatises this is the only *Timaeus* passage cited (cf. examination *infra*). Augustine comments on the second passage in two places: *civ.dei*: VIII, 11 and XXII, 11. Let us proceed to the examination of the first passage, which we see as the only possible rival to *Tim* 41ab, in terms of attention received in Augustine's Plato.

[39] cf. *Patrologia Latina Database.* Leuven: KULeuven Limo access, June 2012. *Search engine*.

4.3. Augustine's *Tim* 29c.

To follow the discussion below adequately we will use the following four key quotes from Cicero's and Calcidius' translations of Plato as well as the appropriate extract from Augustine:

A. ὅτιπερ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια

Plato's *Timaeus* 29 c3-4.

B. *Quantum ad id quod ortum est aeternitas valet, tantum ad fidem veritas*.

Cicero *tim* III, 8:6, thrice cited by Augustine: in *de consensu* 1.35.53. and twice *de Trinitate* 4.24.

C. …*est melior generatione essentia, tanto fama et opinionis incerto praestantior veritas*. Calcidius, *Timaeus*. P. 22. Waszink.

D. *Itaque in illo quia et id quod ortum erat transiit ad aeternitatem, transiturum est et nostrum, cum fides pervenerit ad veritatem. de Trinitate* 4.24.

Tim 29 c3-4 is the first extract from *Timaeus* he ever cites. This allows us to speak either about his initial impression about the dialogue, or at least about the source of his familiarity with it (e.g., Cicero's translation, encyclopedias, doxological material, and so forth).[40] The extract is accompanied by a reference both to the dialogue's title and to its author. It occupies the second rank in importance among all Plato's passages cited by Augustine, in terms of the quantity of quotes and the extensiveness of his commentary. M.Testard detected two quotes from this extract in two dialogues: one in *de consensu*, is the other in *de Trinitate,* but curiously neither P. Courcelle nor M. Testard noticed that Cicero's quote from *Tim* 29c3-4 is used by Augustine thrice on the same page. Moreover, the entire chapter 24 of *de trinitate* II appears as a Christianizing interpretation of this text.[41] It is not surprising that M.Testard misses two out of the three

[40] Solignac, A., *Doxocraphies et manuels dans la formation philosophique de saint Augustin*. Paris: Études augustiniennes, vol. 1. 1958, pp. 113-48.

[41] Augustine did not mean *de Trinitate* to be a polemic treatise versus philosophers, or indeed the pagans. Cf. Arnold, J. *Begriff und heilsoekonomische Bedeutung der*

adjacent quotes in this chapter: the interpretation that follows is so liberal that Augustine avoids mentioning Plato's name (let alone the dialogue), referring to him merely as *one of the Greek sages*.[42] At any rate, the quantity of quotes from *Tim* 29c has now reached four. Let us have a look at these texts so that having made a parallel with the passage under the scrutiny, we examine a text which is closest in number of quotes as well as the intensity of the commentary to the object of our study. The approach to Plato in both these texts can be comparable. We shall see what is it about.

In *Tim* 28a1 Plato makes a key distinction in his physics between *being* (τὸ ὂν) and *becoming* (τὸ γιγνόμενον).[43] The result of the knowledge process of the former is the *truth* (ἀλήθεια), the result of the knowledge process of the latter is *opinion* (δόξα). In the course of Plato's manifold usage it becomes clear that the notion of *belief* (πίστις) is synonymous with the notion of *opinion*. However, the notion *opinion* is somewhat less ambiguous and therefore more standard for Plato than the notion *belief*. Interpreting Plato in Cicero's version, Augustine paraphrases terminology according to the Christian spirit, so that not only Plato's original, but even Cicero's far from literal translation turns into a hardly recognizable presence.

For instance, in the first part of this expression he tends to understand *id quod ortus est* in a temporal sense (*temporale*), clearly opposing *temporality* to *eternity* (*aeternitas*). At this point Augustine's logic is straightforward. Plato similarly opposes time to eternity. However, in the text in question he speaks about *being* (οὐσία), rather than *eternity*, thereby making a clear correlation between *being* (οὐσία) and *becoming* (γένεσις). Placing these notions next to *eternity* and *temporality* results in *becoming* as a *temporal being*, and *being per se* as an *eternal being*.

Curiously, despite the inadequate translation available to Augustine, he somehow still understands the complex dialectics of Plato's correlations. Augustine rightly sees that the correct correspondence to *eternity* is *temporality*, and not *becoming*, or *generation*, which appears in Cicero's version. In the course of his discussion Augustine opposes *id quod ortus est* to *mortality* (*mortalitas*), not to *being,* viewing it as a process of *generation*.

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goettlichenSendungen in Augustinus 'De Trinitate'. Paris: Etudes Aug. 25 (1991), pp. 3-69. Still, the other kinds of Christians are at times in the focus of attention. M.Barnes analses the dispute against the Arians in de Trinitate V. Cf. M.Barnes, *The Arians of Book V, and the Genre of De Trinitate*, in *Journal of Theological Studies* 44, 1993, pp.185-95.

42 Dixit quidam et illorum qui quondam apud Graecos sapientes habiti sunt… *de Trinitate* IV, 18, 24: 8.

43 τί τ? ?ν ?εί, γένεσιν δ? ο?κ ?χον, κα? τί τ? γιγνόμενον μ?ν ?εί, ?ν δ? ο?δέποτε; *Tim* 28a1.

He applies a synonym, thinking that the Christians understand *generation* as *temporality*.

Although Cicero translates both notions of the second part in the present expression literally, Augustine also interprets these completely inadequately to the *Timaeus* context, and that too is not his fault. Cicero's unexpected literal translation helps very little, if not to say otherwise, confuses the reader. Plato interprets both *belief* and *truth* in a gnoseologic rather than in a theological sense, the way Augustine goes about it on the basis of what he finds in Cicero.

According to Plato, *belief* (πίστις) is a synonym of *opinion* (δόξα), the way also Calcedius rightly translates it (*opinio*),[44] i.e. the knowledge, which corresponds to the constantly changing world. Plato's attitude towards belief, as a synonym of opinion, is quite disregarding in its capacity to deal with the things that bear importance. He thinks that opinion is a kind of knowledge but not the true one.[45] The opinion is misleading for the science, being completely incapable of grasping the truth and ideas adequately (perhaps it may happen accidentally). The object of opinion is an eternally changing being, or briefly, *becoming*.[46] It is subject to constant alteration, and therefore cannot be trusted. It is not by chance that Socrates spends his life in the market place fighting opinions, customarily claiming them to be false.[47]

Augustine is not aware that Plato's meditations concerning *being* and *becoming* are directly connected to the text he ventures to quote. Instead, he is convinced that Plato speaks about a religious belief, this being the reason why he turns to its detailed discussion. As the discussion becomes increasingly complex, Augustine searches for clarifying terminology. He adds and even multiplies new notions in his attempt to clarify the text. He, who interprets Plato via Cicero, tends to think that the terminology applied in this short saying is unsatisfactory. If we dare embrace Plato's opposition along Augustine's line of thought, we arrive at the following: *just as eternity*

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[44] Calcidius, *Timaeus*. Ed. J.H. Waszink. London, Leiden: J.Brill.1962, p. 178.

[45] Lee, D. C. identifies the crucial findings on correspondence between knowledge and belief already on the day before recorded in *Republic*. He thinks that the popular belief that Plato thought the philosopher-ruler is a knowledgeable man is questionable, and rooted in Plato's metaphysics. Lee, D. C., *Interpreting Plato's Republic: Knowledge and Belief*, in *Philosophy Compass*, 2010, Vol.5 (10), p.854 (11).

[46] F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology. A Running Commentary on 'Timaeus'*. London: Routlege. 1937. P. 126.

[47] Vlastos, G. *Plato's Universe, Introducution Luc Brisson*, Parmenides Publishing. 2006. P. 311.

corresponds to the temporal, knowledge to opinion, and being towards becoming, so the truth corresponds to belief. Augustine understands the point of these oppositions, despite having no idea about the content of the original text.

What is surprising from Augustine's liberal rendering of the text and its content, is that he cares very little about the correspondence of his interpretation to the text available to him, let alone to the original. Closer inspection reveals a double difficulty: Augustine freely interprets the text, which the translator already interpreted freely, thereby perfectly following the style. The interpretation he provides here has a wide range of possible results: either he will arrive much closer to the original than the translator, or to the contrary, he will go astray with his interpretation. In the given context it is hard, if not impossible, for Augustine to arrive at an adequate grasp of Plato's thought even on this small scale. Out of four key notions in this passage (γένεσις, οὐσία, πίστις, ἀλήθεια) Cicero translates two of them literally (πίστις - *fides,* ἀλήθεια - *veritas*), whereas he renders freely the two others (γένεσις - id quod ortus est, οὐσία - *aeternitas*).[48]

Naturally, it would be an oversimplification to accuse Cicero of a 'mistaken' translation. Plato's terminology is also not always precise, sometimes deliberately imprecise, since he often applies poetic style to express complex ideas. For instance, in applying the notion οὐσία, *essence*, he understands it as the true unchangeable being, for which τὸ ὂν would be a better Greek term, as well as the Latin *esse*. Cicero correctly grasped this, looking for another, no literal meaning. Since the preceding text is about eternity, here too he applies the notion *aeternitas*. This brings Augustine ideas, which have nothing to do with Plato, as we see it in its interpretation.

Cicero does not always make alterations to the text. In the case of πίστις a literal translation suddenly appears satisfactory to him. However, this literal approach is seldom a wise idea. Plato speaks about *belief* as a *true opinion* concerning the *world of becoming*, thus the best knowledge accessible to the humans. πίστις is superior to the δόξα, since δόξα is often inadequate even for the *world of becoming*. Although πίστις is the best kind of δόξα, yet even πίστις is far from the truth, since the truth is an eternal knowledge about eternal things. It concerns exclusively the world of true unchangeable being, the *world of ideas*. What is clear is that the Latin notion *fides* does not have the same religious connotation for Cicero as in the time of Augustine.

[48] M. Tullius Cicero, *De Divinatione, De Fato, Timaeus*. Ed. W.Ax. Teubner. Stuttgart. 1977. P. 78.

The translation of this text is a hard task indeed, yet not impossible. Calcidius manages to realize a project of *Timaeus* translation, with which Augustine is not familiar. Although Calcidius shows little signs of mastery over a creative translation, he still finds precise terminology to render correctly the translation of the text in question, e.g. γένεσις - *generatio*, οὐσία - *essentia*, πίστις - *opinio*, ἀλήθεια - *veritas*. Out of four notions translated by Calcidius only one coincides with Cicero's version: *veritas* as an equivalent to ἀλήθεια. The other three are different, when notably Calcidius' version is preferable in every case.

Notice that Calcidius' translation is not always literal either. He does not translate πίστις with the obvious *fides*, as Cicero renders it, but insightfully with *opinio* according to the spirit of Plato's text. This is rather impossible without an intimate study of the text and the Platonic tradition. In this sense this translation is indeed precise. Had Augustine used Calcidius' translation, he would possibly also draw other conclusions, most probably somewhat closer to the original.

Augustine cites *Tim* 29 c3-4 four times: once in *de consensu* – this being the very first Augustine's quote from *Timaeus*, in his *corpus*, and later also three times in *de Trinitate* 4,24, the last of which has been paraphrased with Augustine's own words in accordance with his convictions. In *de consensu* Augustine refers both to Plato and to the *Timaeus'* title.[49]

On the contrary, in *de Trinitate* he mentions neither of them, this probably being determined by Augustine's pure theological project in that treatise. He just refers to one of the oldest Greek sages, which can be easily mistaken for Thales or an oracle, whose vague wisdoms it is possible to translate in various fashions. Augustine goes on further proving a Christian understanding of this text in such as way that an ignorant reader starts thinking that Augustine is busy with a Greek-speaking Old Testament prophet, not Plato.

The two interpretations of this text in two different works have one similar point: a clear Christian emphasis. Nevertheless, these texts substantially differ as to the detail. In *de consensu* the whole attention is towards Christ, who is identified with the *truth*, - the word which is directly mentioned in the text. Here Christ is also a mediator between this earthly world and the heavenly world – that what in *civ.dei* Augustine calls the *city of the world* and the *city of God*, the topic which is neither discussed in *Tim* 29c nor elsewhere in *de Trinitate*. Augustine claims that we are dealing with two pairs of oppositions: *eternity-generation*, and *truth – belief*, the latter being a desire to achieve the former. These oppositions agree due to their

[49] Cf especially *consensu* I, 23, 35.

reconciliation through the mediator. The Christ is *born*, yet he remains in *eternity*. Christ is the *Truth* itself, and also the *belief* as the way to achieve it.

A possible Neoplatonic presence is traceable in this text, as the Neoplatonists also like employing triadic structures. Accidentally, the first explicit reference to Porphyry is also in *de consensu,* which marks the beginning of a long-running dispute.[50] It is not excluded that it is exactly the time when Augustine conceives an idea of using a Plato's quote to combat the Platonists.

Paradoxically, in the passage that appears in *de Trinitate*, the idea of Christ's intermediate role does not imply a triadic character. This is indeed a bit unusual, since the aim of the treatise is to trace the triadic structures all over in the universe.[51]

According to Augustine, this acclaimed ancient Greek saying is of a purely religious significance. He understand the truth exclusively as Christ, and the belief as a desire to find him. Augustine thinks that it is impossible to put this desire into practice otherwise than by the means of purification. Neither Plato says anything of the kind, nor even Augustine in his preceding interpretation.

The result of the terminological excercise are the following oppositions: *aeternitas* - *vita aeterna, id quid ortus est* - *mortalitas, veritas* - *Christus, fides* - desire for God. This works well as far as Augustine's personal interpretation is at stake, yet it is hard to claim that such a reading is an adequate exegesis for the original.

This interpretation is a far-reaching external projection upon the text. If we temporary drop Cicero's intermediacy, we clearly see the absurdity of a parallel between Plato's original and Augustine's final result. This way, we arrive at the following: efforts - *vita aeterna,* γένεσις - *mortalitas,* ἀλήθεια - *Christus,* δόξα - *fides.* Only the interpretation to the notions γένεσις as *mortalitas*, as well as *becoming* in the sense of *mortality* is traceable within a Platonic framework. The process of generation of the living beings indeed ends up in death, which initially means mortality as a driving force behind the process of becoming. This perfectly works for the living beings yet not for the beings that have no life. The latter undergo corruption, and do not undergo death, since only a living being dies. However, the corruption differs from mortality. The notion of mortality does not exhaust the meaning of becoming.

[50] Cf. G.Madec, *Le Christ des paêns d'après le 'de consensus evangelistarum' de Saint Augustin*, in *Études augustiniennes*, 26 (1993), pp. 3-67.

[51] I.Chevalier, *St Augustin et la la pensée grècque: les relations trinitaires*. Freibourg. 1940.

In the case of the other three notions the meaning of identifications is somehow confusing. To understand οὐσία as an eternal life is possible only, if we understand the eternity as life's essence, meaning that the true life does not end with death, but continues for ever. Plato does not make such statements, whereas Augustine although he is capable of making such claims, yet he does not, because his discussion of the passage takes another direction. Only a Christian can identify the truth with Christ, as they, as much as Augustine, follow Christ's words.[52] Plato lived half a millennium before Christ, so to make such an identification he must have been a kind of Judaeo-Christian prophet.[53]

Finally, it is even less straightforward to read the Christian *belief* into Plato's *opinion* (δόξα). The latter is a limited, yet only possible mechanism of grasping the ever changing being, whereas the former is a Christian virtue of pursuing the way to the Christ as the eternal unchanging truth. On the one hand, it makes little sense to trust the *belief* in the sense of opinion. - The majority of Plato's dialogues are dedicated to the refutation of opinions, which therefore concern also the beliefs. On the other hand, the church is built up on the ground of *belief* in Christ, the notion which is not treated in Plato. Augustine discusses the second understanding of belief in a purely Christian context, having hardly an idea what Plato means in this text.

There is another curious aspect of Augustine's present exegesis. Plato speaks about the oppositions of *being* vis-à-vis *becoming*, as well as *truth* vis-à-vis *opinion*. Augustine insists on *transitus* [54] – a transfer from the state of *mortality* towards the state of *eternity*, and also from *belief* towards the *truth*. He understands the process of coming into being through generation as a desire for the eternal life, and the *belief* as a desire for arriving at truth. Unlike Plato, who provides a description of disruptive oppositions, Augustine speaks about the process of turning the one lower state into another superior state of existence.

As much as in the case with *Tim* 41ab, here too, Augustine shows no familiarity with either the preceding or following Plato's passages surrounding *Tim* 29 c3-4. His interpretation is far remote from the original by the translator's intermediacy, and also substantially obscured by his own 'clarifications'. Augustine arrives at an interpretation, which is biased on his religious convictions. He is not at all concerned with interpreting either

52 *John* 14:6.

53 E. von Ivanka, *Plato Christianus. La Réception critique du Platonisme chez les Pères de l'église*. Paris: Press universitaire de France. 1990: especially the introductory discussion.

54 *Itaque in illo quia et id quod ortum erat transiit ad aeternitatem, transiturum est et nostrum, cum fides pervenerit ad veritatem.*

Plato, or Porphyry correctly to the spirit of their philosophy.[55] He is doing nothing of the kind to other Platonists either, or philosophers of some other schools criticizing Christian doctrines, or even to the opinion of the judging this polemic reader. He simply extracts this saying from the text in order to achieve the goal of his personal ideological reading. If the reader is not a Christian he can hardly follow.

Augustine uses the quotes from *Tim* 41ab four times more than from *Tim* 29c (sixteen against four). The longest quote from the former is six times longer than the longest quote from the latter (73 characters against 12).[56] In both cases Augustine uses Cicero's translation, which poorly reflects the original. Nevertheless, the translation of the former passage is somewhat less deformed than the translation of the latter text, since every misrepresentation can cause serious deformations when a passage is short. In the case of *Tim* 29 c3-4 Plato's train of thought is practically inaccessible to Augustine.

In both cases Augustine provides a purely ideological Christianizing reading of Plato's text. While treating the former text, he pretends that he is polemicizing with the (Neo)-Platonists, rhetorically rebuking them for misreading Plato, whereas in the latter case he does not do even this, giving an impression as if we attend to an oracle or a prophet. In both cases Augustine addresses the intellectual Christian reader, like himself, who is expected to be familiar with the basic Platonic teaching of his time, but no more.

[55] Augustine's references to the Platonists are casual, sometimes simply implicit. For instance, the theme grand theme of Neoplatonism on the triads found little explicit expression in de Trinitate, although through Marius Mictorinus it still found its way to Augustine. Cf. E.Booth, *St Augustine's 'Notitia Sui' related to Aristotle and the Early Neo-Platonists,* in *Augustiniana* 27, 1977, pp. 70-132.

[56] Cf. Chapter Two *supra* on Augustine's *Tim* 41ab material.

4.4. Conclusive Paradox.

In the present chapter we touched upon the issue of Augustine's references to Plato's name and extracts from his *corpus*. We attempted to add to the rich research material of the 1950s on Augustine's Platonism with our examination of *Tim* 41ab.[57]

In this chapter we attempted to demonstrate the special status of *Tim* 41ab vis-à-vis the rest of the passages Augustine cited from Plato. The present task was not an examination of the passage itself, but a preparatory work for such an evaluation.

We attempted to learn more about Augustine's familiarity with Plato, moving from a general knowledge down to a more particular presence, so that a single concrete case provides us with the answer to many a question.

We conclude that out of the entire Plato's *corpus* Augustine's knowledge of *Timaeus* is the most profound. Yet, even in the body of this dialogue we can easily spot a very limited number of passages, which Augustine uses *ad litteram* with a certain regularity. These are first and foremost: *Tim* 29 c3-4 and *Tim* 41 ab.[58] Out of these two the latter quote is much longer in size in Augustine and quoted four times as many as the former; he also gives it a closer examination vis-à-vis the original; finally, his interpretation of *Tim* 41ab is more insightful, more manifold and more creative than his interpretation of *Tim* 29c3-4.

In the first section of this chapter we dealt with the density of Augustine's quotations from Plato and references to his name, arriving at the conclusion that throughout Augustine's writings there are many references to Plato and his doctrines, but a relatively small number of quotes.

In the second section we examined Augustine's use of the *Timaeus* dialogue, concluding that *Timaeus* was indeed Augustine's favorite dialogue of Plato. However, despite his evident partiality to this dialogue, Augustine was acquainted with it exclusively through Cicero's translation. There is no indication that Augustine was familiar either with the introductory interactive section of *Timaeus*, or with the second larger part on the creation of man. The number of precise quotes from Plato is too small to establish the significance of this dialogue's influence on Augustine. Far less still is this the case with any other of Plato's dialogues. Augustine treats

[57] Cf. *supra* note on Alfarec through *Augustinus Magister* and later.

[58] Cf section 4.3. Augustine's *Timaeus* 29c *supra*.

Timaeus as a work on the creation of the universe. Even so, he fails to discuss even some elementary ideas on this issue that are raised in *Timaeus*.

We dedicated the third and final section to *Tim* 29 c3-4, which is the closest text to *Tim* 41ab in density of interpretation and number of quotes.

Augustine's familiarity with Plato's actual texts enables us to form some idea of Plato's influence upon Augustine. The latter's discussion of *Tim* 41ab demonstrates his speculative approach to Plato's original. Augustine is plainly biased by his own Christian convictions and led astray by the looseness/liberality of Cicero's translation. As a result, Augustine projects ideas upon this passage that are not to be found there.

At the moment we do not try to identify Plato's true meaning of *Tim* 41ab, which indeed could make a rather interesting project. The present task is more humble: to demonstrate what exactly Augustine understood on the basis of familiarity with Plato via the accessible sources.

We are rather skeptic as to the application of the term *Christian Platonist* to Augustine.[59] This is not due to our doubts as to his Christian convictions, but because he can hardly be considered a Platonist, since his knowledge of Plato is too elementary. He is a Platonist in a similar sense as we are all Cartesian according to Heidegger, meaning that Descartes' way of thinking marked our languages and thereby our way of thinking. It is also the case with Augustine Platonism indeed. His philosophical vocabulary is Platonic and thereby his train of thought is also Platonic. If this is enough to be called *Platonic* then a large number of philosophers and theologians of Augustine's time are Platonists as well. However, his familiarity with Plato's texts is too basic to place him within this framework of thinking, let alone a Platonic school of any kind.

[59] In this sense, there is a similar reverse characteristic on Plato as Christian, which appears even more paradoxical since Plato lived a half millennium before Christ was born. There is still nothing forbids us to view him as a Christian in prophetic sense, as some Apologists did. Cf. chapter *infra* Seven on Theologians.

Conclusion Part One.

RESPONSE: AUGUSTINE'S *TIM* 41AB COHERENT EXEGESIS

In Part One of our study we have attempted an examination of the content and context to Augustine's treatment of *Tim* 41ab. This Part is double in its study purpose: the *inner* and *outer* one. The inner study purpose consisted in exposition and preparation of the material for Part Two, which is an evaluation of the presented material.

The outer study purpose has a meaning independent from Part Two. Whether Augustine read our passage in Timaeus correctly or not, we have sufficient grounds to claim an exclusive importance for *Tim* 41ab in his polemic against the Neo-Platonists. We have demonstrated that for the major part his presentation is novel and coherent. Still, we clearly traced a certain incompleteness of Augustine's main argument against Porphyry concerning the Creator's omnipotence. It can to be linked to the rhetorics of his polemic: Augustine addresses the reader with his argument, not the opponent mentioned. Yet, even if the reader is a mediocre intellectual Augustine's nuances in the discussion around the Creator's omnipotence remain confusing.

In Chapter One we turned to the following intrigue: why does Augustine feel a need of turning to *Tim* 41ab. We have demonstrated that Augustine cites this text in his Polemics against Porphyry and his direct followers on the topic of resurrection. Augustine either repeats or paraphrases the majority of Porphyry's objections against a bodily resurrection, which also came down to us in *Apocriticus* of Macarius Magnes. Augustine refers to Plato as an absolute authority for the Platonists, on the basis of this text claiming that one may find convincing arguments in defense of the resurrection theory in Plato.

In Chapter Two we cited all sixteen quotes of *Tim* 41ab in Augustine and provided our own translation. We also provided a commentary to each of the cited passages. It turned out that in spite of the main idea concerning bodily resurrection, the discussion's scope has a wide range of themes. We will give discussion room to each of them in part two.

Chapter two also includes a brief discussion of Plato's authority as the founder and master of a school. In this respect his *on the creation of the universe* is under scrutiny. In this work Plato seems to state the Supreme God's superiority over the minor gods he creates and addresses with a speech. The Supreme God also turns out to be God the Creator of the universe. He is the only uncreated God who addresses the created gods.

We trace a certain development in Augustine's treatment of the relationship between the Supreme God and minor gods, starting with the problem of the minor gods' identity - which is also the ground of our judgment that sermons 241-242 somewhat precede the discussion in *civ.dei*., as *sermones* contain a more primitive interpretation than the *civ.dei*. In *sermones* 241-242 Augustine understands the created gods as the celestial bodies, whereas in *civ.dei* in the early books he consider them to be sometimes as the angels, sometimes as the demons, whereas towards the end of the treatise more intensively as a pre-figuration of resurrected humans (cf. section on *summus deus-dii minores* opposition). The minor gods, having been created as mortal and corruptible, receive immortal life while they are still in the body. Augustine is familiar with Plato's explanation of the world as the first created god, who was created by the uncreated God before the creation of the minor gods.

The world as a god has a soul, similar to the humans. According to Augustine, it seems that some Neo-Platonists give the name *Jupiter* to the universal soul, some others among them mean Jupiter to be the entire world, and not just its soul. Augustine understands Plato's Supreme God as promising eternal life both to the world and to the celestial bodies. The Supreme God also promises a happy bodily state to the minor gods, although the fact of having a body underlines their mortality, which it seems is possible to overcome.

Indeed, neither the universe, nor celestial bodies will die because of the omnipotence of the Supreme God the Creator. This is comparable to humans who are expected to live eternally as inseparable in the resurrection from their primordial body, likewise on the account of the Creator's omnipotence. Outside the present discussion Augustine defines omnipotence as an absolute efficiency of the willing agent, so that everything he wants becomes reality.

Eternal life for the humans is possible, even though the bodily life has a beginning. Augustine suggests two versions of eternity: one as having beginning but no end, whereas the other has no beginning and no end.

In Chapter Three, having examined Augustine's commentaries on *Tim* 41ab we presented a critique of the main existing translations into the key European languages. An accomplishment of the adequate translation requires a mastery of the topic under the discussion., which keeps reappearing throughout the *sermones* and various books of *civ.dei*. Our discussion has many nuances on which we dwelt. We also discuss some elements of the major themes, which Augustine touched upon in his commentaries on *Tim* 41ab.

In Chapter Four we demonstrated that *Tim* 41ab is Plato's major presence in Augustine, significantly superseding all other Plato's quotes and commentaries in number, size and intensity. Nevertheless, Augustine's treatment of Plato's texts is comparable throughout his *corpus*. We have demonstrated this by means of a comparison with the quote and commentary on another Plato's *Timaeus* passage: *Tim* 29 c3-4, which is Plato's second passage of importance in Augustine. All these quotes are extracted from a quite free translation executed by Cicero. Here again, as always in Augustine's Plato, we trace a liberal treatment of the original, often contextually irresponsible, and projecting Christian views upon Plato and some of his followers.

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Part Two.
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Augustine's Tim 41ab incoherent exegesis

Introduction to Part Two

In Part Two we are going to evaluate the material presented in the first part of this work from the point of view of Augustine's hermeneutical requirements. We carry on according to our three main directions. (1) We evaluate the quality of the translation used by Augustine and his acquaintance with both Plato's original and the details of this translation - its literal adequacy and its correspondence to the spirit of the original. (2) We take into account Augustine's statement about the Neo-Platonists either not knowing anything about the reception of this passage, or (choosing) not (to) understand(ing) it, and for whose correction he solely uses *Tim* 41ab, we will evaluate his acquaintance with their interpretation. (3) We evaluate Augustine's interpretation of this text in the frame of theological tradition to which Augustine belongs. We will do this by evaluating his acquaintance with the exegetical tradition of this passage by other authors, his own input and the degree of novelty of his interpretation. Therefore this part consists of three chapter: translation (chapter 5), Neo-Platonists (chapter six), theologians (chapter seven).

We are not going to apply the requirements of modern exegesis to Augustine or demand his knowledge of material that was not available to him. For example, we are not going to evaluate his interpretation in the detailed comparison of *Timaeus* original in the context of Plato's other dialogues, although this could be a very interesting project.

After this evaluation we will be able to determine Augustine's input in Platonism: his belonging to the tradition, his originality and his right to correct other authors.

AUGUSTINE's TIMAEUS 41AB

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Chapter Five: Distortion: Cicero's translation of Plato's Timaeus 41 ab in Augustine

5.0. Introductory Clarifications

Let us turn to Augustine's usage of Cicero's translation of the *Timaeus*. Our goal is to illustrate that Augustine's *Tim* 41ab is a creative variation upon Cicero's *Tim* 41ab, which is not identical with Plato's *Tim* 41 either literally, or contentwise. The discussion will include: the philosophy of Cicero's particular translation in general, and its application to the *Tim* 41 ab in particular. We will emphasize translator's occasional faithfulness and virtual deviation from Plato's original. Finally, we will examine two issues in connection with Augustine's ability to estimate the quality of this translation: first, whether or not he made an effort of a careful reading to the text in its entirety, and secondly, whether or not he had a chance of comparing Cicero's text with Plato's original.

As early as 1948 Pierre Courcelle suggested that Augustine lacked a fundamental knowledge of the *Timaeus*, as the latter cites only a few passages from this one dialogue.[1] In this chapter we will continue along the line of this argument, claiming that even if Augustine lacked a fundamental understanding of the *Timaeus*, this one passage is still representative to his thinking.

[1] P.Courcelle, *Les lettres grècques en Occident* (Paris, 1948), p. 23.

Before plunging into the controversy we will clarify our argument by presenting a short summary of Augustine's exposition. Such spadework has not, to my knowledge, yet been undertaken. It can have some value within the scope of the Neoplatonic studies, as these commentaries, taken together, can be seen to line up with other ancient commentaries on the passage, such as those of Jamblicus and Proclus.[2] But first let us glance at the quote from Plato's *Timaeus* 41 a7-b6, in Cicero's translation, which Augustine used:[3]

> *You who rose from the seed of* gods, of whose works I am *progenitor and effecter, hearken*: these are indissoluble as long as I summon (them), even though everything that is bound together can be dissolved; but *it is of no good* to want to dissolve something that is bound together *by reason*. Since you *rose*, you indeed *cannot* be immortal and indissoluble; yet you will be neither dissolved, nor any fates of death will seize you, nor will *a fraud* be mightier than my decision, which is a stronger bond for your perpetual existence than those (bonds) by which you were bound together (when you were born).[4]

The original for this version is a piece of valuable evidence, which impresses thinkers starting from the time of Plato up until our days. The above-cited quote is a third-hand translation, since we keep jumping from one translation to another (Greek-Latin-English). Moreover, we are now going to embark on still another one, yet an interpretation.[5] This should certainly suffice for the purpose of our study, since after all every translation, be it in its best, is still an interpretation.

The fact that the original of this text, composed by Plato, has received a considerable reception in Antiquity running from the time of Plato up until the end of the Neoplatonic School is surely not by chance. The reason for this attention must be sought in the issue of the powers of the demiurge.

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[2] *On the Speech of Zeus in Timaeus*, cf. Proclus, *in Tim* 1.308.19.-20.

[3] *civ. dei* XIII, xvi.

[4] Translation V.Yudin. Translated after *CCL, vol*. 48. Brepols. Turnhout. 1955. P. 397: Vos qui deorum satu orti estis, adtendite. Quorum operum ego parens effectorque sum, haec sunt indissolubilia me invito, quamquam omne conligatum solvi potest; sed haudquam bonum est ratione vinctum velle dissolvere. Sed quoniam estis orti, immortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis; ne utiquam tamen dissolvemini, neque vos ulla mortis fata periment, nec erunt valentiora quam consilium meum, quod majus est vinculum ad perpetuitatem vestram quam illa quibus estis (tum cum gignebamini,) conligati. Cf. *supra* quote (η) and C.

[5] By this we do not mean only our use of some of the Russian sources, such as С.С.Аверинцев, *Тимей*, в Платон, *Избранные диалоги*. Москва. Мысль. 2001г. (S.S.Averintsev's *Timaeus*) translation, but also some typical Slavic patterns of looking at the problematics of this dialogue.

The demiurge's creative speech, addressed to the gods, who, curiously, have not yet come into existence, also brings them into existence. Since the demiurge did not want to talk to himself, he decided to arrange an audience.[6] This particular aspect of the speech should have impressed a Christian such as Augustine, yet strangely, he paid very little attention to it, if any. What did attract him in this text was the implication of some elements of the contents of the speech, rather than its magic context. The focus of his attention is the demiurge's declaration that his progeny is mortal, yet due to his will they will stay eternally immortal. According to Augustine, this is a pagan pre-figuration of the resurrection of the body clearly based on the Creator's omnipotence.

However, there were still several particularities in the way Augustine went about this text. These are the following:

First, Augustine did not make any use of Plato's original. This was probably due to the fact that his Greek was not good enough. In the last years of his life his Greek was sufficient to make some elementary exegesis of certain Gospel passages, yet certainly it was not sufficient to read Plato's dialogues in the original.

Secondly, as Augustine acknowledges it in his most significant quote, he read *Timaeus* in Cicero's translation.[7] This imposes great limits on the possibility of understanding the original adequately, as there are several distinguished particularities to Cicero's version of the text. Yet, Augustine does not provide clear signs that he read at least Cicero's translation fully.

Third, the part of Cicero's translation which Augustine used can hardly deserve to bear Plato's name, as it is so profoundly marked by Cicero's thought and limits.

Fourth, from the part of Cicero's translation, which survives, Augustine has a good knowledge of one passage only. As we have already mentioned it *supra*, he cites and interprets this passage on sixteen separate occasions in the course of *civ.dei* and his *sermones* (241, 242).

Finally, our working hypothesis is that Augustine does not have a copy of a complete version of Cicero's translation at his disposal, but quotes from it on the basis of one or another Christian Encyclopedia (*florilegium*),

[6] This can certainly be a subject for controversial opinions, as Plato does mention these gods first separately by their names - already in *Tim* 40 d-e - and then collectively just before the demiurge's speech. We will come back to this issue in the chapter on Plato.

[7] Nempe Platonis haec uerba sunt, sicut ea Cicero in Latinum vertit… *civ.dei* XIII, 26.

which contains doxological material, most probably dedicated to the topic of the creation of the world.[8]

This chapter unfolds as follows: first I will talk about some general problems that concern Cicero's translation of Plato's *Timaeus*. In the second part we will supply it with some more specific material concerning *Tim* 41 ab. Finally, we will end this chapter with a short exposition of its use by Augustine.

5.1. Cicero's translation and transmission of Tim 41ab

A crucial point in the discussion of Augustine's knowledge of Plato's *Timaeus* is the analysis of the peculiarities of Cicero's Latin version. Although our work is dedicated to Augustine's usage of Plato's *Timaeus*, we will focus more on its translation than on the original, since Augustine cites this dialogue exclusively in Cicero's Latin version.

Cicero, despite his best intentions, introduces slightly modified ideas into his translation, as compared to those advocated by Plato. At times these ideas appear to be even entirely different in two sources. However, if one gives it a bit more consideration one soon discovers that Cicero's 'innovations' are not so revolutionary either. After all, Cicero – the great linguist and expert in Greek antiquities has limits of grasping philosophical notions.

Augustine's logic is not helped by the use of this incomplete and far-from-faithful translation. He does not hide the fact that the source of his Plato's knowledge is not based on the original (which he would not have been capable of reading anyway)[9] but on Cicero's translation: Nempe Platonis haec verba sunt, sicut ea Cicero in Latinum vertit… (*civ.dei* XIII, xvi). However, it is not certain whether Cicero ever accomplished a full translation of the text as we do not have traces of the second part after 47b.[10] It is most probable that Cicero never translated more than a part of it. Evidently, his objective must have been more ambitious than that of a 'boring' translator's job, namely, to give a full account of the story of creation, wherein Plato's text had to appear merely as a means to an end.[11] Therefore, it would not be surprising if he did not take the trouble of

[8] Cf. H.-M. Rochais, *Florileges spirituels*, in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité.* Vol. 5 (1964), pp. 435-512.

[9] Augustine's modest knowledge of Greek is a well-known fact. During his study years he deeply disliked the Greek lessons he received along with the supplied literature. Even in his later years, when his adolescent sentiments came to pass, and instead the adult interests prevailed, the best he could manage was a basic exegesis of certain Gospel passages. This is comparable to the knowledge of a present day diligent philosophy student. Cf. Courcelle, P., *Les lettres grecques en Occident: de Macrobe à Cassiodore*. Paris : de Boccard, 1948. P. 147.

[10] M. Tullius Cicero, *De Divinatione, De Fato, Timaeus*. Ed. W.Ax. Teubner. Stuttgart. 1977. P. 87.

[11] The following passage from *De finibus* 1.7 is quite characteristic of Cicero's liberty in his attitude towards other writers: "I expressly reserve the right of borrowing certain

translating the entire dialogue since the second, larger, part is not strictly cosmological.[12] Neither did he feel bound by the author's peculiar formulations, as he did not always share Plato's views.[13] Cicero was an excellent Hellenist who did not need a literal translation of the Greek original in order to make perfect use of it as it runs.

If so, Augustine could not be familiar with the complete text of the *Timaeus*, since at the time it simply was not yet available in Latin. Nevertheless, even if Cicero had translated, and Augustine had read, the whole of the *Timaeus*, the latter could not have an adequate picture of Plato's exposition. From what has come down to us it is clear that Cicero was neither very precise in his renderings,[14] nor faithful to Plato's thought. On the contrary, his translation is strongly biased with a heavy use of the Stoic vocabulary. At present let us have a look at some elements that characterize Cicero's version, without going into the details of what we can find in his rendering of *Tim* ab.

The best evidence is Cicero's handicapped demiurge. He does a major alteration by rendering ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα᾽ (T*im* 28C), with 'this father, so to speak' (*illum quasi parentem*). Even a pure linguistic explanation does in no way justify the omission of 'the demiurge', or 'the maker' if you like, in this passage. The insertion of 'as if' (*quasi*) makes us think of the demiurge as if he were a kind of father, whereas, for Plato, he is a real father, all earthly fathers being *quasi* this archetypical 'father', and not the other way round.[15] For Plato the demiurge is ἀγαθός (29A), which one can render as *bonus* or even better as *optimus*,[16] yet Cicero turns this into *probus*, which can mean 'upright' but also bears connotations of 'honest', 'humble' and even 'practical' without much of philosophical pretence. Plato is careful in his usage of vocabulary in order not to subject the demiurge to any kind of natural causality. His ἀγαθὸς ἦν (29E) is

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passages, if I think fit, and particularly from the philosophers just mentioned (Plato and Aristotle), when an appropriate occasion offers itself for doing so…" M. Tullius Cicero, *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, trans. Rackham. Cambridge, 1999.

[12] Even the beginning of Cicero's *Timaeus* took a different shape. In his version the text does not appear as a dialogue but as a monologue, as he does not consider it necessary to translate Socrates' response from the *Timaeus* 29c. Cf. Levy. 'Cicero and the *Timaeus*', in *Timaeus as cultural icon*. Ed. G.J. Reydams-Schils, Notre Dame, 2001, p. 99.

[13] Poncelet argues that Cicero's vocabulary was determined by his Latin background which prevented him from transmitting Plato's thought adequately. Cf. R. Poncelet, *Cicéron, traducteur de Platon: L'expression de la pensée complexe en Latin classique*, Paris, 1957. See also M. Puelma, 'Cicero als Platon-Uebersetzer', in *Museum Helveticum* 37. 1980, pp. 137-77; J.G.F. Powell, 'Cicero's translations of Greek', in *Cicero the Philosopher*, ed. J.G.F. Powell, Oxford, 1994, pp. 273-300.

[14] Unlike the literal and rather rigorous translation of Calcidius. Instead of Cicero's creative *creator* and *artifex* (in various places) for δημιουργὸς Calcidius uses the plain *opifex*.

[15] C.Levy. P.101.

[16] Ibid. P. 103.

the statement of the demiurge's goodness, whereas Cicero gives him iron fetters of causality by using *impulerit eum*,[17] implying that there is another force behind him. It is evident that the true supreme god here is supposed to be no one else but *natura*.

These few examples suggest that Cicero not only failed to grasp the character of the Platonic understanding of the demiurge, but also underestimated the demiurge's significance in the entire dialogue. It is then surprising that Augustine, who read Plato through Cicero's spectacles, found himself at the other extreme by granting a seven-fold repetition of the royal title *summus deus* to the creator of the world in the course of just few chapters of *civ. dei*.[18] The opposition of importance, *'summus deus – dii minores'*, little emphasized in Plato and Cicero, becomes the principal argument for Augustine, who sees a parallel between *dii minores* and the bodies of resurrected saints.

Tim 41ab is a speech. As we know, there are always at least three elements to every speech: speaker, audience and the content (also possibly its form).[19] The speech under scrutiny is although absolutly unique, still includes all these basic elements. Let us have a look at these in Cicero's interpretation. Simplifying, we can say that we are dealing with *Speaking God* (5.2.), *gods* (5.3.) and the *content* (5.4.). This simplification is unavoidable since, as we shall see it *infra*, a statement of any kind concerning this speech can lead to the difference in opinions.

5.2. Plato's Demiurge's Speech in Cicero's *Timaeus*

At the beginning we ought to come back once again to this speech in question in the form in which it came down to us from Plato. We already dealt with this text in Chapter Two *supra* on material in Augustine. For the moment it is suffice to cite Plato's text, since Cicero departs from it.

> Θεοὶ θεῶν ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων,
> δι᾽ ἐμοῦ γενόμενα ἄλυτα ἐμοῦ γε μὴ ἐθέλοντος.
> τὸ μὲν οὖν δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν,
> τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ
> λύειν ἐθέλειν κακοῦ·
> δι᾽ ἃ καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ
> οὐδ᾽ ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν, οὔτι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ
> γε οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας,
> τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου

[17] 'he is forced to'. Ibid. P. 102.
[18] *civ. dei* XIII, xvi-xviii.
[19] Cf R.Jacobson, eisagoge *supra*.

λαχόντες ἐκείνων οἷς ὅτ᾽ ἐγίγνεσθε συνεδεῖσθε.
νῦν οὖν ὃ λέγω πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐνδεικνυμενος, μάθετε.[20]

This is the passage in question, from which Augustine took some vital ideas. To know this for sure we have to compare it with Cicero's translation to see whether or not there are some differences. The passage below is the one what Augustine had in front of him:

Vos qui deorum satu orti estis, adtendite.
Quorum operum ego parens effectorque sum,
haec sunt indissolubilia
me invito : quamquam omne conligatum solvi potest,
sed haudquam boni est ratione vinctum velle dissolvere.
Sed quoniam estis orti, immortales vos quidem esse
et indissolubiles non potestis, neutiquam tamen dissolvemini,
neque vos ulla mortis fata periment nec faus valentior
quam consilium meum, quod maius est vinculum ad perpetuitatem vestram
quam illa quibus estis (tum cum gignebamini) conligati.[21]
Quid sentiam igitur cognoscite

We are not going to follow Julian's example (cf. chapter six *infra*), who having cited two texts on a similar topic next to each other claims that the reader will spot it at once which of the two is preferable. Since both these texts are composed by two great personalities in Antiquity, it makes little sense of making such statements. Nevertheless, the second text is a translation from the first, and therefore, quite naturally, based upon it. However, one does not have to be an

[20] "Gods of gods, of whose works I am craftsman and father (of gods), the things which came by me into being are indissoluble even if I did not want it. On the one hand, everything what is bound is dissoluble; on the other hand, to want to dissolve that what is really beautifully harmonized and well off is proper to the evil one. Therefore, since you were born, you are neither immortal nor at all indissoluble; yet you will be neither dissolved, nor will you taste the fates of death; by my will you are favored with an even better and more authoritative bond than those (bonds) by which you were joined together… (when you were born)». Translation V.Yudin.

[21] "*You who rose from the seed of* gods, of whose works I am *progenitor and effecter, hearken*: these are indissoluble as long as I summon (them), even though everything that is bound together can be dissolved; but *it is of no good* to want to dissolve something that is bound together *by reason*. Since you *rose*, you indeed *cannot* be immortal and indissoluble; yet you will be neither dissolved, nor any fates of death will seize you, nor will *a fraud* be mightier than my decision, which is a stronger bond for your perpetual existence than those (bonds) by which you were bound together (when you were born)." Translation V.Yudin.

expert in classical languages in order to notice obvious discrepancies between these two extracts. Even at a brief glance, whether you are familiar with classical languages or not the first striking fact is that the second text is slightly longer than the first one.

Note that all the major problems with Cicero's translation technique, mentioned *supra* (neglecting transcendental realities as well as distorting the text the translator's own preferences), occur also in this passage. Our choice of this particular extract is somehow accidental, determined by Augustine's peculiar needs at his time. Our intention is not to demonstrate the poverty of Cicero's translation, on the contrary, Cicero's competence is evident, as he is clearly at ease with the Greek text, and this passage is of no exception. It makes little sense to require from an ancient translator to be in accord with the modern standards. Our selection is determined by the frequency of its occurrence in Augustine's *corpus*, and therefore its significance for his, Augustine's, train of thought.

What we can do is to compare Cicero's version with another one made half a millenium later, which is old enough to have the same, or similar, translation techniques. In order to highlight both Cicero's achievements as well as his difficulties in grasping Plato's position we suggest placing that translation of *Tim* 41ab here.

> Di deorum
> quorum opifex idem paterque ego,
> opera siquidem vos mea, dissolubilia natura,
> me tamen ita volonte indissolubilia,
> omne siquidem quod iunctum est natura dissolubile,
> at vero quod bona ratione iunctum atque modulatum est dissolui velle non est dei.
> Quapropter, quia facti generatique estis, immortales quidem nequaquam
> nec omnino indissolubiles, nec tamen umquam dissolumini
> nec mortis necessitatem subibitis,
> quia voluntas mea maior est nexus et vegetatior ad aeternitatis custodiam
> quam illi nexus vitales ex quibus aeternitas vestra coagmentata atque composita est.
> Iubendi ergo quod iubeo causa haec est…[22]

This is an extract from Calcidius' translation made at the request of Hosius, bishop Cordubensus (256-357) in the first half of the fourth century, not long before Augustine's life-time. It is

[22] *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus*. Ed. J.H. Waszink, in *Plato Latinus.*
Vol. IV. London-Leiden. 1962. P.35

therefore much closer to the latter in style, lexicon, and general world outlook. As much as Augustine, Calcidius joined the holy orders. He served as a (n arch-) deacon in the diocese of the above-mentioned bishop.[23] Pretty much as Cicero, Calcidius considered the first part of the dialogue dedicated to creation (up to 53c), to be of importance, the rest leaving out.[24] He also provided the text with an extensive scientific commentary, focused exclusively on the literal meaning of the text. Unfortunately, Augustine neither read Calcidius' translation, nor did he disclose any signs of familiarity concerning its existence.

This is unfortunate for two reasons: first, because this later translation appears to reflect the ideas that concerned Augustine adequately, although, curiously, there is nothing in it which reflects Calcidius' Christian affiliations.[25] Secondly, because it was Calcidius', and not Cicero's translation, which made the *Timaeus* popular in the middle Ages. Despite this obvious *lacuna* in Augustine's knowledge, it is useful to juxtapose these two variants for practical reasons, comparing them in the process both to Plato's original and to Augustine's interpretation.

We will now proceed with examination of the context to the demiurge's speech. Three constitutional parts of this speech include: (5.2.1.) the speaker, (5.2.2) the audience, (5.2.3.) the contents. In order to better visualize the text, as viewed by the author and his two translators, we also will use three corresponding schemes.

[23] Ibid. J.H. Waszink, *Praefatio: de Calcidio in commentario auctoribus*, p.X.

[24] The fact that Cicero and Calcedius translated the same amount of text suggests that they both had only a section of the original Greek.

[25] This reasoning raised a number of doubts among the scholars concerning the fact whether or not Calcedius, the translator of the *Timaeus*, was identical with the deacon of the bishop of Cordoba. Stephen Gersh, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition*, Publications in Medieval Studies, vol. 23. University of Notre Dame Press, 1986, p. 421–492.

5.2.1. Speaker. The Demiurge of the *Timaeus*.[26]

The figuring out the speaker's identity is the basis for the understanding of this text. Let us see whether the four writers in question make the same out of it. The scheme that follows concentrates exclusively upon the speaker's title, and not upon his name and status. Although it became an important issue with the Neoplatonists (see the following chapter), it makes little sense discussing the speaker's name, as it is neither mentioned by Plato, nor by the translators in questions, nor by Augustine.

Comparative Scheme A.

	Plato	Cicero	Calcidius	Augustine
Title(s) elsewhere	(ὁ) δημιουργὸς	-*is qui aliquod munus efficere molitur*, 4, -*artifex mundi*, 6, -*aedificator*, 7, -*procreator*, 26, -*effectrix*, 10, -*efficiens*, 46, -*effector et molitor*, 17, -*genitor et effector*, 47.	*opifex*	----------
Title 41 a7	δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε	*parens effectorque*	*opifex paterque*	*creator, summus deus*

Analyzing Plato's text we find that δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε is the key notion of the passage in question. If to trust Plato's precision, we may see it as a kind of fixed title, almost a name, which by virtue of this particular combination (*craftsman and father*) refers to one unique being. Altering this title Cicero shows disregard to the significance of the word-order, depriving this being of such a uniqueness, or worse: changing its identity. Cicero reverses Plato's denomination of the demiurge as δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε into *parens effectorque*. For later Neo-Platonists, such as Proclus, this 'slight alteration' means a serious misinterpretation, since πατήρ δημιουργὸς τε corresponds to the paradigm and not to the

[26] Note that the order of the presentation of the comparative schemes in my analysis does not reflect the order of their appearance in Plato's passage.

demiurge (who then must be *effector parensque* if the word order were the only issue). Cicero's *variatio* style,[27] successfully employed on other occasions, offers him a poor service at this point considerably confusing the matters.

Among his many other talents, Cicero gained his faim as a translator from an ingenious technique he used, but that brought him as much praise as criticism. The different ways he went about to translate the notion δημιουργὸς in this passage as compared to the other passages in the dialogue is rather exemplary. We come across this notion and its derivatives thirteen times in the course of Plato's dialogue. In the part translated by Cicero we are left with nine different versions. His creativity in finding new ways of rendering the same expression in Latin is remarkable.

-*is qui aliquod munus efficere molitur*, 4, 'he who plans to carry out some task';

-*artifex mundi*, 6, - craftsman (expert) of the world;

-*aedificator*, 7, - architect, builder;

-*procreator*, 26, - begetter;

-*effector et molitor*, 17, - producer and contriver (builder);

-*effectrix*, 10, - a female maker, producer, the one who causes; the source;

-*efficiens*, 46, - part.act. - (the) causing;

-*genitor et effector*, 47, - father (begetter) and producer.[28]

The variety of synonyms that Cicero employs for one and the same Greek notion may serve us as an example for Cicero's *variatio* style, with all its strengths and weaknesses. Now, if someone would ask one to give a concise presentation of Cicero's understanding of the demiurge on the basis of these extractions one would have to tell him that the demiurge is an 'architect engaged in a certain construction' (*aedificator*), i.e. 'someone who plans to carry out a certain task' (*is qui aliquod munus efficere molitur*); but he is also the one who effectively carries out this task (*effector*), doing the most remarkable job ever; thus he is the world's craftsman of high expertise (*artifex mundi*); furthermore, he is certainly also a begetter (*procreator*) of certain beings inside the universe; moreover, he is also a 'contriver' (*molitor*) who delegates and distributes particular tasks to his progeny

[27] N.Lambardi, *Il 'Timaeus' ciceroniano. Arte e tecnica del 'vertere'*. Firenze. 1982, pp. 105-109.

[28] An excellent yet incomplete analysis of five of these terms we find in N.Lambardi, *ibid*.

(which may instigate the accusations of nepotism). In a word, he is a 'causing (*efficiens*) source (*effectrix*)' of everything what is present in the material world; and subsequently you may grant him the title of 'father and producer' (*genitor et effector*) or put in friendlier terms as 'relative and maker' (*parens effectorque*), if you wish.

This picture is clearly a simplification, although it does bear certain advantages of Cicero's famous *variatio* style. To illustrate how this style works in practice, let us have a brief look at the first expression: *is qui aliquod munus efficere molitur*, 4, - 'he who plans to carry out a certain task'. It is a bit peculiar that Cicero chooses such a long phrase to render one single word (δημιουργὸς). Carlos Lévy correctly stresses the fact that considering the context, in 28a Plato speaks about the demiurge in general,[29] meaning that every demiurge who is a mere *craftsman* (which is the literal meaning of the word), looks at a paradigm, and seeing that it is beautiful uses it as a source for his inspiration. In Plato's perspective, it is only on the basis of this inspiration that he can plunge into carrying out his task. Luc Brisson saw it also this way giving 'chaque fois qu'un demiurge' in this place.[30] His choice of the indefinite article ('un') shows a certain continuity with Cicero's translation. However, Plato uses a definite article in his Greek: ὁ δημιουργὸς, thereby bringing an ambiguity into the text and confusing interpreters: perhaps he does talk about that unique demiurge, the creator of the world after all: in this second sense Cicero's rendering is completely misleading, since it illuminates this ambiguity completely and does not allow the demiurge to be a paradigmatic figure.

Nevertheless, Cicero's grasp of the notion δημιουργὸς should not be underestimated. In the majority of cases (six out of nine, if to take into account our passage) Cicero etymologically connects the notion δημιουργὸς to the Latin *efficere*, meaning 'to put in effect, in practice', which is correct, since *efficere* presupposes a presence of a project in Latin. The demiurge is the one who is going to carry it all out, to put it in practice.

5.2.2. The Audience.

The gods addressed by the Demiurge in *Timaeus*

We shall now proceed to identification of the gods addressed by the speaker. These are not directly named in the passage of *Tim* 41ab. Therefore, we will have to deal with the preceding passage concerning the

[29] C.Lévy, *Cicero and the ' Timaeus'*, in *Plato's Timaeus as cultural icon*. Ed. G.J. Reydams-Schils. Notre Dame : University of Notre Dame Press. 2003, p.100.

[30] Platon: *Timée/Critias*, trad. L. Brisson et M. Patillon. Paris. 1992-94.

genealogy of the Greek divinities. We will again apply a scheme as a help means, including the elements of the original, both translations and Augustine's possible reflection(s) on the matter. Unlike the case in the previous scheme, we will concern here not only with the title of these divinities but also their names.

Comparative Scheme B.

	Plato	Cicero	Calcidius	Augustine
Collective titles elsewhere	δαίμονας	*Lares*	daemones	-------
Collective title in 41 a-b	Θεοὶ θεῶν	*Vos, qui* deorum *satu orti estis, adtendite*	Di deorum	dii minores
Names	᾿Ωκεανός, Τηθὺς, Οφρανῆ, Γῆ, Φόρκυς Κρόνος, ῾Ρέα Ζεὺς ῞Ηρα καὶ ὅσοι μετὰ τούτων Μοῖρας	Oceanus, *Salacia*, Caelum, Terra, ... Saturnus, *Ops*, Iuppiter, Iunona, Reliques : Fata	Oceanus, Tethys, Caelum, Terra, Saturnus… et Phorcus, Rhea, Iupiter, Iuno, ceteri…	-------

First of all, we would like to draw the reader's attention to the fact that Plato uses the plural οἱ δαίμονες to refer to the divinities who the demiurge is addressing in his speech as the audience. Cicero does not translate this term, thereby showing that there is no adequate equivalent for it in Latin. Yet, he adds that the closest equivalent to this term would be *Lares*, a term used for the Roman tutelary deities, most notably those of the household. One would wonder whether *Lares* is a good finding. Cicero adds a following cautious remark *si modo hoc recte conversum videri potest* (obviously absent in Plato). This way he shows his own incertitude about the equivalent he is providing: an ancient Roman word *Lares* for rather

standard Greek δαίμονας.[31] Cicero's choice of *Lares* could have well been influenced by Varro, who according to Augustine's report in *civ.dei* VII, vi equated the Greek δαίμονας with Latin '*heroas*', *'Lares' et 'genios'*.[32]

At this point I would like to allow myself a brief look backwards on this issue. Ancient word δαίμων has received an appropriate treatment in Latin literature starting only from the 2nd c. A.D. Apuleius, in his treatise *de deo Socratis*, used the notions *deus*, *daemonium* and *daemon* interchangeably, providing little explanation and leaving us to speculate.

In another place Apuleius does state his opinion on the matter: 'δαίμονας *vero quos 'genios' et 'lares' possumus nuncupare, ministros deorum arbitrantur custodesque hominum et interpretes, si quid a diis velint'*. [33] In *Apologia* 43.2 he improves a definition for demons distinguishing them from gods by the place they occupy in the universe: '*inter deos atque homines… medias quasdam divorum potestates'*. [34] Augustine refers a lot to Apuleius, especially in his teaching on demons. This discussion provides a lot of insight on Augustine's views on the matter.

When considering the description of the audience we see that in the second place, Cicero introduces a temporal aspect into the origin of the gods generated by the demiurge by saying *vos, qui satu orti estis deorum* 'you, who are in the origin of gods'. The Greek phrase 'Θεοὶ θεῶν' does not necessarily imply this. The original leaves enough room for other alternatives. For instance, the expression can refer to the position of these divinites in the hierarchy: 'you are the best of gods', 'you are on top of them all'; or even simply 'you are gods among other gods', allowing no subordination as it is the case with the preceeding phrases. This last hypothesis better explains the appearance of goddesses of fate, μοίρας, or *fata*, the way Cicero ventures to put it in Latin by the end of the passage. Most logically, they also have to be counted among δαίμονας and Θεοὶ (or even perhaps among θεῶν, if we are to distinguish these from Θεοὶ as Proclus does).[35] It is quite peculiar that Plato shifts the generation of μοίρας a few lines down, as compared to the generation of the rest of δαίμονας, so that you can even easily miss the fact.

[31] M. Puelma. P. 157.

[32] Dicit ergo idem Varro... aerias esse animas, sed eas animo, non oculis uideri et uocari heroas et lares et genios.

[33] *De dogmate Platonis* 1.12., in Apuleius Madaurensis, Lucius, Hermes Trismegistus, Albinus, *Asinus aureus. Florida. Apologia. De deo Socratis. De Platonis dogmate. De mundo.* Joannes Andreae (ed.), Rome: in domo Petri de Maximis (Conradus Sweynheym & Arnoldus Pannartz). 1469.

[34] M. Puelma. P. 158.

[35] Cf. following chapter on Neo-Platonists.

Furthermore, Plato uses Θεοὶ θεῶν as an evocation. There is an energy and at the same time beauty in this address. On the contrary, Cicero's '*Vos, qui deorum satu orti estis*' is a verbose static expression. To keep the dynamics he had to add an originally absent (yet, definitely implied) *adtendite* 'listen'! As a matter of fact, Cicero could have used the literal *dii deorum* at this point, as Calcidius later did. Most likely, he was sensitive to Plato's reference to all these divinities as δαίμοναϛ in 40 d-6. Why now suddenly start calling these demons 'gods', thereby introducing an extra confusion? More consistently with Cicero's vision Plato could have used δαίμοναϛ θεῶν, yet for some reason he stuck to δαίμοναϛ. On top of that *Lares deorum* sounds very peculiar in Latin. So Cicero, having already declared his difficulty in rendering this term adequately,[36] went for a simplified version instead.

Comparing Cicero's catalogue of divinities with Plato's original list it is striking to note that Cicero tries to find an equivalent in the ancient Latin mythology for every single divinity, mentioned by Plato. Thus we find *Oceanus* for ᾽Ωκεανός, *Salacia* for Τηθὺς, *Caelum* for Οὐρανός, *Terra* for Γη, *Saturnus* for Κρόνος, *Ops* for Ρέα, *Iuppiter* for Ζεὺς, *Iuno* for ῞Ηρα, *fatum* for μοίρα, etc. However, Cicero is here not as innovatory as it appears at the first sight, since several Latin authors at the time, such as Varro and Virgil, kept themselves busy with such matters. Cicero did not come out all victorious in this competition, as a number of his findings were not integrated into Latin literature. Unexpectedly, he renders the name of the Greek goddess Τηθὺς by 'Salacia', which according to the folk etymology has to do with the word *salum*, the 'high tide'. He downgrades the mother of Greek gods Ρέα to the Latin goddess of darkness Ops. He stripes the female goddesses, Μοῖραϛ, of their appropriate gender by turning them into neutral *fata* (Pl., *fatum* in Sg.), so that you start wondering whether they are still goddesses or mere instruments, similar to the later French guillotines in their perfect efficiency. When Cicero fails to find an equivalent for a given Greek god in the Latin pantheon, which happens in the case of Φόρκυϛ, the situation gets completely out of hand. Following Hesiod,[37] Plato places Φόρκυϛ side by side with Κρόνος, thereby making the god of time and husband of Rhea relative to the sea-god Φόρκυϛ, the father of Graiai and the Gorgons. Cicero prefers eliminating Φόρκυϛ from Plato's text, rather than to use the Greek word or its Latin

[36] *Si modo hoc recte conversum videri potest* 38:10.

[37] Hesiodus, *Theogonia* 270. Hesiodus, Solmsen, Friedrich, *Theogonia opera et dies scutum. Oxonii*: e typographeo Clarendoniano, 1970.

transliteration, thereby recognizing the limits of the Latin language in producing an equivalent (or at least his ability to find it).

Four centuries later, another translator, Calcidius, does not want to put himself into an extreme position of Latin fanaticism, whereby every divinity had to have an exact equivalent in Latin divine inventory. He simply transcribes several names of certain Greek divinities with the Latin letters: *Tethys, Phorcus, Rhea*, but curiously does away with Μοῖρας all together later in the body of demiurge's speech. The reason for this is perhaps that he, as a Christian, considers this speech far more important than the preceding catalogue of δα΄ μοναῳ, which would present nothing more than the false idols. The presence of Μοῖρας, if they are to be understood as demons of some kind, downgrades this speech's importance. After all, Calcidius, as much as Cicero, may appear at times somewhat ideological in his translation.

5.2.3. The Speech.

Main elements of the demiurge's address

For a better understanding we divide the content of the speech into six sections that follow *infra* in the scheme. Each of them represent a separate thought unite, which can be viewed to a certain degree on its own. Note that the last column concerning Augustine does not contain the elements of translation but exclusively interpretation. Augustine did not make a translation of his own, but provided his own reading of the text which is the main focus of our research. The ideas rendered in the first column are based on my translation of Plato's *Tim* 41ab, which can be found *supra*.

Comparative Scheme C

Element	Plato	Cicero	Calcidius	Augustine
that which is really beauty-fully har-monized and well off	τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ	*ratione vinctum*	*bona ratione iunctum atque modulatum*	----------
to want to dissolve is proper to the evil one.	λύειν ἐθέλειν κακοῦ	*Sed haud-quaquam boni est… velle dissolvere*	*dissolui velle non est dei*	----------
since you were born	καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε	*quoniam estis orti*	*quia facti generatique estis*	humans, created by God
you are neither immortal nor at all indissoluble	ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ οὐδ᾽ ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν...	*immortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis,*	*immortales quidem nec omnino indissolubiles*	*civitas mundi*
yet you will be neither dis-solved, nor will you taste the fates of death	οὔτι μὲν δὴ λυθησεσθέ γε οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας,	*neutiquam tamen dissolvemini neque vos ulla mortis fata periment, nec fraus valentior,*	*nec tamen umquam dissolvemini nec mortis necessitatem subibitis*	*civitas dei*
by my will	τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως	*quam concilium meum*	*quia voluntas mea*	Creator's omnipotent will
What I tell you now and demonstrate, do learn!	νῦν οὖν ὃ λέγω πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐνδεικνυμενος, μάθετε	*Quid sentiam igitur cognoscite.*	*Iubendi ergo quod iubeo causa haec est*:	----------

We will now turn to a running comparative commentary to each of the elements present in the scheme *supra*.

As we will see in the discussion that follows the elements of the demiurge's speech differ in translation no less than the terminology used for speaker and the addressees.

A. Plato's 'εὖ' has a direct implication of the presence of the moral good in everything made by the demiurge. Notice first of all that it is completely absent in Cicero's Latin. '*…ratione*' principally refers to the presence of reason, implying additionally that what is rational must be also good. This again reveals Cicero's limits in grasping anything beyond Hellenistic rationalism, whereby reason is taken as the top reference. It is perhaps true, we are also facing the natural limits of the Latin language, as Calcidius, whose translation generally tends to be more literal, did not find anything better than *bona ratione*, 'by (a) good reason'. His addition of 'bona' is a statement of disillusion as to the natural 'goodness' of *ratio*. If one decides to employ 'ratione', one better makes sure what sort of 'bona' we are dealing with, in order not to end up with 'mala'.

A similar difficulty arises with Cicero's treatment of Plato's καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν, as the original Greek ἁρμονία, to which ἁρμοσθὲν is linked, is taken from shipbuilding lexicon, indicating a certain unity of material, which keeps together all the parts of the ship. Yet both Cicero and Calcidius translated Plato's double affirmative καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν and ἔχον εὖ by a single (*bona) ratione,* treating these expressions as synonyms. However, in Plato these expressions are not mere repetitions: the first one refers to the perfect craftsmanship, the second to the moral goodness of the project involved. In this sense the first expression is more linked to the demiurgic aspect of the speaker, whereas the second to his paternal aspect.

B. The intervention of the evil purpose, which aims to dissolve what is well-made, is expressed in Plato's λύειν ἐθέλειν κακοῦ, whereas Cicero's '*haudquaquam boni est*' ('is of no good') renders it only indirectly. Yet one can wonder whether the absence of good necessarily leads to the presence of evil. Calcidius' '*non est dei*' it 'is not of god' is not much of an improvement either. We suppose both translators were puzzled how we could possibly talk about an evil desire, as in the text nobody is there to possess it: demiurge and his progeny are the only existing beings so far, and they are all good. Did they possibly misunderstand that precisely this passage introduces evil, as the demiurge does allow for a possibility of an evil principle, or at least he warns the gods that it is immanent to the world of generation. Both translators simply cut it off, thereby provoking the reader to raise questions concerning the origin of evil. Plato's text admits a possibility of an evil principle, whereas both Cicero and Calcidius team for the absence of good and god.

C. By καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε Plato refers to the gods' birth from the demiurge. It explains why the god who is delivering the speech is not only δημιουργὸς but also πατήρ, the father of, as it seems, of the addressed audience. Contrary to this Cicero, by '*satu orti',* emphasizes the fact that the demiurge is the gods' origin, although he does not specify what sort of origin: birth (a), creation (b) or even perhaps emanation (c). All these options simply stay open.

Calcidius made it worse by adding *facti... estis*, 'you are made' in *quia* ***facti*** *generatique estis*, as referred to the created divinities. According to him, these 'daemon-gods' are not only generated by the demiurge, but also made by him, although the notion of creation is absent in Plato. Calcidius is trying to identify the ἔργα from the beginning of the demiurge's speech with the generated gods. Were it the case, then the use of '*facti*' in this context should be indeed justifiable. Yet, the ἔργα, 'works' naturally depend on the δημιουργὸς, whereas the expression 'gods of gods' depends on πατήρ. Moreover, this distinction stays clear throughout in the context. Calcidius confuses the two, bringing a strong Christian connotation therein, as the implication is that the creatures, produced by the demiurge are not gods but humans.

D. The key difference between the original and translation in this phrase is Cicero's substitution of non-being (οὐκ ἐστὲ) for an absence of a possibility (*non potestis*).[38] Plato's demiurge says 'you are not at all indissoluble' (οὐκ ἐστὲ οὐδ᾽ ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν), stressing *the fact* (οὐκ ἐστὲ, 'you are not'). On the contrary, Cicero's 'you *cannot* be indissoluble' emphasizes gods' inability (*non potestis*) to become indissoluble, although this does stay an option (since unlike his progeny the demiurge *potest*). Cicero's text seems to impose limits on gods' abilities, where Plato is talking about an applied decree issued by the demiurge. The difference here is in emphasis, yet an important one. It is as if by saying '*non potestis*' the demiurge is showing his absolute superiority to the gods: 'I can do what you cannot. You better know you place'. This implication is absent in the original. Calcidius plainly follows Plato (*nec omnino indissolubiles (*ἐστὲ*)*).

E. By '…γε οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας' Plato says that the generated gods' end will not be decided by the Moiras, the goddesses of fate and daughters of Anagke (destiny).[39] It is more acurate to say that only Moiras are meant to deal with the physics of death: Lachesis (the one who casts lots) and Atropos (the Moira whose job is to cut the thread of one's life). These two are in charge of tasks quite different from Clotho, their sister, who designs one's life ornament but in the end is not involved in the decision making concerning death.[40]

In using neutral Plural *fata* Cicero depersonifies the fates in his phrasing, substituting them by a natural causality. He could have used *Parcae*, a Latin equivalent for Moiras, which would have been more in line with his attempt to latinize the Greek pantheon. Yet, he did not. He probably did not, or did not want to, realize that here Plato continues the list of divinities, started *supra*. The appearance of Moiras on the scene at the moment when the demiurge evokes them in his creative speech is not casual at all. Clearly they follow the suit of the 'gods of gods'. Taking into acount that, similarly to the Hellenistic causality, Plato's Moiras are also quite severe in nature, almost implorable, yet they remain goddesses, living beings: one's chances to talk to them are not high but they are there. Cicero eliminates this option, and thereby sends us back to the Hellenistic ideas. What stands out here is the dominating character of the natural causality,

[38] 'Immortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles non *potestis.*

[39] According to Hesiod Moiras are daughters of Zeus and Themida. *Theogonia*, 901-906.

[40] *Republic*, X, 617 b. Plato places more emphasis on the timely aspect of Moiras: *Clotho* is responsible for the Past, *Lachesis* for the Present and *Atropos* for the Future. In his presentation the lot of human lives is chosen by an unnamed prophet under the supervision of Moiras.

which prevails over all other causes, including demiurgic ones. Such causality is more akin to a machine than to a living being, including divine, or rather such a causality machine in itself is taken to be divine. This is not to say that causality is a simplistic cause. On the contrary, it has various ways of action. Cicero's use of the *fata* is not purely linguistic, but philosophical. He tries to show that there are different fates allotted to different individuals by necessity: e.g. one is going to die this way, another another way. It is not by chance that Calcidius in his *'nec mortis necessitatem subibitis'* went even further by substituting the plural *Moiras* (and *fata*) by the singular *necessitas*, pushing the causality machine to the limit. In fact, *necessitas* would have been the correct rendering of Ananke, the mother of Moiras, in the same pattern as *fata* are an equivalent for the Moiras. The identification of the two generations of destiny is a mere attempt to get rid of a mythological connotation, thereby giving way to the Christian interpretation of the passage (Augustine), which certainly does not permit some idols to be in charge of death.

On top of that Cicero introduces another problem by inserting '*nec fraus* ' 'nor a fraud' (or 'damage', 'harm') at this point, a word which is absent in the original. Does it refer to ἐθέλειν κακοῦ, dropped earlier in his translation? This could have also been a later insertion by a copyist, which I think is the case, if we compare the Carolingian Manuscript to the text cited by Augustine. We will return to this issue later.

F. Cicero's '*consilium meum*' implies more of a 'connection, union, perhaps a council, but not the will, intention and the sense of a hidden purpose, present in Plato's βούλησις. Consilium is also a decision but made on the basis of discussion, as opposed to a rather voluntaristic βούλησις. Although the origin of the word βούλησις is similar to that of *consilium* (βούλησις as a council of elders, a Senate, or a piece of advice based on conciliar decision, and thus βούλα is a loca council, the meaning which you may come across in Thucidides), this meaning started disappearing as time passed by. Another interesting connotation of βούλησις given by the Liddell-Scott is '*the purpose* or *meaning* of a poem'. It is as if the fragility and mortality of the gods generated by the demiurge is a sort of poem, written by him, the real meaning of each is in fact immortality, intended for them by his will.

The final remark we would like to raise in connection with Cicero's treatment is that sometimes he goes as far as to pretend that he understands Plato better than Plato understands himself. Two following examples would suffice to demonstrate the point.

The first one presents itself in the choice of the word *parens* in *parens effectorque* as applied to the demiurge. Apart from 'father', the only meaning of the Greek πατήρ, Cicero's *parens* bears connotation of 'a relative', 'parent' in the sense either of mother or father, and 'a subject'. All of these meanings can apply to the demiurge indeed. He plays not only the father's role for the gods he generates, but in a sense that of the mother as well, as they do not have a mother. Ἥρα (Juno), Zeus' wife and sister is listed among the gods generated by his speech. As their father the demiurge is related to the other gods by family links. Finally he becomes a subject to his creation, because he still has to administer it by keeping an eye on it, making sure that everything keeps going all right in there.

G. The second example we find is '*sentiam*' from '*quid sentiam igitur, cognoscite'*. The ambiguious use of 'sentio' allows Cicero's demiurge to admonish gods to start learning not only what he says,[41] but also what he senses and thinks, all implied by this tricky notion… Calcidius changed the angle by using the clearly commanding (and also repetitive) '*iubendi... iubeo*', otherwise expressing the pair 'λέγω ἐνδεικνυμενος'.

It is unthinkable that Cicero did not find *dico* for λέγω, or *pater* for πατήρ, as Calcidius did, in each of these phrases respectively. Both *parens* and *sentiam* are real statements of superiority of his supreme style, and his ability of grasping the context.

Thus, most of the problems concerning Cicero's perception of the transcendental realities become evident even from a small portion of his translation, such as the *Tim* 41 ab. Most striking of them is this: Cicero changes the status of the demiurge by shifting the accent from a 'maker' to a 'parent' (*parens effectorque* instead of a plaussible *effector creatorque* for δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε). He misses to grasp that the correct word order is essential in order to tell apart the demiurge from the paradigm (which is first *father* and only then *maker*). He depreciates the living character of Moiras, turning them into machine-like *fata*. This all emphasizes the fact of him being a typical product of his age – the Hellenistic period, and foreign transcendental philosophy.

5.3. Augustine's use of Cicero's translation

At the first glance, Augustine's interpretation is little effected by Cicero's tentative translation of Plato. He does not try to figure out what is actually behind Cicero's peculiar wording. Curiously, his, Augustine's

[41] Plato turned his straightforward λέγω into a more nuanced expression by adding ἐνδεικνυμενος.

perception of certain Platonic notions is just opposite to what we find in Cicero. In our post-evaluation *infra* (chapter eight) we will deal with what exactly came out of the Stoic presence in Augustine through Cicero's translation. At the moment, we will examine a case of Augustine's major disruption with both Plato's original, which he does not know, and Cicero's translation, which he does. Curiously, while citing *Tim* 41ab Augustine develops his own line of thought, which has its own logic independent from his sources.

5.3.2. *Tim* 41 ab among other Cicero's *Timaeus* quotations in Augustine

Far too little of the *Timaeus* dialogue has come down to us through Augustine, yet in our opinion the little what is left is quite authentic. It serves well in identifying the quality of the transmitted texts. Narrowing down my argument we find that Augustine's quotes from Cicero's *Timaeus* are more accurate than the earliest known manuscript of Cicero's *Timaeus*. This latter is Carolingian, dating as far back as the 9th century. It was copied in the Northeast of France and these days it forms the famous Leiden Corpus of Ciceronian philosophical treatises collection.[42] This copy is as early as the earliest known copy of Calcidius' translation supplied with commentary.[43]

Augustine's quotes (both in *civ.dei* XIII xvi and XXII, xxvi) differ from Cicero's earliest known Mss (9th c.) only in two places:

First, '*bonum*' instead of '*boni*' in 'haudquaquam bon*um*(i) est ratione vinctum velle dissolvere'. The Carolingian Ms of Cicero's *Timaeus* makes a link between the Acc. Plural of 'bonum' and 'velle' in Acc. cum Infinitivo construction, thereby getting 'good things… want' in 'in no way good things want to dissolve what is bound by reason'. Augustine's 'bonum' serves the same purpose but in singular making 'the good… wants' in 'in no way the good wants to dissolve what is bound by reason'.

As far as the reference to the original is at stake, although Cicero's translation is far from being perfect at this point, it is clear that only Augustine's 'bonum' has a correspondence either in εὖ, or in το, as both of them are also used in singular.

Secondly, The phrase *'nec erunt valentiora*' instead of '*nec fraus valentior*'. Augustine's *'nec erunt valentiora*' corresponds to 'fata', thus 'the fates of death will not be stronger than the demiurge's decision'. However, it is a bit too straightforward to be either Platonic or Ciceronian. Carolingian Ms. of Cicero has '*nec fraus valentior*', thereby adding that the fates of death work together with their even stronger partner: fraud/ corruption. Yet, this fraud (*fraus*) is not mentioned in Plato, unless we have a reference to ἐθέλειν κακοῦ, which Cicero mentioned earlier. It does indeed sound like one of Cicero's tricks (everything from the original is taken into account although not always clear how exactly), but in this case

[42] Leiden Voss. Lat. F.86.

[43] Cf. R.McKitterick, *Knowledge of Plato's Timaeus in the ninth century*, in *From Athens to Chartres.* Ed. H.J. Westra. Leiden. 2002. P. 86.

the question still remains as to why he chose *fraus* for κακός and not the most obvious *malus*.

Thus, if one takes these examples to be paradigmatic, the conclusion is inevitable: Augustine must have had a better copy of this passage than the one contained in the Carolingian Ms. This is not to say that Augustine's quotes are in any way worse. In fact, they could have been based on much earlier versions of Cicero's text. Now, what is the importance of these alterations?

Even if we were to assume that Cicero supplied Augustine with a possibly disappeared translation we still have our reservations as to whether the bishop of Hippo ever read the *Timaeus* as a whole. The evidence of the alternations is one suppliment to this theory. Four points following can be raised in its favor.

First, why does Augustine never cite the demiurge's speech in his earlier period, while working on the subject of creation?[44] He does not cite other doctrines from the *Timaeus*, nor makes reference to their implications.[45]

Secondly, in none of his sixteen quotations does he refer directly to the title of the *Timaeus* – a very natural thing to do, and a habit he has regarding other authors he quotes.[46] In four instances out of eight where the speech of the demiurge is discussed he does not disclose the source, whereas in his first quotation he says that Plato 'in libro quodam suo quem scripsit *de constitutione mundi* inducere Deum fabricationem deorum….'[47] Thus the title of the book discussed is *de constitutione mundi*, and not *Timaeus*. Scholars have always viewed this expression as referring to the

[44] *De genesi adversus Manichaeos* (388-389), *de duabus animabus* (392-393), *de genesi ad litteram imperfects liber* (393-394; 426-427), *Confessiones* (397-401), *de genesi ad litteram* (401-415).

[45] The *Timaeus* contains a number of Platonic doctrines that certainly deserve Augustine's attention. Such reflections are strikingly absent. An appropriate example of this is the discussion about the meaning of time in *Confessiones*, XI – a text which surprisingly does not disclose any familiarity with the *Timaeus* 37-38 where Plato deals with the same subject.

[46] Augustine is more careful in referring to some authors than to others. The title of Cicero's *de republica* appears no less than thirteen times in the course of de *civ. dei*, whereas Varro's *Antiquitates*, although cited more than one hundred times, is referred to only once. This is not accidental: Cicero was a widely accepted authority in the time of Augustine, whereas Varro was a minor author with a disproportionately important influence upon Augustine. J.O'Meara, *Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine* (Paris, 1959), pp. 16-17. Even Augustine does not take him seriously, as his quotes from Varro tend to be wage. In general, the more Augustine respected a writer, the more careful he was to quote his source.

[47] s*ermo* 241, viii, 4.

contents of the book rather than to its title. It is clear that the *Timaeus* is in question, but whether Augustine meant it in this way is not always clear. Did he know that the *Timaeus* and the *de constitutione mundi* are one and the same book?[48] Did the copy he had have the *Timaeus* title on its front page?

Such an ambiguity, which Augustine leaves behind him, is not exceptional. We do find other instances where he treats his sources in a similar fashion. The most famous example is with *de regressu animae* which J.O'Meara convincingly identifies with a part or the whole of Porphyry's *The Philosophy from oracles*. The title *de regressu animae*, so many times mentioned by Augustine, is again a straightforward rendering of the main idea of the book, and not its real title. Another even more obvious example is his reference to Porphyry's *adversus christianos* from *civ. dei* XIX, 23, which is again a reference to the contents rather than to the specific title of the work.[49] This must be also a similar case with *de constitutione mundi*. Perhaps this is even more confusing as Augustine does refer to the title of the *Philosophy from Oracles*, even in Greek.[50] This is not the case with the *Timaeus*, which is mentioned only once by its original title, and even that happened only in his early period. *Timaeus* seems to have only one title in later Augustine: *de constitutione mundi*.

[48] The only direct reference to the title of *Timaeus* appears in Augustine in the *De consensu evangelistarum*, 53: *Nam et quidam eorum nobilissimus philosophus Plato in eo libro, quem Timaeum vocant, sic ait: quantum ad id quod ortum est aeternitas valet, tantum ad fidem veritas…(Duo illa sursum sunt, aeternitas et veritas, duo ista deorsum, quod ortum est et fides. Ut ergo ab imis ad summa revocemur adque id quod ortum est recipiat aeternitatem, per fidem veniendum est ad veritatem)*. This alleged quotation (M.Testard, *supra* p. 121.) does not come from the *Timaeus* either directly or contextually. Although there is an important discussion dedicated to time as imitation of eternity in *Tim* 38 B, nothing is said there either about truth or faith.

[49] *Iste vere philosophus* (scil. Porphyrius) *vel potius qui talibus adversus christianos quasi oraculis credunt*. On the basis of this and similar quotations P.F. Beatrice argues against A.Von Harnack's conclusions about the existence of a book by Porphyry with the title *Against the Christian*s. She insists that all quotes that can be gathered from the Augustian *corpus* are actually taken from *Philosophy from Oracles*. P.F. Beatrice, 'Quosdam Platonicorum Libros. The Platonic readings of Augustine in Milan', in *Vigilae Christianae* 43 (1989), p.261. See also A. Von Harnack, *Porphyrius "Gegen die Christen", 15 Buecher: Zeugnisse, Fragmente und Referate* (Berlin, 1916), p.1. In fact, Von Harnack's claim almost entirely stands on the assumption that the philosopher criticized by Macarius Magnes in his *Apocriticus* is Porphyry. Since then T.D. Barnes challenged this statement which opened a number of speculations in recent scholarship about the attribution of the remaining fragments. T.D. Barnes, *Porphyry Against the Christians: Date and the Attribution of Fragments*, in *Theological Studies* 24 (1974). Pp. 424-42.

[50] …in libris, quos ΠΕΡΙ Τ'Σ ΕΚ ΛΟΓΙΩΝ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ appelat… *civ. dei* XIX, xxiii.

It does not look like Augustine took Plato's cosmology very seriously, as he did not make an effort of reading *de constitutione mundi* (*Timaeus*) diligently: most likely, he trusted Plato in his early period and based his trust on the opinion of others but never actually read the *Timaeus*. In his later period he did not trust Plato any more, but finally came to read some bits of the dialogue. That little he learned from it he thought to be sufficient for drawing conclusions. From the whole corpus of Plato's writtings this one quotation from the creator's speech was so dear to him, as it seemed to illustrate his point so well, that one is left with the impression that Augustine is seeking rhetorical effect rather than a fruitful discussion. Nor does he exhibit any interest in any aspects of the demiurge's speech other than the argument on the omnipotence of the creator. This is somewhat surprising, as the speech is full of reminiscences to Christian-like ideas. Among others these are: speech as a creative act,[51] time as a moving likeness of eternity,[52] the harmony of the universe,[53] universe's structure[54] etc.

Third, for about ten years immediately before starting his monumental *civ. dei* Augustine was working on a book *de creatione mundi* of his own, although with a slightly different title - *de genesi ad litteram* – the book, in which Augustine meant to give a literal interpretation for the biblical creation account. Nowhere in this book does he refer to the *Timaeus*, which, despite its different perspective, still treats exactly the same subject.[55] True, *de genesi* is a pure biblical exegesis, where pagan authors do not belong.[56] However, two sermons – 241 and 242 –to have been preached during roughly the same period (405-410). He gave these sermons to his flock of the faithful in an appropriate down-to-earth register, during Easter Week, where pagans do not belong either. On these occasions Augustine went at length to discuss Pythagoras, Plato and Porphyry. This again might suggest that he was not acquainted with the *Timaeus* at the time of writing *de genesi ad litteram*. Moreover, it is probable that the time when he delivered these sermons is to be roughly dated as the period when he came across the relevant passages from the *Timaeus*.

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[51] *Timaeus 41 A-B.*

[52] *Ibid. 37C - 38C.*

[53] *Ibid. 35A – 36B.*

[54] *Ibid. 31 B-34 A.*

[55] As I have mentioned earlier, the same argument applies to Augustine's four other major books on the creation story: *Confessiones* XI-XIII*, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber, civ. dei,* XI.

[56] R.J. Teske, *The motive of Creation according to Augustine*, in *Modern Schoolman* 65. 1988. pp. 245-53; M.-A. Vannier, *"Creatio", "Conversio", "Formatio", chez Saint Augustin*. Fribourg. 1991.

Fourth, as far as the contents of this passage are concerned, none of Augustine's comments admits that the demiurge's speech was addressed to the traditional Greek gods, such as Juno, Apollo, Athena, and not exclusively to the celestial bodies (as he fails to see anything else in these lines). It is rather surprising, as in *Tim* 40de, i.e. the passage preceding the demiurge's speech, Plato speaks exactly about these gods, whom he calls 'demons', thereby depreciating their status in Augustine's eyes. This would definitely please Augustine's ear, as would also Plato's somewhat sarcastic tone in talking about those divinities.[57] Surprisingly, Augustine appears to be fully ignorant of this context, and subsequently does not make any use of it to preach the Christian message.

5.4. Conclusion

Due to the major alterations made by Cicero in his Latin version of the text, the contents of Plato's original version of *Timaeus* were practically inaccessible to Augustine. Yet, even if he did a close reading of this text he could have hardly grasped its meaning. Moreover what happened in fact was that Augustine did the same thing what Cicero did earlier to Plato: he used Cicero's translation in the same way Cicero used Plato's original. Augustine had a project in mind, namely, to convince pagan philosophers of the truth of the resurrection of the body by means of an argument. Now, he had to find a way to put this project into practice. An authoritative ancient text was to serve very well for this purpose. An extraction from Plato's *Timaeus* in Cicero's Latin version seemed to have been the best possible candidate for this purpose.

However, Augustine was most likely unaware of the fact that Cicero did not complete his translation. Augustine also failed to notice that in that part which Cicero did finally translated, there are serious misreadings of the original, which mostly concern the downgrading of the transcendental realities, such as the paradigm and the demiurge. Were Augustine attentive enough in his analysis, he would notice these problems even on the basis of the passage he knew. His uncritical treatment of Cicero's version of the

[57] "Concerning the other divinities (Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων *δαιμόνων*), to discover and declare their origin is too great a task for us, and we must trust to those who have declared it aforetime, they being, as they affirmed, descendants of gods and knowing well, no doubt, their own forefathers. It is, as I say, impossible to disbelieve the children of gods, even though their statements lack either probable or necessary demonstration; and inasmuch as they profess to speak of family matters, we must follow the custom and believe them." Plato, *Timaeus* (and other dialogues). Cambridge Mass. Translated by R.G. Bury. P.87.

text, which was due to his - Augustine's - limited knowledge of Greek, prevented him from doing so.[58]

Moreover, Augustine managed to misread even Cicero's translation. In his commentaries he put a strong emphasis on the opposition between *summus deus* and *dii minores*, none of which was present either in Plato's original or in Cicero's version. Considering the given context Augustine thought perhaps that these expressions were adequate synonyms for δημιουργὸς and δαίμονας respectively, yet they were not. Neither Plato nor Cicero thought of the demiurge in terms of the supreme God. The conclusion Augustine has drawn concerning the supremacy of the demiurge is based on the promise to grant the immortality to the corporeal deities contrary to the natural order of the reality. The issue at stake is the demiurge's will (*consilium meum*), which is not limited by any natural laws, which the demiurge himself had previously instituted. Although Augustine's conclusion has certain grounds in the text, ultimately speaking it is however too farfetched. The expression *dii minores* (minor gods), although less problematic, still causes certain confusion: Plato perceived the gods addressed by the demiurge in his speech in terms of demons (δαίμονες), Cicero in terms of the domestic divinities (*lares*). Augustine plainly identifies them with human beings, to who the creator promises the corporeal immortality. In fact, this address is in a sense providential, because the above-mentioned promise concerns only those among the humans who deserve it, namely, the saints. The question about the destiny for the rest of the humanity is still an open issue here, yet treated in detail elsewhere.

This kind of solution fits Augustine's objectives pretty well, as his final aim is Christian Soteriology. Yet, this approach plainly neglects its main and intermediate sources. Although the immortality of the addressed divinities and the demiurge's omnipotence are indeed the most important elements of the demiurge's speech, they are not the only ones. The issue of the status and potence of the moral good (εὖ), the desires of the evil principle (ἐθέλειν κακοῦ), the disruptive character of the world of generation (γένεσις), the powers and limits of fate(s) (μοίρας), and finally the primary speech as a creative activity are all virtually left out of the discussion. This in the end becomes a rather short-sighted affair in one sense, and its clever manipulation in another.

[58] I am not going to discuss here in detail the issue of whether or not Augustine ever had access to the Greek original. There are no signs of it whatsoever. This points us in the direction to think in terms of a negative answer, and yet it does not give us any certainty.

AUGUSTINE's TIMAEUS 41AB

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AUGUSTINE VIS-A-VIS
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Chapter Six
Ignorance –
Augustine vis-à-vis the Neo-Platonists
On Tim 41ab

6.0. Introduction into the Tradition of the *Tim* 41 exegesis

The following chapter is important for the understanding of how justified Augustine's statement is that Platonists are not familiar with *Tim* 41ab text which, according to Augustine, expresses Plato's opinion on the resurrection of the body. Here we will try to determine just how familiar Neo-Platonists were with *Tim* 41ab, its context and its exegetical tradition. To clarify the matter we chose six major figures of Neo-Platonism starting with Porphyry and Simplicius.

In each case we offer an analysis of the material referring to *Tim* 41ab made by these authors and which is available to us. In the following comparative conclusion we compare this analysis to that of Augustine's commentaries on this abstract. This way we will be able to understand how familiar each specific Neo-Platonist was with *Tim* 41ab and how legal Augustine's charges were against them for not being sufficiently acquainted with the text.

Of course it is not always possible to compare the chosen authors. Unfortunately there is quite little left of Plotinus' work to write anything definite about his reflection on this text; this while Plotinus is being considered the founder of Neo-Platonism. What is left of Porphyry's work is also very little material; nonetheless he is a key figure for our research and it is impossible not to mention him as the whole polemics starts with him. The tiny bit left has enormous value for us. Julian the Apostate, being a very insignificant figure among the Neo-Platonists, has left us with some interesting material due to the fact that he was an emperor who has influenced the history greatly. Material that we have can be compared with the lost treatise *Against Christians* containing direct quotations from *Tim* 41ab. The last three great Neo-Platonic authors lived and worked after Augustine, yet they give us a serious idea about the tradition of Tim 41ab commentaries. What we have left of Proclus' work is rather detailed information which includes rich doxological material. Philoponus is the only Christian Neo-Platonist in our list who was involved in the dispute

with preceding and following pagan Neo-Platonism. This in its turn gives us a possibility to take a glance on how the polemics between Christians and Neo-platonists developed, which is exactly what happened in the case of Augustine and Porphyry.

6.1. Porphyry:

6.1.1. *Tim* 41ab demiurge – Zeus as hyper cosmic soul

In his well-known polemics against the Christians, Porphyry does not use Plato in general or *Tim* 41ab in particular. It is not surprising since the Neo-Platonists had a rather exclusive and esoteric attitude to their school and doctrine. In the Neo-Platonic mental worldview, Plato was divine and Christianity was just a vulgar religion, not worthy of a serious comparison with the doctrinal sources of the Neo-Platonic School but only of a sarcastic mockery. This exclusiveness of the Neo-Platonic School is apparent not only in relation to the Christians but also to all major philosophical schools of the time. Neo-Platonists hardly entered into discussion of their sources even with the Stoics and the Epicureans. The very fact that Porphyry condescends to criticizing the Christian doctrine after careful reading of the Bible is a great indulgence to the Christians. The mere fact of referring to the divine when considering the vulgar means to taint the divine, and certainly neither Porphyry nor any other major representative of Neo-Platonists from the Athenian School would condescend to this.

Having said that, we need to note that *Tim* 41ab became the key passage in the Christian-Neo-Platonist polemics. Since a great number of Christian apologists used the passage for their polemics with the opposing philosophers (see infra next chapter), it is important to clarify, even in a hypothetical manner, what Porphyry could or should have understood from this passage.

Unfortunately, no direct commentaries on *Timaeus* or, for that reason, on *Tim* 41a by Plotinus or Porphyry survived. However, Porphyry was one of the originators of the tradition which included the systematic commenting on all Plato's dialogues. Therefore, in all likelihood, Porphyry had to write a commentary on Plato's *Timaeus* including the commentary on our passage. We find evidence of that in the early work of Proclus, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (In *Tim* 5.324.18). *Tim* 41ab was an important, interesting, and puzzling part of the dialogue, and each puzzle calls for a solution. This is why commentaries are written, and Porphyry should have also had a detailed commentary on the passage.

Many times Proclus refers to Porphyry in his *Platonic Theology*. However, in the fifth book (5: 40–105), while discussing the status and the role of the demiurge in great detail, Proclus does not make such a reference.

Even though Proclus most often disagrees with Porphyry when discussing various problems, he still usually refers to him. Yet, the reference to Porphyry is missing in the section on the demiurge in this most important work of Proclus, although Proclus had referred to Porphyry in his *Commentary on Timaeus*. It is possible that Proclus seriously disagreed with Porphyry, especially in the later period of his life. If the main doxographist of Neo-Platonism does not give us much information, we have to look for the answers in the early commentary mentioned above.

We have two small passages in the surviving sources, which give us a glimpse into Porphyry's knowledge of *Tim* 41ab. The first passage mentions Porphyry's commentary on *Tim* 41ab and the second passage describes the content of the commentary, including the status and name of the giver of the speech.

The fact that Porphyry had a commentary on our passage is testified by the text of a doxographical nature which we find in Proclus's *Commentary on Timaeus*, where Proclus once mentions Porphyry (5.234.18.32) in his discussion of the deeds of the demiurge next to Albinus, Atticus, Iamblichus, and Syrianus. In this passage Proclus argues with Porphyry concerning the problem of mortality and immortality of the individuals discussed in *Tim* 41d1.

Proclus indicates that according to Porphyry the terms *mortality* and *immortality* can be transformed into the terms of continuation and termination of existence when they are applied to individual beings. The survival of a mortal being can be terminated, but this does not mean that it ceases to exist. Rather, it is transferred from individual existence to general existence. In this sense, even a mortal being is immortal (5.234.25-26).

It is clear that Porphyry discusses some typical problems raised in the speech of the demiurge as well as what follows from the speech. Although the mortality and immortality of the addressees of the speech in *Tim* 41ab are different from the death and immortality of individual beings created by these addressees, two adjacent passages of *Timaeus* are comparable in terms of the general problem of death and immortality raised in them. By and large the problem remains the same for both groups.

The second passage is related to the content of *Tim* 41ab. We find it again in the doxological text from Proclus's *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, in the part often called the *Treatise on the Demiurge* (2.307.-319). It contains a synthesis of the materials on the demiurge, based on many texts from different dialogues of Plato. This text is also a major reason why we are obliged to consider Plotinus and Porphyry together. Both positions, of Plotinus and Porphyry, are directly related to each other, although

according to Proclus they seriously differ not only in nature, but also in the general conclusion: the first position is correct, and the second position is erroneous.

These authors touch upon two issues, namely, the status of the demiurge and his name. With regard to the status of the demiurge, Proclus argues that according to Plotinus the demiurge is twofold: one is passive in the intelligible realm, and the second one is active in the intellectual realm. Plotinus calls the passive part of the demiurge "Chronos," and the active part "Zeus" (2.306). According to Proclus, Porphyry identifies the demiurge with the hyper cosmic soul (τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν τὴν ὑπερκόσμιον ἀποκαλεῖ δημιουργόν) and her mind (that is, the mind of the demiurge) with the world of ideas, in the singular called the self-living being (αὐτοζῷον) – the intellectual paradigm which returns to the One and thus shows the example to the demiurge that he too should be turned to the One (πρὸς ὃν ἐπέστραπται). The turning is a quality of all living beings, but in the utmost way it characterizes the soul. The highest type of the soul – the hyper cosmic soul – is the demiurge, turning to the One (2.307).

As a disciple and the successor of Plotinus, Porphyry obviously elaborates on the thought of his teacher. Therefore it is important to trace the continuity, and if such continuity exists, Porphyry probably refers only to the lower active part of the demiurge or to the demiurge as the connector of the highest (the passive) and the lower (the active) part of the demiurge (the demiurgy). Thus, the demiurge in Porphyry is not divided into two parts, but as a soul connects the contemplative and the active parts.

Concerning the name of the demiurge, apparently, Porphyry believed that it was Zeus; at least one of the names of the demiurge according to Porphyry is Zeus. According to Proclus, Porphyry believed that his position on the issue coincided with the position of Plotinus (ὁ Πορφύριος οἰόμενος τῷ Πλωτίνῳ συνᾴδειν 2.307.1). Since Plotinus said that Zeus was one of the two names of the demiurge (2.304.27–28), most likely Porphyry as well should have argued that the demiurge was Zeus or that Zeus was a creative, active aspect of the demiurge. Given that Iamblichus, followed by Syrianus and Proclus, identified the author of the speech in *Tim* 41ab with Zeus (5.209.4), and the majority of the heads of the School maintained the same belief, it is safe to assume that not only Plotinus, but also Porphyry had that position.

Indeed, it is not obvious that the subject in the text under discussion is the same as the giver of the speech in *Tim* 41ab. The *demiurge* may be different than *the demiurge and the father*. Later Proclus clearly distinguishes between them; for him these are different persons. It is not

clear whether Porphyry also distinguished between them. The text, where Proclus makes the distinction does not contain doxographical material. It is likely that Proclus was the first philosopher to make this distinction, and if so, for Porphyry as well as for other precursors of Proclus, *the demiurge* and *the demiurge and the father* was the same person.

6.1.2. Comparative Conclusion:

Porphyry and Augustine on Tim 41ab

Augustine is familiar with the works of Porphyry only through the Latin translation by Marius Victorinus. Therefore, as it was the case with Augustine's use of Plato, he is completely dependent on the translator who belongs to the same rhetorical tradition as Cicero and later to the same faith as Augustine. Even though Marius Victorinus, himself a renowned orator of the first half of the 4th century, followed the principles of Cicero (see the previous chapter),[1] he rendered his translations more accurately than his famous predecessor (mainly because he did not consider himself to be as eminent a philosopher who had to correct the "errors" of the original texts). He carried out a number of translations of Porphyry into Latin, although not all of them.[2] Augustine too was not familiar with all the translations. Therefore, Augustine's familiarity with Porphyry's commentary on *Tim* 41ab has a special importance which depends not only on Augustine's knowledge of the text, but also on his general familiarity with Porphyry's philosophy. Let us compare the main points of this speech which reached us in one form or another.

Only some citations have survived from Porphyry's commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*,[3] and there are only few of such citations relating to *Tim* 41ab. In spite of writing a great number of commentaries on the Books of the Bible, Augustine never belonged to the tradition of compiling scholastic commentaries on Plato. Thus, Augustine has never written a systematic commentary on the whole *Timaeus* nor was he familiar with the entire text of *Timaeus*, being limited to a half-done translation which he knew only in excerpts. Although Augustine's comments on *Tim* 41ab exist, they are not systematic in nature. They are scattered in several works and show a strong influence of Christian doctrine on Plato's text, especially as far as the resurrection of the body is concerned. This is reflected in Augustine's interpretation of the concepts which are not contained in this text (*ratio,*

[1] Marius Victorinus wrote commentaries on Cicero's *De inventione* and *Topica* as well as the main treatise on rhetorics *Ars gramatica*, also written in Cicero's style. P.Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*. Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes. 1968.

[2] P.Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*. Paris. 1967. Vol. 1. P. 237.

[3] Bidez, J*., La vie de Porphyre*. Gand-Leipzig. 1903. Liste des écrits. P.66.

satus, omnipotentissima voluntas, resurrectio, anima, etc). Proclus also accuses Porphyry of using the concept of the soul which is absent from the discussion of the text in Plato, and, at the same time, of dropping the concept of god contained in the texts. However, it is obvious that the scale of such interpolations should be much wider in Augustine than in Porphyry. These two examples are rather the exception than the rule.

Porphyry comments on the original Greek text of *Timaeus*, and Augustine comments on a highly modified Latin translation of Cicero. As a result, some concepts of these commentators are comparable, and other concepts are not. Thus, Augustine discusses the problem of *corruption* and *incorruption*, as well as mortality and immortality having the adequate knowledge of his source. On the other hand, the repeatedly used double title of the speech-giver δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε, available to Porphyry, is only available to Augustine in the form of *pater effectorque* which is not the same thing. Not only the meaning of δημιουργὸς (*craftsman*) is changed into *effector* (causer), but also the order of words in the title is changed. We do not have any information concerning the importance of the accuracy of the terms and their sequence for both authors. Augustine does not write about it; in the discussion of this topic, Proclus does not refer to Porphyry or to any other Neo-platonists (In Tim. 5.209). It is possible that Proclus was the first philosopher who began to distinguish between δημιουργὸς and δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε, considering them to be different subjects as opposed to Porphyry who did not make a distinction between them.

Surprisingly, both Porphyry and Augustine take somewhat unexpected positions in their use of the concept of *god*. Porphyry does not name the demiurge *god*, for which he is later rebuked by Proclus (In Tim. 5.307.11). In spite of the fact that Augustine does not believe in multiple gods and considers erroneous to use the term *god* in the plural, he acknowledges the author of the speech not only as *god* (*deus*), but also as the *Supreme God* (*Summus Deus*), thus comparing him with other *lesser gods* (*dii minores*). Augustine sometimes interprets the *lesser gods* as angels, sometimes as demons, and sometimes as heavenly bodies or people in the future resurrection, even as “gods” by communion, but never as gods in the same sense as the Supreme God. Even in the framework of a purely classical understanding of God as immortal being, Augustine believes that there is a fundamental difference between the Supreme God and the “lesser gods”: the Supreme God has no beginning and no end, and the lesser gods have a beginning but no end. We could not establish how Porphyry understands the addressee of the demiurge’s speech – the equivalent of the *lesser gods*.

Augustine uses the *effector* of Cicero as the equivalent of Plato's notion of δημιουργὸς, used by Porphyry. Augustine does not comment on

this term, understanding it as the Creator whom Augustine identifies with the Supreme God in a purely Christian spirit. Augustine never views the demiurge as the hyper cosmic soul following the understanding of Porphyry, although Augustine names Zeus (see below) the cosmic soul of the world, being obviously aware about this tradition. Augustine, however, does not differentiate between the cosmic souls and the hyper cosmic soul in the vein of Porphyry, thus, we can suppose that for Augustine these are simply synonyms. If the source of Augustine indeed was Porphyry, Augustine's understanding of Porphyry was very different from the understanding of Proclus. Zeus (Jupiter) for Augustine is nothing else but a mythological figure; at the very least, Augustine does not attempt to identify Zeus with the *Summus Deus* or with the creator of the world. However, if Augustine's reproduction of the material partially corresponds to that of Porphyry, we can assume that according to Porphyry the World Soul is called the cosmic soul being within the world, while it is called the hyper cosmic soul being outside of the world as its exterior envelope. In this case only the outer hyper cosmic soul (or part of that soul) may be called the demiurge, while the name of Zeus can be used for naming both souls.

Like all Neo-Platonists, Porphyry uses the personal name of *Zeus* as applied to the demiurge. Augustine does not assign any personal name, not even , the pagan name of Zeus to the *Supreme* God. This is probably the result of Augustine's Christian apophatics according to which no names were supposed to be given to God the Father, whom Augustine apparently suggests (but does not mention) here. He is familiar with the use of the name of Zeus in the interpretation of this passage by some Platonist (probably Porphyry in the translation of Marius Victorinus). However, when Augustine refers to such interpretations, he understands *Zeus* as the cosmic soul. Sometimes Augustine even understands the soul of Zeus as the world itself. Such confusion in expressing the opinion of the opponent probably indicates that Augustine does not always carefully follow the logic of his opponent's thought.

Proclus does not say anything about the omnipotence of the demiurge according to Porphyry, but it is clear from the context that Porphyry refrained from such use. It is not surprising, if the fragment no. 94 (A. Harnack) is really based on his thought. In the fragment Porphyry refutes the idea of the divine omnipotence which makes it possible to perform the resurrection of bodies and other incredible things. At the same time it is unclear whether Porphyry had in mind the Creator of the world or the higher God, such as the One, since Porphyry clearly distinguished between them. Augustine is not aware of these differences; for him the omnipotence of the Supreme God the Creator is the key concept to which he constantly

returns in the context of his discussion of *Tim* 41ab and the debate with the Platonists concerning the resurrection of the body. Augustine is aware of some objections against the divine omnipotence (God's inability to die, lie, and deceive) and says that he is ready to accept them. Nevertheless, in his polemics with the Platonists, Augustine does not seriously consider these arguments and constantly insists that that everybody, even the pagans, recognize the divine omnipotence while at the same time he perfectly knows that, in fact, they do not.

It is doubtful that in the context of analyzing *Tim* 41ab, Porphyry elaborated upon the theory of the *omne corpus fugiendum*, so often discussed in the context of Augustine's theory of the resurrection of the body. Augustine mentions it once (*The City*, 22.26) in the context of discussing the passage. If the δημιουργὸς is the hyper cosmic soul for Porphyry, it should be beyond the body of the world which it envelopes on all sides, since even the body of the world should be avoided. More difficult is the question of the cosmic soul called Zeus, since it is located inside the body of the world. It is hardly possible for this kind of soul to avoid the body; however, Porphyry speaks about turning the soul to the One, thus even the cosmic soul, being within its body, should turn to the One, and not to its body. Turning not to the body but upwards, to the One, is by itself the avoidance of the body – any body, even the body of the universe. Unfortunately, Augustine does not address the issue of soul's turning to God / to the One as a reason for avoidance of body. Augustine mocks the theory of *omne corpus fugiendum*, and advises Zeus to jump out of his body – the body of the universe – that is to say, to die (in fact, Augustine was a zealous opponent of suicide). Porphyry, however, obviously does not imply death, but turning to the One through contemplation of the world of ideas.

Clearly, Augustine is familiar with some elements of Porphyry's philosophy, which outwardly coincided with the views of Proclus. Yet, Augustine cannot always put them together into a general picture and thus often understands them out of context.

The main problem in Augustine's understanding of Porphyry's thought, related to the text of *Tim* 41ab, is that according to Augustine, the giver of the speech in *Tim* 41ab is the Supreme and the only God; moreover, this God is the Creator. For Porphyry, the author of the speech, even if he is the Creator of the world, is not the supreme God; it is even uncertain if he is god at all. Therefore, the Creator of the world is not the Supreme God. For Porphyry the One, and even the paradigm (the world of ideas, self-subsisting being αὐτοζῷον), is above the demiurge who represents the hyper cosmic soul. This soul itself turns first to the world of ideas and ultimately to the One. Had Augustine understood this last statement, he

would have obviously realized that the Creator of the world for Porphyry is not the Supreme God, since Porphyry never claimed that the soul (whether it is cosmic or hyper cosmic) has the highest position in the hierarchy. Augustine affirms not only that the soul is eternal but also that it is created; that is, that the soul has a beginning but no end.

Porphyry calls the giver of the speech the demiurge, whereas Augustine calls him the creator. Creator and the demiurge are not the same thing. The demiurge is a craftsman performing his duties in creating the world. The creator is different; he is both the Supreme God and the creator of the world.

At the same time, both authors attached different meaning to this word. Although both are in a certain sense monotheists, Christian monotheism differs from the Platonic monotheism since it implies the belief in the Trinity and in Christ, which Porphyry rejects.

6.2. Iamblichus (ca 245-325)[4] on Tim 41ab:

6.2.1. The Speech of Zeus in Timaeus

Iamblichus seems to have been the only author in history so far to have dedicated an entire treatise to *Tim* 41ab (cd)[5]. Unfortunately, this treatise is not extent, as is the case with the majority of Iamblichus' commentaries on Plato and Aristotle that constitute the bulk of his writings.[6] What we do know of it from Proclus is its title *On the Speech of Zeus in Timaeus* περὶ γὰρ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ τοῦ Διὸς δημηγορίας - *in Tim* 1.308.19.-20.). As little as it is we may still attempt to draw a few remarks on this evidence, especially taking into account the fact that Proclus regularly refers to Iamblichus and his doctrines. *In Tim* contains as many as 98 references to Iamblichus' name and its derivatives out of 114 scattered in the whole of Proclus' oeuvre.[7] Giving the scope of quotes from Iamblichus in this study as well as the details on every aspect of the *Timaeus* text it is most possible that Iamblichus also wrote a separate running commentary on *Timaeus*.[8] Let us turn to the remarks on what has survived.

First, Iamblichus' identification of our passage with the speech of Zeus in *Timaeus* is hardly deniable (unless we start doubting Proclus' testimony). There is nothing elsewhere in the text of the dialogue similar to

[4] A.Cameron, *The date of Iamblichus' birth*, in *Hermes*, 96, 1968. Pp. 374-376; T.D. Barnes, *A correspondent of Iamblichus*, in *G.R.B.S.*, 19. 1978. Pp. 99-106.

[5] Cf. infra.

[6] Curiously, the *Protreptics* being one of the few survived treatises presents Aristotle as perfectly fitting into the Platonic tradition. Cf. Jamblique, *Protreptique*. Texte établi et traduit par E. des Places. Paris. Les Belles Lettres. 1989.

[7] TLG.

[8] A.J. Festugière: Vol. II: P.162, footnote 5; Zeller, III 2, p.739, n3.

this speech. The demiurge performs various demiurgic activities, the most important of which is an eternal construction of the universe with its soul and body.[9] Yet, it is only once when the demiurge expressly delivers an address, namely in *Tim* 41ad. Notice that Iamblichus' treatise must have covered twice as much material from *Timaeus*, than we attempt to deal with in our present analysis, since the demiurge's speech does not end at *Tim* 41b8 but it extends as far as to 41d3.

Curiously, besides the title *On the speech of Zeus in Timaeus*, Proclus provides virtually no detail of importance as to the content of this treatise. In the part of his *Timaeus* commentary dedicated to this speech, he quotes Iamblichus only once, and even this quote concerns a rather secondary issue about the immortality of the demons (*in Tim* 3.219.17-18.).[10] It is not impossible that Proclus took this reference not from the treatise on the speech of Zeus but from elsewhere. This rather superficial acquaintance with the argument raises an issue of whether Proclus has been much impressed by Iamblichus' exposition, or perhaps he was simply not familiar with this text at all (which would be quite unusual for Proclus).

Secondly, Iamblichus' presentation on Tim 41ad sits quite comfortably in the tradition. Clearly, he is neither the first nor the last who gave a systematic presentation of its contents. Therefore, in spite of the preceding remark, for the major part his presentation must have been similar to that of both Proclus and Syrianus (whose exposition is identical with that of Proclus, if again we are to trust Proclus). Proclus constantly refers to Iamblichus as *divine* (ὁ θεῖος᾽ Ιάμβλιχος).[11] This is not so much a statement of admiration or religious adoration, but rather a sign of agreement with his doctrines ('if Iamblichus' explanations are correct then he must be divine, since he managed to grasp divine Plato correctly'). Proclus takes Iamblichus' exegesis of Plato as exemplary with a dismissal of preceding Platonists, notably Porphyry. This concerns first and foremost the doctrine on the demiurge, especially on his name and status (in the so-called 'Treatise on the Demiurge', *in Tim* I. 299.-319.).

[9] Proclus, in Tim 1.382.13.-25. Procli Diadochi In Timaeum Platonis Commentaria, Edidit E.Diel, Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Tuebneriana, Amsterdam, Hakkert, 1965. Infra *In Tim.*

[10] Having listed four different meanings of the word *death*, Proclus says that the first of them is the death of the demons. This is a death in accordance with position (κατὰ σχέσιν, which in practice implies an obscure yet intriguing *throwing down the tunic*᾽ χιτῶνος ἀπόθεσιν. Proclus says that in spite of its mortality Iamblichus maintains that the race of demons remains unchangeable, so in reality it does not die. He further judges this opinion as reasonable and healthy. *Ibid.*

[11] Apparently, Proclus inspired the editors H.J. Blumenthal and E.G. Clark to render the title to the collection of articles on Iamblichus: *The divine Iamblichus: philosopher and man of gods*. Bristol. 1993.

Nevertheless, in this section (*in Tim* 1.307.15.-309.14.) Proclus attributes two contradictory opinions to Iamblichus' position on the demiurge. First, he says that Iamblichus identified the demiurge with the entire divine universe, situated between the One and the physical world.[12] This position refers back to the problem of whether the paradigm is prior to the demiurge, or perhaps the other way round. Clearly, Iamblichus claimed a still different position, namely, that the demiurge encompasses (περιέχει) the paradigm within himself.[13] Proclus does not agree with this claim, since his conviction is that the paradigm is prior to the demiurge. He advances a number of arguments against Iamblichus' grounds in

in Tim 1.308.11-18 and comes back to criticize it again in *in Tim* 1.399.5-10. Further on, as if to contradict himself Proclus immediately states that Iamblichus correctly identified the rank of the demiurge, placing him at the bottom of the triad of the intellective divinities. Proclus borrows this position from Iamblichus. He also tells us that the triad of the intellective divinities is the seventh triad in the divine hierarchy, the first three of which being the intelligible triads; the second three of them are the triads of the Intelligible-Intellective gods.[14]

Thus, the name of the demiurge is *Zeus* in Iamblichus' system; his status is the *third intellective divinity in the triad of the intellective gods*. The name becomes evident from the title of Iamblichus' treatise,[15] whereas his status is presented in *in Tim* I.308.20.-309.6. This presentation is rather complex. To make it more accessible we will use a slightly modified scheme, proposed by L. Brisson:[16]

[12] *in Tim* 1.308.6. ...πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ πλάτος τοῦ τε κόσμου καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς ὁ δημιουργός ἐστι.

[13] Slightly differently Amelius claimed a complete identity between the demiurge and the paradigm. Cf. *in Tim* 1.336.16.-20.
πάντα ἄρα μετείληχεν ἀλλήλων τὰ αἴτια καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ ὁ τὸν δημιουργὸν λέγων ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ παράδειγμα περιέχειν ἔστιν ὅπῃ φησὶν ὀρθῶς, καθάπερ ὁ θεῖος Ιά μβλιχος διατάττεται καὶ ὁ τὸ παράδειγμα δημιουργὸν ἀποφαινόμενος, ὥσπερ ὁ γενναῖ ος Αμέλιος·

[14] *in Tim* 1.308.20. ...μετὰ τὰς νοητὰς τριάδας καὶ τὰς τῶν νοερῶν θεῶν τρεῖς τριάδας ἐν τῇ νοερᾷ ἑβδομάδι τὴν τρίτην ἐν τοῖς πατράσιν ἀπονέμει τῷ δημιουργῷ τάξιν·

[15] The Speech of Zeus in Plato's Timaeus.

[16] Brisson, L., *Le même et l'autre*... P.68.

General Structure of Iamblichus' Metaphysics

The One

Gods (=*demiurgy*)

Three triads of the Intelligible gods
2.1.1. First triad of the Intelligible gods
2.1.2. Second triad of the Intelligible gods
2.1.3. Third triad of the Intelligible gods
2.2. Three triads of the Intelligible-Intellective gods
2.2.1. First triad of the Intelligible-Intellective gods
2.2.2. Second triad of the Intelligible-Intellective gods
2.2.3. Third triad of the Intelligible-Intellective gods
2.3. Triad of the intellective gods
2.3.1. Transcendence
2.3.2. Connection
2.3.3. Union (=*demiurge*)

The Universe

There is an evident paradox hidden in this scheme. This goes as follows: according to Proclus, Iamblichus claims that the demiurge is identical with entire section 2 (*gods*) of this scheme and at the same time he occupies position 2.3.3. (*union*) in it. The conclusion must be then that: 2 = 2.3.3., or in other words, the demiurge curiously appears to be a part of himself. This paradox is not necessarily a contradiction, yet it does require a certain explanation. We do not find it in Proclus; although Proclus also likes to play with such seeming contradictions (see Zeus re-appearing on different levels of his divine hierarchy, *cf. infra*).

Generally speaking, the structure of this scheme is comparable to Proclus' own position, especially the idea that the intelligible divinities not only precede the intellective divinities but they are also separated from each other by an intermediate class of the intelligible-intellective gods. However, as we can clearly see in the scheme, the participants of the intellective divinities differ from those of Proclus: instead of the names of some particular divinities (Kronos, Rhea, and Zeus), we are confronted with rather abstract philosophical notions of *transcendence*, *connection* and *union* in Iamblichus' presentation.[17] Proclus does not leave any ambiguity as to the position of the demiurge in the divine hierarchy, whereas in Iamblichus' presentation this ambiguity clearly remains.

The third point that attracts our attention is that Iamblichus was the first Neo-Platonist to turn from a purely philosophical discourse to theurgy.[18] He understood theurgy as soul's active co-operation in the demiurgic process.[19] The process of demiurgy did not cease with the acts performed by the demiurge but it continues due to the demiurgic powers of the soul.

According to Iamblichus, the demiurge of the universe did not exhaust even the cosmogonic processes but these processes continue to uncover themselves up to the present-day history and will continue to do so in the future. After the accomplishment of the first demiurgy exercised by the *demiurge and father* there comes the second demiurgy exercised by the encosmic gods. Yet, even the second demiurgy does not seem to be the end of the demiurgic activities. The human souls, being the result of both first and second demiurgies receive a capacity of continuing a demiurgic process

[17] Cf. L. Brisson, *Le même et l'autre*… P.68.

[18] Scholars (H.D. Safrey, A.Smith, D.J. O'Meara) mark Jambichus as a transitory thinker between two major periods of the development in Neo-Platonism: (1) the purely philosophical period, and (2) a period of philosophy mixed with theurgy. The cornerstone of this transition is Iamblichus' ten volume treatise *De Mysteriis Aegiptorum*, which purports to defend theurgic practices within a Platonic context. The book was written as a response to Porphyry who was defying these practices. Wherefrom is the book's subtitle *Response of Abamnon to the letter of Porphyry to Anebon and the solution to the difficulties, which are found there* (*De Myst*. 1.11.). Cf. Jamblique, *Les Mystères d'Egypte*. Texte établi et traduit par E. des Places. Paris. Les Belles Lettres. 1966. P.6. Iamblichus' position as a defender of theurgic practices in this treatise gave H.D. Safrrey the idea to see Abamnon as simply Iamblichus' pseudonym. Cf. H.D.Safrrey, *Abamnon pseudonyme de Jamblique*, in *Philomathes… Philip Merlan*. La Haye. 1971. Pp. 227-239.

[19] G.Show builds the entire presentation of his book upon this argument. G.Show, *Theurgy and the soul*, Pensylvania 1995. P. 23.

by performing certain theurgic rites.[20] Therefore, for the purpose of convenience we may call this soul's theurgic demiurgy as a 'third demiurgy'

Fourth, seeing that Iamblichus lived and worked already in the Christian era, the impact could have channeled both directions, namely, not only from Neo-Platonism to Christianity, as in the case of Ambrose and Augustine, but also the other way round: from Christianity back to Neo-Platonism. Thus, it is imaginable that Iamblichus' choice of writing a scholarly work on the speech of Zeus could have been 'inspired' by Christian commentaries, e.g. on the Prologue to the Gospel of John,[21] although this does not necessarily mean that Iamblichus actually read any of these commentaries. At that time these commentaries simply became popular as a literary genre.

Finally, Iamblichus (d. ca 325)[22] lived just two generations previous to Augustine. Although the bishop of Hippo never refers to Iamblichus in his sporadic commentaries on *Tim* 41ab, he does know Iamblichus by name. However, he is not familiar with the title of the treatise *On the Speech of Zeus*, let alone its contents. Nevertheless, this work must have had some if not a significant effect upon the intellectual circles of the period (since the Neo-Platonist could arguably be considered as *the* intellectuals of the epoch),[23] to the effect that the demiurge's speech had some importance whether among the Neo-Platonists or among their opponents.

Taking this all into account it is hardly surprising that Iamblichus received a rather hostile reception in the posterior Christian theology and for the major part was just simply ignored by the Christian writers. Having turned to theurgy, Iamblichus introduced 'an applied' philosophy, what the Christians plainly condemned as magic. A speech of Zeus may seem to represent a description of some sort of a sacral rite, which can be accessed and understood exclusively by chosen ones. Although, following the tradition of ignoring the Christian presence (see Plotinus' similar silence on the issue), Iamblichus most probably did a purely philosophical reflection on Plato along with oracle commentaries. The whole context of the confrontation with the Christians was certainly in the air.

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[20] Iamblichus' most important treatise testifying these practices had the title *Chaldean Theology*, which did not extend, yet it has been cited by Damascius on several occasions. Cf. Jamblique, *Les Mystères d'Egypte*. Texte établi et traduit par E. des Places. Paris. Les Belles Lettres. 1966. P.5.

[21] E.g., theological oeuvre of Athenagoras, Justin Martyr, Pseudo-Justin, Hippolyte, Origen, among many other pre-Nicean writers that attach a crucial importance to the doctrine of λόγος, which is found first and foremost in the Prologue to the Gospel according to John.

[22] Cf. supra.

[23] See the example of Marius Victorinus trying to spread Neo-Platonist teaching in the Latin speaking world by means of his translations - almost exclusively from Plotinus and Porphyry. We learn the story of his conversion in *Confessions* XIII, 2.

6.2.2. Comparative Conclusion: Iamblichus and Augustine on Tim 41ab

If Iamblichus wrote a special work on the speech of Zeus in *Timaeus*, it had to contain twice as much commented material than the largest quote from *Timaeus* in Augustine (*The City*, 13.26); it is only enough to compare *Tim* 41a7-d3 and *Tim*41 a7-b6.

With the exception of the general fact that the "Supreme God" (the demiurge) entrusted the creation of the man to the "lesser gods," Augustine shows no acquaintance with the second half of the speech by the demiurge. However, this position can also be inferred from the subsequent text, thus we do not know whether Augustine was familiar with the second half of this speech. The questions about the necessity of creating three types of living beings, without which the heaven will be imperfect (*Tim* 41b7-b10), the completion of the creation (*Tim* 41b1-3), the need for devolution of the authority of creation because of the impossibility for the demiurge to create mortal beings, but only immortal beings (*Tim* 41c4-9), the immortality as a designation of the divine (*Tim* 41c9-d2), the "weaving" of mortal with the immortal (*Tim* 41d1), and, finally, the need for taking care of the creation (*Tim* 41d2-D4) are not discussed by Augustine.

And yet, even in spite of their sporadic nature, we have more surviving materials with the commentaries by Augustine than with the commentaries by Iamblichus. Strangely enough, even Proclus, while giving a passing reference to the title of the work by Iamblichus, does not transmit virtually any details on its contents. It is hard to imagine that a person who believed that Iamblichus was *divine* and agreed with Iamblichus in almost every instance when he is referring to him (which cannot be said about his attitude to Porphyry, see above), did not appreciate the content of one of his works or was not even familiar with it. It is possible that this treatise had some sort of esoteric content that Proclus did not want to reveal even to a dedicated reader. Augustine never mentions the mystical content of the speech, nor does he even draw the parallel with the beginning of the prologue of St. John's Gospel, where it would be natural for him to see some mystical or even esoteric content.

From the perspective of the classical Platonic framework concerning the hierarchical relationship of the demiurge, the world of ideas, and the world of becoming, we see both radical differences and fundamental agreements between the positions of Iamblichus and Augustine. Both argue that the world of ideas (the paradigm) is a part of the demiurge / Creator; in some sense the ideas are his thoughts (see *de diversis quaestionibus*, 83, but

not in the comments on *Tim* 41ab). This position of Iamblichus differs from other positions existing in the School, namely, that the demiurge is higher (or he is even the source) of the paradigm; coincides with the paradigm (Amelius), or is lower than the paradigm (Syrianus, Proclus). However, Iamblichus believes that the One is above the demiurge and includes the paradigm, and according to Augustine, there is nothing higher than the Creator (the *demiurge*), and he – the Creator – is identical to the Supreme God. Thus the status of the giver of speech for Augustine is far higher than for Iamblichus. If Iamblichus was ready to accept that the demiurge coincides with the One, his ideas would have been more akin to the concept of the hennads. However, inasmuch as the hennads for Iamblichus differ from the world of ideas, the One differs from the demiurge.

Despite the outward similarities between the views of Augustine and Iamblichus, Augustine shows no knowledge of such concepts as the One or the hennads in later Neo-Platonism in general and in Iamblichus in particular. This points to Augustine's meager knowledge of the system. In addition, it is worth mentioning that even though Augustine argues for the presence of the divine ideas in the divine mind, he does not show knowledge of other above mentioned positions, and does not discuss the theory of ideas in the context of his discussion of *Tim* 41ab. Therefore, despite the similarity of some of Augustine's positions with the position of Iamblichus on the relationship between the Creator / the demiurge and the world of ideas, we can speak of some influence of Neo-Platonism on Augustine's views; however, we can also say that Augustine by no means belonged to the tradition.

The information on the status and name of the speaker which Proclus provided us, obviously did not reach Augustine. According to Proclus, Iamblichus identifies the demiurge with the third figure in the intellectual Triad, following the intelligible and the intelligible-intellectual triads. This system would have represented an absolutely unimaginable mathematics for Augustine. We cannot find a single word in Augustine concerning the complex structures of the divine hierarchy, and most likely Augustine was not familiar with such a system. Since such a structure was likely to be contained in the commentary on *Timaeus* by Iamblichus, Augustine was obviously not familiar with that commentary.

As opposed to Porphyry who used the name of *Zeus*, but did not emphasize it in the speech under discussion, Iamblichus includes the name of *Zeus* into the title of the whole treatise on the speech in *Tim* 41ab. Plato himself does not say anything about Zeus in this speech, and Iamblichus who perfectly knows the text of Plato, wants to emphasize the identification of the demiurge with Zeus on the basis of parallels in other texts of Plato.

Augustine, obviously, does not know anything about it. Augustine's use of the name of Zeus in the context of discussing *Tim* 41ab shows that he was familiar with this use, but his understanding of Zeus was rather close to the position of Porphyry. Porphyry claims that Zeus is the name of the demiurge who at the same time is the hypercosmic soul; Augustine says that Zeus is the cosmic soul of the world; Iamblichus says nothing like this (otherwise Proclus would have definitely noted that).

Augustine knows about the practice of theurgy which Iamblichus introduced into Neo-Platonism, and bitterly reproaches it in *The City*, 10.9. In the treatise called *de regressu animae* Augustine notes the tendency of theurgic practices in Porphyry.[24] However, for Porphyry theurgy is primarily a path to universal salvation, since the vast majority of people are unable to practice philosophy, representing a narrow path to salvation only for the elect.[25] At a certain level theurgy is similar to the practice of Christian liturgy which might have affected the next stage in the development of Neo-Platonism struggling to find a path of salvation available to all through sacrifices and rituals. Iamblichus was a great enthusiast of theurgy and wrote a special treatise with commentaries on the *Chaldean Oracles*.[26] It is possible that the treatise *On the Speech of Zeus in Plato's Timaeus* included additional commentaries on theurgic practices. Augustine is unfamiliar not only with the content of this treatise and its possible role in theurgy, but also with a particular contribution of Iamblichus to the theurgy as a whole.

[24] J. O'Meara proved that this title is the other title of *Philosophia ex oraculis*. However first Hadot, and recently M. Edwards have argued that there is a possibility that both treatises have existed. Cf. J.O'Meara, *Porphyry's Philosophy from oracles in Augustine*, 1958; P. Hadot, Citations de Porphyre chez Augustin (à propos d'un ouvrage recent), in *REAug* 6 (1960). Pp. 205-244. M.Edwards, *Porphyry and the Christians*, in *Studies on Porphyry*. Ed. G.Karamanolis, A.Sheppard. Londoon. 2007. Pp. 101-127.

[25] G.Clark, *Augustine's Porphyry and the Universal way of salvation*, in *Studies on Porphyry*. Ed. G.Karamanolis, A.Sheppard. London. 2007. Pp. 127-141.

6.3. Flavius Claudius Julianus (Julian the Apostate) (emperor ca. 361-363):

6.3.1. Tim 41ab versus the Bible Creation Story

Due to the acquaintance with Iamblichus' philosophy Emperor Julian experienced a spectacular conversion to Heliolatry,[27] and thus he did his best to remain within the scope of the tradition. In *Against the Galileans* 57d-65c[28] Julian ventures to oppose the texts of *Genesis* I:26-28 with *Timaeus* 41ad. He quotes the speech of the demiurge in its complete form (*Tim* 41a5-41d3: *KG* 58b5-58d9), with a slight alteration to the initial section: (a) he skips the usual διʼ ἐμοῦ γενόμενα (which we have already seen in Philo and Athenagoras); and (b) inserts ἔσται between ἄλυτα and ἐμοῦ γε ἐθέλοντος, so that the result becomes as following:

> Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων ἄλυτα ἔσται ἐμοῦ γε ἐθέλοντος.

The first alteration (a) is less significant than the second one (b), since by inserting ἔσται Julian adds a temporary aspect to the demiurge's speech, which Plato hardly meant. This insertion is still significant as a reflection of Julian's own limited comprehension of the source. After all, he must have personally added ἔσται at this point, as we failed to find it elsewhere. Apparently, in the course of KG Julian views the creation story both in *Timaeus* and in the Bible as a true myth, not an allegory of some kind. He also understands these texts as a true creation story, thus undermining the concept of eternity of the world, which was held by the majority of the Neo-Platonists.[29] In the course of the tradition such a position was later held only by a Christian Neo-Platonist Philoponus. No wonder, Proclus does not take Julian's philosophy seriously, as he never mentions any of the latter's positions in his doxographical collections. Even the emperor's title does not save Julian from silence.

Nevertheless, Julian offers virtually no exegesis of the passage in question, leaving this endeavor to an intelligent reader. He assumes that the reader would draw the correct conclusions to the advantage of Plato's text, as compared to the Bible creation story. Perhaps he also has in mind

[27] F. Cummont, La Théologie solaire du paganisme romain, in Mémoires présentées par divers savants à l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres. XII. 1913. P.477.

[28] κατά Γαλιλαιῶν (*Contra Galilaeos*), infra *KG*. Editio princeps: *Contra Galilaeos, Juliani imperatoris librorum contra Christianos quae supersunt*. Teubner, Leipzig. 1880. Pp. 163-233 ed. Neumann, C.J. 2003. P.18.

[29] Proclus presents these views in a doxographical section on the theme of the eternity of the world in *in Tim* 1.382.-383.

Iamblichus' treatise *On the Speech of Zeus in Timaeus*, or Iamblichus' running commentary on the *Timaeus* dialogue,[30] as a clear point of reference and, more importantly, containing a complete exegesis. If so, he was right perhaps in using shortcuts through a very complex presentation: it appears somewhat superfluous to repeat the line of argument indeed. It is however surprising that in KG Julian does not refer to Iamblichus at all. This suggests that the Emperor most probably was not familiar with either of these studies (the use of these texts could have scored some strong points in his polemics). Despite this deficiency, in a certain sense Julian still remains a perfect follower of Iamblichus, since he also kept himself busy not so much with a philosophical system, as rather with an applied philosophy in theurgic practices. He tried to restore the Hellenic religious cult, which is what Iamblichus also desired a generation before him.

The very fact of the *Tim* 41ab choice by a pagan author to quote it in opposition to a biblical story is significant on its own. Despite an evident opposition between these texts, Julian remains on his own in his treatment: no other Platonist does so elsewhere. Probably, it is just below their dignity to come up with such a comparison (as they had a tendency to consider Plato far more superior to the Christian teaching or indeed almost any other teaching. Thus, such a comparison makes indeed little sense). Even Julian does not do it upfront in KG, although it seems to be so at the first glance. We have to keep it in mind that he is not a mere pagan, recently confronted with Christianity. Julian has been brought in the Christian context, having been the last ruler of the Constantine dynasty, with Constantine I (the Great) as his uncle.[31] He even was ordained a reader in the church at some point when he was a teenager.[32] He consciously abandoned his former religion. No wonder, he received the apostate title in the Byzantine era. Thus his struggle against Christianity became a major affair in his life, and therefore *volens-nolens* he often reasons within a Christian paradigm.

Julian uses Plato to refute the Christian doctrine indirectly, as he considers the beginning of the book of *Genesis* to be purely a Jewish, not a Christian, text (to continue his idea he should have better chosen John's prologue in order to demonstrate the fact that the book of *Genesis* is a more powerful text than the Gospels). His choice of *Genesis* 1 well suited Julian's chosen method of refutation, which consists of two steps: (1) to demonstrate the superiority of the Greek-Roman traditional religion as compared to Judaism; (2) to claim a complete disruption between the

[30] Proclus, *in Tim* 1.308.19.-20.

[31] Julian's mother was the second wife of Emperor Constantine I. H.Chadwick, *The Early Church*. London. Revised edition. 1993. P. 152.

[32] Ibid.

religion of Judaism and the beliefs of the Galileans (mere simpletons according to him who could not grasp the essence even of the religion of their fathers).[33] Thus, the Roman cult is at least as twice as superior to the Galilean superstition (and since it is a superstition, it is dangerous due to its vulgarism). Nevertheless, in practice Julian being an Emperor did not choose for a direct persecution of Christianity, as happened earlier in the times of Decius and Diocletian. Being sensitive to the religious issues, Julian noticed that the direct persecution does not work while dealing with the matters of religion. Still, he was a more fervent anti-Christian than the other two, if we consider his personal convictions. After all, he chose to embark on a formal refutation.[34]

Clearly, the comparison between *Timaeus* and the book of *Genesis* is a part of the project belonging to step one in Julian's Platonist apologetics. Similarly to other pagan writers under discussion, he would hardly condescend to comparing the *Timaeus* text directly to the Gospels or any other New Testament writing. By choosing a specifically Christian source as an object of criticism he could have launched a direct attack on Christianity, which finally he did not do. By singling out an extraction from the Old Testament,[35] Julian seems to apply an intermediate method of approaching his adversary. In using such a tool he remains a typical Neo-Platonist, whose regular exposition requires intermediate steps.[36] Unfortunately, Julian does not appear to have mastered this method, since he never wrote a full-scale commentary on Plato's texts. His most original philosophical text is his *Hymn to the Sun*. Julian is no more occupied with a criticism but enters into a constructive philosophical presentation of his own position.[37]

[33]W.C. Wright, Introduction to *Against the Christians*. LCL 157: *Julian*, Vol. III. Harvard University press. Cambridge Mass. 1932, p. 313.

[34] In fact, Julian employed sporadic persecution of the Christians, in response to the local events, such as the burning down of Apollo's temple in Antioch in year 364. H. Chadwick, *The Early Church*. London. P.154.

[35] The beginning of the Bible is an obvious choice for someone who is not familiar with the Jewish-Christian sources. It is quite plausible that Julian had a rather poor knowledge of the textual basis of the tradition that he singled out for criticism. Thus it is not surprising that he runs into obvious difficulties commenting on a rather complex story.

[36] Cf. e.g. an insertion of the class of Intelligible-Intellective divinities connecting the class of the Intelligible gods with the class of Intellective gods both in Iamblichus and Proclus.

[37] According to Ch Lacombrade, E.G. Rabinovich, and recently G.Buzasi, Julian's anti-Christian writings do not occupy the core of his thinking. Rather, these were a consequence of his restoration project to renew the classical culture and religion. Ch.Lacombrade, *Notice*, in L'Empereur Julien, Oeuvres completes. T. II. Sur Hélios-Roi. Paris. 1964; Е.Г. Рабинович, *"Золотая середина»: к генезису одного из понятий античной культуры*. 1979; G.Buzasi, *The hymn to the Sun in Emperor Julian* (doctoral thesis). Leuven. 2009.

6.3.2. Comparative conclusion: Julian and Augustine on Tim 41ab

Julian is an important figure in many ways. In the same way as Augustine is often considered as a defector to Christianity from the beliefs, Julian in the opposite unique way is considered an apostate from Christianity to Neo-Platonism. Both Augustine and Julian have a certain intimate, although not always deep, understanding of both doctrines.

Both authors reveal a partial attitude to Christian teaching: Julian attacks it, and Augustine defends it. Similarly to Porphyry, the opponent of Augustine in the dispute about the resurrection, Julian also must have written a treatise against the Christians, although none of these treatises have survived. However, the existence of such a treatise by Julian is more likely than that of Porphyry, because Cyril of Alexandria in the extant refutation of this treatise directly refers to Julian. The longest quotations in Macarius Magnes do not contain the name of Porphyry, so we constantly have to question whether we are dealing with Porphyry or somebody else. Yet in spite of the doubts concerning the amount of existing texts, it is clear that Porphyry was an outspoken opponent of Christianity, and some of his arguments came down to us primarily because of Augustine.

Both Porphyry and Julian considered Christianity to be a vulgar religion of the multitude. This follows from Julian's title of his anti-Christian treatise: *Against the Galileans*. Calling Christians *the Galileans*, he thereby relegates them to the status of provincial simpletons from the northern Palestine. Obviously, these provincial simpletons strongly annoyed him, since the Emperor has undertaken a task of refuting their views. Porphyry must have also been annoyed by these vulgar people, if he considered it necessary to break the silence of his teacher Plotinus.

It is a strange fact, that Julian is the only author among the Neo-Platonists we mentioned, who uses a striking comparison of the beginning of the Book of Genesis and *Tim* 41ab. Even pseudo-Justin, who among all the Apologists provides the most profound analysis of *Tim* 41ab, does not employ this comparison, all the more so Augustine. Nevertheless, such a comparison seems natural because in both texts God the Creator addresses the results of his work.

Julian cites the entire speech of the demiurge (*Tim* 41ad) in the original version, while Augustine cites only a half of it (*Tim* 41ab) in a rather free translation. However, the level of Julian's analysis is much more superficial than rather speculative analysis by Augustine. Julian limits himself to a simple parallel citation of the first chapter of the Book of

Genesis and the speech of the demiurge in *Tim* 41ab, declaring that it should be obvious for the reader that Plato's text is deeper and has a more profound meaning. Julian does not provide an explanation of the exact nature of this superiority. While Augustine does not cite such a long extract from *Timaeus*, he gives it a multi-dimensional interpretation in different places. Augustine does not draw any parallels with the Scripture and does not make assertions concerning the preference of the Bible or Plato, although it is not difficult to guess what his position was. Augustine does not cite the Bible because it is not an authoritative text for his opponent Porphyry. Therefore, Augustine tries to deduce the Christian doctrine using the hermeneutics based upon an authoritative text of the Platonists, that is, *Tim* 41ab. Unlike Julian, Augustine does not resort to comparative textual analysis of two different doctrines. However, the essence of his argument is directly opposed to the accusations of Julian. Augustine argues that both Plato and Christianity are right in asserting the resurrection of the body (it is another matter whether this statement is correct), whereas Julian claims that Plato is right and Christianity is wrong. However, Julian does not say exactly in what respect Plato is right, and what the mistake of Christianity is. The only point that we are able to establish is that Christianity is just a sect of illiterates, and Platonism is the greatest cultural and religious phenomenon.

Julian sharply separates the teaching of the Old Testament from the teaching of the New Testament. For him the Book of Genesis is a part of the teaching of the Jews. Julian personally disagrees with this teaching, arguing that the vulgar sect of the Galileans is not even capable to understand it. Therefore, the comparison of the speech by the demiurge with the history of creation is rather a comparison of the Jewish teaching with Plato's teaching; an undoubted preference should be given to the latter. In the context of a dispute with Porphyry concerning the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, Augustine does not resort to the difference between the teachings of the Jews and Christians, and does not use the texts of the Old Testament or the New Testament.

6.4. Proclus (ca. 411-485): extensive elaboration on Tim 41ab

6.4.1. Brief introduction

The *Tim* 41ab appears numerous times in the course of four following treatises of Proclus: [38] Platonic Theology, [39] Timaeus Commentary, [40] Parmenides Commentary[41] and Cratylus Commentary.[42] In each of these treatises it appears in its particular way. First and foremost, the passage receives an in-depth systematic treatment in the Commentary on *Timaeus* in the scope of more than twenty pages (*In Tim* 3III.201. – 222.). Proclus cites the entire *Timaeus* dialogue in this treatise and offers a detailed passage by passage running commentary for it.[43] This commentary is absolutely unique in field of the Hellenic studies among the surviving documents of the kind. Proclus is building up a complex and coherent system of Physics mixed with Theology, based on a scrupulous textual exegesis of the *Timaeus* dialogue.[44] His approach in *Theologia Platonica* is just opposite, even though it aims to achieve the same objective: a systematic presentation of Plato's doctrine (which Proclus means to be identical with that of his own, as well as with that of Syrianus, his teacher). Proclus is using a large number of Plato's writings as supportive material, wherein *Timaeus* plays a significant role, and especially the *Tim* 41ab as its indispensible part (*TP* V.57.-5.58.). Further, Proclus mentions the *Tim* 41a once only in his *Cratylus* Commentary (*In Crat.* 98-99). Nevertheless, this quote still contributes to a very complex picture (not to mention that there is a large number of references to *Cratylus* in *in Tim* and *TP* in connection with this passage). This may serve as an example of how Proclus anagogically explains difficult passages in one dialogue with the help of the passages from another dialogue.[45] Finally, there is one expression in Proclus' Parmenides Commentary (θεοὶ θεῶν· *In Prm.* 943-944.), which is identical with the initial address in the *Tim* 41a, and yet has nothing to do

[38] Only the initial address is to be found up to nine times in the treatises listed below.

[39] Proclus, *Théologie Platonicienne*, Vol. I-VI. Texte établi et traduit par H.D.Saffrey, L.G.Westerink. Les Belles Lettres. Paris. 1968-1997: *Theologia Platonica*: infra *TP*.

[40] Procli Diadochi, *In Timaeum Platonis Commentaria*. Edidit E.Diel. Amsterdam. 1965: infra *In Tim*.

[41] Proclus, *Procli in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria*. C.Steel, Gribomont, A., P.D'Hoine. Oxford. Claredon. 2008; Proclus, *Procli in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria*. C.Steel, C.Macé, P.D'Hoine. Oxford. Claredon. 2007: infra *In Prm*.

[42] Proclus, *Procli Diadochi in Platonis Cratylum commentaria*. Edidit Pasquali G. Stuttgart. Teubner. 1994, infra *In Crat*.

[43] Unfortunately, the τέλος – the end of the Commentary did not extend to us, yet the largest part still does survive.

[44] Lernould, A. Physique et Théologie. Lecture du Timée de Platon par Proclus. Septentrion. Paris. 2001.

[45] Curiously, these 'other' passages are often as obscure, or even more so than the passages explained.

with it directly. This also has its significance, since, contrary to the conclusion, which tends to be drawn by some scholars,[46] it demonstrates the fact that this expression is not unnatural to the Greek language, at least in the context of the Platonic tradition. The appearance of this expression in *in Prm* is significant also for another reason: Plato's *Parmenides* is arguably the main source for the entire system of Proclus, since it contains in-depth discussions of the metaphysical system. This system has become the source for other philosophical disciplines, discussed not only in the *Timaeus* but also elsewhere.[47]

Taking into account a substantial amount of information which is available at our disposal in Proclus' oeuvre, we divided our exposition of his analysis of *Tim* 41ab for the sake of convenience in accordance with its three key elements: the speaker (I), the addressed (II) and the contents of the speech (III). We will not follow the inner logic of Proclus' exposition in detail but use it as much as we can for the sake of the current research. Understandably, the main accent of our analysis will be put upon the *Timaeus Commentary* and partially the *Platonic Theology.*

[46] *Inter alia*: R.D. Archer-Hind, Th.H. Martin, F.Cornford. Cf. Cornford. F.Mc D. *Plato's Cosmology: the Timaeus of Plato.* Translation with a running commentary. London. Routledge and Kegan. 1957; Plato, *The Timaeus*, transl. R.D. Archer-Hind, New-York. 1973; Martin, Th.H. *Etudes sur le Timée de Plato*. Paris. Vrin. 1981.

[47] C.Steel, Le Parménide est-il le fondement de la Théologie Platonicienne? in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne. Ed. A.Ph. Segonds, C.Steel. Leuven. University Press. 2000. Pp; 373-399.

6.4.2.Speaker

The identification of the speaker of this passage is a major task, the way Plato formulated it in *Tim* 28c3-4 ("finding the demiurge and father is hard, but even if you do find him, it is impossible to declare him to other people"). Proclus underlines this difficulty (*TP* V 102.11.-105.14.), providing a reason: there is a divine revelation in the discourse delivered by the demiurge (*in Tim* III.202.27.-28.). To understand the meaning of the revelation is indeed an almost impossible task. We divided this identification process of Proclus' exposition into three major issues: status/rank of the speaker (1), his title(s) (2), the speaker's name(s) and his main character/istic(s) (3). This is the path to follow a further presentation.

6.4.2.1. Status/rank of the speaker

Proclus claims that the author of this speech is identical with the third intellective divinity of the triad of the intellective gods (*in Tim* I.310.9.; *TP* VI, 22). According to him, there are three triads in a preceding hierarchy, which all descend in the divine procession from the One: the first one is a triad of the intelligible gods (*TP* book III). The second one is a triad of the intelligible-intellective divinities (*TP* book IV), and finally there is a triad of the intellective gods (*TP* book V), where the author of this speech belongs. The main characteristic of the intelligible divinities is the power of perception, whereas the main characteristic of the intellective divinities is the act of perception. The main characteristic of the intelligible-intellective divinities is a mixture of the power and the act of perception. Since the speaker belongs to the triad of the intellective divinities, he is first and foremost a perceiver of the realities above him. His function in contemplation is active, which is one of the reasons why he delivers a speech to the divinities below him. Since his function is active, whereas his activity consists both in creation and in his speaking, he renders the recipients of his speech also active demiurges (*in Tim* III.198.4.), among which he remains the first and most important one.

The structure of the divine hierarchy, the way it is put forward throughout the *Platonic Theology* and partially in the *Timaeus Commentary*, can be represented in the following way:

Proclus' universe, Part I

1. The One (το ἕν)

Transcendent gods

2. Hennades

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3. Intelligible gods, Being
   - 3.1. 1st triad of the intelligible gods, One which Is
   - 3.2. 2nd triad of the intelligible gods, Eternity
   - 3.3. 3d triad of the intelligible gods, Living Being in Itself (paradigm)

4. Intelligible-Intellective gods, Life
   - 4.1. 1st triad of the intelligible-intellective gods (ὑπερουράνια)
   - 4.2. 2nd triad of the intelligible gods (ἡ τῶν οὐρανίων περιφορὰ)
   - 4.3. 3d triad of the intelligible gods (ὁ ὑπερουράνιος διάκοσμος)

5. Intellective gods, Intellect
   - 5.1. 1st triad of the intellective gods
     - 5.1.1. Kronos
     - 5.1.2. Rhea
     - 5.1.3. Zeus (the universal demiurge/demiurge and father)
   - 5.2. 2nd triad of the intellective gods
   - 5.3. Seventh divinity

This scheme.[48] and synthesis[49] represents Proclus' system up to the point where he undertakes an extensive commentary on *Tim* 41ab, which in itself marks the distinction between the first and the second demiurges. The author of the first demiurgy is the universal demiurge – *demiurge and father*, who is the author of the speech in question. The author of the second demiurgy is the plurality of gods created by the demiurge and father. The first demiurgy exclusively concerns things divine, immortal and invisible. The second demiurgy concerns things mortal and visible.

6.4.2.2. Title

There are three titles, reserved for the character in question in the analysis advanced by Proclus: a *universal demiurge* (1), *demiurge and father* (2), and finally, the *first demiurgic monad* (3). The first one has become clear in the part of the *Timaeus* dialogue, dedicated to the creation of the universe (*Tim* 28a-40d). Evidently, it is the same character, who has created the whole universe, and later created and addressed other divinities. He is thus the universal demiurge (*in Tim* 1.58.29. ὅ τε τοῦ παντὸς δημιουργὸς ὁλικὸς; ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργός*, in Tim* 1.12.6.) in the first place.

The second title can be found in his speech. And indeed, Plato lets the speaker of *Tim* 41ab say about himself that he is *demiurge and father* (ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε*: Tim* 41a7). Proclus is convinced that this word combination and its word order are not casual at all. On the contrary, they have a key significance in the hierarchical structure of the divine universe. In fact, *demiurge and father* is an identity title, which distinguishes him

[48]The scheme on the preceding page is based on two other schemes, which are to be found in: (1) J.Opsomer, *La démiurgie des jeunes dieux selon Proclus*, p. 34. (appendix) and in L.Brisson, *Le même et l'autre* p. 67: *Proclus' doctrine in general* (2), p. 68: *divine hierarchy* (3). There is a certain disagreement between L. Brisson and J. Opsomer concerning the general structure of the divine hierarchy. First, with regards to the hennades: according to L.Brisson, Proclus means the hennades to be emanated from the One. J. Opsomer does not include the hennades into the divine hierarchy in his major scheme. However, in a footnote (appendix), he remarks that the hennades are to be equated with the Platonic ideas, and thereby he implies them to be situated on the level of the third intelligible triad (paradigm). Secondly, as if following Jamblique, J. Opsomer triples every element on the level of the intelligible as well as intelligible-intellective gods, which L. Brisson thinks is too simple. On both these issues I tend to side with L. Brisson, as it appears in my general accumulative scheme, which is put forward *supra*.

[49] There were similar attempts made to reconstruct Proclus' system in a schematic fashion, notably by A. Lernould (p.28-29) and L.Y.Loukomsky (p.562). Cf. Lernould, A. *Physique et Théologie. Lecture du Timée de Platon par Proclus*. Septentrion. Paris. 2001; Прокл, *Платоновская Теология.* Перевод Л.Ю. Лукомского. Санкт-Петербург. 2001 г.

from other divinities. Any alteration to the word order, dropping or adding a word may also lead to an identification change.

The title of the discussed divinity is double (διὸ δὴ καὶ ποιητὴς λέγεται παρὰ Πλάτωνι καὶ πατήρ, – *in Tim* I.311.25.). Proclus explains the significance of the denominations *father* (1) and *demiurge* (2) in *in Tim* I, 311, and then refers to it in *in Tim* III, 208b. He also explains why the denomination *demiurge* precedes the denomination *father* in this case, and not the other way round, even though the latter one is more significant than the former one (*in Tim* 299.22.-300.13.).

In *in Tim* III. 208.26.-209.13.. Proclus explains that there are four of these: *father* alone (1), *father and demiurge* (2), *demiurge and father* (3), and finally *demiurge* alone (4). The *father alone* is identical with (the) ether,[50] which is the first procession from the One (cf. implied in point 2 in the scheme *supra*, since ether must be a hennade). The *father and demiurge* is a god in accordance with the paradigm (ὁ κατὰ παράδειγμα θεός), which is to be found in the third intelligible triad (3.3 *supra*).[51] The *demiurge and father* (4.3.) is the author of the speech, which is the object of our analysis, whereas the *demiurge alone* is a cause of a partial fabrication

ποιητὴς δὲ μόνως ὁ τῆς μεριστῆς ἐστι δημιουργίας αἴτιος- *inTim*3.209.5.[52]

[50] Ether is known as the fifth element, especially since the epoch following Pseudo-Aristotelian, but virtually Stoic, *de mundo*, where it figures prominently. Proclus takes all material implications away from this notion in the context of his system. Curiously Th.Taylor adds '(or bound)' to ether in this passage (p.343). Not only this insertion is absent from the text, but even linguistically there is little connection between these two notions. Cf. Taylor, Th., The Theology of Plato, London, Prometheus trust, 1995 P 343.

[51] At this point Proclus uses evidence from the Orphic tradition, which renders him with the name 'Phanes Protogonus'.

[52] Th. Taylor mistakenly translates μερικὸς (as opposed to ὁλικὸς – 'total, integral') with *particular* Cf. Taylor, p. 343, A.-J. Festugière grasps it adequately with 'partièlle', Cf. Festugière p. 69.

Due to these identifications with the particular divinities in the divine hierarchy, the rank and status of each of them turns out to be strictly determined. This is why the power domain of these divinities becomes equally clear. Thus, the subordinates of the *father alone* are as follows: the intelligible, intelligible-intellective, intellective, supra-celestial and encosmic divinities, since *father alone* is a hennad. The subjects of the *father and demiurge* are: the intelligible-intellective, intellective, supra-celestial and encosmic divinities, since *father and demiurge* is an intelligible god. The subjects of the *demiurge and father* are: the intelligible-intellective, intellective, supra-celestial and encosmic divinities, since *demiurge and father* is an intellective god. Finally, the subjects of the *demiurge alone* are exclusively encosmic divinities, since the *demiurge alone* is an intellective god (*in Tim* I.312.25-27.; *in Tim* III.209.8-13.).[53]

In *in Tim*. I.310:15-20 Proclus describes another division, which is still very different from the one described above. It is a division in four from the point of view of the demiurgic causes. There, he takes into account a total (ὁλικῶς) and partial (μερικῶς) mode of analysis, projected upon universal and partial types of demiurgies. J. Opsomer rightly underlines the fact that Proclus describes this division in four not in accordance with the result of the demiurgic activity, but in accordance with its mode(s), which are expressed by the adverbs ὁλικῶς and μερικῶς.[54] This way Proclus achieves the following structure: (1) a demiurgic cause of the whole in a universal way - τῶν ὅλων ὁλικῶς, (2) a demiurgic cause of the parts in a universal way - τῶν μερῶν ὁλικῶς, (3) a demiurgic cause of the whole in a partial way - τῶν ὅλων μερικῶς; (4) a demiurgic cause of the parts in a partial way - τῶν μερῶν μερικῶς (*in Tim* 1.310.16.-17.). The demiurgic operation is therefore quadruple, although the most basic one still remains the division into two: universal (ὁλικῶς) and partial (μερικῶς).

[53] There are peculiarities in Proclus' division in these four related divinities. In two separate texts where it appears he uses the words *maker* (ποιητής) and *craftsman* (δημιουργὸς) as synonyms. This is a confusing, since Proclus states that word-usage is crucial, therefore must be precise. Unlike elsewhere his exposition lacks a necessary precision at this point. Despite a close link between the two words there is still a nuanced discrepancy in meaning between δημιουργὸς and ποιζ̓ῃ. Every craftsman is a maker, but not every maker is a craftsman. Not surprisingly, confusion arises when Proclus uses terms ποιζ̓ῃ and δημιουργὸς in order to express the same notion. Thus we are dealing another term in the analysis, which does not necessary has to be there. In fact, there could be many more divinities of this kind when we introduce a third term. However, Proclus does not recognize a separate significance of the term ποιζ̓ῃ. In his view, it is simply identical with δημιουργὸς.

[54] J. Opsomer, *Proclus on demiurgy and procession,* in *Reason and Necessity*, ed. M.R. Wright. London. Duckworth. 2000. P. 5. The main analysis in Opsomer's article focuses on this four-fold division of the demiurgic causes.

These four demiurgic types consist of two monads and two triads: in each case a monad preceding a triad. The first monad is the monad of the universal demiurge (δημιουργικὴ μονάδα, *in Tim* 1.226.12.), whose name is Zeus-1. He is also the demiurge and father, who is the author of the speech under consideration. He is the first and main demiurge. The triad that depends on him is the triad of the Kronides, who similarly to the first demiurge, are also fathers and kings (*TP* VI.35.10.; VI43.1.-45.6.). It consists out of Zeus-2, Poseidon and Pluto, followed by the multitude of the Olympic gods. The first one is in charge of the superior parts of the universe, the second one is responsible for what is found in the universe, and the third one is in charge of the underworld. The second monad is identical with the god Dionysius (*in Tim* V.3.169.). The last triad depending on him is the triad of the Titans. This is rather curious, because according to the myth, the Titans tore Dionysius apart, when they presented themselves as Bachuses at a party.[55]

It is not the right place *hic et nunc* to go into the details of the division in four of the demiurgic causes (we will still shortly return to it in the section concerning the addressed divinities).[56] What is yet significant for our limited purpose is to identify the title of the author of the speech in *Tim* 41ab. He has three following titles: the *universal demiurge* (ὅ τε τοῦ παντὸς δημιουργὸς ὁλικὸς; ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργός), *demiurge and father* (δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε), and finally, the *first demiurgic monad* (δημιουργικὴ μονάδα).

6.4.2.3. Speaker's Name(s) and Character

There are two names attributed to the author of this speech: Zeus-1 (1) and Dios (2). Let us have a look, how Proclus came to such a conclusion.

The speaker's name is neither mentioned in the passage, nor elsewhere in the dialogue. Yet, Proclus is convinced that Plato knew this name (although for some reason he did not find it suitable to use it in *Timaeus*). It is therefore to be looked for in other dialogues, such as *Cratylus*, *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*.[57] After the reading of these dialogues one will have little doubt left that the most significant name attributed to the

[55] An excellent presentation on this myth and its influence in philosophy through the ages you can find in S.Ijsseling, *Apollo, Dionysos, Aphrodite en de anderen. Griekse goden in de hedendaagse filosofie*. Amsterdam. Boom. 1994. Pp. 22-35.

[56] This has been partially done: besides the article by J. Opsomer (*op.cit*.) there is also an important contribution by F.Romano: *L'idée de causalité dans la Théologie Platonicienne de Proclus*, in *Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne*. Ed. A.Ph. Segonds, C.Steel, Leuven. University Press. 2000. Pp. 325-339.

[57] *In Tim* I, 313: 1-10; V, 190: 2-8.

demiurge and father is Zeus. However, we have to be careful in its usage, since in all these dialogues Plato speaks of Zeus in different ways, and therefore Zeus is to be found in various classes. Zeus as a demiurge is described in *Cratylus* (396a); In *Gorgias* (523a) Zeus is presented as a first god in the triad stemming from Kronos; in *Phaedrus* (246e) Zeus is described as a divinity separated from the universe

According to Proclus, the Orphic tradition on Zeus as a universal demiurge appears to confirm this Platonic treatment of first, attributing this name to various divinities, and secondly, identifying it with the universal demiurge (*in Tim* I, 313). He cites from several fragments (fr.(s) 164, 165, 166 167b, 168)[58] in support of his position. The largest section among these fragments is a quote from fr. 168 v 1-8, where Zeus is presented as the first and the last as well as the King and author of all things.[59]

Furthermore, according to the presentation provided in *Theologia Platonica*, the speaker does not have one name only, but two, namely: *Zeus* and *Dios* (*TP* V, 79-83). Plato discusses the importance of these names in *Cratylus*. Proclus continues along this line, especially in his *Commentary on Cratylus* and later in *Theologia Platonica*. Now, at the first glance, linguistically, these two names correspond to different cases of the same notion, describing the leader and head of the Olympic gods: Ζεύς is the Nominative in Greek, Διός is the Genitive. True, there are still two other forms that are left out: Δία, the Accusative, and Διί, the Dative. Yet, both these forms are just mere variations on Διός. This is why these two forms do not have to be treated separately. What is striking indeed is that the two basic forms: Ζεύς on the one hand, and the rest of the forms (Διός, Δία, Διί) on the other hand, look quite different from each other, as if referring to different origins. And indeed they do, since Plato also uses the Nominative forms Δίιος and Δίς, which seem to be at the origin of three other above-mentioned variations. Proclus likewise does not see this discrepancy purely from a standpoint of the Greek Grammar (although he does not miss it either), but perceives Zeus and Dios as two different names, both referring to the same reality. Let us consider in what sense this usage is legitimate?

First, he also comes up with an etymological explanation for their origin. He thinks that the first name – Ζεύς – originates from one of the forms connected to life, namely ζῆν, Ζῆνα (*TP* V.83.22.); whereas the

[58] Diels, H., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. Vol.1. Berlin. Weidmann. 1951.

[59] The place of oracles (Orphic as well as Chaldaic) in Proclus' thinking is analysed in L. Brisson, *La place des Oracles Chaldaiques dans la Théologie Platonicienne*, in *Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne*. Ed. A.Ph. Segonds, C.Steel, Leuven. University Press. 2000. Pp. 109-163.

other name – Δίιος– must be related to the proposition διὰ, meaning *through* or *by the means of*. If these links are not casual (as Proclus is convinced to be so), one and the same character who is the subject of these two names must be a distributor of life, and at the same time someone *through* (διὰ) who the visible world comes into existence. Clearly, the second name emphasizes his creative demiurgic nature, which is currently under the consideration.

Secondly, Proclus emphasizes the fact that the speaker has not so much two names, as rather two variations on the same name (although so different they may sound to be). It is in fact more appropriate to speak about one name, which is double: *Zeus-Dios*. Thus, in Proclus' view, the name of the *demiurge and father* is double. In *Theologia Platonica* he also speaks about the demiurge and father in terms of a *dyad* (*TP* V 82:11).

Already in the general part on the demiurge (which is often referred to by scholars as the *Treatise on the Demiurge*)[60], while presenting doxological material, Proclus praises Plotinus for understanding that the demiurge is double, namely: Kronos and Zeus at the same time. The former is always in the state of contemplation, the latter is in the state of action, the action of creation (*in Tim* 305.17.-306.2.). Although Proclus does not accept Kronos to be a name for the demiurge, he still essentially agrees with Plotinus to the fact that the demiurge is double (Πλωτῖνος ὁ φιλόσοφος διττὸν μὲν ὑποτίθεται τὸν δημιουργόν, *in Tim* 1.305.16.-17.). This is an expression of the demiurge's nature, which ought to be expressed by the means of two names. The names Zeus remain in Proclus' exposition, whereas the other one – Kronos - is replaced by the name Dios.

Why does the *demiurge and father* have to be double? The reason is that he has to remain in the state he is, namely among the intellective gods. Yet, in some way, he also has to be present in the universe he creates by his very being (*TP* V.91.20.-99.2.). Thus, not only his name is double but his character is also double.

The fact that the *demiurge and father* is present in the universe below him is demonstrable in the following way. The demiurge and father is a source for the hyper cosmic, hypercosmic-encosmic and encosmic divinities. It is not by chance that the name Zeus reappears amidst those hierarchies. One can get an impression that Proclus identifies Zeus to be the name not for one only, but for three different divinities. Thus we learn about Zeus-1, Zeus-2 and Zeus-3 (*TP* VI viii). Only the first one, namely Zeus-1 is identical with the universal demiurge (*demiurge and father*) and

[60]L.Brisson, A.Lernould, J.Opsomer: *in Tim* I. 299.-319.

the author of the speech in passage under the scrutiny. Zeus-2 is the first divinity in the triad of the hyper cosmic gods (along with Poseidon and Pluto). Zeus-3 is the first divinity in the triad of the hypercosmic-encosmic gods (*TP* VI 1.1.). These two latter divinities are separate, and yet they are also reappearances of the former ones in another function.

Proclus' universe, Part II.[61]

6. The hyper cosmic gods

6. 1. 1st triad of the hypercosmic gods (=Zeus)

6.1.1. Zeus-2

6.1.2. Poseidon

6.1.3. Pluto

6.2. 2nd triad of the hypercosmic gods (=Koré)

6.2.1. Artemis

6.2.2. Koré

6.2.3. Athena

6.3. 3d triad of the hypercosmic gods (=Apollo/Helios)

6.4. 4th triad of the hypercosmic gods (=Korybantes)

7. Hypercosmic-encosmic gods (gods separated from the universe)

7.1. 1st triad of the hypercosmic-encosmic gods (demiurgic triad)

7.1.1. Zeus-3

7.1.2. Poseidon-2

7.1.3. Hephaistos

7.2. 2nd triad of the hypercosmic-encosmic gods

7.3. 3d triad of the hypercosmic-encosmic gods

Notice how prominently the name *Zeus* appears in this part of the structure of Proclus' universe. And indeed, the first triad of the hyper cosmic gods is that of Zeus. It is a demiurgic triad of the type τῶν μερῶν ὁλικῶς (differing from the first type τῶν ὅλων ὁλικῶς, which is that of the universal demiurge, *demiurge and father*). Zeus-2 also occupies the first position in this triad. Finally, Zeus-3 occupies the first position in

[61] J.Opsomer, *Proclus on demiurgy and procession,* in *Reason and Necessity.* W.Right. London. Duckworth. 2000. Appendix. P. 131.

the triad of the hypercosmic-encosmic divinities. Generally speaking, it would be no mistake to say that the name *Zeus* is present throughout the entire structure of the hyper cosmic as well as hypercosmic-encosmic divinities. Thereby the universal demiurge exercises his powers.

6.4.3. The addressed

The addressed are the encosmic gods (*in Tim* 204.4.), according to Proclus, that is to say the gods situated within the universe. They are primarily characterized by having visible and invisible part(s) to them (*in Tim* 204.8.-10.). In fact, they are the first class in the divine hierarchy which permanently possesses a body (*in Tim* III.205.19.-21.): the hypercosmic-encosmic divinities that precede the class of the encosmic gods also possess a body, yet not in a permanent fashion.

Proclus discusses the paradox spotted by Plato in the demiurge's speech: how is it possible to be a god and to have a body as a constituting part of its being at the same time. Apparently, the paradox is commonplace in the context of the Greek culture, since the traditional Greek gods do have a body, at least at some point of their presence around.

6.4.3.1. Status/rank

The status of the encosmic gods is that they constitute the lowest rank in the divine hierarchy. They follow hypercosmic as well as hypercosmic-encomic clusters in the divine hierarchy (see the previous scheme: *part II*). We will use the following scheme to complete the structure of the divine universe as presented by Proclus.

Proclus' universe. Part III.

The Dionysian world

8. Encosmic gods.

8.1. Celestial gods.

8.2. Sublunary gods.

9. Universal soul.

10. Superior beings (angels, demons, heroes).

As we can clearly see, the encosmic gods occupy an intermediary level between the higher divinities and the structures beneath them, namely between the class of the hypercosmic-encosmic divinities (7.) on the one hand, and on the other hand the universal soul (9.) closely followed by the superior beings such as angels, demons and heroes (10.). Yet, the encosmic gods are still unique beings in their way, since they unite the divine and partially divine worlds. Certainly, the universal soul, which follows the encosmic gods in the divine hierarchy, is also divine. Yet, the universal soul is not a completely independent entity. It is a part of the universe. Contrary to this, every encosmic god is an independent being.

Another noticeable characteristic of the encosmic gods is that there are two kinds of them: celestial gods (8.1.) and sublunary (8.2.) gods. The celestial gods include stars, planets, the sun and the moon. They all possess large visible bodies. Contrary to this, the sublunary gods dwell on the surface of the earth. Their bodies are not always visible.

6.4.3.2. Title

The primary title of these gods is θεοὶ θεῶν – the initial addressing words of the demiurge. This expression is also a crucial indication as to their status and rank.

Proclus recognizes that the expression θεοὶ θεῶν is not easy to understand. It is certainly not accessible to the crowd (*in Tim* III.203.26.-27.). It is therefore not surprising that there exist various circulating opinions concerning this expression, which are simply incorrect. Proclus undertakes to refute three of them.

The first opinion (*in Tim* III.202.29-203.8.) splits this expression in two, as if there was a comma dividing it θεοὶ, θεῶν). This way, the first word θεοὶ grammatically becomes the Vocative, and turns into the entire address, whereas the second word θεῶν becomes semantically attached to the expression which follows (ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς, *Tim* 41.a.7.). Thus the whole expression (Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων *Tim* 41.a.7.) has to be read in the following fashion: "*Gods, of gods I am a craftsman and (I am) a father of works*".

According to Proclus, this interpretation is incorrect, and this is for two following reasons. First, it establishes a wrong order in hierarchy, namely, it makes a craftsman to be the origin of gods, and a father to be the origin of works. Yet, on the one hand, 'father' is more noble than 'craftsman', on the other hand 'gods' are more noble than 'works' (*in Tim* III.203.3.-4.). It is more consistent to see the father as being the origin of gods, and the craftsman as being the origin of works.

The second problem with this interpretation according to Proclus is that it uses a superfluous unnecessary repetition of the word *gods* (*in Tim* III.203.5.). And indeed, with such an interpretation the second – Genitive – form is useless. In fact, it would have been better to say: "*Gods, I am your craftsman…*". In case the two initiating words refer to one and the same notion, it is as good as to say twice the same (gods and gods; or even gods, gods!). Sometime later Proclus considers this opinion as well. He thinks that such an artificial expression is completely unsuitable to apply in speech addressed to the divine beings.

(B) The second opinion (*in Tim* III.203.9.-203.19.) is quite close to that of Proclus, since it agrees on the fact that this speech is addressed to the encosmic gods. The nuance is that here the two initial words (θεοὶ θεῶν) refer to two different types of divinities. The former (θεοὶ) refers indeed to the encosmic gods, whereas the latter (θεῶν) refers to the intelligible gods. It is as if you achieve the following meaning: '*(encosmic) gods of (the intelligible) gods*!' – This opinion tries to emphasize the fact that the intelligible gods are the image of the encosmic gods. To make it clear Proclus provides a comparison: the encosmic gods are an image of the intelligible gods in the same way as the gods in general are an image of the entire universe.

This opinion is also incorrect according to Proclus. Such a usage of the Genitive case is meaningless, because a large number of classes in the divine hierarchy are an image of the intelligible gods. Moreover, the entire universe as well as everything what is contained there is also an image of the intelligible gods. Thus, a specific reference to the intelligible gods while

talking about the encosmic gods has little sense. In case if one wishes to apply a meaningful expression of a kind, it would be better to say *Gods of god*! (*in Tim* III.203.16.) – The singular *of God* would refer to the demiurge, since he is indeed a unique creator of the encosmic divinities. Thus, there are two related problems with this interpretation: first, a wrong interpretation of the second word (θεοὶ), and secondly, the use of the Genitive Plural instead of the Genitive Singular for it.

(C) The third opinion (*in Tim* III.203.20.-203.32.) means the expression θεοὶ θεῶν to be an address to the hennades, because the hennades are the most universal of all the divinities, the encosmic ones included. This way, the first word θεοὶ implies the hennades, whereas the second one, θεῶν, refers to the encosmic gods. The meaning of the initial words would be: *Hennades of encosmic gods*! Such a treatment is an analogy to the expressions *chiefs of chiefs*! as well as *kings of kings*!

Proclus does not agree with this interpretation either. His objection is that the demiurge is addressing his speech to all the encosmic gods, and not exclusively to some of them (*in Tim* III.203.26.). If we are to attempt to continue his line of reasoning we would have to add that the hennades do not have bodies, whereas the encosmic gods do. From the contents of the speech itself it becomes clear that the fact of having a body is a major reason for addressing the speech.

(D) After the refutation of the three above-mentioned opinions Proclus offers his own position (*in Tim* III.204.1.-204.32.), which he says to be identical with that of his master Syrianus. According to Syrianus and Proclus, the speech of the demiurge is addressed to all the encosmic gods, and not just to some of them. We have to keep in mind that the encosmic gods are participating gods (μεθεκτοὶ θεοὶ - *in Tim* 204.5.) by nature. This means two things.

First, they have an invisible as well as a visible part to them. In this sense they are similar to humans, who also consist of two parts: soul and body: the former is the invisible one; the latter is the visible one. The invisible part of the encosmic gods participates in the divine hierarchy beyond them. The visible part participates in the world below. The latter part is a bodily part, which is located in the visible universe, due to which they received their name as encosmic gods (they are in the κόσμος). Both invisible and visible parts are divine, although perhaps in a different sense.

Secondly, the encosmic gods are called participating gods, since they participate in the nature of the hypercosmic gods, which are situated a level

above them in the divine hierarchy.[62] This is also the explanation of their title θεοὶ θεῶν· the former word, θεοὶ, refers to them proper, the latter, θεῶν, refers to the hyper cosmic gods. Being different from the encosmic gods as participating divinities, the hypercosmic gods are non-participating (ἀμέθεκτοι - *in Tim* 204.18.) beings. Therefore, if the speech of the demiurge were addressed to the hypercosmic gods only, it would suffice to say *Gods*! This is a simple Vocative, whereas the addition *of gods* (θεῶν) in the Genitive demonstrates the participating nature of these divinities. Later on in this chapter we will present our evaluation of this presentation of Proclus.

6.4.3.3. Name(s) and Character

The names for the encosmic gods are listed and discussed in the passage preceding the speech, delivered by the demiurge. It contains a genealogy of the traditional Greek divinities (*Tim* 40e5-41a6). Proclus dedicates almost thirty pages to the discussion of this genealogy in his Commentary on *Timaeus* (*in Tim* III, 171.21.-199.12.). This section opening book III is a very complex presentation, which reflects many details concerning the structure of the divine hierarchy, although Proclus says that this part is essentially about the sublunary divinities (*in Tim* III, 174.19.). The difficulty is partially due to the fact that *In Tim* is a detailed running commentary on Plato's text. Thus, the discussion uncovers the original meaning of the text. What is yet missing is a systematic presentation of the encosmic divinities. As we have already mentioned it *supra*, this task was undertaken in *Theologia Platonica*. Unfortunately, the part on the encosmic gods has not survived to us.[63] The entire presentation stops at the discussion concerning the hypercosmic-encosmic divinities.[64]

[62] Actually, two levels above them, since there is another level of the hypercosmic-encosmic gods in between.

[63] This is partially the case also with *TP* I.11.-II.4., called by scholars a *Big Fragment*, which was not included in H.D. Saffrey/L.G. Westerinck's *editio princeps* of the *Theologia Platonica*. Eight manuscripts contain this fragment. This is why it can be hardly compared to the case of the lost part on the encosmic gods by the end of *TP*. Cf. C.Steel, G.van Riel, *Le Grand Fragment de la Théologie Platonicienne*, in *Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne*. Ed. A.Ph. Segonds, C.Steel. Leuven. University Press. 2000. Pp. 533-553.

[64] Curiously, we can still read this part of the *Theologia Platonica* in Th.Taylor's English version. Th.Taylor made a pure reconstruction of what Proclus might have written. What is still more curious is that Th.Taylor makes no mention of the fact. He plainly presents it as if it were the original. This is yet a good example of someone who was convinced and strongly inspired by Proclus' ideas. Cf. Th.Taylor, *The Theology of Plato*. London. From: Prometheus trust. 1995.

Plato mentions nine names from the Greek pantheon: Ouranos, Gé, Oceanos, Tethys, Phorkys, Kronos, Rhea, Zeus, Hera. According to Proclus, many more divinities are implied in this passage. The number can run up seventy two (*In Tim*, III, 197.16.), and even more: the procession of the divinities can take the dimensions of an extreme fragmentation (*in Tim*, III, 191.29.). The nine divinities mentioned in this passage form a unity, which Proclus calls the Ennead in a collective fashion. Each of these divinities exercises a function, which makes an essential contribution to the completion of the divine presence in the universe. Ouranos limits the totality of the sublunary creation; Gé fills it with the force; Oceanos pushes it into movement; Tethys attaches an appropriate movement to every particular being; Kronos occupies himself with the intellective divisions; Rhea produces life; Phorkys deals with the seminal reasons; Zeus makes things pass from the invisible into the visible; Hera takes care of things in accordance with the ongoing mutations (*In Tim*, III, 192.18.-25. Another similar list of the functions attributed to this Ennead we find a page *infra* 193.25.–194.9.).

If we return to our schemes (*supra*) we will see that a good number of the gods from the divine Ennead appear first and foremost on higher levels of the divine hierarchy. E.g. Kronos and Rhea belong to the intellective triad along with Zeus and precede him. However, similarly to Zeus, some of these gods have various appearances, or perhaps it is better to say, some of the gods have the same name on different levels of the hierarchy. This is the case with Kronos, since there is an intellective Kronos, but also an angelic Kronos, a demonic Kronos, an aerial Kronos, a watery Kronos, a terrestrial Kronos etc (*in Tim*, III, 188.33.-189.2.). In this section the emphasis lies upon the encosmic divinities only. Their superior namesakes are discussed elsewhere.

Proclus calls the gods created by the *demiurge and father* as *young gods* (νεοὶ θεοὶ*, in Tim* I.453.8). It is curious to call gods young. There are several possible explanations for this particularity. The most evident one is clearly that they are naturally younger than the demiurge, their father. Possibly, they are called young because they operate in the world of becoming, which is always in the state of the renewal. This is why the gods, which are inherent to it, are also in the state of eternal renewal. Thus they always remain young, although they have never turned old, according to Proclus.

6.4.4. The speech

Proclus attaches an enormous significance to the speech delivered by the *demiurge and father*. Not only does he dedicate to it a large section, but he also adds a short transitory note from the section on the genealogy to the section dedicated to the speech. In this transitory note (*in Tim* III.197.28.-199.12.) he discusses a number of incorrect perceptions concerning the purpose of this speech.

Before we plunge into what this speech is about, Proclus suggests that we think about what it does not mean at all. This speech is not an annunciation coming from within into the outside world (a); nor is it a physical notion (b); nor is it a psychic expression (c); nor is it an intellective notion (d). (a) is foreign to the immaterial entity, (b) is appropriate to the encosmic gods, but not to the demiurge who is delivering this speech; (c) is appropriate to the soul; (d) to the universal intellect (*in Tim* 197.28.-198.3.). Yet, it is again the universal demiurge who is the author of this speech.

6.4.4.1. Purpose and Character

Instead, Proclus is convinced that this address is a demiurgic speech, which renders all the encosmic gods to turn into demiurges, who become capable of imitating the powers of the universal demiurge (*in Tim* III.198.5.). This imitating activity is necessary, since the universe cannot be complete without the mortal beings (to be discussed in the commentary on the second part of the speech: *Tim* 41cd). However, the demiurge cannot proceed to the creation of the mortal beings directly, because everything that he makes necessarily becomes immortal. What is needed is a demiurgic level separating him from the mortals, which are still to be created. This is a task for the encosmic gods, who are now to become demiurges of a second rank (*in Tim* III.200.23.).

Moreover, the demiurge distributes the divine activity (ἐνέργεια ἐκθεωτικὴ, *in Tim* III.205.6.) starting from the hyper cosmic gods down to the encosmic gods. He does this not by an actual speech with flesh and sound, but by means of a pure thought. Therefore, his creating act is a pure intellectual act.

This speech is in fact a message passed down from the world above to the world down in accordance with the scale of the divine hierarchy (*in Tim* III.198.3.-7.). This message is essentially that of creativity. Yet, there are various sorts of creativity. It is so, it is crucial to distinguish a demiurgic

activity from the creativity applied in the art (τέχνη), the results of which are masterpieces of art (τεχνητὰ, *in Tim* III.198.12.). An artist is capable of producing masterpieces but he is not capable of making anyone doing the same, that is what the demiurge does in this speech: he delegates his demiurgic powers to his assistants (who he also creates for that purpose).

6.4.4.2. Contents of the Speech

At this point we will turn to the actual contents of the demiurge's speech. Proclus enters a scrupulous passage by passage analysis of the speech. He splits it into the following sections: (*Tim* 41 a8 – b2: *In Tim* 210.1.-214.36.); (*Tim* 41 b 2-6: *In Tim* 215.1.-220.9.); (*Tim* 41 b6: *In Tim* 220.11.-221.6.). Each of these sections consists of a *lemma* – a quote from Plato's *Timaeus*,[65] followed by a *theoria* - a discussion, which includes: presentation of the issues; refutation of the incorrect opinions; *lexis* – the analysis of some expressions; final statement.

We are not going into the discussion of his presentation in detail, as Proclus is not the main focus of my research. We will discuss the main points only. Basically, Proclus discusses its two major elements: bond (a) and mortality (b) of the encosmic gods. This is also the way we will proceed with our presentation.

6.4.4.2.1. Bond and Dissolution

One of the most crucial points of the demiurge's speech is the issue of bond and dissolubility. In *Tim* 41b3 Plato's demiurge tells the addressed beings 'you are not *totally* dissoluble'. From this it becomes clear that they are dissoluble, but not completely. What is this supposed to mean? Are they dissoluble, or not? These two expressions ('dissoluble' and 'not dissoluble') seem to contradict each other.

Proclus goes even further. He claims that the encosmic gods (the addressed of the speech in his opinion) are dissoluble and indissoluble at the same time. At the first glance these two statements contradict each other completely. Nevertheless, Proclus refuses to see any contradiction in this claim.

[65] This is approximately how the recent English translation of Proclus' Commentary on Plato is organized. Cf. Proclus, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus.* Vol. 1. Edited and translated by Tarrant, H. Cambridge. 2007; Proclus, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus.* Vol. 2. Edited and translated by D.T. Runia, M.Share. Cambridge. 2008; Proclus, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus.* Vol. 3. Edited and translated by D.Baltzly. Cambridge. 2007. It is unfortunate though that the part on the demiurge's speech is not yet published within the frames of this project.

To understand it, one should turn to the following points. The first one is that the dissolution and indissolubility fully depend on a bond. Every bond has a particular way of binding. To this way of binding there is also connected a particular way of unbinding or loosening. A bond and unbinding are thus connected by an idea. For instance, if something is *totally* bound, it can be also *totally* unbound. If something is bound *by oneself*, it can be also unbound *by oneself*. If something is bound *by someone else*, it can be also unbound *by this someone*. If something is bound *in time*, it can be also unbound *in time*. If something is bound *in eternity*, it can be also unbound *in eternity* (*in Tim* III.210.5.-9.) etc. In short, the same idea must be present in the type of binding, as in the type of unbinding.

However, one and the same being can employ two different ideas: for instance, one can be bound *by oneself* and *in time*; or *by someone else* and *in eternity*. This way such a being would bound in two ways, as well as dissoluble in two ways. The two modes of bond as well as two modes of dissolubility do not have to do with each other directly. Therefore, one should not be surprised, according to Proclus, if something or someone may be dissoluble and indissoluble at the same time (*in Tim* III.210.25.-27.). Yet, these two notions may apply to two different ideas, each in its own fashion.

Now, out of all the examples of the modes of binding, Proclus chooses two, which according to him, are the most fundamental ones, namely, *by oneself* (1), and *by someone else* (2) (*in Tim* III.210.31.). To these two modes of binding there are naturally two corresponding modes of dissolution: *by oneself* (1), and *by someone else* (2) (*in Tim* III.211.3.). Further on, these two modes of binding and dissolution cause four following possible classes:

something, which is completely indissoluble by oneself and by someone else;

something, which is indissoluble by oneself and by someone else in a certain sense;

something, which is dissoluble by oneself and by someone else in a certain sense;

something, which is completely dissoluble by oneself and by someone else (in Tim III.211.12.-14..;

Proclus claims that the first class belongs to the intelligible divinities (since the ideas are completely indissoluble by themselves and by someone else). The fourth class belongs to the mortals (since the mortals are dissoluble in every sense), whereas the two intermediate classes (2 and 3) belong to the encosmic gods. The encosmic gods are dissoluble and indissoluble at the same time in a certain sense (*in Tim* III.211.15-22.). This is the claim.

This kind of reasoning was already circulating in the School before Proclus. However, some philosophers drew incorrect conclusions concerning this passage. Surprisingly, the majority of them tended to fall into the same trap. Severus, Atticus and Plutarch thought that the encosmic gods, addressed by the demiurge are dissoluble by nature. Yet, due to the will of the demiurge and father these divinities became indissoluble (*in Tim* III.212.8-9.). This idea looks quite natural. As we will see, it appeared on a regular basis in the writings of the Christian authors as well, Augustine included.

However, the Peripatetics saw serious flaws in this reasoning. They raised two objections against it. Their argument went as following: on the one hand, if the encosmic gods are dissoluble by nature, who then gave them that nature, if not the demiurge? If so, then the demiurge must be held responsible for the dissolubility of the encosmic gods. On the other hand, if being dissoluble is contrary to the nature of the encosmic gods, then their true nature must be to remain in the state of indissolubility. If so, why then does the demiurge decide to provide them with the indissolubility by means of his will, if actually they already have it? (*in Tim* III.212.10-17.).

Proclus essentially agrees with the core critique launched by the Aristotelians. Yet, he goes even further: he offers a still more nuanced objection which is essentially based on the two paradoxes, provided above. According to him, there is a hidden contradiction between the will and the power of the demiurge in the position of the three above-mentioned Neo-Platonists. This position appears to be quite irreverent (*in Tim* III.213.2.) towards the demiurge, since even a virtuous man does not suffer from the contradiction between his will and his potency. On the contrary, he tends to do what he wills, since there is no virtue without exercising it. Yet, these three Neo-platonists seem to claim that such a contradiction is immanent to the demiurge and father. And indeed, why does the demiurge first give the dissoluble nature to the encosmic gods, which he then alters with his will? Is not he contradicting himself? Or, still worse, he gave them an indissoluble nature, how does it happen that it became corrupted so that he again had to repair it by means of his will? Therefore, this position must be wrong, since it limits the demiurge and father in his powers.

Proclus returns to his own position claiming that it is the only correct one: the encosmic gods are in some sense indissoluble, in other sense they are dissoluble (*in Tim* III.213.16.). They are indissoluble, but not in the sense the Intelligibles are indissoluble. The Intelligible ideas are indissoluble because they are completely simple. Their simplicity refers back (ἐπιστροφὴ) to the unity, the cause of which is the One. The One cannot be possibly dissolved, because there are no elements in it into which it is to be split. Contrary to this, the encosmic gods are not entirely simple. They consist of elements, of which the soul and body are the most obvious ones. Therefore, potentially, they can be split into the body and soul. This is the reason why they are dissoluble by nature. Yet, in reality this split will never take place. The demiurge has created the encosmic gods in such a way from the beginning. Further on, he has also assured them of their actual indissolubility with his divine will.

The fact that the encosmic gods are dissoluble and indissoluble at the same time is demonstrable on the basis of the textual analysis of the passage. We have already seen the importance of the word πάμπαν (*not completely*) in the whole exposition by Proclus on the present issue (if the encosmic gods are not completely dissoluble, then they must be indissoluble in one way or another). There are still two other expressions: καλῶς ἠρμόσθαι and ἔχον εὖ that emphasize the idea of the dissolubility/indissolubility, but this time from the point of view of the diverse causality. The two above-mentioned expressions refer back to three causes: *final* cause (1), *exemplary* cause (2), *demiurgic* cause (3) (*in Tim* III.214.5.-7.). Now we will go into this more in detail.

The presence of the final cause (1) can be traced through the expression ἔχον εὖ, because it refers to the idea of Goodness (εὖ), which crucially coincides with the One. The One/Good(ness) provides everything with the unity from the very top down to the bottom of the divine hierarchy. Since it is at the top of the divine hierarchy, it implies the ultimate, final cause, which is nothing else but the One. The word καλῶς (*beautifully*) indicates the exemplary or paradigmatic causality (2), since it is nothing else than the idea of beauty, which causes everything to be beautiful. The idea of the beauty is one of the crucial ideas belonging to the world of ideas and constituting it. This world of ideas is the intelligible paradigm. Therefore, by the word καλῶς we can identify the presence of the paradigmatic causality. Finally, the word ἠρμόσθαι refers to the demiurgic act, since the demiurge is the one who harmonizes the universe and everything what is in it. Thereby, we can trace the *demiurgic* causality (3).

These three causalities cause the encosmic gods to remain in the state of indissolubility. This is despite of the fact that they are primarily dissoluble due to their composition. Proclus uses the third (3), demiurgic cause as an example for such a proof. And indeed, if the encosmic gods are dissoluble, who can cause their dissolution? There are only two candidates for this: the demiurge or someone else. If it is someone else than the demiurge, who can inflict a damage to the work of the demiurge? No-one can do this, even if he wishes so. In any case, if it were the demiurge himself, why would he (being good) want to dissolve something which is beautifully harmonized (καλῶς ἡρμόσθαι) (*in Tim* III.214.15.-19.)? – This is the case with the universe. This is also the case with the encosmic gods). It is not possible either. The demiurge will not dissolve his own creation.

This way Proclus accentuates his point that the encosmic gods are both naturally (κατὰ φύσιν - *in Tim* 2.214.25.) dissoluble and naturally indissoluble at the same time, and this has to be true on the basis of the scrupulous reasoning and the analysis of the text.

6.4.4.2.2. Death and Immortality

Proclus applies a similar line of reasoning to the notion of 'mortality', since both concepts of 'bond' and 'immortality' are closely linked to each other. This is directly rooted in the speech. Plato's demiurge tells the young gods 'you are neither completely immortal nor indissoluble' (*Tim* 41b3). As we see it, the same intriguing οὐ πάμπαν (*not completely*) applies both to indissolubility and to immortality. Thus, the encosmic gods are immortal, but not completely immortal. Similarly to the case of bond and dissolubility, they are mortal and immortal at the same time in a certain sense. On the one hand, they are not immortal in the sense of the Intelligibles, on the other hand, they are not mortal in the sense of mortal beings (*in Tim* III.215.11.-12).

The dissolubility in relation to indissolubility, as well as mortality in relation to immortality are two opposing extremes (ὕπακρα*, in Tim* III.218.19.). As it is in the case of all extremes, these extremes too are completely remote from each other. The role of the encosmic gods as intermediate beings partially consists in reconciling these extremes and going beyond them. At the same time, the encosmic gods participate in the extremes they transgress. This happens due to their nature, which is at once intermediary and participatory (they are μεθεκτοὶ θεοὶ). In a way, the status of the encosmic divinities is an example of Proclus' system, wherein every two consecutive levels of the hierarchy must be connected by an

intermediary level. The encosmic gods reconcile the divine and created word, the world of the immortals and the world of the mortals.

The discussion concerning the issue of immortality requires an understanding of its source, its content and the meaning of death and mortality.

As far as a general source of immortality is concerned, Proclus discusses three following possibilities. First, someone as being a source of his own immortality: he being a self-subsisting (αὐθυπόστατος) source. This is the immortality in a proper sense. Secondly, someone receives immortality from someone else. This way one does not have immortality on one's own, but has received it from another source. Third, someone who neither has immortality on one's own, nor has received it from someone else: no source at all (*in Tim* III.216.4.-7.). This is the case of mortality.

The first *true*, immortality is the immortality of the intelligible divinities. The third case is the case of the mortal beings. The second one concerns the encosmic gods, who indeed, do not have immortality on their own, but they have received it from the demiurge and father directly, and from the intelligible gods indirectly. This does not mean that the encosmic gods have become mortal. They have received their immortality for a permanent use. Nevertheless, their immortality is not comparable to the immortality of the intelligibles, who have a true primordiary immortality belonging to them. Since the encosmic gods received their immortality from the demiurge, it is he, the demiurge and father, who is a direct source of their immortality (the paradigm would be an indirect source). As he has endowed them with immortality, he may also take it back. In reality it does not happen, but the principle remains. Therefore, the encosmic gods are neither mortal nor immortal. Or, it is still better to say, that they are mortal and immortal at the same time.

Besides the issue of the immortality's source, it is also important to grasp what is the content of immortality, or what exactly does an immortal being have, or receive, or what does a mortal being miss to become immortal. Proclus says that the content of the immortality consists in the infinite life (ζωὴν ἄπειρον*, in Tim* III.216.9.). The intelligible have the infinite life of their own; the encosmic gods have received an indefinite life from the intelligible passed by the demiurge and father; the mortals do not have it at all.

Despite the fact that the notion of immortality is a positive one, linguistically it is a negation. Immortality is ἀ–θάνατος (*im*-mortality), a denial of mortality, the denial of death. We can identify this denial in the words of the demiurge and father who tells his audience 'you will not taste

of the destiny of death'. These words raise a question: what is death? – Proclus claims that the concept of death is ambiguous. It has various meanings depending on the object towards which it is applied. True, since the concept of immortality has an indefinite life as content, the death must have to do with a privation of the indefinite life. We have to keep in mind that only living beings obtain life to be deprived of it. Proclus mentions four following classes: demons, human souls, living beings (in general) and bodies endowed with souls (*in Tim* III.219.8.-9.). For each of these classes death means something else. For the demons, death is a throwing down of the tunic; for the human souls it is their attraction to the world of becoming, and finally their falling down into it; for the living beings in general death means the soul's separation between from the body; for the bodies endowed with souls death means the soul's departure (*in Tim* III.219.10.-14.).

Curiously, Proclus does not apply the notion of death to the encosmic gods at all, and does not even discuss such a possibility. This is not fully surprising: the encosmic gods occupy the lowest rank in the divine hierarchy. Yet they are gods, and we know that gods are immortal in the Greek context by definition. Nevertheless, this is not completely true, as much as Proclus' system is at stake. The encosmic gods are mortal/immortal. We can still try to figure it out in what sense death would be applicable to the encosmic gods in his system.

There are four different meanings of death depending on the subject (cf. *supra*), to which it applied. None of these is applicable to the encosmic gods, since they are still a different sort of beings. Death should mean still something different to them, even if not as a reality, then perhaps as a possibility. This should have to do with some of their essential characteristics.

The expression 'encosmic gods' (ἐγκόσμιοι) provides us with a hint (*in Tim* II.143.32.). They are the gods that are located in the universe (κόσμος), the essential meaning of which is the status of change (something which never is but always in the state of becoming). They, too, since they are bound to the world of becoming, must be in the state of becoming (this is one of the reasons why Proclus names them as 'young gods': the gods who are in the state of a permanent renewal). Proclus emphasizes this fact in his interpretation of certain expressions from the speech of the demiurge. He reads "you are neither immortal nor indissoluble' to mean 'you *became* immortal (γίγνεσθε ἀθάνατοι - *in Tim* III.218.28.) and indissoluble'. The word γίγνομαι (*become)* refers both to the granting act by the demiurge and to the fact that they, as encosmic gods, received their immortality in their state of becoming. Thus, mortality for them must mean

remaining in the state of becoming without receiving an indefinite life from above. This yet remains not more than a pure possibility. The encosmic gods received an indefinite life from the demiurge and father both by the fact of his creation and by means of his divine will (thus, curiously, they are immortal by nature). They became immortal, although their immortality is a received or acquired immortality (*in Tim* III.220.1.): the immortality in the second sense. Therefore, their status is unique in Proclus' system: they are mortal immortals.

6.4.5. Conclusion on Proclus

To conclude this section on Proclus, I will provide a brief recapitulation of the presentation *supra* (A), and accomplish it with a few general points of critique of his doctrine as applied to this specific passage (B) and its major elements.

6.4.5.1. Recapitulation

As we have seen it, Proclus' presentation of *Tim* 41ab is the most impressive analysis of the passage in Antiquity. The Diadoch is attentive towards every single detail, both content-wise and linguistically. He finds an explanation for it within his system, as this system is clearly behind the entire treatment. It is again his system which appears to be the key to understand the passage in question. The passage itself serves as an entry towards his system and also as an example of how the system must be explained. Naturally, all the major elements appear and reappear again in the exegesis of the passage. His explanations make sense only as long as they encompass the system.

And indeed, if we try to recapitulate the main statements of Proclus, they would sound to be somewhat esoteric not only for a none-philosopher, but even for a connoisseur of Plato. The latter would still need a guidance to find his way around. The summary would never be complete if we omit the following: the demiurge occupies the rank of the third intellectual divinity among the intellective gods. His titles are: the universal demiurge (ὅ δημιουργὸς ὁλικὸς), demiurge and father (δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε) and the first demiurgic monad (δημιουργικὴ μονάδα). He has two names: Zeus-1 as well as Dios. The speaker's character is double (διττὸν), which is reflected by these names. He is responsible for the first type of the demiurgic causality, which is the causality of the universal things in a universal way (τῶν ὅλων ὁλικῶς). Finally, he is the author and a source of the first demiurgy, which is divine and universal. Thereby he distributes the divinity down the hierarchic scale to the gods he is addressing.

His addressees are encosmic gods (ἐγκόσμιοι θεοί), according to Proclus. This means that they are gods, endowed not only with intellect and soul but also with body. Their status is the lowest one in the divine hierarchy. They are on the edge of this divine hierarchy, as well as on the edge of the created universe. They are intermediary beings between the mortals and immortals. They are distinguishable from these both classes as well as participating in them both. Thus they are participating gods (μεθεκτοὶ θεοὶ). The demiurge and father has created them to be so, and endowed them with the demiurgic powers, so that they may proceed with a further creation. Thus, they are in charge of the second demiurgy, which is the source of existence for the mortal beings. They are called young gods (νεοὶ θεοὶ) due to the fact that they remain in the world of becoming, and thereby in a state of a permanent renewal.

The content of the speech consists of two main points: the first concerns a bond, the second concerns immortality. By the means of his speech the demiurge pronounces the encosmic gods to become dissoluble-indissoluble, or what is the same in the end: that they are neither dissoluble, nor indissoluble but both (οὔτε ἄλυτοι οὔτε λυτοί, ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς ἀμφοῖν). They are so by nature (κατὰ φύσιν) and not exclusively by the demiurge's will, as some other Neo-Platonists claim. He has created these gods to be so, and then re-acknowledged this in his speech. The explanation is also similar concerning death and immortality: the demiurge created the encosmic gods to become mortal-immortals by nature (κατὰ φύσιν). This is the same as to say that they are neither mortal, nor immortal (οὔτε οὖν ἀθάνατοι οὔτε θνητοὶ).

6.4.5.2. Brief Critique on Proclus Tim 41ab

Despite of a number of strong points, Proclus' presentation suffers from numerous deficiencies and a certain incompleteness at several points. I will mention just a few of these.

First and foremost this concerns the status of certain classes in the divine hierarchy. Such a status is often obscure in several points. E.g. the position of the hypercosmic-encosmic gods is little explained. This is a bit unfortunate, because, taking into account the system; these divinities must have been also created by the demiurge and father. Therefore, an explanation of the status of these divinities could provide us with a better understanding of the powers of the demiurge. The positioning of the hypercosmic-encosmic divinities towards the quadruple division into the demiurgic causes is equally unclear.

Moreover, this division in four of the demiurgic causes stops short of the expansion into a multitude. The above-mentioned division consists of

two monads and two triads. Yet, a triad can hardly be considered as identical with a multitude. For instance, the demiurgic monad is the cause of the triad of the Kronides, and at the same time it serves as a cause for the Dodecaid of the Olympic gods. Does it mean that the Kronides are identical with the Olympic gods, or not?

There are also similar difficulties in grasping the relations between the second monad and the triad which depends on it. The monad of Dionysios is evidently a cause of this triad, and at the same time it is also a cause of the multitude of the Titans. Now, does it mean that the second triad is identical with the Titans, or not? There are also passages in Proclus, from which one can draw a conclusion that it is not really Dionysius but Helios, who is the head of the encosmic gods. Does it mean that the encosmic gods alter their leaders, or that Dionysius coincides with Helios in some sense?

There are still several other ambiguities left concerning the *Tim* 41ab in Proclus' exposition. He analyzes some of the expressions from this passage into the smallest detail (e.g. *demiurge and father*, *gods of gods* etc.), yet he leaves some other expressions poorly explained (e.g. the notion of *evil*, *destiny* etc.). Sometimes Proclus is very close to the *Timaeus* text in his analysis, at other places he makes projections upon it from elsewhere in his attempt to reach a coherent system (e.g. in the case of the expressions such as *encosmic gods*, *Zeus* in the role of a demiurge etc.). He also makes unnecessary multiplications of the divinities and even multiplications of the same names (e.g. Zeus-1, Zeus-2, Zeus-3, Kronos-1, Kronos-2 etc.). The diverse titles of the demiurge apply to completely different power domains (the universal demiurge/ the created world as a whole; demiurge and father/ first demiurgy; monad/ division in four of the demiurgic causes), and seem little to have to do with each other.

Further on, some of the major points in the content of the demiurge's speech are not very convincing to me. For instance, the notion of *immortality* appears to be only superficially connected to the notion of *death*. This is a bit curious indeed, since *immortality* is just a negation of mortality, whereas the core of the notion of mortality comes down to the concept of death. Proclus uses some expressions in the course of his exegesis in an allegorical sense (e.g. the *throwing down the tunic* as applied to the death of demons), and often leaves it to the reader to figure it out what is it all about.

What is worrying is that Proclus takes this speech far more serious than Plato really meant it. This becomes already clear in the treatment of a genealogy of the traditional Greek gods, which precedes the passage in question in *Timaeus*. Proclus seems not to notice Plato's irony at all. Instead,

he keeps pressing the point. Every word seems to fit his system, accept the irony. On the whole, this all points at the direction of a significant degree of speculation on the part of the Diadoch.

6.4.6.Comparative conclusion: Proclus and Augustine on Tim 41ab

There is not a single author in the history of ancient philosophy, whose writings on *Tim* 41ab have survived in a more complete form than those of Proclus. His commentary on *Timaeus* as well as his systematic reproduction of Plato entitled the *Platonic Theology* constitutes an inexhaustible source of precious information not only about the views of Plato and Proclus, but also of other Platonists who preceded Proclus. It is therefore evident that the study of any ancient source on the subject should be compared with the analysis of Proclus' writings. Naturally, this also applies to Augustine.

The analysis of *Tim* 41ab by Proclus is a manifest indicator of how inadequate is the statement of Augustine that the Neo-platonists were not familiar with the passage. Proclus' knowledge of Plato as a whole as well as *Timaeus* with all its details and particularly *Tim* 41ab, is absolutely incomparable with Augustine's knowledge of the text in terms of the quality of analysis on any issue related to Plato, his school, and the Platonic tradition. All numerous writings of Proclus are commentaries on Plato. Augustine's multivolume literary works do not contain a single commentary on Plato. Proclus wrote his detailed commentaries on most of Plato's works, while Augustine does not even show familiarity with the titles of a number of Plato's dialogues. Proclus systematically uses a system of cross-references between the dialogues of Plato which he cites, while Augustine does not indicate a direct connection of even the two closest dialogues of Plato. In his writings, Proclus repeatedly and exactly quotes almost all texts of Plato, while Augustine quotes rarely, only a small amount of texts, and even then in a severely modified form due to a rather free translation of Cicero. Proclus often provides an etymological analysis of those words from the text, which present a difficulty. In most cases Augustine does not even know which words are in the text, but had he known the words, it is unlikely that he would have been able to understand their meaning. Proclus has a perfect knowledge of the context of the text which he analyzes including its preceding and subsequent passages. Augustine does not show such knowledge. In his analysis Proclus is extremely careful to every word and every grammatical construction of the text, treating them with extraordinary awe and trust. Augustine shows this attitude only in respect to the Biblical texts. In most cases Augustine quotes

our passage in large excerpts without trying to look closely into its constituent parts. Overall, his analysis lacks sophistication.

Proclus (412–485) lived several generations later than Augustine (354–430) and Augustine could not know Proclus' works. However, since the larger part of Proclus' writings have survived, and Proclus followed the tradition of Plato's interpretation, it is likely that some positions attested in Proclus also existed among other major Neo-platonists, such as Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Syrianus, and even among the lesser known Neo-platonists, such as Theodore, Amelius, and Neo-Platonist Plutarch, with whom Proclus is in continuous discussion.

Without going into details of Proclus' system which Augustine did not know and could not know due to the chronological gap, we need to make a brief comparison to highlight the differences in Augustine's understanding of the positions which we have seen in the previous discussion to get a basic idea of the disparate quality of Proclus' and Augustine's analysis of *Tim* 41ab. The difference in the quality of analysis is related to such basic points as status, title, and name of the giver of speech; status, title, and names of the listeners, and, finally, to the main points of the contents of the speech.

The title of the author of the speech as *demiurge and father* has a key importance for Proclus in determining the identity of the speech giver. By changing any of the two words or their order we can get different results with a completely different identity. The status of the *father* for Proclus is immeasurably higher than the status of the *demiurge*. In this framework, the position of the giver of speech according to Proclus can be limited to four options: *father* (1), *father and demiurge* (2), *demiurge and father* (3), and *demiurge* (4). All four are different deities, each one with a different hierarchical status, title, and authority in the divine hierarchy. *Demiurge and father* is the third of them. By rearranging the word order, we may receive *father and demiurge*, which corresponds to the much higher status of the deity in the paradigm under discussion. By removing one of the words from the title we either significantly raise the status or significantly reduce it. Augustine did not have the slightest idea of such a context. His translator - Cicero - arbitrarily rearranged the words in the title of the speech giver, which resulted in a completely different subject in the hierarchy of Proclus. Augustine simplified the title even more, sometimes calling the giver of the speech the Supreme God and thus greatly exaggerating his status, and sometimes calling the giver of the speech the creator of the world, thus assigning him an adequate status in the system of Proclus yet with an inappropriate title. Augustine does that unconsciously; it never occurs to him to compare the titles of the *father and creator*, even

more so to consider that their use in relation to God may imply a certain hierarchical order.

According to Proclus, the giver of speech is the third intellectual deity in the triad, following the *One*, the *hennades*, the *triad of intelligible deities*, and the *triad of intellectual-intelligible deities*. For Augustine, all of this together and each one separately would seem to be a strange and hairsplitting sophistry. He does not show the slightest familiarity with the idea of divine hierarchy, so important for the conceptual system of some Neo-platonists. For him, the author of speech is the Supreme and the only God, the Creator of the world. Clearly the status of the subject of speech in *Tim* 41ab in Proclus and Augustine is absolutely incomparable: for Proclus he is a secondary deity, while for Augustine he is the highest and the only God.

A similar problem is with the name of the speech giver. Similarly to Plotinus, Proclus thinks that it is a double name, indicating the dual nature of the speech giver who exists both in the contemplative world and in the creatively active world. The name of the first one is *Zeus*; the name of the second one is *Dios.* The first name is etymologically related to life, while the second name is related to the creative intermediary activity. Augustine does not say a word about the name of the speech giver. In the view of Augustine's identification of the speech giver with the one God, we may assume that he would have agreed with the names of Yahweh, Sabaoth or Elohim, but since he does not mention it, it remains a pure speculation. Augustine does not say anything about the double name of the speech giver, and apparently does not have the slightest idea about it. We might speak about the intermediate character of the speech giver, if Augustine has ever called him Christ, who in Augustine's own interpretation but following a number of Christian writers, is the mediator between God and man being both at the same time (*God-and-man*). Such a parallel would have been interesting in the view of the role of Christ in the creation of the world according to Augustine. Unfortunately, Augustine does not speak about it in the context of his discussion of *Tim* 41ab. Augustine is unable to discuss the etymology of the words from the text, despite the fact that he likes to do it whenever possible. In this case he does not operate with any name because obviously the Greek text is not in front of his eyes, and Augustine is not reflecting on the ambiguity of the text.

The addressees of the speech according to Proclus are the so-called *young gods*. They have the status of *demiurges*, but not *demiurges and fathers*, or *fathers and demiurges*, located in the realm of the cosmic deities. Their names are mentioned by Plato in the genealogy of the traditional Greek gods in the passage, preceding *Tim* 41ab. According to Proclus, the

majority of these names have already appeared in the top echelons of the divine hierarchy. Their names are unoriginal and secondary; they imitate the higher deities. Thus, there appears the second Zeus, the second Neptune, and the second Pluto. These names have already appeared before. It is to them that author of speech – the demiurge and father – delegates the creation of mortal and corruptible beings. According to Augustine, the addressees are the lesser gods. Their very title is depreciatory, compared to the Supreme God; there is a feeling that they are not real gods in spite of such a name. Augustine does not give personal names to these gods. In his *Sermons* (241–242) Augustine identifies them with the heavenly bodies, and in *The City* he considers them to be an allegory of the people in the future resurrection. Clearly, there is quite a marginal relationship between the ideas of Proclus and Augustine.

As far as the content of speech is concerned, it was the content that inspired Augustine to find the theory of the resurrection in the passage.

However, even in this respect there are differences in details between the ideas of Proclus and Augustine. Regarding the key issue on corruptibility and incorruptibility of the gods who are addressed in the speech, the position of Augustine is similar to the position of some of the Neo-platonists, such as Atticus and Severus, who believe that these gods are corruptible and mortal by nature but become incorruptible and immortal by the decision of the demiurge. As we have seen (see above), Proclus finds convincing the critique of this position by the Peripatetics who claimed that if the demiurge created this kind of nature, he himself was the reason for the corruptibility of the gods. Thus Proclus was familiar with Augustine's position and its refutation, whereas Augustine was not familiar with the criticism of the position he proposed, or with the future position of Proclus. The assertion that these gods are corruptible in one sense, but are incorruptible in another sense, that is, that they are corruptible because they have bodies, and they are incorruptible because they have the demiurge as their source was not familiar to Augustine.

In this text Proclus finds direct links to three different types of causes, expressed with adverbs: final, intermediate, and demiurgic. Augustine would have never thought of such a concept since these expressions were not adequately translated into Latin by Cicero. Yet, even if there were these expressions in front of Augustine's eyes, it is doubtful that he would have thought about such a distinction between the causes, because the first two types imply the existence of the divine hierarchy, about which Augustine has no idea.

The power of the demiurge is also to a large degree the expression of the limitation of his power. According to Proclus, everything that has the demiurge as its source is incorruptible and immortal. It is for this reason that the demiurge has the need for creating such beings who themselves could create corruptible and mortal beings. A certain magic power of the demiurge, which endows everything it touches with his incorruptibility and immortality, is at the same time the source of his limitations, since by his nature the demiurge is unable to create corruptible and mortal beings. Therefore, he should delegate creative powers down the hierarchical system to gods-demiurges. Thus, the power of the demiurge and father, paradoxically, is the evidence of his lack of omnipotence. Since he cannot create the corruptible and mortal, he is not omnipotent. We are talking about certain principles that govern any member of the hierarchy, including the demiurge. For Augustine, the submission of the Supreme God the Creator and the author of the speech to any principles is out of question.

The greatest difference concerning the content of the speech is that Augustine finds the confirmation of the omnipotence of the Creator in the text. This concept is absolutely mandatory for Augustine since with its help he attempts to protect the theory of the resurrection. For Proclus such an idea would have been absolutely unimaginable. Since the *demiurge and father* is not the supreme deity, he carries out the assignments which he had received from above. He does not have and cannot have the authority over the deities which are higher than him in the hierarchy. He has only the position of superiority over the subordinate beings in the hierarchy but not omnipotence. Even in relation to them, he behaves as it was passed to him from above. Therefore, according to Proclus, any omnipotence of the author of the speech in *Tim* 41ab is out of question.

Moreover, the assumption that the theory of the resurrection of the body is present in this passage implies not only the possible immortality of the addressees of the speech, but also the assumption of their real death, followed by their return to life and their eternal immortal and incorruptible subsequent existence. In contrast, Proclus does not allow for their real death although he speaks on mortality (and immortality) of the addressees of the speech. It is not surprising, since for Proclus they are cosmic deities, real deities, in spite of their lowest position in the divine hierarchy. According to Augustine, the use of the word “gods” in this text is not really appropriate and rather has an allegorical meaning. Being the image of the people in the future resurrection, these beings are mortal, and this is the basis for their real resurrection and immortality as consequences of not only their mortality but also of their real death.

6.5.John Philoponus (ca. 490-570):

6.5.1. Tim 41b1-2 as a critique of the Eternity of the World

Apparently, Proclus wrote a separate book on the eternity of the universe. It contained eighteen arguments in favor of the world's eternity.[66] Some scholars are convinced that Proclus turned to this issue in order to undermine a Christian idea of the creation of the universe.[67] However, none of Proclus' arguments cited by Philoponus contains any reference to Christianity, its texts or specifically Christian doctrines. Proclus' line of argument is purely Platonic: it stems from the tradition and remains exclusively within its framework. Therefore, we will also attempt to treat it within the context of this tradition.

Although this treatise by Proclus is not extent, we can still perfectly follow its argument, since John Philoponus two generations posterior to Proclus wrote its detailed refutation.[68] Providentially, it has been composed in 529, the year of dramatic historical changes marking the transition from the Hellenic to the Byzantine era: the closure of the Athenian Academy by the Emperor Justinian, as well as the foundation of the Monte Casino monastery by St. Benedict.[69]

Curiously, *de aeternitate mundi contra Proclum*[70] appears to be the work where the Tim 41ab has been partly cited and discussed.[71] Philoponus

[66] Full-range quotations from are to be found in *de aeternitate mundi contra Proclum*. Editio princeps: Ioannes Philoponus, *De aeternitate mundi*. Edidit H.Rabe. Lipsiae. 1849. English translation by M.Share in Philoponus, *Against Proclus On the eternity of the World* 6-8. London. Duckworth. 2005. There are two other volumes with the same title and publishing house: J.Wilberding 12-18. 2005; M.Share 1-5. 2004. An abbreviated German translation: in *Johannes Philoponos, Grammatikos von Alexandrien*. Transl. W.Boehm. Muenchen. 1967. Pp. 315-319.

[67] R.Sorabji, *John Philoponus*, in *Philoponus and the rejection of Aristotelian Science*. Ed. R.Sorabji. Cornell University Press.New York. 1987 (Infra: *Rejection* (1987)). P.2.

[68] John Philoponus taught in the Alexandrian Academy, when Proclus' student Ammonius (c. 440-520) was in charge. When Ammonius died Philoponus did not become head of the Academy. Soon after he had to leave the school, probably due not so much to his Christian convictions - which had become common in Alexandrian Platonic circles-, as to his critical position towards Aristotle and some established Platonists, as Porphyry and Proclus.

[69] R.Sorabji, *Preface*, to: Philoponus, *Against Proclus On the eternity of the World* 6-8. Translation by M.Share. London. Duckworth. 2005. P. vi.

[70] Infra *aet mundi*.

[71] This is not the case with Philoponus' refutation of Aristotle's ideas on the eternity of the world, even though we can judge this discussion only from the surviving fragments. Cf. Philloponus, *Against*

quotes from *Tim* 41ab thirteen times within the scope of the first fifteen pages throughout the discussion of the sixth argument in the book.[72] The passage of reference is rather short. Although in *aet mundi* 128.1-4 Philoponus once cites the beginning of the demiurge's speech (*Tim* 41a7-b2),[73] he virtually makes no use of the demiurge's address to the gods. The only extraction from the *Timaeus* dialogue under an intense discussion is *Tim* 41 b1-b2 καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ λύειν ἐθέλειν κακοῦ. In the course of developing the argument Philoponus also once paraphrases *Tim* 41b6-c3 concerning the demiurgy of the gods created by the demiurge (*aet mundi* 129.5.-130.1.).

Tim 41b6-c3 tells us that to will to dissolve that what is well put together and is in good state were the deed of the evil one. Porphyry, Proclus and then Philoponus read this what was well put together and in good state as applicable to the universe. This is the first lesson to learn from this polemics. Another lesson concerns the evil desire. Still other lessons are to follow.

This short extraction from the *Timaeus* dialogue is at the core of the sixth argument advanced by Proclus in favor of the eternity of the world. Philoponus cites it in *aet mundi* 119.15.-120.14., and partially in *aet mundi* 128.6.-13. Proclus' argument consists roughly of the three following statements:[74] (a) if the demiurge has bound the universe together, then he alone can unbind it. He alone intimately knows both the bond and the mode of unbinding. Nobody else knows or possibly can know what these actually are, let alone to apply them to the world. Therefore, for anybody else the universe cannot be unbound, whereas for the demiurge it can; (b) nevertheless, the demiurge will never wish to unbind the universe, because it has been well put together. It would be a desire of an evil one to wish to unbind something what is well put together. If the demiurge would want to unbind it, he would be evil. But he is not. Therefore he will never unbind the universe; (c) if the universe is to be never unbound, it will never perish. If it is imperishable, it is also ungenerated. If the universe is both imperishable and ungenerated it is eternal.

Aristotle, on the Eternity of the World. Translated by Ch.Widberg. Cornell University Press. New York. 1987.

[72] *aet mundi* 119.21., 120.2., 121.3., 121.12., 121.12., 127.15., 128.9, 128.21., 129.20., 131.3., 133.3., 134.5. and curiously 592.16.

[73] Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, ἃ δι᾽ ἐμοῦ γενόμενα ἄλυτα
ἐμοῦ γε θέλοντος. τὸ μὲν οὖν δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν, τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἁρ μοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ λύ ειν ἐθέλειν κακοῦ.

[74] L.Judson argues that Proclus' sixth argument is the key argument to the whole polemics on the world's eternity. He singles out its two elements, which are identical with elements (b) and (c) in our discussion. Cf. L.Judson, *God or nature? Philoponus on generability and perishability*, in *Rejection* (1987). P. 181.

Philoponus agrees with the (a) element and presents a detailed refutation to the sections (b) and (c) of this argument. His refutation consists of as many as 29 steps. First, Philoponus gives a short summary of these steps in their development (*aet mundi* 120.15.-125.5.), followed by their detailed exposition (*aet mundi* 125.5.-242.22.). This is the usual procedure of treating each of the eighteen arguments in the treatise. The largest section of the refutation (steps 7-28) is dedicated to the rebuttal of the (c) statement. However, in this section neither Philoponus nor his opposition uses material from *Tim* 41ab. This is why we will skip it as irrelevant for our purpose. What does concern our present analysis is Philoponus' ways of dealing with sections (b), where the *Tim* b1-2 is being put under a full-scale scrutiny. Steps 1 to 6 are fully dedicated to it.

Philoponus claims that the recent Platonists, such as Porphyry and Proclus contradict Plato. They project their own doctrines upon Plato using all sorts of tricks and twists of mind to achieve their objective. Contrary to this, the language of truth is simple.[75] They claim the eternity of the world, which Plato does not mention anywhere in his writings. At the same time they deny the world's generation, which Plato talks about it in many passages. The exception is *Tim* 41b1-2, the quotation of which is justifiable in the given context. A relevant discussion concerning it rightly deserves proper attention.

Thus, the only valid argument from their presentation which is fully based on Plato's authority stems from *Tim* 41b1-2. However, even if these people were right, meaning that their doctrine was authentically Platonic (namely, that Plato had also advocated the world's eternity); this still would not let us stop dealing with the truth. Philoponus claims that Plato's doctrine is hypothetical at this point, since it is not based on the observed facts but on pure reasoning. Therefore, the only way to evaluate such a doctrine is to follow it with our mind, in other words, to apply our reason.

Philoponus' claim is that Plato's doctrine at this particular point is not impeccable. In fact, *Tim* 41b1-2 contains the two following statements: (1) that the (world) was well put together, (2) that to unbind it would be a desire of an evil one. The first statement is correct, the second one is incorrect. As to the first statement, the Bible also offers a similar statement: when God has accomplished his creation, he said that it was *all* beautiful (Gen 1:25; *aet mundi* 128.16-17).[76] As to the second statement, Philoponus does not see why the wish to unbind the universe, which is well put

[75] *aet mundi* 126.6.-25. contains a quote from Euripides, *Phoenissae*, 469-72.

[76] *aet mundi* 128.16. καὶ ἰδοὺ πάντα καλὰ λίαν. Curiously, Philoponus applies the 'all' (πάντα) to the universe in the Bibicale creation story of the book *Genesis*. The Septuagint Greek translation does not have this πάντα.

together, must be attributed to an evil one (*aet mundi* 128.20-22). The demiurge has once put the world together; the demiurge may unbind it as well.[77] The demiurge is good while creating the universe; he still remains in his goodness while unbinding it.

Although the universe is unique and exceptional as a creature, there are still other known examples of something that was well put together, yet was unbound at some later point. Philoponus lists animals of every kind along with the human being as examples. And yet, any living being in the universe comes to its end. The demiurge does not want them to have an everlasting existence (*aet mundi* 129.5-6). No-one considers this as a work of an evil one, but rather as belonging to the natural order. Certainly, the direct cause of all these beings is individual in each particular case; it does not seem to be the first demiurge. However, there is an order of natural causality, established by the creator. Not surprisingly, it brings us back to the demiurge. The demiurge is an ultimate cause for all living beings (*aet mundi* 130.10). He has brought these beings into existence, he has bound them together, and he will unbind them in the end. And yet, no one considers him as evil.

A critically minded Platonist may object that there is an error in this reasoning: the mortal beings are not created directly by the demiurge, but by the gods who were addressed by him in *Tim* 41a7-8. Philoponus counterparts this objection in saying that the problem inherent in section (b) of the argument persists also with these gods (*aet mundi* 129.24-25). They continue the work of their father by imitating him: so they create the mortal beings that are well put together. Yet, all these beings die at some point, so that they also become unbound. Since the gods were the cause of their being, these gods must be also the cause of unbinding ofthe mortals. This unbinding is not hypothetical any more but reality. If we apply Plato's reasoning from *Tim* 41b1-2 here then we must conclude that the gods are evil (*aet mundi* 130.18), because they serve as a cause of unbinding for beings who were well put together, which must be the work of an evil one (*Tim* 41b1-2). This line of argument is absurd and impious. Therefore, Plato must be also wrong at this point.

The critique concerning an implicit impiety present in Plato's text takes more force when it is applied to the demiurge. In accordance with section (a) of Proclus' argument, the demiurge knows the universe's bond and the mode of unbinding. Although the unbinding will never take place according to Proclus and Porphyry, still the demiurge intimately knows what the bond and unbinding are all about. But the unbinding of what is

[77] This is what Proclus claims as well (section (a) of argument six) drawing from this an opposite conclusion.

well put together must be the work of someone evil (*Tim* 41b1-2). The demiurge does not actually apply it according to these Platonists, but he can do it potentially. Therefore, he can do evil (*aet mundi* 133.8-9). He is potentially evil, Philoponus argues that the Neo-platonists suggest. Yet, this suggestion is most impious. Therefore, these people must be wrong.

Moreover, according to Aristotle, potentiality is imperfect (*de caelo*). Both Porphyry and Proclus would agree with this statement (*aet mundi* 132.8-9). But if the demiurge were potentially evil, he would be imperfect, which is not correct. The demiurge is perfect. If he excels in everything what he does, his potentiality must become actuality. If the demiurge were potentially evil, he would become actually evil, which is again the most impious suggestion. There is neither potential nor actual evil in God (*aet mundi* 133.27).

This all draws us to the following conclusion: Plato is not correct to claim that it must be a desire of an evil one to unbind something what is well put together. Someone who is good can bind as well as unbind. In fact, it is so even strongly: he binds and unbinds. In other words, he is not only the one who has a potency of binding-unbinding but also actuality. Such an attribution of a necessary actuality with respect to the demiurge is a strong statement: it requires an abstract reasoning. However, it lacks factual evidence and contradicts Plato. No wonder that it is a difficult argument to accept. Nevertheless, there are many examples from everyday life that support this argument and, analogically, can be projected upon the demiurge. E.g. a good harpist has to tune his harp well if he wishes that the harp may produce good music (*aet mundi* 131.1-13). However, the harpist does not leave his harp tuned all the time; otherwise the stretched strings might harm his harp. Having finished playing, the harpist untunes his harp. Actually what he does is he unbinds the harp which is well bound together. Now, nobody would say that the harpist becomes evil because he untunes his harp. The harpist remains good doing so. His qualification as a good harpist requires from him to untune his harp, when a concert or an exercise is finished. The untuning is good which equals another statement: the unbinding is good of what is well put together. This applies to the harpist with his harp. This also applies to the demiurge. Therefore, it is good for the demiurge to unbind the universe which he has well put together.[78]

[78] This example does not appear as convincing at the first sight. The demiurge deals with living beings, not just with things, as it is the case with the harpist who tunes his harp. Engagements with the living beings presuppose moral issues, and thus dealing with good and evil. Unbinding living things does not seem to be good at all, perhaps even evil. However, the demiurge put his work well together.

Finally, let us turn back to the issue of potentiality and actuality: as Proclus rightly says in section (a), the demiurge is the one who intimately knows what the unbinding of the universe is, since he is the one who bound it together. However, it is not enough to know that the demiurge could unbind the universe in principle (potentially). It is necessary that the demiurge will actually unbind it. Otherwise he would be imperfect with respect to his powers (Aristotle, *metaphysics* 1050b7). His potentiality must become actualized. Therefore, the demiurge not only potentially knows what the unbinding of the universe is, but he will actually unbind it at some point (*aet mundi* 132.29). Therefore, the world is perishable and not eternal, according to Philoponus.

From the exposition presented above we can clearly see that Philoponus is a non-dogmatic thinker. Having started with undermining Proclus' sixth argument in favor of the world's eternity, Philoponus ends up singling out one brief extraction from Plato's *Timaeus* (41b1-2), and criticizing it with all the force of his mind. This pattern tends to reappear in Philoponus' biography: he is well-known for critical reflections upon his roots. And indeed, in the first philosophical period of his φιλοπονία (*industry,* which earned him his name) he deviated from pure commentaries on Aristotle to criticizing the founder of the Peripatetic school.[79] He went as far as to undermine Aristotle's authority on several crucial issues in Physics (ether as a fifth element, void, impetus theory etc.). Later, he also broke with the official church by defending the Monophysitism and went as far as to come up with the tritheistic claims (the drastic result of which was his condemnation at the sixth Ecumenical Council in 681 at Constantinople).[80] Here again, Philoponus goes as far as to criticize Plato, whom other Platonists considered to be divine and therefore infallible. In this respect, Philoponus is a very independent thinker, whose methodological approach is quite close to that of modernity, even though his motivation might lie in his religious convictions.

Nevertheless, his project of liberating himself from his philosophical background in favor of a new theological perspective is difficult to call a success. When Philoponus starts criticizing Plato, he falls back to his

[79] There is a substantial difference in attitude towards Aristotle between (1) Philoponus' commentaries on Aristotle, which were simply student notes taken from Ammonius' lectures (*On generation and corruption*, *De anima*, *Categories*, *Prior analytics*), and (2) Philoponus' own commentaries on Aristotle, which are marked by the spirit of freedom and criticism, and are most probably based on the record of his own lectures and seminars (*Physics*, *Meteorology*).

[80] In this respect Philoponus stands completely on his own. Tritheism was a popular accusation among the theologians in Early Christianity (e.g. mutual accusations between Hypollyte and Pope Callixt, Jerome's accusations against the Cappadocians etc.), yet besides Philoponus, it finds no advocates in history.

Aristotle, whom he criticized before. An example of this is how Philoponus insists on a literal treatment of the creation account in the *Timaeus* dialogue. Besides his ideological motivation there is still a school background to it in Aristotle (*de caelo* 1.10-12.). Philoponus wrote a rather critical commentary on Aristotles' *de caelo*, along with a refutation of Aristotle's views on the world's eternity. Nevertheless, he borrowed some pieces of Aristotle's methodology, such as a literal treatment of Plato's creation account. Yet, this did not hinder him from applying a metaphorical approach in *in Physics* 575.7-11.[81]

Thus, Philoponus could not liberate himself from his philosophical roots even in the second, theological, period of his literal activity.[82] In many respects he remained a faithful Platonic and even a faithful Peripatetic. His treatment of *Tim* 41b1-2 is a funny phenomenon: he uses it to criticize the Platonists, but he also attacks Plato for taking a philosophically untenable position.

6.5.2. Comparative conclusion: Philoponus and Augustine on Tim 41ab

Of all the authors being discussed, John Philoponus is unique in many ways. In comparison to all others, and first of all to Augustine, he is the only true Christian Neo-Platonist in our list. He is the only author who can be considered among theologians just as among Neo-platonists (for this reason he is mentioned in both chapters). Still, if we are to chose, his place is among Neo-platonists, as his choice of themes and of the methodology is definitely that of the School and its tradition. He argues directly with Proclus as with one of his direct predecessors, while Simplicius in his turn argues with Philoponus about the same issue of the eternity of the world. If it was a matter of choosing a place for Augustine within the chapters (either among Neo-platonists or theologians), he would definitely belong among the theologians. He never got involved in the typical schemes of scholastics, while the level of his textual analysis of Plato's texts is not comparable to that of any serious Neo-Platonist, including Philiponus. Augustine lived at the same time as Philoponus; it is doubtful that being a bishop and defending the church teachings he would consider it appropriate to be discussed in the same chapter with a thinker who was

[81] Cf. Judson, op.cit. supra. P. 180; Ch.Schmitt, Philoponus' commentary on Aristotle's Physics in the sixteenth century, in *Rejection* (1987). P. 197-210.

[82] Scholars (R.Sorabji, H.Chadwick) often mark 529 not only as a year of the composition of *aet mundi*, but also as a year of Philoponus' transition from pure philosophy to theology. *Philoponus the Christian theologian*, in *Rejection* (1987). P. 42.

cast out by the church due to a series of doctrinal controversies such as John Philoponus.

Nevertheless, the abstract chosen by Philoponus from *Tim* 41ab is considerably shorter (*Tim* 41b1-b2) than that chosen by Augustine (*Tim 41a7-b6*), although the number of quotes used by both is the same (sixteen). Still, the analysis of Philoponus is more thorough than the one done by Augustine, demonstrating deep knowledge of Plato's text as well as of the exegetical tradition of the School. This cannot be said about Augustine.

The reason the abstract is being quoted is similar to both: two of them being Christians defend the Christian teaching against pagan philosophers and using Plato's text for analysis as if Plato has already received a true revelation. It is obvious that both authors see Plato rather positively in spite of some critique. Augustine, for instance, makes rather sharp comments about Plato's theory of the reincarnation of the soul, although he is rather uncritical towards *Tim* 41b accepting all its expressions. Philoponus, on the other hand, shows his disagreement with the half of the quoted abstract (*Tim* 41b2) which is seen in the analysis of the text. The Holy Scripture is obviously the source of wisdom for both, Plato being used in both cases for rather technical or rhetorical purposes. This places Augustine among Christian thinkers but outside the Platonic tradition, while Philoponus, as a representative of the School, is in the critical position towards the original source while a number of the members of his school consider Plato's texts purely valid.

The context of Augustine's quotation of *Tim* 41ab is the theory of the resurrection of the body, while Philoponus deals with the theory of the eternity of the world. In his choice of the themes Augustine is unique and lonely, at the same time Philoponus being at home in the traditional (see also Proclus and Simplicius) and Christian (Minucius Felix) polemics. Pagan thinkers seem to be defending the eternity of the world, while Christians make efforts to undermine it; both cite Plato in order to defend their views. The first group, though, is more in harmony with the quoted texts, while the second is forced to either change Plato's text completely (Minucius Felix) or to argue with it (Philoponus).

If we consider that there are two headlines in *Tim* 41b1-b2, then we should compare their understanding by Augustine and Philoponus. They both accept the statement (*Tim* 41b1) about the Creator (both understanding him as demiurge and father) being amazed by his creation. Philoponus brings to light the similarity with the book of Genesis where the Created is just as amazed by the result of his work.

The situation with the text in *Tim* 41b1-b2 is completely different. Each of them has a different text: Philoponus sees Plato's original text, while Augustine uses a translation made by Cicero. Philoponus knows that it has

to do with the possible role of the evil element (ετελεν κακου); Augustine has received no notion of this, therefore he does not even have a possibility to comment on it.

Here Philoponus argues with Plato; in his opinion the destruction of the world is not due to the evil element but rather to the desire of the Creator (*demiurge*). It is worth noticing that to correct Plato, Philoponus uses Aristotelian' argument (from "On the Heavens") that potency has to be realized in the actuality in order to become complete. Therefore, the disengagement of the world which the author talks about is not just an abstract possibility; it has to inevitably take place. Augustine uses neither this argument in particular, nor Aristotelian thought in general in his argument with Porphyry; whereas Philoponus does in order to correct Plato, and the Neo-Platonists. It is obvious that the authority of Aristotle for him is much higher than in the previous era among both the Neo-platonists and Christians.

6.6. Simplicius (ca. 490-560)

6.6.1. In favor of Aristotle's vision on the World's Eternity

Simplicius could hardly react to Philoponus' criticism on Proclus and Plato, since according to his own evidence he has not read *aet mundi*,[83] even though he cites twice from it in *de caelo* (vii, 135.27-31; vii, 136.17).[84] This ignorance is a bit unfortunate, since Simplicius is the right person to deliver such a criticism. Similarly to Philoponus he was also a student of Ammonius, and consequently he knew well the context of the dispute and the spirit of the time. The fact that he did not read this treatise must have been a deliberate statement on his part: he claims that Philoponus is far too verbose and literal, and therefore reading his books is a boring exercise. Certainly, this was a typical trick in ancient polemics used to undermine the opposition.

Despite such a high-brow position, Simplicius still remains a bitter adversary to Philoponus. He dedicates the entire book I of his *in de caelo* Aristotle commentary to the refutation of Philoponus' criticism against the world's eternity.[85] However, this refutation is fully based upon Philoponus' other book on the world's eternity, this time directed not against Proclus but Aristotle: *de aeternitate mundi contra Aristotelem*.[86] In fact, Simplicius' refutation is the main source for our knowledge of the contents of *contra Aristotelem*, as the latter is not extent in its integrity. Confirming to the scholarly standards in the Academy of the time, Simplicius extensively cites his opponent *ad litteram*.

Simplicius follows the Late exegetical principle that there is an inner harmony between Plato and Aristotle. In fact, Plato has to be explained with the help of Aristotle's argument. In case, if at the first reading you find a seeming disagreement between the two, you have to seek beyond the letter (λέξις) of the text, and look for the spirit (νοῦς) of the hidden meaning.[87]

[83] Ph. Hoffmann, *Simplicius' Polemics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 57.

[84] Ibid.

[85] It has become a common practice to consider this part of Simplicius' treatise *de caelo* as a separate book among the scholars. Even the standard *CAG* (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*) edition has *Contra Philoponum* as the title, which covers *in Physica* 1129.29.-11.52.19.; 11.56.28.-11.69.9.; 1171.30.-11.82.39. and finally 1326.38.-1336.34. Cf. I.Croese, *Simplicius on continuous and instantaneous change*. Leiden. 1998. P.15.

[86] Cf. Philloponus, *Against Aristotle, on the Eternity of the World*. Translated by Ch.Widberg. Cornell University Press. New York. 1987. Infra *contra Aristotelem*.

[87] Simplicius too has departed from the traditional distinction between *theoreia* and *lexis* in the school of his time. The *theoreia* was a general exposition of the argument, *lexis* a close-up interpretation of the letter of the text. Instead, Simplicius shifted from a *theoria-lexis* to a lexis-*nous* distinction. The latter is clearly a projection of the Pauline *letter-spirit* distinction upon the methodology. Cf. I.Croese, *Simplicius on continuous and instantaneous change*. Leiden. 1998. P.19.

That is what Philoponus, Simplicius' contemporary, in the eyes of the latter, failed to achieve.

Simplicius cites from *Tim* 41ab six times in the course of his writing: thrice in the seventh book of *in de caelo* (vii, 106.9.; vii, 346.23; vii, 351.16), and thrice in the tenth book of *in Physica* (x, 1337; x, 1360; x, 1361). His first quotation from *in de caelo* includes the entire speech to the gods: *Tim* 41ad. All three quotes from *in Physica* include the part of the speech which is under the present discussion.

Almost all these quotes from *Tim* 41ab that are found in his oeuvre Simplicius uses in favor of the doctrine of the eternity of the universe. He is convinced that this doctrine is authentically both Aristotelian and Platonic. Since Plato is less explicit on the matter than Aristotle, we have to use the latter to explain the former. This happens rather regularly: therefore the following explanation has become a common procedure. We will use two passages: one from in *de caelo*, another from *in physica*, in order to demonstrate the main points of Simplicius' defense of the eternity of the world on the basis of *Tim* 41ab, along with his major methodological approaches.

The first text of our choice is *in caelo* vii. 350.[88] In this text Simplicius projects ideas applied towards various objects in *Tim* 41ab upon the universe in order to achieve his desired result. In fact, in one place Plato speaks about an abstraction, in another place about the gods created by the demiurge. Simplicius cites two extractions from this passage, which render a similar tension. First, there is a seeming contradiction contained in *Tim* b1-b2, wherein Plato says that everything what is bound together will be unbound, and yet a wish to unbind something what is well put together would be a desire of an evil one (Philoponus extensively uses just this extract from *Tim* 41ab, as we have seen it in the previous section). Secondly, in address towards the gods the demiurge tells them that they are neither incorruptible nor immortal. Yet, as if to defy his own words that were just pronounced the demiurge declares that the gods will not die (they will not taste of the fate of death, *Tim* 41b3-4).

Both these extractions appear to contain a similar idea, namely: something what is mortal and corruptible by nature[89] will neither be corrupted nor die but stay forever. In the first extract from Plato's text the

[88] Unfortunately, there is no translation available of the VIIth book in *de caelo*, even in the monumental series of *Ancient Commentators on Aristotle*, initiated by R.Sorabji. This is mostly due to the prolificvolume of Simplicius' writing. The closest what we have is Simplicius, *On Aristotle of the Heaven 2.10-14*. Duckworth. Transl. Ian Mueller. 2005.

[89] κατὰ φύσιν is a standard Aristotelian expression, intensively employed by Simplicius (1433 times in the survived corpus, compared to 374 times in Aristotle). Cf. TLG.

object is not specified, the second extract concerns the gods. On the basis of these two statements Simplicius makes an inference towards the universe. As much as it is the case with gods and anything what is well put together, the universe is still corruptible and mortal by nature. Yet it will neither be corrupted nor die.

Further on, Simplicius remarks that this idea in Plato seems to contradict Aristotle who says that a being is not corruptible by nature (the universe is a being; therefore it is incorruptible by nature).

According to Simplicius, this contradiction between the two greatest philosophers is an illusion, since it can be resolved if we apply Aristotle's concepts of ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια. From the very start, this is a tricky distinction, because traditionally philosophers make use of the opposition between potency/power (δύναμις) and actualization (ἐνέργεια), and not between ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια, as Simplicius suggests us to proceed at this point. In fact, he also uses the former distinction in the same text of *in de caelo* before coming up with the analysis of Plato's quotes from the *Timaeus'* dialogue. There, he speaks about the world and time as existing potentially before their realization in the demiurge's act of creation. Simplicius claims that the potency necessarily must be actualized in reality. The world and time which have the power to exist become a reality. Therefore, it makes little sense to speak about the distinction between potency and actualization as applied to the universe, since every potency will be actualized.

Now, ἐντελέχεια is a concept, which is slightly different from the concept of potency (δύναμις). Sometimes it can render unexpected solutions. Potency is applicable towards any object, whereas ἐντελέχεια is applicable exclusively towards living objects, namely, those which went through the process of birth. ἐντελέχεια is a kind of potency within the living objects. Aristotle uses this concept in order to describe the essence of soul (*de anima* 412-413). Simplicius goes further applying it towards the notion of corruptibility (φθαρτὸν), and implicitly towards the notion of immortality (ἀθανασία).

In attempt to explain Plato he says that the universe is corruptible and mortal by nature. However, corruptibility can be either actualized *in energy* or *in entelechia*.

In fact, everything what is corruptible has a potency (δύναμιν) towards a none-being (δύναμιν ἔχον τοῦ μὴ εἶναι *in Caelo* vii.326.23.), or towards a never non-being (ποτε ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι *in Caelo* vii.326.25.).

When it appears as a potency it has to be realized, namely, a corruptible being has to disappear into a none-being.

This is not the case with the ἐντελέχεια of the corruptible universe. The universe's corruptibility contains a none-being within itself in the form of ἐντελέχεια. This ἐντελέχεια tends towards a none-being, but never turns into an actualized reality. Thus, the universe is indeed corruptible as well as it is mortal by nature (meaning that it has an ἐντελέχεια towards corruption and death), but it will neither become corrupted nor die. In other words, the corruptibility in ἐντελέχεια will never become an actualized corruption.

This distinction between ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια when used towards the notion of corruptibility applies to the universe as a whole. Certainly, we can speak about an actualized corruption and mortality as applied towards any particular individual which is found in the universe.

The second text of our choice is *in Physica* x.1361.[90] In this section of his commentary Simplicius uses *Tim* 41ab in support of the eternity of the universe. His line of reasoning goes approximately as follows. The demiurge says that he passes the demiurgic activities down to the gods he is addressing. The reason for this is that he is kind to arrange the perfection for the universe. However, such perfection cannot be possibly accomplished without the creation of the four mortal species. Yet, being the first demiurge he does not create these species, since if he does so they will become immortal, and not remain mortal any more. Only the gods, created by the demiurge, are to create these species. Everything what the demiurge creates necessarily becomes immortal. His first creation is the universe, and not the gods of the traditional religion. Since it was him who created the universe, it became an immortal being. Since it is immortal, it will never die. Therefore, it is eternal.

In this discussion Simplicius uses Plato in order to justify Aristotle and to find the right way of interpreting the latter with the assistance of the former. This is a bit unusual: the common practice is to do the other way round, as it was the case with the argument in *de caelo*. He says that there are two different views on God, which can be identified in Aristotle's oeuvre. And yet, everyone agrees that according to Aristotle, God is a perfect and eternal mind (νοῦς). The difference of interpretation between two major trends concerns the issue of the divine causality. Some think that God is a final cause of the universe, but not its creative/ demiurgic cause.

[90] There is no translation available of the Xth book in *in physica*, as it is also the case with *de caelo* vii. The closest what we haver is Simplicius, *On Aristotle Physics 8.6-10*. Duckworth. Transl. R.McKirahan. 2001.

Others are convinced that he is both the final and creative/demiurgic cause of the universe. Plato clearly belongs to the second group of "interpreters", if may reverse the time constrains. When in *Tim* 41c1 the demiurge applies the expression *in* δι᾽ ἐμοῦ (by me: *in physica* x.1361.6.), he means himself to be a creative cause for the universe. Similarly, in Aristotle we find an expression ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀκινήτου, which boils down to the same meaning. In this case the first mover – τὸ πρώτως κινοῦν plays the role of the world's mover.

This exposition seems to contradict the idea of the world's eternity, which Simplicius tries to defend all the way through. However, the contradiction is illusionary. Plato does not apply δι᾽ ἐμοῦ to the world as a whole but to the three living genera, without which the universe will not be complete. Thus, the demiurge is a creative cause not for the universe, but for the living beings, which are found within the universe.

On the whole, Simplicius makes a good use of several extractions from the *Tim* 41ab, all of which he applies in favor of the eternity of the universe, and probably some of which are indirectly intended in the context of a general response to Philoponus' attack on Aristotle and the Neo-platonists. Simplicius uses Aristotle's arguments to interpret Plato's *Timaeus* in *in de caelo*. Surprisingly, he does the same thing but the other way round with Plato's *Timaeus* in order to interpret Aristotle in *in de Physica*.

In the collection of texts we are dealing with, Simplicius is the only exegete so far who uses Aristotle to explain *Tim* 41ab. Taking into account that in general it was a common procedure in the School of the time. We would not be surprised if there were also similar examples of interpretation.

What is surprising is that the scholarly dispute concerning Aristotle's philosophical heritage took another rather personal dimension. Simplicius attacks Philoponus *ad hominem*. He claims that Philoponus suffers from the sickness of vain-glory (κενοδοξία); saying that the latter's motivation for publishing his pretentious books is a personal fame. He compares him to Herostratus, a man, who for the sake of becoming famous at any cost set fire to the temple of Artemis in Ephesus in 356 BC. To punish the vandal the Ephesians put him to tortures and forbade his name to be ever spoken out.[91] Simplicius respects this prohibition. He also thinks that Philoponus deserves a similar punishment by silence. This is why he avoids pronouncing his name. Instead, he calls Philoponus a 'grammarian' and imputes all sorts of pejorative expressions upon him, such as 'this

[91] Providentially, the vandalistic assault happened on the very day Alexander the Great was born. Whatever the motivation Herostratus had, he did become famous.

individual' (οὗτος). According to Simplicius, Philoponus commits sacrilege of the kind Herostratus did. Thus, he accuses Philoponus of atheism and impiety: since the latter denies the divinity of the heaven, and thereby undermines the power of the demiurge. What Simplicius offers instead is his pagan piety: a prayer to the demiurge as well as an address to Heracles (pleading him to clean the filthy stables brought in there by Philoponus). Simplicius refers to Heracles' labor of cleaning the Aegean stables by diverting the course of the river Alpheus. This was done out of a true love for labor (φιλοπονία). It is therefore Heracles, and not John the Grammarian, who deserves the title 'Philoponus'. Simplicius' whole presentation of Philoponus turns into a slander.[92]

This is rather curious. Philoponus, the Christian, who is expected to appeal to more theological arguments, uses a dry philosophical vocabulary in his refutation of Proclus and Aristotle. Simplicius the pagan, who to the contrary is expected to be busy with logical tenets, seems to have left his territory and plunged into personal accusations, mixed with some sort of theology (which he actually claims to be a kind of an Aristotelian science, since in his views Aristotle's *de caelo* is an inauguration into theology).

We do not know the precise reason why Simplicius reacted so harshly towards Philoponus. We must be careful of attributing this adversity to Philoponus' Christian belief as opposed to Simplicius' rejection of it. Both thinkers studied in Alexandria under Ammonius, although this must have taken place at two different points, as Simplicius says that he never met Philoponus. At that time it was a common practice of admitting both Christians and pagans in the same school. Simplicius and Philoponus are not the only examples of opposing parties. For instance, Ammonius, being the head of the school, was not a Christian, whereas Zacharias, a student of his who wrote a survived account of Ammonius' Platonism was a Christian.[93]

In the past there were also attempts to explain this dispute by the exegetical reasons. Possibly, this may have to do with Aristotle's reception in the School. Already at the time of Porphyry and Iamblichus reading and interpreting Aristotle's *corpus* had become a common practice. The curriculum started with logic (*Categories*, *Prior Analytics* etc.), passed through natural philosophy (*Physics*, *On generation and corruption* etc.) and

[92] Ph.Hoffmann amuses himself with a detailed presentation of all these offenses in his article, dividing them into groups: A. The gardens of Adonis; B. Herostratus; C. The Augean stables. *Op.cit*. Pp.66-72. This can hardly be a good example for a scholarly debate.

[93] Ammonius or de opificio mundi.

end up with pure philosophy (*Metaphysics*).[94] As a whole, this was some sort of propedeutical introduction to the reading of Plato. However, starting from Ammonius there was a certain shift of attaching more significance to Aristotle in general. It is not surprising, that among five surviving commentaries by Simplicius,[95] there are four on Aristotle and none on Plato.

Thus, it is quite natural that in the past, there were attempts to explain the divergence between Simplicius and Philoponus by two different approaches to Aristotle. K.Praechter's assertion was that there was a basic difference towards Aristotle in Athenian and Alexandrian schools.[96] He was convinced that in the school of Athens the approach was more authentically and metaphysical, whereas in Alexandria the accent fell upon Aristotle for his own sake, along with the natural science. K.Praechter's analysis dominated the handbooks and scholarly literature for the major part of the twentieth century.

This position has been thoroughly criticized by I.Hadot. She found no substantial difference between these two approaches whatsoever.[97] Taking Simplicius and Hierocles as examples, she traced no presence of pre-Plotinian or Christian elements, the two points which were emphasized by Praechter. Although Praechter considered both Philoponus and Simplicius as representatives of the Alexandrian tradition, the story must be more complex than that. Simplicius has also studied under Damascius in Athens and taught there between his departure from Alexandria and the closure of the Athenian Academy by Emperor Justinian in 529. Moreover, Simplicius wrote almost all his Commentaries on Aristotle after his exile to Persia and subsequent return to Byzantium, most probably to Harran.[98]

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[94] The curriculum and their daily routine is nicely presented by Ph.Hoffmann in *What was commentary in late Antiquity? The example of the commentators*, in *A companion to Ancient Philosophy*. Ed. M.L. Gill and P.Pellegrin. Blackwell Publishing. Oxford. 2006. Pp. 597-621.

[95] Commentaries on *de caelo*, *physica*, *categoria*, and *de anima* (the authorship of which is disputed by F.Bossier and C.Steel). On top of this there is a survived commentary on Epictetus' *Enchiridion*.

[96] Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Teil I: K.Praechter, Die Philosophie des Altertums, 12. Auflage. Berlin. 1926.

[97] I.Hadot, La vie et l'oeuvre de Simplicius d'après des sources grecques en arabes, in Simplicius: sa vi, son oeuvre, sa survie. W. de Gruyter. Berlin-New York. 1987. P. 4. A more elaborate exposition can be found in I.Hadot, Le problème du néoplatonisme aléxandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius. Paris. Etudes Augustiniennes, 195s. 1978.

[98] R.Thiel is convinced that Simplicius went to Harran after his return to Byzantium. This is also the place where he must have written all his Commentaries. On Aristotle Thiel bases his argument on Simplicius' familiarity with four different calendars (Attic, Roman, Asian, Asian-Damascean) which were all in use at the time in Harran. Cf. R.Thiel, *Simplikios und das Ende der neuplatonischen Schule in Athen*. Stuttgart. 1999. Pp. 41-49.

Thus, Philoponus must be considered as a representative of the Alexandrian tradition, whereas Simplicius was a representative of both Alexandrian and Athenian schools of Neo-Platonism, with an accent on the second period (against Praechter's assumption).

However, both thinkers used Aristotle as their major source and the object of exegesis. The difference was that Simplicius was a dogmatic Aristotelian, whereas Philoponus undertook a thorough criticism of a number of Aristotelian doctrines. Of course, we can hardly take Philoponus as a typical representative of the Alexandrian school. It has been often emphasized by scholars that his approach was in many ways revolutionary.[99]

6.6.2. Comparative conclusion: Simplicius and Augustine on Tim 41ab

Among the authors discussed Simplicius is the one who introduces a new methodological element to the analysis of *Tim* 41ab. He refers to Aristotle for clarifying the difficult passages in Plato, including this abstract. This method is not at all evident taking into consideration the fact that Aristotle stopped any possible relation with Plato and his school. In late Neo-Platonism Aristotle is often viewed as a Platonist whose main area of specialization was logic and physics, rather than metaphysics and theology in comparison to his teacher's. Due to Aristotle's methodology and general style clarity it seems rather logical to use his work to clarify difficult passages by Plato.

Augustine is not familiar with this method. He knows Aristotle much less than Plato does, and does not consider him a Platonist. It is not surprising that he never refers to him in his analysis of *Tim* 41ab. Nonetheless, Augustine is familiar with the method of using one text for clarifying the other one. In his *On Christian Doctrine* he recommends this exact method of bible exegeses: clarifying difficult passages from the Scripture by more simple ones. The parallel is quite evident: for Simplicius', Plato's and Aristotle's works differ and are of his late Neo-Platonic canon.

Quite typical for the Antiquity method of disqualifying one's opponent is of interest here. Simplicius refuses to call Philoponus by name and refers to him as to *Grammatic,* considering him arrogant and vain. This is a

[99] It is not surprising that one of the best collections of articles dedicated to Philoponus edited by R.Sorabij has been given the title *Philoponus and the rejection of Aristotelian science*. Cornell University Press. New York. 1987.

common attitude among some Christian thinkers towards their opponents. Jerome especially is the harshest in his expressions. Porphyry is one who suffered from such attitude a lot. It is no coincidence that Macarius Magnes does not call his opponent-philosopher by name; that being similar to Simplicius' attitude towards Philoponus when he does not want to refer to him by name and to promote him. Augustine's attitude towards Porphyrios is much more respectful, although Beatrice as well thinks that Augustine had been using his materials for 16 years before mentioning him for the first time. When discussing the theory of the resurrection in general and when quoting *Tim* 41ab in particular, Augustine often calls Porphyry by name while using grandiloquent expressions like *accerimus inimicus Christianorum - the bitter enemy of the Christians*, but never talks about his vices or says anything bad about him.

As to the content of his speech, just as in the case with Philoponus and Minucius, the main topic of the discussion is that of the eternity of the world, whose adherent, and opponent of Philoponus, Simplicius is. We have noticed already that Augustine uses *Tim* 41ab mainly for the discussion about the resurrection of the body. Simplicius quotes the whole demiurge's speech twice in his original text, while Augustine uses the whole abstract just once in The *City 13.26*

In spite of using two various themes from *Tim* 41ab, Augustine sometimes refers to the themes of imperishability and endlessness of the world. For instance, while discussing two types of eternity, one with and the other without a beginning, Augustine uses the examples of the soul and the world: having been created, both are without end, and therefore eternal. The eternity of the Creator self is of the second type, namely being one without a beginning or an end.

Simplicius, as we have mentioned above, uses a different thinking based on the contextual hermeneutic of *Timaeus*. The demiurge is the author of only the eternal, the imperishable and the immortal. For this reason he creates gods and entrusts them the process of creating the perishables and the mortals. The world is the first creation of the demiurge; therefore the world is eternal, immortal and imperishable. Such thinking, based on the role of the intermediaries of the creation does not come forth in Augustine's works.

6.7. Conclusive evaluation:

Augustine's Tim 41ab within the Neo-Platonist reception

The results of the current research make it clear that there was a scholastic school in the times of Augustine doing exegesis of Plato's texts; of those *Timaeus* and in particular *Tim* 41ab were of great significance. Most of the school's members writing detailed commentaries on Plato's texts were very well acquainted with the preceding works. Their knowledge of Plato was based on the reading of the original texts in the context of one or another dialogue being discussed and of Plato's system as a whole.

Augustine knew this tradition of commentaries on sacred texts and wrote a series of detailed biblical commentaries. Still it is doubtful whether he considered Plato's text sacred. For this reason he does not fit the school. He commented neither on Plato's dialogues nor on separate passages. His commentary on Plato's text of *Tim* 41ab which he knows very well is not of systematic nature. Augustine is neither familiar with the passage in the dialogue context nor with the preceding commentary tradition. His own interpretation goes beyond the tradition of academic exegesis. None of the Neo-Platonists came to such conclusions or replied to his commentaries. Augustine accuses Neo-platonists of not knowing the contents of the passage while he turned out to lack the knowledge himself. The Neo-Platonists are well familiar with the passage but he seems to know nothing about their commentaries. At the same time he demands from them an understanding of the text similar to his own. It is quite unfair to reproach anyone's lack of familiarity with your own original thoughts taking into consideration that they were never written down. Augustine's conclusions on this abstract are not evident at all.

There was of course a serious language barrier between Augustine and Neo-Platonists. Neo-Platonic schools, both in Athens and Alexandria, used Greek, while Augustine knew Latin only. We have no signs of his acquaintance with commentaries on Plato's texts in Latin translation. He mentions Iamblichus just once with no reference to any elements of his teaching or dialogues names. As to Porphyry, Augustine refers only to his *Philosophia ex oraculis* and *De regressu animae.* There is no evidence that he was familiar with Porphyry's commentaries on Plato's dialogues. On the basis of translations made by Marius Victorinus and used by Augustine we see that he was not familiar with Neo-Platonists' commentaries on Plato's dialogues. Therefore there is a serious doubt whether Augustine was familiar with the *Commentaries*, or whether he even could have been if given a chance.

Philoponus, as a closest by spirit to Augustine Neo-platonists, lived a hundred years later than Augustine. He nevertheless is a representative of what can be called Christian Neo-Platonism. Still, according not only to the time period but also to the content Augustine stands very far from this tradition. Philoponus knows Plato's and Aristotle's texts very well, while Augustine shows the opposite. Philoponus comments not only on Plato's and Aristotle's themes but also on Proclus' with whom he gets involved in a detailed written polemic. The problem of the eternity of the world, being the main issue of the polemics between Christian and pagan Neo-Platonists starting at least with Proclus and then with Philoponus and Simplicius, is not familiar to Augustine. Nonetheless, it is this issue that fits naturally the problematic of the Neo-Platonic discourse and is based on the reading of *Timaeus*. It is amazing that knowing *Timaeus* best of the entire Platonic corpus he shows no signs of acquaintance with one of the most standard themes of this dialogue. On the other hand, he undertakes the discussion of the topic that is not directly in question and has neither been considered by Neo-Platonists, nor by his contemporaries, nor by following Neo-Platonists, even of Christian mindset. Neither is Augustine familiar with the texts of Neo-Platonists written directly against Christians and using *Tim* 41ab. This refers first of all to Emperor Julian the Apostate's text *Against Galileans,* especially that the author makes a strange comparison of the beginning of the Bible with Tim 41ab. Evidently the absence of a Latin translation of the text is an insoluble obstacle to Augustine.

The closest text allowing us to see Augustine's acquaintance with any of the Neo-Platonists' commentaries on *Tim* 41ab is the set of Augustine's remarks concerning Jupiter (Zeus) as the soul of the universe, which is possibly an element of Porphyry's interpretation of *Tim* 41ab. This text however has not been preserved, so we are forced to operate with the extrapolation from Proclus' treatise about demiurge from his commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*. Even if we allow a thought of Porphyry calling the demiurge Zeus and the soul of the world, this has not been understood correctly by Augustine as sometimes he names Jupiter (Zeus) the soul of the world, while in other cases the universe becomes the soul of Jupiter (Zeus). Besides, a few times Augustine interprets Porphyry's expression *omne corpus fugiendum* in a too simplified manner. Porphyry stresses going up to the One and not just a mechanical wasting of the body. The crude manner in which Augustine refers to Porphyry suggesting Jupiter to commit suicide by leaving the body of the world proves that he either does not understand Porphyry's teaching or simply has no desire to do so.

Augustine shows no familiarity with the elements of the most detailed and deep Neo-Platonists' commentary on *Tim* 41ab that has survived until

now and which is found in Proclus' *Commentaries on Plato's Timaeus*. Although Proclus lived later than Augustine, his teacher Syrianus, contemporary of Augustine, could have had such commentaries for Proclus states his teaching to be identical to that of his teacher's. Moreover, the main statements of Augustine in his sporadic commentaries on Tim 41ab are directly opposite to Proclus' statements and possibly to the statements of other pagan Neo-Platonists. There is a complete disagreement in how the author of the speech in *Tim* 41ab understands the main elements of the Neo-Platonic teaching: status, name, title. The author's status according to Augustine is not comparable to that of Proclus: while for the former the author of the speech is The Highest God Creator, for Proclus it is the third godhead in the intellectual triad following the One, the hennades and the intelligible and the intellective triads. Augustine does not mention the name of the author of the speech while Proclus speaks about it in detail, calling it *Zeus* or *Dios* considering the demiurge to be dual.

According to Augustine, the speech is addressed to minor gods. He understands the word god in a rather allegorical sense and considers gods to be either celestial bodies or people in their future resurrection. At the same time Proclus considers them to be young and eternally reviving cosmic gods named after the gods of the Greek pantheon. Although the names coincide, they are secondary to the higher gods who bear them.

At last, Augustine understands even the content of the speech in a different way than Proclus, although in some parts similar to some of the Neo-Platonist' reading. For instance, the statement of gods being mortal in their nature but immortal by the decision of the demiurge is mentioned by Proclus with a reference to Amelius and Attic. It is obvious that without knowing it Augustine uses similar arguments which are being refused by Proclus who refers to the Peripatetics. Augustine's main statement about the speaker's omnipotence, which is the basis for Augustine's argumentation defending the theory of the resurrection of the human body, is completely opposite to Proclus' presentation. If the demiurge is a minor god, his powers are limited; he mainly fulfils the assignments of the gods standing higher in the heavenly hierarchy. Besides we dispose a number of arguments considered to belong to Porphyry that argue the all-might of God as the key element in the Christian theory of the resurrection of the body. We have reminiscence left of Augustine being familiar with this argumentation. In direct polemics with Neo-Platonists on the theory of resurrection where he quotes Tim 41ab, Augustine suspiciously avoids the discussion.

AUGUSTINE's TIMAEUS 41AB

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Chapter Seven:

Tradition?

Augustine vis-à-vis the Theologians

on Tim 41ab

7.0. Introduction into Theological Tradition of the *Tim* 41 exegesis

Due to Augustine's Christian affiliation now the time has come to dig into the material used mostly by Christian theologians concerning our topic. The scope of our analysis concerns the writers spread throughout four centuries (from Philo of Alexandria, 1st c. up until Eusebius of Caesarea, 4th c.). The *post quem* point to serve our purpose is the age of Augustine, whose interpretation of *Tim* 41ab we are trying to evaluate in this thesis. We restricted our project to the authors, whose commentaries on *Tim* 41ab we could effectively find. We decided not to deal with all significant figures of the time, which could have had some knowledge of our passage, since they did transmit it clearly down to us. E.g. we had to leave out Gregory of Nyssa – a rather important figure in the history of Plato's reception among the church fathers - because we found hardly any information on his thought on our present research into *Tim 41ab*.

As expected, the number of Greek fathers using the text of *Tim* 41ab outweighs the Latin authors in the pre-Augustinian period. This is quite natural, since the Greeks had ready access to this text in their mother tongue, whereas the Latin writers had to use a translation. In fact, the Latin authors, such as Arnobius and Minucius, knew this text due to their activities as rhetors, not as theologians. Their expertise lies in the knowledge of Greek Antiquity rather than in theology. Not surprisingly, from the point of view of a theological contribution, the Latin Arnobius of Sicca and Minucius Felix were far less significant figures, as compared to such an outstanding Greek theologian as Origen, or such a writer and an active history player as Eusebius of Caesarea.

All the theologians on our list can clearly be divided according to their general evaluation of Plato: simply positive or negative. The first group attached a significant value to Plato's thought, the second group essentially

denied it. In the first group we find Philo, Clement of Alexandria, Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Eusebius of Caesarea, Arnobius of Sicca and Minucius Felix. The second group is represented by Origen, Hyppolyte of Rome and Pseudo-Justine. The reason for a positive approach to Plato's philosophy by the first group is a conviction that Plato had acquired some Hebrew wisdom, and had possibly a direct access to the precepts of Moses on his visit to Egypt (Philo, Pseudo-Justine, Eusebius). In some cases, eg. that of Eusebius of Caesarea. the appreciation of Plato went so far as to attempt to interpret the Bible from the point of view of Plato's philosophy. The group of theologians rejecting Plato is significantly smaller, yet their interpretation is often very insightful and representative of certain commonplace attitudes towards philosophy among the Christians. Such an evaluation of Plato's thought can have various important consequences. For instance, it is one of the major indicators of false authenticity of the writer known as Pseudo-Justine, who unlike the true Justine Martyr is negative towards Plato. Also Origen's radical denial of Plato and philosophy is a position, based on thorough knowledge of the latter's philosophy, and it is not at all a sign of ignorance.

Moreover, the knowledge of this text by Plato is neither equal, nor even comparable among the cited authors. One author is clearly superior to all the rest. The anonymous author who claims the authority of Justine Martyr (Pseudo-Justin) must have been someone who knew philosophy very well, and thus his familiarity with Plato in general, and this text in particular, was far more intimate than that of the majority of the other authors on our list. The majority of other theologians of the epoch demonstrate a rather sporadic and at times superficial knowledge of the context and the meaning of the passage.

The accuracy and intensity of quotation(s) from *Tim* 41ab among the cited writers varies substantially. Philo cites almost the complete passage with one alteration that is hardly significant. Clement quotes only the initial address of the demiurge. Origen cites as much as Clement but gives it a totally different evaluation. We find the largest amount of quotes (four) in Pseudo-Justin, which he supplies with a significant exegesis. Athenagoras' quote from the passage is short and somewhat modified equaled by a rather short interpretation. Hyppolyte of Rome cites this passage twice, whereas Eusebius of Caesarea cites it as many as three times. Justin Martyr renders the content of the passage with his own words. Similarly, neither of the two Latin writers on our list cite *Tim* 41ab literally but they venture to paraphrase it with their words. Arnobius of Sicca does so in two treatises, Minucius Felix in one.

Even if the text of *Tim* 41ab has often been cited quite accurately, its interpretation by various authors of the Patristic period is remote from what Plato's original meaning even at a first superficial glance. Philo and Pseudo-Justin know the *Timaeus* dialogue very well, whereas some like Clement of Alexandria show a general familiarity with it within the scope of his encyclopedic presentation. Certainly, his identification of the Father of the Holy Trinity with the figure of 'demiurge and father' (*Stromata* 5.14.102.) is surely worth of consideration, yet remains too daring. Justine Martyr plainly identifies the 'demiurge and father' with God, whereas the addressed are human souls, according to his view. Plato certainly did not mean human souls by the gods addressed by the 'demiurge and father', as he even calls them by name in a sentence preceding our passage. Some theologians, such as Origen, Hippolyte of Rome, are offended by the polytheism, implied in this passage. They all missed Plato's own irony about the plurality of traditional gods – as is clear from the passage preceding *Tim* 41ab. Also different writers see the main point of *Tim* 41ab differently: thus Justin Martyr and Arnobius of Sicca analyze within the scope of psychology: the first sees it as a proof of the soul's immortality, the second perceives it a proof of the intermediate character of the soul, this being between mortality and immortality. Philo perceives the main of this passage as contributory to the theory of creation.

Here we find the specially interesting case of the three great Alexandrian theologians: Philo, Clement and Origen all commenting on *Tim* 41ab. In a certain sense they all belong to the same Alexandrian tradition, although each of them is quite original. Philo was not a Christian, whereas the other two are and as a matter of fact the rest of the authors under the scrutiny in this chapter. We dare to include everyone in a general Judeo-Christian outlook. Therefore, although we can hardly speak of these writers as belonging to one and the same school, methodologically we can group them into the same tradition.

Another significant phenomenon is a possible Neo-Platonic influence on some theologians present on our list.
E.g. in *Contra Celsum* VI, 10.15 Origen mentions Zeus' speech in *Timaeus*' (τοῦ Διὸς κατὰ τὸν Τίμαιον δημηγορία). Taking into account Origen's habitual accuracy in the treatment of texts, it is somehow surprising that he speaks about Zeus, who is not mentioned in the *Timaeus* dialogue. This identification of Zeus with 'demiurge and father' must have been a commonplace of the Neo-Platonic tradition at some point. It can be traced for instance in Origen's later contemporary Iamblichus, who wrote a treatise '*On the speech of Zeus in Timaeus*' (Proclus, *in Tim* 1.308.19.-20.). Origen is generally very careful not to reveal his Neo-Platonic background.

Here we are confronted with a rare case where he does hesitantly. Origen does not refer to his source, which could have been also Iamblichus' source and inspiration for his treatise. This might mean that it was not Iamblichus who is to be claimed as the author of *Zeus-demiurge* identification, but rather some earlier Neo-Platonist(s), possibly even Plotinus or Porphyry.

Hippolyte of Rome has introduced an interesting hermeneutic principle that the understanding of Plato is inseparable from the Platonic tradition. Talking about Plato's theology he is hesitant to attribute a clear view to this great philosopher. Instead, he refers to four different positions, held by various Platonists, although he refuses to disclose their names. One of these positions is monotheistic and three other ones are polytheistic. Hippolyte interprets two out of four positions on the basis of *Tim* 41ab.

Finally, one can identify a certain succession of interpretation among these theologians. There was clearly some influence between these writers. Some of them show familiarity with the interpretative tradition of *Tim* 41ab. Origen discloses his knowledge of Neo-Platonic thought. Pseudo-Justin is familiar with the idea present in Clement that Plato went to Egypt and acquired some Hebrew wisdom there relating it to *Tim* 41ab.

What is clear from the data available and presented here is that the text of *Tim* 41ab was well-known to the writers of the early Patristic age, especially among the apologists. In fact, all the major figures of that time found themselves in a position of having to treat it in one way or another, even though there were substantial discrepancies in interpretation. Some of them went even as far as to see it as a key text to Plato's thought in general, and to philosophy in particular. However, the familiarity with it in later Patristic period, even starting from the golden age of the fourth century, substantially decreases. We do not find commentaries on it among the Cappadocians, John Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria, Pseudo-Dionysius or Maximus the Confessor. We tend to ascribe this sudden decrease of Plato's popularity to the victory of the party, which rejected philosophy as an important source for Christian doctrines. Curiously, this party is represented by great thinkers (Origen, Pseudo-Justin, Hippolyte of Rome), who nevertheless had little direct power in the church.

7.1. Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20BC-50AD) on *Tim* 41ab

7.1.1. *Tim* 41ab as the essence of Plato's theory of creation

In *De Aeternitate Mundi* (*dam* 13)[1] Philo once cites *Tim* 41ab in its complete form (13.3.-14.1.) if not to count a hardly significant alteration by replacing

διʼ ἐμοῦ γενόμενα ἄλυτα ἐμοῦ γε μὴ ἐθέλοντος

with ἄλυτα ἐμοῦ γε μὴ ἐθέλοντος.

The implication of dropping διʼ ἐμοῦ γενόμενα from the original carries a possible understanding as synonym to the ἐμοῦ, which follows. The meaning of the text has hardly suffered, if we are to ignore the grammatical reality of turning a careful negative construction into a positive rather more straight forward statement.[2]

This difference may reveal some interesting details. Either Philo presents another existing ancient manuscript of the *Timaeus* or, and more probable, he thought that the expression of the original was rather superfluous and a tautology which he therefore left out.[3] Curiously, Philo is known for his alterations of the texts - mostly Greek translations - of the Hebrew Bible. These alterations were deliberate in character with a view of emphasizing another meaning in the text, different from the first one, that comes into mind. This is especially true when one is confronted with the limits of the Bible translations and the need to go beyond them. In Philo's view, one ought to look for the presence of θεῖος ὀῴῃῷ in the biblical texts, which is revealed only to the initiated, those who mastered the allegorical method of the biblical exegesis.[4]

However, Philo hardly applied this method to texts in philosophy. Although a partisan of a systematic approach to the world of argument, he

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[1] *Dam* will be an abbreviation used by us *infra*. The Latin standard title *De Aeternitate Mundi* (*On the Eternity of the Universe*) is not an exact translation of the Greek ΠΕΡΙ ΑΦΘΑΡΣΙΑΣ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ, De l'incorruptibilité du monde, the way it is rightly rendered by J.Pouilloux.

2 This was already spotted by the editor of Les oeuvres de Philo d'Alexandrie, 30: De Aeternitate Mundi. Introduction et notes par R.Arnaldez, traduction P.Pouilloux. Paris. Cerf. 1969. on p. 82.

3 It is not excluded that he simplified the text unintentionally. If this be true, a psychoanalyst would certainly have something to comment on this.

4 That what we customary name as the Old Testament. Even that he did not cite: this is natural, as the Jewish canon was not yet established in his lifetime. We have to keep in mind that Philo was a Jew, not a Christian. All he says corresponds to the Jewish theological outset.

believed that the texts of philosophy were of lesser importance. Even Plato, who was certainly one of his favorites, especially in the theory of creation, belongs to this category. Not surprisingly, Philo's alteration of the passage in question from the *Timaeus* went in the direction of a simplification, rather than that of an expansion. If this was the Jewish Bible, Philo would never do this: he might alter the text, but would never simplify it. According to one of his suggestions, repetitions might be poignant with meaning which leads us to grasp hidden truth, ὄρθρος λόγος. Here we find a good example to explore but, curiously, Philo omits the repetition as if disagreeing with himself. As I said, Philo would not apply his method of allegorical investigation to Plato.

By dropping δι᾽ ἐμοῦ γενόμενα from the original Philo implicitly equalizes γενόμενα to λυτὰ in the cited passage. Although these words may appear to be synonymous in Plato's exposition, Philo tends to distinguish the two concepts in his own discourse. However, what follows is contrary to expectation. Since Plato's textual wording does give an emphasis to Philo's idea, we may expect him to keep and underline the presence of this idea in the Timaeus. Yet, Philo decides to disregard Plato's contribution by slightly mutilating the text. He is perhaps right as far as Plato's intentions are concerned, but he is not right as far as the meaning of the text is concerned. As Plato used to insist himself, the written word does bear at times unintended meanings[5]. The meaning that we try to decipher here is rather prosaic: his respect for this text has definite limits.

Philo's discussion which follows is rather *sec*. It focuses on the issue of whether or not the universe is created and corruptible (dam 7). Three possible solutions follow: (1) the universe as uncreated and incorruptible; (2) the universe as created yet incorruptible; (3) the universe as both created and corruptible.

Position (1) is Aristotelian, Position (3) is Stoic, whereas Position (2) has numerous proponents, such as Anaxagoras, Plato, Philo himself and perhaps still some others (the Christians are to follow suite). This does not mean that the mentioned authors necessarily agree with each other. The difference in their respective positions is rooted in the ambiguity, or even equivocity, of both terms 'universe' and 'corruption' (3). Thus Philo attaches three meanings to the word κόσμος 'universe' and two meanings to the word φθορά 'corruption'. To put it briefly, these are as following: The notion of the universe can mean either (dam 4) (A) the fundamental

[5] Especially in the case of poets, who might write beautiful poetry, poignant with deepest meanings, but they would not necessarily understand themselves what they wrote. Res publica II, 377d5

elements which the entire whole consists of, i.e. heaven, earth and all living beings within them; (B) the heavens (Anaxagoras); (C) the temporary visible universe which keeps on persisting before its consumption by fire (Stoics)[6]. Corruption can mean either a) being exposed to corrosion; b) a complete destruction (dam 5).

Thus, Plato's and Philo's, positions are closest to each other in character, occupying 2A in the above-mention division. This means that the universe, being defined as a combination of fundamental elements makes a created unity, yet not corruptible (i.d. not destructible). So far there is indeed a harmony between Plato and Philo. However, they do differ, when it comes to clarification of the constituting elements of the universe. To identify Plato's position more adequately Philo cites *Tim* 41ab. He suggests that Plato thinks in the following terms: a) the demiurge's speech makes a fundamental contribution to the act of creation, b) the new gods addressed in this speech belong to the important constituting elements of the universe (besides the heavens, the earth, the animals and the plants); c) the incorruptibility of the universe fully depends on the demiurge's will, declared in this speech.

Philo partially agrees with Plato's position as represented in *Tim* 41ab. I suppose, the very fact of God speaking, thus revealing a kind of sacral meaning (ἱερός λόγος), might have especially appealed to him. After all, it happened to Moses on several occasions. However, statement (b) appealed to him to a much lesser degree, namely, the idea that the traditional Greek gods should be an indispensible constitutive part of the created universe. This disagreement is natural: Philo simply does not believe in the gods of the Greek pantheon.

It is curious to see Philo cite *Tim* 41ab as representing the essence of Plato's position on the theory of creation and corruption of the universe. Clearly he knows the *Timaeus* dialogue very well. However, in accordance with Plato's exposition, the creation of the heavens and earth precedes the event described in the passage in question (Tim 37, 38), whereas the creation of the animals and plants follows it (Tim 41c). Why would Philo cite this passage and not the other two, if not to emphasize the creation of the new gods (νέοι θεοὶ: dam 13, 3 – an interpretative expression, not found in the Timaeus)?

Clearly, the creation of gods, as an initiation of plurality of gods, the gods who apparently have a beginning is the point distinguishing Plato's and Philo's positions.

6 This is still continue in the eternal cycles of regeneration and destruction

7.1.2. Comparative conclusion: Philo-Augustine on Tim 41ab

Both Philo (dam 13.3.-14.1.) and Augustine (civ.dei 13.16.) cite literally one and same passage from Plato (Тим 41 a7-б6). This fact alone admits speculations which goes as follows: either this passage was regularly used in the debates as a standard reference, or both Philo and Augustine cite a common source, such as a florillegium, which must have been accessible both in Greek and Latin.

Philo cites Plato in Greek, Augustine cites Plato in Latin. Not surprisingly, Augustine gets under influence of Cicero's translation, whereas Philo deals with the original. Although Philo also simplifies the original at one point (dam 13.4.), we can hardly compare this with Cicero's significant alterations to the text. Both Philo and Augustine freely use the passage in question in their exegesis. Neither of them considers Plato's philosophy as comparable with Scripture in authority.

According to each of them, the main topic of the *Timaeus* is the creation of the universe, yet Philo spots this topic in the passage itself, whereas Augustine does not. For the latter, the passage's theme is the resurrection of the body. Both of them understand this passage as a speech.

Philo and Augustine have a different view on the relations between the one addressing and the addressed. For the former, this is an time relationship, expressed through the notions of old and young age, whereas for the latter it is a hierarchic relationship, expressed by the means of status.

Philo calls the speaking God as elder and a leader (πρεσβυτάτος καὶ ἡγεμόνος), whereas Augustine names him as the Supreme God (*summus Deus*) Creator and God not made (*Deus non factus*). Both identify the subject of the speech with the Judaeo-Christian God Creator.

Both call the adressed as gods (θεοὶ), (dii), yet according to Philo these are the young gods (νεωτέροὶ θεοὶ), whereas for Augustine these are the minor gods (dii minores). Philo clearly uses the notion of young gods, known in the Platonic tradition of the exegesis of this passage, which is known to have been used up to the age of mature Neo-Platonism, particularly Proclus. Augustine is not familiar with this expression. According to him, these are the heavenly bodies, later understood as humans in the future resurrection.

The key difference between the authors in question consists in the reading of the speech's contents. The readers stress different aspects of importance. According to Philo, the content of this speech concerns the status of the universe as both created and incorruptible. For this purpose

Philo constantly deals with the notions of the universe and incorruptibility. According to Augustine, this speech is about the Creator's omnipotence, who transfigures the natural corruptibility and mortality into incorruptibility and eternal life.

7.2. Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150-215) on Tim 41ab

7.2.1. Tim 41ab as a contribution to the universal truth

In Stromata 5.14.102.5 Clement cites only the initial words of the demiurge: θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων. This passage, he says, is a clear proof that the Father in the Holy Trinity is also the demiurge delivering a public speech (δημηγορία) in the *Timaeus*. The use of the term δημηγορία for this purpose is somewhat peculiar.

In the first place Clement - using a posh classical style - applies parallelism, as both δημιουργός and δημηγορία not only sound similar but also have the same root: an adjective δήμιος - public, folk, of people.[7] What is public for a Greek usually takes place at the market place – ἀγορά. This can be an important announcement to the fellow citizens of the πόλις. Clement evidently applies the term δημηγορία to refer to the public, and thus, renders universal importance of the demiurge's speech, whose πόλις is an entire created οἰκουμένη. This speech will have consequences for everyone however it is *not* an esoteric speech of any kind. On the contrary, the speech is supposed to be open and accessible to everyone.

According to Clement this passage, along with two other extractions from Plato's letters: Letter II, 312e 1-4 and Letter VI 323 d 1-5, is evidence that Plato knew and adhered to the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. If one interprets Letter II one comes to the conclusion that each of the persons of the Trinity has unique functions. The Father's function is that of a creator due to his own decision (κατὰ βούλησιν), as *Tim* 41a seems to declare. The Son's function is that of a direct maker (δι᾽ οὗ "πάντα ἐγένετο"), and the Spirit's function is the dispensation of knowledge to/in the souls (cf. infra).

Here as elsewhere Clement affirms that the truth is accessible not only for Christians but also for Jews and philosophers alike, although to a lesser extent. He gets his idea from Plato's Republic III, 415 a 2-7 where he reinterprets the idea of different kinds of precious metals attached to the souls of various kinds of people: bronze and iron are imprinted in the souls of philosophers, silver is imprinted in the souls of Jews, whereas gold – being the gift of the Holy Spirit - illumines the souls of Christians (Stromata 5.14.14, 98, 2).

7 In fact, out of two root words, one root word is the same, the other is different but the sound is very similar in both cases. For the various connotations of the demiurge in the sense of a public officer see Luc Brisson, Le Même et l'autre dans la structure ontologique du Timée de Platon. 3-me ed. Academia Verlag. Sankt Augustin.1998. P. 84-101.

Clement assures us that the pagan philosophers not only received the natural predisposition to the truth, but he also claims that wisdom was directly transmitted to them by the Jews, and thus philosophy is likewise a product of revelation. He is sure that Plato particularly went to Egypt, where he read and became instructed in Hebrew scriptures (Stromata 5.14.99.3).

To prove his point Clement brings an immense amount of material into consideration. His knowledge of classical literature is encyclopedic, although, he lacks a bit of accuracy and critical analysis. He virtually barrages the reader with quotations from the representatives of various philosophical schools in support of his idea. Within the scope of a few pages (Stromata 5.14.96-103) Plato alone is cited a dozen of times (*Theatetus, Phaedrus, Republic, Timaeus, Letters II, VI:* some of these works are cited several times), not to speak of other authors (*Antipater, Aratus, Aristobulus, Callimacus, Democritus, Epicharmus, Hesiodus, Homer, Pindar, Xenophonus, Apocryph of Zoroaster*) along with several biblical books (*Genesis, Deuteronomy, Maccabeans, Matthew, John, Acts*). Clement does not appraoch these different authors and their texts critically, but writes as if they all mystically intertwine, agree and support each other.

Despite the fact that Clement cites only a short passage from *Timaeus 41ab ad litteram*, he still discusses the major issues of this passage in a wider context, as if he has the full passage in mind. Thus, in the text preceding the quotation he briefly touches upon the following issues: (a) the creative speech (Stromata 99.3), (b) the divine omnipotence (Stromata 5.14.100.6-101.1-4), (c) the 'divinity' of Zeus as leading to the true God (Stromata 5.14.101.2-102.1); and after the quote in question he mentions (d) the resurrection theory as related to the reincarnation myth of Er from the Republic (Stromata 103.2-4).

Clement elaborates extensively on the same issues throughout his discussion of the *Timaeus*, and as if afraid to be considered as a one-sided, or narrow-minded thinker, he builds an arsenal with supporting material from other sources. Only the Gnostics and Epicureans seem to be left out in his view that all philosophers share to a certain extend in the great treasury of knowledge on the divine. Clearly, he thinks that the true γνῶσις implies a certain universalism. This is not surprising: Clement was the second great head of the Alexandrian Catechetical school - succeeding Pantaenus, and followed by Origen. He worked in an atmosphere of impressive academia in an environment, where Christianity had been fully accepted.

7.2.2. Comparative conclusion Clement - Augustine on Tim 41ab

Clement's Stromata contains many quotes from various writers, including Plato's major dialogues (*Theatetus, Phaedrus, Republic, Timaeus, Letters*). We cannot possibly say something similar about Augustine, as he does not quote Plato's other dialogues in the context of discussion around *Tim* 41ab. Thus, Clement is offering a contextual reading of this passage, whereas Augustine's reading is mainly out of context.

Both Clement and Augustine assume that Plato went to Egypt, where he learned Hebrew wisdom. For Clement this statement is part and parcel of his national pride as he is also a Greek whose forefathers settled in Egypt. Augustine's point is focused on his rejection of Plato's possible encounter with the Prophet Isaiah which he argues could not have happened due to time discrepancy (civ.dei 8.11.). Augustine is ready to accept a lot, yet he remains level-headed and critical in treating of sources.

According to Clement, the *Timaeus* is comparable in importance to the Bible, since both these sources are a fruit of the divine revelation. Augustine rhetorically also advances claims of a similar character, knowing that Plato's oeuvre is the Platonists' Bible, yet he is not sincere. According to him, the *Timaeus* is not comparable with the Bible at all and therefore should not be considered the fruit of the divine revelation. Although both Clement and Augustine appreciate the achievements of the pagan culture, yet the latter's position is more fundamentalist than the former's. Clement assimilates the pagan wisdom into his system, whereas Augustine merely makes use of it.

Clement cites a small section of *Tim* 41a7 in Stromata 5.14.103. which is not much of a match to the length of Augustine's quote in civ.dei 13.26. of Tim a7-b6. Clement exclusively refers to the initial address of the demiurge, whereas Augustine quotes half of the demiurge's speech - note that he also misses its second half.

Clement stresses that the demiurge's speech is public (δημηγορία), and not esoteric or some secret information hidden from society. Augustine says no word about this matter.

Referring to the title of the speaker both Clement and Augustine's translator Cicero alter Plato's original. Clement adopts another word sequence: instead of δημιουργός πατὴρ τε he has πατὴρ δημιουργός τε. We understand why he made this alteration. This way the Greek text is more clear, as we then understand that the father refers to the gods, whereas the demiurge refers to the works, the way Proclus also explained Plato's original formula. Unfortunately, Clement attaches no further importance to

this word order, as if he did nothing more than naturally corrected the text. Augustine's translator Cicero does a similar job altering the word order in his translation by turning to *parens effectorque* instead of a much expected *effector parensque.* Evidently, neither of them can adequately follow Plato's train of thought, and their interventions show their conviction that Plato either expressed himself wrongly or made a mistake.

According to Clement, this passage along with two other passages from Plato, are proof for the Holy Trinity, surprisingly explained already by Plato. Augustine never cites this passage in the context of his Trinitarian discussions. Notably, he discusses *Tim* 29c in detail but not *Tim* 41ab in his *de Trinitate*. According to him, this passage concerns the resurrection theory as another crucial Christian doctrine, which is not mention by Clement at all in his discussion of Tim 41ab. Curiously, these two great Christian thinkers manage to identify two crucial Christian doctrines in a well-known pagan source, being considered the exclusive fruit of divine revelation. Both Clement and Augustine are quite daring in their far-fetched projection of Christian ideas on the pagan texts, although Clement is arguing out of conviction, whereas Augustine cleverly applies rhetoric.

7.3. Origen (ca. 185-254) on Tim 41ab

7.3.1. Plato's tricks in Tim 41ab

Origen's quotation of the passage under scrutiny is identical to that of Clement: he remains within the limits of the first line only: the initial invocation by the demiurge: θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων (Contra Celsum VI, 10, 16-17). Naturally, the length of the offered quotation imposes limits upon the discussion: it does not continue into other issues, such as the incorruption of body, the creator's will or the creative power of the divine λόγος.

Origen is one of the few ancient author on our list who refuses to take advantage of Plato's heritage.[8] He plainly claims that Plato makes false pretensions (ἀλαζονεύεται) in the demiurge's speech, which he means to be the speech of Zeus (τοῦ Διὸς κατὰ τὸν Τίμαιον δημηγορία, *CC* VI, 10, 15). Origen makes this a rather harsh statement in response to Celsus' remark that Plato not ever makes false pretentions nor does he tell lies (ὁ Πλάτων οὐκ ἀλαζονεύεται καὶ ψεύδεται, *The True Doctrine* 6.10b.3). Contrary to the given impression, Origen does have a lot of respect towards Plato, but the claim of Plato's infallibility is a bridge too far.

[8] Cf. M.Edwards, Origen against Plato. Oxford. Ashgate series. 2002.

According to Origin Plato does occasionally make false pretentions, i.e. in Tim 41a. Origen rebukes Plato for introducing polytheism in this passage. Unfortunately, he does not add any straightforward comments on this matter: he simply lets the reader draw this conclusion from the context. Curiously, the word ἀλαζονεύεται has become a technical term typically applied to the Sophists, who both wandered around and easily changed their philosophical standpoint. No wonder that soon its meaning turns to be 'making false pretention'.[9] In applying it to Plato Origen does not necessarily mean that Plato belongs to the Sophists' school in any sense, but implies that the latter has some tricks up his sleeve.[10]

Further on, Origen continues that the revelation concerning the Creator and the Son of God in the Bible is superior content wise to the speech of Zeus. A curious implication that can be drawn is that, despite his radical anti-polytheist position, Origen still finds that the speech of Zeus reveals something about divinity. Plato might be wrong, but not entirely, even with regards to Zeus as a true personage. Origen does not say here that Plato ψεύδεται but ἀλαζονεύεται – . Unfortunately, Origen does not go into a detailed discussion of what exactly Plato's implied positive contribution might be.

Two further points are important. First, nowhere in the *Timaeus* does Plato identificaty Zeus with the creator. Yet, Origen somehow spotted it in the text. True, he is not the first to do so. It has already become a commonplace of the *Timaeus* exegesis by the third century AD among the Platonists. Such an identification belongs either to Plato's unwritten doctrines, or to the subsequent tradition of the Platonic school(s). This way, Origen implicitly shows his familiarity with either of the two (or both of them).

Secondly, Origen does not cite *Tim* 41ab directly from Celsus' book *The True Doctrine* (ἀληθής λόγος), from which he often quotes Plato elsewhere in his apology. Origin directly uses the source, thereby showing familiarity with the original text. Thereby, he is somewhat contradictory to the chosen exegetical procedure, applied from the beginning of Contra Celsum, where he remains close to Celsus' text. Origen is well known for his none-literal method of textual exegesis. However, only on the basis of detailed analysis he might subsequently plunge into an allegorical interpretation. Nevertheless, he reserves the allegorical exegesis for the

9 H.G. Liddell and R.Scott, Greek-English Lexicon with a revised supplement. Oxford. 1986. P. 51.

10 The accusations in Sophistry towards Socrates, Plato's great teacher, were well known in Antiquity, for instance in Aristophanes' comedies. Cf. The Clouds. Cf. Aristophane, Les Acharniens-Les Cavaliers-Les Nuées. Paris. 1934.

Bible alone, like Philo before him. Plato's texts do not enjoy this privilege in the eyes of the great Alexandrians.

7.3.2. Comparative conclusion Origen - Augustine on *Tim* 41ab

Augustine is familiar with Tim 41ab exclusively through Cicero's translation. Origen cites Plato from the source, certainly not via Celsus, with whom he is running a dispute. He quotes this text in such a way, as if he spotted something important there what Celsus is trying to hide. To undermine his opponent Origen accuses Plato of lies and playing tricks (Πλάτων ἀλαζονεύεται).

Unlike Augustine's claims, Origen refuses to see any wisdom in Plato's teaching. He neither seeks Christian doctrines there, nor an influence upon Christian theologians. Therefore, although Plato is an authority for Origen, yet he appears as a negative authority. However, similarly to Augustine, Origen refers to our passage in order to respond to a Platonist (Celsus as much as Porphyry) harassing the Christians.

Unlike Clement and Cicero who reverse the word order in the speaker's title in the text of Tim 41ab, Origen quotes the same brief address yet literally the way it is in the original. This suggests that for Origen, who is one of the greatest textual exegetes ever, such a violation to the text would be unthinkable. Surprisingly, he too, makes another smart move by dropping ἔργων after πατὴρ τε. This way he also achieves a textual clarity, which is either not there or it is hard to spot. He leaves the address unfinished, yet adding καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς, as if to say "look, for those interested there is also ἔργων there, just check it".

The most intriguing detail in Origen's commentary is his claim that this speech is addressed by Zeus. Also in Augustine, Jupiter (Latin for Greek Zeus) appears several times in his commentaries on Tim 41ab. However, Augustine and Origen speak about two different things concerning Zeus. According to Origin, Plato's speaker in Tim 41ab is Zeus, whereas according to Augustine's reading of Porphyry, Zeus is a universal soul.

Apparently, they speak about different aspects of Zeus' role in a demiurgy. Yet, the matter of fact is that they both speak about Zeus in the context of Tim 41ab discussion. Since this passage does not directly refer to Zeus, most probably these go back to the common tradition, if not to the common source.

If to admit a possibility that both Origen and Augustine were acquainted with the teaching of Porphyry, who lived somewhat earlier than Origen and a century before Augustine, let us remember Proclus' reference saying that Porphyry identified the demiurge with the universal soul. If according to Plotinus, Zeus is an active aspect of the demiurge, this opinion is most probably is also shared by Porphyry as his successor. This assumes

that Zeus, being the demiurge of the universe, also delivers a speech to the gods (Origen), and is also the universal soul (Augustine).

It seems there is no contradiction between Origen's and Augustine's presentations. Yet, such an interpretation suggests an acquaintance of them both on the ground of Plotinus' and Porphyry's teaching on the demiurge, or perhaps on the basis of some other, possibly not extent, Neoplatonic source.

Curiously, Augustine applies an allegorical method of the reading of this passage, whereas Origen, as the greatest master of the allegorical method of the Alexandrian school of e the Bible exegesis, does not apply it here at all. Augustine reads first the celestial bodies and later the human beings into the minor gods. He also understands the general meaning of this passage as being on the theory of resurrection.

Origen says that Plato condescends to lies and tricks in this passage. Although he does not clarify his thought what he means by these, Origen appears to suggest that Plato is lying by supporting a Greek polytheism which he does not share. Clearly, Origen with the power of his impressive imagination could easily identify the humans in the future resurrection in this passage if he wanted to.

Origen hints at a comparison of Tim 41ab to the beginning of the Book of Genesis as well as to the Prologue of John to his Gospel. Augustine never comes up with such a suggestion in his writing. Although Origen claims a superiority of the Bible passages to Tim 41ab, the very fact of such a comparison tends to upgrade the status of this Plato's text. Indirectly he suggests a presence of a creative speech in this passage, whereas we never find anything of the kind in Augustine’s commentary.

7.4. Justin Martyr (ca. 100-165) on *Tim* 41ab

7.4.1. *Tim* 41ab as a prove of soul's immortality

In his Dialogus cum Tryphone[11] Justin renders the context of the Tim 41ab with his own words, sporadically citing brief extracts from the text (DT, V, 4).[12] This demonstrates Justin's intimate familiarity with Plato's philosophy (it is quite probable that he was some kind of a Platonist before his conversion to Christianity).[13] Justin can largely reconstruct the argument although some important details still escape his mind. Most probably, this may simply mean that while referring to the text he does not have it in front of him. We have certainly no grounds to claim an attempt at a deliberate distortion of the text, since his knowledge of and respect for Plato is substantial. Justin is convinced that both the Scripture and Plato essentially agree with each other. He thinks that the source of Plato's inspiration, as well as of the Bible authors, is a seminal reason (σπερματικὸς λόγος), a kind of divine revelation spread all over the word in different forms.[14]

To start with, the context of the discussion is already quite peculiar. The beginning of the dialogue is autobiographic,[15] at least to a certain extent. Before Justin plunges into his infamous dispute with Trypho, a fictitious Jew,[16] he initially receives instructions from his elder (addressed as πάτερ, father), whose task is to set his disciple on a right path in true, Christian, philosophy.[17] Curiously, the elder does so by using dialectical

11 Infra DT.

12 Ph. Bobichon, Justin Martyr: Dialogue avec Tryphon, édition critique. Paradosis 47/1. Fribourg. 2003. Pp. 200-201.

13 Saint Justin, Apologies. Introduction, texte critique, traduction, commentaire par A.Wartelle. Etudes augustiniennes. Paris, 1987. P. 41.

14 Apologia secunda 8.3.2.-3; Monseigneur Freppel, Saint Justin. Cours d'éloquence sacrée. 3-ème édition. Paris. 1885. P. 189.

15 Ch.Kannengesser, A.Solignac, Justin (saint), in Dictionnaaire de Spiritualité. V. VIII. Paris. 1974. P. 1641.

16 Ibid. P.1642.

17 An oral transmission of Christ's teaching from the teacher to the disciple has become a classical form in Antiquity. Naturally, the standard for it ought to be looked for in the relationships between Christ and the Apostles. This form can later be found in the Egyptian desert of the fourth century AD (Cf. Apophthegmata patrum). The teacher is often referred to as elder (γέρων), and is typically addressed as πατήρ (thus spiritual father, as he is never the disciple's genetic father). Note that this form has been also preserved as early as in the 2nd century, although here we can see signs of a philosophically weighted interaction between the elder and his disciple. This form of instruction goes as far back as to Socrates and his disciples (Plato being among them).

maieutics, a quasi- Socratic method of questioning his disciple (ἡ μαιευτικὴ τέχνη, *Theaet* 210.b.8.), thereby implying that the disciple already possesses the true knowledge. The challenge of the instructor is to help him to grasp it in the full light, to realize it. Yet, the elder does it sometimes in a hardly Socratic fashion. Sometimes his questions are plainly provocative, e.g. whether the animals too can see God (VI, 3-4). And also the elder's disciple, unlike Socrates' conversants, ventures to say far too much for someone who is supposed to receive instructions. Nevertheless, the disciple does often get it right. Apparently, this is due to the fact that the disciple is quite advanced in his training. It is not surprising: he is soon to go into a real fight with a tricky Jew (the dispute is to start just a few pages infra, from DT, VIII, 3).

The discussion centers on around the issue of whether or not the soul is immortal. The elder, showing his familiarity with the Platonists' teaching concerning the immortality of the soul (DT, V, 1), attempts a somewhat more nuanced exposition. According to him (DT, V, 3), the soul is not immortal by nature but may become so (even against the natural laws). After the departure from the body (i.e. a visible death of a human being), some souls expect their fate in a happy place, whereas other ones are kept in the place of endurance. Both these groups of souls await God's final judgment, who may grant immortality at least to some of the mortal souls.

At this point (DT, V, 4) Justin remarks that the elder's doctrine, despite apparent discrepancies with the Platonists' teachings, may still derive from Plato, the way it has come down to us in the Timaeus dialogue. Although Plato's argument there does not concern the soul but the universe, we can still easily project his reasoning also upon the soul in such a way that the doctrine might become similar (if not identical) to that of the elder.

According to Justin, in the Timaeus Plato tells us that the universe is both generated and/or corruptible (καὶ φθαρτός ἐστιν ἢ γέγονεν) by nature. Only God is non-generated and incorruptible per se (μόνος γὰρ ἀγέννητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος ὁ θεὸς), [18] because God's existence is not caused by anyone/anything else. On the contrary, he is the cause for everything else, the universe in the first instance. Since the universe came into existence at some point, it is also due to perish in the end. Therefore, it is corruptible by nature, according to Plato. However, by

[18] This kind of argument may have had an influence upon Gregory Nazianzen's characteristic distinction between the Father and the Son in the Trinity: Father's main feature as being ἀγέννητος, the Son's main characteristic as γέννητον. Cf. De filio 12.1; see also G.Florovsky, The Eastern Fathers of the Fourth Century. Belmont, MA. 1987, p. 133-134; B.Bobrinskoy, Le Mystère de la Trinité, Paris, 1986. P. 251.

God's will (διὰ τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ θεοῦ) the universe may become incorruptible (although it will still always remain generated).

This type of reasoning concerns the universe, but it also can be projected upon everything that is contained in it: the souls included, and potentially all the rest (τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πάντα). Similarly to the universe, the soul is also generated and therefore corruptible by nature. Nevertheless, on the account of God's decision (διὰ τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ θεοῦ) it may become incorruptible (yet, like the universe, it will remain generated). However, we do not know what God's decision concerning a particular soul may be. The soul may perish, abandoned by God to its fate in corruptible nature; it may possibly escape its fate of having to taste of death (οὐδὲ τεύξεται θανάτου μοίρας, *Tim* 41b4) by continuing to live eternally in accordance with God's grace even be it contrary to its corruptible nature.

Clearly, the argument derives from Tim 41ab.[19] Expressions such as γεννητὰ καὶ φθαρτα; οὐδὲ τεύξεται θανάτου μοίρας; διὰ τὴν βούλησιν (τοῦ θεοῦ) have been extracted from there ad litteram. The structure of the argument as a whole is also characteristic for the passage in question: exclusively one subject (X) is incorruptible (a), everything else (Y) is corruptible (-a). However, if X decides (a) for Y instead of (-a), then Y does become (a).

This being the case, there are still a few severe deficiencies in Justin's exposition, as far as the adequacy to the original is at stake. The subjects of Plato's argument differ from the subjects of Justin's recollection. For Plato the X is 'demiurge and father', for Justin the X is an undefined god.[20] Y is 'gods' for Plato, for Justin these are the universe and consequently soul

19 This has been already noticed by G.Archambault as early as in 1909 (Justin: Dialogue avec Tryphon. Paris.1909. P.30). E.F.Osborn continues along this line, offering an interesting analysis in Chapter 1 (The God and Father of All) of his book but cites Plato's Timaeus 41ab full section directly from the original. He does so a bit uncritically, thereby giving us an impression as if Justin cited Plato fully and adequately as well, which is not the case. Cf. E.F.Osborn, Justin Martyr, Tûbingen. 1975. Pp. 20-21.

20 It is curious that Justin drops this crucial title at this point, as if he attached no importance to it. On the contrary, several times he employs its synonym ποιητής καὶ πατήρ towards god the ceator in the course of the present dialogue (DT: 7, 5; 56, 1; 60, 2; 60, 5; 117, 5). This last expression is clearly Platonic (Tim 28c). The only difference between the two titles (ποιητής καὶ πατήρ and δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε) is that Justin appears to prefer Plato's ποιητής to Plato's δημιουργὸς as far the creative function is concerned. Certainly, the notion ποιητής is less controversial than the notion δημιουργὸς in the Christian context, since the derivatives of the first expression are found in the Septuagint (e.g. Gen 1:1), whereas those of the second are not.

(being a part of the universe), and possibly other components of the universe (πάντα) but in no way 'gods'. [21]

If we may allow ourselves to indulge into a speculation concerning this distortion of Plato's thought, there is a possibility that at the time when Justin was reading this passage at some point in the past, he thought that Plato meant a personalized universe while speaking of Gé – one of the possible addressees of the speech. That is perhaps how Justin remembered this text, taking into account that the universe was indeed thoroughly discussed in preceding sections of the dialogue. However, even if it were the case, it would be a far-fetched simplification: perhaps one can agree on the identification between Gé with personalized earth, but in no way with the entire universe, earth being just a part of it. Moreover, the other addressees of the speech (a number of Greek traditional gods) are simply left out in Justin's presentation. On top of this, Justin has also altered the genre of Plato's passage: instead of a lively address-monologue, one gets a rather sec argument.

To conclude, Justin is the first author on our list so far who shows an intimate and not artificial familiarity with Plato's argument in Tim 41ab, yet he does come up with a new insight which can hardly be named authentic. That happens also to Augustine as well. He reproduced the argument adequately, yet replaced the context and project of Plato's discussion. Justin creatively reworks Plato's passage to serve his own needs at the time of writing the DT. That what Augustine later also ventures to do in civ.dei., even though he does not appear to be familiar with Justin's oeuvre.

7.4.2. Comparative Conclusion: Justin Martyr and Augustine on Tim 41ab

Both Justin and Augustine held Plato in high esteem, yet in different ways. Justin believed that in a spermatic way the truth could be already found among pagan sages and philosophers, including Plato. Plato's teaching, as well as the Scripture, was the result of revelation, and God was the source of both. In the early years Augustine also admired Plato and Platonism, perceiving Platonism as a doctrine similar to Christianity, although even at that time he never considered Plato's writings equal in importance to the Bible. In the later period, Augustine started to use Plato

21 In fact, Justin fully accepts the traditional accusation in atheism raised against the Christians in Antiquity. : "…we admit that we are atheists as far as these so-called gods are concerned" (1 Apology 6, 1). This was a dangerous piece of rhetoric which might cost one a life in the time of hostility. This happened in the end to Justin, who was put to death in Rome with six other companions ca. 165 under the prefectorate of Junius Rusticus (163-167).

with more caution and used him mostly for rhetorical purposes, as, for example, is the case with Tim 41ab. Augustine repeatedly referred to this passage in a dispute about the resurrection of the bodies, yet, the question of how sincere he was convinced that Plato really shared this doctrine, still remains open.

Justin believed that theological knowledge should be obtained not simply through rational arguments, but through the living tradition of the elders, transmitted face to face. This tradition included centuries-long experience and was based not only on the Scripture but also on the philosophical teachings including Tim 41ab. Augustine set to build up his argument on his own.

Justin did not consider Tim 41ab a speech. Neither the demiurge nor the gods, to whom the demiurge addressed, appeared in the text, which means that Justin did not have to dwell on the problems concerning the status of the demiurge, polytheism, etc. For Augustine, this text was primarily a speech in which the Supreme God expressed his omnipotence, changing the laws of nature at his will.

For Justin Martyr, Tim 41ab primarily spoke about the immortality of the soul. In his discussion of this passage, Augustine also addressed this issue ((ε) civ. dei X, xxxi. 10-25). According to Justin, souls were mortal but they became immortal by the will of the Godhead. According to Augustine, souls were immortal, but their immortality differed from the divine immortality. The soul had a beginning, but it would never have an end. Both Justin and Augustine compared the soul to the universe. According to Justin, both the universe and the soul were originated, yet imperishable. Augustine argued that the whole universe as well as the heavenly bodies and the soul became immortal, being mortal by their nature. The same thing could happen to the body, if God so desired.

7.5. Pseudo-Justin on Tim 41ab

7.5.1. Tim 41ab on God's existential character

Pseudo-Justin cites from Tim 41ab on four occasions within the scope of five short chapters (XX-XXIV) in his Cohortatio ad gentiles (CG infra).[22] Thrice he cites the beginning of the demiurge's address (CG: XX:13, XXII:13, XXIV: 4), and once he quotes a major section of the demiurge's speech (CG: XXIII: 2-5). What is the most intriguing from the start for the purpose of our study is that he places Tim 41ab into the center of importance for the whole exegesis of Plato's thought. He considers the Timaeus dialogue to be a treatise on theology (CG: XXII: 3-4). Pseudo-Justin's interpretation of the Timaeus is indeed an insightful, creative, in-depth reading of the text. Nevertheless, he still misses some essential points, these being based on his repeated handicapped quote from the original. To grasp what and how it happened let us examine his exegesis of the passage.

Pseudo-Justin follows Justin's idea concerning Plato's source, who in his view learned the Hebrew wisdom in Egypt (insistently repeated in CG, e.g. in XX:1, XX:15; XXII:1). One can find out that this is true by discerning his secret teaching contained in the text of the Timaeus dialogue, which we will discuss infra. Nevertheless, Plato also makes some minor mistakes in grasping the Hebrew wisdom adequately. This is due to the fact that he received his knowledge orally and did not make a step towards joining the Hebrew faith.

[22] The Greek text of the CG, provided with a Latin translation is in: Iustini philosophi et martyris Opera Omnia. Vol III. Edidit I.C.T.Eques de Otto. Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum saeculi secundi. 1847. Pp. 71-87. The attribution to Justin Martyr stems from Eusebius of Caesarea, who lists Cohortatio ad gentiles: Eccl. (IV, 18, 1) among other Justin's writings. However, a number of convincing arguments both of philological and theological nature demonstrate that the treatise under examination which carries this title in fact was not written by Justin (Cf. i.e. O.Bardenhewer, Pères de l'église: leur vie et leur oeuvres. Paris. 1905. Pp.124-125). This either can mean that Eusibius made an attribution mistake, or that Justin indeed wrote a work with such a title, which yet did not extend until these days. A similar story goes about two other works: Oratio ad gentiles, and de monarchia. These were also first attributed to Justin Martyr, but later the attribution was withdrawn. Moreover, the author of these two treatises is not necessarily the same as the one who wrote the Cohortatio. It is quite plaussible that we are speaking about four different authors (one authentic Justin Martyr and three Pseudo ones), all coming roughly from the same epoch (2nd-3d c.). As if to make the story even more complicated, M.Heimgartner convincingly argues that the treatise De Resurrectione, previously commonly attributed to Athenagoras, has also come from the pen of one of the above-mentioned Pseudo-Justin(s). Cf. Pseudojustin, Ueber die Auferstehung. Texte und Studie von M.Heimgartner. Walter de Gruyter. Berlin-New York. 2001. P. 203.

According to Pseudo-Justin, the most important part of the Hebrew scripture can be found in the book of Exodus 3:14. "Ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤν" (the LXX version)[23] is the essence of God's personal revelation to Moses.[24] This is the closest concept concerning the divine essence, which is accessible to the human mind. In fact, there are no true names for God (this being a statement of an apophatic theology in Pseudo-Justin). All the divine names are mere attributions to him advanced by the humans. This concerns any name for God that a human being is capable of thinking of. Even the word 'god' is not really a name but an 'objectivising' projection of human expectations, which is therefore inadequate. The exception is yet Hebrew YHWE (ὁ ὤν in the LXX), as this is not a name given to God by the humans like in all other instances. God first revealed this name to Moses, and then he used it in contexts, from which you ought to infer that it is a true name of a mystical nature. An example for it is given in the same verse where the name appears (Exodus 3:14). When Moses inquired God how his people would recognize his mission, God answered: "tell them that ὁ ὤν has sent you" (CG: XXI:21).

In Plato too one can reconstruct this sort of reasoning within the line of the apophatic and cataphatic theology, which figures prominently in Pseudo-Justin's perception of the divine. First and foremost, he is convinced that the word θεὸς does not always refer to god. Sometimes it does, sometimes it does not. The Tim 41ab can serve as a good example, where the expression 'gods' is Plato's deliberate false attribution of this term to non-gods (conventional or traditional gods). Plato commits this failure out of fear for the Areopagues (persistently repeated in CG: chapters XX and XXV). He still remembers far too well what happened to his teacher Socrates: Anyt's and Meletus' accusation of atheism on the grounds of denial of the plurality of gods are still fresh in his mind (CG: XX: 2-3). Thus Plato speaks about gods in Tim 41ab but actually does not mean them to be as such.

In fact, Pseudo-Justin cannot believe that Plato's statement concerning gods' plurality is in any sense sincere. It is hardly believable because it simply contradicts Plato's preceding presentation. In Tim 27d-

[23] Cited as many as six times in the course of four short chapters: CG: XIX: b3, XIX e3, XX b7, XX c3, XXIII e6, XXIV: a3.

[24] E.Gilson constructs an impressive vision of the medieval philosophy, which culminates in Thomas Aquinas' existential interpretation of Exodus 3:14. If he were familiar with Pseudo-Justin's interpretation his system would certainly require a certain polishing. Cf. E.Gilson, La philosophie au moyen-âge, vol.II : De saint Thomas d'Aquin à Guillaume d'Occam, Payot, 1922; The Christian philosophy of Saint Augustin. Gollancz. London. 1961; Trois leçons sur le problème de l'existence de Dieu, Divinitas, 1961.

28a he says that everything what really is, does not come into the world of becoming, and that everything that comes into the world of becoming, is not really (this idea is repeatedly mentioned in CG, chapters XXII through XXIII). However, Plato's demiurge declares gods to be coming into the world of becoming. If these 'gods' come into the world of becoming with their bodies, souls and their particular mode of existence, then they are generated and do not really exist, despite appearances. Contrary to the multitude of these divinities, the true God is the one who really is, without having to come into the world of becoming, both according to the Hebrew scriptures and Plato alike.

Clearly, the θεοὶ of the demiurge's speech are not really gods according to Pseudo-Justin. They are named gods, but named falsely. There is a definite similarity concerning intimate knowledge about God between the account of Moses in Exodus 3:14 and Plato's account in the Timaeus 27d-28a. Both Moses and Plato speak of God in terms of being, existence (CG: XXII). However, these authors use different articles (CG: XXII: 7), while making comparable claims concerning the divine nature. (They also use different yet connected participles for the divine existential characteristic). Moses uses the masculine form of the Participle of the verb 'to be' (ὁ ὤν) (in LXX version), Plato comes up with the neutral (τὸ ὂν). Thus, Moses places an accent on God's personal character, whereas Plato, naturally, prefers a philosophical exposition. Otherwise, both comprehensions essentially agree. As we have said supra, Pseudo-Justin is convinced that Plato learned of God as being (ὁ ὤν) in Egypt. Thus his source must be Moses and ultimately God himself in his revelation.[25]

Moreover, according to Pseudo-Justin, Plato questions even the divinity of the speaker in Tim 41ab. He has to do so taking into account the above-mentioned reasoning concerning the divinity of gods. The speaker is a demiurge. But who is actually this demiurge? Is he really a god? He is certainly a maker of some kind, but whether he is a creator referred to at the beginning of the book of Genesis still remains a question. At the first glance, the demiurge must be the creator of the universe, as Plato must have known the exposition on creation rendered by Moses, and yet there are still intricate difficulties present. To grasp this Pseudo-Justin makes a terminological distinction between ποιητής and δημιουργός, referring

[25] In chapters that follow Pseudo-Justin goes as far as to claim that not only Plato but also Homer received knowledge of the one and true God in Egypt (CG: XXIV-XXV). He bases this claim on a few textual parallels between Homer and Plato. The one which concerns our study is a comparison between Tim 41a with Homer's Illiad 9. 497: 'even gods are changeable' (cited twice in CG: XXIV:2, XXV: 6). Pseudo-Justin thinks that both Plato and Homer speak of the same: mistaken attribution of plurality to the divinity.

to Plato as an authority (CG: XXII: 21), this being without any textual support (this distinction must be Pseudo-Justin's Christian personal input). ποιητής is a creator who accomplishes the act of creation out of his own power, without any intermediate means.[26] The demiurge is a craftsman who uses an intermediary material means, which serves him as a basis for his creation. The ultimate starting point for the craftsman's result is matter as a basic principle. In a certain sense the demiurge depends on matter as far as his craftsmanship is concerned. The clear implication of this discourse is that God must be distinguishable from the demiurge.

In fact, God and matter are two key principles in Plato's exposition (CG: XX: 6). When the demiurge delivers his speech towards the gods, thereby he accomplishes an act of craftsmanship not out of nothing, but out of matter. According to Pseudo-Justin, Plato's gods in the Timaeus originate from matter (CG: XX: 7-8). Although matter is a principle, it falls outside existence (not surprisingly, there is an inherent contradiction contained in the concept of matter as a principle: matter remains a principle although it does not really exist, since existence belongs to the realm of the divine, which stems from another principle). Since gods arise into the world of becoming from matter, they do not really exist either. Therefore, gods are not really Gods, as a god in order to be God ought to exist really before coming into the world of becoming. God cannot originate in matter, but has to remain a separate independent principle.

A larger section of the *Tim 41ab* quotation appears in CG: XXIII, which commences right after the demiurge's initial address: ᾽Επείπερ γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστε, all the way up to ἰσχυροτέρου, λαχόντες. Pseudo-Justin claims there that the key idea here is a lie, which the philosopher commits out of the already mentioned fear for the polytheists. Plato's presentation in this passage seems to intend to please these people, since it depicts the traditional gods as immortal beings. Essentially, this is a lie because it contradicts Plato's two previous fundamental statements, which cannot be compromised. First, everything what has come into the world of becoming is necessarily mortal and corruptible. Secondly, the idea of a speaking demiurge seems to transgress the concept concerning God and matter as two independent principles. And indeed since gods came into existence, their essence is rooted not only in God as their craftsman, but also in matter as a principle. Therefore, these 'gods' will have to die and become dissolved according to the system

[26] Perhaps purely coincidently, Pseudo-Justin applies the analyzed word (ποιητής) towards Homer in the following chapters (CG: XXIV-XXV). In case, if this use is not completely accidental, it makes us think of an evident parallel between the creator of the universe and a great poet, both of which being artists of some kind.

requirements, introduced elsewhere in the Timaeus. Yet, as if to contradict himself, Plato says here that the demiurge decides to overrule the law of mortality and dissolubility, since he has made gods out of material premises. He decides to render possible what is impossible. However, even if we are to equate the demiurge with God (which is a false statement within Plato's system), this is still impossible. God cannot overrule the laws of matter, since these laws are neither originated in him, nor do they depend on him. The passage suggests that there is but one principle: God, whereas matter depends on him, and thereby it looses its status as a principle. This reasoning can hardly fit into Plato's thought. Thus, God is not omnipotent in Plato's system, contrary to what the passage in question appears to suggest. Although Pseudo-Justin clearly would like to agree with a statement concerning the divine omnipotence, he does not trust Plato to have really meant it so. He thinks that if Plato does really mean what he writes in this passage, then all his system has to end in a self-destruction, which would be strange to admit as his intention. Therefore, the key statement of this passage concerning the demiurge granting immortality and incorruptibility to the traditional Greek gods is simply a lie, advanced by Plato out of fear of the polytheists.

Now we will turn to Pseudo-Justin's main exegetical shortcoming in his interpretation of *Tim 41ab*. Curiously, he abandons a quote of the demiurge's address half-way through the demiurge's title: Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργός (the applied comma belongs to the editor:[27] this way it purports to canonize Pseudo-Justin's reading – the only one possible on the basis of his extraction).[28] He calls the speaker by the name 'demiurge', whereas Plato names the speaker as a 'demiurge and father' (δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε). By omitting the word 'father' from his interpretation Pseudo-Justin undermines the speaker's fatherhood title and function. This lacuna is quite suspicious in a Christian context wherein God is commonly addressed as the father in the key prayer (Our father: Mt. 6:9-14). Pseudo-Justin's abridged version of the speaker's title significantly alters the meaning of his identity. Pseudo-Justin ends up making gods into a craftsman out of a complex character of the speaker in Plato's text.[29]

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[27] Justinianus*, Iustini philosophi et martyris, Opera Omnia*, Vol III, Edidit I.C.T. Eques de Otto, *Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum saeculi secundi*, *,1847.. Pp. 72, 78,, 82

[28] In I..C.T. De Otto's bilingual edition appears an extract from Calchidius' and not from Cicero's version of the Timaeus: Dii deorum, quorum ego sum opifex. Ibid. Pp. 73.79, 83. This is quite natural as Calchidius' translation is much closer to the original.

29 P.Haeuser consistently renders the identity of the speaker with 'Gottensbuildner'. In his translation. This compact title introduces an obviously new term into our discussion, which is yet absent from the original: there is noting but a trivial θεῶν δημιουργός to be

In *Tim 41a* the address of the demiurge's speech is somewhat longer than the one cited by Pseudo-Justin: Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς (πατήρ τε ἔργων) – here the brackets indicate a difference between Plato's original address and Pseudo-Justin's extract from it. The original version offers a different perspective from a modified version in use by Pseudo-Justin. In *In Timaeo Commentaria* V Proclus correctly spots a parallelism in this expression: the Genitive θεῶν is bound to the πατήρ, and not to the words situated next to it either way: neither the preceding Θεοὶ nor the following δημιουργός, whereas the Genitive ἔργων hangs upon the δημιουργός and not upon the πατήρ.[30] There from, a possible rendering of the text: 'Gods, of who I am a father, and (I am) a craftsman of the works' substantially differs from what Pseudo-Justin makes of it. Plato's tricky style is misleading even for someone like Pseudo-Justin, whose native language is obviously Greek.

By skipping πατήρ τε ἔργων from this address Pseudo-Justin not only gets rid of a half of the speaker's title, but consequently projects a simplified reading on the remaining half. 'θεῶν... δημιουργός' which he admits to pertain means nothing else indeed but a "gods' craftsman" - the meaning, which becomes a focus of his exegesis. There from Pseudo-Justin tends to play down both the status of the speaker (who consequently turns into a super-human craftsman), and the gods, who are the addressed audience of the speech. Within such an exposition these 'gods' tend to become nothing else but mere creatures, products of the demiurge's making, and not his children as it appears in Plato.

The discussion supra suggests us to join in a present day scholarly consensus concerning Justin Martyr vis-à-vie Pseudo-Justin:[31] we ought to agree that we are dealing indeed with two different authors.[32] They both

found there. Cf. Pseudo-Justinus, Mahnrede an die Hellenen. Ueberstzt von P.Haeuser. Kempten, Muenchen. 1917. Pp. 273 and 274.

30 The commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato. Vol. 2. Translator Th. Taylor. London. Prometheus trust. 1998. P. 338.

31 M.Slusser in his recent study Justin Scholarship: trends and trajectories (in Justin and his worlds. Ed. S.Parvis and P.Foster. Fortress Press. Minneapolis. 2007) presents the stastus quaestionis on various issues in Justin's scholarship, yet he even does not attempt to bring back in question the identity of Pseudo-Justin. The issue seems to be closed, yet the question remains: who is the author of the Cohortatio? - 'Pseudo-Justin' can hardly be claimed as an identity.

32 Nevertheless, the main argument of philosophical nature against the authenticity of (Pseudo)-Justin does not yet agree with the present section under scrutiny. In the Introduction to his German translation of the CG P.Haeuser claims that the two authors differ in their evaluation of the Greek philosophy, namely, Justin says that Plato and other philosophers were inspired by the divine logos, whereas Pseudo-Justin says that they were

show a substantial familiarity with the contents and the context of Tim 41ab. However, Pseudo-Justin knows it in detail, making comparisons with other sections of the Timaeus dialogue, whereas Justin's knowledge of *Tim 41ab* is significantly more modest. In the course of the *Tim 41ab* exegesis Justin's conclusions are far-less reaching than those by Pseudo-Justin. For instance, Pseudo-Justin's key section concerning God as ὁ ὤν (*Exodus*), as being compared to τὸ ὂν (*Timaeus*) seems to have left no traces on Justin's own reception of Plato. A nuanced distinction between a craftsman and a creator plays an important role in Pseudo-Justin's discussion but does not leave any traces on Justin's analysis either. The only argument from Justin which most probably stems from *Tim 41ab* receives a contradictory treatment by Pseudo-Justin. Justin argues for the omnipotence of the demiurge, whereas Pseudo-Justin denies it (CG: XXIII), as in his view, matter appears to be an independent principle in Plato. Justin does not discuss the issue on matter at all.

7.5.2. Comparative Conclusion: Pseudo-Justin and Augustine on Tim 41ab

Pseudo-Justin's excellent knowledge of Plato from original sources cannot be compared to Augustine's knowledge of Plato. Yet, similarly to Augustine, pseudo-Justin treated Plato in a creative way for supporting the Christian doctrine. In Augustine we can see the tendency to Christianize Plato in the framework of the Christian doctrine whereas pseudo-Justin shows the tendency to "Platonize" Christianity in the framework of the Platonic discourse.

Augustine did not raise the question on how sincere Plato was telling his story, while pseudo-Justin believed that Plato wrote about many gods, mentioned in the text, out of fear of the Areopagites, who punished his teacher Socrates. Therefore, the problem of the many gods in Plato should not be taken seriously; the text is about something else.

Many times pseudo-Justin referred to Exodus 3:14, stating that both Moses and Plato understood God as being. However, only Moses understood God as personalized being, while Plato understood God as abstract being. According to pseudo-Justin, Plato learned this truth from the Jews in Egypt. Even though Augustine was also convinced that Plato had visited Egypt for studying wisdom, in his discussion of Tim 41ab Augustine never referred to Exodus 3: 14 or to other passages of the Bible.

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not: only prophets receive such an inspiration, which can be only the fruit of the divine revelation. Ibid. P. 236.

In their analysis of Tim 41ab, pseudo-Justin and Augustine focused on two different Christian doctrines. Pseudo-Justin concentrated on the name of God and the nature of His existence, while Augustine concentrated on the resurrection of the body. As opposed to Augustine, who was not interested in discussing the nature of God in the context of this passage, pseudo-Justin perceived the text as directly pertaining to such a discussion. For pseudo-Justin this text spoke about God and thus was strictly theological in nature. Pseudo-Justin analyzed the biblical text of Exodus 3:14 from the perspective of Plato's philosophy, understanding God as true everlasting existence emitting existence into this transient world, the world of becoming, which in itself did not have anything existing in the true sense of the word. Augustine never touched upon the problems of such theological and existential nature in his writings, even more so in the context of discussing our passage. In general, Augustine was more interested in the voluntaristic type of issues while pseudo-Justin was more interested in the existential type of issues.

7.6. Athenagoras (ca. 133-190) on Tim 41ab

7.6.1. Plato's misleading use of terms in Tim 41ab

In Legatio sive supplicatio pro Christianis ("Embassy for the Christians") VI, 2-3 Athenagoras quotes the following section of Plato's passage in question:

θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων ἃ (...) ἄλ υτα ἐμοῦ μὴ θέλοντος, τὸ μὲν οὖν δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν. Note that this quotation skips a part of the text connecting ἃ with ἄλυτα: δι᾽ ἐμοῦ γενόμενα (Tim 41a7-8). This was however, the case with a major part of quotes in Antiquity (Philo, Julian etc.).

Athenagoras uses this extract as an element in his apology, intended to make a link between traditional philosophical schools, such as Plato's Academy, the Peripathetics and especially the Stoics on the one hand, and the Christian doctrine, which was yet to be formulated on the other hand. A link between philosophers and the Christians is an essential point on Athenagoras' agenda: this was the time of anti-Christian persecutions. Therefore, he took into account the fact that in charge of the persecuting party was Marcus Aurelius, a Roman Emperor who boasted himself to be a

philosopher. Therefor, a flattering dedication of the book: to Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus, conquerors 'but above all, philosophers'.[33]

Athenagoras ought to answer three charges against the Christians common in his days: atheism, incest and cannibalism.[34] The first charge meant that the Christians neither believed in gods nor shared the polytheistic practicies expected from a low-abiding Roman citizen. Athenagoras' reply to this is that the Christians are not atheists at all, although they indeed do not comply to the expectations. They believe in one god only (the way Athenagoras formulates it, they believe in a monad – μονάδα - god's oneness, his unicity).[35] In case such a belief is to be considered atheism, we have to count philosophers, especially the Pythagoreans who also speak about God as a monad, to be atheists as well. However, philosophers are usually excluded from these charges. Understandably: the Emperor himself is a Stoic philosopher.

At this point Athenagoras brings in some doxological material (ἐπὶ τὰς δόξας ἐτραπόμην).[36] In fact, his list is not that long: he quotes from Plato, Pseudo-Aristotle (whose treatise de mundo he considers to be authentically Aristotelian according to his day's custom)[37] and the Stoics.[38] The quotes from Plato's Timaeus (28c and 41a) are closer to the original than Athenagoras' presentations of two other doctrines. He refers to Tim 28c to demonstrate the difficulty of finding out the identity of the universe's creator, wherefore one would need a courage of a philosopher, the virtue he is ready to attribute to the Christians. Athenagoras further cites Tim 41a in

[33] The trustworthiness of this dedication has been challenged by scholars: most probably that the true reason for writing the Legatio was the persecutions in Lyon, to which the author wishes to draw the attention of the learned audience.

34 The latter two are formulated here in a civilized fashion as 'Oedipus's Manner' and 'Thyeste Banquets'. Legatio VI, 3.

35 A proof of oneness as the most basic constitutive element that binds a thing or an idea was to become from the third century on a typical way of reasoning in Neo-Platonic tradition as the way of ascension to the One. This connects well also with the Pythagorean tradition, which Athenagoras has mostly in mind in this part of this book.

36 Curiously, G.Bardy translated this as florilèges in Athénagore, Supplique au sujet des Chrétiens. Introduction et traduction G.Bardy. Sources Chrétiens. Paris. 1943. P. 84.

37 Athenagoras attributes to Aristotle the doctrine that a) god consists of soul and body; b) god's soul consists of ether. Neither of these two statements are authentically aristotelian. The doctrine of ether is typicaly belonging to Pseudo-Aristotelian de mundo.

38 The references to the Stoic doctrines, especially as corresponding well to the Christian beliefs, were sine qua non in Athenagoras' apology, which is dedicated to the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius, a Stoic himself, along with his son Commodus, both of which launched systematic persecution against the Christians. In these circumstances charging adequately the philosophical arguments was meant to disarm the persecution.

order to affirm that although Plato used the expression θεοὶ ('gods' in Plural) in the speech of the demiurge, he actually meant these not to be really gods, since these 'gods' such as various celestial bodies are merely created beings. Yet, the father of these 'gods' must be identified with the universe's creator, who is the unique monad and true god.

Augustine never refers to Athenagoras, let alone to the interpretation in question. Athenagoras' personality was poorly known in the fourth century, not to mention the absence of translations of his writings into Latin which could have made him accessible to the reader like Augustine: if to exclude a short mention of him by Methodius of Olympus and by Philip of Side.[39] Athenagoras has been virtually rediscovered as late as in the 10th century. Augustine does not neglect Athenagoras deliberately: if the intriguing story of Athenagoras' conversion told by Philip of Side is true, and if it was known to Augustine, then Augustine would certainly comment on it, since it is so similar to his own conversion in the garden of Ostia (tolle, lege!).

What may possibly have some value for our further discussion is that in Legatio VI chapter 4 Athenagoras quotes two great tragedists (Euripides and Sophocles) as examples of denial of the divinity to Zeus in attempt to demonstrate that the Christians are neither alone nor the most ancient in such a statement of 'atheism'. Among several supporting quotes Athenagoras cites one form fr. 941 where Euripides proposes to use the name 'Zeus' for the divine infinite ether which embraces the earth.[40] Augustine also refers to this idea, which possibly stems from Cicero who quotes this passage of Euripides in de natura deorum II, 25, 65.

7.6.2. Comparative Conclusion: Athenagoras and Augustine on Tim 41ab

Athenagoras quoted just a short excerpt of Tim 41a7-9, but, in contrast to Augustine, he quoted it accurately and in accordance with the original text. He used this passage in a number of quotations from various authors, including pseudo-Aristotle and the Stoics.

Contrary to Athenagoras, in his analysis of Tim 41ab, Augustine did not have to deal with the most primitive early accusations, charging Christians with atheism, incest, or cannibalism. Such accusations, which were common in the early Christian period, were often based on hearsay and desire to denigrate the persecuted Christian opponents. The opponents

[39] Although Philip of Side mentions a hardly believable fact that Athenagoras was in charge of the Alexandrian Cathecetical School, his story concerning Athenagoras' conversion to Christianity as a result of his attempt to refute the Christian Scriptures is intriguing.

40 Euripide, fr. 941 Nauck., G.Bardy, P. 82.

of Augustine – the philosophers – were more sophisticated people. Augustine replied to the objections of Porphyry, which were much more subtle and showed the knowledge of Christian texts and basics of the Christian doctrine.

The accusation of Christians of atheism is the most interesting of the three above-mentioned charges. If atheism is defined as the rejection of any mentioned gods, the Christians indeed should be called "atheists" since Christians did not believe in many gods, considering all gods except one God as idols, demons, or simply false gods. In this sense, the opposite of atheism is polytheism; whereas monotheism simply becomes a version of atheism. Athenagoras did not agree with such an approach, saying that if Christians were atheists, Plato (respected by the prosecutors – the Stoics, similar to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius) should also be called an atheist on the basis of the quote from Tim 41ab, since Plato believed that the gods were created by the demiurge, and it was hardly possible to determine who the demiurge was in Tim 28c. If the gods were created, they were not real gods and were called "gods" unjustly. If, on the contrary, Plato was not an atheist, Christians were not atheists as well since they thought that the "gods" were created hypostases.

Augustine also advanced similar arguments concerning gods in the context of his discussion of Tim 41ab. In various places of civ.dei Augustine pointed to the fact that different religions and philosophical doctrines used different terms to describe the same things. For example, those whom the Platonists, following Plato, called gods, the Christians called demons. According to Augustine, it was rather a matter of terminology than a different interpretation. Therefore, in his interpretation of Tim 41ab, Augustine never took the expression "gods" at face value. The "lesser gods" addressed to by the "Supreme God" – the only true God from Augustine's point of view – were not gods for Augustine. Sometimes he understood them as heavenly bodies, and sometimes as a prefiguration of people in the resurrection, but never in the proper sense as gods. However, he allowed for the use of the word "gods," cited its use in the Bible and gave it a Christian interpretation.

Therefore, although the context of the dispute with the opponents of the Christian views was different for Augustine and Athenagoras due to the period of over two hundred years between these authors, Augustine reiterated some arguments from the earlier polemics.

7.7.Hippolyte of Rome (ca. 170-235) on Tim 41ab

7.7.1. Tim 41a as a key to Plato's theology

Hippolyte cites twice the beginning of the Tim 41a in his Philosophoumena[41] within one brief sub-chapter dedicated to Plato's theology: Phil. 1.19.8. Right after it he also renders the context of the rest of the passage with his own words. Further on, he shortly refers to the preceding section of the Timaeus dialogue (on the genealogy of the Greek divinities: in Phil. I:19, 29-30, Tim 40e5), as well as the section which follows (on the bowl, in Phil. I: 19, 40, Tim 41d4). His knowledge of the passage in question is quite accurate,[42] yet his interpretation lacks creativity,[43] as it is generally the case with his treatment of philosophy, which he does not trust. And indeed, in the first three books of Phil. Hippolyte presents philosophy along with magic and pagan mystical rites as a major source for various heresies, which are later also examined in Phil. The non-Christian essence of the pagan philosophy seems to be evident to him to such a degree that he does not even find it necessary to prove what exactly is wrong with it. For him philosophy is wrong from the start.[44] Thus, his methodology in presenting heresies turns to be an easy bit: it just suffices to show a link between a mistaken theological doctrine and its philosophical root. Yet, in the initial part of the work his tone gets modified a bit: Hippolyte sticks to rather neutral wordings.

The first book of Phil. is dedicated to the exposition of the preceding history of philosophy. In Phil. 1.19 Hippolyte gives a short and concise exposition of Plato's system. However, he is not satisfied with an analysis of Plato's own views, which do not seem to be that straightforward to him. Hippolyte also refers to various Platonists (τινὲς δὲ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν I:19, 5) in order to find it out what Plato actually meant. Curiously, Hippolyte does not apply such a procedure in his treatment of the philosophers preceding Plato, thereby implying that Plato's doctrine is, first, hard to evaluate, and secondly, difficult to distinguish from its later

[41] Or better known under the Latin title Refutatio omnium haeresium (ἐλεγχος), infra refered to as Phil. Critical editions: Hippolytus Werke. Refutatio omnium haeresium. Herausgegeben von P.Wendland. Leipzig. 1916; and more recent one: Hippolytus, Refutatio omnium haeresium. Edited by M.Marcovich. Walter de Gruyter. Berlin-New York. 1986. It is not our task here to discuss the authenticity of the attribution of the Philosophoumena to Hyppolyte, Origen (Miller, Oxford) or some other anonymous author (Abbé Crice). This issue has been successfully resolved in favour of Hippolyte already in the 19th century.

[42] If to skip some lacunas, which are to be discussed infra.

43 The number of abstract terms used by Hippolyte was quite limited, which obviously shows his lack of interest in speculations of any sort. Dictinnaire de Spiritualité, vol. III. Ed. M.Richard. Paris. 1969: Hippolyte. P. 543.

44 Ibid.

reception. Unfortunately, Hippolyte does not disclose the names of the Platonists he is dealing with, leaving us with a puzzle.[45]

The passage in question is the best example of such a treatment. He cites the Tim 41a to characterize the nature of Plato's theology (the doctrine of God). Hippolyte provides us with four alternative positions, that suppose to represent various Platonists (some (oi) say this, others (oi) say that, etc.).

The first position claims that there is but one god, unborn and incorruptible (οἱ μὲν ἕνα φασὶν αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον 1:20:6). Hippolyte sees the main proof for this in Plato's Laws IV, 715e. The second position affirms the indefinite plurality (πολλοὺς ἀορίστους) of gods, with the reference to the beginning of the demiurge's speech: θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργός τε καὶ πατήρ (Phil. 1.19.8). The third position also speaks of the plurality of gods, yet making an emphasis on their definite (ὡρισμένους) number, since in Tim 40e Plato presents gods' genealogy, which stems from Heaven and Earth: the number of gods in it is naturally limited. Finally, the fourth position refers back again to a slightly longer version of the demiurge's address, as compared to the one cited in position two. It says that the gods are created, and thereby corruptible: sooner or later this will cause them to dissolve completely. Yet, these gods still remain immortal due to God's will (διὰ δὲ τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀθανάτους εἶναι). This becomes explicit in the following words:

> θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργός τε καὶ πατήρ, ἄλυτα ἐμου γε θέλοντος (Tim 41a: Phil. 1.19.8.).

Now, there are a few remarks which ought to be made concerning this Hippolyte presentation of Plato and the Platonists. The first position, described supra, is monotheistic; the last three are polytheistic presentations, even though the plurality of gods derives there also from one single divinity; in any case, there is a clear subordination in the relations between the demiurge and his offspring. Further on, position four does not

45 A helpful text to single their identity, is probably the one which follows directly and possibly concerns their 'joined' opinion: talking about the eternity of the universe, they all seem to use the same comparison of the wagon: as any particular part of a wagon can be replaced without the damage to the wagon's identity, so it is with the universe: it remains eternal, even though every single part of it is mortal and corruptible. (Phil. I: …). Hippolyte could hardly be influenced by the Neoplatonist doctrines, since Plotinus – the founder of the school and movement, was a young man in Alexandria, building up towards what he was going to become at some point, when Hippolyte was writing his book in Rome.

necessarily exclude any of the preceding ones: in fact, it can be considered as monotheistic, since, it is questionable whether or not the expression 'gods' is correctly applicable to the creatures. In case it is, we are faced then with a polytheistic system, which turns into a variation on either position two or position three. This all is to say that the number four is not exhaustive (or even accurate) when we start looking to differentiating various positions of the Platonists, as some of them hardly contradict each other at all. Yet it is evident that there has been a history of contradictory interpretations of this particular text within the Platonic schools.

What is especially interesting for the purpose of our study is that in two out of four cases (positions two and four) Hippolyte cites the beginning of the Tim 41a as a major source for Plato's theology, while in his treatment of position three he refers to a passage concerning the genealogy of the traditional Greek gods, which, again, precedes the demiurge's speech, and therefore is linked to it in one way or another. Position one is the only one, which is not referred to in connection with the passage in question. Nevertheless, Hippolyte could have easily quoted Tim 41a also as an argument in its favor (in case he would consider ἀγένητος as an essential characteristic of a god, and thus the generated divinities would be necessarily excluded from the eligibility for the 'gods' title, since they are born and perhaps even created – cf. infra). At any rate, it is clear that Hippolyte tends to present the Tim 41a as Plato's major source for all four different interpretations of theology. Thus this text seems to appear as an equivocal composition, permitting a number of somewhat contradictory readings.

Another difficulty concerns the accuracy of Hyppolyte's quotations from Plato, especially the longer extract from the Tim 41a, as referred to in position four of the text quoted supra:

> θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργός τε καὶ πατήρ, ἄλυτα ἐμου γε θέλοντος (Tim 41a: Phil. 1.19.8.).

Hippolyte provides us with no exegesis as to the title of the supreme divinity the way it appears in this text: his brief θεός is rather unsatisfactory.[46] If he did provide us with an exegesis, it would most probably turn to be quite confusing affair, since his extract from the Tim 41a is not complete: it misses ἔργων after πατήρ (τε).[47] This one word,

[46] H.U. Meyboom (a Dutch translator of the Philosophoumena) curiously twice translated θεοὶ (Pl.) by 'God' (Sg.), as if refusing to believe that Plato could possibly use a plural for god(s). Therefore, according to him, it is in need of a correction (p. 42).

[47] Besides the remark which follows in my text, Hyppolyte also misplaces τε and adds καὶ to the extract under scrutiny. He does so both times when he quotes the Tim 41a.

although it gives an impression of being completely out of place at the first glace, is actually quite essential for the reader's attempt to single out the identity of the demiurge. If we are to restructure its poetic wording, it becomes clear that Plato means him to be a 'craftsman of works' (δημιουργός ἔργων) and a 'father of gods' (θεῶν πατήρ). Thereby, the notion of a 'craftsman' (δημιουργός) ought to be linked to the expression 'of works' (ἔργων). In case we cut ἔργων from the original, the way Hippolyte does it,[48] then we ought to arrive to a conclusion that the plurality of gods is not only fathered, but also created, since if we are to take into account the way this extract appears in Phil., the identity of the demiurge turns to be equal with the 'father and craftsman of gods'. The addition ἔργων, which is actually present only in the original, clarifies the meaning of the address in the direction of the exclusion of the misleading connotation for gods as creatures 'made' by the demiurge. Hippolyte's handicap quote does not allow for this more authentic reading.

Let us summarize Hippolyte reading of the Tim 41a: he clearly sees it as a key text for understanding Plato's theology. Yet, he admits that this text is hard to evaluate outside the Platonist tradition, which offers us as many as four interpretations. Hippolyte's rendering of these positions is clear, yet a bit suspicious, since his repeated quote of the original discloses slight corruptions, which tend to misrepresent the original value of its contents. Finally, Hippolyte does not pass a judgment on those positions, leaving us to wonder which one is more authentic, or even true.

Augustine is not familiar with Hippolyte's interpretation of the Tim 41a, as he never cites him in his writing. This is a bit unfortunate both in general, and for the purpose of our study in particular, as both these theologians carry a significant value. Two factors that are closely linked to each other contributed to this lack of influence: first, the fact that Hippolyte was an anti-Pope for a number of years (217-235)[49] under three successive Popes (Calixte I, Urban I and Pontien), and thus his popularity as a writer

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Apart from a poetic profanation, this minor insertion to the original shows Hyppolyte's lack of precision, which not suprisingly leads him to drop ἔργων of the demiurge's address.

[48] Curiously, both critical editions (P.Wendland: 1916; Pp. 20-21; M.Marcovich: 1986, Pp.77-78) spotted the missing μὴ from the original in the demiurge's initial words in position. In fact, this negation has as little effect upon the content as the insertion of καὶ and misplacing τε (cf. supra): this μὴ is just rhetorical, and does nothing more than emphasizes the power of the demiurge's will. Yet, the editors did not notice an important missing ἔργων, in Phil. 1.19.8.

49 The traces of mutual accusations of modalism and dy-theisme between Hypolyte and Pope Calixte can be found in Phil. Dictinnaire de Spiritualité, vol. III. Ed. M.Richard. Paris. 1969: Hippolyte. P.535.

was often undermined. This happened in spite of the fact that he was a unique anti-Pope in history to have ever been canonized by the church and who even was buried in the same crypt together with one of the Popes he had bitterly criticized: his theological rouses with Pope Pontien ended up in the reconciliation and martyrdom of them both under emperor Maximian I. Secondly, Hippolyte was writing in Greek in Rome, which was still customary at the beginning of the third century. The situation changed drastically within half a century in the direction of a total Latinisation of the capital. As a result, Hippolyte's oeuvre was not available in Latin translation, as the ecclesiastical writers who occupied themselves with the business of translation, such as Jerome and Rufinus, were ill-disposed to popularizing theology of the figures, which were once on the black list in Rome. Thus Hippolyte's writing naturally was not accessible for the Latin-speaking audience, among which we also have to count Augustine, due to his severe handicap in Greek. Therefore, it makes little sense to speak about the influence of Hippolyte's exegesis on the *Timaeus* dialogue in general, and the Tim 41ab in particular, that could have been exercised upon Augustine's thought.

7.7.2. Comparative Conclusion: Hipollytus and Augustine on Tim 41ab

Compared to all other theologians, Hippolytus takes the most radical stand against Plato. Hippolytus perceives philosophy as the source of all heresies, and, therefore, considers the great philosopher Plato a source of many heresies, for example, regarding the issue of polytheism. Augustine, on the contrary, sees an ally in Plato, who, by means of rational arguments, came to the conclusion that the bodies would be resurrected. Therefore, Plato is an enemy for Hippolytus and an ally for Augustine.

If we compare how Hippolytus and Augustine treat Tim 41ab, we should touch upon two issues, namely, the context and the familiarity of both authors with various positions of Platonism.

As far as the context is concerned, it is clear that Hippolytus is familiar not only with the text of Tim 41ab, which he accurately quotes and extensively comments upon, but also with its context: Hippolytus cites the genealogy of the gods from the preceding Tim 40 and the subsequent story of the bowl. We cannot say the same about Augustine. He does not refer either to the preceding or to the subsequent portion of Timaeus, as if he knew Tim 41ab in the form of an excerpt or a citation in some other source.

Secondly, Hippolytus is the only theologian among all the cited authors, who refers to different interpretations of Tim 41ab, which were likely to have existed among the Platonists. All four interpretations focus on a single question concerning the existence of gods. The same question can

be viewed from a different perspective: the majority of positions related to the discussion on the existence of gods in Hippolytus (three out of four) are based on the same source, Tim 41ab. Hippolytus does not even raise the question about the true meaning of this text in Plato, although it is obvious that the first and the fourth positions are consistent with Plato's beliefs, and the second and third positions are not. However, Hippolytus does not claim that Plato had in mind exactly the points which Hippolytus would like to find in his teachings. Following Origen, Hippolytus is suspicious of the teachings of Plato, so Hippolytus is not going to trust Plato with no special reason. Augustine never refers to different interpretations of this passage by other authors, as if this text is unambiguous and understandable to all. Moreover, Augustine cites only Christian interpretation of the passage in favor of the theory of bodily resurrection. It seems that the most likely explanation is that Augustine was simply not familiar with other interpretations of Tim 41ab. This, however, does not mean that he did not know the difference among the Platonists on other issues, even including the issues indirectly related to his own interpretation of Tim 41ab. Thus, in the City 22.27 Augustine cites two interpretations concerning the theory of the transmigration of souls. The first interpretation belongs to Plato and allows for the transmigration of the souls into the bodies of animals. The second interpretation is that of Porphyry, and it only allows for the transmigration of the souls into the human bodies. Augustine does not agree with either of the positions but corrects each one with the help of the other. He corrects the position of Plato stating with Porphyry that it is unworthy for the human soul to be in the body of an animal, and corrects Porphyry with Plato, stating that the soul can be happy within the body.

Finally, similarly to Augustine, Hippolytus also addresses the issue of the divine omnipotence of the Creator. In the fourth position, which cites the largest fragment of Tim 41ab, Hippolytus gives the same explanation as Augustine concerning the immortality of the gods. Since they are created, they are perishable and mortal, but they become immortal by the will of God. Augustine goes on to find a direct parallel with the destiny of men in the future resurrection, and thus the text becomes allegorical. Hippolytus does not draw any parallels, and it seems that Plato's demiurge of his own accord accomplishes polytheism that had not previously existed.

7.8. Eusebius of Caesarea (ca. 263-339) on Tim 41ab

7.8.1. Tim 41ab as attempt to platonize the Bible

Eusebius quotes three times the passage in question in Preparatio Evangelica:[50] once in book XI (32, 4) and twice in book XIII (13, 28; 18, 10). The first and the third of these quotations are complete, whereas the second one presents a rather minor section of the passage. The first two quotes are employed to refer to Plato's authority in a positive way, the last one is a critique towards his philosophy. Let us have a closer look at Eusebius' comments.

First time he quotes Tim 41ab at the full length in XI 32, 4.[51] There he is eager to identify parallels in the creation account between the book of Genesis and the Timaeus. He finds it striking that both Plato and 'Moses'[52] present the Creator not exclusively as a maker of the world as a whole but also as someone who fashions what is contained within it, taking the creation of celestial bodies as an example (XI, 30, 1); further on, both 'Moses' and Plato say that the Creator admires his own works (XI, 31), as he sees them to be 'beautiful' (Tim 29 a 2-4; Gen 1:4, 1:31). In fact, Eusebius is very keen to trace similarities between these texts. He tends to project Plato's ideas upon the biblical creation story: note that he does not really do so the other way round, despite him being convinced to be doing so (XI, 28, 17). This way Eusebius ends up 'platonizing' the Bible with a help of 'his best friend among the Greeks', the way he calls Plato infra in book XIII.

Two following instances, connected with each other on a larger scale and located next to the passage under the scrutiny, may exemplify this point. First, in XI, 29, 1 and XI, 30, 1 Eusebius uses the verb γίγνομαι both in the sense of generation and creation while comparing two creation accounts. In such a way he leaves us with an impression that the notions of generation and creation are plainly interchangeable. Although linguistically such a usage is fully justifiable, theologically it leads to terminological misunderstandings. The Council of Nicaea I (325) has put an end to this confusion, insisting on systematically applying the notion ποίησις towards the creation of the world (out of nothing), whereas the notion γέννησις must be applied exclusively towards the eternal generation of God the Son by God the Father and his temporal generation in the sense of incarnation.[53] Plato's attitude towards the process of generation in the sense of becoming may have had a mark upon Eusebius presentation in PE.

50 Infra: PE.

51 Eusèbe de Césarée, Préparation Evangélique, Livre I. Traduction par G.Favrelle, révision par E. des Places. Paris. 1982. Livre XI. Pp. 206-207.

52 Ascribing to Moses the authorship of the book of Genesis was a common view in the Patristic epoch. E.g. Origen, First Principles, 3.6.1.; Marius Victorinus, Against Arius IA, 20; John Chrysostom, Homilies on Genesis; 2.5; 7:10 (PG 53:38, 65) etc.

53 N.P. Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. Vol. I. Georgetown; 1990. P. 24.

Origen's ideas on the divine paternity of the world,[54] also may have added an extra weight to it. One can trace a possible Arian influence in this context, since according to Arius, the usage of the notions generation as well as creation towards the Son is completely justifiable.[55] This again is confusing, since generation infers a fatherhood, whereas creation refers to a craftsmanship. Such a division is even sharper than in the case of ποιςΐ̈η and δημιουργὸς referred to infra, as the fatherhood is the matter of parental relationship, whereas the craftsmanship is the matter of professionalism.

However, we have to take into account the fact that the present discourse is about the universe and its elements, and not about Christ as the Son of God, as it was the case under discussion in the Arian controversy. The terminological mess as far as the concepts of generation and creation are under the focus of scrutiny, may have put a mark on Eusebius' cosmology. The above-mentioned Council of Nicaea, in which Eusebius participated and of which he presented a historical account, [56] emphasizes a distinction between generation and creation. It claims that a Christian must believe in Christ as the Son of God, who is born not made (γεννηθέντα, οὐ ποιηθέντα).[57] Since Eusebius finished PE a few years before the Council, [58] his terminological inconsistencies are quite understandable. Yet, we can imagine that they could have persisted even later Eusebius never became a promoter of the Nicaean theology. He managed to retain his Arian sympathies after the council. Moreover, Eusebius took an active role in deposition of the main Nicaean champions: Eustatius of Antioch (Antioch, 327), Athanasius of Alexandria (Tyre, 335) and Marcellus of Ancyra (Constantinople, 336).[59]

Secondly, passing down to Book XIII, Eusebius does not seem to see a problem in using the word δημιουργὸς both applied to Plato's creator's character in the Timaeus and to the Creator in the creation story as

54 E.g.: "Et propter hoc opinamur parentem omnium deum…". De principiis, II, 1, 2. Rufinus' Latin translation. Cf. Origène, Traité des principes. Tome I. Traduction par H.Crouzel et M.Simonetti. Paris. 1978. P. 236.

55 B.Bobrinskoy, Le mystère de la Trinité. Paris, 1996, p. 224; G.Florovsky, The Eastern Fathers of the Fourth Century. Belmont, MA. 1987, p. 18.

56 Since the minutes of the Council of Nicaea-I have been lost to us, Eusebius's account is one of the main sources for the schoraship. Cf. Eusebius, Vita Constantini, III, 3-21.

57 N.P. Tanner, Decrees of the Oecumenical Councils, Georgetown, 1990. P. 5.

58 First E.Schwarz (1390) and then K.Mras (1954) placed the dates of composition for PE circa 314-322, this means a few years before the Council of Nicea I (325). Cf. Eusèbe de Césarée, Préparation Evangélique, Livre I. Traduction par J.Sirinelli et E. des Places. Paris. 1974. Pp. 8-14.

59 H.Chadwick, The Early Church. London. 1993. P. 130.

presented in the book of Genesis (XII, 18, 11). He gives an impression that the two accounts are virtually complementary. This contradicts the terminological line taken up in the Septuagint version, which Eusebius had in use as the main yet not the exclusive source translation of the Old Testament.[60] The Septuagint also served as a direct source for the Nicaean Creed, both of which employ the notion ποιητής maker – for the creator, at the same time carefully avoiding implications of craftsmanship, contained in the notion δημιουργὸς.

Further on, the first quote from Book XIII of Tim 41ab contains just the initial address of the demiurge (XIII,13, 28): [61] Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, δι᾽ ἐμοῦ γενό μενα ἄλυτα ἐμοῦγε μὴ ἐθέλοντος . Eusebius connects the idea contained in this passage to Pindar's account,[62] who says that there are two races: men and gods, but their mother and father are unique characters: matter is the mother, whereas god-creator is the best craftsman and father (ἀριστοτέχναν πατέρα). Plato seems to have supported and perhaps even made use of this idea in Tim 41a. His expression δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε is a direct parallel to Pindar.

In the given context Eusebius applies a standard package of quotes from Plato, which we have already spotted in Clement:[63] Letters II, VI, where, following Clement's example, Eusebius traces a proof of Trinitarian theology (XII, 13, 28); and after the passage in question also the account of the myth of Er, where Er is being identified with Zoroaster (Clement does not go that far), not in the sense of the resurrection but reincarnation.

The second extract which appears in book XIII is again a complete quote of our passage (XIII, 18, 10).[64] This time Eusebius uses it to demonstrate that although Plato is right in calling god-creator to be the father of the celestial bodies, he is yet wrong in applying the word gods θεοὶ' to them, because this title implies a worship, which is due to god the creator alone. In this sense the usage of word θεὸς in plural is simply absurd. To demonstrate that Plato is wrong at this point, Eusebius quotes further on not only from 'Moses' (Deut. 4, 19) but also from Philo (Spec. I, 13-17), neither of which indeed ascribes divinity to the celestial bodies.

60 Eusebius had different Greek Bible versions available to him through Origen's Hexapla. Cf. A.Kofsky, Eusebius of Caesarea against paganism, Leiden, Brill, 2000. P. 85.

61 Eusèbe de Césarée, Préparation Evangélique, Livre I. Traduction par G.Favrelle, révision par E. des Places. Paris. 1983. Livres XII-XIII. Pp. 348-349.

62 Fr. 57 (Snell).

63 Stromata 5.14.102.

64 Eusèbe (1983). Pp. 434-435.

One has to keep in mind that this is the first critique towards Plato offered by Eusebius. In the course of previous books XI-XIII he cites Plato extensively,[65] but only as an example of a harmony between philosophy and revelation. In the preceding section his attitude is fairly similar to that of Clement. Yet, although his radical step to inaugurate the critique seems to appear rather abrupt, it is yet not at all casual. Eusebius brings in several other issues, upon which he disagrees with Plato: the attitude towards women, homosexuality etc. Yet, in order not to sound too harsh in his sudden change, the great historian passes to his critique with an eulogy to the great philosopher who he still so much admires. Despite almost a millennium of age difference Eusebius names Plato his 'best friend among all the Greeks', because Plato had 'ideas close and valuable' to himself (XIII, 18, 17).

According to A.Carriker, out of voluminous Eusebius' oeuvre Augustine knew only what was available to him through the Latin translations, which to my understanding is not that little: Rufinus' version of the Ecclesiastical History, Jerome's version of the Chronological Canons, the Onomasticon and the Evangelical Canons, a concordance of Gospel passages, faithfully reproduced by Jerome in his translation of the Gospels.[66] Augustine hardly uses Eusebius' historical works in civ.dei, although this could have had some value for his vision of history. Unfortunately, he could not study Eusebius' comments on the present discussion, as PE was not translated into Latin.

7.8.2. Comparative Conclusion: Eusebius and Augustine on Tim 41ab

Regarding the analysis of Tim 41ab, Eusebius briefly touches upon a very interesting Biblical as well as (indirectly) ecclesiastical and political aspect which cannot be found in any of the sixteen passages discussed by Augustine.

Eusebius compares the beginning of the demiurge's speech in Plato's Tim 41a7 with the beginning of the Book of Genesis, attributed to Moses according to the standard beliefs of the time. This parallelism managed to escape the attention of Augustine. Eusebius, however, not only sees a parallel between the accounts of creation, but also the influence of the Bible

65 Eusebius quotes mostly from Plato's Laws (48 times) and its supplement Epinomis (6 times). His knowledges of Plato is far more superior to any other author cited anywhere in his works, although he also ventures extensively into Porphyry and Numenius. Cf. E. des Places, Eusèbe de Césarée juge de Platon dans la Préparation évangélique, in Mélange de philosophique grècque offerts à Mgr. Diès. Paris, 1956. P. 71.

66 A.Carriker, Eusebius of Caesarea, in Augustine through ages. An Encyclopedia. Ed. A.D. Fitzgerald. Cambridge UK, 1999. Pp. 339-340.

on Plato. Certainly, this notion reflected another standard belief of Eusebius' time that Plato had learned the wisdom of the Jews during his visit to Egypt (which also was the belief of Augustine). However, Eusebius knows Plato's philosophy well, feels at home with Plato's concepts, and instead of projecting the Christian teaching upon the doctrine of Plato (as he tries to do), Eusebius achieves the opposite effect, projecting certain aspects of Plato's teaching upon the Christian theology. Augustine never does the same in his interpretation of Tim 41ab, although we can discern some influence of Platonism on Augustine's Christian doctrine in the question concerning ideas from Augustine's de diversis quaestionibus ("Eighty-three Questions"), partly related to the problem of seminal principles, primarily found in his On the Book of Genesis, but also indirectly in Augustine's terminology that had been used by Cicero in his translation of Tim 41ab (satu orti estis). However, the overall borrowing from Plato is much more substantial in Eusebius than in Augustine.

Unfortunately, in their discussion of Tim 41ab, neither Eusebius nor Augustine elaborate on the distinction between the notions of createdness and generation. This problem suggests itself since Plato names the subject of the speech with two titles – "artificer" and "father." Each of these titles has its meaning which becomes clear if we juxtapose them with Plato's use of dependent words θεῶν and ἔργων. The first one sets the relationship of fatherhood, and the second one the relationship of creation. If we take into account the Arian influence on Eusebius and the fact that in his Christology Arius speaks about the createdness of the Logos, we may see why Eusebius tends to ignore the difference between createdness and generation, which characterized the Nicene party to which Eusebius belonged only nominally (signing the decrees of the Council of Nicaea against his will). Even though Augustine shares the Nicene position and knows the difference between createdness and generation, he uses the distinction exclusively in the Trinitarian and partlially in the Christological context in his On the Trinity and does not use it in discussing Tim 41ab. Moreover, Augustine could hardly use the distinction for discussing Tim 41ab since in Cicero's translation the phrase Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων is rendered as vos qui deorum satu orti estis adtendite quorum ego parens effectorque sum. Even if Augustine attempted to determine generation by linking parens and deorum (which is even less obvious than linking θεῶν and πατήρ in Greek, separated by another word), the equivalent for ἔργων, expressing the idea of createdness is entirely missing in the Latin translation. Therefore, on the basis of Cicero's translation, it is practically impossible to make a distinction between fatherhood and createdness. Unfortunately, neither Augustine nor Eusebius, whose views are radically different as far as the problem of the difference between createdness and

generation is concerned, touch upon this problem in the context of discussing Tim 41ab.

It is unfortunate that even though Eusebius noticed a parallel between Tim 41ab and the beginning of the Book of Genesis, he completely missed the obvious parallel in the Prologue of the St. John's Gospel and, consequently, the idea of the creative word. It is not possible to detect a similar discussion in Augustine's reading of Tim 41ab, since Augustine does not compare Plato and the Bible. This is surprising, since Augustine, following Eusebius, was convinced that Plato had learned his wisdom in Egypt from the Jews. What exactly that wisdom was for Augustine, remains a mystery.

7.9. Arnobius (died ca. 327) on Tim 41ab

7.9.1. Timaeus 41 ab as a proof for the soul's intermediate character

Arnobius paraphrases the Tim 41 a-b twice (Adv. Nat.II. 36.2. and Adv. Nat.II. 51.4.) in the course of book II of his Adversus Nationes.[67] These two texts are complementary to each other, since the first one partially renders Tim a, whereas the second one partially renders Tim b-c. These passages are as follows:

> Plato ille divinus multa de deo digna nec communia sentiens multitudini in eo sermone ac libro cui nomen Timaeus scribitur deos dicit et mundum corruptibilis esse natura neque esse omnino dissolutionis expertes, sed voluntate dei regis ac principis vinctione in perpetua contineri. Quod enim recte sit vinctum et nodis perfectissimis conligatum, dei bonitate servari: neque ullo ab alio nisi ab eo qui vinxit et dissolvi, si res poscat, et salutari iussione donari (adv.nat.II. 36.2.);[68]

and also a few pages further on:

> Quid enim putamus habuisse rationis Platonem illum magnum pie sancte que sapientem, cum hominis fictionem deo removit a maximo et ad minores nescio quos transtulit cum que eiusdem noluit sinceritatis esse mixturas humani animas generis, cuius animam fecerat universitatis istius, quam quod hominis fabricam indignam esse rebatur deo nec rei flaccidae fictionem magnitudini eius et eminentiae convenire? (adv.nat.II. 51.4.).[69]

These passages appear in book II of adv.nat. – the most commented as well as controversial section of Arnobius' treatise: the part dedicated to

[67] Infra adv.nat. Arnobe, Contre les Gentils, livre II. Textes établi, traduit et commenté par H.Le Bonniec. Les Belles Lettres. Paris. 1982.

68 That divine Plato who expresses many worthy opinions about God which are not shared by the multitude, in that dialogue which bears the title Timaeus, says that the gods and the world are by nature corruptible and in no way free from disintegration, but that by the will of God, the King and the Chief, they are preserved by an everlasting bond. For, as he states, what has been properly bound and tied together with the most perfect knots, is preserved by the goodness of God; and by no other than by him who bound them, can they, according as the case requires, be destroyed, or gives the order of salvation. Translated by G.McCracken. Arnobius of Sicca, The case against the Pagans, Westminster, Maryland. The Newman Press. 1949. P.148.

69 What reason do we think motivated that great Plato, a philosopher of goodness beyond reproach, when he took away from the Supreme God the fashioning of man and gave it to some sort of lesser gods, and when he would not have the souls of the human race to be composed of that same pure mixture of which he had made the soul of the universe, except that he thought the making of man unworthy of god and the fashioning of something feeble, as incompatible with his exalted greatness? Ibid. cit. P.163.

philosophy. Moreover, Arnobius uses these texts to serve as the main argument for his idea of an intermediate character of the human soul.[70] This idea is often considered to be his most original thesis in the entire treatise, namely, that the human soul is neither mortal nor immortal by nature, but rather intermediate between mortality and immortality.

Arnobius dedicates the largest section of book II to the detailed discussion on this issue (adv.nat. II.13. through II.62.). He embarks on a full-scale refutation of the immortality of the soul, which includes issues such as: whether skills in arts and crafts are a proof of the soul's divinity (adv.nat. II.19); if the soul once had knowledge, why did it forget it (adv.nat. II.26); whether the belief in the soul's immortality is profitable for morality (adv.nat. II.29); in case the soul is immortal why did it leave heaven (adv.nat. II.37); whether God sent the souls down so that they might become evil (adv.nat. II.39); whether or not the investigation of the soul's true origin makes sense (adv.nat. II.47); whether magic powers and prayers can make the soul immortal (adv.nat. II.62). The majority of these arguments stem from Plato's Phaedo,[71] where this thesis is treated systematically and in-depth, but also from Meno (adv.nat. II.24.), Theatetus and Politicus (adv.nat. II.13.).

Having refuted the idea of soul's immortality, Arnobius proceeds to his main positive statement: the soul is created mortal. Moreover, it will remain mortal if, first, it leads an immoral life while being placed in the body, and secondly, if its creator does not take care for its immortal life. However, the soul may become immortal if, first, it leads a morally good life when united to the body, and secondly, if its creator decides to grant it immortality on the basis of its good deeds. Therefore, we better attribute an intermediate quality to the soul, since it becomes mortal or immortal according to these two main conditions: its moral behavior (1), and the creator's deliberation (2). Another way to express the same idea is to claim that the soul is in fact mortal according to nature, but its natural mortal character is reversible to immortality, if the creator wishes so in spite of nature's laws (adv.nat. II.33.). No wonder, that Arnobius insists on the divine omnipotence (e.g. '…to the Omnipotent King nothing is hard, nothing

70 G.E. McCracken, an English translator of adv.nat. often renders qualitas media with 'neutral' in the course of his translation, which tends to bring the reader into confusion. McCracken means the soul to be neutral both as to mortality and immortality, but in fact it is not so according to Arnobius. On the contrary, he thinks that the soul is naturally mortal and not at all 'neutral'. Moreover, it does becomes sometimes immortal in accordance with its own deeds and the will of its creator. Ibid. cit. Pp. 144, 147.

71 "…that same Plato of yours in that book he wrote on the immortality of the soul." adv.nat. II.14.

is difficult' adv.nat. II.35). Thus, the soul is pending between mortality and immortality. This is why it must have an intermediate character/ quality (qualitas media).

Arnobius is convinced that his presentation is a true Christian thesis concerning the soul. This may be so, yet he makes little effort to look for the biblical or patristic sources in favour of his argument. Instead, he brings in an evidence from within the Platonic tradition, as if this tradition is in direct continuity with the Christian belief. His argument refers back again to Plato in order to counterpart other Platonists, most probably Porphyry.[72] However, he finds no direct support for his position in Plato either. What he does find instead is a methodological procedure to argue the soul's intermediate character based on the Tim 41 a-c. True, Plato does not speak about the soul in this passage. He speaks about the gods addressed by another - supreme – god (maximus deus). The multitude of gods addressed by the supreme god are mortal according to Plato. Yet, the supreme god grants immortality to the mortal gods in accordance with his wish. Arnobius suggests that Plato means this to be a key principle: the supreme god granting immortality to the mortals in general. This applies first, to the minor gods (dii minores) (A), second, to the universe (B), and third, to the human souls (C). He does not go as far as to apply the same procedure to the human bodies as well as to the human being as a whole, body and soul included, - the way Augustine later does it in his interpretation.

Thus, Arnobius places (A), (B) and (C) into the same category of intermediate beings, which pendle between mortality and immortality, directed to the latter by the will of the supreme god. There is still a difference between (A), (B) and (C): the immortality of the universe (B) in no way depends on its moral status, since the universe as a whole does not really exercise a free will of its own. There has also been a scholarly debate concerning the status of the minor divinities (A) as to whether or not they really exist according to Arnobius,[73] and in case they do, perhaps they ought to be equated with the angels and demons (adv.nat. II.35.). Another possible reading of Arnobius is to view these gods as an allegory, which serves the author for practical reasons in projection of his own ideas upon Plato. However, in doing so it is difficult to distinguish Plato's doctrines from those of the Christians. No wonder that Arnobius refers to Plato as great

72 De regressu animae, as referred to later by Augustine in civ.dei. Since this treatise did not extend, there have been attempts to identify it with the Philosophy from oracles. Cf. P.Courcelle, Les sages de Porphyre et les viri novi d'Arnobe, in Rev. Et.Lat. 31. 1953. Pp. 257-271.

[73] M.B. Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca. Religious conflict in the age of Diocletian. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1995. Pp. 174-183.

and divine (Plato magnus, Plato divinus), these epithets were a commonplace in the Platonist tradition, yet calling a pagan philosopher as divinus goes a bit too far for someone who wishes to be baptised in the church.[74] Clearly, he has a problem of situating Plato vis-à-vis the Christian doctrine.

Arnobius thinks that it is not Plato, but the new men - viri novi – the innovators of the recent times, who present a problem.[75] They introduce new teachings in order to scandalize the Christians, yet thereby they in fact distort Plato too. The doctrine of immortality of the human soul is an example of such innovations.

However, Arnobius' attitude towards certain viri novi is a bit ambiguous. In one sense he argues against the Neo-Platonists, in some other sense he argues for them. As we have seen, he invests a lot of effort in order to refute the thesis concerning the immortality of the soul, but uses the Neo-Platonic methodology of intermediary levels. And indeed, the idea of the soul's status pending between mortality and immortality, and thereby between matter, body and god, fits quite consistently into the Neo-Platonic system as a whole.

We have to keep in mind that the immortality of the soul has become one of the commonplaces in the Platonic tradition by the end of the third century and onwards. We find it also later in Augustine, who dedicated an entire treatise to this subject.[76] Unfortunately, Augustine was not familiar with the arguments presented by Arnobius in book II of adv.nat. Otherwise, he would have been less enthusiastic in attributing such an idea to the

[74] Arnobius wrote adv.nat. at the demand of his bishop, whose name did not survive to us. Being a catecumen, Arnobius wished to be baptised in the church, and this treatise was to serve as a proof of his orthodoxy. Conversion to Christianity was a risky business in the time of a great persecution (302-304, under the emperor Diocletian), especially in North Africa, where the course of events turned particularly bad. Cyprian, a bishop of Carthage was martyred in 258 under the emperor Valerian. This was the most probable fate which was awaiting the bishop of Sica, a suffragant of Carthage. Arnobius hardly mentions persecutions, which were either taking sway around him, or just ceased. This is not to say that he was trying to be politically correct with the authorities. In adv.nat. II.77 he remarks that the persecution is 'our deliverance, … which will bring us to the light of freedom'. Cf. O.Bardenhewer, Les Pères de l'église. Leur vie et leur oeuvre. Vol. I. Paris. 1905. P. 366.

75 The possible candidates for these viri novi ranges between the Neo-Platonist Porphyry, who was Arnobius' younger contemporary, the Neo-Pythagoreans Numenius and Cronius, and go as far as the representatives of a Zoroastrian cult. Cf. M.Maza, La doctrina dei 'viri novi', in Helikon. 1963. Pp. 11-169; Arnobe, Contre les Gentils, livre I. Textes établi, traduit et commenté par H.Le Bonniec. Les Belles Lettres. Paris. 1982. Pp. 43-46.

76 de immortalitate animae, in Saint Augustin, Dialogues philosophiques, trad. R. Jolivet. Brugge. 1955.

Christian religion. The least he could do was an attempt to refute Arnobius' arguments.

Returning to Arnobius' quotations, I would like to draw the reader's attention to the already mentioned fact that he does not cite the Tim 41ab ad litteram but paraphrases it with his own words. This leads to the following somewhat conflicting results. On the one hand, it shows his intimate familiarity with Plato's Timaeus, most probably in its Greek original.[77] We see this in the fact that he also comments the passages preceding as well as following the Tim 41ab (on the genealogy of the traditional Greek gods: adv.nat. II.35.; II.37., and on the mixing bowl: adv.nat. II. 52.). He does so likewise in a creative fashion. Curiously, Arnobius says that Timaeus (a person and not the supreme god, as we would expect it from his terminological usage) mixes the natures of various animals inside the bowl.

On the other hand, in paraphrasing Tim 41ab Arnobius is not perfectly faithful to the original but uses it as much as he needs to meet his limited objectives. He simplifies the demiurge's status from the δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε down to the 'supreme god' (maximus deus). Thereby he shifts the emphasis from creation and fatherhood to the divine hierarchy by using a sharp opposition between the supreme god (maximus deus) and the minor divinities (dii minori),[78] the latter are being made and made immortal by the former. Instead, he characterizes the supreme god also as a king (rex) and chief (princeps), which is an extrapolation from elsewhere. Arnobius does a similar job in talking about a corruptible nature of the universe, which gets reversed to the incorruptible nature due to the supreme god's decision. The passage in question does not raise the issue of the universe at all. This issue has been exhausted in the Tim 28-40.

Augustine never mentions Arnobius of Sicca in his oeuvre. This is a bit unfortunate because the latter being a rhetor was the former's colleague from the same region (North Africa) a century before. Both Arnobius and Augustine underwent a similar school training, although clearly Arnobius mastered Greek far better than Augustine (which is yet another sign of the decline of the classical culture in the Latin West in the fourth century). This made Arnobius able to read the Timaeus dialogue in the original,[79] whereas Augustine had to deal with Cicero's handicapped translation. Both Arnobius

[77] Festugière discusses a possible use of some Platonist manuals from the school of Gaius, which were in circulation since the second century: Albinus, Apuleus, Taurus. Cf. A.J. Festugière, Arnobiana, in Vig. Christ. 6. 1952. Pp. 210-215.

78 adv.nat. II.35; adv.nat. II.52.

[79] A.Viciano, Retorica, filosofia y gramatica en el adversus nationes de Arnobio de Sica. Patrologia. Beitraege zum Studium der Kirchenvaeter. III. Frankfurt an Main.1993.

and Augustine converted to Christianity from the intellectual Neo-Platonic milieus. Thus, they both found it necessary to use Plato's authority in arguing against their well-trained opponents. The Tim 41ab appears to be a key passage in their discussions, which each of them creatively conducted. However, they both used this text methodologically rather than literally for the issues closely linked to each other. Arnobius argues for the mortality of the human soul, whereas Augustine stresses a basis for the future of the resurrection of the human body. They find the reason for this in the promise of the supreme god towards minor divinities, the way they interpret Tim 41 ab. The opposition between the supreme god and minor divinities carries a significant value for their respective arguments, yet the differing terminological use (maximus deus in Arnobius vis-à-vis summus deus in Augustine) suggests an independence of their respective discussions. Moreover, Arnobius' main point concerning the mortality of the human soul has been treated by Augustine from a Neo-Platonic standpoint in de immortalitate animae, although the ideas concerning the soul's intermediate character do appear in de qualitate animae as well. Nevertheless, no traces of inner discussions with Arnobius can be found in his early dialogues.

7.9.2. Comparative Conclusion: Arnobius and Augustine on Tim 41ab

The main point of Arnobius in his discussion of Tim 41ab is the emphasis on the intermediate nature of the addressee of the speech. This thought is simple, but is not evident for each reader. The gods which were called the lesser gods are mortal because they have bodies, but they become immortal by the will of the Greatest God. Accordingly, they are mortal while becoming immortal. Augustine always stresses this idea, yet he does not employ the technical term intermediate, which was constantly used by Arnobius.

Both Arnobius and Augustine think that the subject who is giving the speech is God, identical with the Christian One God. The only difference is the epithet maximus, "greatest" in Arnobius, and summus, "supreme," in Augustine. Both words are, in fact, synonyms, meaning the same supreme nature of this God. It is, however, surprising that Plato does not use any similar expressions. It is not possible to translate demiourgos patyr as maximus Deus or summus Deus. If this is the translation, such a translation is imprecise and interpretive, imposing the beliefs of the translator upon the original text.

Both exegetes diverge even more from the original text of the speech in their understanding of the addressees: even though both call them gods in the same way as Plato did, unlike Plato they added the epithet "lesser,"

thereby not only diminishing their status, but also calling the correctness of their naming as gods into question. The expression "lesser gods" is somewhat self-contradictory since being god requires perfection, and therefore is unlikely to allow for a dubious expression of "lesser."

Both Arnobius and Augustine use the expression "lesser gods" in the allegorical sense. Both agree that mundus – the universe – is included in this concept. Augustine also includes celestial bodies while Arnobius does not say anything about them. Yet, such an understanding has a key importance for both authors.

For both of them the lesser gods are associated with a human being, with people, whereas Plato does not say anything directly on the subject. However, Arnobius and Augustine focus on different aspects of the human being. For Augustine, the lesser gods are the prototype of the human body in the resurrection. For Arnobius, they are the human souls. For Arnobius, souls are mortal but become immortal, albeit not by default but due to their moral qualities and the will of the Greatest God. For Augustine, bodies are mortal by nature, but become immortal by the will of the Almighty God.

Both Arnobius and Augustine are concerned with interfacing problems related to Christian anthropology. However, body and soul are different entities, and one cannot necessarily say the same concerning the two.

7.10. Marcus Minucius Felix (2nd-3d c.) on Tim 41ab

7.10.1. Deus Artifex as the cause of the Apocalypse

Minucius (160-300)[80] never renders either a literal quotation of Tim 41ab, or a faithful presentation of its contents with his own words. Nevertheless, one can trace its minimal reminiscence in his Octavius XXIV, 4.[81] Octavius, the main personage of the book, exposes a certain knowledge of the Timaeus dialogue, despite of the absence of any reference to its title. The way Minucius goes about the Timaeus may allow us, with a certain degree of probability, to claim the author's familiarity with the argument in Tim 41ab, although this appears to happen in a very limited and somewhat contradictory fashion. Let us have a brief look at the context of the discussion.

Octavius Januarius, a Christian lawyer, versed in the art of a public dispute, is confronted with his pagan opponent (Caecilius Natalis)'s argument who ventures to challenge the Christian belief in the final destruction of the universe.[82] In the initial part of the dispute (actio) this argument appeared to be completely unreasonable to Caelicius. In his turn (part two: responsio) Octavius objects to this saying that if this idea is unreasonable, than the Stoic, Epicurean and Platonic teaching on the final destiny of the universe must be likewise unreasonable. An attempt to undermine the importance of these philosophies would be an error of a vulgar man (vulgaris erroris est). Both Stoic and Epicurean teachings refer to the final consumption of the universe by fire (XXIV, 1-3). To Caelicius Plato's doctrine on the issue appears to be similar to the Stoic and Epicurean cosmologies as well.

In a tiny section which follows (XXXIV, 4) Octavius shortly attributes to Plato the following peculiar reasoning. Apparently, Plato said that the universe was made eternal and indestructible (ipsum mundum perpetuum et insolubilem diceret fabricatum). He then also added that god the creator (artifex deus) has a power to cause personally (ipsi) its destruction and

[80] This rather incredible datation is a representation of a complete uncertainty surrounding both Minucius dates and person. It is not our task in a present limited discussion to have this major problem sorted out. Neither is this possible for us to identify the right sources of influence, namely, whether it was Tertulian's Apologeticum which was the source of Octavius, or it was the other way round, or indeed perhaps there was a (unidentified) common source for them both. Cf. …

81 Minucius Felix, Octavius. Texte établi et traduit par J.Beaujeu. Paris. 1974. P. 58.

[82] The other doctrines under the scrutiny in the the course of the dialogue are: God's unity, creation of the universe, divine omnipotence, resurrection of the dead, life after death.

mortality. Therefore, it would be no surprise if one day this immense edifice of the universe would be indeed destroyed by the one who constructed it in the first place (ita nihil miraum est, si ista moles ab eo, quo extructa est, destruatur).

This brief discourse is a curious mixture of an adequate rendering of some of Plato's ideas, combined with a considerable misrepresentation of some other ones. What is correct here is that according to Plato, the demiurge created the world eternal and indestructible, yet such a statement must be supplied with an explanation, namely, that the universe is eternal and indestructible because the demiurge is its cause, whereas the paradigm which he looks at is perfect (Tim 29e-30d). Municius' use of the term artifex instead of the creator,[83] in order to render the meaning of δημιουργὸς, is quite appropriate (the way Cicero also does it in his translation).[84] However, if it is indeed a free quote from the Tim 41a, Municius disappoints us at once by dropping pater (πατήρ) from the demiurge's double title (δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε). What is still more puzzling to learn from Octavius' discourse concerns a possible destruction of the universe by its artifex deus. According to Plato, the universe is the most beautiful of all creatures (Tim 29a), even an attempt at its destruction would be the work of an evil one (Tim 41b1). A Gnostic would then happily conclude from the given propositions that the artifex deus might be an evil creator. Both Plato and Minucius would strongly object to such a vulgarized conclusion. Clearly, if some Plato's ideas are to be combined with the present arguments advanced by Minucius, the reader can be pushed to some undesired statements, which are contrary to Minucius' own intentions.

Nevertheless, what is implicitly correct in Minucius' argument concerning the demiurge (artifex) as the cause for the destruction of the universe, the argument which seems to be so inadequate with regards to the original, is that the demiurge is presented here as having a persistent power over the universe. Not only has he brought it into existence, but he also sustains its eternity and indestructability by the means of his will. This idea may possibly derive from Tim 41ab, as the demiurge promises incorruptibility to the gods in his speech on the account of his own will. In case the universe may be counted among the addressed gods (which is already a somewhat controversial idea), then Octavius' reasoning does indeed appear sustainable.

83 Creator is the term customary in Christian literature starting from the early Latin Bible translations, both in the Italica and the Vulgate.

84 This does not give us an certainty to claim that Minucius ever read Cicero's Timaeus translation.

This argument does not provide us with a certainty for making claims concerning Minucius' actual familiarity with the Tim 41ab directly from the source (possibly in Cicero's rendering) at the time of writing the Octavius. However, it permits us to come up with a hypothesis concerning Minucius' knowledge of this passage either directly at some point in a remote past (forgetting is a natural cause for misrepresentation), or indirectly from another source (either written or oral one).

A curious, though hardly intended similarity between the Tim 41ab and Oct XXXIV, 4 is the fact that Octavius' discourse is an address towards his two friends (Caelicius Natalis and the author - disguised Minucius Felix under the ficticious name Marcus) it corresponds to the monologue style of Tim 41ab, which is also an address to the listeners. Although the addressees in Tim 41ab are not people but gods; yet a god talking to gods paradigm parallels the lawyer speaking to the lawyers. Is that then by chance that the titles of both dialogues in question bear the names of the main speakers?

Further on, it is not impossible that Octavius slightly altered Plato's ideas in order to make them fit into his own argument. We see him twisting also towards the Stoic and Epicurean ideas in a similar fashion. For instance, it is quite adequate to speak about the Stoic concept of the final destruction of the universe in a consuming fire,[85] but it is inadequate to stop an exposition of the Stoic view at that point: you ought to continue with the presentation of the recurrence of the universe back to its previous state (perpetual cycli of the recurrent existence). Octavius' claim that the Epicureans have a similar system concerning the end of the universe in a consuming fire is clearly an ungrounded projection of the Stoic cosmology on the Epicurean one.[86]

A slight distortion of the system by means of its simplification also happens, although to a lesser extent, with Octavius' presentation of the Christian doctrine. He neither goes into Christology, nor into the Trinitarian issues, nor does he even mention the Eucharist, the Baptism or any other sacrament.[87] Seeing that Minucius' work has been written in the time when the church doctrine has been yet vaguely formulated, this is quite

85 The major philosophical school which excersised an influence upon Minucius was Stoic. Cf. Western philosophical schools and doctrines, in Encylpedia Britannica, London, 1994: XXV, p.598:2a.

86 The Epicurean school was largely unscientific even according to the Ancient standards. It had very developped physics and ethics, but its logic and mathematics had just en instrumental value, whereas cosmology and biology received little attention. M.C. Nussbaum, The therapy of desire, Prnceteon University Press. Princeton, 1994. P. 109.

87 J.Beaujeu, Introduction to Minucius Felix, Octavius. Texte établi et traduit par J.Beaujeu. Paris. 1974. Pp. xvi-xvii.

excusable. However, avoiding speaking about Christ's mission and teaching is still a bit surprising for a Christian. This yet appears to happen to Octavius.

However, we should take into account the fact that Octavius' presentation is restricted to the subject matter of the dispute already, which is drawn up by his opponent. It does not make sense to open new issues if the ones which are raised did not receive a satisfactory treatment. The Octavius is not a manual in Christian theology, but a sort of a report of a lively dispute between the friends, presented in Cicero's classical rhetorical fashion of actio and responsio.[88] The topics raised in the dispute are often marked by a personal interest, and do not tend to give a complete coverage of all possible pros and contras.

Moreover, Minucius along with his friends Octavius and Calicius are neither philosophers nor theologians. They are practicing lawyers from the North-African province at the decline of the Roman Empire. They represent an educated social class, which underwent a usual routine training in liberal arts. These people had a mastery in public speeches and were generally familiar with the main current ideas of their time. Yet, we must restrain ourselves in our demands as to their an in-depth knowledge of various philosophical schools and an insightful vision into the Christian teaching.

Whatever minimal contribution this discussion in the Octavius may generally be for the purpose of our study, it still plays a certain importance within a general framework of the discussion. Minucius Felix is one of a few authors, anterior to Augustine who was writing in Latin and knew or may have known Tim 41ab. Similarly to what is going to happen to Augustine, Minucius is quite loose in his representation of the contents of the passage. And indeed, even if we drop our reservations and accept that he was really familiar with the passage to some extent, we must still admit that Minucius drops the major part of its contents (creative speech; gods as the object of the speech; demiurge the father as a creator and not just deus or artifex; bodies of gods being under the scrutiny and not the universe). Yet, Minucius creatively uses that little what he finds possible to use for the purpose of the dispute at hand. That little which does remain interestingly corresponds to Augustine's ideas concerning the omnipotence of god the creator.

88 H.J. Baylis, Minucius Felix and his place among the early fathers of the Latin church. London. 1928. P. 4.

7.10.2. Comparative Conclusion: Minucius Felix and Augustine on Tim 41ab

In comparison to Minucius, Augustine is better familiar with Tim 41ab and cites the text repeatedly even though in a distorted translation. Minucius does not quote this text of Plato but paraphrases an argument associated with the source of corruptibility and mortality.

Augustine and Minucius employ the text of Tim 41ab with the same purpose to refute the criticism of Christianity by the pagan intellectuals. However, Augustine and Minucius discuss different topics, namely, the resurrection of the body (Augustine) and the end of the world (Minucius). Neither of the topics is discussed directly in Plato's original text. Both authors use remarkable creative efforts to apply Plato's text for polemical purposes.

Both Augustine and Minucius focus on the divine omnipotence of the Creator. However, Minucius reverses the argument of the original text. Minucius believes that God is omnipotent and therefore can make the world corruptible or perishable. And if God can do this, He also may. Leaving aside the question how credible such arguments are, especially in the view of groundlessly optimistic transition from possibility to necessity, it is obvious that in their interpretation Augustine and Minucius share the conviction in the omnipotence of the Creator, and from that belief they draw their own conclusions about what God can do and what He will do. Augustine argues that the Supreme God (summus deus) will transform mortal corruptible bodies into immortal and incorruptible. Minucius argues that even if the world is incorruptible and immortal, God the Creator (artifex deus) can and will make it corruptible and mortal. On the basis of the same premise on the omnipotence of the willing God, Augustine and Minucius come to opposite conclusions: the former from mortality and perishability to immortality and imperishability; the latter from immortality and imperishability to mortality and perishability. Although the results seem to be opposite to each other, in fact, these opposites are interlocked through the idea of the omnipotence of the Creator. A ter all, if it is a real omnipotence, it can do anything, even reaching the opposite outcomes: to make immortal and incorruptible those who were mortal and corruptible, and to make mortal and corruptible those who were immortal and incorruptible. The possibility to achieve such results is a peculiar kind of proof of Creator' omnipotence, although Augustine speaks about the human bodies in the resurrection, while Minucius speaks about the universe. Thus, the views of Augustine and Minucius on the omnipotence of the Creator in the context of discussing Tim 41ab complement each other in an indirect way, despite the fact that neither of the two authors knows about it.

It is evident that in spite of a seriously distorted translation, Augustine's argument is based on a literal understanding of the important parts of the cited text, underlied by Creator's promise of incorruptibility and immortality to his corruptible and mortal creation. The opposite idea of Minucius that the Creator can and will destroy the incorruptible world cannot be found in the text of Tim 41ab and is based only on the conclusion of the omnipotence of the Creator, which by itself is an interpretive inference derived from Plato's text. Yet, the very fact that both authors without direct influence on each other came to similar conclusions, allows us to say that Plato's text induced such ideas in a Christian context.

Despite the obvious fact that both authors emphasize the theme of the omnipotence, the paradox is that neither Minucius nor Augustine seriously considered the issues related to the divine omnipotence. Neither of the two authors in their discussion of Tim 41ab shows familiarity with the objections against the divine omnipotence from such opponents of Christianity as Porphyry. However, as opposed to Minucius who does not touch upon such criticisms in his other writings, Augustine briefly raises the problem of the limitation of the divine omnipotence by the "capacity" to lie, deception, and death, and finds the solution in his definition of omnipotence as the fulfillment of all that is the most desired.

7.11. Conclusive general evaluation of Augustine's interpretation to Tim 41ab within the theological reception

Augustine's analysis of Tim 41ab is similar to the analysis of the same text by other theologians on the number of issues; on the other hand, it is radically different in some points. We shall try to systematize our findings.

The level of the familiarity with Tim 41ab varies significantly among different authors. Pseudo-Justin clearly shows the best knowledge of the text; he accurately and repeatedly quotes the passage, creatively applying it to his needs and, at the same time, easily operating with the Platonic notions of being and becoming. He is also familiar with the context of the passage within the dialogue. By adducing four different interpretations Hippolytus also shows good knowledge of the Platonic tradition of interpreting some elements of the passage. The discussion on Philo, Origen and Arnobius show some parallels with the discussions later raised by the Neoplatonists, yet, without going too deep into the question. Philo calls the gods, who are addressed to in the speech, the young gods (neoteroi theoi), using the notion which was absent in Plato, but extremely widespread in the later Neoplatonism (particularly in Proclus). Origen calls the demiurge "Zeus," which also cannot be found in Plato's Timaeus, but becomes common among the Neoplatonists (Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and

Proclus). Arnobius resorts to the methodology of intermediate links, extremely important for the later Neoplatonism and particularly for Proclus. Athenagoras, Clement, and Minucius show only a superficial familiarity with Tim 41ab. Although Athenagoras and Clement cite Tim 41ab, they do not provide a serious analysis of any of the problems emerging from the passage. Minucius only paraphrases the text, simplifying it almost beyond recognition and making conclusions contrary to those following from the logic of the text. Augustine knows Tim 41ab very well, but uses it completely out of the dialogue's context and in a much distorted translation of Cicero. As a consequence, some of Augustine's conclusions correspond to the original Plato's train of thought, such as, for example, the idea that the corruptible and mortal by nature becomes incorruptible and immortal by the decision of God. At the same time, other conclusions which Augustine derives from Tim 41ab, can hardly be called Platonist, including the statement on the immortality of the body and the omnipotence of the Creator.

Almost all our authors use Tim 41ab in a polemical manner, defending Christian doctrines from the attacks of the pagans – it is not for nothing that most of the authors under discussion were called "the Apologists," that is, the defenders of the Christian doctrine. Their choice of using Plato for response is understandable since Plato had an enormous authority in almost all philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period. Reference to Plato is the argument ad auctoritatem. Writings and authority of Plato for the pagans were similar to the authority of the Bible for the Christians, particularly for the Platonists of the "scholastic period" – the Neoplatonism. Therefore, it was a serious argument if one could find a convincing proof of his own opinions in Plato. Only some authors, such as Origen, Hippolytus, and partly pseudo-Justin, radically reject the authority of Plato. Origen accuses Plato of lying and distorting the argument; Hippolytus of inventing uncountable heresies, and pseudo-Justin of dishonesty out of fear of the authorities.

However, the fact that all the above authors used the text of Tim 41ab, speaks for itself. Since it was difficult to find direct evidence of the unity of Plato and the Christian doctrine, it was the best solution to refer to the text or texts with multiple layers of meaning, among which one could find, besides other things, the support of the Christian doctrines.

The problem of the attitude towards Plato, in fact, reveals the wider problem of the attitude towards pagan wisdom and its value for Christianity. The Apologists do not show a unified opinion on the issue, and Augustine is the most vivid example of such an ambiguous attitude. All the authors discussed can be divided into two groups according to the degree of

their confidence in Plato: one group of theologians finds Plato's doctrine compatible with the teaching of the church, while the other groups believes that Plato's doctrine contradicts it. Clement of Alexandria, Athenagoras, Justin Martyr, pseudo-Justin, Arnobius, and Minucius belong to the first group, while Origen and Hippolytus belong to the second group. The views of Justin Martyr and Hippolytus (also a martyr) are radically opposite to each other. The former author claims that logos is present both in the Bible and in Plato in a seminal way while the latter author considers Plato almost as a primordial heresiarch and the source of many heresies.

Augustine gradually changes his attitude to Plato, shifting from the first group closer to the second. During the time when Augustine wrote his dialogues in Cassiciacum and "De consensu," he sincerely believed in the unity of Plato and the Christian doctrine. Moreover, being a citizen of the Roman Empire, where many issues of religious nature were treated in a fairly eclectic way, Augustine often tried to reconcile different philosophical schools, in particular, the Platonists, with the Peripatetics and the Stoics, claiming that they all said the same things, and the difference between these schools was only of verbal kind. It often happens that the philosophers oppose Christianity without any attempts to get to the bottom of the problems, whereas, in fact, there is no difference between Christianity and philosophy on many issues. In the "City" and in the context of our discussion, Augustine rhetorically uses Plato for his own polemical purposes. Augustine does not give much trust to Plato, yet he does not reach extreme positions, similar to the positions of Hippolytus or even Origen. We can say that by the end of his life Augustine did not entirely define his attitude to the subject, assuming that the pagan philosophy in general, and Plato in particular, can and should be used for catechetical purposes, but truth and wisdom are to be found only in the Scripture and in the church.

Augustine is unique in terms of the subject for support of which he quotes Tim 41ab. No one else uses this passage in discussing the theory of the resurrection of the bodies. However, a number of other apologists, although not all of them, show a unique approach in using Plato's text in their discussions. Apparently, the scope and the depth of Plato's text could inspire and even engage in such exercises. Thus, Philo is the only author among others, who compares the problem of the creation of the world in Plato's Timaeus and in the Book of Genesis. And although Eusebius of Caesarea also compares these books, he does so in relation to a different problem, being the only theologian who finds the parallels between the words of the Creator at the beginning of the Genesis and the speech of the demiurge from Tim 41ab. Pseudo-Justin is the only author who turns to

Plato's text for his analysis of divine existence. Origen is the only one out of all theologians who calls Zeus the subject of the public speech contained in the passage of Tim 41ab. Arnobius is the only author who considers the text to be the proof of the natural mortality of the soul. Minucius is the only author who finds evidence of the Christian teaching about the end of the world in Plato's text. Hipollytus is the only author who endeavors to compare various understandings of the constituent elements of the text in the philosophical schools. In general, the spread of the selected topics gives the impression that the apologists approached Plato's text on their own without consulting interpretations of Tim 41ab by other Christian authors. On the other hand, Plato's text proved to be so manifold that it could be used for discussing the whole variety of philosophical and theological questions. Clement of Alexandria and Eusebius find the elements of the Trinitarian doctrine in the text.

Some topics appear in several authors. Thus, the question of the immortality of the soul is treated in both Arnobius and Augustine. For Arnobius this is the main topic in his analysis of Tim 41ab, while for Augustine it is a secondary issue that appears in only one of the sixteen passages. Moreover, Augustine and Arnobius come to different results; this indicates that Augustine did not consult the position of Arnobius on this issue. The position of Arnobius is more subtle, clear, and closer to the Neoplatonic sources, although it is purely Christian in nature. Arnobius argues that the soul is mortal by nature, and refutes the arguments of its immortality. Augustine already in his treatise "On the Immortality of the Soul" argues for the immortality of the soul following Plato's Phaedo, and in his analysis of Tim 41ab in "The City" only briefly uses an argument from the position he had discussed earlier. Augustine argues that the soul is immortal by nature, but immortal in a different way than God because God has no beginning and no end, and although the soul has no end, it does have a beginning. Augustine goes on to say something similar about the resurrection of the human body which also has a beginning but no end, and therefore is incorruptible and immortal.

The authors, including Athenagoras, pseudo-Justin, Hippolytus, and Augustine, show the greatest unanimity on the issue of polytheism. They all try to refute it, although the arguments they use differ significantly. Pseudo-Justin even thinks that Plato used the plural for the concept of god in bad faith out of fear of the Areopagites who punished Socrates for not believing in polytheism. Surprisingly, pseudo-Justin does not pay any attention to the playful and ironic tone of Tim 40, when Plato begins to discuss the genealogy of the traditional gods of the Greeks. On the contrary, Hippolytus seriously examines four possible understandings of the word "gods" in

Plato, three of which are polytheistic in nature. Since Plato does not claim allegiance to any of these positions and does not argue with any of them, it seems that all of these positions are equally acceptable. Since it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand what Plato's real belief concerning the problem was, we may presume that he did not make a definitive stand on the question about the gods, and thus his writings became the source of many misconceptions. Augustine does not consider the question of polytheism especially important in his reading of Tim 41ab. Augustine suggests that Plato chose an inaccurate term meaning something else, for example the celestial bodies, but more likely the bodies of people in the future resurrection. According to Augustine, the use of inaccurate or rather allegorical terminology in relation to this problem was very common; it often occurred not only in Plato, but also in Apuleius and in the Old Testament. Even when the pagans use the word "gods," they deal, although unknowingly, with idols. If we replace the inadequate words with adequate notions, such as, depending on the context, the universe, the celestial bodies, angels, demons, idols, people, or bodies, everything is coming back in its place. Therefore, one should not listen to the words, but to their meaning.

Almost all our authors try to identify the subject who is giving the speech. For most of them – Philo, Clement, Justin, pseudo-Justin, Eusebius, Arnobius, Minucius, and Augustine – he coincides with the Judeo-Christian God the Creator. At the same time, for Clement and Eusebius he coincides with God the Father of the Christian Trinity. Only Origen and Hippolytus refuse to draw positive parallels between the author of the speech and the Christian God in one sense or another. According to Origen and some Neoplatonists, this was Zeus of Greek mythology and philosophy. According to Hippolytus, it is altogether not clear who he is, although there are several possible explanations, most of them of the heretical nature.

Many authors are perplexed concerning the naming of the subject of speech. They think that something was wrong in the original text. Some of them changed the sequence of the words in the title, as did Cicero whose translation was used by Augustine. Thus, instead of Plato's δημιουργός πατὴρ τε, Clement and Justin have πατὴρ δημιουργός τε, while Cicero (and, therefore, Augustine) has parens effectorque instead of effector parensque. It is possible that Clement and Cicero used the same modified source, given that neither of the two authors tell us about the reasons for such a rearrangement. Some authors also express perplexity in their understanding of the text, but in different way. Origen removes the last word ἔργων from the full title of the subject of speech (Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων), thus in a subtle manner getting rid of the

conspicuously absurd reading of the expression πατὴρ τε ἔργων as the father of works (of things), because is not easy to imagine how one can be the father of things. Fatherhood can be applied only to animate objects. It is difficult to imagine that Plato means the animation of inanimate objects. The easiest way to correct this strange reading was to radically remove this understanding of the text, citing it without the last word (ἔργων) and thus making the father (πατὴρ) unrelated to "the things." Several authors give new titles to the giver of the speech: πρεσβυτάτος καὶ ἡγεμόνος (Philo), maximus deus (Arnobius), summus deus (Augustine), the latter two being synonymous, which indicates an existence of a certain system of thought in a Latin-speaking Christian intellectual reader of the text.

The majority of the apologists under discussion make attempts to identify the addressee of the speech, but not all of them. Thus, the most sophisticated interpretation of pseudo-Justin refers only to the truly existing God, and the addressee of the speech turns out to be of imaginary kind. Pseudo-Justin does not even try to find a replacement for the addressed gods, for example, by treating them in an allegorical manner. For Minucius the word "gods" is, first of all, the universe; for Arnobius gods signify everything that has an intermediary status including the universe and the human souls, and for Augustine gods are the heavenly bodies and the human bodies. Some of our authors (Clement and pseudo-Justin) did not discuss the problem of who the gods were in this passage.

Arnobius, Minucius, and Augustine argue for the omnipotence of the Creator who addresses with a speech in the passage. However, these authors apply this omnipotence to different objects: to the universe in Minucius, to the soul in Arnobius, and to the body in Augustine. Among them, Minucius and Augustine reach seemingly opposite conclusions on the basis of the same passage. According to Minucius, God cancels eternity, incorruption, and immortality for this world making it corruptible, mortal, and destined to come to its end. According to Augustine, bodies as corruptible and mortal by nature become incorruptible and immortal by the omnipotence of the Creator revealed in Tim 41ab. According to Arnobius, souls, being mortal by nature, become immortal by the will of the Creator.

As we have seen, the majority of the theologians under discussion Christianize Tim 41ab, finding the elements of the Christian teaching in the passage which, in fact, does not contain them: the Trinity (Clement and Eusebius), the existential nature of the divinity (pseudo-Justin), the omnipotence of the Creator (Arnobius, Minucius, and Augustine), the mortality of the soul (Arnobius), the end of the world (Minucius), and the resurrection of the body (Augustine). Therefore, in the ideological and

methodological sense, Augustine's attitude to Plato's text in no way differs from other Christian authors, although the specific features of the Christian doctrines he found in the passage, in some cases are similar to other authors (the special type of incorruptibility and immortality of the universe and the soul as well as the omnipotence of the Creator), and in other cases are absolutely unique (the theory of the resurrection of the body).

Conclusion to Part Two

We evaluated Augustine's reading of Tim 41ab text in this part. We have done this by following three main directions: (1) by evaluating used translation (2) by evaluating Augustine's understanding of the readings of Tim 41ab by Neo-Platonists whom he criticized and finally (3) by determining Augustine's place in the theological tradition of the reception of *Tim 41ab*. We reflected on these evaluations in three chapters of this part: on the translation (chapter five), on the Neo-Platonists (chapter six) and on the theologians (chapter seven). The last chapter (eight) is a post-validation on stoic idioms used by Cicero in his translation and later by Augustine for his exegesis adds to all the above mentioned chapters. General results we have obtained are as follows.

In contrast to his own hermeneutical principles expressed in the Christian Doctrine, Augustine is completely dependent on the only translation of Tim 41ab he used – the one made by Cicero. He is not familiar with any Greek original, neither with any existing Latin translation. Cicero, on one hand, has made a beautiful Latin translation accessible for those fond of literature and pleasant reading; on the other hand, in Latin that had become classic already one and a half thousand years before the described events. The accuracy of Cicero's translation is much lower than that of the recent translation made by Augustine's contemporary, especially this refers to the text of Tim 41ab. On the other hand, although Calcidius translated Timaeus in a rather simple style it is nonetheless rather accurate and reflects deep understanding of the original.

Cicero, on contrary, has translated the smaller part of Timaeus, seeing his main goal in telling the readers only about the creation of the world and nothing else. He translated Timaeus poetically according to his own understanding of the discussed matter, apparently considering the original too confusing. In several places of the translation he simplifies Plato's text, in others he adds thoughts that are not present in the original. Concepts typical for Plato are sometimes translated by Cicero with stoic idioms (see chapter eight). It is amazing but true that we do not have any testimony of Augustine being acquainted with this rather peculiar translation. Augustine's citing is selective and shows week knowledge of context. What he does know exhibits a rather free translation. Augustine has only Plato in the stoic traditionand Cicero's interpretation at his disposal containing only abstracts.

It would be interesting to compare simultaneously the second and the third chapters of part two of this work. We can be almost certain about a succession of Tim 41ab reading in the Neoplatonic school. Authors to come are well familiar with the writings of the preceding ones and base their

work on the interpretation of the prior tradition trying to develop it by moving a step forward. This development reaches its peak in Proclus' interpretation. In the interpretations of Philoponus and Simplicius we trace an accent on the specific theme (of the eternity of the world) and using Aristotle as the main commentator on Plato.

Apologists have a comparable approach when it is a matter of interpreting Bible sources, though tradition is spread over different regions that has led to the development of two different schools of Christian exegeses (Alexandria and Antioch). Augustine, being under the influence of both, was able to harmonize their achievements. As to the readings of pagan authors, even such famous ones as Plato and Aristotle, such a succession is difficult if not impossible to detect. Most of these authors never studied these interpretations even when they were sometimes aware that the text of Tim 41ab had been used by other theologians previously. Succession of this text's interpretation is hardly present. In this sense Augustine's interpretations with his creative approach to this text fits ideally into the absence of common interpretation succession. For this reason he belongs to the tradition of Christian theologians who paid little attention to the interpretations of even key philosophical texts such as Tim 41ab. It would be wrong to consider Augustine as one of the Platonic school as he is unaware the interpretation of this passage. Besides his criticism of the Neo-Platonists based on Tim 41ab has completely no ground.

AUGUSTINE's TIMAEUS 41AB

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Chapter Eight:

Post-validation:

Negligence:

Stoic Presence in Augustine's Tim 41ab

8.0. Introduction: Stoic intermediacy between Plato, Porphyry and Augustine, via Cicero

In *de timore dei* Augustine says that the Stoics do not believe in the resurrection of bodies because they have ignorant masters, claiming themselves to be those themselves.[1] Augustine thereby accuses the Stoics of arrogance, due to which they do not listen to others but exclusively to themselves. Therefore, they could not grasp the basic doctrinal issues of Christianity, first and foremost the doctrine of resurrection. Having said this, it seems there is no further need to discuss the importance of Stoicism in the resurrection debate. Yet, curiously, the Stoic philosophy still plays a role in this debate, almost like a parasite growing on the body of another philosophy, namely Platonism. It does so through the presence of its terminological elements, which I called 'idioms' in the text and in the context of *Tim* 41 ab as it was translated, or rather interpreted, by Cicero.

Years 1930s through 1970 Augustine's familiarity with the Stoic philosophy was the subject of intensive research.[2] This showed that we can clearly trace a certain period of Augustine's intense interest in Stoicism. Apparently, Augustine knew the main names of the Greek Stoicism, including Zeno, Chrysippes, and Cleantes, though Latin Stoicism was naturally more

[1] *epistola 358, 2.3.*

[2] *Baquette, C., Une périoe stoïcienne dans l'evolution de la pensée de saint Augustin, in Revu des Études augustiniennes 16 (1970); M. Spanneut, Le Stoïcism et Saint Augustin in Forma Futuri, in Studi in anore de Cardinale Michele Pellgribo. Turin, 1975;O'Connell, R.J., De Libero Arbitrio I: Stoicism Revisited, in Augustinian Studies 1 (1970); Baquette, C., Le Stoïcisme dans la formation de Saint Augustin, Ph.D. diss, Université Louvain la Neuve, 1968; Holloway, A.J., The Transformation of Stoic Themes in St. Augustine, Ph.D. Diss., Fordham University, 1966; Verbeke, G., Augustin et le Stoïcisme, Études augustiniennes 1 (1958); Bushman, R.M., St Augustine's Metaphysics and Stoic Doctrine, in New Scholasticism 26 (1952); Verbeke, G., L'evolution de la doctrine du pneuma du Stoïcisme à S. Augustin, Bibliothèque de l'Institut Superieur de Philosophie, Université de Louvain, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1945.*

accessible to him. According to his own acknowledgment, he read a bit of Seneca in the original (*paucussimos Senecae libros*).[3] His attitude towards Stoicism is positive in his early writings before his conversion to Christianity, especially in his Cassiciacum Dialogues, among which *de ordine* occupies a significant position. After 390 Augustine begins to be increasingly critical towards Stoicisim, to the extent that M.Spanneut goes so far as to name him 'an anti-Stoic'.[4] *Civ.dei* contains a number of discussions around Stoic doctrines, among which are the theory of *apatheia*, virtues, seminal reasons, the doctrine of sage, evil etc. What is still to be identified is the place of my present research.

Curiously, traces of several Stoic doctrines appear in Augustine's writings or sections of his writings that do not seem to discuss Stoicism. This is evidently the case in Augustine's discussions with certain Neo-Platonists. The Stoic presence articulates itself in the forms of what we will call 'idioms': the philosophical vocabulary unique to and characteristic of a particular school. Clearly, the Platonists use terminology different from the terminology used by the Epicureans, Peripatetics or Sceptics.[5] Each of the major philosophical schools is known for its attachment to certain key notions, which characterize their doctrines. Some of them also introduced neologisms or contributed to the new meanings into the vocabulary of the language. These notions are often indispensable to philosophical discourse. The usage of the incorrect vocabulary may introduce misconceptions. It appears that Augustine sometimes speaks about the Platonic philosophy in Stoic language, consequently drawing curiously Christian conclusions.

We can trace an intermediary doctrine present in the transmission process between Plato-(Neo-plato-)nists and the Christians in the polemics concerning resurrection. This intermediary doctrine is the Stoic philosophy in Cicero's version of *Timaeus*. Apparently, Augustine is not even aware of this intermediary role, as he never questions the faithfulness of Cicero's translation of Plato, and alas, is scarcely aware of Cicero's long-standing engagement with Stoic ideas. As a result, he innocently attributes Stoic views to the Neo-Platonists, thinking that these views are authentically Platonic, both in the passage (2.3.1.), and in the discussion surrounding the passage (2.3.2.). Let us examine this more closely.

[3] *Confessiones V, 6, 12.*

[4] *M. Spanneut, Le Stoïcism et Saint Augustin in Forma Futuri, in Studi in anore de Cardinale Michele Pellegrino. Turin, 1975, p. 271.*

[5] Cf. Comparisions of the terminology of major Hellenistic schools in M.Nussbaum, Therapy of desires. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994.

8.1. Stoic Doctrines *in* Augustine's *Tim* 41ab

Although the passage of *Tim 41ab* in Cicero's translation is rather short, it still contains several notions that are characteristically Stoic, and quite atypical for Plato. However, the conclusion would be too far-fetched if we start making claims in attempt to identify fully exposed Stoic doctrines in Cicero's translation of *Timaeus*. This work of Cicero's is indeed a translation, and not a treatise on Stoic philosophy. We think Cicero was overtaken by his own philosophical background, rather than deliberately trying to impose Stoic views on the reader. In my view, the problem was that he saw little difference between Stoic thinking and Platonism, often confusing the one for the other. However, since Plato's discourse in Timaeus lacks precision, a difference in vocabulary may bias the reader's interpretation of the passage as a whole towards the Stoic way of thinking.

This concerns the following: (a) the notion 'reason' replacing the idea of the 'good' in the context of the passage; (b) the identity of the speaking god is expressed in terms of abstract causality; (c) following Stoic materialism, the addressed divinities are perceived as heavenly celestial bodies; (d) the use of the word 'seed' as the cause of someone's existence, in the context of the theory of seminal reasons; and finally (e) the word 'evil', used by Plato, and its translation as 'deception' in Cicero, with both being absent in Augustine.

Let us look at each of these five idiomatic forms in turn.

8.1.1. Reason as the Top Principle (a)

Cicero translated the word εὖ, meaning 'ethical good' in Greek, as *ratio*, meaning 'reason' in Latin. Although this is not literally correct, from the point of view of the transmission of the values of one philosophy to another the correspondence is makes sense.

Such a transmission demonstrates Cicero's amazing creative appropriation of Plato's ideas. His *ratio* is also ultimately identical with the notion of 'nature' (φύσις - *natura*) within the Stoic system. Yet, none of these notions appears in their pure form in the original passage. The way Cicero did it in the context was to turn a passive participation (ἔχον εὖ also followed by καλῶς) into an active act of reason (*ratione*). This is a detail, yet of crucial importance. In the Neo-Platonic system ideas, especially the idea of the Good, do not act but proceed, that is, emanate. The first real action, the creation of the universe, is a consequence of emanation. The idea of creation emanates down its powers.[6] Yet the act of creation belongs exclusively to the creators.

[6] Cf. chapter six on the Neo-Platonists *supra*, especially section on Proclus. Proclus went a step further to talk about the procession of divinities.

The idea of the Good is present everywhere, especially in things well bound together. Since goodness is present in them, they are well (καλῶς) bound together. Clearly this καλῶς is being consequence of ἔχον εὖ. In Cicero's translation both these words disappear. Goodness, whether expressed with one word or two, is substituted by rationality. In Stoic ethics reasonable actions are good, therefore, *ratio* is identical with (the) Good.

As already mentioned, this is quite natural: the top principle in one system is rendered by the top principle in another system. However, it is questionable whether one philosophy is perfectly translatable into another philosophy, this time Platonism into Stoicism: a Plato into a Cicero.[7] It is unsurprising that Augustine followed this approach, translating Stoic Platonism into Christian resurrection doctrine, since this way of thinking was not atypical in the Hellenic context, especially for the Greek religion: the Greeks used to find equivalents for their gods in other countries and in other religions, particularly in Egypt. Athena was exceptionally popular among the Greek divinities with the variety of the worship places in other countries.[8]

[7] It is not surprising that in the largest part on Stoic Anthology is dedicated to Cicero. E.Bréhier, Les Stoiciens. Paris: Gallimard. 1962.

[8] Plato spots Athena's worship in Egyptian city of Sais, where the inhabitants identify Athena with Neith, their local goddess. *Tim* 21e.

8.1.2. Progenitor and Effector (b)

The Speaker in Plato's passage is δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε. [9]Cicero translates this term as *parens effectorque* - which we render as progenitor and effecter- drastically altering the meaning towards the causality in abstract terms.,

Cicero correctly attaches a kind of a double title to the speaking god: yet he turns Plato's 'craftsman and father' into 'progenitor and effecter'. Plato adduces importance to this double title. Cicero keeps the same structure.

Nevertheless, either he does not adequately grasp the meaning of these words and the importance of their sequence, or he refuses to do so.

First, the Speaker in Cicero's translation of Plato's δημιουργὸς 'craftsman' turns into an abstract effecter, referring to a causality, and not necessarily to a craftsmanship: 'father' is converted into a more general progenitor, a 'parent', thereby allowing the term to be also interpreted as 'mother', or as some other creature who is beyond both father and mother – a kind of 'unpronounced parent'.

Second, and most significantly, he reverses the word order: the doer (either craftsman or effecter) is the first term in Plato, but follows the second in Cicero; the parent (either father or parent as such) is the first term in Cicero, but the second term in Plato.

These alterations by Cicero also have Stoic implications. In Stoic Cosmology, there is no figure of active creator similar to Plato's demiurge or the Christian Creator – indeed, there is no active separate creator of any kind. Their universe is not created but eternal. In fact, it exists forever. Its development runs through various stages and is due to a natural process. There is a sort of efficient causality, which Cicero calls effecter, as well as progenitor.

[9] *Tim* 41 a7.

8.1.3. Rising gods (c)

The plural participle *orti* (Sg. *ortus*), the 'rising' ones in the passage referring to the addressed gods, may derive from a Stoic way of thinking. Since the Stoic system is materialistic,[10] it is not surprising that the gods mentioned in this context also appear to be material, i.e., bodily. In fact, the audience addressed is not necessarily gods in Cicero's translation: they are the ones who 'rose from the seed of gods',[11] allowing to identify possible traces of a seminal reasons theory, (cf. section 2.3.1.4. to follow). This seed (*satus*) may be an origin of gods but possibly also of some other unspecified beings. If Cicero had regarded the addressed audience as gods, he would simply have used the word *dii* ('gods'), as Calcidius did four centuries later in his translation.[12] Since he avoided the word that was literally present in the original, there is good reason to think that he did not want it to be there. Perhaps, Cicero simply did not consider the beings addressed by the speaker to be gods, or at least wanted to abstain from a judgment on the matter.

Augustine misses this nuance, implicit in Cicero's intricate rendering, concerning beings rising from the seed of gods. Already in the passage where he first comments *Tim 41ab* (quote (α), cf. supra) Augustine bluntly calls them 'gods': God as a producer of gods, apparently producing celestial gods, all the stars, the sun and the moon. Thus he spoke about God as the creator of celestial gods…[13] Here one cannot be mistaken, as Augustine says it thrice within two lines, naming these beings as *celestial gods*, and not simply stars, planets, or perhaps still some other kinds of being, as we would expect him to do from a reading of Cicero's text. Augustine's reading is closer to Plato's original than to Cicero's translation, although there is little reason to believe that he read it otherwise.

The beings, who rose from the seed of gods, may be similar in importance to gods, yet they are not gods in the sense Augustine perceives it. He thinks they are simply celestial bodies: the sun, the stars and the planets (cf. supra).

If these gods are celestial bodies, then they naturally have to be appearing as ascending (rising) and then descending to us. These are: the sun, the moon, the stars and the planets,[14] namely, the celestial bodies, which appear from behind the horizon in the East (Oriens) and hide behind it in the

[10] Sellars, John, *The Stoics on Nature and function of Philosophy, Ashgate*, 2003, p. 33.

[11] *tim* 40:4.

[12] Calcidius, Timaeus. Ed. J.H. Waszink. London, Leiden: J.Brill.1962, p. 178.

[13] sermo 241.8. Translation V.Y.

[14] α1 Why is that we find the same Plato, α2 the master of them all, α3 who refers to God α4 in a certain book which he wrote α5 on the creation of the world, α6 God as a producer of gods, α7 apparently producing celestial gods, α8 all the stars, the sun and the moon? (translation V.Yudin), *sermo* 241.8.

West. They appear as the servants of nature, as well as parts of the natural mechanism, indicating time and seasons (Plato).[15]

Four times in two different treatises Augustine quotes Cicero's translation (*tim* III, 8 :19-20. *Tim* 29c2) «Quantum ad id quod ortum est aeternitas valet, tantum ad fidem veritas». Duo illa sursum sunt, aeternitas et veritas: duo ista deorsum, quod ortum est, et fides.[16] Cicero uses the expression *ortus est* to express one of Plato's key notions of becoming.

8.1.4. Seminal Principles (d)

As already noted in the preceding section, though traces of the seminal reasons theory are virtually absent in Plato's Timaeus, they are present in Cicero's interpretative translation of the passage. In the context of the discussion around Tim 41ab these traces appear as idioms rather than as a clear advanced doctrine, which in its adjusted Christian version appear intensely in *de genesi ad literam*, written roughly at the same period as both *sermones 241/242* and *civ.dei* which are crucial in the use of *Tim 41ab*.

The expression 'satu orti estis' in the initial address of the speaking god contains the word *satu* – 'seed' - the word which has been used by Cicero in his discussions on the theory of the seminal principles. Curiously, at this point he applies this notion to the gods: the seed, from which all the gods arise. (It would not be at all surprising if Augustine's identification of a resurrection theory in Plato was partly marked by Cicero's choice for *orti*, the first meaning of which is '(a)rising', which could then refer either to the rising celestial bodies in the sky, or to deceased bodies arising to their initial state of life.)

The doctrine of *rationes seminales* played a significant role in Augustine's teaching. Several studies were written on the subject at the beginning of the twentieth century.[17] Yet, with few exceptions, the focus was seldom upon the Stoic origin of this notion.

As previously mentioned, the *satus* – 'seed' - may relate to the Stoic notion of λόγος σπερματικὸς, which is a generative principle of the Universe that causes a creation to come into existence and take back all things. This notion arrived into Christianity from the Stoics via Cicero and prominently Augustine. For the latter, the seminal reasons (*rationes seminales*) are the principles of all beings (which he then turns into causales rationes), somehow similar to the Platonic ideas, yet contained in the divine

[15] *Tim* 37c-38c. Also cf. F. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 97,

[16] Cf supra section on Tim 29c in Augustine in chapter Four on Plato.

[17] E.g. G.Pelland, Cinq études d'Augustin sur le début de la Genèse. Paris: Desclée. 1972; M.J. McKeough, The Meaning of the rationes seminales in St. Augustine. Washington. 1926. It is peculiar that McKeough in his doctoral dissertation makes no link between Augustine's rationes seminales theory and Stoic philosophy, even in the section on Philosophy. Pp. 5-10.

mind. Moreover, through Augustine this theory had been spread throughout medieval philosophy.[18]

Nevertheless, Augustine does not feel at ease using the word *satus* in the given context, since he cites *Tim 41ab* in this version only once in the entire corpus: he does not use it elsewhere while citing from other sections of fifteen quotes of *Tim 41ab,* nor does he discuss it in other contexts. Instead, he turns to its synonym *semen*, which is first and foremost a 'seed', a 'grain', thus a more down to earth term than *satus*. *Semen* refers to an 'action of sowing or planting', or the 'result of procreation', and more aptly characterizes the way the 'minor gods' are brought into existence by the 'supreme God'.

This issue corresponds to Augustine´s discussion in (δ) *civ.dei* IX, xxiii, of whether or not these minor divinities are angels or some other kind of being, since one of the angels' functions appears to be spreading the seminal reasons, as sacral seeds of things. In *de Trinitate 3.8.13*., Augustine claims that although God, who is the only Creator, created seminal reasons, these are later spread around by the angels and, surprisingly, sometimes by the demons. The celestial beings resemble sowers, spreading these seeds down in the elements and distributing them in the right proportions, thus allowing life to flourish. The Gnostics as well as the Middle Platonist Apuleus questioned whether we can consider angels and demons to be the creators of men.[19] Naturally, Augustine gives a negative answer to this question.[20] However, Plato's 'minor gods', as Augustine formulated them, appear as co-creators with the Supreme God. Thus we can conclude that Augustine does not identify Plato's 'minor gods' with angels and demons.

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[18] This concerns the major figures of Mediaval philosophy, such as Albert, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Duns Scotus. Cf. A. Harrison-Barbette, *Augustine. Christian Neoplatonism*, section *Religious Philosophy/Metaphysics*. in *Philo-Sophus*. 2004.

[19] *civ.dei* VIII, 18; *civ.dei* VIII, IX, 27.

20 Jam vero hujus etiam garni semen quamvis oculis videre nequeamus, ratione tamen conjicere possumus: quia nisi talis aliqua vis esset in istis elementis, non plerumque nascerentur ex terra quae ibi seminata non essent; nec animalia tam multa, nulla marium feminarumque commixtione praecedente, sive in terra, sive in aqua, quae tamen crescunt et coeundo alia pariunt, cum illa nullis coeuntibus parentibus orta sint. Et certe apes semina filiorum non coeundo concipiunt, sed tanquam sparsa per terras ore colligunt. Invisibilium enim seminum creator, ipse creator est omnium rerum: quoniam quaecumque nascendo ad oculos nostros exeunt, ex occultis seminibus accipiunt progrediendi primordia, et incrementa debitae magnitudinis distinctionesque formarum ab originalibus tanquam regulis sumunt. Sicut ergo nec parentes dicimus creatores hominum, nec agricolas creatores frugum, quamvis eorum extrinsecus adhibitis motibus ista creanda Dei virtus interius operetur: ita non solum malos, sed nec bonos Angelos fas est putare creatores, si pro subtilitate sui sensus et corporis, semina rerum istarum nobis occultiora noverunt, et ea per congruas temperationes elementorum latenter spargunt, atque ita gignendarum rerum et accelerandorum incrementorum praebent occasiones. De Trinitate III, viii, 13.

8.1.5. Evil in absentia (e)

As discussed above, Cicero substitutes ἐθέλειν κακοῦ, which is Plato's reference to evil with *haudquam boni est*, which is a reference to an absence of good. It is quite a stretch to identify an absence of good with evil. It is interesting to consider what is behind this watered down translation. In a purely Stoic context, mentioning evil is superfluous at this point. According to the Stoic doctrine, evil has to do with passions of the soul and her sufferings.[21] Hence the need for απάθεια, as the avoidance of passions, which is ultimately also the avoidance of evil. απάθεια leads to αταραξία, as detachment from disturbance, the state of a sage, which is also discussed at length by Augustine in *sermo 348.3,22* as well as *in civ.dei VI.9* and XIV.8. For the Stoics, evil does not have a purely objective dimension. In a sense, evil is always subjective since it does not exist outside the soul. Contrary to what Plato seems to suppose, the desire for physical destruction may not be applicable to the source of evil. Cicero simply drops this reference to evil in the passage, completely depriving it of this element .

Although there is little evidence, we still think that this silence concerning evil has a 'Stoic' origin. As is also the case with the presence of other Stoic doctrines in civ.dei, the evidence is too slight to make any claims with certainty. The most we can say is that it is probably a presence of a doctrine *in absentia*.

Naturally, having no knowledge of Plato's mentioning evil in this passage, Augustine does not touch upon this issue in his sporadic commentaries on *Tim 41ab*. We cannot know whether he would have said anything on this had he known the original. Nevertheless, knowing the importance he always attached to the problem of evil,[23] given his experience with the Manichaean dualistic system, as well as the significance he attached to the passage of *Tim 41ab*, we suppose that he could have had something to say about it. His silence here is eloquent.

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[21] The doctrine of evil is a big issue in Stoicism which radically differs from the views on the matter within the majority of other philosophical schools. According to the Stoics, evil substantiates exclusively in the human beings, and is identified with passions of any kind. The cure from evil is reason, which is also a cure from passions, ultimately from desires. Therefore, a virtuous life is first and foremost a reasonable life. The rationalistic approach to the cure from passions is yet typical for the Hellenistic schools, such as Epicurianism, Skepticism and indeed Stoicism. Cf. M.Nussbaum, Therapy of Desires. Theory and Practics in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994. P.17.

[22] *de timore dei, sermo* 348.

[23] Augustine's privation account as influenced by Plotinus, cf. R. Williams, The insubstantial evil, Augustine and his Critics. London, New York: Routledge. 2000, pp.105-124; D.A. Cress, Augustine's privation account on evil: a defense, in Augustinian Studies 20 (1989), pp.109-28; G.R. Evans, Augustine on Evil. Cambridge. 1983.

8.2. Stoic Doctrines around Augustine's Tim 41ab:

It is not my aim in the present research to update and improve upon the *status quaestionis* of the Stoic period in the development of Augustine's thought. It will suffice here to limit ourselves to uncovering the presence of the Stoic standard idioms in Augustine's commentaries on *Tim 41ab* as used in the resurrection polemics versus the Neo-Platonists.

The Stoic doctrines which appear in the discussion surrounding *Tim 41ab* (right before and right after it) are the following: the tripartite division of philosophy, the theory of universal fire, the theory of seminal principles, the theory of intransitivity of elements, and finally the identification of Jupiter (Zeus) with the soul of the universe.

Several times in the course of this surrounding discussion Augustine feels the need to give a response in defense to the critique against the resurrection of the flesh. This critique aims to claim that resurrection is impossible, since corporeal bodies cannot possibly enter heaven, which consists exclusively of the fiery element. The essence of this critique is that one element cannot mingle with another.

The theory of intransitivity of elements, especially of ether, most probably originates in the Stoic treatise *de mundo*, attributed in Antiquity to Aristotle. The 'fire' in question ought to be identified with the Stoic universal fire. The 'fire' he is talking about is not the fourth element, but a different kind of fire, a heavenly fire, the fire of which heaven consists. Thus fire is a sort of ether, about which so much has been spoken in the literature concerning Plato's unwritten doctrines. This heavenly fire does not admit anything inside apart from what has been made out of it. The bodies made of other elements cannot enter heaven, as they are of a completely different nature[24].

Augustine offers a witty refutation of these statements. He reminds his opponents that birds fly in air, fish swim in water, and celestial bodies move around in heaven, and draws the following parallel: just as the metal vessels made by human artisans float upon water, the human bodies fashioned by the creator may enter heaven, especially when the creator of both heaven and earth wishes so. And he does, as we read it in *Tim* 41ab, when the impossible happens due to the Creator who commanded indissolubility as well as immortal existence for the minor gods, whose bodies were both dissoluble and mortal.[25] Basically, Augustine's response consists of two arguments. First, he argues that the theory of intransitivity of elements is incorrect, since it is contradicted by numerous examples in the nature around us. Secondly, even if this theory were correct, still it was overruled by the will of the

[24] (ια) *civ. dei* XIII, xvii, 19-32

[25] (ιε) *civ. dei* XIII, 19, 12-20.

Creator, as we can clearly read it in the *Timaeus*. The first argument is based on observations concerning the natural order, the second one defers to Plato's authority.

Yet Augustine's refutations are dubious for the two following reasons. First, his initial argument concerning the natural order is rather banal, and does not seem to do justice to his opponents' intelligence. It is hard to imagine that they did not think of this kind of objection Augustine raises concerning the natural order. Perhaps Augustine did not understand the theory of intransitivity of elements correctly, or oversimplified it in order to ridicule it. Regardless, the theory of intransitivity of material elements exclusively concerns heavenly fire, and not the other elements. Indeed, since fire annihilates bodies consisting of other elements, its very nature precludes presence of foreign bodies within itself .

Secondly, Augustine is equally mistaken in criticizing the Neo-Platonists for their adherence to such theories. On the one hand, unknowingly and incorrectly, he criticizes them for embracing a Stoic doctrine, which they never accepted. On the other hand, even the Stoics could not really have been convinced by Augustine's reference to Plato's divine authority, since they did not regard his authority as indisputable. On this matter Augustine simply confused the doctrines of two different philosophical schools of thought: the Stoic and the Neo-Platonic. This confusion again has to do with Cicero, the major source of Augustine's knowledge of Antiquity, since Cicero changed his philosophical position several times throughout his life, vacillating mainly between Platonism and Stoicism. He passed this mixture of Stoicism and Platonism down to Augustine, without the latter being aware of this.[26] Augustine might have been better off addressing his critique to Cicero rather than to Porphyry and his followers.

8.2.1. Threefold Division of Philosophy

In two places in *civ.dei* (VIII, 4,5,6 and XI, 25) Augustine embarks on a discourse on of the history of philosophy's division into three major parts: Physics (*philosphia naturalis*), Logic (*philosphia rationalis*) and Ethics (*philosphia moralis*). Augustine attributes this tripartite classification to Plato.[27]

However, this peculiar division is Stoic and not Platonic. Plato did not initiate it, nor is it identical with the division applied in any other school of philosophy. On the contrary, this division has become a trade-mark of

[26] Apparently, it was a common phenomenon in Christian era, starting as early as with Apostle Paul, who was undar a considerable Stoic influence. Cf. T.Engberg-Pedersen*, Stoicism in the Apostle Paul*, in *Stoicism: Traditions and Transformation*. S.K. Strange, J.Zupko (ed.), Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2004, pp. 54-64.

[27] Sellars, J., *Stoicism,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006, p. 42.

Stoicism. Since Augustine refers to it as a division of philosophy in general, he seems unintentionally to have identified Stoicism with all of philosophy, the Stoics with all the philosophers. Plato seems to be credited with the foundations of Stoicism.

These statements are incorrect. Stoicism is neither identical with the entire philosophy, nor are the Stoics the only philosophers, unless we are to believe a certain indoctrinated Stoic. Yet, since Augustine is not a Stoic he must have found this statement in a Stoic source. The attribution of the initiation of this division is not and cannot possibly be Plato's invention. Plato does not find Physics important. He hardly considers it to be a philosophical discipline, since it deals with the world of becoming. Since this world is unstable, changeable, impermanent, it is not subject to scientific inquiry, which deals with eternal truths.[28] On the other hand, crucial parts of his teaching, such as Metaphysics (although perhaps formulated in Aristotelian terms) and Dialectics, do not seem to correspond to the tripartite branches of philosophy.

8.2.2. Universal Fire

Fire and light are among Augustine's favorite themes. He talks about one's supposition concerning the bodies of which the celestial bodies consist as returning to the universal fire at some point. The gods addressed by the supreme God are the celestial bodies that consist of an element that Augustine variously calls ignis 'fire', caelum 'heaven', or aether 'ether'. He talks of ether as of some refined fire, or even as liquid fire.[29]

What sort of fire is this? Is it a natural or supernatural fire? Fire is one of the four elements. The philosophers of various schools single out each of these elements as a proto-element, from which everything starts. For instance, Thales, who was the first philosopher according to Augustine, thinks that water is the proto-element, Anaximen considers it to be air, Democrites speaks about the atoms, whereas the Stoics placed fire at the core of their system. According to the latter, everything consists of fire and is reducible to fire. Fire is nature itself. Since fire also has a creative power, it must be considered to be god.

To better understand the nature of fire, one has to remember that Augustine often employs the notions 'ether' and 'heaven' instead of fire. Ether is an element, the heavens consist of this element, which is a liquid fire. Jupiter

[28] Fine, G., Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. P. 71.

[29] *civ.dei* XXI, 2.

rules over the heavens, whereas Ether is one of his names. Everything in the heavens also consists of ether: Jupiter, gods, and their thrones.[30] Souls purified by means of the theurgic rituals dwell in the ether countries among the ether gods.

These identifications are rather peculiar. Augustine simplifies the achievements of Stoic Physics. As we know, there are four basic elements in classical Antiquity. At a later stage, we can trace the theory often attributed to Plato, as the author of the 'unwritten doctrines', of the fifth element.

The author of the first century treatise *de mundo*,[31] previously attributed to Aristotle, introduces ether as the fifth element, this being the substance of which the heaven consists.[32] Augustine echoes this position, with the difference that for him ether is no longer the fifth element but the fourth. He seems to have gotten rid of physical fire which was viewed as the fourth Ancient Physics. The fire he is talking about is a special, refined fire, also identical with ether. In this way, the fifth element simply becomes the fourth.

Augustine comments on Plato's passage concerning the fire shining through the eyes of humans (*Tim 45 b-d*). To a certain degree this may fit into Augustine's illumination theory, whose possible Neo-Platonic source has not yet been sufficiently studied.[33]

Augustine was not unwitting in his assimilation of some of the Stoic doctrine concerning fire. He knew and understood this doctrine quite well. In *civ.dei* VIII, 5 referring to the Stoics in general he says that they attached a great deal of importance to fire. Since fire is a source of life and wisdom, they thought that it was not just one of the four elements of which the universe is composed, but god (*ignem deum esse putaverum*).[34] Augustine says this in the section of *civ.dei* where he is treating the predecessors of the Platonists in their view on god as being 'materialists'. He lists the Stoics among these materialists.

8.2.3. Fate and Providence

[30] *consensu* I, 23, 35.

[31] Aristotelis de mundo liber. (ed. I.C. Kappius)...Altenburg. 1902.

[32] Cf the discussion on a possible attribution of de mundo to Apuleus in Charles B. Schmitt, Dilwyn Knox (ed..), *Pseudo-Aristoteles Latinus. A Guide to Latin works falsely attributed to Aristotle before 1500.* London: The Warburg Institute, 1985, p. 117.

[33] A notable silence on the matter we trace in Schumacher, L. *Divine illumination : the history and future of Augustine's theory of knowledge.* Malden : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011

[34] *civ.dei* VIII, 5.

In Cicero's version of *Tim 41ab* we come across the term fatum 'fate', which is one of the the key notions in Stoic philosophy.[35] Nevertheless, Augustine does not comment on this notion in his discussion on this passage.[36] This could be for a variety of reasons. He may have thought it did not fit the topic under discussion, or he may not have paid attention to some crucial words that are present in every version.

We cannot exclude the possibility that his silence is linked in some way to a presence, if not an indirect influence, of the Stoic philosophy. Augustine shows no signs of suspicion of the kind, being convinced that Cicero's translation is faithful to the original. Yet, the Stoic presence is there, whether Augustine manages to spot it or not. If Cicero had translated Plato differently, perhaps Augustine would also have reacted otherwise. Let us glance at the issue of destiny in this respect. This notion is clearly mentioned both by Plato (Tim 41b4) and by Cicero (tim 40.10). Cicero translates Plato's *Moiras* as *fata,* while using an equivalent for *Moira*. Augustine is dealing with a similar notion, albeit losing a nuance. Moira is a generic name for the goddesses of fate, whereas *fatum* which he has in front of him does not. Like Cicero, he substitutes a generic name with a notion, also in the plural.

However, unlike *Moira* who is a personified fate, *fatum* is the fate that is personally indifferent to the humans.[37] This cannot be, since it is not a living being: fate is abstract. In the Stoic materialism destiny is a mechanism of agency upon the human being. The interference of the personified divinities, mentioned by Plato in *Tim 41ab* and *supra,* thereby becomes superfluous, being considered as a piece of the mythical past. Since both Cicero and Augustine have the plural *fata* in the text, it may be that they consider there are many fates to be dealt with: probably every human has his own personal fate. Accordingly, this mechanism of destiny has a direct impact on everything in its own particular fashion.

The plurality of Cicero's *fata* differs from Plato's plurality of Moiras. There are but three Moras (Μοῖραι from μοῖρα, «share, part» Clotho (Κλωθώ, «Weaver»,), Lachesis (Λάχεσις, «Fate») — Athropos Ἄτροπος, «the Unavoidable»).[38] Although each of these divinities is entrusted with its own

35 Sellars, J., *Stoicism*. University of California Press. Berkley. 2006. P. 85.

36 Nevertheless, the entire civ.dei V is dedicated to the subject. G.O'Daly calls it a short treatise on fate, anprovidence. G. O'Daly, Augustine's City of God. A Reader's Guide. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2004, p. 94.

37 Onians, R.B. The origins of European thought : about the body, the mind, the soul, the world, time, and fate. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. P. 381; Jan Bremmer, Interpretations of Greek Mythology. Australia. 1987.

38 In *Republic* 617c Plato attributes three aspects of time (the past, the present, the futre) to three Moiras .

unique task (although clearly linked to the tasks of the other two), they treat each man in a similar fashion, despite there being many fates: one for each person.

In spite of this understandable silence on Moiras, in *civ.dei* V Augustine appeals to the notion of destiny in the context of his discussion with the Stoics and Cicero, thinking that the two occupy mutually contradictory positions on the issue in question.[39] He thinks both these positions are wrong: the truth must be somewhere in the middle, as usual.

The issue at stake between Cicero and the Stoics is the role of *genethliathics* – the horoscope sorcerers – in the prediction of human destiny, based on date of birth.[40] The acceptance or rejection of the horoscopes depends on the philosophical stance in the dialectics of the mutual influence between the fates and free will.

Augustine thinks that the Stoic position is mildly deterministic. The Stoics reject free will and affirm the power of fate over the human being, without attributing an overwhelming importance to necessity (this latter position is purely deterministic).

Augustine cites and comments on Seneca's famous expression "the fates conduct the wise man, as they drag the fool".[41] According to Augustine, Seneca claims on the issue of prediction that wisdom consists in submission to, if not cooperation with fate, whereas foolishness consists in resistance to destiny. Whether or not one tries to oppose destiny, it will happen according to one's lot.[42]

As it makes little sense to resist destiny, the one who does so is a fool. However, destiny is not the same as necessity: perhaps the best one can say is that fate is similar to a personal inner necessity. According to Augustine, the Stoics view free will as a kind of resistance to complying with necessity. They claim there are two sorts of reasons: those submitted to necessity and those that are free from it. They also assert the primordial character (*primitus*) of the will: when the will wills something, it happens; when it does not will something, that thing does not take place.

It seems Cicero's position is voluntaristic: he rejects the power of destiny, yet emphasizes the power of free will. The motive for his position is his distrust of the horoscopes sorcerers. To refute their system, he takes a position contradictory to theirs, thereby unintentionally siding against the

39 *civ.dei* V, 9.

40 *civ.dei* V, 2-8.

41…ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt. *civ.dei* V, 8.

42 M.Daraki thinks that Stoicism and Augustine are two main expressions of ancient selfishness. As much as modernity, the Antiquity produced the figure of a wiseman, a 'superman'. Augustine was the one to discover the 'I' – the individualistic ego. M.Daraki, Une reliosité sans Dieu. Essai sur les stoîciens d'Athenès et saint Augustin. Paris: la découverte. 1987. P. 212.

Stoics. This is peculiar, since in his *Timaeus* translation Cicero often applies Stoic terminology, even if he does not always agree with what this terminology implies. Augustine remarks that in his desire to refute sorcery Cicero fell into the trap of blasphemy, by denying the role and subsequently the existence of the divine.[43]

Not surprisingly, Augustine disagrees with both these extreme positions, considering that they do not necessarily contradict one another. He thinks, these positions are compatible. This third position accepting both destiny and free will is Christian. Later in the same treatise, Augustine inconsistently manages to arrive at a position bordering extreme determinism, which radically differs from the position suggested here. In fact, whether Moiras are the daughters of Anangke (necessity) is not that important, although when one reads Plato, it is almost impossible to avoid a discussion on this question. Augustine is unfamiliar with the original: the link between *fata* and *necessitas* is not personally mythological, but rather abstractly logical. Not surprisingly, Augustine does not hold to his previous critique of Cicero and the Stoics on destiny, turning to the doctrine of predestination, which had partisans up until the Reformation and later.[44]

The Stoic *fata* – 'fates' are individualistic. There are as many of them as there are people on earth.[45] The fates are linked to the notion of a happy life as the goal of human life, yet there is no equivalence between the two. One person's fate may be easy and happy, while another may be hard and unhappy. It is curious that Fate is a goddess in the Roman pantheon.[46] One of her features is her dishonesty: she is well-disposed to some, but ill-disposed to others. Neither of these attitudes seems to have a fair basis. Augustine asks how can we place Fate among the gods, seeing as she is so unfair, whereas both Plato and other philosophers speak about the gods always in superlative terms.

8.3. Conclusion: Stoic Idioms in Augustine's Tim 41ab

The preliminary findings of the present research are that Augustine's interpretation of *Tim 41ab*, which aimed to refute Porphyry's critique of the doctrine of resurrection, did not hit its mark. Not only was he unfamiliar with the Neoplatonic exegesis of *Timaeus* , but also his reference to Plato was based on the Stoic minded Cicero's version of the *Timaeus* dialogue.

[43] *civ.dei* V, 9.

[44] Cf. J.M. Rist, *Augustine on Free Will and Predestination*, in *Journal of Theological Studies*, 20 (1969), pp. 420-47.

[45] Sellars, J., *Stoicism*. University of California Press. Berkley. 2006. P. 122.

[46] J. Champeaux, *Fortuna. Vol. I. Recherches sur le culte de la Fortuna à Rome et dans le monde romaine des origines à la mort de César; Vol. II. Les Transformations de Fortuna sous le République,* Rome: École Française de Rome, 1987.

Augustine unwittingly identified Plato's philosophy with a number of foreign (Stoic) elements,[47] such as Soicism doctrine of reason as a ruling principle of the universe, theory of the universal fire, and theory of seminal principles. Paradoxically, we can speak of an influence of Stoic philosophy upon Christian resurrection theory via Cicero and Augustine without the latter having any of these.

Nevertheless, it would be somewhat simplistic to claim that Cicero's ignorance of Platonic subtleties is the chief cause of his interpolation of some Stoic doctrines upon Augustine's Christianity via a 'stoicised' Plato. The fact of the matter is that Augustine does not count Cicero among the Stoics. Although he names him an orator, a politician, and an Academic, Cicero is so dear and special to him that Augustine assigns him a unique place, different from all other thinkers, especially because Cicero often manages to reconcile their views.[48] In reading Augustine's reports on Cicero, one gets the impression that Cicero surpassed all these schools by perceiving that they do not disagree but agree with each other. There are passages where Augustine sees Cicero as first disagreeing with the Stoics, and then bringing them back to the correct line of interpretation. According to Augustine, Cicero argues against the Stoic interpretation of destiny (*providentia*), as leading the wise and forcing the vulgar, and being dependent on Jupiter as a top divinity, responsible for the distribution and configuration of lots. In his defense of mercy (*misericordia)*, which the Stoics count among vices as it causes one suffering, in Augustine's report in *civ.dei IX, 5*. Cicero disagrees with the Stoics on this matter, counting mercy among the virtues. Next, Augustine admits that there are some Stoics, such as Epictetus, who also count mercy among the virtues, because it may arise in the soul of a wise man. When mercy arises in the soul of a common man, it is a vice as a disturbance, whereas when it arises in the soul of a wise man, it turns into a virtue, since the wise man is in control of it and it serves a good purpose. In the end, Augustine maintains, all the major philosophical schools agree with each other on this matter, as Cicero demonstrated in his writings. They just prefer disputes (*verbi controversia*) to the truth, if we are to trust Cicero's judgment on the nature of the Greek character.

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[47] Scholars regularly spot Stoic vocabulary in major Hellenic schools. Not surprisingly, as having been a serious philosophy it also had a popular appeal. Cf. T.Rasimus identified the Stoic background behind the Gnostic triad innovations. These were later also used by Plotinus, Victorinus and Augustine. P. 266. T.Rasimus, Stoic Ingridients in the Neoplatonic Being-Life-Mind Triad. An original Second-Century Gnostic Innovation? in Stoicism in Early Christianity (ed. T.Rasdimus, T.Engberg-Pederson, I.Dunderberg). Grand Rapids: Baker Academic. 2010. C.K. Crawford found Stoic idioms in Maximus' tinted Neoplatonism. C.K. Crawford, 'Essential and Sustaining Aptitude': Amb 7, 1080B revisited, in Studia Patristica forthcoming.

[48] Which is to be attributed to his ecclectism. Cf. chapter five on Cicero *supra*.

AUGUSTINE's TIMAEUS 41AB

EXAGOGE P. 411

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Exagoge

We started our journey with *Eisagoge* - a guided introduction to Augustine's *Tim* 41ab, triggered by a Porphyrian spark. Porphyry sets out to underline the absurdity of the Christian resurrection theory. and also claims that one should not talk to the Christians since they do not listen - yet, contradicting himself he engages exactly in an effort to refute the unreasonable. Augustine repays him with a similar judgment, implying that it makes no sense to argue with Neo-Platonists as *they* will not listen. However Augustine is aware that it does make sense to turn to those who listen to the Platonists in order to convince them of Christianity. After dwelling for many pages on the issue it is now time to proceed to our *exagoge*. [1]. We take our reader confidently by the hand and lead him out of the labyrinth of interpretations.[2]

9.1. Thesis Achievements

As the reader will not have failed to notice, *Tim* 41ab is a key section in the *Timaeus* dialogue, written by Plato, yet it is not so very well known in Platonic and Augustinian scholarship.[3] Augustine undertakes to quote and comment on it as many as sixteen times in the course of his oeuvre. However, the circumstances of his usage of this text are so curious and complex, that the passage starts a new life when reading Augustine; The new life of the passage is quite independent from its original author. In the manner of Augustine's commentaries, the text perfectly fits Augustine's train of thought.

1 *Exagoge* is a part of a full title *Eisagoge of Ezekiel* composed by an anonymous second century BC Alexandrian Jewish writer. It is also a kind of a synonym to *Exodus*, a way out of slavery of the people of Israel led by Moses, ultimately by God, to the promise land, to the place of freedom.

2 *R*ather than using the Latin rooted words conclusion and its counterpart introduction we turn to Greek variants. In the Latin root confusion arises since the way is led in but there is no way out. Concludere means so much as drawing everything together on the inside. We opt to use the Greek notion exagoge and its counterpart eisagoge: a guided way in and a guided way out.

3 V.Yudin, *Studia Patristica*, 2004, 2006, 2011. *Augustinus*, 2007.

The general outlook of my present research is the following. At the outset we find Augustine challenged by a sharp attack on the Christian teaching of the resurrection of the human body. The attacks are advanced by a 'certain philosopher', most probably Porphyry the Neo-Platonist. Augustine undertakes a refutation of this attack, though instead of writing a coherent treatise he scatters comments in several writings, most notably in his monumental *de civitate dei* and in some of his Easter sermons (resp. 241, 242). We put those comments in an overview taking the reader through the labyrinth of *de civitate Dei* where the history of two opposing cities – the city of God and the city of the world - is sketched in as many as twenty-two books.

Despite the title of the elaborate work, only the conclusive 22nd book of the treatise has the right to bear the treatise's original title: *on the city of God*. It is the only book of the work where the city of the world is left behind. The ultimate domain of life (for a Christian) is existence beyond the threshold of this visible world – in a transfigured world, the world of resurrection – which includes the resurrection of the flesh. The entire treatise gravitates towards this climax.

A common man, who may well be an unbeliever, may consider the story to be a rather extravagant affair. At best the pagan will laugh at this futuristic presentation. However Augustine in all honesty undertakes to convince the Roman intellectual – the reader and a possible future inhabitant of his City. Fearlessly Augustine chooses Porphyry as his opponent *par excellence* – the brightest philosopher of his time, who undertook a refutation of Christianity based on a diligent study of Christian sources- as his opponent to prove his point. Augustine's reasoning is simple and straightforward: if he can refute the most able of his enemies, he should have relatively little trouble dealing with the remaining critics.

Augustine accomplishes his mission in a brilliant fashion: he chooses a text written by Plato, the author widely regarded as the supreme authority, especially by the Neo-Platonists, Porphyry included. This passage is but half a page long. Augustine claims that it contains a convincing proof in favor of the theory of resurrection of the flesh. He also claims that Plato believes in the resurrection, whereas the Neo-Platonists, most notably Porphyry, either overlooked this passage, or misread it. Therefore, if we re-read it attentively , the puzzle will fall into place – dixit Augustine. The Neo-Platonists will have to join the rest of the intellectuals and will simply convert to Christianity.

Let us now take up the thread of my present research once more. Methodologically speaking, we combine Augustine's own acclaimed yet

unaccomplished mission in his infamous *de doctrina Christiana* with an excellent grip on the matter by Luc Brisson.

The preliminary chapter of my thesis mounts the challenge: we find a systematic reconstruction of sixteen arguments, attributed to Porphyry, all of which are directed against the theory of bodily resurrection. The largest number of these objections originate from Macarius Magnes, the author of the much debated *Apocriticus*, though many are also found in Augustine's *corpus*. Surprisingly, in the course of his discussion on the resurrection in his monumental *de civitate dei*, book XXII, Augustine appeals neither to the Scripture, nor to the authority of the Church Fathers, but to a text by Plato concerning a speech addressed by a god to other gods. We are clearly confronted with the issue of the plurality of gods. It is hard to believe that such a text - written by a pagan philosopher - could serve as evidence for one of the most significant Christian theories, often claimed by the Christians to be exclusively the fruit of divine revelation. It is not obvious how a pagan philosopher could have direct access to this fruit. Moreover, Plato's writing ends up being used by some important Christians as a principal source in the debate on this doctrine.

The most challenging section dealing with these objections is dedicated to arguments against divine omnipotence. These include historical, mathematical and ethical arguments, the majority of which are identified in both sources and which force Augustine to modify his views. He also agrees that divine omnipotence is first and foremost the ability to fully implement one's will, whereas one often perceives it as the ability to achieve anything imaginable. Nevertheless, for some reason Augustine keeps returning to the issue of divine omnipotence in its most simplistic form, as though he has never came across the objections to divine omnipotence, and never modified his position.

The present research now sets out to unravel this knot of sophisticated paradoxes. The preliminary chapter is followed by two main parts. In Part One a *Response* to Porphyry's challenge is defined: we included a presentation of the analysis and discussion of the sixteen passages in Macarius and Augustine that contain direct or indirect quotes and commentaries on *Tim* 41ab. Part Two is an *Evaluation* of Augustine's reading of *Tim* 41ab based upon the translation by Cicero available to him and which cause quite some *Distortion*. We evaluate against the Neo-Platonic exegesis of this text, and Augustine's knowledge or rather *Ignorance* of it. As he chose to teach the Neo-Platonists a lesson on this 'ignored' passage we look at the tradition of the preceding theological reception of this text by mainly the Apologists, who, if we are to base our judgment on Augustine's treatment, had no knowledge of the matter

whatsoever. We tried to identify the place of Augustine's exegesis within the context he outlined for himself.

Augustine's exegesis of this passage is simple, unique, creative and for the most part coherent. *Tim* 41ab is a speach, yet its content and the nature/identity of its participants became the object of careful study. According to Augustine, the speaker is (the) *Supreme God, Creator* of the universe. Augustine paraphrases the addressees as the *minor gods,* meaning the celestial bodies referred to in his sermons 241-242, who will be resurrected as humans, receiving the promise from the Supreme God to remain eternally in their bodies, in *civ.dei*. Eternal life in the body is not a straightforward notion, since it would seem impossible to claim eternal life for a body that is liable to corruption, decay and death. The speaker promises the audience something impossible indeed, turning the corruptible into incorruptible and their mortality into immortality. Therefore, the crucial point is the omnipotence of the speaker, the Supreme God Creator. Augustine keeps repeating this, saying that even the *paganus* - Porphyry and the like - embrace divine omnipotence.

A small problem appears at this point in the discussion : against Augustine' s expectations, not everyone is easily convinced by the argument of the creator's omnipotence. Surely, all the Platonists whom he seems to be successfully indoctrinating still keep doubting. Surprisingly, Augustine's name is the first on this list. Augustine's *alter ego* not only realizes that the question of the Creator's omnipotence is a corner-stone of the entire polemic but also dares to question whether this is really so. And indeed, if the Creator were not omnipotent, the whole argument would collapse like a house of cards. If God is not omnipotent, it is unclear whether he can turn the corruptible into the incorruptible, and the mortal into the immortal. In other words, this means achieving the bodily immortality by means of transition from the impossible to the possible. Augustine admits some limits to divine omnipotence, briefly mentioning in this polemic that God cannot lie (he also adds in other places that God can neither deceive nor die). Therefore, there is a serious flaw in Augustine's picture which he refuses to discuss, prefering to insist upon the obvious fact of the Creator's omnipotence.

Taking into account that among the above-mentioned arguments, attributed to Porphyry, the objections against the divine omnipotence play an important role, the whole affair turns to be somewhat strange. In his polemic with Porphyry Augustine gets stuck with the argument, which has been previously refuted by his opponent. Curiously, Augustine shows signs of his familiarity with the refutation. Perhaps the solution is simple:

Augustine was defeated in the polemic, having found no answer, and having failed to convince his opponents: they turned to be right after all.

Yet Augustine is a fighter to the last breath, fearing no objections and feeling at home in any polemic. When we examine it more carefully, an explanation surfaces: the polemic under way must have been insinuated, and is not a real one. And indeed, if we look at the case carefully, Augustine does not seriously engage with the Neoplatonists. The matter is different: his audience consists of Roman intellectuals, readers of *de civitate dei*, namely, those who raise the question of who is to be held responsible for the fall of the Roman Empire. These people are potential Christians, possible attendants of the services in his parish, who he addresses in his Holy Tuesday sermon, around 405. One has to speak with the intellectuals with the language of culture, meaning that one ought to mention all the right names and yet not go too much into depth, since, unlike Porphyry, they are no philosophers after all and may have a trouble of following the argument.

What is still more embarrassing is that *Timaeus* 41ab does not contain the resurrection theory at all, although Augustine managed to read it into the text.[4] He achieved this by taking the passage out of the dialogue's context; and mainly by being at the mercy of Cicero's free interpretative translation.[5] The opposition *summus deus–dii minores;* as well as *deus non factus – dii a se facti* is regularly used by Augustine[6] in his commentary on the *Timaeus*. He aims to draw an analogy between Plato's demiurge creating the new gods (gods by grace) and the Christian God the creator (god by nature) who awaits our becoming gods by grace in the life to come. Although Augustine's terminology and analogy is an interesting conjecture in its own right, it is simply not in Plato's text. Plato nowhere speaks about the resurrection, not even implicitly. He also makes no reference to the omnipotence of the creator.

The biggest problem with Augustine's reading of *Tim* 41ab in the context of the present debate is that he does not even suspect that

4 V.Yudin (2004), p. 332.

5 Cicero translated only the first half of the dialogue (on the creation of the world), and dropped out the second half (on the creation of man). Moreover, he made a monologue out of Plato's dialogue. The worse of all, he simplified and misinterpreted a number of crucial passages. There is no way you could grasp the *Timaeus* through Cicero's eyes adequately. Cf. C. Levy, 'Cicero and the Timaeus', in *Cultural Icon*, ed. G.J. Reydams-Schils (Notre Dame, 2001).

6 Notably in *sermo* 241 (8); *sermo* 242 (5); *civ.dei* XII, 27; *civ.dei* XIII, 18 (18), 19; *civ.dei* XXII, 25-26.

according to Porphyry and other Neo-Platonists the demiurge of the universe and the highest god could be two different divinities. Yet, this had become a commonplace in the Neoplatonic school by the time of Augustine. For instance, in *de philosophia ex oraculis*, to which Augustine constantly refers, Porphyry says that "the god worshipped by the Jews (and also by the Christians – *v.y.*) is the second god, the demiurge of all things".[7] This 'second' *god*, the demiurge, is not identifiable with the Christian God the Creator, since this second god is subordinate to the first god. The first god in his turn is hardly accessible for us, since he does not condescend to the lowly business of creation. Once can perhaps talk about the omnipotence of the first god, but certainly not of the second one: the latter's status is relatively low and his powers are limited. Thus, appealing to Porphyry along with his students and claiming that they also believe in the omnipotence of the creator (demiurge) was at least a misunderstanding. As a result, Augustine's attempt to Christianize the Neo-Platonist intellectuals was certainly doomed to fail.[8]

9.2. Allegory of the Court Trial

Now that we have safely guided our reader through and out of the web of Augustine's Tim 41 ab, we can look back and fully notice the rhetoric character of the polemic at hand. Augustine's purpose is to crash the opposition, and not merely to refute their arguments. The final goal is to convince the audience, not the opponent. We are dealing with the tricky matter of the art of persuasion, not with a head-on exchange of argument. It makes sense to turn to an analogy similar to Plato's at this point. It is quite appropriate in the current setting since even Christ applied many a parable.[9] We took the allegory of a *Court Trial* in order to shed light on Augustine and the disturbing paradoxes of his *exposé* on *Tim 41 ab*. All notions in the *italics* are analogies briefly pointed out in the footnotes. Let us sit back now and let the narrative take its course.

Once upon a time (*cf. chapter one*),[10] a serious *crime* (*the Fall of Rome*) took place inflicting enormous damage, both material and moral. After an *investigation* into who is to blame, *detectives* (*the philosophers, the recent Platonists*) bring a *suspect* (*the Christians*) to court. The latter now

7 Cf. Lydus, *De Mensibus* 4.53 p.110.

8 Here we will leave the question aside as to whether or not Augustine was sincere in his attempt to proselytize among the intellectuals. It is quite possible that his target was not so much his opponents as the hesitating audience, which runs for the winner.

9 E.g. of the Sawyer, of the Prodigal Son, of the Merciful Samaritan, of the Ten Maids, of the Last Ordeal etc.

10 For us a distant past but for Augustine's audience a well-remembered recent event.

stands trail (*polemic on the resurrection*) in an illustrious court. The *prosecutor* (Porphyry) is renown in his time, and though he previously led a secluded life in a close circle of *intimates* (Neo-Platonic Academy), he now speaks out in public. The *attorney* (*Augustine*) is also a famous man in the field, who previously won many important public court cases (versus the Manichaens, Donatists, Pelagians). The members of the jury come from all the corners of the Empire.[11] A small volume of *Scripture* (Plato's collected works in a rather old-fashioned yet stylish modern translation) is used for pledges at the court. For the Roman citizens this text appears holy, or at least they all keep saying so. Many days after the trial opening the *attorney* surprisingly opens the *Scripture*, and he starts referring to one specific Gospel passage (*Tim* 41ab), using it craftily and weaving it into a convincing argument for the *jury* in favor of the *accused* (Christians). The *prosecutor* (Porphyry) objects and surely the *attorney* (Augustine) is not completely sincere (*on omnipotence*). The point is that it works: not the truth is at stake – as so often in court – but winning the argument by convincing the magistrate(s). The *attorney* applied such tricks in the past (previous court cases cf. *supra*), as he is effective and daring in the applied science of rhetorics. At *college* (Rhetoric School in Carthago) he was after all an exemplary student, even though he barely passed the exam on the *main foreign language* (Greek). This is a pity as the language is not unimportant in court to have direct access to the *evidence* (original texts – ancient and biblical), especially with regards to the *evidence in the present court case* (Timaeus 41ab). The *attorney* wins *the case* (the polemics), the *defendants* are liberated. The members of the *jury* (the intellectuals) got even annoyed with the *prosecution* (Neo-Platonists). And the *defendants* (Christians) innocent and falsely charged , are restored in honour. The *trial protocol* (*de civitate dei*) is made available to the public and the *attorney* is quite sure it will get the attention of the *media* (other intellectuals in Augustine's time – also Neo-Platonists).

So far so good, but many years later the case is reopened. New investigators (modern scholars such as J.R. Hoffmann) introduce an appeal in higher court which causes a new investigation altogether (present research). It appears that there have been procedure irregularities. A 'minor' issue is that the prosecution and defense never met eye to eye (time discrepancy between Porphyry and Augustine). A serious infringement of the course of justice is the absence of a *judge;* the *attorney* simply signed off the documents in the judges name. The investigators suspect power politics underlying the irregularities. At the time of the court case the party of the

11 *the intellectuals of the country*

accused (Christians) had recently come to power and were therefore in a position to manipulate *proceedings* (recognition of Christianity as a state religion the post-Constantine epoch). Most importantly, the *defence*'s case was fully grounded on one single piece of evidence (*Tim* 41ab), repeatedly brought into court at some crucial points by the *attorney*. The validity of the evidence is now questioned. Is its content really connected to the case at hand? The *attorney* was convincing as he rehearsed his arguments back *home* (sermons at the Cathedral in Hippo) and quoted this small *Gospel passage* with *much ease* (cf. chapter two on the material). However now it becomes clear that the translation of the entire *Scripture* used in the *court* is an abridged *version of the original* (*Timaeus* translation). The *translator* (Cicero) is a former politician of statue, although a bright man of every kind he still altered the *original* in translating,[12] feeling himself in a position to clarify what was clearly unclear. Since the *attorney* is not familiar with the *Scripture* in the *original*, he cites the extract in an altered version and thereby –unwillingly – misleads the jury (chapter five on Cicero). Although the proceedings looked fine a closer look throws suspicion on the whole affair. (chapter three *Examination*).

On further *enquiry* (present thesis as a whole), the attorney's case becomes even less plausible: the *attorney* did not study the *Scripture* well: he cited the crucial *passage* outside the context and without much of knowledge of the preceding as well as the following texts. It turned out (chapter Six on the Neo-Platonists),[13] that the *detectives* (the Neo-Platonists), and especially the *prosecutor* (Porphyry), were very competent experts on the *Scripture* (Plato). *They* (Plotinus i.a.) thought it beneath their dignity to utter a word to the *accused* (Christians), considering them to be vulgar, until later *one of them* (Porphyry) lost his patience. On paper however they introduced the whole genre of commentaries on the *various proceedings* (Commentaries on Timaeus),[14] some of which survived up until these days and contain reports on what was written by the others (*notably by Proclus*), and some specifically on the passage in question (Iamblichus' *Speech of Zeus in Timaeus*),[15] all of which were written in the *language* of the *Scripture* (Greek). Some (*Emperor Julian*) used the *Scripture* (Plato) in general and the *passage* (*Tim* 41ab) in particular to challenge the *defendants*. The *attorney* (*Augustine*) was oblivious of this due to his lack of access (*Greek*). He read a very limited selection from the *detectives'* work

12 *reducing the dialogue to a monologue and getting rid off the second half*

13 *cf. chapter six on the Neoplatonists*

14 *also Republic etc. by Jamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus*

15 *The Speech of Zeus in Timaeus by Jamblchus*

(*libri Platonicorum*) available in his mother tongue but not in a *recent translation* (Calcedius' *Timaeus* translation).[16] He could hardly give an adequate appreciation of the true content of his opponent's work on *Scripture* and sometimes completely misses the point. (E.g. the speaker of this passage is a craftsman (*demiurge*), whereas the *attorney* understands him as *God Creator of the universe*, tremendously upgrading his status.) It mus be said that the fault does not always it the *attorney's* but is often due to the *translator*'s (Cicero's) free rendering of the *tricky sections* (chapter five *supra*). The *translation* has a beauty of its own, but it often works at the expense of precision. At any rate, the *attorney*'s statement that the persecution misinterprets the text in question lacks the ground completely.

Moreover, in the enquiry shows that in the milieu in which the *attorney* received his *training* (Christian Apologetics)[17] the passage was very well known. Many interpretations, sometimes even written (Chapter Seven on Theologians) were available.[18] Some knew it well in the *original* (Philo, Pseudo-Justin), some were up to date with the *investigation* material (*Hypollytus; Origen*),[19] others knew the texts exceptionally through second hand (*Clement, Athenagoras*), or in *translation* (Minucius Felix), producing a speculative projection of some kind as a result (*Clement, Eusebius*), yet still some researched it carefully along the line of the *Scripture* text (*Arnobius*).[20] There were still some who did not trust the *Scripture (Origen, Pseudo-Justin, Hypollytus)*. Obviously, the *attorney* was not even familiar with his own tradition of this text exegesis both in the language of the *original* (Greek) and in *translation* (Latin). He gave his own novel interpretation to the *passage*,[21] with one practical goal in his mind: to win the *trial*.[22] It must be said he was quite up to that job.

It turns out that the brilliant and cunning *attorney* is a *scholar* (*rhetor, philosopher, theologian*). As a young man he wrote a methodological *manual* on the *trial case* (*de doctrina Christiana*), targeting training of the *jury* (preachers). However, he does not follow his own principles in his own practice. E.g. he neither checks the text against the original nor against other translations (neither Greek, nor Calcidius). He refers often to the

16 *by Marius Victorinus*

17 *Christian Apologists*

18 *cf. chapter seven on the Theologians*

19 *Hypollytus on disagreements among the Platonists; Origen on Zeus in Timeus, cf Jambichus on the same subject*

20 *Arnobius explaining an intermediate nature of the human soul*

21 *theory of the bodily resurrection based on Creator's omnipotence*

22 *to acquit the Christians of the accusations*

Scripture and its *author* (Plato), even though his attitude to them undergoes a certain development. In his youth (*dialogues from Cassiciacum*), he shows signs of admiration for him as a source of wisdom. Later he is less enthusiastic (*de civ.dei*), although at his *workplace* (Cathedral in Hippo) he does not declare that he ever changed his mind. Moreover, it turned out (chapter four on Plato) that, out of the whole *Bible cannon* (Plato's corpus) the *attorney* used one book by far more than the others (*Timaeus*), within which the spotted *passage* (*Tim* 41ab) was the one abundantly quoted in the court thinking that it will serve as decisive *evidence*.[23]

The *investigation* (thesis) also demonstrates that even content wise both the *proto*col(*civ.dei*) and the *passage* (*Tim* 41ab) in question somewhat are akin to the current *court trial* (anti-Christian polemics), even though they appear to be more peaceful than the *court* case under scrutiny. The *protocol* (*civ.dei*) is also a kind of speech, recorded by the *attorney* to celebrate his victory in the court and get media attention. After all, in those days texts were meant to be read aloud and the 'reader' was naturally also 'audience' and thus a member of the *jury* (the intellectual public).

Finally, though the re-opening of the case throws a rather negative light on the *attorney*, one of the present investigators (V.Y.) is struck by the cunningness and intelligence of first. This *attorney* was well aware that some court cases are a turning-point in the history of public opinion (If convinced, the members of the jury are then are expected to quit their pagan abode and to join the accused in God's city.) and therefore never – rarely - objective. In defending his clients the *attorney* was aware of his public function and constructed his argument accordingly thereby fearlessly taking up an awesome task to change society.

9.3. Prospectives

At the end of our present research let us consider the paths that are still left unthrodden. It is a bit unfortunate that Augustine does not turn to the issue of creative speech in his discussion on *Tim* 41ab. Nevertheless, this text is a speech. The speaker is a creator, according to both Plato (*demiurge*) and Augustine (*Creator*). Therefore, this speech can be nothing other than a creative speech. For Christian Theology the issue of creative speech is significant. Both the *Prologue to the Gospel of John* and the beginning of the book of *Genesis* contain a divine creative speech. Surprisingly, this crucial aspect escaped the attention of so impressive a Christian thinker as Augustine, at least at first glance.

23 *in the polemic against the pagans on the issue of the fall of the Empire*

The present work is merely a stage in the development of an interdisciplinary program of research connecting three domains: Augustine's Platonism (1), anti-Christian Neoplatonic polemics (2), and the resurrection theory (3). Although we deliberately did not expand on these themes due to time-constraints, they warrant further discussion. Another limiting factor was the importance of defining a precise and tractable research topic. We can nonetheless briefly sketch the outline of desirable further developments.

First, so far we have dealt rather superficially with the meaning of Augustine's interpretation of *Tim* 41ab (cf. Chapter five on Cicero). This could be further clarified through the study of Plato´s *Timaeus* and its relation to other dialogues. A rich secondary literature on the topic remains to be explored.

Second, Augustine's interpretation of *Tim* 41ab must be situated within his general resurrection theory. To this end, the theory should be examined within *civ.dei* XXII as well as Augustine's other treatises (cf. F.Van Fleteren's and M. Alflesh's studies on the topic).

Third, it is important to trace the development of Augustine's *Tim* 41ab through the ages, seeing if and how it influenced succeeding generations of interpreters.

Fourth, further research is needed on the roots of Augustine's knowledge of *Tim* 41ab, to verify our working hypothesis that Augustine was familiar with *Tim* 41ab exclusively through *florilegia*, ancient encyclopedias on specialized topics in which passages were often taken out of context. This might explain Augustine's lack of familiarity with the preceding as well as the following sections of the *Timaeus* dialogue. It would be desirable to find a copies of these *florilegia*.

Fifth, one ought to look in detail at the historical development of this text, to uncover the difference between Augustine's early reading and his later exegesis. In the present thesis, this has been done only with the *summus deus* - *dii minores* opposition. It would be important to do a similar analysis of the text's other sections.

Sixth, it would be useful to examine the achievements of the present research within the framework of the dynamics of the two cities in the *civ.dei* treatise. It appears that the methodology of scrutinizing the polemic ideally fits the general methodological approach of *civ.dei*.

Finally, one has to determine if this passage analysis contributes at all to research on reconstructing Porphyry's lost *Against the Christians*, or whether it - on the contrary - undermines the reconstruction of the text.

In short, research must go on, we are only midway along our route.

ADDENDIX 1 P. 424

Scheme : Porphyry's argumentation against the resurrection

ADDENDIX 2 P.428

Scheme: Works by Augustine Used in this Dissertation Title, Editions, Translations and Dates

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Addendix I: scheme : Porphyry's argumentation against the resurrection[1]

NN	Type of Argument	Short content of argument	Macarius Magnes	Augustine	Source of reference
1.1	I**. Objections concerning the natural order**: the everlasting character of the laws of nature	Nature and its laws are established by God: they are unchanging. Therefore resurrection is against the laws of nature	Harnack, fr 94 (Harnack and infra section 2 (94.7-94.13)	Sermo 242 (5)	Plato, Tim 41ab
1.2	**I. Objections concerning the natural order:** the need for alteration in the natural order implies imperfection of its creator	Since the natural order, which is established by God the creator needs an improvement and alteration by means of resurrection, it requires His personal intervention. This means that the Creator's universe, being the result of His own activity, is still imperfect. If He could not predict a possible fault in His creation He must be imperfect Himself.	Harnack fr. 94 section 1 (94.5-94.7)	civ. dei XXII,2	
1.3	**I. Objections concerning the natural order:** impossibility of reassembling a body which has deceased long ago	It is impossible to reassemble a deceased body because its composites are so scattered and often destroyed e.g. a man who died in shipwreck: his body goes through 5 degradations of decomposition (the man-the fish-the fishermen-the dogs-the vultures). How is his body supposed to be reassembled?	Harnack fr. 94 Section 3 (94.8-94.23)	civ.dei XXII, 26	Plato, Tim 41ab
1.4	**I. Objections concerning the natural order:** Impossibility of traversing the elements	It is impossible for creatures whose natural habitat is one element to inhabit the domain of another element. Thus human bodies whose	Harnack fr.35	Sermo 242 (5), civ. Dei XIII, 17; XXII,4; XXII,11	1 Thess 4:15-17 Plato, Tim.41

[1] Cf. supra: 1.0. Preliminary Chapter: CHALLENGE: PORPHYRY versus RESURRECTION towards AUGUSTINE

		natural habitat is earth (first element) cannot reach into heaven (4th element). Therefore resurrection which requires such traversing is impossible.			ab
NN	**Type of Argument**	**Short content of argument**	**Macarius Magnes**	**Augustine**	**Source of reference**
II.1	**II. Objections against God's omnipotence:** Historical objection	God cannot reverse history. E.g.1. He cannot stop Homer from being a poet; e.g.2. He cannot bring it about that Troy did not fall.	Harnack fr .95 section 5 (94.23-94.25)		
II.2	**II. Objections against God's omnipotence:** Mathematical objection	God cannot change the eternal laws of mathematics, even if He prefers it. E.g. He cannot equal 2X2 to 100 instead of to 4.	Harnack fr. 94 section 6 (94.25-94.28)		
II.3	**II. Objections against God's omnipotence:** Ethical objection	God cannot become evil, even if He would wish it. E.g. being good by nature He cannot sin; God cannot lie.	Harnack fr.94 section 7 (94.24-95.1)		
III.1	**III. Objections against the apocalyptic scenario – the end of the world:** Demiurgic objection	God would not allow the universe to be destroyed because He is its Creator.	Harnack fr. 94 section 8 (94.30-84.34)		
III.2	**III. Objections against the apocalyptic scenario – the end of the world:** Aesthetic objection	God would not allow beautiful things to be destroyed. He would not stand watching heaven melting and the stars falling down; since nobody has ever imagined anything more beautiful than the starry night sky.	Harnack fr. 94 section 9 (94.32)	civ. Dei XII,27 ??	Tim 41ab
III.3	**III. Objections against the apocalyptic scenario – the end of the world:** Apocalyptic objection	Resurrection would cause space shortage. Should the resurrection take place the earth would become overpopulated.	Harnack 95 section 10 (95.3-95.7)		

NN	Type of Argument	Short content of argument	Macarius Magnes	Augustine	Source of reference
IV.1	**Moral Criticism :** objection to the resurrection of all	Resurrection, if it would take place at all, must be viewed as a reward for the life of a good man. It is silly to talk about the resurrection of all bodies. Perhaps a few worthy individuals deserve resurrection, but the majority of people who die don't. Why then would God take care of bringing them back to life?	Harnack fr. 94 section 4 (94.33-95.2)	civ. Dei XIII	
IV.2	**Moral Criticism:** license to promiscuous life	The promise of resurrection and eternal life gives license to promiscuous life	Harnack fr. 88		

NN	Type of Argument	Short content of argument	Macarius Magnes	Augustine	Source of reference
V.1	**Miscellaneous objection:** different kinds of resurrection	There are at least two types of resurrection: the one of Jesus and the one of Lazarus. The former concerns a man not born of the seed of man, the latter a man born of the seed of man. Which of these are you, Christians, talking about? There is still a third type of resurrection: a future resurrection of decomposed bodies. It is not the same to resurrect someone who has just died; or three days ago, or three years or even worse: thousands of years ago such as Priam and Nestor, the heroes from the Trojan war.	Harnack fr. 25	Ep. 102 Harnack fr. 92.arg 1	John 11
V.2	**Miscellaneous objection:** Trustworthy evidence	If Jesus wanted his resurrection – if it at all happened – to be believed, why did he not appear to noble men such as Pontius Pilate or Jewish high priests or Roman senators? These are witnesses that can be trusted. Instead He appeared to Mary Magdalene, a hysterical woman, a prostitute, and people of similar background. These were either shocked by rocks that fell or by grief. You can hardly rely on their evidence.	Harnack fr. 64	Ep 102, 32	1 Cor 6:11
V.3	**Miscellaneous objection:** the reason for the popularity of the resurrection theory	Peter's sorcery – black magic – has been the only power to convince reasonable people about such silly doctrines as the resurrection	Harnack fr.25	civ.Dei XXII,5, 7-8; XXII,25	Tim 41 ab; Acts 5:1-11
V.4	**Miscellaneous objection:** prophecies concerning resurrection	The story of Jonah, as one of the main prophesies proving the future resurrection is false, simply because it is incredible. Nobody can survive the belly of a monstrous fish for three days. He would be killed by the warmth of the digestive process.	Harnack fr. 94 section 3 (94.10-94.17)	Ep.103 Harnack fr. 92. Arg 6	Jonah, 'another porphyry'

Addendix II: scheme : Works by Augustine Used in this Dissertation.[1]

Latin Titles	*Latin Editions*			*Dates*
Confessiones	PL32	CSEL 33	CCL 27	397/401
Contra academicos	PL 32	CSEL 63	CCL 29	November 386-March 387
Contra Faustum Manicheum	PL 42	CSEL 25.1		397/399
Contra Julianum	PL 44			421/422
Contra Julianum opus imperfectum	PL45	CSEL 85.1 (bks I-III)		429/430
De animae quantitate	PL 32	CSEL 89		387/388
De baptismo	PL 43	CSEL 51		400/401
De beata vita	PL 32	CSEL 63	CCL 29	November 386- March 387
De bono conjugali	PL 40	CSEL 41		401
De civitate Dei	PL 41	CSEL 40	CCL 47-48	413/427[2]
De consensu Evangelistarum	PL 34	CSEL 43		399/400?
De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus	PL 40		CCL 44A	388/396[3]
De divination daemonum	PL 40	CSEL 41		406

[1] Based on Fitzgerald, A.D., *Augustine through the Ages, An Encyclopedia*, Cambridge (UK) and Michigan, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999, Introduction and Tables, pp. XXXV-iL. With regards to the dates indicated caution is needed as most of these dates are approximations. As mentioned in sources (Cf. Fitzgerald (1999) page iL) research for the dates is based on the following authors Brown, P. (Berkeley, 1969); La Bonnadiére A.M. (Paris, 1965); Madec, G. (Rome: Citta Nuova Editrice, 1994); O'Donnell, J.J. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1992); Perler, O.& Maier, J.L. (Paris, 1969) and Frede, H.J. (Freiburg, 1995).

[2] Books 1 to 3 were finished by September 413, books 4 and 5 by 415. In 417 Augustine was working on book 11; in 425 on book 18. The overall work was finished by 427. Cf. Fitzgerald (1999) page Xliii.

[3] These questions were written in intervals, some in Thagaste and some in the monastery in Hippo. Cf. Fitzgerald (1999) page Xliv.

Latin Titles	*Latin Editions*			*Dates*
De doctrina Christiana	PL 34	CSEL 80	CCL 32	396 ; 426/427[4]
De duabus animabus	PL 42	CSEL 25		392/393
De fide et symbolo	PL 41	CSEL 41		October 8 393[5]
De Genesi ad litteram	PL 34	CSEL 28.1		401/415
De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber	PL 34	CSEL 28.1		393/394; 426/427
De Genesi adversus Manicheos	PL 34	CSEL 91		388/389
De immortalitatae animae	PL 32	CSEL 89		387
De libero arbitrio	PL 32	CSEL 74	CCL 29	387/388 - 395
De magistro	PL 32	CSEL 77.1	CCL 29	389
De musica	PL 32			387/391[6]
De ordine	PL 32	CSEL 63	CCL 29	November 386 – March 387[7]
De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptism parvulorum	PL 44	CSEL 60		411
De rhetorica	PL 32			387
De Trinitate	PL 42		CCL 50/50A	399-422/426

[4] Madec claims that books 1 to 3, 25 and 37 were written just after Augustinus was ordained bishop perhaps before April 4th. Cf. Fitzgerald (1999) page Xliv.
[5] Delivered at a bishops council at Hippo cf. Madec, p.40 (introduction)
[6] This work was written in Thagaste and belonged to a more elborate work *Disciplinarum libri.* Many parts of this latter work were written in Milan but have not survived. . Cf. *Ibid.* page Xlvii.
[7] Written in Cassiciacum. Cf. *Ibid.*

Latin Titles	*Latin Editions*			*Dates*
De utilitate credendi	PL 42	CSEL 25.1		391/392
De vera religione	PL 34	CSEL 77	CCL 32	390/391
Enarrationes in Psalmos	PL 36-37	CSEL 93/1A ; 93/1B ; 94/1 ; 95/1-3&5	CCL 38-40	392/422[8]
Epistulae Epistulae secundum ordinem temporis	PL 33	CSEL 34,44,57,58,88	CCL 31,31A, 31B	386/430[9]
Retractationes	PL 32	CSEL 36	CCL 57	426/427
Sermones Sermo de scriptures Sermo ad populum	PL 38, 39 PLS 2		CCL 41	392/430[10]
Soloquia	PL 32	CSEL 89		November 386- March 387

CCL = *Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina*, Turnhout, Brepols, 1953 -.

CSEL = *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, Vienna, Tempsky, 1865 - .

PL = Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina, ed. Minge, J.P., Paris, 1844-1864.

PLS = *Supplement to Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina*, 3 vols., ed. Hamman, A., Paris, 1958-1963.

[8] More detailed info see the excellent work by H. Rondet, *Essais sur la chronolgie des 'Enarrationes in Psalmos'*, BLE 61 (1960) : pp. 11-127.
[9] For a more detailed account on dating the *Epistulae* Cf. Fitzgerald (1999) pp.299-305.
[10] For a more detailed account on dating the elaborate *Sermones* Cf. Fitzgerald (1999) pp.774-789.

Abbreviations

ADV.NAT.	ARNOBIUS, *ADVERSUS NATIONES*
AET.MUNDI	PHILOPONUS, *DE AETERNITATE MUNDI CONTRA PROCLUM*
CC	PORPHYRIUS, *CONTRA CHRISTIANOS* ,ED. VON HARNACK
CCL	CORPUS CHRISTIANORUM SERIES LATINA
CIV.DEI	AUGUSTINUS, *DE CIVIATE DEI*
CG	JUSTINIANUS, *COHORTATIO AD GENTILES*, ED. DE OTTO.
CONSENSU	AUGUSTINUS, *DE CONSENSU EVANGELISTARUM*
CONTRA ARISTOTELEM	PHILOPONUS, *CONTRA ARISTOTELEM*
DAM	PHILO, *DE AETERNITATE MUNDI* - ΠΕΡΙ ΑΦΘΑΡΣΙΑΣ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ,
DOCTRINA	AUGUSTINUS, *DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA*[1]
MUNDO	AUGUSTINUS, *DE MUNDO*
DT	JUSTINUS, *DIALOGUS CUM TRYPHONE*
EP	AUGUSTINUS, *EPISTULAE*
IN TIM	PROCLUS,*IN TIMEO PLATONIS COMMENTARIA*
LOEB	LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
NPNF	NICEAN AND POST-NICEAN FATHERS
OCA	ORIENTALIA CHRISTIANA ANALECTA
OSA	OEUVRE DE SAINT AUGUSTIN
PE	EUSEBIUS, *PREPARATIO EVANGELICA*
PL	PATROLOGIA LATINA
PLD	PATROLOGIA LATINA DATABASE
QUAESTIO	AUGUSTINUS, *DE DIVERSIS QUAESTIONES*
REJECTION	SORABJI, R (ED.).,*PHILOPONUS AND THE REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE*.
SERMO	AUGUSTINUS, *SERMONES*
TIM	PLATO, *TIMAEUS*
TP	THEOLOGIA PLATINA
TLG	THESAURUS LINGUAE GRAECAE
WAA	WORKS OF AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS
WSA	THE WORKS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE

[1] TO THE WORKS BY AUGUSTINE REFERENCE IS GENERALLY MADE BY THE TITLE OF THE WORK. CF. APPENDIX.

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Victor YUDIN

Augustine's Timaeus 41ab

Summary

This study focuses upon Augustine's interpretation of the central section in Plato's *Timaeus* ('Tim' *infra*) within the scope of his polemics against the Neo-Platonists.

This unfolded as follows. A sharp insightful criticism against the Christian teaching, was formulated by Porphyry the Neo-Platonist in the third century A.D. and continues to be in use up until these days. His attack on the resurrection theory (*inter alia*) came down to us chiefly via Augustine (*infra* 'A.') in sixteen arguments. Methodologically, Porphyry does not refer to his own platonic sources within this discussion but rationally dissects the sources of his adversary.

On behalf of the Christians A. responds to Porphyry, applying his opponent's tactics, and claims that their *divine* Plato also advocates the resurrection theory in a crucial passage. – This text (*Tim* 41a7-b6) also serves as the master key to A.'s real Plato. A. refers to this text sixteen times in the course of his writing, four times more than *Tim* 29c3-4, this being the next passage in importance, and far more than any other text of Plato. It also concerns the length, intensity and intimate knowledge of the compared texts. However, A.'s approach to Plato's *Tim* 41a7-b6 is ambiguous.

On the one hand, A. achieves a perfectly coherent picture, which he is quick to sell to his *city* reader. According to Plato, demiurge the father addresses the gods with a speech, saying that, despite the fact that they are created as corruptible and mortal, they still become incorruptible and immortal on the account of his decision. According to A., Plato's speaker is an anonymous *Summus Deus* Creator, who promises the humans, as *dii minores*, the eternal life in body after resurrection. Although this task seems impossible, so it happens in accordance with his overwhelming omnipotence. The "over-all acknowledged" divine omnipotence appears as the key to the bodily resurrection witnessed in this passage. A. rebukes the Neo-Platonists of ignorance as to the content of this text, which, he claims, testifies to Plato's belief in resurrection.

On the other hand, A.'s picture is completely amiss, as his criticism of the Neo-Platonists is groundless. In fact, they are intimately familiar with *Tim* 41a7-b6, certainly much better than A. E.g. Iamblichus has dedicated to it an entire treatise. Proclus testifies to the consistent internal reception of its exegesis. Along the entire school line they identify the demiurge with the god Zeus. Although he is indeed the universe's craftsman, he is still a minor god, whose status is low in the divine procession. His potency is also restricted (he cannot do evil or reverse the past events), likewise the resurrection is beyond his limits (and the need). The gods that he addresses are not human: they are creators of the human body and the mortal part of their soul. The Neo-Platonic exegesis differs radically from A.'s. The latter is not aware of this difference.

Moreover, it turns out that A. is clearly familiar with Porphyry's critique of the divine omnipotence. Augustine partially agrees with it, considering that God cannot lie, die or commit sin. However, in the course of the *Tim* 41ab discussion A. keeps insisting that God is plainly omnipotent. We trace a significant lacuna in Augustine's discussion of the divine omnipotence, which plainly undermines the coherence of his presentation. A. corrects himself elsewhere claiming that the omnipotence consists in the complete realization of one's will, and not in achieving just anything. This way A. could never persuade any Neo-Platonist (as he did not really intend this any way). It also turns out that they are not A.'s true addressees but rhetorically an average intellectual, the *City of God* reader and hopefully inhabitant. A. attempts to dispense the Christians from the accusations for the fall of the Roman empire.

A. is equally ignorant of the preceding interpretations of this text within the Christian tradition. He neither cites the Apologists, nor refers to their ideas in his textual analysis. Yet, there was a good number of these interpretations, even though they hardly form a school unity of reception. They mainly focus on the issue of polytheism, and ignore the parallel Neo-Platonic exegesis. Still some, like Pseudo-Justin, and unlike A. had brilliant interpretations based on an intimate study of sources. A.'s insight into the text matches none of these. None of the preceding Apologists understood this text within the framework of the resurrection theory.

Contrary to his own exegetical requirements (*de doctrina christiana*), A. is familiar with *Tim* 41ab exclusively through a single (Cicero's) translation into Latin, ignoring both the original and another recent translation by Calcidius. Cicero's translation differs drastically from the original in favor of the Stoic doctrines, the partisan of which Cicero was for the major part of his life. Plato's typical idioms δημιουργὸς, εὖ, καλῶς, κακό, Μοῖραι) water down from the scene. A refurbishing Stoic vocabulary (*ratio, effector, fatum, satus, ortus*)

traceable in Cicero's version pushed A.'s interpretation yet into another direction: in favor of the Christian resurrection theory (which he was determined to spot anyway). A. projects Christian idioms back on Plato (*Summus Deus,* Creator, omnipotence). It is virtually impossible to follow this background on the basis of existing translations. For this purpose we accomplished our own wording to these passages.

Briefly, A.'s *Tim* 41ab exegesis is unique and insightful, yet it is neither based on the sources (Plato, the Neo-Platonists, the Apologists), nor does he manage to identify foreign (Stoic) influences. If A. is so poorly familiar with his absolutely favorite passage, his knowledge of the rest of Plato must be still worse. If he ever was a convert to Platonism (P.Alfarec), he ever remained a mildly advanced adept. His *Tim* 41ab exegesis is albeit novel, yet a mere projection of the Christian ideas upon Plato (*Plato Rhetor Christianus*). Finally, we assess the complexity of A.'s Plato by the classical means of allegory. Our Allegory of the Court Trial unfolds not only the strength and weakness in the argument but also the hidden intentions of the involved parties as well as a historical background behind the polemics.

Victor YUDIN

Le Timée 41ab d'Augustin

Résumé

Cette étude se concentre sur l' interprétation donnée par Augustin (*infra* 'A.') de la section centrale du *Timée* de Platon (*infra* 'Tim') dans le cadre de sa polémique contre les néoplatoniciens.

Une critique très intelligente de la doctrine chrétienne avait été formulée par le néoplatonicien Porphyre au troisième siècle, et avait continué d'être en usage jusqu'à l'époque d'A. et même jusqu'à nos jours. Les attaques de Porphyre contre la théorie de la résurrection (entre autres) nous sont parvenues principalement à travers A. sous la forme de seize arguments. Dans la discussion, Porphyre ne fait pas référence à ses propres sources platoniciennes, mais dissèque rationnellement les sources de son adversaire.

A. répond à Porphyre, au nom des Chrétiens, en appliquant la tactique de son opposant, et il affirme que leur *divin* Platon lui aussi soutient la théorie de la résurrection dans un passage crucial. Ce texte (*Tim* 41a7-b6) est également essentiel dans la vision qu' A. a de Platon. Selon celui-ci, le démiurge-père adresse aux dieux un discours disant que, bien qu'ils aient été créés corruptibles et mortels, ils peuvent néanmoins devenir incorruptibles et immortels si telle est sa décision. A. y fait référence seize fois dans ses écrits, c'est-à-dire quatre fois plus souvent qu'à *Tim* 29c3-4, qui est le second passage le plus important chez A., et beaucoup plus qu'à n'importe quel autre texte de Platon. L'importance donnée à ce texte se reflète aussi par sa longueur et la connaissance intime qu'en a A. Cependant, la façon dont A. traite ce passage *Tim* 41a7-b6 n'est pas sans ambiguïté.

D'une part, A. réussit à donner une image parfaitement cohérente de la pensée de Platon. Pour A., l'auteur du discours chez Platon est un *Summus Deus* Creator anonyme, qui promet aux humains, en tant que *dii minores*, la vie éternelle dans un corps après la résurrection. Bien que cette tâche semble

impossible, cela se produit grâce à sa toute-puissance. La toute-puissance divine “reconnue de tous” apparaît comme la clef de la résurrection corporelle attestée dans ce passage. A. accuse les néoplatoniciens d'ignorance quant au contenu de ce texte, qui, affirme-t-il, démontre la croyance de Platon en la résurrection.

D'autre part, la vision d'A. est inadéquate et sa critique des néoplatoniciens est sans fondement. En fait, ceux-ci étaient tout à fait familiers de *Tim* 41a7-b6, certainement beaucoup plus qu'A. lui-même. Par exemple, Jamblique a dédié un traité entier à ce passage. Proclus atteste d'une continuité ininterrompue de la réception de son exégèse dans l'école néoplatonicienne, qui identifie unanimement le démiurge avec le dieu Zeus, qui, tout artisan de l'univers qu'il fût, n'en demeure pas moins un dieu mineur, dont le statut est assez bas dans la procession divine. Son pouvoir est également restreint: il ne peut pas faire le mal ni changer le cours des événements passés, et ainsi la résurrection est au-delà des limites de son pouvoir. Les dieux auxquels il s'adresse ne sont pas humains: ils sont les créateurs du corps humain et de la partie mortelle de l'âme. L'exégèse néoplatonicienne diffère ainsi radicalement de celle d'A., mais celui-ci ne se rend pas compte de cette différence.

De plus, il s'avère qu'A. est clairement familier avec la critique de Porphyre de la toute-puissance divine, avec laquelle A. est partiellement d'accord, dans la mesure où Dieu ne peut pas mentir, mourir ni commettre de péché. En outre, nous avons découvert une lacune importante dans la discussion par A. de la toute-puissance divin, qui diminue fortement la cohérence de sa présentation. A. se corrige lui-même ailleurs, en affirmant que la toute-puissance consiste dans la réalisation complète de la volonté et pas dans la capacité à accomplir n'importe quoi. Néanmoins, au cours de la discussion sur *Tim* 41ab, A. insiste sur le fait que Dieu est pleinement tout-puissant. De cette façon, A. ne pourrait jamais persuader aucun néoplatonicien (et telle n'était de toute façon pas son intention). Il s'avère également qu'A. ne s'adresse pas à un public réel, mais, de façon rhétorique, à un intellectuel moyen, le lecteur de *La cité de Dieu*. En outre, A. tente de défendre les chrétiens contre les accusations d'être responsables de la chute de l'Empire.

A.est également ignorant des interprétations précédentes de ce même texte dans la tradition chrétienne. Il ne cite pas les Apologistes, ni ne fait référence à leurs idées en matière d'analyse textuelle. Un certain nombre de ces interprétations existaient pourtant, même si elles ne formaient pas vraiment une unité cohérente. Leur point commun était de se concentrer sur le problème du polythéisme, tout en ignorant l'existence d'une exégèse parallèle néoplatonicienne. Certaines cependant, comme celle du Pseudo-Justin, et contrairement à A, s'avéraient de brillantes interprétations basées sur une bonne connaissance des sources. L'approche d'A. par rapport au texte ne correspond à aucune d'entre elles et aucun des Apologistes n'a compris ce texte dans le cadre de la théorie sur la résurrection du corps.

Contrairement à ses propres exigences en matière d'exégèse (*de doctrina christiana*), A. ne connaît *Tim* 41ab qu'au travers d'une seule traduction en Latin (celle de (Cicéron), ignorant et l'original et une autre traduction récente par Calcidius. La traduction de Cicéron diffère drastiquement de l'original pour se rapprocher des doctrines stoïciennes, dont Cicéron a été un fervent partisan durant la majeure partie de sa vie. Certaines expressions typiques de Platon (δημιουργ□ς, ε□, καλ□ς, κακόν, Mο□ραι) ont été évacuées de cette traduction, tandis que le vocabulaire stoïcien (*effector, ratio, fatum, satus, orti*) importé par Cicéron a influencé l'interprétation d' A., mais dans une direction très différente, à savoir en faveur de la théorie Chrétienne de la résurrection. Ainsi, A. projette des expressions chrétiennes dans le texte de Platon (*Summus Deus, Creator, omnipotentia*) et il est virtuellement impossible de retracer cet arrière-fond sur la base des traductions existantes. C'est pourquoi nous avons proposé notre propre traduction de ces passages.

En bref, l'exégèse donnée par A. de *Tim* 41ab est unique et intelligente, mais elle n'est pas basée sur les sources (Platon, les néoplatoniciens, les Apologistes, une traduction plus adequate), et elle se montre incapable d'identifier les influences étrangères (stoïciennes). Si A. est si peu familier avec son passage favori de Platon, il est permis de mettre en doute sa connaissance des autres textes platoniciens. Si donc A. avait jamais été un platonicien (comme l'affirme P. Alfarec), il faut conclure qu'il était resté un disciple d'un niveau peu avancé. Son exégèse de *Tim* 41ab est sans doute novatrice, mais consiste en fait en une projection des idées chrétiennes sur Platon (*Plato*

Rhetor Christianus). Enfin, nous avons montré la complexité de la vision qu'a A. de Platon dans l'allégorie du tribunal, qui démontre non seulement la force et la faiblesse de l'argument, mais dévoile aussi les intentions cachées des parties concernées et l'arrière-fond historique de la polémique.

Виктор Юдин

Тимей 41ab Августина

Резюме

Работа посвящена толкованию Августином центральной части диалога *Тимей* Платона в рамках полемики с неоплатониками о воскресении тела. Главное утверждение состоит в том, что анализ текстов показывает, что Августина платоником называть не следует.

Ряд резких возражений христианскому учению, широко используемых и доныне, были сформулированы ещё в 3-м веке неоплатоником Порфирием. Шестнадцать его аргументов против теории воскресения дошли до нас преимущественно через Августина. При этом Порфирий, в дошедшей до нас аргументации на свои платонические источники не ссылается.

От имени христиан Августин отвечает Порфирию, используя ту же тактику ссылок только на источники противника, утверждая, что сам «божественный» Платон в одном из мест защищает теорию воскресения тела. По Платону, демиург-отец обращается с речью к богам, заявляя, что хоть они тленны и смертны, но по его решению станут нетленными и бессмертными. Этот текст (*Тимей* 41a7-b6) является идеальным показателем знания им Платона. Августин цитирует этот отрывок шестнадцать раз – в четыре раза больше, чем второй наиболее цитируемый им отрывок (*Тимей* 29c 3-4), и несравненно больше, чем любой другой текст Платона. Тоже касается длины цитат и глубины их интерпретации. Но даже к этому тексту отношение у Августина двояко.

С одной стороны, Августин даёт ему в целом последовательное толкование, которое тут же предлагает читателю «Града Божьего». По Августину, в *Тимее* 41a7-b6 Платон имеет в виду безымянного Всевышнего Бога-Творца, обещающего людям, как «меньшим богам», вечную жизнь в теле по воскресении. Хоть это и невозможно, но, благодаря Его всемогуществу, происходит. «Общепризнанное» Всемогущество Творца становится ключём к воскресению тела. Августин упрекает неоплатоников в незнании этого текста и того, что Платон, по его словам, верит в воскресение.

С другой стороны, толкование Августина совершенно неубедительно, а его упрёки неоплатоникам голословны. Те были близко знакомы с *Тимеем* 41a7-b6, во всяком случае, гораздо лучше Августина. Этому тексту посвящены целые трактаты (напр. Ямвлиха), а в трактовке текста прослеживается очевидная академическая преемственность, переданная в доксографии Прокла. О неоплатонической традиции толкования этого текста у Августина нет никакого представления. Демиург для неоплатоников – греческий бог Зевс. Он хоть и творец мира, но сам меньший бог, находящийся довольно низко в божественной иерархии. Могущество его ограничено: он не может совершать зла, обращать вспять исторические события, не сможет и восстановить к жизни разрушенное тело, да это и не следует делать. Боги, к которым он обращается, – не люди, а создатели человеческого тела и смертной части души. Итак, толкование неоплатоников во всём отлично от толкования Августина.

Более того, при чтении других произведений оказалось, что Августин знаком с критикой божественного всемогущества неоплатониками, и даже с нею сам частично согласен, считая, что Бог не может лгать, обманывать, грешить. В его толковании наблюдается пробел, который он сам в другом месте поправляет, утверждая, что всемогущество состоит в полной реализации воли. Тем не менее, при обсуждении *Тимея* 41ab он продолжает настаивать, что Бог может всё. При таком подходе никого из неоплатоников Августин никогда не убедил (да всерьёз, видимо, и не пытался). Оказалось, что Августин обращается не к ним, а к среднему интеллектуалу, читателю, и наследнику *Града Божьего* с целью оправдания христиан в обвинениях о развале империи, обвинения предлагаемые последователями Порфирия.

Августин также не знаком с предшествующими толкованиями этого текста у других христианских авторов. А таковых было множество, хотя единой традиции толкования апологетами *Тимея* 41a7-b6 нам установить не удалось. Большинство из них делали акцент на вопрос многобожия, хотя были и гениальные трактовки (например, Псевдо-Иустином), основанные на доскональном знании источников. Понимание Августина стоит особняком. Никто из апологетов не использовал этот текст в рамках теории воскресения, основанной на божественном всемогуществе. В своей интерпретации он на них не ссылается и их мыслей не знает.

Вопреки своим высоким экзегетическим требованиям («О Христианском учении»), с текстом *Тимея* 41аб сам Августин знаком исключительно по одному переводу (Цицерона) на латынь, без всякого знания первоисточника, а также нового для своего времени перевода

Халкидия. Перевод Цицерона радикально отличается от оригинала в сторону стоического учения, приверженцем которого он был на протяжении большей части своей жизни. Типичная терминология Платона (δημιουργ□ς, ε□, καλ□ς, κακόν, Мο□ραι) исчезает со сцены. Стоические идиомы (*effector, ratio, fatum, satus, ortus*) занимают образовавшийся вакуум. Незримым образом они повлияли на строй мысли Августина, дав новую окраску (*Summus Deus, Creator*, *omnipotentia*), удивительным образом в пользу теории воскресения. Восстановить это понимание по существующим переводам на современные языки нельзя. С этой целью мы осуществили свой прояснительный перевод.

Итак, толкование Августином *Тимея* 41аб о теории воскресения творчески уникально, однако не основано на знании источников (Платона, неоплатоников, апологетов, последнего перевода) или понимания присутствия чуждых Платону (стоических) влияний. Если он так знает свой любимый пассаж из Платона, то очевидно, что другие пассажи он знает и того хуже. Если Августин, как предполагал П.Альфарек, и обратился когда-то в платонизм какого то толка, то не продвинулся дальше уровня неофита. Его толкование *Тимея* 41аб хотя и оригинально, но является христианизацией истинных взглядов Платона. Его Платон – ритор и христианин. Всё это невозможно иначе выразить, нежели с помощью введённой нами аллегории *Суда*, которая помогает разобраться не только с силой и слабостями выдвигаемых аргументов, но также со скрытыми задачами оппонентов, а также историческим фоном обсуждаемой полемики.