Carles Feixa, Carmen Leccardi and Pam Nilan

(Eds.)

Youth, Space & Time:
Agoras in the Global City

HERE PLACE COVER PHOTO

Afterword by Michel Wieviorka

Carles Feixa, Carmen Leccardi and Pam Nilan

(Eds.)

Youth, Space & Time: Agoras in the Global City

Oscar Aguilera, Ilenya Camozzi, Vitor S. Ferreira, Liliana Galindo, Elham Golpoush-Nezhad, Leila Jeolás, Jeffrey J. Juris, Hagen Kordes, Sofia Laine, Jordi Nofre, Ndukaeze Nwabueze, Luca Queirolo Palmas, Yannis Pechtelidis, Geoffrey Pleyers, José Sánchez, Mahmood Shahabi

Afterword by Michel Wieviorka

The Hague and Boston: Brill

Book series "Youth in a globalizing world"

V. Cicchelli (dir)

www.brill.nl.

2015

This book is dedicated to the memories of family members
who passed away during the journey of this book:

To Mario and to Jamie.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents 4

PRELIMINARY PAGES 5

List of Tables, Figures and Maps 6

Acknowledgements 7

List of Contributors 8

Introduction Chronotopes of Youth *Carles Feixa, Carmen Leccardi and Pam Nilan* 9

PART I YOUNG TRANSNATIONALISTS 27

Foreword *Carmen Leccardi* 28

Chapter 1 Young progressive activists in Europe. Scales, identity and agency *Geoffrey Pleyers* 34

Chapter 2 Young people on the move. Cosmopolitan strategies in the transition to adulthood *Ilenya Camozzi* 54

Chapter 3 Forming Agora chronotopes from young people's political participation in transnational meetings *Sofia Laine* 78

Chapter 4 Atlantic Latino gangs. *La Raza Latina*, transnationalism and generations *Luca Queirolo Palmas* 98

Chapter 5 Youth cultures in the new century: cultural citizenship and cosmopolitanism *Carmen Leccardi* 127

PART II YOUNG GLOCALS 143

Foreword *Pam Nilan* 144

Chapter 6 Juvenilising cultures: illegal and legal road racing in Londrina, Brazil *Leila Jeolás and Hagen Kordes* 148

Chapter 7 The tattooed young body: a body still under suspicion? *Vitor Sérgio Ferreira* ... 181

Chapter 8 Hip-hop culture and youth in Lagos: The interface of globalisation and identity crisis *Ndukaeze Nwabueze* 210

Chapter 9 Rap music and youth cultures in Iran: serious or light? *Mahmood Shahabi and Elham Golpoush-Nezhad* 248

Chapter 10 Space, time and symbol in urban Indonesian schoolboy gangs *Pam Nilan* 276

PART III YOUNG PROTESTERS 300

Foreword *Carles Feixa* 301

Chapter 11 Occupying school buildings in the Greece of *The Memorandum*: Discursive formations around pupils' political activism *Yannis Pechtelidis* 307

Chapter 12 From *hara* to *midam*: Public spaces of youth in Cairo *José Sánchez García* 337

Chapter 13 Geographies of the European Spring: The case of #SpanishRevolution *Jordi Nofre* 369

Chapter 14 Youth movements, politics of identity and battles for visibility in neoliberal Chile: Penguin Generations *Óscar Aguilera Ruiz* 391

Chapter 15 The network as chronotope: Internet and political practices in the Colombian student movement *MANE* and Occupy São Paulo Liliana Galindo Ramírez 414

Chapter 16 Reflections on #Occupy Everywhere: Social media, public space, and emerging logics of aggregation *Jeffrey J. Juris* 435

COVER BACK 476

Preliminary Pages

List of Tables, Figures and Maps

List of Tables

Ch. 3

Table 1. Different categories of youth political participation in transnational political events, applying the typologies of Bakhtin (1981), Pleyers (2010) and Hellsten (2005).

Ch. 6

Table 1: Profile of seven Nigerian hip hop artists

Ch. 13

Table 1: Responses to Question 7: "What is the main problem that currently exists in Spain?"

Table 2. List of most popular discussion strands in the Forum.

Table 3. Socioeconomic characterization of those provinces that actively participated in the #SpanishRevolution (top) and those that did not (bottom).

Table 4. Regional Tributary Resources per capita (2006), and Total Guaranteed Regional Funding per capita (2006).

Table 5. Aging rates in those Spanish provinces where there was more protest (top) and where there was little protest (bottom), 2009.

List of Figures

Ch. 3

Figure 1. Cosmopolitan micropolitical moments in time and space

Ch. 12

Figure 1. Ethnosocial life cycle schema

Ch. 15

Figure 1. Graph of the Facebook page of MANE - Colombia

Figure 2. Graph of the Facebook page of Acampa Sampa Ocupa Sampa - Brazil

List of Maps

Ch. 11

Map 1. Map of corruption (top left), and maps of encampments in Spanish plazas on May 21, 2011 (the rest).

Map 2. Viral growth of the #SpanishRevolution and the role of university cities.

Map 3. A comparison between the geography of encampments and protests on May 21, 2011 (left) and October 15 global protest day (right).

Acknowledgements

Cover
Photograph by Andreu Romani ©
Assembly of Indignados in Catalunya Square Camp, Barcelona, May 2011.

Chapter 3
Picture photographs:
Centre and upper left: Raisa Kyllikki Ranta
Upper right and lower left: Sofia Laine
Lower right: Jorma Vainio
Picture design: Minna Laukkanen and Sofia Laine ©

Chapter 16
Partial reproduction of the article published in *American Ethnologist*, Volume 39, Issue 2, pages 259-279, May 2012. Not for sale or further reproduction.
Jeffrey J. Juris and American Anthropological Association ©

List of Contributors

CARLES FEIXA, Professor of Social Anthropology, Centre for Youth and Society - JOVIS, University of Lleida, Catalonia-Spain. Feixa@geosoc.udl.es.

CARMEN LECCARDI, Professor of Cultural Sociology, University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy. Carmen.leccardi@unimib.it.

ELHAM GOLPOUSH-NEZHAD, Researcher in Sociology, Allameh Tabatabai' University, Iran.

GEOFFREY PLEYERS, FNRS Researcher at the CriDIS Université Catholique de Louvain (Belgium); Visiting Senior Fellow at the Civil Society and Human Security Unit, London School of Economics. Geoffrey.Pleyers@uclouvain.be.

HAGEN KORDES, Professor of Sociology, Münster University, Germany. leilajeolas@sercomtel.com.br.

ILENYA CAMOZZI, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy. Ilenya.camozzi@unimib.it.

JEFFREY J. JURIS, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Northeastern University, Boston (USA). J.Juris@neu.edu.

JORDI NOFRE, Postdoctoral Researcher in Geography, CesNova-FCSH/UNL, New Lisbon University, Portugal. jnofre@fcsh.unl.pt.

JOSÉ SÁNCHEZ GARCÍA. Post-doctoral Researcher in Social Anthropology, Centre for Youth and Society Studies - JOVIS, University of Lleida, Catalonia-Spain. Sanchez.garcia.jose@geosoc.udl.cat.

LEILA JEOLÁS, Professor of Sociology, Universidade Estadual de Londrina, Brazil. leilajeolas@sercomtel.com.br.

LILIANA GALINDO, Ph D Candidate in Political Science, University of Grenoble and Sciences Po Paris, France, Observatorio de Juventud, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. mlgalindor@gmail.com.

LUCA PALMAS, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Genova, Italy. Luca.palmas@unige.it.

MAHMOOD SHAHABI, Professor of Sociology, Allameh Tabatabai' University, Iran. mshahabi88@gmail.com.

NDUKAEZE NWABUEZE, Professor of Sociology, University of Lagos, Nigeria. nwabueze1955@yahoo.com.

OSCAR AGUILERA RUIZ, Associate Professor in Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Chile, Chile. oscar.aguilera@gmail.com.

PAM NILAN, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Newcastle, Australia. Pamela.Nilan@newcastle.edu.au

SOFIA LAINE, Ph.D. in Development Studies, Finnish Youth Research Network, Finland. sofia.laine@iki.fi

VITOR SÉRGIO FERREIRA, Postdoctoral Researcher in Sociology, Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal. vitor.ferreira@ics.ul.pt.

YANNIS PECHTELIDIS, Associate Professor in Sociology of Education, University of Thessaly, Greece. pechtelidis@uth.gr.

Introduction
Chronotopes of Youth

Carles Feixa, Carmen Leccardi and Pam Nilan

This book is based on a selection of papers that were presented to International Sociological Association (ISA) Research Committee 34 sessions on *Youth Cultures, Space and Time.* The first session on this theme was convened by Carmen Leccardi and Carles Feixa during the XVII ISA World Congress in Gothenburg, Sweden, in 2010. The second session took place during the XVIII ISA World Congress in Yokohama, Japan, in 2014, when Pam Nilan joined the team of convenors. Between the two ISA World Congresses, dialogue on the book took place at the ISA World Forum in Argentina in 2012.

This edited collection follows up some key themes of a previous volume edited by Nilan and Feixa (2006), *Global Youth? Hybrid cultures, plural worlds*, published by Routledge following the XV ISA World Congress in Brisbane, Australia in 2002. That volume was launched during a co-themed Research Committee 34 session in the XVI ISA World Congress in Durban, South Africa in 2006. In total, between the three of us, our mutual collaboration as youth researchers and authors has finally arrived at the age of sixteen, it has reached its "adolescence" and we hope it will not grow old too soon. This new volume extends our original sociological approach to youth and globalisation by focusing on the concept of *chronotope,* that is, the time/space dimension of young people's contemporary social practices. The value of this volume for youth researchers worldwide is twofold. Firstly, the chapters exemplify innovative approaches to understanding the fluid and dynamic space-time dimension in which young people's cultural and bodily practices are located. Secondly, the volume offers a transnational perspective. Chapter contributors come from countries across the world, and give

account of very diverse youth culture phenomena. They represent both established researchers and new voices in youth research.

In this introduction we discuss the key concepts of the book, starting with chronotope, followed by the five terms included in the title (youth, space, time, agoras, global city), and ending with global generations.

Chronotopes...

> Science, art and literature also involve *semantic* elements that are not subject to temporal and spatial determinations … Every entry in the sphere of means is accomplished only through the gates of the chronotope.
>
> (Bakhtin 1981, 258)

To focus on the concept of chronotope is to elevate the time/space dimension of the social experience to a powerful analytic tool. The academic use of the concept "chronotope" derives from the work of Russian literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin. His article "Forms of time and the chronotope in the novel" was written between 1937-38 and published later in English in the compilation *The dialogical imagination* (1981). Here the chronotope is defined as "the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature" (Bakhtin 1981, 84). The notion was borrowed from physics and mathematics, especially Einstein's Theory of Relativity. It refers to the inseparability of time *(chronos*) and space (*topos*), where time is a fourth dimension of space. For the social sciences, the chronotope is a double-sided concept. On the one side, it can be seen as the time of space (the historical dimension of geography or social memory); on the other side, it can be seen as the space of time (the geographical dimension of history or the social locality).

For Bakhtin, the chronotope is the organizing principle for fundamental narrative events in a novel. He distinguishes five types of chronotopes: the *Road*, a place for encounters (such as Don Quixote); the *Castle*, a place for history, traces of centuries, a museum-like character (the Gothic novel); the *Salon*, a place for dialogues, a barometer of political and business life (novels of Balzac); the *Town*, a place (street, square) for cyclical every-day life (the novels of Flaubert); the *Threshold*, a place for crisis and break in a life, a corridor, passages (the novels of Dostoyevsky). In essence, the

chronotope is exemplified as a kind of street-corner time and place: "the spatial and temporal paths of the most varied people – representative of all social classes, estates, religions, nationalities, ages - intersect at a spatial and temporal point" (Bakhtin 1981, 243). Through the chronotope events can be effectively represented in narration:

> The chronotope makes narrative events concrete, makes them take flesh, causes blood to flow in their veins (…) It is the chronotope that provides the ground essential for the (…) representativity of events. And this is so thanks precisely to the special increase of density and concreteness of time markers – the time of human life, the time of history - that occurs within well-delineated spatial areas (…) Thus the chronotope, functioning as the primary means for materializing time in space, emerges as a center for concretizing representations.
>
> (Bakhtin 1981, 250)

For Bakhtin, the chronotope is not a fact but a perspective: an interpretive knowledge that needs and breeds creativity. He described the chronotopical imagination as follows: "those things that are static in space cannot be statically described, but must rather be incorporated into the temporal sequence of represented events and into the story's own representation field." He continues: "the relationships contained within chronotope (…) are dialogical" (Bakhtin 1981, 251-2). For our purposes then, the dialogic chronotope is the gate that connects (local) events, (social) memory, (researcher) imagination and the subjects of study – young people and youth cultures.

… of Youth

> Who describes distant cities undertakes a journey in space, who describes its own city undertakes a journey in time: the city seems disseminated through the traces of lost times; as ultraviolet light, the memory teaches everyone the secret codex accompanying, as a prophecy, the book of life.
>
> (Benjamin 1980, 10)

The subjects of this book are young people – *youth,* and their lifestyles: that is, *youth cultures*. And the object of analysis is the variety of their connections to specific time/space sites: that is, *chronotopes*. In a broad sense, the term youth cultures describes young people's social experiences expressed collectively, through the construction of differentiating lifestyles. Youth cultures are constituted mainly in the fluid dimension of youth leisure time, or in the interstitial spaces of institutional life. In a more narrow sense, the term youth cultures can refer to youth micro-societies, with significant

degrees of independence from the adult institutions that provide regulated space and time dimensions (Hall and Jefferson 1983; Willis 2000).

Youth cultures were historically formed in Western countries after WWII, along with significant processes of social change in economic, educational, labour and ideological conditions. Their most visible expressions are a set of spectacular lifestyles whose influence reaches a wide range of young people. In this book we primarily use the word cultures rather than subcultures to avoid any ascription of deviance. Moreover, we use youth cultures in the plural to recognise their heterogeneity, against the common media use of the singular. These terminological shifts signal our innovative approach to studying the culture of young people; transferring the emphasis from marginalisation to identity, from appearance to strategy, from spectacular events to daily life, from delinquency to leisure time, from images to actors.

How can we use the concept of chronotope to study youth cultures? There are perhaps three ways: a) Methodologically - reading the society through life stories in (local) youth contexts; b) Theoretically - analysing (national) youth cultures, in supra-local contexts; c) Strategically - understanding the contemporary processes of de-territorialization and the emergence of post-national (global) youth networks. All three applications of the concept of chronotope to youth cultures are represented to a greater or lesser extent in this book. These are applied in hybrid youthful arenas, acting as calendars and cartographies of contempory transitions into adulthood (Burnet 2010), in the context of the "atemporal time" of the information society (Castells 1996).

To read the time/space experiences of youth not only as symbolic perceptions but as social practices evokes generational memory, emphasising the outcome of constant interaction between past and present, there and here, the objective and the subjective. In encouraging readings of culture that do not focus on the factual elements of life stories, the time/space approach serves to analyze the historical mutability of youth cultures and their integration into broader institutional frameworks (Feixa 2000; Leccardi 2008). The emergence of youth as a social subject is expressed in the process of redefining the city in space and time, and acknowledges the appearance in the urban network of a number of specific time/space universes for young people. The life stories of several generations of young people can therefore be read as a sequential process of conquest of urban spaces, which expresses the struggle for autonomy in everyday life.

In the telling of life stories by young people, space is usually organized as a series of concentric circles that are based on the subject and what surrounds him or her. This includes physical space: housing, domestic space, neighborhood, leisure places, institutional and represssive spaces. It includes also social space: family, kinship network, networks of neighbors and friends, networks of institutional relations and even virtual networks. This concentric spatial dimension encodes a series of polarities: private space versus public space, civil space versus state space, institutional space versus recreational space. At each concentric level you pass through certain conventions, symbols, values and rituals that constitute more or less formalized integration or exclusion. For example, each level comprises specific codes of conduct such as certain private behaviors that are not acceptable in a public space. The intensity of social relations depends on the central axis of space in which each young person conducts his or her daily life. This includes intimate areas of affective and discretionary practice, as well as open and coercive spaces, where activities take place regularly and in a hierarchical fashion. Yet sometimes the intimate space of the family can become a place of control, and public places of entertainment can become private places for young people.

The second axis is time, organized in the temporal dimensions of daily, weekly, calendar, biographical, generational and historical time. The time dimension also structures various binary oppositions. So institutional time; the time of work and school, of family and other social institutions, is opposed to festive time, collective time to individual time, or quiet time (such as music in the room) versus noise time (at a concert or dance). There is also a contrast between repetitive time (exercise, school and work rhythms, patterns of consumption) and time for rupture (the party, transgression, travel, free-running) and so on. The organization of the day, the routes of the weekend, planning travel, crucial moments in the life cycle, generational events, are not left to chance but are culturally elaborated by formalized ritual, reflecting symbolic memory of the biography. When youth time experiences appear to collapse into themselves, transforming “time forks” into “time loops”, we are talking about “chronoschisms”, that is, discontinous postmodern narrative experiences of time (Heise 1997).

Thus, the concept of chronotope can be applied to the study of youth cultures. Life stories can be considered as a variant of life history. Although based on real events and places, the stories told reflect the confabulatory ability of the narrator, who recreates his

or her biography by mixing interconnected spaces and times. Moreover, the history of youth culture can be seen as a history of creating chronotopes: real and symbolic struggles for the conquest of specific time/space universes; a history of appropriations of significant moments and places for each youth generation and for each life story.

This book recognizes several distinct "chronotopes of youth", grouped into three main categories: private and/or intimate spaces/times for personal identity (what we can call *body chronotopes*); semi-public and/or clandestine intersubjective spaces/times for group identity (what we can call *corner chronotopes*); and public and/or political collective spaces/times for social identity (what we can call *agora chronotopes*). The gate that connects those scenarios is the researcher's multi-sited glocal ethnography in search of young actors (Laine 2012).

Space...

> The local now transacts directly with the global.
>
> (Sassen 2001, 415)

The spatial temporality of the contemporary city offers a "strategic lens" (Sassen 2000, 143) for the study of youth cultures. Authors of chapters in this volume have collected ethnographic data from many kinds of urban spaces that are significant for how and where young people spend their time. Beyond domestic spaces there are institutional spaces for study and work, but only at set times. Some public spaces are important for socialising and leisure: parks, clubs, sporting arenas, entertainment and retail spaces. However, they too are bounded by time restrictions. Since place is a defining element in the social relationships between youth, and between young people and the rest of the community, locations that escape time rigidity are created and developed. These are not only physical places but social and symbolic spaces.

Over the past two decades, new information and communication technologies have altered the space-time matrix of society. Virtual spaces available through mobile phone and internet technology enable 24 hour communication, information, sharing and networking. Here young people can collectively connect with a world brought ever closer by the pressures of globalisation (Nayak 2004), even while they give priority to

the local. More so than any other age group, young people move rapidly between a number of different places and spaces (both physical and virtual) in the course of a week. They are more mobile than children and adults, and operate broader networks in their use of urban and online space. Use of intersubjective social space is at the heart of youth identity and lifestyle practices, often differentiated by gender and ethnicity, but equally by socio-economic status and membership of taste cultures. The social practices of young people in city space-time often articulate discourses of risk and confrontation, employing generational memory. Creative synthesis also takes place in the exploratory intersubjective spaces of youth cultures. Here, for example, new and syncretic forms of popular music emerge and are developed, expressing the creative relationship of local young people with cosmopolitan cultural space (Hannerz 1990).

The distinctive material and virtual locations of young people are transitional spaces through which they move chronologically from youth to adulthood. The lives of young people during the teenage period of youth transitions are situated in particular places where they have a family and personal history. Moving away to another neighbourhood or even another city at a later stage of their youthful existence does not so much disrupt as transfer and transmute this urban narrative. The twenty-first century has seen an accelerated rate of change, accompanied by expanded choice and uncertainty. The multi-dimensional space of contemporary cities offers unrivalled opportunities for the production of life trajectories that reflect ambivalence and contingency. Young people from different backgrounds engage in diverse ways with the urban spaces of contemporary cities, producing a variety of identity discourses and youth cultural practices. In the space-time dimension they seek out gathering places beyond the restrictions of institutional time.

… and Time

> The 'second modernity' is producing significant changes both in the temporal (and spatial) parameters of the social world and in the ways in which one experiences it.
>
> (Leccardi 2005, 123)

Since Durkheim, sociology has shown that time, in the first place, can be considered as an essentially social (as well as religious and political) institution. Secondly, the consciousness of time has changed in different periods according to specific forms of

social organization (Elias 1993). Thirdly, because of these characteristics, exploring time highlights connections between individual and social processes, biography and history, culture and structure. Since individual and social existence is constructed within and around time, examining the latter also sheds light on the former, and vice versa (Adam 1995).

This seems especially evident in the case of youth. The time cultures of the new millennium are dominated by the rapidly accelerating pace of social life, which erodes our capacity for control. In this context, young people worldwide are engaged in struggles - and everyday negotiations – with the aim of achieving an effective "mastery over time": they set out to challenge the dominant temporal cultures of their specific social context. In general, as shown by field work, these endeavours are about more than just mere survival or adaptation. In their attempts to interweave subjective time with social time and clock time, these young people often try to reshape dominant temporal dynamics, in search of new ways to express their agency. As this book illustrates, these efforts shape youth cultures and represent an arena in which young people can give voice to different expressions of creativity. And it is this very creativity that enables a substantial number of young people around the world, both individually and collectively, not only to face the uncertainties of the future, but also to succeed in transforming the accelerated pace of everyday life into a resource for action.

In this respect, these temporal practices exhibit a sophisticated capacity to handle the codes and dynamics that govern contemporary modernity. The increasingly rapid pace of worldwide time (Laidi 1997) in which we are all immersed, and its well-known consequences in terms of time experience, appear to be challenged, at least to some extent, by these practices. In opposition to the absolutization of the present and the demise of the collective memory; the loss of the future and the flattening of temporal horizons, the connections enabled by ICT appear to be allowing young people around the world to reconstruct some kind of social bonds. The precariousness of life and the weakening of the link between biographical and social time can also be challenged by these forms of intersubjective temporality (albeit not based on physical co-presence).

So what does this book have to say about the changes in the relationship between young people and the dominant neo-liberal vision of time? In young people's everyday lives, it would appear that the present, rather than being "absolute", has been reframed in the form of the "extended present". According to Nowotny (1994) the extended

present is the present which occupies the time span related to institutional activities in which the individual is involved. So in turn, the past does not disappear. On the contrary, the fact of giving space to relationships redefines the criteria for reconstructing it. The future is no longer envisaged in terms of a life-project, but rather as a time of potentially emerging opportunities to be grasped day by day, in line with the accelerated time of the new millennium. Of course the vision of politics (and participation) is also profoundly reshaped by these temporal constructs.

In keeping with the contemporary climate, and as a result of these processes of social and cultural change, young people's relationship with time is increasingly individualized. It is also largely uncoupled from institutional rhythms and schedules, including those of (institutional) politics. Nonetheless, as the following chapters show, there is a possibility that this individualization of time might not give rise merely to forms of privatism but can be considered as the basis of new forms of participation.

Agoras...

> The public space of the virtual city is thus very much the electronic *agora* - not as Al Gore implied in his 'new Athens' vision, but in the sense that the agora was the point where the conventional orderings and rules of the classical Greek city broke down.
>
> (Crang 2000, 313)

How, one might ask, can a redefinition of temporal coordinates be reconciled with the dimension of politics and democracy, and with the "long time" that the latter require? As the historian and philosopher Jean Chesneaux (2003) has written, the balance among present, past and future is the core of the strategic alliance between time and democracy. If we carefully consider these three dimensions of time, in constant interaction and only distinguishable from each other in analytical terms, and if we seek to identify one of them as strategically the most important, it is undoubtedly the future which is chosen. In Chesneaux's view, for instance, the future is the prevailing determinant of the time of political responsibility. The latter, in turn, is based on the capacity for anticipation, on the ability to "grasp beforehand" (*ante capere*) the flow of time, to be consciously aware of becoming.

But what happens with politics if the future is no longer the personal, and collective, reference point for society and individuals, as is the case in the present era? Indeed we live in a period in which both institutional politics and governmental strategies seem to neglect their relationship with the medium- to long-term future. Public decisions are in most cases contingent. Moreover, more often than not, time-consuming deliberation is sacrificed to the speed required by the management of public issues in highly complex societies. In this scenario, the first requirement for an *agora* is the search for a temporal horizon not restricted to the here-and-now.

At the same time, the new political subjectivities, such as those expressed for example by the alter-globalization movements, attempt to construct forms of participation based on the idea of a global world. Thus, the global time and global space in which young people live today - the very basis of the neo-liberal social model - are reworked so that new forms of horizontal participation and individual creativity can take shape, and a cosmopolitan perspective is embraced (Innerarity 2006). New time-spaces are created, and imbued with meaning. The global city is precisely the main locus of these new agoras.

Together with the global city and its global time-spaces (and with no contradiction among them) the web is the medium through which new forms of participation are moulded. In this respect, the distinction between offline and online is no longer relevant to young people's ways of dealing with participation issues. New forms of collective action are constructed around the possibility for each individual - as such - to express her/his critical viewpoint through the web. This gives rise to a new "mixed reality", in which real and virtual spaces and times intertwine and construct maps of political participation.

Today's agoras are the result of these multiple connections and their integration into a common horizon of meanings. Politics is being reconstructed, starting from the idea of an open present, which rejects presentification and the elimination of the past and memory. Even though the medium- to long-term future can no longer be seen as the true time of politics - as Chesneux put it a decade ago – politics and participation can still be positively practised. In this scenario, as the following chapters vividly show, the present is not a closed time, and the past is not simply cancelled (Cwerner 2000). On the contrary, despite the lack of future, participatory practices – also thanks to the web –

can flourish. In the new agoras the open present enables close, non-conventional contact between ethics, politics and economy (Alteri and Ruffini 2014).

To sum up, in the global world where we live, public spaces are being reconstructed, overcoming the traditional borders between public and private, personal life and political issues. Issues that were traditionally considered ultra-private, such as religious choices, sexual orientations, ethical preferences, are now recognised to all intents and purposes as political. Youth, it must be underlined, is the vanguard of this reconstruction, a point of reference for the construction of active forms of citizenship. This is, at least, the point of view shared by the editors and the authors of this book.

… in the Global City

> Public space therefore is not produced as an open space, a space where teenagers are freely able to participate in street life or define their own ways of interacting and using space, but is a highly regulated – or closed – space.
>
> (Valentine 1996, 214)

Approximately 50.5 per cent of the global population now lives in cities. The seven largest are Tokyo, Delhi, Sao Paulo, Mumbai, Mexico City, New York and Shanghai. Half of the global population now is under the age of 25. By 2030, it is estimated that 60 percent of urban dwellers worldwide will be under the age of eighteen (United Nations 2010). Rapid urbanization intensifies the need for us to study the experiences of young people in cities where the urban divide means many young people are marginalized and excluded from work and life opportunities (UN-Habitat 2010). It is ironic that while there have never been so many healthy and literate young people in the world, opportunities flowing from the prosperity of cities are unavailable to so many of them. Highly sociable, young people have always flocked to public spaces for expression of their culture and connections (see Harrington and Crysler 1995). Yet where young people from lower socio-economic or marginal backgrounds gather in streets, parks, shopping malls and even waste grounds they are subject to the regulatory practices of the state, usually enforced by police patrols, but sometimes by the military. They face curfews, laws against gathering, mandatory detention provisions, and other deterrents (Malone 2002; Toon 2000). More and more often urban spaces that were previously open to free use are being closed and restricted. Furthermore, as inner urban

areas gentrify and shopping malls mushroom in the suburbs from Tehran to Vancouver, more and more objection is made by adult citizens to the perceived disruptive presence of young people, driving the adoption of further regulations and exclusions.

In the contemporary cities of the world, this amounts to the legalised construction of spatial and temporal boundaries that limit and constrain the activities of youth. Yet physically defined urban areas constitute important aspects of the identity of young people, encoding specific cultural meanings and practices. For example, a group of young men may come to be associated with a particular neighbourhood, suburb, street, or even street corner (the *corner* chronotope), so that just the place name itself connotes their identity when uttered beyond the immediate community. This is especially so for the gangs of young men that are a characteristic feature of poor neighbourhoods in so many cities. The young people like the metaphorical street *corner* precisely because "the spatial and temporal paths of the most varied people – representative of all social classes, estates, religions, nationalities, ages – intersect" (Bakhtin 1981, 243).

One solution for urban planning authorities is to remove young people from the public gaze. To do so they might create a separate space for young people where they can "conduct their own activities without interfering with legitimate users of public space. On the surface, it seems like a win–win situation: young people are allocated rooms in the basement of shopping malls or skate ramps on the outskirts of town" (Malone 2002, 164). However, such places do not reflect the free sociality of the *corner* chronotope. Not only are they often under direct adult surveillance, but isolated from the real action of passers-by, of challenges and opportunities. In practice youth often avoid them altogether and continue to congregate in inner city spaces where they can avoid regulation and socialise freely in the flow of the city. Where this is not possible under authoritarian regimes, such gathering places may be developed in virtual reality or selected private homes.

Global Generations?

> Social scientists have to learn to be open to the transnational ties, homelands, identities which are increasingly becoming normal in the rising generation.
>
> (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2008, 58)

Apparent similarity in urban youth culture practices all over the world can lead to the assumption that we are now talking about "global youth". Or are we? There is no singular global youth culture as such. The 2006 volume by Nilan and Feixa and this edited collection itself contest that assumption through representing the astonishing variety of actual youth culture practices in different nations and among youth from different socio-economic strata, ethnic and religious backgrounds. The myth of a singular global youth culture not only legitimises a monolithic conceptualization of youth, but also the breathless pronouncements of marketers (Kjeldgaard and Askegaard 2006). Yet at the same time there is some common ground in the youth cultures and social practices of young people across the world. It is appropriate as youth researchers to devote our attention to it.

Anthony Giddens offers a useful framing of space, time and discourse for understanding social and cultural practices of contemporary youth. He writes that not only do all social practices have a spatial and temporal dimension but the constitution of meaningful action takes place in temporalized space.

> All social activity is conjoined in three moments of difference: temporally, structurally (in the language of semiotics, paradigmatically), and spatially: the conjunction of these express the *situated* character of social practices. The binding of time and space in social systems always has to be examined historically.
>
> (Giddens 1995, 30)

This understanding of the temporalization of place opens up for interpretation the "possibilities of immanent and emergent orders" (Crang 2001, 206); a productive heuristic for understanding the logic of everyday practices by the current generation of young people in the cities of the world. Following Mannheim (1952), we acknowledge that each generation must be understood as located within a certain historical, social, political and economic milieu. This tenet can be expanded by adding that each generation must also be considered in its specific space-time dimensions of social practice shaped by that milieu. Youth researchers Shildrick, Blackman and McDonald (2009, 460) argue that "the politics of globalization and the postmodern questioning of place have brought opportunities and instabilities" to the development of youth identities for the current generation. New cosmopolitan youth trends offer opportunities for youth to imagine their futures differently, not only in upward social mobility, but

towards widespread social and economic change. So instead of assuming that contemporary young people are in the process of becoming a fixed, static thing called an adult, we need to acknowledge that they are in a process of "becoming" in the sense proposed by Deleuze and Guattari (1987); with a multiplicity of possible identity outcomes.

Further to this lack of certainty, Thrift (2005) proposes that not only are cities always undergoing decay and repair, but that contemporary city life itself is inherently "precarious". It is only in the constitutive nature of everyday social practices that cities are anchored as physical, social and symbolic entitites. In the context of rapid changes in the urban and economic landscape, the constitutive and meaning-making practices of post-millenium young people differ from those of previous generations who came to adulthood in a different set of social, structural and economic conditions. Moving back to a chronotope framing, in the inextricable connectedness of space and time in life events, there is simultaneity: "time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movement of time, plot and history" (Bakhtin 1981, 84). So when young people give account of their youth cultural practices they speak in response to what others have said in the past and what others might say in the future; in a dialogic rendering of synthesis between the local and the global. In the telling, spaces where events take place may be owned or disowned, while the chronology of events may be altered, compressed, or even reversed. Time has this historical and biographical quality while space is emphatically social. Use of space "creates the determining conditions for social life" (de Certeau 1985, 129). Yet the concept of chronotope provides a way of rendering experience in more than one dimension, for understanding youth culture events and actions within specific contexts determined by the space-time matrix within which they exist, and out of which they are formed. Space-time is not "transcendental" but pertains to "immediate reality" (Bakhtin 1981 85).

Methodologically it is possible then to read local youth cultures through the space-time anchored stories of young people that create dialogue with the past, the present and global youth voices. The new cosmpolitanism has had both impoverishing and enriching impacts. New interpretations and variants of cosmopolitan youth trends are inevitably produced because the site of their production is both local and collective, increasing possibilities for syncretism and synthesis. It has been proposed that, "going

out is, I think, for many young people, in Bangalore as in London, *the* practice around which their politics, pleasures and spatialities are organized" (Saldanha 2002, 339). So first, when considering youth culture in any modern metropolis, questions of where young people socialize together, at what time of day, and the salience of shared discourses to their actions, are all important for understanding the distinctiveness of their identity practices. Whereas once the street itself was the place to be if you were young and seeking to socialise with others, now crowded, lively, private/public spaces such as shopping malls and busy multi-function internet cafés may be attractive and safe places for contemporary youth to gather, to see and be seen. Groups of young people use such places for their own social purposes.

They are both local and "world" places because the time-space compression achieved by new forms of media and information technology erodes the constraints of distance and time on social organization and interaction, and accelerates interconnectedness (Harvey 1990) for youth. This is strongly observable in mobile phone communication, especially the ubiquitous practice of texting (Goggin 2006), but also in internet communication through social networking, image sharing and tweeting. Gathering places (actual and virtual) in contemporary cities are an important conduit for the exposure of youth to challenges from the wider world (Hansen 2008), offering a potential cosmopolitan experience. Yet we must not lose sight of the material and structural constraints young people in the cities of world encounter, not only because of their age, but also due to their gender, race, ethnicity, religion and, last but certainly not least, their socio-economic location. The facts of where a young person lives, with whom, and on what income, not only reflects existing socio-economic inequalities, but actively constitutes them within the temporal space of the future.

Structure of the book

This edited book is divided into three parts that reflect different approaches to the "chronotopic imagination". The first part, introduced by Carmen Leccardi, has the theme of *young transnationalists*. It includes ethnographies of young social actors who move across territories and social boundaries. The second part, introduced by Pam Nilan, has the theme of *young glocals.* It includes ethnographies of young social actors who live their global youth cultures in specific localities. The third part, introduced by

Carles Feixa, has the theme of *young protesters.* It includes ethnographies of young social actors who contested global hegemony from specific squares and agoras of the global city, specially during 2011 protests. The Forewords to each part of the book seek to integrate the research findings of the chapters into a broader comparative framework.

As mentioned earlier, many chapters were first presented at our sessions during the Research Committee 34 meetings at subsequent ISA World Congresses of Sociology. The chapters by Pleyers, Leccardi, Jeolás and Kordes, Ferreira, Nwabueze, Sahhabi and Golpoush-Nezhad, Nilan and Pechtelidis were first presented as papers in Gothenburg, Sweden, in 2010. They have all been been revised and updated for this volume. The chapters by Laine, Sánchez, Nofre and Galindo were presented as papers at the 2014 ISA World Congress in Yokohama, Japan, in 2014. The chapters by Camozzi, Palmas, Aguilera and Juris were invited with the aim of completing the thematic axis of the volume. The editors gratefully acknowledge the patience and hard work of all the contributing authors.[1]

Every book is in itself a kind of chronotope that synthesizes the places and events of the writing process in a transnational context. This volume is the outcome of offline – conferences and meetings- and online –email and skype- discussions. Many of these exchanges were made in our rather idiosyncratic *lingua franca* of French. Many discussions with the authors also took place in Italian, Spanish and Catalan, even though the final text you are reading is in English. The fact that one of the editors is native in this language has been of great help, due to the fact that the other editors and author have a total of eight other tongues as well as another first language. On the journey that is this book, we left Sweden with high hopes, and arrived in Japan almost there, with Argentina in between. On this journey we have experienced "times" of relaxation and acceleration, but at last we have reached our destination, thanks to the perseverance of the editors, the authors, the publisher Brill and the series editor Vincenzo Chichelli, to whom we are forever in debt. The final stage of this journey was a small academic "space": we completed the book in Milano at the end of 2014, during a seminar entitled "Youth, space and time. Resistance throughout the world", in which the three editors presented their reflections about the chronotopes of youth.

[1] Please note that the contributions by Feixa, Leccardi, Pleyers, Laine, Palmas, Pechtelidis, Sánchez, Nofre, Galindo and Juris are related to the transnational research project GENIND: "An Indignant Generation? Space, Time and Culture in the Youth Movements of 2011", financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (CSO2012-34415).

Let's start our journey to the youth planet.

Gothenburg, July 2010

Buenos Aires, July 2012

Yokohama, July 2014

Milano, December 2014

References

Adam, B. 1995. *Timewatch: The Social Analysis of Time.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Alteri, L. and Raffini, L. 2014. *La Nuova Politica.* Napoli: EDIses.

Bakhtin, M. 1981. "Forms of Time and the Chronotope in the Novel." In *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M Bakhtin*, edited by M. Holquist, translated by C. Emerson and M. Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Burnett, J. 2010. *Contemporary Adulthood. Calendars, Cartographies and Constructions*. London: Palgrave.

Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim, E. 2008. "Global Generations and the Trap of Methodological Nationalism – For a Cosmopolitan Turn in the Sociology of Youth and Generation". *European Sociological Review* 25(1): 25–36.

Benjamin, W. 1980 [1929]. *Immagini di Città*. Torino: Einaudi.

Castells, M. (1996). *The Information Age: The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Chesneaux, J. 2003. "La Temporalité Démocratique: Quel Arbitrage entre Présent, Passé et Futur", in *Modernité: La Nouvelle Carte du Temps,* edited by F. Ascher et F. Godard. La Tour d'Aigues: Éditions de l'Aube.

Crang, M. 2000. "Public Space, Urban Space and Electronic Space: Would the Real City Please Stand Up?". *Urban Studies* 37(2): 301-317.

Crang, M. 2001. "Rhythms of the City: Temporalised Space and Motion." In *Timespace: Geographies of Temporality*, edited by J. May and N. Thrift, 187-207. London: Routledge.

Cwerner, S. 2000. "The Chronopolitan Ideal: Time, Belonging and Globalization". *Time & Society* 9(2-3): 331-45.

De Certeau, M. 1985. "Spatial Practices." In *On signs*, edited by M. Blonsky, 123-45. Oxford: Blackwell.

Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. 1987. *A Thousand Plateaus*. London and New York: Continuum.

Elias, N. 1993. *Time: An Essay.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Feixa, C. 2000. "Los Espacios y los Tiempos de las Culturas Juveniles." In *Aproximaciones a la Diversidad de lo Juvenil*, edited by G. Medina, 45-60. México: El Colegio de México.

Giddens, A. 1995. *A contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Goggin, G. 2006. *Cell Phone Culture*. London and New York: Routledge.

Hannerz, U. 1990. "Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture." *Theory, Culture & Society* 7(2/3): 273–351.

Hansen, K.T. 2008. "Conclusion: Urban Youth in a Global World.". In *Youth and the City in the Global South*, edited by K.T. Hansen et al., 210-231. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Harrington, C. and Crysler, G., eds. 1995. *Street Wars: Space, Power and the City*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Harvey, D. 1990. *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Heise, U.K. 1998. *Chronoschisms. Time, Narrative and Postmodernism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Innerarity, D. 2006. *El Nuevo Espacio Público.* Madrid: Espasa Calpe.

Kjelgaard, D. and Askegaard, S. 2006. "The Glocalization of Youth Culture: The Global Youth Segment as Structures of Common Difference." *Journal of Consumer Research* 33(2): 231-247.

Laïdi, Z. 1997. *Le Temps Mondial.* Paris: Éditions Complexe.

Laine, S. 2012. *Young Actors in Transnational Agoras*. Helsinki: Finnish Youth Research Network.

Leccardi, C. 2005. "Facing Uncertainty: Temporality and Biographies in the New Century." *Young* 13(2): 123-146.

Malone, K. 2002. "Street Life: Youth, Culture and Competing Uses of Public Space." *Environment & Urbanization* 14(2): 157-168.

Mannheim, K. 1952. "The Problem of Generations." In *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge by Karl Mannheim*, edited by P. Kecskemeti. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Nayak, A. 2004. *Race, Place and Globalization*. Oxford: Berg.

Nilan, P. and Feixa C. eds. 2006. *Global Youth? Hybrid Identities, Plural Worlds*. London and New York: Routledge.

Nowotny, H. 1994. *Time. The Modern and Postmodern Experience.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Saldanha, A. 2002. "Music, Space, Identity: Geographies of Youth Culture in Bangalore." *Cultural Studies* 16(3): 337-350.

Sassen, S. 2000. "New Frontiers Facing Urban Sociology at the Millennium." *British Journal of Sociology* 15(1): 143-159.

Sassen, S. 2001. "Impacts of Information Technologies on Urban Economies and Politics." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 25(2): 411-418.

Shildrick, T., Blackman, S. and MacDonald, R. 2009. "Young People, Class and Place." *Journal of Youth Studies* 12(5): 457-465.

Thrift, N. 2005. "But malice Aforethought: Cities and the Natural History of Hatred." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 30(2), 133-150.

Toon, I. 2000. "Finding a Place in the Street: CCTV Surveillance and Young People's use of Urban Public Space." In *City Visions*, edited by D. Bell and A. Haddour, 141-161. Harlow: Pearson Education.

UN-Habitat. 2010. *State of the Urban Youth 2010-2011*. Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlements Programme. Accessed October 6, 2010. http://www.unhabitat.org/documents/SOWC10/L3.pdf

United Nations. 2010. *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision Highlights*, New York: United Nations. Accessed October 6, 2010. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Documents/WUP2009_Highlights_Final.pdf.

Valentine, G. 1996. "Children Should be Seen and not Heard: The Production and Transgression of Adults' Public Space." *Urban Geography* 17(3): 205-220.

Part I

Young Transnationalists

Foreword

Carmen Leccardi

The first section of this book is devoted to an aspect of strategic importance in the construction of contemporary youth cultures: transnationalism. In particular this section examines the connection between "grassroots transnationalism" associated with participatory practices that unite young people from different countries, and the space-time dimension of their action. In some cases, however, this transnationalism takes a more traditional form in regard to the experiences of young migrants whose lives are constructed across borders, something that gives rise to specific, *ad hoc* forms of spatial and temporal experience and culture.

In his book *Transnationalism* (2009), Steven Vertovec rightly points out that this term has gradually accrued a number of different meanings over recent decades. Yet despite this plurality, all the interpretations of the term refer to processes related to the dynamics of contemporary globalization, namely: the physical and virtual crossing of national borders by increasingly mobile subjects, the changing experiences and cultures that accompany them, and the new subjectivities that take shape and come to the fore as a result of these movements. Migration flows have undoubtedly played a crucial role in the development of transnationalism. Another key factor in its growth is the use of ICTs and the disjunction between cultural practices, forms of identification and bonds with a specific physical space. What many individuals and groups now view as "home" may be far removed in space and time from their physical houses. And this applies not only to the diasporic communities analysed, among others, by James Clifford (1994). Young people, for example, habitually tend to construct representations and imaginaries that draw on symbols, information flows, cultural practices and networks of relationships that are territorially unbounded.

Their hybrid identities bear the mark of this global vision. More generally, it can be said that the intersection of a multiplicity of differences - gender, ethnic, religious and cultural - in a global scenario of increased mobility, and in the context of a daily life that is increasingly globalized, lays the foundations for the development of "nomadic subjectivity" (Braidotti 2011). Fragmented and built around a variety of aspects with no hierarchical order, these subjectivities - in the world of youth in particular - appear to be intertwined with the ability to combine the global and the local (see Section 3 of this book). This gives rise to forms of cultural innovation that are in tune with the global ecumene (Hannerz 1992) in which we live.

This capacity becomes especially visible when we focus on the interaction between youth cultures, transnationalism and, in some cases, forms of political and social participation - the area that the first section of this book sets out to cover. The experiences described in this section often refer to the forms of transnationalism manifested by young activists, which can be summed up as "grassroots globalization" or alter-globalization (Pleyers 2011). These forms of "globalization" revolve around the meaningful practices deployed by social actors, involving transnational exchanges of ideas and concepts that stand in opposition to the neo-liberal economic model. It is in this context, drawing on these forms of social antagonism, that a transnational public sphere is gradually taking shape (Guidry, Kennedy and Zald 2000). The internet undoubtedly plays a key role in this.

In this book the focus is specifically on the space-time dimension of transnational youth cultures, their chronotopes. This focus underlines the importance attributed to young people - both activists and non-activists - in constructing individual and collective forms of control over the space-times of daily life; the aim being to curb, or at least contain, the alienation caused by the processes of time acceleration and space compression connected to the dynamics of capitalism. Although these processes are undoubtedly long-standing, the phenomenon of neo-liberal globalization has strongly accentuated them. As a result, young people are now being forced to combat heavily commodified spatio-temporal models. The latter explicitly run counter to both an interconnected vision of experience, time and space, and the desire to prioritise quality over quantity. The five chapters in this section give an account of these space-time battles - expressed with varying degrees of directness - which are marked by the attempt to put subjectivity first. And, in many cases, especially when it comes to activists, by the pursuit of a transnational, cosmopolitan form of citizenship.

It should also be noted that, for most of the young people involved in the studies reported here, this cosmopolitanism draws on a clear awareness of the fact that the divide between local and global is now somewhat arbitrary. The transnationalism that they practice on a daily basis takes up the legacy of cosmopolitanism and turns it into a lifestyle. Naturally, as the following chapters show, this occurs in a variety of different ways and forms, and with differing levels of awareness. The Atlantic Latino gangs discussed in the second chapter are far removed from the young cosmopolitans who are the focus of the two Milan-based studies. Equally distant from the Latin American scenario is the cosmopolitanism of the young activists who take part in important transnational events or are deemed to be representative of different political cultures. Nevertheless, despite their differences, all the groups of young people represented in this section of the book express the same sentiment: as they see it, the communities they wish to belong to are not limited by spatial constraints, and are open to the global time of our century.

The first chapter is by Geoffrey Pleyers, who explores the views of Europe expressed by progressive young activists concerned with alter-global issues of international scope: peace, defending the environment and public goods, and combatting social inequalities. Although they live and operate in Europe, only a minority view Europe as the arena for their political action. The research conducted in recent years by Pleyers, presented in this chapter, shows how the spatial arena of their action is mainly local/national rather than European. Not only is there a progressive decline in their trust in Europe, which is viewed as increasingly overlapping with neo-liberal designs, but this is pertinent not only for activists, but young Europeans in general. For the majority of respondents, the notion of a European identity also appears to be an increasingly less viable ideal. More often than not, this detachment from the old continent and its policies is something that the various cultures expressed by progressive activism have in common. Yet the transnationalism of the young activists studied by Pleyers continues to be very strong. As a confirmation of the crisis that Europe is currently experiencing, however, it tends to diminish when the space-time of Europe is the focal point of the protests.

The second chapter, by Ilenya Camozzi, examines the rapport between the transition to adulthood, migration experiences and strategies for redefining biographical and everyday space-time in a group of highly educated migrants from different continents temporarily residing in Milan. After an initial exploration of the concept of cosmopolitanism and its various manifestations, the chapter goes on to highlight how

the cosmopolitan outlook of the young people interviewed informs their life experiments. In a period in history dominated by social uncertainty, the young respondents use the cosmopolitan culture they embody as a coping mechanism in the increasingly arduous task of constructing a life project. In this way the extreme mobility that they take for granted, their transnationalism and their global sense of belonging - all elements of their cosmopolitan culture - become antidotes to uncertainty. Extremely sensitive to the accelerated pace of the city of Milan, which they view as oppressive, in their daily lives the young people in the study also deploy practices aimed at domesticating the space-time of the metropolis. In short, transnational experiences and a cosmopolitan outlook give these young migrants special resources to cope with the dominant space-time models on the one hand, with the increasingly complex transition to adulthood on the other.

While the first two chapters address the theme of youth chronotopes indirectly, that is by exploring the spatial and temporal dimension without specifically referencing the concept proposed by Bakhtin, Sofia Laine's chapter reverses this trend. She considers the different chronotopes analysed by the Russian scholar and deploys them to shed light on forms of youth political participation. Laine presents a multi-sited ethnographic study conducted in three continents - Europe, Africa and Latin America - regarding three different political events (two social forums and a meeting organized by the EU Presidency), in which she links the chronotopes identified by Bakhtin to differentiated forms of political participation - and therefore the creation of public spaces/agoras. Chronotopes, namely the connections between times and spaces, are used as a prism through which to analyse these public spaces, and the ways in which discourses and transnational practices are formulated collectively. The presence or absence of cosmopolitan cultures among participants helps categorise the types of political participation examined in this chapter.

The transnationalism analysed by Luca Queirolo Palmas in the fourth chapter focuses on youth cultures from the point of view of the transcontinental experiences of Atlantic Latino gangs. The Nation of the Latin Kings, for example, came into being in the second half of the 1980s in the United States, before moving to Latin America, and from there to Europe. The distinctive feature of this form of transnationalism, writes Queirolo Palmas, lies primarily in the multiple connections that are created between various different countries of origin and various different destination countries, and secondly in the specific involvement of the young generations in this process. A key

binding agent in the construction of these transnational practices and cultures is music. Music provides the basis for asserting and confirming a sense of global belonging across time and space. And it is also a way of expressing an "emotional transnationalism", both indispensable factors when it comes to ensuring that the organization is identified as a (first or second?) family. The use of the internet is also indispensable when it comes to strengthening these bonds, and guaranteeing the collective identity. Based on extensive field work conducted in different continents, predominantly ethnographic in nature, the study presented in this chapter analyses the ways in which Atlantic Latino gangs succeed in reproducing themselves in time and space, above and beyond relations of proximity; and transforming the diaspora into an opportunity to create genuine transnational cultures and communities.

This section ends with a chapter by Carmen Leccardi devoted to an issue which is increasingly central in the practices of young progressive activists in Europe and beyond: the mobilizations that connect forms of civic participation to demands for cultural rights in urban and metropolitan settings. In particular, the research documented in the chapter highlights how these practices are based on the collective attempt to lay claim to a vision of time not conditioned by market logic and an idea of space capable of supporting interaction, exchange and participation. The activists interviewed in Milan highlight positive experiences of cultural citizenship. Through them they create forms of agora, capable of turning the most anonymous spaces into lived spaces, and the accelerated times of the metropolis in times of personal experience. In this context, creativity and art are in the service of social bonds, combatting the risk of social atomization. These young people's cultural practices are infused with a strong cosmopolitan and transnational spirit, fuelled by the awareness that the local dimension is now anything but marginal; and that, also thanks to the internet, processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization are indissolubly linked.

References

Braidotti, Rosi. 2001. *Nomadic Subjects*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Clifford, James. 1994. "Diasporas". *Cultural Anthropology* 9 (3): 302-338.

Guldry, John A., Kennedy, Michael D. and Zald, Mayer N. (eds.) (2000) *Globalization and Social Movements: Culture, Power and the Transnational Public Sphere*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Hannerz, Ulf. 1992. *Cultural complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Pleyers, Geoffrey. 2010. *Alter-Globalization: Becoming Actors in the Global Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Vertovec, Steven. 2009. *Transnationalism*. Abingdon, UK and New York: Routledge.

Chapter 1
Young progressive activists in Europe. Scales, identity and agency

Geoffrey Pleyers

Introduction: Young progressive activists and Europe

The 2012 Eurobarometer should ring as a major alert to all those who care about the European project. For the first time, young citizens were identified as the age category most critical and suspicious towards the European Union (EU). 50 per cent of young people distrusted the EU and almost 50 per cent of them considered that "things are going in the wrong direction in the EU" (see Willems et al. 2013). Yet from the beginning of the European integration process young people had been the age category most favourable to the EU. How have they become the most suspicious category? Haven't the European Union and the Council of Europe spent considerable funds promoting a European identity among young people, notably by organizing dozens of meetings and thousands of student and youth exchanges every year? The Erasmus exchange program alone has allowed millions of young Europeans to experience another country.

Suspicion towards the EU and decline in a European identity was clearly visible among the young progressive activists I interviewed between 2012 and 2014. Another apparent paradox was even more evident. At a time when the Euro zone crisis and European Union politics are at the top of news headlines and when public intellectuals such as Habermas (2012), governments, and the mainstream media were portraying Europe as the main scale of action for solving the crises, young *indignados* and local

activists did not consider Europe to be a major scale of action. A significant number of the young progressive activists who were interviewed didn't have much (if anything) to say about Europe or the EU, even after repeating and reframing the interview questions.

> In fact, I don't take Europe very much into account. I don't know much about it. I don't understand it much either and it doesn't interest me that much. (David, transition activist, Brussels, 2012)

Young progressive activist stances towards Europe provide a contrasting panorama, as some young activists expressed a strong European identity and focused most of their energy on that action scale and some did not.

The comprehensive approach proposed by the editors of this volume is particularly insightful to understand what lies behind these apparent paradoxes and contrasting stances. "To see the world through the eyes of young people themselves and pay attention to the space and time in which their practices are located" to take the words of Carles Feixa, Carmen Leccardi and Pam Nilan (introduction to this volume), is particularly insightful for understanding young people's lives and their forms of activism, and beyond that to grasp some resources for European identity in the EU legitimacy crisis.

In previous work dedicated to the alter-globalization movement (Pleyers 2010), I have stressed how actors' visions of the world (Weber's *Weltanschauung*) are at the core of their cultures of activism and preside over the forms of action and movement organization they will adopt. In this chapter, I stress the strong connection between identity, agency and space. Scales and spaces are not only pre-existing to actors (Lefebvre 1991), they are also produced by actors. Fieldwork data led me to stress the connection between identity and agency. As I will argue, the main explanatory factor for a contrasting panorama of stances towards Europe among progressive young activists is the presence or absence of a sense of social agency at the European level.

This chapter draws on first hand empirical material from two qualitative research projects. The first project entailed 37 interviews[2] with progressive activists in France, Belgium, Spain, Finland, Poland and Germany, a focus group discussion organized in

[2] I am very grateful to Dr. Bartolomeo Conti (CADIS/EHESS) and Madeleine Sallustio (Free University of Brussels) for providing efficient research assistance and thoughtful comments during the early phase of this research.

Paris with nine activists from different sectors of civil society and networks, and participatory observation in activist meetings and events in 2012. Another focus group with a dozen activists and ten scholars from across Europe was organized in Brussels in June 2012 by the LSE Subterranean Politics research project, coordinated by Mary Kaldor and Sabine Selchow. The second research project focused on ecological transition activists, with over 40 interviews and two series of six focus groups in Belgium in 2013. The analytical perspective draws on previous research on the alter-globalization movement and on local food movements (Pleyers 2010, 2011).

Beyond national differences: four cultures of activism

Stances towards Europe are partly shaped by national and regional contexts[3]. Bernard Roudet (2014) convincingly argues that sub-regions such as Scandinavia and Southern Europe constitute more consistent analytical units than countries to study young people's stances towards Europe, the EU, the welfare state (Vandevelde 2008) and democracy. As young people are the most affected by economic crisis (Blossfeld et al 2005; Leccardi and Ruspini 2006), the harsh crisis in Southern Europe for example, has had a clear impact on their stances towards Europe and forms of activism (Feixa and Nofre 2013). Likewise, Central and Eastern European activist stances on Europe remain shaped by the Communist experience and stress the contribution of the EU to democratic transition. Up to the present, consider the EU to be more transparent and accessible than their national government and institutions:

> I very much like Brussels because the politicians and the officials there act in a more transparent way. In Poland it is more difficult to get in touch with higher level officials and there is a huge lack of transparency in our democratic process. (Nadia, a young Polish activist, interview, 2012)

[3] The fact that most studies on young people's values point to differences across countries results at least partly from methodological nationalism. Values surveys are carried out on a national base and primary analyses of the data are usually conducted at that level before scaling up at the European level by comparing countries (Roudet 2014). Few analyses, whether quantitative or qualitative, are actually conducted on a properly "trans-national" set of data, that is, one not primarily connected to a national framework.

To understand todays' young people and young activists, many factors are however neither national nor regional. Transnational similarities are strong among some categories of young activists, while they may considerably diverge from some of their countrymen. In this chapter, I will argue that the most relevant factor to explain the contrasting stances towards Europe is that of transnational cultures of activism. Each one corresponds to a vision of the world and a coherent set of concepts of social agency that shape the movement's organization and practices.

Interviews and focus groups suggest four cultures of activism are particularly popular among progressive youth: *self-organized direct democracy outside formal institutions; ecological and social transition practices in daily life; expert activism* and *protest*. This list doesn't constitute a full map of informal politics, but synthesizes the logics of action implemented by some of its driving forces. Like Weber's ideal-types, they exist neither in a pure form, nor as isolated practices, but nevertheless constitute heuristic tools to understand some core features of progressive activism in Europe.

These four cultures of activism are declinations of two ways to become actors I developed in previous work (Pleyers 2010). The first two cultures of activism follow the way of subjectivity. Activism and democracy are embedded in personal experience and concrete actions. More than a demand addressed to politicians, these activists consider democracy to be a civic culture and a personal commitment (Glasius and Pleyers 2013) that they seek to implement in all realms of life. The last two, *protest* and *expert* forms of activism, represent two declinations of the "way of reason", in the framework of a monitory democracy (Keane 2009) or counter-democracy (Rosanvallon 2006). These activists monitor and try to convince political and institutional actors to change their perspectives and take decisions.

Direct democracy in camps and assemblies

Indignados and Occupy movements surged in the wave of the 2011 economic crisis that had devastating effects on youth precarity and unemployment. *Indignados* and Occupy activists however focused their claims less on economic demands than on the crisis of

democracy. They pointed to the actual and structural limitations of representative democracy. They denounced an "*empty democracy*". They consider that policies with any real impact on their lives are settled within circles upon which citizens have no impact (see Glasius and Pleyers 2013).

Indignados and Occupy activists consider democracy not only as a claim but also as a practice. They implement prefigurative activism in decision-making processes and place experiments in horizontal and participatory discussion and deliberation processes at the core of their activism (Ganuza and Nez 2013) whether in activists' camps, neighbourhoods, thematic working groups or online deliberations. *Indignados* camps and assemblies for example, provided time and space for each participant to express themselves and take an active part in the camp and movement organization, notably through multiple assemblies and commissions. Occupied squares and neighbourhood meetings became "spaces of experience", understood as "as places sufficiently autonomous and distanced from capitalist society and power relations which permit actors to live according to their own principles, to knit different social relations and to express their subjectivity" (Pleyers 2010, 37-40 and 84-87). In an epoch where youth is increasingly shaped by an acceleration of time and a crisis of the future (Leccardi 2009, 2010), alter-activist camps provide a time out of time, where young activists live an intense experience and experiment with alternative ways of life and direct democracy practices, and where young activists' individual lived experience intersects with collective history (Pleyers 2004). Beyond opposing neoliberalism, these camps provide spaces for socializing, sharing ideas and experiences, celebrating, mixing private and public, making friends and struggling for a better world. At the same time, despite their utopian thrust, alter-activist camps also present concrete dilemmas and challenges. Horizontal and participatory democracy practices demand considerable time (Juris 2007; Poletta 2002).

Each group has to grapple with the dilemma of maintaining the participation of all and a strong internal democracy on the one hand, and the need for some efficiency on the other (Pleyers 2010; Jasper 2014). Various *indignados* and Occupy camps set up innovative practices to handle such dilemmas (Occupy Wall Street 2001). For example, in the first few weeks of the camps, the daily general assemblies of Occupy London Stock Exchange became efficient enough to disseminate information, discuss and adopt practical decisions during the first part of the meeting, by then attended by over 200

activists, while the second part of the meeting was dedicated to broader political and strategic issues, such as how to reach out to other sectors of the population. Prefigurative practices also applied in other realms of daily life in the Occupy camps. In many cities, including in London, the camp kitchen provided local and vegan food. Libraries were set up where people could freely borrow books, and a system of free exchange allowed everyone to leave or take clothes and objects.

> Around St Paul's cathedral [Occupy London main camp], I was able to avoid money, universities … and all the things that people tell me I have to do to have a happy life … We build spaces where you find freedom of imagination. (Mike, an activist from Occupy London, LSE focus group, Brussels, 2012)

While ephemeral, *indignados* and Occupy camps represent learning processes and intense experiences that have a long-lasting impact on their participants. Reflection on the movements' own practices and the development of techniques to increase the open, horizontal, anti-sexist and democratic features of the assemblies remain a major focus for activists even after the camps and square occupations. Experimenting with concrete forms of direct democracy is also a personal, and often transformative, experience.

> What was interesting in the [*indignados*] movement is that we tried to organize ourselves horizontally, to talk, to communicate, to make sure that everyone had a voice and that this voice was as important as any other. … It requires being open, truly open … If we want to get at a point to make a true democracy work, we need to be honest and open with each other. (Laure, an *indignada*, Brussels, 2012)

Activists' insistence on the consistency between one's actions and values brings a personal commitment at the core of *indignados'* commitment. *Indignados* and Occupiers consider that changing oneself is a fundamental step towards a better world.

> The goal of the movement is the development of a new subjectivity and a change that is not only political - because capitalism is within ourselves, in our consumption habits, our way of thinking, in the way we connect to other people, in our sexuality, in the way we think about ourselves. It is hence also a spiritual revolution. (Daniel, an *indignado*, Barcelona, interview, 2012)

The prevalence of these subjective and expressive dimensions may explain their insistence on direct participation and the avoidance of authority, representation and delegation.

> We don't represent anyone. Everyone can come and bring her own ideas, her own expertise, as an individual. Actually, it is really the idea of questioning the authority … There is indeed more focus on individualities, even though it is a movement that criticizes individualism (Cecile, an *indignada* in Paris, focus group, 2012)

As lived experience can't be delegated, activists are careful to limit the practice of delegation (Pleyers 2010, chapter 2). "You can't delegate your words and feelings – otherwise, you are giving yourself over to someone who will speak in the name of your singularity, your specificity, your desires and what you need as your rights" (an alter-globalization activist interview, 2003). Like many alter-globalization youth camps, the *indignados* camps in various cities were "No Logo" camps (Pleyers 2004), where banners and slogans from political parties and civil society organizations (including alter-globalization organizations) were not welcome: "It is a movement without pre-conceived labels, that would restrain the field of possibilities". (Cécile, an indignada, in Paris, focus group 2012)

Scales of actions and identities: local, national and global

Indignados activists want their actions and assemblies to be as local as possible and thus refer to their movement as "translocal" or "inter-city" rather than "international" or "global". Occupiers focus almost all their energy at the local level; their assemblies and networks of activists are very committed to local people and issues. And rather than organizing transnational meetings to discuss global claims, the protest wave that started in 2011 lands these global claims in a local context (Bringel 2013). The local is seen as the scale where it is possible to implement strong and participatory democracy through horizontal, open and participatory assemblies.

> I'm not sure democracy can work beyond a certain level, beyond the local or city level. Beyond, it is rather about coordination than democracy. (Sophie, an *indignada* in Paris, focus group, 2012)

The national level is also considered a relevant scale of action by many *indignados*/Occupy activists, since they denounce the problems of representative democracy that is primarily organized at this scale and demand that national governments change their economic policies. In May 2011, the Spanish M15 movement

(the *indignados*) started as a reaction to the absence of political alternatives at the national elections. From 20 June to 23 July 2011, the *indignados* marched from all the cities of Spain to Madrid (Feixa and Perondi 2013), collecting claims and proposals from the population, thus illustrating the national character of the movement.

The European scale seems lost somewhere between actions at the local and national levels, and values and resonances at the global. For example, on 15 October 2011, the *indignados* organized a global day of action, with events occurring in cities across Europe and beyond, and a few protests and actions were "networked" at the European level. However, these trans-national mobilizations were conducted in a decentralized way, coordinated online by working groups in dozens of cities. While such networked actions have proven efficient in diffusing information and action repertories, they may be less efficient in fostering a European identity and creating a European public space comparable to the experience of a European Social Forum or activist meeting.

Several of the *indignados* who were interviewed questioned the importance and the legitimacy of the European level. For many, Europe appeared to be an intermediary scale that has lost most of its appeal. It may even be referred to as Occidentalism or "quasi-racism":

> I care about the global level, the community level, the regional level ... but Europe, does it still make sense among all these levels? And even more, isn't it in some way a quasi-racist concept? Why should we care about Europe and not the Mediterranean region? … We have many links with French-speaking Africa for instance. Why shouldn't we do solidarity with them? Why more with the Danes than with the Senegalese people? (Sophie, an *indignada* in Paris, focus group, 2012)

While the EU was once considered to embody a global project and correspond to a cosmopolitan ideal (see Albrow 1996; Habermas 2012; Beck 2009), *indignados* and young activists question this assumption. In the minds of many *indignados*/Occupiers, the EU is no longer the Union embodying a cosmopolitan ideal, but the opposite: a fortress building fences between youth from different continents.

Transition activists

Social changes and democracy are not only happening under the spotlight of global media, through professional politicians and activists who demonstrate in the streets or occupy squares in global cities. They are also (and foremost) produced in the shadow of everyday life by "ordinary citizens" who develop and engage in thousands of small, but significant initiatives and practices. The *indignados* and city square occupations may only be the tip of the iceberg; the visible part of a wide range of young citizens' initiatives that implement concrete alternatives.

While *indignados* and Occupiers implement prefigurative activism in public spaces and in their movements' camps and organizations, critical consumers and "local transition activists" focus on prefigurative actions and the consistency between practices and values in their daily life, since behind alternative consumption lies the question and possibility of a radically different society. In the words of Ivan Illich (1973, 28), it is a matter of "moving from productivity to conviviality". Critical consumers and local transition activists contest the dictate of the acceleration of time by proclaiming themselves to be "objectors to growth and speed" and "voluntary simplifiers"; reclaiming a "slow life" and praising "slow movements" where convivial relationships are more important than immediate efficiency, increasing membership and having an impact on institutional politics.

They challenge the monopoly of economists in determining well-being on the basis of economic growth and GDP; they embed resistance in the practices of everyday life. To the global brands and anonymous (super-)markets, they oppose the authenticity and conviviality of direct local relationships, whether in activists' meetings, neighbourhood life or local consumption through direct contacts with small producers. Creating a stronger local social fabric is now the force at the centre of a multitude of community-minded urban movements, ranging from the "critical masses" of cyclists who promote the use of bicycles – and the safe passage of their riders – in cities (Eliasoph and Luhtakallio 2013), to the community gardeners who create small, green areas in disused corners of the city. Young people also get involved in solidarity or social economic projects. Campaigning for fair trade in towns and universities, colleges and schools has strongly been in the hands of young volunteer activists[4].

[4] See http://www.fairtradetowns.org/?lang=fi; http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/get_involved/campaigns/fairtrade_universities/default.aspx http://www.injep.fr/IMG/pdf/JES22_Jeunesse_et_e_conomie_BD.pdf

While some critical consumers and local activists emphasize the political dimension of their commitment, others do not consider their practices as activism: “I don’t see it as activism. It is just a change in our way of life” (a Swedish student, interview, 2012). They consider that the roots of social change lie in a change of one’s lifestyle and in alternative practices at the local level. Subjective and personal dimensions are particularly strong in this form of action. They consider it a *personal responsibility* to lower their impact on the environment.

> It is first and foremost a way to refuse playing a game with which I disagree. At least with vegetables, I don’t play the game, I don’t provide more water to the system. (Jerome, a young activist in Paris, interview, 2013)

A focus on daily life and the local level

Young “transition activists” combine: a concern to build oneself - a major challenge of youth in late modernity; a deep concern for global challenges - whether human rights, democracy or global warming; and a will to anchor their life and activism in local spaces of life such as the neighbourhood, university and affinity networks. Transition activists maintain that a better society will come from changes to daily life, and that these changes are more important than decisions taken from above by policy makers and institutions.

> The idea is to show that it is possible to construct something locally, at a scale where we have the means to act. (Benoit, Brussels, interview, 2012).

This perspective also leads to a different conception of the movement’s structure and extension. Many local activists don’t want to increase the membership of their local organization, as it would put at risk the personal and convivial relationships among the group and require a more formal structure. They rather promote a "swarm" of local alternatives and groups, each with its own specificity.

Relationships with institutions and even coordination of networks of local initiatives are constant sources of debate (Pleyers 2011). Many young transition activists share a mistrust of institutions in general, and a fear that scaling up their activities at the

national or European level will lead to the institutionalization that they are trying to avoid. Europe was absent in the discourses of almost all the local transition activists interviewed. Only after persistent questioning on the subject did some of them say they didn't feel very European and that this scale was too remote from people.

> Europe is something I don't know much about … It's something that may be used and that can bring a lot of nice things. But the problem is that it is very remote from people. I don't feel at all concerned with Europe. (Augustin, an *indignado*, Brussels, interview, 2012)
>
> I do not feel European. For me Europe doesn't mean anything ... I think I would have been open to feel European if there were reasons to do so, but the Europe we are in is exclusively economic and political. I do not feel we are in a cultural Europe, unfortunately. (Eloise, a young teacher and chair of a local food network, Paris, focus group, 2012)

At a time when the EU and the Euro were being portrayed in the national media daily as the only "actors" able to solve the debt crisis, the absence of interest in Europe implied by these young local activists is particularly significant.

Protest activists and mobilizers

Austerity policies have generated a wide range of protests in most Western European countries (Flesher and Cox 2013). In Britain, the "UK uncuts" campaign have driven tens of thousands of students to the streets since 2008. Mass protests in Greece, Spain, and Portugal regularly denounce the social damage of the austerity plans. General strikes against austerity policies also occurred in Italy and Belgium in 2014.

Demonstrations and strikes typically belong to "counter-democracy" (Rosanvallon 2006) repertoires, where protest actors aim at pressing the government to change its policies. To achieve that, protesters focus on building popular mobilizations and mass demonstrations able to forecast a different balance of power in the political system that can influence national government policies. "Protest activists" believe that neither left-wing governments nor expert activists will be able to "force" a major political change without strong citizen mobilization.

> Social progress has never been obtained only by elections. In 1936 [year of the *"Front populaire"* in France], social benefits were obtained not only thanks to the progressive government but because millions of people were striking and demonstrating. (Ronan, a young activist, Paris, focus group, 2012)

A focus on the national scale

Protest activists and mobilizers consider national governments to be the primary policy makers and thus focus much of their efforts on building movement organizations, promoting demonstrations or fostering citizen awareness at the national scale. The main mobilizations against austerity focus on the national level.

> The question is not so much in terms of having targets and interlocutors at a higher scale as of building a stronger social struggle at the national level, and to do it in different countries at the same time. (Ronan, a young activist, Paris, focus group, 2012)

The current panorama of activist stances contrasts indeed with the 1997-2004 period when a strong process of the Europeanization of social movements was going on (Caini and Della Porta 2009). Alter-globalization demonstrations took place at each EU summit during those years. Along with the European Social Movement process, this fostered the rise of a European movement. Trade unions from all over Europe and the unemployed peoples' network "Euromarches" were among the first civil society organizations to demonstrate at EU summits[5]. In 2002, the European Social Forum (ESF) in Florence was opened by a one million person march, and the following ESFs in Paris (2003) and London (2004) gathered over 50,000 activists each.

In spite of the strong European dimension of the economic crisis and similar austerity policies in many Western European countries, since 2008 mass protests have remained focused on a national level, with little significant transnational coordination. There has been little pan-European action despite widespread protests against austerity. The Greek demonstrations, UK Uncut campaigns, French student mobilizations and the Spanish

[5] Since 1997, at the EU summit in Amsterdam. Fifteen years later, the Euromarch had lost most of its impetus. The dynamic unemployed network "EuroMayDay" conduct decentralized and very creative actions all over Europe led by precarious workers, making the movement younger, more decentralized; closer to the way of subjectivity and less coordinated at the EU level.

and Portuguese protests in city squares have all denounced similar policies with practically the same arguments, but with little transnational coordination.

Most European initiatives such as the "Alter-Summit" held in Athens in 2012 have gathered far fewer activists than similar initiatives a decade ago. However, some larger European actions have emerged in the last few years, with "Blockuppy Frankfurt" the largest and most significant one. On every first of May since 2012, this annual event gathers some 10,000 activists from various European countries in front of the European Central Bank to specifically target European economic policies. This event alone has however had a limited impact on any deeper connection between dynamic national mobilizations across the continent.

Expert activist networks

Young progressive activists also attempt to re-politicize debates on the European economic crisis. In London, Istanbul and many of the Occupy and *indignados* camps, various tents have been dedicated to sharing knowledge; developing a better understanding of economic policies and elements of alternative policies. In and around the camps, youth activists created websites, articles and magazines aiming at producing and diffusing alternative analyses of the austerity policies. Other young expert activists joined or initiated international expert activist networks, such as the Tax Justice Network.

The concept of social change for these young "expert activists" combines an institutional perspective focused on policy makers, regulations, institutions and redistributive policies at the national, continental and global level, with a dynamic to promote more active citizenship, which notably requires providing information and some economic background to citizens. Popular education is thus an urgent task to which expert activists dedicate much of their time.

Europe as the main scale of action and advocacy

The young expert activists denounced EU neoliberal policies in interviews, but maintained a deeply pro-European identity. They interacted much more with European institutions than the other categories of activist and were keen to organize European networks and meetings. For example, ATTAC-Europe Summer University gathered over 2,000 activists from different countries in 2012 and 2014, which contributed to fostering a European identity among participants.

> We invited many European activists of ATTAC to the Summer University to fill the void left by the European Social Forums. We don't have many spaces for discussions at the European level. (Elodie, a young activist from ATTAC-France, interview, 2012)

Contrary to most other young activists, these expert activists do not consider the EU as "structurally neoliberal", but as resulting from a political evolution of "treaty after treaty since the 1980s". They perceive Europe to be the main scale on which activists propose alternative policies that may have an impact, whether to influence European policies or to have an impact on global institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and national policies. The European scale of EU institutions is often their main target. They claim NGOs and expert activists networks have an impact on EU policies on specific issues.

> We have some experts who have actually advised the European commission on the EU directive on tax, on how to make it effectively tax evasion proof. (Mita, Tax Justice Network, interview, Finland, 2012)

Expert activists point out that the EU is often blamed for neoliberal policies that are actually decided on by national governments. Most expert activists support a stronger European integration, notably in fiscal matters, in order to limit the power of transnational corporations and to get out of the current crisis.

> People say "we like the EU to give us benefits such as a common currency; a kind of regulatory framework for many products and services in Europe; oversight on human rights; and other basically public goods. But we don't want to contribute taxes to the EU and that". I see it as a fundamental problem. (a Polish-French expert activist, Paris, interview, 2013)

Cross-fertilizations

Like ideal-types, the four cultures of activism identified here are heuristic tools that exist neither in a pure form, nor as isolated practices. *Indignados*/Occupy camps provide a clear illustration of coexistence and cross-fertilization among these four cultures of activism. For example, they blended alternative food initiatives and popular education such as the "university tent" at Occupy London or the Gezi library (see Demirhisar 2015). They also blended the discussion and elaboration of expert-produced alternatives, the publication of appeals, newsletters and magazines, and organized days of action and demonstration. Moreover, the occupation of a city square and the setting up of spaces of experience and prefigurative practices were combined with protests and demonstrations to denounce austerity and neoliberal policies.

Such cross-fertilizations may contribute to overcoming the ephemeral nature of the camps; the sporadic nature characterizing movements rooted in experience, subjectivity, creativity and horizontal organization. So after the camps were closed down in the city squares, *indignados*/Occupy movements combined their energies and creativity with initiatives closer to the other three cultures of activism. Connections and cross-fertilizations occurred with local human economy projects. This was particularly the case in Barcelona (see Sanchez, 2012), with expert activists and popular education. It also took place with the magazine "Occupied Times of London"[6] and with more formal civil society organizations.

A few years after the *indignados* and Occupy camps, two other forms of activism have spread across the continent. The first set of initiatives combines practices of direct democracy with representative democracy. For instance, in Germany and Northern Europe, the Pirate Party invites its members to vote online and decide the stances that its elected activists will adopt in local or regional assemblies. In Spain, the new party *Podemos* is a direct development from the M15/*indignados* movements. In 2014, five *Podemos* members were elected to the European parliament and the party became the most popular across the country. Local and thematic citizen assemblies that enact practices of direct democracy remain at the core of its democratization project. Rather than contesting representative democracy, as many activists claim to do, these

[6] http://theoccupiedtimes.co.uk/

movements explore ways to complement representative democracy and empower citizenship. However, combining often informal practices and institutional democracy remains a major challenge.

Occupations of disputed territory to oppose infrastructure projects have also multiplied all over Europe. These occupations combine the practices and culture of young alter-activist camps with elements of transition and protest activism. Thus the protest against the Rosia Montania gold mine project in Romania connected rural and urban protests and had a deep impact on civil society. In France, the "ZAD" (*Zone à defender* - Area to be defended) actions re-develop forms of activism popular in Italy in the 1960s and also in France in the 1970s with the famous occupation of agricultural land by small farmers against the extension of a military camp in the Larzac. In 2010, resistance to the construction of an airport in Notre-Dame-des-Landes attracted young activists and significant media coverage. By the end of 2014, three major ZAD initiatives were active in France. The occupied territory becomes both a space of resistance and direct confrontation. A 21-year old ZAD activist was killed in a confrontation with the police on 26 October 2014. A ZAD is a space of experience where direct democracy organization and ecological practices are implemented. Because it is at the core of alter-activism (Pleyers 2010), lived experience is central in the ZAD. "It is a community living experience. In the ZAD, we put everything in common, knowledge and practices. We are not only opposing the system, we seek, we build and we propose an alternative lifestyle" (Martin, a 20-year old *ZADist,* cited in Bordenet 2014; see also Comité invisible 2007).

The European scale: From agency to identity

A structural analysis of the interviews shows a strong connection between the assertion of a European identity and a sense of social agency at the European scale. This connection was asserted in three ways.

1. It is particularly striking that, when asked whether they felt "culturally European", most activists answered by referring to European political citizenship and its democratic deficit or to the (im)possibility of a significant political change at the European level.

> I do not believe in Europe ... If changing Europe means changing institutions with other institutions which will then be occupied by the same people, it won't change anything. (Eloise, a young teacher, local food network, Paris, focus group, 2012)
>
> In fact, I don't take Europe very much into account. I don't know much about it. I don't understand it much either and it doesn't interest me that much. This scale is too big for me. I feel too small to act and affect Europe. (...) So, I feel easily as an actor, but not at the European level … I see Europe as too big, too untouchable. (David, transition activist, Brussels, interview, 2012)
>
> You can't separate the content of the European model from the promotion of the European idea. I think that if you want to promote Europe you should try to make Europe the vehicle of a sustainable society, the vehicle of new regulation. (Eric, a French expert activist, interview, 2012)

2. Activists closer to a culture of activism which maintains that civil society may have an impact on the EU - are also those who assert a European identity. *Expert activists* are convinced that advocacy and good arguments will have an impact on EU policies and claim some successes on concrete issues. They assert the strongest European identity. On the opposite side, some *local transitioners* who believe that no significant change will stem from the EU claim they don't feel European. Withdrawal to the local scale and mistrust of the possibility of change coming from institutions partly results from what is seen as a closed structure of political opportunity. They consider that European institutions will remain dominated by neoliberal policies and cannot be reformed.

3. This connection is further supported by contrasting stances towards Europe across generations. When defending their European identity, "older" activists pointed to the fact that they had experienced the European Union as a means to foster progressive policies and to overcome closed political opportunity structures at the national level. On the opposite side, the majority of young progressive activists associate the EU, and in particular the European Commission, with neoliberal policies. They believe that the EU will stick to these policies, which leads them to dismiss Europe as a meaningful scale for action. They disdain European identity.

Conclusion

Empirical material gathered here from qualitative research shows a close connection between chronotopes, understood as integrated concepts of time and space, and forms of agency among young progressive activists in Europe. This connection goes both ways. Relevant literature has shown how specific concepts of time and space lead young activists to favour different forms of action (Feixa 1999; Leccardi 2009) and, when it comes to young activists, cultures of activism. Chronotopes are core elements of each culture of activism and key factors that lead young people to choose a specific culture of activism. The connection between chronotopes and agency also works the other way round. The sense of agency at a specific level (local, national, European or global) is a determining factor for the identity construction of young activists at a particular scale. In that regard, this chapter has shown that lack of a sense of social agency at the European level plays a major role in disdain for the European Union and European identity observed among progressive young activists. The more activists believe they may have an impact on EU policies, the more they feel European. On the contrary, those who are convinced that the European institutions pay no attention to civil society arguments and will stick to their neoliberal agenda, do not feel very European, nor consider Europe to be an important scale of action.

Pam Nilan and Carles Feixa (2006) have convincingly argued that, as far as youth culture is concerned, the global doesn't eclipse the local. The qualitative research data presented here confirm that many young progressive activists in Europe build their identity, sense and forms of agency at a local scale rather than at a European or global scale. With the decline of a sense of agency at the European scale among young activists, the local and national scales have regained impetus in the last decade, at the expense of a European identity still under construction. The process of "Europeanization by contestation" was far more powerful between 1997 and 2005 (Caini and Della Porta 2009), an epoch when activists multiplied European counter-summits, social forums and marches. The decline of focus and protest at the European scale among young progressive activists in the aftermath of the economic crisis potentially represents a deep threat for the European project.

The development of new ways of participation for young people and the renewal of democracy at the European scale are thus urgent challenges for those who wish to reconcile young people with a European identity and the European project. Young progressive activists' actions and explorations are particularly valuable contributions in this regard. Beyond the private/public divide, they provide ways to live democracy as an experience, a practice and a personal commitment. They remind us that democracy lies not only in citizens' active participation in public decision-making but also in a way of life that is not limited to the relations between citizens and the state. It is an emancipation project that lies in "people practices oriented towards the presupposition of the equality of anyone with anyone" (Rancière 1998, 15). Taken together, the four cultures of activism implement and combine in a wide range of initiatives, protests and practices to offer concrete ways forward for a multi-dimensional approach to deal with the structural limits of representative democracy and to explore paths towards a more democratic Europe.

References

Albrow M. 1996. *The Global Age.* Cambridge: Polity.

Beck, U. 2009. *Cosmopolitan Europe*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bey H. 1997). *TAZ. Zone Autonome Temporaire*. Paris: L'éclat.

Bordenet, C. 2014. "Moi, Martin, 20 ans, Zadiste à Visage Découvert", *Le Monde,* 14.12.2014

Bringel, B. 2013. "Brazil within the Geopolitics of Global Outrage". ISA: *Global Dialogue.*

Comité invisible. 2007. *L'Insurrection qui Vient.* Paris : La fabrique.

Della Porta, D. 2009. "Concluding remarks". In: Della Porta and Mosca: *Social Movements and Democracy*, London: Blackwell.

Caini M. and Della Porta, D. 2009. *Social Movements and Europeanization.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Demirhisar, D.G. 2015. "Le Parc Gezi comme Espace de Subjectivation", In: Pleyers G. and Capitaine B. *Les Mouvements Sociaux du Sujet Personnel au Global.* Paris: Editions de la MSH.

Eliasoph, N. and Luhtakallio, E. 2013. "Personal Attachment and Global Climate Change: Promoting Bicycling in Helsinki, Los Angeles, and Paris". Session Theorizing Context, ASA, New York.

Feixa, C. and Nofre, J. eds. 2013. *#GeneraciónIndignada. Topias y Utopias del 15M*. Lleida: Milenio

Feixa, C. and Perondi, M. 2013. "El Peregrino Indignado: El Camino de Sol". In: Feixa C. And Nofre J. Eds. *#GeneraciónIndignada. Topias y Utopias del 15M.* Lleida: Milenio, pp. 117-140.

Flesher, F. and Cox, L. (eds) 2013. *Understanding European Movements.* London: Routledge.

GANUZA, E. and Nez, H. 2013. "Among Militants and Deliberative Laboratories: The Indignados". in B. Tejerina and I. Perugorría (eds) *From Social to Political: New Forms of Mobilization and Democratization*. Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, pp. 119-134.

Gerbaudo, P. 2012. *The Tweets and the Streets.* London: Pluto.

Glasius, M. and Pleyers G. 2013. "The Global Moment of 2011: Democracy, Social Justice and Dignity". *Development and Change,* 44(3): 547–567.

Graeber, D. 2012. *Inside Occupy.* New York: Campus.

Gretschel, A., Levamo, T.M., Kiilakoski, T., Laine, S., Mäntylä, N., Pleyers, G. and Raisio, H. 2014. *Youth Participation: Good Practices in Different Forms of Regional and Local Democracy.* Helsinki: Finnish Youth Research Network

Habermas J. 2012. *The Crisis of the European Union: A Response.* Cambridge: Polity Press

Hopkins, R. 2011. *The Transition Companion.* Devon: Green books.

Illich, I. .1973. *Tools for Conviviality.* Glasgow: William Collins and Sons

Jasper, J. 2014. *Protest. A Cultural Approach.* Cambridge: Polity.

Juris, J. 2007. *Networking Futures.* Durham: Duke University Press

Kaldor, M. and Selchow, S. 2013. "'The Bubbling Up' of Subterranean Politics in Europe". *Journal of Civil Society,* 9(1), 78:99.

Keane, J. 2009. *The Life and Death of Democracy.* London: Simon and Schuster.

Leccardi, C. 2009. *Sociologie del Tempo.* Rome: Laterza.

Leccardi, C. 2010. "Young People's Representations of the Future and the Acceleration of Time. A Generational Approach". *Diskurs Kindheits- und Jugendforschung,* 7(1), 59-73.

Leccardi, C. and Ruspini, E., eds., 2006. *A New Youth.* Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Lefebvre, H. 1991. *The Production of Space.* London: Blackwell

McDonald, K. 2006. *Global Movements.* London: Blackwell.

Occupy Wall Street. 2011. "Quick Guide on Group Dynamics in Peoples' Assemblies", 31 July. http://takethesquare.net/2011/07/31/quick-guide-on-group-dynamics-in-peoples-assemblies/

Pleyers, G. 2004. "Des Black Blocks aux Alteractivistes : Pôles et Formes d'Engagement des Jeunes Altermondialistes". *Lien Social et Politiques,* 51, 123-134.

Pleyers, G. 2010. *Alter-globalization.* Cambridge: Polity.

Pleyers, G. 2014. "Les jeunes Alter-activistes: Altermondialisme, Indignés, Ecologistes". In: Becquet *L'Engagement des Jeunes.* Paris: Syllepse.

Pleyers, G. ed. 2011. *La Consommation Critique.* Paris : Desclée de Brouwer.

Rancière, J. 1998. *Au Bord du Politique.* Paris: La fabrique.

Rodriguez, S. 2014. "L'Engagement des Jeunes à l'Heure du Web 2.0". PhD Dissertation, Montreal: Université de Montréal.

Rosanvallon, P. 2006. *La Contre-Démocratie.* Paris : Seuil.

Roudet, B. 2014. "La Démocratie est-elle un Idéal Commun aux Jeunes Européens?" *Agora/Débats Jeunesse* 67, 79-96.

Sanchez García, J. 2013. in Feixa, C. and Nofre, J. eds *#GeneraciónIndignada. Topias y Utopias del 15M.* Lleida: Milenio

Sánchez, M. 2012. "Losing Strength? An Alternative Vision of Spain's Indignados, Reflections on a Revolution". June 23. http://roarmag.org/2012/06/losing-strength-an-alternative-vision-of-the-indignados

Weber, M. 1995. [1922] *Économie et Société,* Vol. I, Paris: Plon.

Willems, H., Heinen, A. and Meyers, C. 2012. *Between Endangered Integration and Political Disillusion.* Strasbourg: Council of Europe

Chapter 2
Young people on the move. Cosmopolitan strategies in the transition to adulthood

Ilenya Camozzi

Introduction

From the outset, sociological reflections on youth appear to have been characterised by two ever-present, and interwoven themes: one based on the idea that young people represent a *social problem*, and the other exploring whether young people give rise to a specific *youth culture*. With regard to the former, the advent of modern society has heralded a crucial watershed in the relationship between youth and the adult world. In what is now acknowledged to be a distinct phase of life, young people are perceived by the adult world to be independent social actors, removed from dominant cultural models and even a potential threat to social order. The latter perception is the motivation behind the creation of forms of support for socialisation, but also control and punishment for young people. The research undertaken by the Sociology Department of the University of Chicago between the 1920s and the 1930s – research that incidentally legitimised youth as an arena of sociological research – generated a legacy, which continues to exist, based on association between youth and social problems.

With regard to the production of a specific culture, as early as 1954 Talcott Parsons identified the following as the main traits of American youth culture: "compulsive independence of and antagonism to adult expectations and authority"; "compulsive conformity within the peer group of age mates"; "romanticism: an unrealistic idealization of emotionally significant objects" (Parsons, 1954, p. 342-343). Studies on

youth sub-cultures have since enjoyed substantial attention and contribution, above all from the *Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies* in Birmingham, yet the social science community's question of whether young people give rise to a specific culture remains open.

In reflections on youth in the late modern period, these two strands persist. Young people are described as passive subjects, socially invisible, uninterested in public life and politics, oppressed by the present and incapable of completing their increasingly prolonged transition to adulthood. In short, they represent a social problem that acquires further complexity if we take the cultural dimension into account. Perception of conformist, consumerist attitudes interwoven with a basic lack of critical faculties paint a picture of subjects perfectly in line with the dominant cultural stereotypes.

The reflections that we present below emerge from the conceptual framework sketched above. The chapter deals with the cosmopolitan outlook that emerges from the social practices and cultural universes of the younger generation, in the light of the global transformations of late modernity. The chapter explores the spatial and temporal experiences and life plans of a number of young men and women of foreign origin temporarily residing in Milan. It should immediately be said that the numerical dimension of this phenomenon – along with other aspects – is undoubtedly difficult to quantify, in view of both the limits of a sociological perspective firmly anchored to national boundaries, and lack of data on the geographical mobility of young people.

As we will see, the subjects of this study interpret and reflect the major changes under way, engaging with them on a subjective level. They demonstrate the ability to come to terms with the social and individual uncertainty that characterises this period, and they show a markedly cosmopolitan outlook. These young people are therefore presented as both anticipating and interpreting the historical and social changes under way, and they thus – as Karl Mannheim (1928) highlighted - represent a problem in the eyes of older generations.

The chapter opens with a theoretical review of the concept of cosmopolitanism and the cognitive objectives of this dimension: the potential and limits of the new approaches represent the background to our theoretical proposition. We then examine the results of empirical research, highlighting both the ways in which the young people interviewed related to the time-spaces of contemporary cities, and their life planning. In the final part, we define the *cosmopolitan* outlook of the young men and women, and

we also set out to underline the theoretical scope of the concept of cosmopolitanism, in the light of the important role played by differences of gender, generation and ethno-cultural identity, as well as the temporal dimension.

Cosmopolitanism: a useful concept?

As we know, the economic, political and cultural transformations that have been taking place in contemporary societies in recent decades have not only sparked heated debate on the fate of modernity, but also raised the issue of interpretative categories that can be used to understand them. In this direction, the scope of globalisation phenomena in the cultural sphere – first and foremost the intense and entirely novel cultural interconnections occasioned by the new means of communication – have caused many authors to rethink the concept of cosmopolitanism (Featherstone, 2002). As has been underlined, many have returned to this time-honoured concept to highlight the widespread condition of "experiencing the global dimension" – in other words the fact that people are experiencing the world in its entirety, now more than ever before (Skrbis, Kendall & Woodward, 2004, p. 117). This is a consequence of the increase in travel and the development of new occupations not bound to a set location, but also the spread of the media and the new technologies. In his famous essay of 2002, Ulrich Beck noted that contemporary subjects experience 'place-polygamy' (Beck, 2002b, p. 24).

By way of introduction we can assert that the concept of cosmopolitanism is now being reinterpreted under various profiles. It indicates a condition and/or attitude that the contemporary social actor is thought to enjoy, in other words a new outlook on the world, capable of moving between the local and the global dimensions. It also indicates a political/normative horizon to strive for, a cosmopolitan democracy. Lastly, it is synonymous with a new epistemology, a field of study capable of acknowledging the changes taking place on a global scale. These multiple meanings - which are gradually being expressed through the addition of various adjectives to the term 'cosmopolitanism' – have however generated confusion and transformed the concept into a catch-all phrase (Pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge & Chakrabarty, 2000), to the

detriment of a precise, rigorous conceptualisation (Rapport & Stade, 2007; Skrbis et al., 2004).

A theoretical and empirical renaissance

The need to decipher the historic and social changes affecting contemporary societies has led to social science returning to the concept of cosmopolitanism. In the late 1980s the first author to lead the resurrection of the concept of cosmopolitanism was the anthropologist Ulf Hannerz (1990). In Hannerz's vision cosmopolitanism is an individual characteristic: the cosmopolitan subject is one who possesses cultural leanings not limited to his or her local area. Cosmopolitan individuals are capable of distancing themselves from their own culture: they feel a global sense of belonging and responsibility and as a consequence integrate these broader interests into their everyday practices (Hannerz, 1990). As we will see, this perspective was later widely criticised due to its elite vision of cosmopolitanism.

At the start of the 1990s – in parallel to the anthropological development of the dimension of cosmopolitanism – philosophical/political reflections emerged that focused attention on the moral dimension of cosmopolitanism, and its political implications. In this sense Martha Nussbaum – who tackled the parallels between patriotism and cosmopolitanism – interpreted cosmopolitanism as an attitude of 'moral illumination' that does not place 'love for one's country above love for humanity' (Nussbaum, 1994). Thus cosmopolitanism was delineated as a normative project that aimed to take the universalistic norms of ethics, as per Habermas, beyond the confines of the nation-state. This was therefore also a political project, with the aim of building democratic cosmopolitanism (Archibugi & Held, 1995; Held, 1995). This project, which clearly draws on Kant's notion of perpetual peace, has been widely criticised for its prescriptive and utopian overtones.

This initial resurrection of cosmopolitanism was closely followed by ferment among anthropologists who introduced an alternative perspective based on the approach of post-colonial studies. James Clifford expressed himself in terms of 'discrepant cosmopolitanism' (1992), Homi Bhabha proposed a 'vernacular cosmopolitanism'

(1996), and Paul Rabinow a 'critical cosmopolitanism' (1986), while John Tomlinson embraced the cosmopolitan perspective in terms of 'ethical glocalism' (1999). What these notions share is the attempt to make the concept as democratic and 'people-friendly' as possible – the criticism of Hannerz's interpretation is evident here. This perspective aims to formulate a non-elite, non ethno-centric version of cosmopolitanism that acknowledges real individuals and the relevance of everyday life. In addition to this, on a methodological level, cosmopolitan ethnography was also posited.

In the sociological field Ulrich Beck (2002a; 2002b) was the first to raise this dimension[7]. The German sociologist describes cosmopolitan society as a second age of modernity, a society with a vision of the world that goes beyond national borders and is therefore capable not only of producing new forms of sociability among human beings (Beck, 2002a, p. 30) – therefore also strengthening solidarity among foreigners – but also creating the conditions for a legally-binding world society (Beck, 2002a). Beck's cosmopolitan society is the expression of a new everyday experience of the time/space dimension, a new way of relating to work, to the world of business and diversity. The scope of this vision also extends to methodology. In order to understand the late modern period, according to Beck, we need to replace the national outlook that modern sociology is based on with a cosmopolitan methodological approach. In line with this, the sociologist opposes methodological nationalism with a cosmopolitan outlook (Beck, 2004).

The potential and limits of the new cosmopolitanism

Many authors share the view that the dimension of cosmopolitanism can help shed new light on the historic transformations under way, even ousting various concepts which are now overly laden with meaning, such as multiculturalism, globalism, diaspora, transnationalism and hybridity. Yet the trust placed in this conceptual category must not become blind faith: cosmopolitanism must indeed be carefully conceptualised.

[7] See the use made by Robert Merton (1957) in his study of the role of mass communications in models of interpersonal influence in the small American town of Rovere. As readers will recall, the author contrasts two kinds of influential people: locals and cosmopolitans.

We intend to proceed in this direction, but not without first highlighting the limits of the concept as expressed thus far. As mentioned at the start, the concept of cosmopolitanism not only lacks rigorous conceptualisation, but is also subject to multiple interpretations: there are indeed at least three theoretical pathways that attempt to define it.

The first describes it as an attitude, a state of mind that the contemporary subject has developed as a result of globalisation processes. Greater exposure to means of communication and the new technologies, and increase in migration and travel together with the development of occupations that are extremely mobile from a geographical point of view, are viewed as facilitating an unprecedented sense of experiencing world in its entirety. In this scenario, the cosmopolitan subject is capable of shifting between the local and global dimensions with great *savoir-faire* and aptitude on a daily basis. In this context we find the reflections of Ulf Hannerz, who, as we have seen, identifies the cosmopolitan as a subject who engages with cultural plurality and undertakes to address otherness, with a genuine *inclination* towards the Other which is the result of a specific *competence*, in the author's view. In short, cosmopolitanism is an intellectual and aesthetic attitude of openness towards different cultural experiences (Hannerz, 1990, p. 165). Hannerz's specific portrait of an authentic 'cosmopolitan subject' - as different from other geographically mobile subjects – has attracted much criticism for its elite, Euro-centric vision (Mignolo 2000; Tomlinson, 1999; Werbner, 1999[8]): Hannerz's cosmopolitan is a privileged, uncritical, detached, narcissistic, male, middle class subject (Nava, 2002; Tomlinson, 1999; Werbner, 2002)[9].

Alongside authors who describe cosmopolitanism as an attitude or propensity, there are those interested in defining exactly *who* can today be described as 'cosmopolitan'. There are various differing stances within this second analytical approach. For Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1995) the cosmopolitan belongs to a limited group of highly mobile business men; for John Urry (1995) the cosmopolitan is a contemporary traveller with marked aesthetic sensibilities, an intellectual whose main characteristic is that of 'cultural openness'. For post-colonial anthropology, contemporary cosmopolitans are migrants, refugees, minorities. In view of their position within the capitalist system,

[8] Werbner has critically opposed the figure of the '*working-class cosmopolitan*' (1999), with the example of the Pakistani construction workers employed on building sites in the Gulf. These subjects, forced to engage in economic migration, belong to different ethno-cultural groups but share a strong Sufi identity.
[9] It should be noted that after repeated criticism for elitism, Hannerz reviewed his position to include a variety of other subjects held to be cosmopolitan (Hannerz, 2004), yet this u-turn is not deemed entirely convincing.

these ‘subordinate’ subjects embody a radical criticism of the modern period. It should also be noted that according to some authors, the very question of who is or is not cosmopolitan today is misleading and therefore irrelevant (Pollock et al., 2000).

There is a third set of questions regarding the concept of cosmopolitanism. Here we can place the authors – above all political scientists and philosophers – who see cosmopolitanism as both a normative horizon to strive for – basically the ideal of the Enlightenment – and as a political project regarding the formula of cosmopolitan democracy. As Seyla Benhabib underlines (2006), after the Eichmann trial and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, we entered a phase of the evolution of society characterised by transition from norms of international justice to cosmopolitan norms. The latter apply to subjects as moral and juridical subjects of a global civil society. As Skrbis, Kendall and Woodward (2004) note, there are no objections to the notion of cosmopolitanism as a moral and political ideal – indeed it is desirable, even if utopian – but this direction does not differ from the early Stoic or Kantian formulation of the concept - thus making it appear a de-historicised concept and losing its heuristic value. What benefits for sociology would a resurrection of this term bring without specific connotations?

The existence of these three theoretical approaches to the meaning and characteristics of cosmopolitanism lend backing to the view of Pollock and his colleagues on how the “catch-all” nature of this term risks making its meaning irrelevant (Pollock et al., 2000), and, we would add, detracting from its heuristic value. We cannot but agree on the need to arrive at a full understanding of what the concept really means, reducing its inherently abstract nature. As has been seen, to date there has been little inquiry into the practices of cosmopolitanism, namely the dimensions that underpin intersubjective experiences and everyday life. So do practices of cosmopolitanism exist?

In this direction there is the commendable work by Michèle Lamont and Sada Aksartova (2002) on the daily strategies employed by members of the American working class from different origins – ‘ordinary, common subjects’ - to combat rigid cultural divides. This set of strategies and practices has been described by the two authors as ‘ordinary cosmopolitanism’. It is an approach that shares ‘the moral responsibility towards the universal’ underlined by Nussbaum, but at the same time highlights the need to ground this very responsibility in ‘particular universalisms’ (Nussbaum, 1996, p. 2). Lamont and Aksartova’s (2002) approach highlights a second

need that is closely linked to the first and that springs from a critique of Hannerz's elite, ethnocentric vision: the need to adopt an approach that is mindful of diversity. The dimension of diversity – not just ethno-cultural but also gender and generational differences – is neglected in most reflections on cosmopolitanism, with rare exceptions. As the study by Mica Nava (2002) shows, a gender-based perspective not only helps us legitimately acknowledge the complexities of the social situation, but is also an opportunity to shed new light on the theoretical premises of cosmopolitanism. Nava's approach is based on a historic analysis of the condition of women in greater London in the early 1920s and draws on psychoanalytical contributions regarding diversity. By studying the commercial culture of the period, and the popular fashions in clothing and entertainment, Nava reveals the decisive role played by women in the development of a widespread popular culture of cosmopolitan inspiration. These women – shop assistants in Selfridges department store, avid readers of exotic texts and keen theatre and cinema goers – possessed the ability to explore and mediate narrations on diversity. Naturally, as Nava (2002, p. 93) notes, this 'cosmopolitan imagination of women' must be understood in light of the widespread political and social exclusion of women in that period, since it was held to make them more in tune with 'otherness' in general.

As previously mentioned, generational differences also represent a platform that informs the concept of cosmopolitanism. Pioneering work in this direction includes the longitudinal qualitative study carried out by Rachel Thomson and Rebecca Taylor (2005) on the geographical and cultural mobility of young British people. Here mobility was interpreted as a strategic resource for the transition to adulthood. In order to attribute meaning to the role that mobility plays in the narration of the self and therefore the process of identity construction, the two authors adopt the categories of localism and cosmopolitanism.

There are two further aspects which appear fundamental when it comes to exploring the concept of cosmopolitanism. On one hand, a recent reflection shows that the spatial dimension has overtaken the temporal one in the debate on cosmopolitanism (Cwerner, 2000). This space-related perspective not only diminishes the critical scope of the cosmopolitan ideal in an ahistorical and reified global present, but, we observe, would lend legitimacy to the false space/time dichotomy (May & Thrift, 2001). On the other hand, the need to devote attention to 'practices of cosmopolitanism', in terms of

diversity (of ethnic identity, gender and generation) and also of temporality, underlines the need to examine the dimension of cosmopolitanism at an empirical level.

Young cosmopolitans: everyday life and life planning

As indicated, the empirical study we started out from – undertaken in Milan between in 2008 - developed in two directions: it explored both the meanings that the time-spaces of everyday life acquired in the life paths of a number of young people – men and women of foreign origin - and their approach to life planning. At the time of the study the young people in question were temporarily residing in Milan for a dual purpose: that of enriching their education in the arts (music, singing, dance), scientific research or design, and first and foremost that of having new life experiences. The ten subjects involved – five men and five women – were aged between 24 and 34. They came from Europe (Eastern, Southern and Central), Latin America, Asia and Africa. They boasted a high level of education; a degree, with some doing masters or doctorates in Italy. They had lives characterised by a high level of mobility. All of them had studied in foreign countries, mainly France, Great Britain, Germany and the United States, and were planning new moves. They spoke at least three foreign languages (apart from Italian) and came from low to middle class backgrounds. At the time of the interviews – which were of a narrative variety – they had been in Milan for one to two years, some with modest study grants that did not cover the cost of living in the city. This initial social/biographical profile gives us an image of 'distinctive individuals'. On one hand they differ from the majority of migrants in terms of educational credentials and highly specific career paths, constant mobility and the planning involved in that. Most migrants, as we know, migrate for financial reasons and spend a number of years in the same country before returning to their home country. Yet on the other hand, the young people involved in the study had similar geographical origins and socio-economic backgrounds to many migrants.

The time-spaces of everyday life

The process of urbanisation in the nineteenth century and resulting urban transformations have led to modern cities and metropolises becoming a symbol of modern enlightenment. Cities are the perfect expression of a linear, standardised model of time – as required by the capitalist system of production – and a rational organisation of space. Melting pots for a multitude of different subjects, modern cities relentlessly generate new stimuli (at times excessively so, as Simmel points out). Today cities represent the physical and social arena where phenomena such as space-time compression (Harvey, 1990) and social acceleration (Rosa, 2003, 2005) most manifest themselves. In metropolises, the fast pace of life, the attempt to synchronise one's daily routine and the need for constant mobility have now become distinctive traits (Amin & Thrift, 2002). A widespread sensation of time slipping away – the result of the attempt to harmonise public and private space-time, work and leisure time – appears to characterise subjects' life stories and define their day to day lives (Leccardi, 2005).

The city of Milan – here the scenario for the space-time experiences of the young people in the study – perfectly embodies the aforementioned characteristics of the typical metropolis. In the following paragraphs we will outline the impact of the city and its space-time on the young people in question.

The young people reported an immediate perception of a particularly hostile city, over and above the usual reaction when dealing with a new city. They subjectively identified the traits that characterise it as a "difficult city". Albeit committed to a cosmopolitan life style, as we will see, the young people in the study are obliged to come to terms with the specific characteristics of the country they are living in, the historic events in its past and the image it is identified with.

> [During the early months, *A.N.*] It wasn't easy, and I didn't fit in because I wasn't familiar with the Italian mentality. And I found it hard to meet people. I had very few chances to get to know people because I was at university in the morning and then I worked from the afternoon to the evening. I went to visit friends, I had an Italian boyfriend and I met a few Italians, but it was pretty difficult to settle in. (*Sonja, 28, Serbian, waitress/musician*)

This physical and mental malaise added to the sensation of being at a standstill, "doing nothing" and wasting time. "All the changes, not knowing the language well

enough, and the solitude, the difficulty of making real friendships" characterised the experience of Mariana – 27, Romanian, researcher/Ph.D student in Sociology – in Milan, and led to her perception of it as a "nasty city".

Meanwhile the high cost of living in the city forced the young people in the study to look for a job as soon as they arrived, as noted by Haeng-nam (28, Korean, aspiring opera singer). Work commitments combined with an initial hostility towards an unfamiliar city therefore appear to be the main elements that defined the relationship with Milan's time-spaces. To their disappointment, the daily lives of these subjects seem to be dominated by a hectic pace of commitments, as underlined by George, a young Cameroonian whose days were split between his evening work in a bar – out of financial necessity - and scientific research.

> I'm hardly ever at home. At university I have no fixed hours – I spend most of my time and most of my days there. I often go in early in the morning and then go straight from there to the bar. It's a total change! I'm exhausted when I get home at night. I hardly get any free time. At the weekend I have a break from university but the bar is packed. All I do is work! (George*, 33, Cameroonian, barman/medical researcher*)

The time and space of work are hard to reconcile with scientific interests, and even less so with personal pursuits. The sensation of 'time slipping away' – in a scenario in which work 'fills' the days, eating up free time – is a new feature in these young people's life stories. The hectic pace of life detracts from their ability to combine private interests and work commitments – in jobs which often have little to do with their studies or interests – creating genuine upheaval in their daily lives.

The difficulties encountered by the young people interviewed: grappling with the hostility of the city of Milan and trying to reconcile its time-spaces, represent the scenario in which these individuals are obliged to formulate survival strategies, to 'domesticate' the city[10]. A decisive role in this is played on one hand by the creative reinvention of daily life – from De Certeau's memorable notes (1984) – and on the other by the use of technology and the web. As we will see, gender differences play a crucial role in this.

[10] The concept of domestication – which applies to the process of including technology in the complex dynamics of everyday life (see Silverstone & Hirsch 1992) – has recently been proposed by a number of scholars influenced by the work of De Certeau and Lefebvre to identify forms of everyday appropriation of time-space in the contemporary period (Mandich, 2010).

Alecio – 26, Brazilian, shop assistant/dancer/mosaic artist – has been in Milan for four years attending a mosaic course. Like the other young people, he has been forced to find a job to keep pace with the cost of living in the city, with a consequent 'reduction' in time and space, above all those dedicated to personal interests and passions. Nevertheless he has identified *the* way of getting to grips with Milan, and expressing his creativity: he travels around the city on foot or by skateboard, listening to music. This has surprising results: a public space like the street thus becomes a stage for his acrobatic moves and enjoyment; a setting where the distinction between public and private space blur.

When it comes to the capacity to react to the hostile, accelerated time-spaces of the city, the young women in the study not only prove capable of managing everyday time-spaces with greater skill, but also formulate these agency strategies more rapidly, tuning into the pace of the city with the idea of turning a restriction into a resource. The young men, on the other hand, appear more passive and fatigued and in general less proactive when it comes to formulating individual domestication tactics.

> I work during the day and study at night. So now I have much less time for the things I used to do. Sooner or later I'll leave my job because I'm sick and tired of spending eight hours here. Because after a while… ok, you've got a job, but just to earn a living and nothing more, you're not building anything … at least not with this kind of work. I don't feel like I'm building other things in my life – I'm just getting by. (*Mauricio, 26, Chilean, mechanical draughtsman/musician*).

Sonja needed some time to analyse the stresses and strains she experienced during the first few months in Milan and find a solution; in short, to domesticate Milan. She threw down a *personal challenge* to the city, with its restricted times and spaces and hectic pace of life. Now she loves its speed and time-devouring capacity.

> At the end of the day I have to do everything myself! That's what I like about Milan. Everyone lives their own lives and it's all one big marketplace. Everyone can find something, but you always have to be up for it; no-one can let their guard down. What I mean is that everyone is doing a balancing act, with work, life, everything, because you have to be on the go all the time, especially mentally. (*Sonja, 28, Serbian, waitress/musician*)

Angie too has a 'very busy life': she works in the morning, attends university in the afternoon and plays her music in the evening. She has very little free time, and Milan's hectic pace of life makes her nostalgic for the Estonian cafés where you can sit with a book and enjoy a leisurely coffee (though she pointedly underlines that this is the only

thing she misses about her country). Milan's speed and hostility – as she puts it – have enabled her to strategically carve out some time-space in which she can be "active with her mind" and think about herself. She has succeeded in transforming a limitation into a resource.

> When I wasn't working I had much more free time, that I always filled with activities, things, concerts, seeing people, projects. But I was a lot busier, more active. Now there's just this triangle of 'work, university, home', which I do find a bit difficult, but at the same time my mind is active. I mean that this space called Milan has helped me to open spaces inside me that are difficult to find. (*Angie, 25, Estonian, translator/musician*).

What emerges from the accounts of these young women is not only plurality of time that connotes 'women's time', as highlighted by Adam (1989), but also a particular female brand of knowledge when it comes to rationalising, organising and managing the space-times of everyday life.

One particular strategy for domesticating the space-time of the city involves the internet, which is mainly used for two purposes: to find out more about Milan, and to keep in touch with friends and relatives around the world. Mariana, for example, faces her 'battle with the city' by studying her adversary on a virtual map.

> Another space is the virtual arena! It's very important for me, I spend a lot of time on the internet. It's really helped in this battle with the city, in the sense that I often looked up *google maps*, even when I didn't have to go anywhere, but just to see the streets. To work out where to go and how to get around. And to find places to go out in Milan. It was my intermediary! (*Mariana, 27, Romanian, temporary researcher/Ph.D student in Sociology)*

In Emilio's everyday life the web also plays an important role: he uses it to look for information on cultural activities (mainly events and concerts), and in general he finds traces of 'life in Milan'.

> Internet? Yes, I use it a lot. Maybe too much. To connect with my country, I mean my friends, everyone, my family. But also to get loads of information about Milan. Concerts, streets. I mean the kind of life you can have in Milan, I find loads of things on the internet. (*Emilio, 26, Spanish, PhD student in Engineering*)

During the interview Emilio revealed that without his Italian girlfriend he would be 'lost'. She has introduced him to her group of friends and invited him to live in her city

centre flat, but above all been his guide to the city. 'Elisa gives me moral support and contacts. She is a fantastic support, but sometimes too much. In the sense that I feel too dependent on her. But that is maybe because Milan doesn't help you if you don't have your own back-up'. The presence of a female figure – a girlfriend or friend, as the other interviewees report – appears to be fundamental for the young men. She helps when dealing with the hostility of the city's time-spaces and formulating strategies to control everyday life.

Looking to the future

The young people interviewed for this study chose Milan – a metropolitan city that reflects their style – to further their studies and add to their personal experiences. Yet this place, like many other places where they have stayed, is only one step in their journey. Borne up by the certainty of having "taken all that Milan has to offer" the interviewees are already thinking about their next move, in line with their cosmopolitan lifestyles. Mauricio and Sabine, when questioned about their past and future moves, said the following:

> I can't see myself in Europe at all. I'll go to work in South America, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile. I'll definitely go to Venezuela for refresher courses. (*Mauricio, 26, Chilean, mechanical draughtsman/musician*)

> Change is important for me. London was my city too, it was my dream, but after three years, when I got to know the city, the people, everything, it was important to have a change, and the same goes for Milan. After I had met people and learned the language, it was the right time to change. I knew that coming to Italy was just a step, that I had to take everything on offer and then I would move on. *(Sabine, 24, Austrian, shop assistant/aspiring designer)*

Tullio – a young man from Ecuador who dreams about recording his first CD and who works as an IT technician – seems to say that there is a right time to make choices. He works for more than 12 hours a day, studies IT at university and plays in a rock band at night.

> Music is a key part of my life, even if one day I might go back to Ecuador and the group will break up. Life's like that, you have to take what comes. Today it gets the better of you and crushes you, maybe tomorrow you'll be on top – I'm convinced that day will come, when I will get a hold on

> life and get the better of it - 'I'm in charge now'. But until that day comes I'll carry on like this. *(Tullio, 27, Ecuadorian, IT technician/musician)*

The life stories of these young people show them dealing - in an entirely novel way - with the uncertainty that characterises contemporary youth – exacerbated, as we know, by the structural conditions of late modern societies (Beadle, Holdsworth & Wyn, 2011; Furlong & Cartmel, 1997). Their life plans show a lack of planning, apart from the planning involved in moving around, as we have seen. In one sense, this travel planning might even represent a subjective and individualised strategy (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2003) for governing uncertainty. The desire to accumulate experience – pursued since early youth – has meant that these young people have had to overcome many problems and in a certain sense 'grow up fast'. Convinced that it is impossible to plan much and in the long term, at the same time they demonstrate an intelligent readiness to accept what life throws at them, as Tullio reminds us, but also the determination to follow their dreams and pursue their personal fulfilment. Reading between the lines, they seem to be telling us that being stationary, mentally but above all physically, is the least desirable situation.

As Mariana's account shows, the idea of impermanence and uncertainty is a source of both fascination and ambivalence for these young people. In Milan, Mariana – who in Romania lived by herself in a flat where she "felt at home" - has moved house and changed flatmates many times. After raised hopes and delays she has found a small flat where "there isn't much light", and that "isn't very warm". She is not especially keen on it, but she has lived there for some months and at the end of the day it is "okay". Yet, and this surprises her, she doesn't feel ready to "make it her own".

> So I came here (*To the flat she is living in - A.N.*) and I said, ok, I'll take it because I'm going to move again anyway. So in September when I took it I said I'll take it for now and then maybe in January I'll move. So I didn't do anything, I mean I just put up another curtain, and it isn't even a curtain, it's a scarf – that's all I've done. But now I'm thinking that seeing as I'm used to it, that I like it here, that I don't even have that many problems, well a few, paying the rent. I don't know. Basically it's always like that: always a bit temporarily provisional and permanent. At the same time. But that's okay (*laughing*). (*Mariana, 27, Romanian, temporary researcher/Ph.D student in sociology*).

Mariana justifies her doubts about decorating her flat in Milan with the emblematic expression "always a bit temporarily provisional and permanent", revealing her

ambivalence towards a city that she knows is a temporary stop for her. Yet this temporary relationship appears to all intents and purposes to reassure her.

Lastly, when it comes to the life planning of these young cosmopolitans, it is possible to identify some gender-related differences. First and foremost, the young women appear to be more interested in accumulating experience. Not only do they not conceal the fact that they are keen on having new experiences, but they also appear to be worried about the idea of wasting time – despite their young age – in this race. Sabine, when questioned on her short term plans, reports that she has to go back to Austria for a few months, but is already aware that it will be difficult for her after all her experience. So while she knows she will not return to her parents' home – she will find other accommodation – she reveals that she is worried: 'because I'm 24 already, I'm afraid of wasting time!'.

When compared to the young men of the same age, the young women appear all in all to be more enterprising, guided by a markedly practical approach and capable of getting back on their feet after life's setbacks. As underlined by Cavalli and Leccardi (1997), young women are more involved in formulating 'active strategies to face an uncertain future, forms of action capable of guaranteeing the maximum possible level of self-determination in the given conditions' (Cavalli & Leccardi, 1997, p. 30).

A few months after coming to Milan, Haeng-nam found herself caught up in a series of misadventures and took on a number of badly paid jobs that she found demoralising, yet she always managed to get back on her feet:

> I was desperate, I didn't know what to do but I knew deep down that I had to get back on my feet. I thought about music and every single day…I just thought about getting through it. I began to feel better and I realised that you must never give up hope, if you believe in yourself you can get out of a dead end: if you really want to, you can! *(Haeng-nam, 28, Korean, aspiring opera singer).*

As for Angie, she is always ready to set off for a new destination. As she says: "I've always travelled. In the last few years of my life I've lived in many different countries, and moved somewhere new practically every six months. First Madrid, then London, then Perugia." She has very little baggage – both physically and conceptually: "You can't take everything with you because it gets too much". She explains the mechanism behind this, which is based on a highly practical approach and a sense of flexibility.

> I travel very light. I've learned a lot from travelling: a back pack, my computer and two instruments. Your whole life on your shoulders. It shows you that you only really need very few things in life, and how the things that you need build up, even in three or six months. It teaches you to get rid of things when you finish another six-month cycle. And the things you throw away … are things you don't need. Perhaps it's the same for experiences, emotions, people, things you've done. You learn …. you learn a lot but you can't take everything with you because it would be too much. (*Angie, 25, Estonian, translator/musician*).

In Angie's cosmopolitan existence, Milan is therefore a stepping stone: the time-space of a new semester in her life. In this hectic city where she has been obliged to find a job – and the resulting problem of combining spaces and times – she feels "at home". Sabine too, shows her determination to keep the pieces of her life story together, and the internet plays a crucial role in this; indeed the new social networks appear tailor-made for the cosmopolitan lifestyle.

> Without the internet life would be pretty difficult. That might sound stupid, but the people I talk to aren't always near by. Only half of the people I care about are here in Milan – physically here. So it's important because this is what I've chosen in life. If I choose to move to a different city every three years and I don't want to lose the friends I've made in that three year period, I have to at least speak to them a bit. I have loads of friends in London and I only see them on Facebook. On Facebook I can leave just a phrase, and you can do the same; we don't necessarily need to have a conversation. I think Facebook works so well because it's not like writing an email where you have to write about everything that's been going on. Facebook is much faster. We're in touch, if I need to I go to London, if I don't go I don't need to write you an email every week. (Sabine, 24, Austrian, shop assistant/aspiring designer)

Lastly, the game of imagining their future – in five to ten years' time – produced some surprising results. In general all the interviewees preferred not to make plans, and to continue engaging with multiple life experiences, coinciding with moves to new locations selected on an ad hoc basis. Yet men and women appear to have different visions of the actual concept of planning. The young women seemed less interested in the actual idea of a life plan: what counts is self-fulfilment, in other words, continuing to move around, as a sure-fire way of having new experiences, as Sonja relates. She tells us, for example, that if she continued her studies in Musicology with a research doctorate, she would have a guaranteed future in her country – Serbia – as a university lecturer. She has no intention of doing this however, even though she quite likes the idea. She has no desire to return 'home'. Furthermore the political and social situation in the country is delicate and this could represent a risk for a lengthy academic career in the music field which is already unstable, she tells us. Moreover, Sonja is not willing to lose the freedom she has gained by leaving a country in which 'the level of sexism is

fairly high. When it comes down to it, it is a patriarchal system, with a high level of prejudice'. She wants to be a 'decent citizen', recognised for her artistic talent. This is what counts in her present and future life, above and beyond specific plans. Sabine takes a similar approach when it comes to planning her life: she wants to 'take everything I can'.

> I see my future as very much about gaining experience. I want to take everything, everything there is; learn everything there is to learn and then away again…if I thought this job was forever, I'd go mad. I'm well aware that this is just a job, that this house is just a house. I always think there's something better round the corner…yes, I reckon that if you have a clear plan for the future, if you know what you want, you can do it. But I don't actually think about the future that much anyway! (Sabine, 24, Austrian, shop assistant/aspiring designer)

The young men, although unable or reluctant to make plans, nevertheless confessed to two aspects in which they differ greatly from their female counterparts. First and foremost they do not rule out a return, at some point in their lives, to their home countries – something that the young women either do not mention, or categorically reject. In second place, they hope to have families. The following accounts show that direction.

> It's not something that's on my mind right now (*A.N.*: a return to Ecuador). I'm fine here. Maybe in the future, much further ahead in the future, because all my family are there and I have nothing here. It's just me and my wife…who knows? Maybe I'll start a band there and find the right people. *(Tullio, 27, Ecuadorian, IT technician/musician)*
>
> But in five years' time I see myself with her! Yes of course I see myself with her. We make all our plans together. I want to live with her. If she says she wants to stay in Milan, I'll stay here and adapt to it. Yes, maybe a family too (*laughs*). But we are already a family (*laughs, embarrassed*). I sound like an old man (*laughs*). (*Emilio, 26, Spanish, PhD student in Engineering*)
>
> In ten years' time I'll be 36 (*laughs*). But more than anything else I want to be a good father. I'd like to try and have a settled family, a happy family. Because I read that once and it has always remained one of my philosophies. Because, let's face it, with all the problems going on in the world, with everything so screwed up, one person can start a revolution…You might not be able to pull it off - things are more difficult now, with all this communication stuff, and everyone more interested in material things, looking out for number one – there is much less attention to others in this period. I think I would be able to start a small revolution starting with a family of my own… a revolution in my own home (*Alecio, 26, Brazilian, shop assistant/dancer/mosaic artist*)

What Alecio sees as revolutionary and Emilio as a welcome certainty – starting a family and becoming fathers – the women view almost as a restriction. They not only find it difficult to imagine themselves with a family, but in some cases they even resent the deliberately rhetorical question about 'starting a family'. They see a relationship as an obstacle to their independence and cosmopolitan lifestyle. For example Mariana, as

she eagerly tries to imagine the developments in her career over the next two years – her maximum time frame when it comes to planning, she tells us – finds a possible way of reconciling places and times in her uncertain lifestyle, that sounds sensible: 'That's it! That looks like the only solution for now!'. However her mouth immediately forms a grimace when she thinks about her relationship with Paolo, as she explains:

> But that would change my relationship with Paolo…it's different for him. He lives with his parents, has a steady job … his life is planned out and organised. He's got it all sorted out in his head. He told me that he is 100 per cent sure he will stay in Milan. I don't know whether I want to stay in Milan… next year I'd like to go to India (her tone of voice becomes enthusiastic and lively again). I have a friend who hitch-hikes…I told him it sounds a bit weird but I like the sound of it (Mariana, 27, Romanian, temporary researcher/Ph.D student in Sociology)

Sabine has a very clear idea of how a relationship would fit into her life. This is what she told us during the interview.

> In ten years' time I see myself with two more languages. You want to know if I see myself married? I don't know. I hope I'll have found my perfect job, something I really like. I hope that in ten years' time I'll have lived in at least two cities – maybe even three if I carry on like this. It would be a mistake for me not to leave Italy because I have a boyfriend. I think it would be wrong to stay with a person in one city if that is all the city has to offer. I think that if I was really in love and the other person was too, we could go anywhere. And if I was with a person who told me we had to stay in Italy, I would tell him we weren't right for each other. (Sabine, 24, Austrian, shop assistant/aspiring designer)

The lack of planning in terms of relationships thus becomes a crucial tool for self expression. What is at stake is time for oneself, the pursuit of personal fulfilment. For many young women, rejecting the idea of a relationship – something that is often a reaction against older generations of women who often did not have this option – thus becomes an integral part of their rejection of an established path in life (Leccardi, 2009).

Conclusion

As we have seen, this study started out by identifying two interconnected traits that appear to be a constant feature of reflections on youth: youth as a social problem in the modern and late modern period, and the question of whether youth gives rise to a

specific culture. The profile of young people in the contemporary period that emerges from at least a part of the social sciences is one of passive subjects, uninterested in politics and public life, entirely focussed on the present and incapable of making plans, and moreover, conformist individuals devoted to consumerism.

Our analysis of the young people in this study – foreign men and women temporarily residing in Milan – appears to challenge this snapshot of contemporary youth, and it also highlights some specific characteristics which to date have been neglected in the main sociological analyses. As mentioned previously, these are exploratory reflections which require further study, with a greater number of cases.

The main traits of these young people are their extreme mobility in geographic terms and the building of their biography around an accumulation of international life experiences. These take the form of periods of one to three years spent in different cities, for the purpose of further studies or pursuing an interest – mainly of the artistic variety - but above all motivated by an almost obsessive pursuit of new life experiences. These multilingual, highly educated young people travel alone yet build new social relationships in the cities where they settle and are proficient in keeping up previous relationships by means of virtual communications. Technology plays a key role in their lives: as well as being the favoured way of keeping in touch with friends and relatives in different countries, it represents the tool used to 'domesticate' the places they move to. They prove to have a very practical approach both to their constant travel – travelling with a computer and little else – and to their stays in the various cities, where they immediately set about looking for accommodation and work.

These young people have long learned to tackle the difficulties involved in building their own lives entirely under their own steam. The latter aspect gives an image of subjects with deeply individualised traits that combines greater freedom of subjective choices with a higher number of risks (du Bois-Reymond, 1998), risks that are appraised with a disenchanted, critical eye. The need to 'take risks' in order to continue on the quest for 'new experiences' is weighed, together with the need to quickly find an alternative when faced with a setback. As for the uncertainty of the contemporary period, along with their stationary counterparts, the young men and women in the study have developed the specific ability to 'play it by ear' (du Bois-Reymond, 2009). Yet they appear to stand out for the extreme challenges they lay down to this uncertainty, with the decision to keep 'looking for something else' in the cities they choose.

Uncertainty appears to enthrall them, and their lives are characterised by the ability to combine temporary stays with strategies for domesticating the places they live in.

It has been underlined that youth cultures are 'ways of processing experience, producing ideas, lifestyles, behavioural models and forms of expression that respond to the conditions produced by relentless social changes' (Cavalli & Leccardi, 1997, p. 709). In this direction the young people interviewed are undoubtedly the producers of a specific culture that, in the light of its characteristics, can be defined as *cosmopolitan*. As we know, contemporary societies are experiencing deep-seated changes on an economic, political and social level. These transformations have connected up the world like never before, and their implications in cultural terms are being studied in both sociology and other disciplines. The subjects in this study are the most refined exponents or 'vanguard' of these transformations; they are both a reflection and an expression of the increasingly interconnected nature of our planet. Mannheim has effectively underlined the difficult role played by pioneers in the eyes of society, especially in the eyes of the adult world when those pioneers belong to a younger generation.

This chapter has tackled the theoretical and analytical dimension of cosmopolitanism. It has amply explored the reasons for its reappearance in scientific debates, together with its main branches, starting from the concept proposed by Ulf Hannerz and that of the critical, deconstructionist anthropological point of view embraced by post-colonial studies. Alongside these are the notions of the philosophy of politics and sociology (Beck in particular). Some 'minor' arguments – that spring from the main ideas, Hannerz in particular – propose redefining the concept of cosmopolitanism in the light of the role of *differences* – of gender, generation and ethnic identity – and the *temporal dimension*. Moreover, social practices of cosmopolitanism have not been sufficiently highlighted. The limits of a vision that identifies the cosmopolitan as a Western, adult male have been stressed by various authors; while a cosmopolitan perspective that prioritises the spatial over the temporal dimension is also shown to be reductive (Cwerner, 2000).

With regards to diversity, this chapter shows how young social actors of both sexes and from different areas of the world specifically relate to international geographical mobility. The most evident differences were those related to gender: the predominantly female ability to manage both uncertain lifestyles and exercise control over everyday

space-times, while actively planning new moves and seeking new life experiences must give pause for thought. Young women basically appear better equipped than their male counterparts to deal with a cosmopolitan lifestyle. This interestingly subverts the established connections between masculinity and travel, and women as essentially stationary (Wolff, 1995), and is further proof of the multiplicity of times that characterise the female temporal dimension.

Lastly the accent on the temporal dimension of cosmopolitanism – present here in the life plans, the practices for domesticating the space-times of the metropolis and the length of the stays – gives us a detailed insight not only into the subjects' identity construction and transition to adulthood, but also the complexity of contemporary societies. The link between space and time is also decisive in terms of analytical perspectives.

Based on critical analysis of the concept of cosmopolitanism and interpretation of the lives of the young people in question, a new definition of cosmopolitanism can be formulated that takes account of the social transformations under way. Cosmopolitanism represents a new opportunity offered by changes of a structural variety, that social actors seize in order to respond to the risks of life in contemporary society. When it comes to uncertainty, the challenge of reconciling the temporal dimensions of the past, present and future – a challenge faced by young people in particular – can be solved by looking beyond national borders for new alternatives to established life paths. Moreover, with regards to social differentiation, a cosmopolitan scenario enables subjects both to express social diversity (generation, gender and ethno-cultural differences in particular) and to engage (and enter into conflict) with social constructions regarding diversity.

The chapter concludes by expressing a number of hopes for the future. The increase in the international mobility of the young generations is right before our eyes, and studies are needed to explore it and highlight not only the numerical dimension of the phenomenon but also its characteristics. Yet this raises an issue connected to the current breadth of vision in sociology: a national approach risks overlooking the full scope of this social phenomenon. The distinctive life stories of these young people – with their differences and similarities – appear on one hand to call for an interpretative category such as that of cosmopolitanism in order to analyse the phenomenon, while on the other

hand observation is required in the form of longitudinal studies to provide an image of the entire transition to adulthood undertaken by these subjects.

References

Adam, B. (1989). Feminist Social Theory Needs Time. Reflections on the Relation between Feminist Thought, Social Theory and Time as an Important Parameter in Social Analysis, *Sociological Review*, 37:458-73.

Amin, A., & Thrift, N. (2002). *Cities: Rethinking the Urban*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Archibugi, D., & David H. (Eds.). (1995). *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beadle, S., Holdsworth, R., & Wyn J. (Eds.). (2011). *For we are young and… Young people in a time of uncertainty*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Beck, U. (2002a). The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity, in S. Vertovec & R. Cohen (Eds.), *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism – Theory, Context, Practice* (pp. 61-85). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Beck, U. (2002b). The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited, *Theory, Culture & Society*, 19(4): 39–55.

Beck, U. (2004). *Der kosmopolitische Blick oder: Krieg ist Frieden*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2003). *Individualization*. London: Sage.

Benhabib, S. (2006). *Another Cosmopolitanism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bhabha, H. (1996). Unsatisfied: Notes on Vernacular Cosmopolitanism, in L. Garcia-Morena & P. C. Pfeifer (Eds.), *Text and Nation,* (pp. 191–207). London: Camden House.

Cavalli, A., & Leccardi, C. (1997). Le culture giovanili, in F. Barbagallo (Ed.), *La storia dell'Italia repubblicana* (pp. 709-800). Torino: Einaudi.

Clifford, J. (1992). Traveling Cultures in L. Grossberg, Nelson, C., & Treichler, P. A. (Eds.), *Cultural Studies* (pp. 96–116). London: Routledge.

Cwerner, S. (2000). The Chronopolitan Ideal: time, belonging and globalization, *Time and Society*, 9(2/3): 331-345.

De Certeau, M. (1984). *The Practice of Everyday Life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

du-Bois-Reymond, M. (1998). "I Do not Want to Commit Myself Yet": Young People's Life Concepts, *Journal of Youth Studies*,1, 63-79.

du Bois-Reymond, M. (2009). Models of Navigation and Life Management in A. Furlong (Ed.), *Handbook on Youth and Young Adulthood* (pp. 31-38). London: Roudledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Featherstone, M. (2002). Cosmopolis. An Introduction, *Theory, Culture& Society*, 19(1-2): 1-16.

Furlong, A., & Cartmel, F. (1997). *Young People and Social Change*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Hannerz, U. (1990). Cosmopolitans and locals in world culture, *Theory, Culture and Society*, 7(2–3): 237–51.

Hannerz, U. (2004). Cosmopolitanism in D. Nugent & J. Vincent (Eds.), *A Companion to the Anthropology of Politics* (pp. 69–85). Oxford: Blackwell.

Harvey, D. (1990). *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Held, D. (1995). *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Nation-state to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Kanter, R. M. (1995). *World Class: Thriving Locally in the Global Economy*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Lamont, M., & Aksartova, S. (2002). Ordinary Cosmopolitanisms. Strategies for Bridging Racial Boundaries among Working-Class Men, *Theory, Culture & Society*, 19(4): 1–25.

Leccardi, C. (2005). Facing Uncertainty. Temporality and Biographies in the New Century, *Young*, 13: 123-46.

Leccardi, C. (2009). *Sociologie del tempo*. Roma-Bari: Laterza.

Mandich, G. (2010). (Ed.). *Culture quotidiane. Addomesticare lo spazio e il tempo*. Roma: Carocci.

Mannheim, K. (1928). Das Problem der Generationen, *Kölner Vierteljahres Hefte für Soziologie* VII: 157-185.

May, J., & Thrift, N. (2001). (Eds.). *Timespace. Geographies of Temporality*. London: Routledge.

Merton, R. K. (1957). *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Mignolo, W. C. (2000). The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism, *Public Culture*, 12(3): 721–48.

Nava, M. (2002). Cosmopolitan Modernity. Everyday Imaginaries and the Register of Difference, *Theory, Culture &Society*, 19(1-2):81-99.

Nussbaum, M. C. (1994). Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, *Boston Review*, 19(5): 3–34.

Nussbaum, M. C. (1996). Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism and Reply, in J. Cohen (Ed.), *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism: Martha C. Nussbaum with Respondents* (pp. 2–18) and (131–44). Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Parsons, T. (1954). Psychoanalysis and the Social Structure, in *Essays in Sociological Theory* (pp.336-347). New York: Free Press.

Pollock, S., Bhabha, H. K., Breckenridge, C. A., & Chakrabarty, D. (2000). Cosmopolitanisms, *Public Culture*, 12(3): 577–90.

Rabinow, P. (1986). Representations are Social Facts, in J. Clifford & G. E. Marcus (Eds.). *Writing Culture* (pp. 234–61). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rapport, N., & Stade, R. (2007). A cosmopolitan turn – or return?, *Social Anthropology*, 15, 2: 223-235.

Rosa, H. (2003). Social Acceleration: Ethical and Political Consequences of a Desynchronized High-Speed-Society, *Costellations*, 10: 3-33.

Rosa, H. (2005). *Beschleunigung. Die Veränderung der Zeitstruktur in der Moderne.* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Silverstone, R., & Hirsch, E. (Eds.). (1992). *Consuming Technologies: Media and Information in Domestic Spaces*. London-New York: Routledge.

Skrbis Z., Kendall, G., & Woodward I. (2004). Locating Cosmopolitanism Between Humanist Ideal and Grounded Social Category, *Theory, Culture & Society*, 21(6): 115–136.

Thomson, R., & Taylor, R. (2005). Between cosmopolitanism and the locals. Mobility as a resource in the transition to adulthood, *Young*, 13(4): 327-342.

Tomlinson, J. (1999). *Globalization and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Urry, J. (1995). *Consuming Places*. London: Routledge.

Werbner, P. (1999). Global Pathways: Working Class Cosmopolitans and the Creation of Transnational Ethnic Worlds, *Social Anthropology*, 7(1): 17–35.

Werbner, P. (2002). Vernacular Cosmopolitanism, Theory, Culture & Society, 23(2-3): 496-498.

Wolff, J. (1995). *Resident Alien: Feminist Cultural Criticism*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Chapter 3
Forming Agora chronotopes from young people's political participation in transnational meetings

Sofia Laine

PLACE FIGURE 1 HERE
(LEFT SIDE PAGE)

Introduction

This chapter deals with young people's political participation in transnational meetings. Methodologically the study aims to shed light on multi-sited global ethnography (see also Marcus, 1995; Gille and Ó Riain, 2002). The research sites referred here were the EU Presidency Youth Event (2006 Hyvinkää, Finland) and two World Social Forums (2007 Nairobi Kenya and 2009 Belém, Brazil)[11]. Following the theme of this book, the chapter carefully analyses different times and spaces of young people's political participation in these three meetings. Young people are viewed here as a social age group sensitive to critical, alternative and even radical political participation. The diversity of the young actors and their actions in this multi-sited global ethnography was captured by using several different methods, from observation and interviews to media, video and photo analysis. What I have found crucial when conducting the research at

[11] In this chapter I bring together findings from my several different articles which I have published as part of my PhD research on young people's political participation in transnational political meetings. In addition to those fieldwork sites mentioned in this chapter, the research project included three other sites: the World Social Forum in Mali (2006), the European Social Forum in Malmö (2008) and the Global Young Greens Founding Conference in Nairobi (2007).

the three sites is to dive deep into the participatory observation, that is, to tune one's energy into the surrounding energy, to the movements of others. I move among the informants in different spaces, analyse the kinaesthetic language of the informants at different moments, and using methods like "*mirroring*" or *kinaesthetic empathy* (Ylönen 2003, 77; Gieser 2008, 299) reach for their knowledge. Analysis of participants' corporality becomes essential to understand that the movements of bodies are highly strategic in certain social movements (Laine, 2012).

My three fieldwork sites from three different continents are used here as examples of today's agoras where different types of political participation among young participants takes place. As I will show in this chapter, the variety of young people's participation in these meetings can be understood as *Agora chronotopes*[12] (from Bakhtin's chronotopes).[13] This is analysed more carefully in the subsections below. The agora is as old a concept in Europe as politics. The agora was an essential part of an ancient Greek polis or city-state that functioned both as a marketplace and as a forum for the citizens of the polis. In other words, agora means a place of assembly in any Ancient Greek state. Many things have changed in more than 2000 years, but there still exist political agoras, even if their shape is different nowadays. We have moved from the times of the ancient Greece and Aristotle's polis towards a global society, where the 'free men' (a concept used by Aristotle in Politics, Aristoteles VIII 1991) are those men and women who have the opportunity to participate in agoras. They gather from the different locations of the globe in the common space, which is most probably a conference area, hotel other mass assembly centre. Transnational political meetings; transnational agoras, can also be seen as place-making projects (Gille and Ó Riain 2002, 278) where different actors contest the ruling order or the social setting of the space, and seek to define new kinds of places. What is more, all political agoras have borders that underline the question of who can participate and who is excluded. These spaces, places and micropolitical situations at specific times highlight the frontiers of political participation and the freedom of participants. They show the restrictions and the power structures inside the agora and the event's relationship with the surrounding society and its geographic location.

[12] For the definition of this concept, see the Introduction to this book.
[13] See also the Introduction to this book.

Recalling ‘free men’ – that is free men and woman, boys and girls today - politics equals freedom for this research. As Hannah Arendt (2005, 129) states:

> Freedom of movement [...] is rather the substance and meaning of all things political. In this sense, politics and freedom are identical, and wherever this kind of freedom does not exist, there is no political space in the true sense.

Chronotope, as already defined in the introduction to this book, is a concept of Mikhail Bakhtin (1981, 84) that literally stands for “time space”. The term points to the essential connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships, the inseparability of space and time, where time is the fourth dimension of space . Chronotopes are always coloured with emotions as well as values that vary in their degree and scope (Bakhtin 1981, 243). In this chapter I will apply Bakhtin’s five major chronotope types (the Road, the Castle, the Salon, the Town and the Threshold) to my empirical data on youth political participation in different transnational agoras.

Globally, among the 20–30-year-olds who are the focus of this study, most of those who find their motivation in political participation start to act politically on local and national levels, and from there their political participation might extend to the transnational level. Those youth who have travelled abroad to transnational political events many times have cultivated *a psychological cosmopolitan readiness*, defined by Villiina Hellsten (2005, 54) as: knowledge of foreign languages (especially English), higher education, the capacity to travel abroad (with the purpose of leisure or work), having international friends, and acting internationally in organisations. They also handle the new technology (email, chat and other forms of e-communication) competently and spread relevant information electronically. However, as I will illustrate, not all the youth active in transnational political events have a strong psychological cosmopolitan readiness.

Lack of *cosmopolitan resources* may diminish the freedom of young participants. Here I follow Sen’s (2001) argument that different kinds of freedoms are tied together. The young people I studied either possessed or lacked political freedoms such as opportunities to enter transnational political events and participate in political dialogues, dissent and critique. There were also differences in their economic resources for attending the events. Further variation was shown in social opportunities such as knowledge of how to read and speak different languages, understanding of international

politics, familiarity with the right people and whether or not they had an active role in the networks or organisations that would support their participation. As Beverly Skeggs (2004, 17) writes:

> Different bodies carry unequal values depending on their position in space, on their cultural baggage – the capitals they embody. Inscribed bodies literally embody entitlements. They move in space "as if they know it", which in the tradition of possessive individualism or in the conversion of propriety into property, they do!

Youth political participation in transnational events realises itself through two different logics[14] – both of which are visible more generally in political spheres and in different age groups. The "way of subjectivity" is rooted in experience and creativity, rather than in the abstract figures and expertise that characterise the "way of reason" (Pleyers 2010, 104). Young actors who use the "way of subjectivity" create new practices of participation – even in transnational political events. Often they use embodied techniques to provide new perspectives for the discussions, focusing on the practices of here and now – therefore on the event itself. By contrast, participants following the "way of reason" have technical and abstract knowledge and mainstream education (Pleyers 2010, 110). These participants analyse policies and current debates in a precise area, construct rational and theoretical alternatives, confront opposing experts and attempt to convince policy makers.

It is important to keep in mind that the young actors may use both logics of political participation described above, as well use whatever they have of cosmopolitan resources. As I will show, it is possible to identify both logics of action in the transnational agoras. It is also possible to identify actors both with and without cosmopolitan resources participating in these agoras. Before showing empirical cases of five different *Agora chronotopes* among the transnationally active youth, the next section first gives the theoretical background that informs the typology.

Forming five Agora chronotopes

I will explain here how I formed my typology of *Agora chronotopes*. While creating five types of Agora chronotopes I first explored my own ethnographic data, and then

[14] See also Henrik Bang's (2004) dichotomy between "everyday-maker[s]" and "expert citizen[s]".

studied Bakhtin's (1981) chronotope types as well as Pleyers' (2010) typology of different forms of young alter-globalisation activists. Before showing one empirical example of each one of the *agora cronotopes*, I will introduce the five main types of chronotopes that Bakhtin (1981, 243–258) identified - the Road, the Castle, the Salon, the Town and the Threshold - and how they are applied in this chapter. At the same time I will consider Pleyers' young alter-activist categories (2010, 73–76) that seem to match quite well with the chronotopes in light of my empirical research . This combination is summarised in table form at the end of the discussion. This table works as a framework for the empirical cases that follow.

The chronotope of the *Road* is a particularly good place for random encounters where people "who are normally kept separate by social and spatial distance can accidentally meet" (Bakhtin 1981, 243). The Road is both a point of new departures and a place for events to find their declaration. In these spaces time has a *flowing* shape. When reflecting on my empirical data, it appeared that the young people who can take the advantage of the Road are those whom Pleyers calls *alter-activists* (2010, 76). These young people participate in creative forms of action, emphasising process and experimentation. The Road is a suitable space for alter-activists' ad hoc campaigns, direct democracy and flexible forms of commitment. These kinds of actors are using the "way of subjectivity" and often have cosmopolitan resources.

The second chronotope, the *Castle*, is combined with *historical time*. The Castle is the place where lords, kings and queens live. The traces of generations are arranged in it in visible forms as various parts of objects as well as in human relationships (Bakhtin 1981, 246) .The Castle is the space and time where *NGOs and institutional youth actors* are at home. Pleyers describes these young actors as belonging to political parties, NGOs or other formal associations. Either they behave similarly to their older counterparts or present a "fresh approach" that enables "productive collaborations between the dynamism and the experience of older activists" (Pleyers 2010, 75). These kinds of actors are using the "way of reason" and often have cosmopolitan resources.

The third chronotope, the *Salon* (or parlor) is also a place where encounters occur, but in contrast to the Road, in Salons the networks spin, dialogues happen and historical and socio-public events are woven together (Bakhtin 1981, 247). Therefore *historical time* as well as *biographical* and *everyday time* are concentrated and intertwined with each other here. Salons are spaces where *the young revolutionaries* may be found and

heard. As Pleyers (2010, 75) defines it, this group of young activists belong to the extreme left and are mostly committed to state-oriented strategies of change and to "more traditional forms of membership, recruitment and belonging". These young actors use the "way of reason" and may lack cosmopolitan resources, although for participation mainly in national politics, they do not necessarily need these kinds of resources.

Turning next to the fourth chronotope, the *Town*; it is a space for *cyclical everyday time.* As Bakhtin formulates (1981, 247); "here there are no events, only 'doings' that constantly repeat themselves". Bakhtin explains that time in the Town is mainly without event and seems to stand still. Therefore Towns "often serve as a contrasting background for temporal sequences that are more charged with energy and event" (Bakhtin 1981, 248). Those young people who represent the Town in this chapter, Pleyers (2010, 75) defines as *poor and minority youth*. Pleyers states that this group, paradoxically, is often the least visible in the alter-globalisation movement. But what I find even more problematic is that the same group is many times left out of research reports, and in this way researchers contribute to the weak integration of marginal youth into transnational processes. These young actors use the "way of subjectivity" and often lack cosmopolitan resources.

Opposite to this is the fifth chronotope; the *Threshold,* that stands for crisis and a break in a life. In this chronotope, time is "instantaneous; it is as if it has no duration and falls out of the normal course of biographical time" (Bakhtin 1981, 248). Therefore it may also refer to carnival-time. Those young people who accomplish Thresholds, Pleyers calls *libertarian youth*. In his view, this group stresses local struggles and collective self-management. They reject all forms of hierarchy and criticise the functioning of transnational political meetings and processes (Pleyers 2010: 75–76). In Table 1 below, these young people are placed in the middle of the cross-table because the moment of the Threshold takes over all kinds of participants: those using "way of reason" and those using the "way of subjectivity", and both those with and without cosmopolitan resources.

In Table 1 I apply Bakhtin's (1981) chronotopes and Pleyers' (2010) categories. In addition, I bring in here Hellsten's (2005) idea of cosmopolitan resources (or lack of them) in order to form a framework for my empirical examples. One example of each of the five *Agora chronotope* types is covered in the rest of the chapter.

Table 1. Different categories of youth political participation in transnational political events, applying the typologies of Bakhtin (1981), Pleyers (2010) and Hellsten (2005).

	"Way of subjectivity"	"Way of reason"
Lack of cosmopolitan resources	Poor and minority youth The Town *Libertarian youth*	Young revolutionaries **The Salon**
Cosmopolitan resources	Young alter-activists The Road	NGOs and institutional youth actors The Castle

Figure 1, presented at the beginning of this chapter, is a visual presentation of Table 1. The five pictures in the collage represent cosmopolitan micropolitical moments in time and space; also when and where different *Agora chronotope* types were visible and in action. The titles of the following sections relate to dimensions of Figure 1 and Table 1.

The significance of the chronotope lies in its capacity to represent events through narration. So my aim is to present short stories, that is, narrative descriptions of five different *cosmopolitan micropolitical* events from my multi-sited ethnographic research. Since micropolitics are highly important in this study, my strategy has been to observe certain micro events inside the mass events where I conducted my fieldwork, in order to capture different forms of political participation among the young actors. Using several different methods during my multi-sited ethnography, my purpose has been to understand different techniques of the self (Foucault, 1977), and different cosmopolitan micropolitical orientations that actualise in the space and time constituting different Agora chronotopes.

The Road: Free Huggers on the street[15]

The ninth World Social Forum (WSF) was held in Brazil in the city of Belém, located next to the Amazon region, between January 27 and February 1, 2009. It was my third experience of these mass events where tens of thousands of participants who strongly believe that 'another world is possible' organise hundreds of events – seminars, workshops, exhibitions, stands and performances – to show their work, to build networks for future actions, and to get visibility to their missions. In Belém the forum site was located in two different university districts that clearly disconnected the grassroots activists from the cosmopolitan activists. The latter mostly had their sessions in seminar rooms in the UFPA district, an area evocatively entitled 'Professional Rooms'. Here the invited speakers gave their speeches for hours in front of a closely listening audience, disturbed only by the sounds of security helicopters. It was the 'other' university district of UFRA where environmental and indigenous issues, as well as the Youth Camp, were placed. In order to get to any of the activities in meeting rooms, stages and auditoriums in the UFRA district, everyone needed to pass the Youth Camp by walking on the main street that crossed the university area. Another option was a boat from UFPA.

I was in the UFRA observing the Youth Camp during rush hour. The last sessions had ended and hundreds of people were walking to the main entrance. Reaching the Youth Camp area the street was suddenly blocked. I recognised a big sign written in Portuguese declaring: 'Free Hugs'. The wet campers hugged everyone who tried to reach the entrance gates, in the spirit of the globally spread Free Hugs Campaign. At the same time the tropical wind carried a sweet aroma from the nearby canopy where a bunch of youngsters were cocooned. 'Welcome to the Woodstock of the 21st century!' was my first hilarious thought after getting soaked under my umbrella. Without further reflection I started to shoot a video of the huggers with my pocket digital camera. This video was later uploaded to YouTube (see Picture 1).

The Road as an Agora chronotope was actualised in the form of the Free Hugs Campaign. The Road is a place for ad hoc encounters. The Free Hugs Campaign aims to minimise hierarchies and dichotomies and at the same time support diversity and solidarity. These alter-activists grabbed flowing time and surprised people who were

[15] See more details of the themes handled here in my previous article (Laine, 2011).

wandering on the road. As is typical of the Road, the Free Hugs demonstration was "marked by a higher degree of intensity in emotions and values" (Bakhtin 1981, 243). By stating that the Road is a chronotope of alter-activists who use the "way of subjectivity" (Pleyers 2010, 76) and have cosmopolitan resources, I identify the Free Hugs Campaign as a global social movement. To form its *global collective self-presentation* (Eyerman 2005, 49) the Free Hugs Campaign uses new social media, especially YouTube, to sustain collective actions around the globe.

YouTube is the third most popular website on the internet[16] and therefore a strong actor in the global media. YouTube changes the power structures in the media world because its use is free of charge. It is free for users to download videos onto the site, and comment on others' videos with text or a video message. YouTube is a much more interactive media than traditional mass media like newspapers and TV programmes because it allows new forms of self-consciousness and self-reflection (Wesch 2008). It is also important to note that young people are the most active[17] users of YouTube. This could be defined as a *Virtual Road*. They are also active in organising the Free Hugs demonstrations around the world which can be seen on the YouTube videos. This was also the case in the event that I studied. What is easy to recognise from these YouTube videos is that demonstrations happen on the road when the time and the people are flowing – sudden encounters can actualise through the Road chronotope. It is a place for Free Hugs Demonstration to give a happier welcome and departure to random and unfamiliar wanderers.This resonated with Bakhtin's (1981, 243-244) definition: "The chronotope of road is both a point of new departures and a place for events to find their denouncement".

The Castle: EU Presidency Youth Event[18]

The scope of EU policies includes the youth field (COM, 2001). There are instruments in use to foster young people's active citizenship such as the Youth in Action

[16] See http://mostpopularwebsites.net/ (Accessed 26 June 2012).
[17] The 'active' refers here to multidimensional use of the YouTube site. I refer here to statistics from the Sysomos' study that looked at the demographics of bloggers who embed YouTube videos on their own sites (i.e. blogs). In general, 20-to-35-year-old bloggers embed most of the videos (57%), followed by teenagers (20%) and bloggers over 35 (20%). http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/whats_hot_on_youtube_and_who_is_embedding_those_vi.php (Accessed 12 October 2010)
[18] See more details of the themes handled here in my previous article (Laine & Gretschel, 2009).

programme, the Youth Portal and the European Knowledge Center on Youth Policy (COM, 2008). Since 2000, each EU Presidency has organized a youth event, which has served as a political discussion space where current EU Youth Policy topics are discussed with young people. During the Finnish EU presidency in 2006 one of the topics in the EU youth event in Hyvinkää was to develop the definition of *young active citizenship*. In the similarly titled *Young Active Citizenships – EU Meeting* (henceforth the EUP) in Hyvinkää I was involved in planning the event as the EU Meeting coordinator.

The EUP is an example of the Castle Agora chronotope , characterised as a place for history,that is, a rigid form of an institution, that may also have a museum-like character. The EU policy concept of *structured dialogue* (Council of the European Union, 8771/07, 6) resembles the term that Bakhtin (1981, 246) uses - 'arranged' dialogue settings. In the EUP we were even required to place ourselves in a family portrait, and this was mentioned too by Bakhtin. The portrait gallery was identified as a characteristic of the Castle chronotope. The historical past time element and the institutionalised ways of action frustrated the NGOs and other institutional youth actors. As one of the informants, a Finnish 22-year-old woman, said:

> I think a lot of frustration was caused because many had thought of a few things that they wanted to advance but these issues were lost stage by stage until you felt as if nothing was left of these proposals in the final papers. The young people at the meeting were underestimated and our programme was too structured.

As Pleyers (2010, 131) points out, to practice the "way of reason" and to acquire knowledge on highly technical issues requires certain resources. In the case of the EUP, this describes those young agora citizens who were most active, had international networks, good language skills, a lot of knowledge of the EU youth policy and experience of similar events. During and after the Hyvinkää event there was a strong discussion going on about what kind of youth should participate in the event. Those young people who were the most involved in the EU youth policy processes wanted to reserve the event for the young EU youth policy experts only.

The Castle Agora chronotope is quite difficult to turn into a short narrative description as it has a long history, even a museum-like character. To make the Castle - the relationships of king, queen, guests and servants - a living document, I wrote a short

poem right after the EUP event. It gives insight into the kind of cosmopolitan micropolitics that took place at a certain time in a certain hotel in Hyvinkää – when the EU Castle realised itself there:

> This summer I have learned what politics is.
>
> That the some are more important than others.
>
> That two persons control the daily rhythm of 200 others.
>
> The Minister arrives, gives the speech that someone else has written and leaves.
>
> The Commissioner arrives, gives the speech that someone else has written, answers a few questions, places himself in the family portrait, sits in the room decorated with pink curtains.
>
> The Commissioner demands the small flags of the EU and Finland to be placed on the table before the press event can start.
>
> Personnel and secretaries run around the hotel in a mortal terror.
>
> This is politics.
>
> When the Commissioner leaves, I drink the rest of his mineral water.
>
> (July 2006)

In Picture 1 the EU flags that symbolise the historical past are visible. Moreover, the human relationships and different social ceremonies still have their historical hierarchies (see Bakhtin 1981, 246 and Picture 1). As the poem above implies, time in the Castle follows its historical institutional and ceremonial past. There is a specific kind of narrative inherent in the Castle, that compells the young participants to use their "way of reason" in an appropriate manner and increase their cosmopolitan resources, such as knowledge of EU youth policy, as much as possible.

The Salon: Youth from the Amazon region[19]

The 'group' I found the most difficult to reach during my research were young people using the "way of reason" but who lacked cosmopolitan resources. The difficulty was mainly due to language reasons. Without a common language I had difficulties following their expertise. Here my example is young people from the Amazon region attending the World Social Forum in Belém. Many of the Amazonian youth activists didn't even speak Portuguese. As shown in Picture 1, at times when there was a demonstration or other event by these people taking place in the WSF venue site, this grabbed the attention of the media and other participants as well. To assist, there was a

[19] See more details of the themes handled in this subchapter from my book (Laine, 2012).

translator, a supporter of indigenous knowledge and expertise, who explained the issues to the wider public. This is the person on the left hand side, who is recorded while the local experts are still and quiet. Many times this translator spoke Portuguese – and then there was a second translator translating the message into English.

The cosmopolitan micropolitical event captured in Picture 1 provides an example of the Salon Agora chronotope, characterised as the place for dialogues; a barometer of political and business life. As is visible from the picture, the press event took place in a salon, a large hall where there was also a painting exhibition. The picture was taken at an ad hoc media event where was a dialogue between the "way of reason" experts and the audience. What is also visible is that encounters that occur in the Salon include deeper dialogue than the Road offers.

In my second example of this chronotope, I use a short interview sample from a young Amazonian activist who uses the "way of reason" and who lacks some cosmopolitan resources. His form of political participation is close to *the young revolutionaries* that Pleyers (2010, 74) explains are committed to state-oriented strategies of change. The space and time in the Salon sheds light on the "ideas" and "passions" of these young revolutionaries. The interview excerpt illustrates the ideas of a local young party member:

> Researcher: Okay, I'm especially interested in young people's political participation, so my question is about how young people in the area of the Amazon struggle against what is going on there.
>
> Translator: [in Portuguese]
>
> Young activist: [in Portuguese]
>
> Translator: The main struggle of the young people in the Amazonian rainforest, as he says, is to get some partnerships and the main partnerships are with the people that live in the Amazonian rainforests but they don't get access to the kind of knowledge that the original people from the Amazonian rainforests have to protect the Amazonian rainforest. So, there are some young people who get access to university, get access to some other rights but they don't have access to the people from the Amazonian rainforest. Like there is a class distinction. […] And he says, one of the keys to young people's struggle, in order to get more people to this struggle, is to get partnerships with the intellectual side of the Amazon rainforest people, who live there, to get in touch with the original kind of knowledge of indigenous people, the people who have always lived in the rainforest. Because there is an immigration issue and through the 20th and the 19th century people came from the other parts of country to the rainforest. So, lots of them, they don't have contact with the people who always lived in the Amazon rainforest. So, there are young people in the Amazon rainforest that don't know this reality. And he says that one of the keys, one of the struggles that young people have to do, is to get some consciousness for these young people that are intellectualized and go to the university, that get more contact with the development thing and devastation thing and not with the knowledge that is done with the original people. [...]

In the Salon, historical, biographical and everyday time are intertwined together (Bakhtin 1981, 247). What the informant describes as his political mission is to generate Salons in the Amazon region where different kinds of people with different types of resources and knowledge can collaborate and generate sustainable development in the Amazon region.

The Town: Tour guides showing 'a city in the city'[20]

The largest group of the 'non-cosmopolitan everyday makers' at the World Social Forum in Nairobi were youth living in the different slum areas of the city. One group of young slum residents took the WSF participants by foot to their living area Korogocho which was only 20 minutes walking distance from the Forum. In this example, the action of the tour guides in taking participants to their residential area shows the Town Agora chronotope, characterised as a place (street, square) for cyclical every-day life. *Poor and minority youth* (Pleyers 2010, 75), in this instance tour guides, used the "way of subjectivity" when doing politics in the here and now in their local environment where they lacked cosmopolitan resources. Picture 1 represents a moment where one of the guides was taking us (foreign participants of the WSF) to her locale in Nairobi.

All together, we were around 15–20 WSF participants, mostly from the Global North and around 5 tour guides, all young residents of the slum. We paid a small participation fee to the tour guides. The walks were a political mission of the young slum dwellers. Our informant guides told us during the walk about the different activities the youth work organization coordinates in Korogocho. In spite of strong government opposition to visitors being allowed to see these communities, the young people wanted to show that the slums are not as dangerous as officials claim – at least if you walk there in the daytime together with residents of the area (Brewer and Cerda 2007, 31).

> When you ask the government, they will say that the Kenyans are OK. They tell you that we are OK, we have good houses, we have good roads but we don't. When there is some fund which comes to be given to the slum, we don't get that money. (23-year-old woman resident and tour-guide)

[20] The term "a city in the city" gets 108 000 000 hits in Google. It tells how different large residential areas construct their own identity or culture in megacities around the world. See more details of the themes handled here in my book (Laine, 2012).

Time is cyclical everyday time in the Town chronotope. Also our common walk made a cycle – to the tour guides' hometown and back to Forum. Walking is a way of knowing. It is one of the simplest forms of kinaesthetic empathy where the researcher uses his/her body similarly to that which informants are doing at the studied moment. Thus, walking as a method is not just moving the body around, it's experiencing the world and being present in the world by foot (Ingold and Vergunst, 2008). This kind of method is even more significant in an environment where the young people studied always walk to get to different places:

> SL: So what do you do when you get sick?
>
> Amy (26-year-old resident and tour guide): I go to the mission hospital.
>
> SL: OK. Where is it?
>
> Amy: In Kariobangi. […] So if you want to go there, you have to wake up early, and go there.
>
> SL: Walk there all way or how do you get there? Do you have to walk?
>
> Amy: I walk.
>
> SL: So you are sick and you have to walk all the way there? How can you do it?
>
> Amy: You just go slowly.

During our tour to the Town we saw that there are hardly any events, only "doings" that constantly repeat themselves (see Bakhtin 1981, 247). It is difficult to generate an "advancing historical movement" in a slum district without generating conflicts, as a youth worker from the slum explained:

> Youth worker: Probably it is because they, let's say you live in a same area, and you are advanced, for them, the problem is that they lost hope. They lost hope probably, people have lost hope and they see you advancing. They might come to you. [...] You have needs. And they are begging you, but you can't get money. So what do you do. [...] So sometimes there are confrontations between the people in the same area, because of their emancipation. Shot them. It's like, the development of one person becomes something that all the others puzzle over. So it is good if they go with each other. That's why these youths [refers to the tour guides] come up together. They come up like this. They settle here, want to do big work, they come together. So it is like a community. So, I can't steal from you. It enables more communion, they come together, they have various talents and give some ideas.

It is recognisable from the three quotes above that this resembles what is described by Bakhtin (1981, 248). In the Town chronotope the markers of this time type are: "simple, crude, material, fused with everyday details of specific locales, with the quaint little houses and rooms of the town". Time here is without an event, but the WSF Nairobi brought a special event to the Town. By placing the WSF in Nairobi in 2007,

young people from the slums who otherwise would lack cosmopolitan resources had an opportunity to participate in a transnational political event. For example, the two tour guides I interviewed during our common walk felt that WSF Nairobi had made a positive change in their life. At the venue area they had an opportunity to speak about issues such as gay and lesbian rights that Kenyans don't otherwise discuss in public. They had experienced a new kind of togetherness and solidarity during the WSF and they found the forum very empowering:

> I think it [the WSF Nairobi] is going to change the situation of the youth in our country. I think they are going to talk about the issues that are affecting youth in the community. Issues that are affecting youth in the slums. And I hope [strong wind disturbs the recording] it gives us a change in our community. (23-year-old woman resident and tour guide)

The Threshold: Opening the WSF gates to everyone![21]

The main WSF Nairobi venue site was the Moi International Sport Complex. Most of the approximately 1,000 self-organised seminar sessions took place inside the main stadium building. The complex was fenced and the entrances were controlled by armed police. Everyone entering was required to wear the participant badge. On the third day of the Forum, when I faced the crowd of demonstrators at the entrance of the sport complex, I understood that open space is not as open as it seems (see also Nunes, 2006). On the front page of *TerraViva* (2007), the independent newspaper of the WSF Nairobi, young activist Wangu Mbatia explained: "We have been congregating and waiting on the roadside for two days explaining to the officials that we cannot afford the fees. It is apparent that unless we use force, we will never participate in the Forum."

People from the slums got support from participants in WSF Nairobi, who came from all over the world. Most of the demonstrators were middle-aged, but the most cited, interviewed and written about was young activist Mbatia, a member of the People's Parliament who was behind the action (International Viewpoint, 2007). The crowd of demonstrators blocked the main boulevard leading to the entrance of the sport complex so that hundreds of Forum participants were held back by the huge traffic jam. Young (2001, 2000) argues that demonstration and protest, the use of emotionally charged language and symbols, and publicly ridiculing the exclusive behaviour of

[21] See more details of the themes handled here in my previous article (Laine, 2009).

others are sometimes appropriate and effective ways of getting attention for issues of legitimate public concern. It is important to underline here the double meaning of the word demonstration. In most uses, the word stands for pointing out, to make known or to describe and explain (Chaloupka 1993, 147). In this case demonstrators wanted to point out how the entrance fee makes the poorest absent from the discussions. What is even more important, the demonstration is 'a show'[22]. The demonstration performs (carries out, presents) something new, executes things that have previously been covered up.

Therefore, the Threshold as an Agora chronotope; a place for a crisis, a break in life, a corridor, a passages – refers to *contestatory performative acts* (see Laine, 2009) whose mission is to point out the ruling order and contest the set borders (Lattunen 2003, 56.). Here the example is the demonstration to open the WSF gates so that everyone is free to participate. Picture 1 is from the main entrance gates during the successful demonstration.

In another article (New Internationalist, 2007) it was clearly questioned: "Why host the WSF in Nairobi if the poor can't join in the discussion because they can't afford the entrance fee, or transport to get there, or food and water once they're inside?" Mbatia was also quoted in that article. After the demonstrators were let into the WSF venue, after the gates had been opened to everyone for free, the demonstrators rushed into the daily press conference in the Stadium. They climbed on top of the media tables, and there Mbatia spoke again: "This [WSF Nairobi] is supposed to be a conversation between those who have and those who have not. We cannot change the world if we are having one-sided conversation. To ask us to pay seven dollars in order to discuss our poverty is criminal!" (New Internationalist, 2007).

In these moments hierarchies and dichotomies disappear and there is much more room for diversity and solidarity. The initiators of these acts use many times the "way of subjectivity" (Pleyers 2010) but people who mainly use the "way of reason" might join in as well. In addition, possession or otherwise of cosmopolitan resources loses its significance in these special moments. Therefore, these moments are crucial for deeper democracy. Such moments open up the space for new kinds of contacts. While weighing and testing our values they might open new doors and perspectives that are

[22] Chaloupka (1993, 147) shows how this "is more evident in French, where *démontrer*, to demonstrate, immediately recalls *montrer*, to show".

more sustainable and long-term for both observers and participants. In this kind of cosmopolitan micropolitics it is highly important that resistance is a choice of the resisters, who also decide site, time, strategies, tactics and techniques of resistance (Campbell 2008, 301).

In the Threshold chronotope time is instantaneous: "it is as if it has no duration and falls out of the normal course of biographical time", as Bakhtin (1981, 248) writes. It actualises in the streets and in mass scenes – as in the WSF Nairobi demonstration.

Conclusion

Bakhtin (1981, 259) asks: "What is the significance of all these chronotopes"? I accept his answer. He states that the Agora chronotopes are spaces and times where "the knots of narrative are tied and untied". For each ethnographer and for each fieldwork site the narrative looks different. Here the perspective was to study young people's political participation in different transnational meeting sites – and on their borders.

Agora chronotopes have representational importance (see Bakhtin, 1981: 250). When doing research on transnational political meetings the site and timing politics of the event are crucial in many different ways. And when the focus is on young people as a social age group, it becomes important to notice how many times those who decide the location of the event and timetables are 'the real' adults (Laine and Gretschel, 2009). Some spaces and times inside the transnational meeting may be exclusive for young people. In addition, young people may want to co-create new spaces and new time structures with or without the adults (see Mannion, 2010). In the future, while forming transnational agoras, it should be carefully kept in mind what kind of spaces and timeframes are available and what kind of Agora chronotopes they support.

To study micropolitics calls attention to the methodological mix of image and movement analysis, of participant observation and interviews. These are all different techniques and tools to capture the microworld (Scheff, 1990). With this kind of a mix the various kinds of Agora chronotopes become visible for readers through narrative description:

> Thus the chronotope, functioning as the primary means for materializing time in space, emerges as a center for concretizing representation, as a force giving body to the entire novel. (Bakhtin 1981, 250)

Agora chronotopes are constituted in certain times and spaces. They are rich in cosmopolitan micropolitical action and actors; global culture that the researcher tries to grasp. We, youth researchers and ethnographers, are not writing novels but social science articles, research reports and books. In order to really analyse one Agora chronotope, the length afforded by an article is the minimum[23]. Presenting the five Agora chronotopes here in a single chapter narrowed the chronotopes to a form where it was impossible to follow subjects; individual young actors and their history of activism. Yet the value of discussing these five Agora chronotopes in this chapter lies in the opportunity to frame the wide and diverse spectrum of youth political participation in transnational meetings.

References

Arendt, H. 2005. *The Promise of Politics*. New York: Schocken Books.

Aristoteles. VIII 1991. *Politiikka*, Aristotle VIII: Politics. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

Bakhtin, M. 1981. "Forms of time and the chronotope in the novel 1937–38". In *The Dialogic Imagination*. Austin:

University of Texas Press.

Bang, H. P. 2004. Everyday Makers and Expert Citizens: Building Political not Social Capital. *ANU, School of Social*

Science. 26th of March, http://hdl.handle.net/1885/42117.

Brewer, R. and Cerda, E. 2007. *Youth Activists at the 2007 World Social Forum*. 1st of December,

www.socialistproject.ca/relay/relay16_wsf.pdf.

Campbell, D. 2008. "Identity, Difference, and the Global: William Connolly's International Theory". In *The New*

Pluralism: William Connolly and the Contemporary Global Condition, edited by D. Campbell and M. Schoolman, 289–304. Durham N.C.: Duke University Press.

Chaloupka, W. 1993. "Suppose Kuwait's Main Product Was Broccoli? The Street Demonstration in U.S. Politics". In

Rhetorical Republic: Governing Representations in American Politics, edited by F. Dolan and T. Dumm, 143–166. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

COM 2001. European Commission White Paper: A New Impetus for European Youth. 5th of November,

http://ec.europa.eu/youth/archive/whitepaper/download/whitepaper_en.pdf.

COM 2008. *Youth*. 18th of August, http://ec.europa.eu/youth/youth–policies/doc23_en.htm.

Council of the European Union. 8771/07 JEUN 22 EDUC 78 SOC 155). *Conclusions of the Council and of the*

[23] Here I refer to my own previous articles in different journals where I have tackled one Agora chronotope in one article.

Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Meeting within the Council, on Future Perspectives for European Cooperation in the Field of Youth Policy – Adoption of Conclusions. 12th of March, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st08/st08771.en07.pdf.

Foucault, M. 1977. Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison. Random House: New York.

Gieser, T. 2008 "Embodiment, emotion and empathy. A phenomenological approach to apprenticeship learning".

Anthropological Theory 8: 299–318.

Gille, Z. and Ó Riain, S. 2002. "Global Ethnography". *Annual Review of Sociology* 28: 271–295.

Hellsten, V. 2005. "Post-national political community – Myth or reality? Baltic Sea Area". In *Internet, Interaction and*

Networking. Post-National Identities of Youth in Cities around the Baltic Sea, edited by C. Yndigegen and P. Waara and K. Paakkunainen, 37-76. Helsinki:The Finnish Youth Research Network/ The Finnish Youth Research Society, publications 58 and Aleksanteri Papers 3.

Ingold, T. and Vergunst, J. L. Ed. 2008. *Ways of Walking. Ethnography and Practice on Foot*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

International viewpoint 2007. The People's Parliament. Interview Wangui Mbatia. 26th of June,

http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1293.

Laine, S. 2012. Young Actors in Transnational Agoras: Multi-Sited Ethnography of Cosmopolitan Micropolitical

Orientations. Helsinki: The Finnish Youth Research Network/ The Finnish Youth Research Society, publications 121.

Laine, S. 2011. Grounded Globalizations of Transnational Social Movement: Ethnographic Analysis on Free Hugs

Campaign at the World Social Forum Belém 2009. *Ephemera – Theory and Politics in Organizations* 11: 243–257. 25th of June, http://www.ephemeraweb.org/journal/11-3/11-3laine.pdf.

Laine, S. 2009. "Contestatory Performative Acts in Transnational Political Meetings." *Societies Without Borders* 4:

398–429.

Laine, S. and Gretschel A. 2009. "Whose Arena Is the EU Youth Policy? Young Participants' Involvement and

Influence in EU Youth Policy from Their Own Points of View: Case of EU Presidency Youth Event in Hyvinkää, Finland". *Young* 17: 191–215.

Lattunen, T. 2003. Häirinnän politiikkaa: uuden poliittisen toiminnan esteettinen teoria, Master's thesis. University of

Helsinki, Department of Political Science.

Mannion, G. 2010. "After participation. The socio-spatial performance of intergenerational becoming". In *A Handbook*

of Children and Young People's Participation, edited by P.-S. Barry and T. Nigel, 121–124. Oxon: Routledge.

Marcus, G. E. 1995. "Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography". *Annual*

Review of Anthropology 24: 95–117.

Nunes, R. 2006. Nothing is what democracy looks like: Openness, horizontality and the movement of movements, 18th of

May http://info.interactivist.net/node/5420.

Pleyers, G. 2010. Alter-globalization. Becoming actors in the global age. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Scheff, T. J. 1990. *Microsociology. Discourse, Emotion and Social Structure.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sen, A. 2001/1999. *Development as Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Skeggs, B. 2004. *Class, Self, Culture.* New York: Routledge.

TerraViva 2007. What a day, January 24.

Wesch, M. 2008. An anthropological introduction to YouTube. 26th of June,

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPAO-lZ4_hU.

Ylönen, M. E. 2003 Refleksiivinen ruumis, tanssin rajapintoja (Reflexive body, interfaces of the dance). In *Tanssi*

tanssi. Kulttuureja, tulkintoja (Dance dance. Cultures, interpretations), edited by Helena Saarikoski, 53–88. Helsinki: SKS.

Young, I. M. 2000. *Inclusion and Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Young, I. M. 2001. "Activist challenges to deliberative democracy". *Political theory*. 29: 670–690.

Chapter 4
Atlantic Latino gangs. *La Raza Latina*, transnationalism and generations[24]

Luca Queirolo Palmas

Introduction: Drifts and landing places of *La Raza latina*

The founder of the Nation of the Latin Kings in New York - Luis Felipe, a.k.a King Blood - is a marielito[25]. He arrived in the States via the sea, on a raft in one of the waves of escapees from Cuba in 1980. From Collins Prison in 1986, Luis Felipe composed the King Manifesto Constitution (KMC), elaborating, annotating and formulating numerous preceding texts, some going back to Chicago of the 1960's. This document defines the Nation, listing purposes, organizational structure, rituals and sanctions, procedures and exhortations. It begins[26]:

[24] The present text is derived from research begun in 2005 and finished in 2009. An Italian version of this article was published in Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia (3/2009) with the title: *L'Atlantico Latino delle gang. Transnazionalismo, generazioni e traduzioni nell'invenzione della Raza*. The present text was translated by Robert Garot (College University of New York). The research, conducted within the frame of various European projects, is moreover part of a transnational cluster of gang research and intervention. The materials used here come from approximately 50 biographical interviews with members of Latin Kings and Ñetas in different locations, hundred of hours of participant observation, and field visits to Spain, Ecuador and the United States. Francesca Lagomarsino and Massimo Cannarella (University of Genoa) have participated from the beginning in this research, and I thank them for their precious suggestions regarding the structure of the text.

[25] Marielito - from the name of the beach from which tens of thousands left Cuba in 1980, after Fidel Castro opened the jails and freed the "undesirable ones." In those cells King Blood was found. In 1997, he was condemned by a U.S. court to 145 years in prison for conspiracy, of which the first 45 are to be spent in absolute isolation.

[26] The written, official writings of the Latin King and Queen Nation to which we refer are part of the archives that we collected during the research. This archive is known as the *literature* or the *Bible*. Other cited texts are available on the internet or published (see Botello, Moya, 2005; Barrios, Brotherton, 2004).

> [Our purpose is to] construct a strong organization in which we as men can fight in order to achieve the dream of our life. The dream to make our place in society and to leave our emblem, the Crown, anywhere we decide to ramble in this world.

At that time the Nation organized young people of ethnic minorities - Latinos, but not only - in the cities of New York and Chicago. They organized in the great penitentiaries, where to be part of a group is fundamentally an issue of personal protection and survival in light of oppression from the administration and other prisoners. The Nation, as written by King Blood, is an experiential text that draws sap and signs from migrations, from the stabilization of flows and from the processes of confinement. It signals nonetheless a local and urban phenomenon, a paradigmatic example of that which Portes (1995) calls downward assimilation, and Massey and Denton (1993), in a less euphemistic way, call *American apartheid*.

The pledge to "leave our emblem, the Crown, anywhere we decide to ramble in this world" appears at this juncture a tribute to a past to celebrate, a biography, and a collective memory of migration. Or perhaps it appears as the dream of freedom for a life prisoner, rather than a realistic anticipation of the future. During the research I opened the webpage of the Nation[27]. Here I observed a parallel geography, a map of connections that attest to the time zones of the various countries in which the organization is present, recognizing its American place of birth. It is present in Canada, Cuba, Santo Domingo, Peru, Ecuador, Spain and Italy, even without counting the affiliations of soldiers in the U.S military bases scattered across the globe in the contemporary ongoing wars on terror.[28]

An analogous history can be told of the Ñeta Association. In this case a national and local issue—the fight for independence of Puerto Rico—precipitated the incarceration and subsequent self-organization of prisoners. The killing of charismatic leader Carlos La Sombra in 1981 produced a mythology, an epiphany of an annunciation that runs on the legs of Puerto Rican migration to New York and to other cities of the East Coast. It took root in the jails just as in minority neighborhoods.

[27] The page (www.alkqn.org) bore the following heading: "The only official and authorized site." It is moreover possible to order the following book via amazon.com: "The Official Globalization of the ALKQN." Such official insistence alludes to the spread of an unofficial globalization, like web-sites and other forms of media exposure.

[28] The press has documented that the graffiti of the Latin Kings and other groups have appeared on the walls of military bases and cities from Baghdad to Kabul.

In both examples, successive drifts and re-localizations put Atlantic Latino gangs in motion at the end of the 1990's toward new destinations, to Latin America first and then to Europe after, giving life to unforeseen nexuses of the local/global. How to explain such global reproduction of associations based on local experiences in the arc of little more than 20 years? We can characterize three driving forces in the process. First, deportations; second, economic migration and family reunification; and third; expanded access to the Internet.

For the first influence, thousands of young migrants were removed from the streets and the prisons, and returned to their countries of origin, exporting their experiences with gangs and street organizations. This happened in the course of the 1990s with the expulsion of Salvadorans and Guatemalans from post-riot Los Angeles, a phenomenon that contributed to the transformation and professionalization of crime for the Central American street organization, *Las Maras* (Valenzuela, Nateras, Reguillo, 2007). From the deportations of Dominicans and Ecuadorians (Brotherton, Kretsedemas, 2008) were born the Caribbean and Latin American chapters of Ñetas, Latin Kings and other groups.

These are instances of replication from below, unauthorized, about which the leadership in the mother country was usually unaware. Such a form of reproduction gives rise to the problematic of recognition, requiring some definition of authentic principles and devices by the parent organization in regard to new chapters starting up that replicate the original. At the same time, this relocation opens up a space of potential conflict around regimes of truth that sanction affiliations and replications. The non-authorized reproduction from below generates an anxiety of control from the mother authority, which discovers nearly by chance its new charter as a kind of colonial administrator, distant and in absentia, of an association using its logo and a sign, transplanted without its wish.

The Nation of the Latin Kings arrived in a similar way in Ecuador. The process has been reconstructed by Mauro Cerbino and Ana Rodriguez (2008), through the voices of direct witnesses and local sources. Once implanted in Ecuador, this labelled association consolidated, transformed and adapted, growing in size from social and youth cultures to a criminal business and/or the art of survival. The Nation of the Latin Kings came to represent a significant share of sociality and aggregations of the street in Ecuador. Directly, through affiliations, and indirectly, through the voices, the fame, the media

stories, associations came to involve tens of thousands of young people, especially from the violent and marginal neighborhoods of large cities.

In the late 1990's significant migration spread from Ecuador to Spain and Italy of young women, mostly mothers. Later, after several years, the children of such transnational mothers were reunited (Lagomarsino, 2006). This migration and reunification was the second important driver of this globalization. From the sons and daughters of this transnational motherhood—some with long-running experience in groups in their country of origin, others with membership in the society after landing—were born and created the European chapters of the Latin Kings and the Ñetas. After 2000 in Barcelona, Madrid, Genova, Milan, and Brussels, groups began to appear that claimed and presented recognizable names, signs and colors, as well as individuals who entered competition for accreditation as legitimate bearers of the brand. It is claimed by Cerbino and Rodriguez (2008) that the European reproduction of these organizations is in large part due to the migration of young Ecuadorian Latin Kings and Ñetas. The logo was American, but the pioneers and the troops were Ecuadorians. Once organizations were established in Europe, they begin to recruit among young people of many origins.

The passage from Ecuador to Europe was less random and more structured than the previous progession from the United States to Latin America. In the case of the Nation of Latin Kings, who opened chapters in Italy and Spain—*hacen Nacion* or *plantan bandera*, as our interview respondents say—we find a strong charismatic reference in the roles of the Godfather, the Supreme Crown (or president) of the *Sagrada Tribu Atahualpa Ecuador* (STAE[29]) for example. Elements of distinctive symbolic and material economy integrate several Italian cities within the transnational field of the Nation of Latin Kings. In effect, the third engine of globalization is the Internet. Chat, IM, Skype, blogs and, nowadays, Facebook are effective and cheap ways to keep frequent communication open between Nation members scattered in different countries, to check periodically on the development of the group in franchising, for example. Not by chance, a large share of the work and daily tasks of the leaders we met during the research consisted of maintaining distant communication, sending and receiving orders, advice, and materials.[30]

[29] The name that the Latin Kings and Queens have adopted in Ecuador.
[30] In the course of this multiply-situated ethnography we were also, as investigators, used by the members of the organizations in order to deliver messages and objects.

The Internet is the tool shaping the mobility of members, so that a set of practices of power and demands of loyalty can manifest themselves by connecting authorities that hold the trademark and franchise groups scattered in places of immigration. But the Internet is also the territory for the staging of individuals profiles. It offers exposure. It facilitates shopping for brands among the different possibilities of existing affiliations, the messy but no less important social encounters, ochaotic recruitment, and the virtualization of conflicts between various denominations and between groups of the same brand that are differently situated. The Internet is the place of appearance, construction and reproduction of a community lacking proximity (Faist, 2000).

The dimensions of such rhizomatic reproduction (to follow the language of Deleuze and Guattari) or globalization from below, in contrast to globalization from above promoted by the directors of organizations, can be revealed by simply entering YouTube and typing in the names: Latin Kings, Mara Salvatrucha, Bloods, Crips, Ñeta and other exotic titles. In the bodies, signs, colors, gestures, faces and masks, stories are told about the self in multiple locations, from first-generation Bolivians in Madrid to Puerto Ricans who became Anglicized in New York, and from young citizens of Venezuelan ranchitos to subproletariate barrio inhabitants of Guayaquil and to second generation Latinos in Milan. Underlying it all is an *embodiment* of presence often represented by the fantasmagoric speech of the official media. It appears as an imagined yet absolutely real geography, parallel to, yet superimposed over, the map of the United States. It is articulated by frontiers, visas, walls; the control procedures for the mobility of people and the liberalization of mobility for goods.

As Burawoy (2000) suggests, we attempt here a path of global ethnography and multi-situatedness, avoiding the assumption that fieldwork is an island populated by confined subjects. We work instead on the margins, on the links, on trade between sites located in separate places but articulated by communication devices, by travel, by messages, by symbols and materials coming and going, by permanent processes of relocation. The intuition of Appadurai (1989) on the risk of the metonymic freezing of the natives[31] should be taken seriously, and also the lessons of Nashashibi (2007) and Sassen (2007) when they urge people to think about the ghetto, an area of confinement and residential segregation, not only as insulation but also as a terrain of cosmopolitanism, a channel of a cosmopolitan agency. Our attempt at a global

[31] Ways of thinking that confine the groups studied to the local dimension in which they take part.

ethnography unfolds inside the flows and networks built by the organizations of the street. We go against the current by starting not from our nearest local field in places like Genova. Rather we collect directly from the network, and through the contribution of other researchers, through voices from the main areas of location of these gangs as a kind of global nation, present in Spain, Italy, the United States and Ecuador.

Through this method, a simultaneously global and localized view of discourses and practices of youth organizations emerges at the center of our study. Paraphrasing Gilroy (1993), we could describe it as a kind of Atlantic Latino space in which memories and resistance circulate, It contains cultural projects and bodies of migrants, the deported and the pioneers who *plantan bandera*, musical genres such as reggaeton, and the translations of fundamental texts (philosophy and literature, "Bibles" and constitutions in the language used by members of these groups), careers and opportunities for travel and meetings.

This Atlantic Latino space is also an infrastructure or a set of opportunities and practices of generational youth transnationalism. This resonates with the insight of Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999) on the tripartite economic, political and socio-cultural structure of transnationalism. One finds *economic* transnationalism, because for a long time the Nation of the Latin Kings maintained itself in Ecuador thanks to remittances from its foreign chapters. One finds *socio-cultural* transnationalism, because through training and education are defined (or frozen) the characteristics and qualities of a global affiliation. There is *political* transnationalism in standardization of contents of franchising. This is generated and echoed in a series of power struggles between parent organisations and individuals who affirm their positions of legitimacy, authenticity and authority in dissemination. This opens up a field of reflection on the dynamics of conflict and accommodation between logos and franchising, or in other words, between the colonial authority and colonized groups.

We found the phenomenon to exceed the definition of transnationalism as a "process by which immigrants build social fields that bind together the country of origin and country of destination" (Glick Shiller, Bash and Blanc-Szanton 1992, 1). In the first place origin and destiny are conjugated in the plural. Second, origins and destinies allude to an emotional dimension (Wolf, 2002); the mythological assertion and claim of a place in the world—a home—for the vulnerable and marginalized. Third, origins and destinies are amplified through agency, but also by the forces of expulsion and

deportation which inscribe power over biographies on the move. Fourth, this transnationalism concerns primarily young immigrants and the second generation.

The *homing desire*, which is the watermark and the clear track of the phenomenon, echoes Clifford's (1997, 302) concept of diaspora; the connection "between multiple communities of a dispersed population". Yet, as suggested Cohen (1997) and Ambrosini (2008, 75), diaspora also evokes a homeland (not necessarily actual) which continues to exercise a call on identification processes, loyalty and emotions. The concept of diaspora proves useful to designate this transnational field, providing a reading of the desire for homeland as a claim, a language and awareness of belonging which looks to the future and to its pollination more than the past. Reframing Sayad (2006), then we would have a diaspora that works on the myth of departure and arrival, rather than on the myth of return.

Behind La Raza Latina

The discursive apparatus of these transnational gangs maintains the signifiers of *Latino* and *La Raza Latina* at the global level, as well as in public and private discussions. Yet what *Latino* means to the Latin Kings and Queens is not so apparent. Do the terms refer to an American citizen of an ethnic minority? A young person from Guayaquil, a non-ethnic Ecuadorian citizen? A deportee now anglicized in Santo Domingo rather than in Central America? A first generation migrant situated in Europe? A second generation youth who gre up that during the migration but has now has stabilized? And the neo-Latinos, such as newly recruited Italians and Spaniards in the organization, are they Latinos? Language is an even less useful criteria, because the maintenance of a current use of Spanish is variable and contextual. In the United States for example, English is the language of members, as well as the language of texts considered sacred. The Latin American diaspora, like every diaspora, is stratified by functions of time, by legal status and social class, by forms of transmission of cultural and family capital, by engagement and hybridization, to the point where attempts to fix authenticity in every situated exhibition of ethnicity are rendered schizophrenic.

And again, not only Latinos adhere to these experiences of aggregation. As Conguerhood (1992) has documented in the homeland of the gang, Chicago, participation in different groups reflects a balanced ecology of neighborhoods. When Iraqis, Palestinians, Italians, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Irish, and WASPs are members of groups that use *Latinidad* in their titles and languages, lines of color are re-articulated, transforming and neutralizing conflicts no longer legible as ethnic.[32] Regarding the more limited and still embryonic paths in Barcelona, Genova and Milan, we have met young Moroccans, Russians, Romanians, Roma, Catalans, Spanish, Italians, Filipinos, Chinese and Sri Lankans totally at ease under the umbrella of Latino. *La Raza Latina* is thus an imagined community (Anderson, 1991), but no less real because it takes shape in practical language and assertions of identity acts performed by the members. To define oneself as a young Latino is a performance, an attribution, a fabrication of identity and belonging, on one hand pegged to the logic that structures the societies of origin and incorporation, on the other hand stretched into a *glocal* space in a process of ethnogenesis (Feixa, 2006) mixing Guayaquil, Milan, Quito, Genova, New York, San Juan de Puerto Rico, Barcelona, Madrid, and Brussels. *La Raza Latina* thus gives a touch of blood to the nation, in which "you never know all your compatriots, yet in the minds of everyone there is the image of the community" (Anderson 1991, 10). Renan (1990) suggests that "the existence of a nation is a daily plebiscite," and becomes true, or is reified, through acts, gestures, practices and languages that evoke and localize it in contingent forms.

Below is the testimony of King Bibo, someone who pretends to administrate the logo of Latin Kings abroad. He had returned from a trip to Spain, where he discovered the Latin origin of the country visited:

> Because you (researchers) are speaking another language, you were speaking of a global existence, while they, that is us, we're trying to eat in our neighborhoods. They (the Latin community in New York) cannot imagine how in France as in Italy there are other Latinos. They do not understand this. And I also do not understand it well, and they suffer, because when I was in Spain the Spaniards told me they were Latinos, and I asked myself how it was possible because for me they are Spaniards, because when they came to the U.S., they were called Spanish, European, and we considered them white, with skin that is more white [...] but for us whites are Americans. In short, there is a difference in culture.

[32] In the words of the ethnographer, "Regarding race and etnicity, the gang has better results in integration and the acceptance of cultural diversity than many legitimate organizations, like the multinationals and the university" (Conguerhood 1992, 23).

We also find this disorientation in the constituent tribes of the Latin Kings of Spain. The prologue of a document signed in Madrid in 2000 states, "In this country all are Hispanic, and they (the Spaniards), should realize that we are of the same Latino race."[33] So just as to be Anglicized does not correspond to being English in colonial India, to be Hispanic or Latino does not correspond to being Spanish. It is the status of this *ugly copy* of the original, not considered legitimate and equal, which triggers significant consequences. The two following examples report this vagueness and yet symbolic importance. Initially, Mario speaks. He is an Italian-Ecuadorian born in Genova, raised with Italian peers. He expresses himself in Italian, although he understands Spanish well thanks to the company of his fellow Latin Kings.

> I feel Ecuadorian! Although I have never been there. I have the white face of an Italian, but inside I am Ecuadorian. After going to school with them for a while, even a Peruvian told me, "Ecuadorian shit." Then the Italians give me dirty looks when they see me on the street. They are racist with me, because they think of me as a traitor, because I am Italian and I am with South Americans. But this summer we want to go to Ecuador. And then in the Latin Kings there may be people in many places. Not only Ecuador, maybe Russian, Spanish, wherever, but we are all Latinos, because we have married the cause, there is a cause, there are intentions. These resolutions are Latino, you're a Latino!
>
> Q: What is the cause?
>
> For this nation to become a Nation, not a gang, to be seen by all, [...] the old woman who speaks in the street, I do not want that she speaks of the Latin Kings as a gang. One speaks of the Latin Kings as an organization, this is my personal cause in the nation. Each has his cause, once I did not know because I was inside. It seems stupid, but when I was crowned King, this was my dream, it's a good thing. Then I never had a real purpose in my life, in the sense that I never knew if I should go to do something, I just did it. Now I know something [...]

In contrast, Paul had been in Italy since 2001, reunited with his mother. He enrolled in high school but after a few years he left. He speaks Italian and Spanish quite well. Recently he has been working with his mother in a cleaning company. He has an important position in the Nation, and he shows a reflective and projecting capacity throughout the interview. Yet when we asked him who are the Latinos, his response was *disappointing*:

> Well, all the people of the Latin race, I don't know. I don't precisely know [how to respond to] that question here.

[33] Excerpted from Botello, Moya (2005, 304).

Like Paul, dozens of other collected testimonies show a reluctance to define the meaning of *Latino*. Listen once again to the words of Mario: "But we are all Latino, because we have married the cause, there is a cause, there are propositions. These resolutions are Latino, you're a Latino!" To try to grasp the vagueness and yet the high stakes of *Latino*, we must elucidate this blood title o in the global space within which the reception and agency of the Nation unfolds. There are two political purposes found in the literature and discursive practices of members. The first is the fight against racism, oppression, the desire for equality, and the desire for social mobility. The other is the refusal of hypocrisy. In the American texts we found an emphasis on the first discourse. In the Ecuadorians there was emphasis on the second, and in the Spanish and Italian texts both. The KMC – King Manifesto Constitution - evokes a rhetorical figure, that of *Brown Force*, which relies heavily on a figurative ethnicity (the mestizo, brown), to evoke the reality of the figure of the oppressed:

> Anonymous millions of brown men and women have given their life in the fight for liberation. They have fought against colonialism, hunger and ignorance and for the human dignity of our People. They have drawn from one another, through unity, a force of fortitude – Brown Force – the force which provides the splendid light of hope in oppressed people. The seed they cast into the founding of a Nation – The Almighty Latin King Nation – has withstood the injuries of time.

The terms *Latino* and *La Raza* thus work in the texts and practices as a synecdoche, a rhetorical figure that uses the part for the whole. Latino stands for the oppressed, or can incorporate the oppressed, can represent the oppressed. One may encounter the other oppressed and see oneself reflected. In the New York experience this dimension of the fight against racism was fully realized during the political movement of King Tone during the 1990's (Barrios, Brotherton, 2004). Later it disappeared and was removed from relocated literature, translated and then reproduced in Ecuador. There, where everyone is mestizo and brown, yet there is no shortage of oppression, the Nation recruits its members among the young working class and sub-proletarians of the most marginal areas. Thus the discursive register through which Latino takes form is the fight against hypocrisy. To understand the significance of this one turns to the concept of a *nation of individuals*, proposed by Cerbino and Rodriguez (2008) and also the concept of *recovery - reintegration* (redemption, recovery, reinsertion in a shelter through practices of mutual aid) introduced by Barrios and Brotherton (2004). In a nation of individuals citizenship is not abstract, but acknowledged in the flesh. Citzenship derives

from a biographical condition marked by work-related injuries, violence suffered and perpetuated, families who have been abandoned and who have abandoned, the abuse of drugs and alcohol, and criminal careers. Thus we are in a space that escapes from the concept of the juridical subject in defining what is citizenship.[34] In the testimonies we gathered, to participate in a members' meeting corresponded to publicly revealing one's personal problems. They allowed someone to receive advice, to be admonished and sanctioned, a sort of ritual of collective psychoanalysis transformed into a fetish of the Nation, a heavily normative place in which interdictions and obligations act on the private life of its members. This revales the dimensions of refuge, elaboration, confession, and the collective expiation of guilt.

As King Haiti of Milan states, "The Nation is perfect, the brothers no." The *fight against hypocrisy* is thus in the first place directed inward, toward oneself. Thus the Nation is the projection of a purified fetish; a desire for another self, the transfiguration of a perfect self distant from the harsh reality of everyday life, marked by a thousand vulnerabilities.[35] This dimension, originally presented as an experience in the American literature, was emphasized in Ecuador thanks to relocation by a leader of Mormon extraction, like the Godfather.[36] It shows how practices develop over a long cycle of religious translations of life as hard and raw, experienced by members of the Nation on the street, in a context where channels of mobility and recognition through traditional institutions (school, work, citizenship) are closed so as to be unthinkable.

Blood King, in an almost Foucaldian moment in the Bible of Latin Kings, highlights how the oppressor lives inside the oppressed. Therefore it is always necessary to "put one foot in the middle of each threshold, forcing the doors of opportunity to open to the entire nation."[37] He wrote:

---

[34] Santoro (2007) has suggested the concept of personalistic citizenship in his cultural analysis of the Italian Mafia and the public space framed by acts of mafia power. What distinguishes the case study of Marco Santoro from ours is that the cultural analysis of the Mafia must take into account economic acts, from the market and in business, that allow the Mafia to exercise a role in political and social regulation, as well as an entrepreneurial role. Conversely, in our case, an illegal business does not exist (fencing illegal items, prostitution, traffic of substances or weapons, etc.) as the exclusive and crucial prerogative of the members of street organizations.

[35] This progression finds a reference precisely in the language used by members and the literature; we have thus a *primitive* phase, and a *dark* phase, followed by a *pure and mature* phase of the King.

[36] "He came from the Mormon Church; he took all the things that he had learned there and has put them within his nation." Thus a leader tells us who grew up in the managing group in Ecuador. He was the president of the Nation lin Barcelona, and in conflict with the old *casamadre*.

[37] Excerpted from Botello, Moya (2005: 297).

> Brothers, sisters and cousins, I will give you all this story because there is a force greater than the Euro-centric, that hides and minimizes our genius, our capacity. This force kills with ignorance, leaves us addicts, provides us young widows[...] This oppressive force is ourselves, you, me. Each bag of drugs that we sell, every weapon that you, we, I aim against another mestizo man is another piece of the coffin that we're packing for our Porto Rican, Dominican, Cuban, Italian culture, etc….

Guayaquil, August 13, 2003. A letter sent by a mysterious *prince café* tears aside the veil over the state of things and enlightens us on the significance of fighting hypocrisy:

> [...] Our doctrine does not teach one to kill, it does not teach drug addiction, abuse, separation, envy, the cult of the personal and false hopes. Is this the ALKQN for which our ancestors died? Were their efforts and sacrifices made for this state of absolute chaos and confusion? Watch the world today brother and sister. They call us members of a gang; according to the society and the world around us, we are murderers, drug traffickers, drug addicts, thieves and every other evil. They call our sisters prostitutes and accuse them of bringing babies into the world to make them suffer. They criticize us without knowing us [...]
>
> [...] The press, television, is an oppressive power that wants to destroy us by staining our name [...]. But what do we do? Close our eyes and ears? How can we be prepared for a new world if some of us are involved in anti-social activities such as drugs, theft, and weapons? Tell me brother, are we doing something good for ALKQN and our brothers? You know what we are doing? Destroying our neighborhood, our society, our youngest brothers whom we are teaching to steal, sell and consume drugs. Are these our goals? We want to convey that to our future King? We need to open new doors for our children, we must teach them our traditions, culture and the true intentions of ALKQN. Do you want to see our children as brothers today, imprisoned, killed by a pistol shot on a street corner, taken to a rehabilitation center? [...] It is time to stop believing in that philosophy, it is time to unite to eliminate hypocrisy […] and we can do it if we struggle together as a big family. I am the Nation.

From there, from that ground zero, unfolds a distance and a reflexivity about the recent history of the Latin Kings. Perhaps from that moment this transnational gang began the first attempts to activate steps of mediation, of meeting, of forming relationships with some institutional spaces and with other social organizations. Two years later the group took the path of legalization to Spain and Italy. In 2007, the Nation of the Latin Kings and Queens was legalized in Ecuador by a formal act of the President of the Republic, Rafael Correa.

As with the first landing of Latin Kings in Europe it transplanted a logic of identification for denial, through the figure of the enemy, always other groups of young migrants. However, at the same time new discursive schemes - that together empower through self-help and combating racism - begin to circulate. For the hundreds of members of the Nations of Genova and Milan that we spoke to, the stereotypical response to questions about motivation and solidarity always evoked a combination of "fight hypocrisy' and "fight racism." Racism and anti-racism were conjugated in

different ways in the two contexts. In Spain we saw setback and humiliation, a mimesis refused. The children of the conquest – the migrants from Latin America - were Hispanics and Latinos, not Spanish; "not recognized as belonging to the same race." In Italy members use above all the register of human rights. They emphasise the human race as common belonging, sanctioned by the Bible but denied legally and symbolically to migrants. The short circuit between the register of racism/oppression and the register of hypocrisy thus produces a more political leadership, which fights for public recognition in order to get more opportunity for social and symbolic mobility.

Bernard is a young man from Guayaquil, who grew up as a Latin King in that city until he was 19. He has been in Genova for 8 years, and has relatives and friends in Barcelona whom he often visits. He works as a laborer when he can at construction sites, and says he is often not paid. He repeatedly represented the Nation in front of the press and television.

> What we do is for people who feel oppressed […], they search for someone to free them from their dark side, someone who gives them comfort. The most important thing is that all of us every day must continue to struggle [...] In the world we are all gypsies, we are nomads, we move from one place to another. As the birds move, migrating, seeking a way to live, to survive when it is too cold to search for food and warmth, so does man. That is why I say we are all gypsies, nomads [...].

Being Latin, being a migrant, being subject to processes of exclusion which also mark the traumatic course of biographies are thus developed inside a container of social practices and rituals - the Nation. It is like an island linked to other terminals in a transnational field, but also it is also in communication with relevant actors in the context of its location, including educators, social movements, associations of migrants, social centers, service operators and researchers.

A form of life. Penalties and immorality

To belong to a gang means to practice. To be a nation means to make nation, enrolling in a form of life, or in a space that makes a set of demands on the everyday behavior of members in exchange for other material and symbolic rewards such as protection, shelter, empowerment and mutual aid, dignity and respect and social interchange. These

vary in light of their location. Claims and rewards travel, accommodate and get translated in the global reproduction of experience. An example lies in the moral and ritual transformations of the Latin Kings that occurred in the transition through the cycle from the street economy of Chicago to the street politics of New York (Barrios and Brotherton, 2004; Ravecca, 2007).

In Ecuador the Latin King literature on one hand addresses the migration syndrome that crosses the country (Jokisch, 2002). On the other hand it is contaminated with the military socialization[38] of some members as well as the influence of the Mormons and evangelical religion. These influences are widely disseminated in popular culture and among marginal social strata, intensifying and introducing, through written amendments, new fields of interdiction and control. For example, the introduction of "Imperial Visas" expresses the anxiety or the desire to control international mobility. The visa is a right of members, but must be authorized by a hierarchical chain. Violation of this rule is considered a serious crime. We have no evidence to support the effectiveness of this device, but its symbolic meaning is clear. It indicates a country characterized by mass exodus, in which families of marginalized neighborhoods invest in the remittances of their migrant childen as a survival technique, and one where street organizations are beginning to raise the stakes on the migration of members. Several undated Ecuadorian texts list of prohibitions and obligations presumably dating from the late 1990's. Prohibitions include extortion; homosexuality; injuring a brother; taking drugs, with the exception of marijuana; gambling; theft; and abortion. One is also forbidden to use one's position in the Nation for personal benefit, to drink alcohol at meetings, and to criticize and ridicule superiors with gestures of the hands and the face. Obligations include carrying out a census of members every six months, carrying out an AIDS test every 6 months or every year, being punctual and maintaining decorum in meetings. In a subsequent text a number of amendments are then identified. The seem aimed at building a specificity, even a ritual, for the group. The amendments concern forms of greeting, prayers, the absolute prohibition of marijuana, mandatory fasting on the first Sunday of each month, and the control of diet, including avoiding coffee. Also included are: sanctions and physical punishments, the proper behavior of Kings and Queens who have sexual relationships (for example, a period of mourning for six months after separation from a brother or sister), the right of officers to resolve disputes

[38] Many members that we have met have parents or relatives who work in the police and in the intermediate degrees of the army.

related to life as a couple; proper public behavior of women (not to go dancing before the age of 16), celebration of members' birthdays; internal forms and editing techniques for written and oral reports and requirements for new members becoming Kings. This included an AIDS examination; a certificate of completion of community works; knowledge of the history of Atahualpa and other symbolic heritage and interrogations on the history of chapter membership.

How to interpret this kind of reconfiguration? On the one hand we see an anchor in the national history of Ecuador, on the other tight control on the lives of the members, marked by a hegemonic masculinity and expression of social norms. The literature accommodates, through either emphasis or denial, norms that already characterize the lives of people in marginalized neighborhoods. Hegemonic masculinity is emphasised and homosexual practices banned. In the realm of denial, theft, violence, abuse, sale of substances, and extortion are all banned. Yet all are practices widely disseminated in the biographies of many members and their ecological context.

What is described above was also the exported operative literature in Spain and Italy until mid-2005, when a process of politicization and harmonization began. This changed leadership, behavioural standards and the types of subjects involved. When the Nation was in its infancy in Europe, it was marked by the significant marginalization of its members and its pioneers, many of whom lived from and in the economies of the street. These were places in which they had to invent ways to neutralize the banned practices that they committed, which were nevertheless implicitly sanctioned by the regulatory apparatus of the Nation. This was the case in the following testimony by King Soprano, who was crowned in Guayaquil and left there at 18 years of age to become one of the founders of the Nation in Italy:39

> Economically I was in bad shape, I had to steal to live again. Sometimes I had only 20 cents, one euro. I went to the supermarket to buy a box of salt with these 20 cents and then took everything, bread meat, chicken, everything [...] and before I entered I prayed, saying 'God forgive me, but you know that I do it for Mary.' Maria, my girlfriend. In Ecuador I did not rob for hunger but for respect, it was another thing. And here in Italy, when I did it, I did it for me, not as a Latin King.

Many speak of that initial period as an obscure time in which they suffered from cold and hunger, slept in parks, shared houses with many people and took shifts for sleeping.

[39] See the interview collection of Queirolo Palmas and Lagomarsino (2007). See also Cannarella, Lagomarsino, Queirolo Palmas (2007).

Here speaks a young King of Milan, Nomad, who left at only 14 years of age. He took part in the work of a multiethnic group of professional thieves. With the money accumulated after a year and a half he finally succeeded in his goals: reuniting with his mother and paying for the care of his sick father.

> It was by necessity, I had no documents. Each time I went to steal, it went well. So I loved this business. I had an impulse. Then when they arrested my two companions, a Chilean and an Italian, I didn't know where to go. I started working as a dishwasher at a Mexican restaurant for a year from four in the afternoon to three in the morning, only without ever resting. I was the right-hand man of the house; my father in Ecuador was sick with diabetes, so I was the one who gave food to everyone there. I [...] had the desire to go robbing not because I did not want to work. I didn't find work, sometimes I went out twice a week and earned as much as in a month. I didn't lack for anything. Do I repent? For having stolen? No. No [...] I think that robbing from those who have everything is right, it's for a good cause. I did not rob for drugs or things like that, I robbed to give food to my mother, my brothers, to heal my father. I did it as an individual and then I had to distance myself from the Nation for that period.

Similar shifts, forward and backward, for emphasis and denial, may be seen at work on many other issues, such as the prohibition of homosexuality. King Open, a senior executive of the Nation legalized in Barcelona, expressed himself on this topic in the winter of 2007:

> You see, we struggle against racism, but basically we are racist, even us. With homosexuals. I wish they could participate in the Nation, and be together with our children. We need to change, see what happens in Spain. Perhaps it's still early, but we have to talk about it among ourselves, sooner or later.

Also here the effect of context is at work, in which the politicization and recognition of the Nation encounters in its local subjects a powerful discourse on civil rights, also enshrined in Spain by the force of law. When we showed a picture of two men kissing, using visual sociology with members from Genova, we collected diverse, unanticipated reactions. There were those who showed indifference towards a private act between two people, those who reflected on the need to recognize a reality that no one can deny, those who claim to have gay friends and who were afraid to go around with a homosexual for rumours they would attract, and finally those who are commited to fight racism but reject homosexuality, because to combat racism one must be upright and honest, normal to the end, so as not to give a bad look to oneself and the group.

In this last story there is no racist, one who oppresses, so much as a perceived deficit in the subject that does not deserve respect, which attracts racism and discredit. Note

that at the Zapata Club, a meeting place of *hermanitos*[40] of all denominations, a particular group of Ecuadorian transvestites moves smoothly about without attracting scorn. In contrast, when they walk to their place of work in the historical center of Genova, they attract a great deal of attention. Moreover, a few dozen meters from the Zapata Club, at another ethnic locale, is a scene full of gay adults: Italians and foreigners. Here, according to a client - our informant - some young Latinos, gang members who attend the Zapata, appear to give brief sexual performances for pay.[41]

We could continue with quotes and testimonials that provide examples of other neutralizations of former practices, formally sanctioned by Latin King literature, in the field of sexual relations, including terminations of pregnancy, drug use and administration of punishment.[42] Such examples of dissonance/resonance characterise our research findings. However, the problem that we focus on here is another: the translational field.

The series of speeches and practices that constitute the Latin King literature were in the first place accepted, disseminated and then discussed, in the contexts of reflexivity which are the chapter meetings. Subsequently, these spaces of reflexivity entered into resonance with other reflexivities generated along the various Latino Atlantic nodes. This happened through the web, through communications among leaders. It evolved through the travels of members, through friendships and relationships at a distance. And that means that we are talking about a transnational field, not only marked by organizations, standards and power relations that signal the global reproduction of experience, but one woven from speeches and practices from below that circulate, confront each other, are disguised and locally adapted, impregnated with repetition and dysfunction. This is a field in which the players are the Nation, because they reproduce the Nation through their acts and performances. It is a daily plebiscite, just as Renan (1990) suggested.[43] This is a form of political transnationalism (Portes, Guarnizo, Landolt, 1999), because the stakes require continuous political work across borders. In

[40] Members use to call themselves *hermanitos*, alluding to a brotherhood which gathers them in what they call a *second family*, a *street family*.

[41] In this situation, according to our informant, the official homophobic discourse of the Nation is neutralized by the fact that the sexual performance (*marchetta* in Italian) is a job.

[42] The recourse to violence is however contextual and variable. After immersion in Italy, the violent sanction is in fact banned (except in the case of *hermanitos* that hit and humiliate women), while the resource of sporting combat practices, creatively lead back into a more acceptable order of previous practices framed by the boundless abuse of superiors.

[43] The nation-state is belonged to by fact, except in the case of naturalizations, while the nation of the Latin Kings and Queens is belonged to by choice.

defining “a global nation” the issues are: Who owns the authentic? Who controls the pathways of education and the training of new members? Who determines how to relate to institutions? Who decides on the distribution of benefits? Who has the logo? And who is the franchisee? Who is the settler and the colonized? Who establishes the rules and who factually bypasses them?

The will to make a nation, to live in a global nation, becomes more comprehensible by moving our point of observation to the margins and the trades that are produced there. We are short-sighted if we only take into account the endogenous and compact variables of ethnicity, race, or culture. With around 400 members of Latin Kings and Queens in Genova and Milan, we had to think of them as people of a *third space*, an *in-between*, from which they speak and act, in order to understand their micro paths and trails of translation. The Latino Atlantic is constituted in the wake of symbolic flows traveling freely under the straight-jacket of the territory and the nation-state. This is the argument of Appadurai (1996) in discussing the ethnoscape and decolonization of cricket. A geography and a parallel history take shape, other maps of power and affiliations, other memories of homelands and other writings, imbued with a curious nationalism from a distance (Fouron, Shiller, 2002; Anderson, 1991), in which membership of a nation which appears on no map is claimed. It seems we need to heed the words of Homi Bhabha (2001, 12):

> Theoretically innovative, and politically essential, is the need to think beyond the traditional narratives relative to the originating and initial subjectivity, focusing instead on those moments or processes that occur in the interstices, in the articulations of cultural differences. These in-between spaces constitute a field for the elaboration of strategies of the self—as individual or group—giving the green light to new signs of identity and innovative place in which to develop the collaboration and contestation of the act in itself, which defines the idea of society.

At this point of the discussion it is clear why we must assume that the nation of the Latin Kings and Queens, as well as the Association Ñeta, represents the infrastructure of a global movement (Levitt, 2002) revealed in part, but not only, by forms of emotional transnationalism (Wolf, 2002). But then a new question arises: what is signified when this transnationalism is the work of first-and second-generation youth, rather than adults? What does it mean to be a member of the younger generation in the Atlantic Latino?

The strategy of the snail: Generations and transnationalism in the Atlantic Latino

The transnationalism literature is thought of as the preserve of adult migrants and the recently settled, often in opposition to the classical model of assimilation. More recently, the work of Portes (2005) and Guarnizo (2003) has invited consideration that more assimilated immigrants are often the protagonists of transnational practices. It is rare to find research on the relationship between second generation youth and transnational practices. According to a widespread view, ethnic ties and the intensity of border-crossing diminishes in the transition between generations; so Ambrosini (2008) invites us to think of the second generation as the litmus test of transnationalism. In his research on a group of young Chicanos, Smith (2002) has suggested thinking of these trajectories as "transnational lives," highlighting the double play of assimilative pressures. On the one hand is highlighted the discovery and fabrication of identity and relationships that generate a tension, and a desire, toward a transnational life for the second generation. On the other hand, the transnational commitment is disempowered, necessitating the putting down of roots, such as contracts and working careers, real estate obligations, and new births. Guarnizo (2007), following Bourdieu, uses the concept of transnational habitus to describe the field of practices articulated by the dimension of inertia and by introjections of natural and consolidated representations, as well as timely and rational decisions and actions.

If we consider the points above in the context of our research, the overlap between transnational practices and habitus, and generational practices and habitus, seems obvious. The Atlantic Latino is a circulatory space. Gangs and organizations of the street, as well as transnational motherhood, carry the movement. While members and leaders differ in their perspectives, overall they maintain a vision that is more multifocal than bifocal (Vertovec, 2004). Inside the groups that we have observed, members delegated to maintain external relations are those who participate in debates across borders, those who organize the travel schedules of the visiting leaders, those whom we find permanently on the web, and those that filter discussions and interpret them locally.

Moreover, not all must be involved in transnational practices in order to define a space as transnational. Some members have roles as pivot and hubs. Robin Hood for

example, a brother of Ñeta, has deep scars received on the streets of Guayaquil, yet he works today as a travel organiser. The source of respect that he inspires is due to the functions he performs. He is the representative of American leaders with whom he communicates by mail and by phone almost daily. He also mediates the travels of the reggaeton stars of Puerto Rico - music is the other major vector of movement in Atlantic Latino - who have performed several times at the Zapata Club in Genova. Wearing a shirt on which is written, below a derogatory word, "DEA, CIA, FBI, Watch the alphabet boys" he explains this in a rapid discussion on a bus:

> Gonzalo, the leader, told me that he will bring me to New York to work with the Association. I have already applied for approval. I'm waiting. It's my dream. You know I will go to the tomb of Carlos La Sombra in Puerto Rico. In a few months I leave.

Levitt (2002), in one of the few existing anthologies on the subject, explains changes in the practices of the transnational second generation using three factors: the existence of institutions (churches, ethnic associations and home towns), life cycle (rediscovering a connection with the country of origin), and socio-economic factors (the possibility of enhancing human and cultural capital through a transnational life). As we have already explained, organizations of the street are an institutional platform for transnationalism that offer "to a second generation large arenas in which to participate and multiple choices about when and how to do it" (Levitt 2002, 143). However, a preliminary reflection on what we mean by generation is necessary. In the field we found at least three lines of social construction of "generation" at work, triggering combined effects.

The first line of generation is the classic one, tied to the place of birth and the paths of socialization. The youth that we encountered in research are what Rumbaut (1997) defined as the 1.5 generation: young people born abroad who attend Italian schools from elementary to early high school. They often drop out, leading to early insertion in the labor market. These are precisely the children of transnational motherhood. The group founder of the Nation in Italy offers a different trajectory: young people who come as adults or near-adults, alone or weakly linked to a parental figure. They insert themselves directly into the black market.

The second line of generation is linked to longevity inside the Nation. There are some who were born metaphorically in the group, having been crowned in Ecuador and who count almost 10 years of affiliation. There are those who were born physically into

the group, like the son of a King or Queen (Prince). There are also those who accessed membership only recently in Italy. The third line of generation refers to Mannheim's concept of generation as a collective and symbolic event in which one's identity is reflected. The watershed event in this case is the emergence and politicization of the group in the European context.

These three lines of generation are recomposed at the level of individual biographies and generate a new question. How do we combine the transmission of skills, habitus and links inside the space of the family, with the transmission of skills, habitus and links within the space of organizations (not by chance defined by young people as a second family)?

The research of Smith (2002) and Levitt (2002) on the importance of the life cycle inside the family space suggests that the 1.5 generation has only recently rediscovered and produced its *latinity*. Many testimonies tell how, by the mother's choice, children socialized only with Italian peers in their early years, but then changed their space of sociability and rediscovered Spanish as their daily language in high school. The Nation, and other groups, represent a multiplier effect and an affirmation of this investment, fostering the emergence of a generational space from different trajectories - the pioneers and founders of the Nation, members of the 1.5 generation, the newly arrived. They have lived and continue to live next to each other. Through the Nation and other street organizations, young people rediscover and undertake a transnational affiliation, which is certainly emotional in principle, but soon is linked to a range of practices. To be or to become a member in Italy, represents an investment full of meaning, a symbolic transnational act of entry into the Atlantic Latino.

We will try now to outline the space of the practices inside this transnational field. In the first place: departure. The departure was because in almost all of the biographies of young people we have collected, they came originally from neighborhoods deeply marked by violence:

> I was in the middle of that neighborhood, good people, bad people, problems with gangs, but that does not mean that I participated, I was simply inside there, I was not part of that. In a certain sense yes, but not entirely. I did not rob, I did not make problems, I simply lived there. (Distic)

> I was kept close to home, they didn't let me go out, for fear of the gangs. (Lola)

> The neighborhood was quiet [...] sometimes there were people who ran away and shot bullets [...] As I explaiedn to you, these were things of every day, routine in the neighborhood. I lived in the neighborhood of Florida barrio in Guayaquil, almost at the perimeter, where the corpses are thrown. (Chic)

> In the neighborhood where I lived, the Guasmo, you must know, there is a lot of delinquency. They smoke, sell, if you're in the neighborhood they say, "Bueno, you're a neighbor." But if they do not know you, they think you're a cop. My mother did not let me leave the house. (Nadia)

> At 13 years old I already went around with a .38. I shot, bang bang. I don't know if I killed anyone, I never shot at close range. We went around with other guys, they searched for us, we searched for them, they shot at us, we shot at them. (Camillo)

Here at work is another effect of generation: most of the members we encountered, whatever the temporality of their arrival in Italy, share a similar social position, a similar migration path with the mother who leaves first. Later they were reunited after a fairly long period of isolation, a similar experience in segregated neighborhoods.

> Furthermore, the movement of migration can imply a returning flow. Many young people return during adolescence to Ecuador, abandoning their studies. It can also happen because of the mother's decision to avoid dangerous situations in Italy, and/or her inability to ensure the education of her children and to enter into communication with them.[44] It also happens because of deportations which from 2005 onwards, have tried to settle the phenomenon of gangs without success, in Italy as in Spain. Sioux, escaping the sentence of community confinement, came back in Guayaquil for over a year, reuniting with the *hermanitos* of the neighborhood:

> I went to a meeting of the chapter of my neighborhood. They made a meeting for me, to learn how the family is here in Italy. I told them how life is here and there, and some of them know the hermanitos who are in Italy. And I said, 'You know him here.' They said, 'Yes, yes I know him and also there in Italy he continues to be a hermanito.' In those months I was there, for them I was everything. If I went somewhere, they wanted to go too. They came to live with me in my house. We stayed in my house doing everything: listening to music, TV [...] I did not miss anything because my mother sent money there, we had everything to eat.

Like Sioux, other boys and girls add other shores to their mobility. Perro, for example, went to his mother in Italy and began elementary school. Later he reacted to excessive protection. Foregrounding his Latino identity, he joined a particularly violent street gang. This contrasted with his entry into the Nation, which showed a form of maturity gained. His path was marked by several departures and returns, in addition to renouncing higher education. Currently Perro works as a laborer in a car wash, but he also drives a soda delivery truck in Barcelona.

[44] Often the mothers refer to this situation of insubordination and noncommunication with sons by referring to supernatural dimensions: "*tienen los diablitos adentro, hay que sacarselos*" ("They keep the little devils inside, we need to take them out."). The term *diablitos* - literally the devils - often appeared in the interviews that we conducted with relatives, or in the boys' stories of their parents. It is language that reveals the importance of religious socialization.

> My mother always controlled me. She did not want me to go to the discotheque, because it was attended by South Americans. She said they were gang members there who could harm me. Then I was sent back to Ecuador several times [...] and I also went to Spain. I went, I returned. If I search for the Nation when I go to Barcelona? Clearly, my Nation walks with me, and I search for it wherever I go, in Ecuador, Italy, Chile, China [...] I always say, wherever I go I'm always a Latin King, today and forever. My parents are organizing to move to Spain. I would like that.

Spain is a destination that recurred in different forms in the accounts of interviewees. It was often the place where the father lived separately, or where they had friends from school or from the barrio in Guayaquil found via the web. It was a place where other relatives had immigrated, where they had friends of the Nation that could provide a place to stay. It was also a place where one might escape to when having problems with the police. They could go for a holiday, or look for a job. Spain is a short trip from Italy, connected by low cost airlines. Thus a form of circular migration is practiced. More generally, many gang members have family members around the world. The U.S., England, Germany, Japan and Australia were the countries mentioned. Such destinations are often evoked in desire to travel, representing an arena of real possibilities. In this forward momentum a dual narrative is exemplified: on one hand that of a diaspora guided by the myth of departure, on the other that of the Nation as a projection offering moral support for such flows of youth. In the words of Brotherton (2008, 34):

> They were after all Latinos whose imagined community consists of a diaspora that is spread out transnationally, over local, national and international perimeters, imposed by a colonial and post-colonial politics. To counter the sense of physical and historical displacement, they created a subculture to which they gave the name of nation. They decided, in quite a consequential way, that in this world the borders stretch to wherever their people are located. Unlike many other gang formations, they rejected the notion of territory, whose doors are jealously guarded by the groups, and transformed themselves into vagabonds [...].

Obviously, Brotherton is alluding here to the Nation pioneers who stretched the transnational field. Take the example of Nomad; in principle he steals to maintain his family, then he detours into the world of dealing cocaine. After a couple of entrances and exits from prison, he now works in a record shop in Milan. He left Ecuador alone at the age of 14. Like many others, he has pi family and relatives around the world, and is obviously a frequent Internet user.

> Yes [...] in all the 8 years that I have been here I never returned to Ecuador, and I do not think I

will. All my friends from when I was young have left; some are dead because of the life that they had. My father is also dying. For three years I did not call anyone; I only sent money to my father. I want to go to another country, leave Italy. Try Australia or the United States where I have relatives. [...] When I travel to another country, I always bring the ideology of my people, I pay tribute to the flag of my people, which I find wherever you find people with the Latin King connection. My idea is [...] how do you say [...] to go as a conqueror, found chapters, leave chapters, so that my people will unite, since we Latin Kings are in many countries.

So your idea is?

Go on founding chapters and then move to another country.

Yet there is no need to travel to get a transnational life. As Beck (2003, 140) ironically notes, "to stay at home is another way to get around." This is the case for Federica an Italian student of a hotel school. She found her public space by becoming a Queen in Barcelona. She attended mostly with young Ecuadorans of her district, thanks to whom she now speaks perfect Spanish with a Guayaquil accent. Recently she triggered a round of remittances: the relatives of friends from Ecuador sent her favorite perfume. It is a path of integration in the opposite direction, in which she begins to feel the ostracism of former Italian friends as she develops her curiosity for a far-away world that is nearby.

When you entered, did you imagine you would be treated differently, you as an Italian and all of them Latinos?

Many have said this, even my family. They said to me [...], "Don't you see that they have a different culture?" But I've never sensed this different culture, I don't see the difference. OK, they eat more rice and we eat more pasta. [...] Then I started to listen to bachata, salsa [...] I liked it but I didn't understand the words [...] Then I became the girlfriend with one of them and then I translated all the songs. I began to sing them from the beginning to the end; that music has become essential for me [...] I finally found the kind of music that I liked [...]

Lucia is 17 years old and lives in the same neighborhood as Federica, who is her cousin. During a dinner in a Latin restaurant she demonstrated that she knows perfectly the names of dishes that recall the gastronomic tradition of the Ecuadorian coast. She showed me her dry hands and told me that it is caused by the products that are used to make shampoo; she has recently finished training as a hairdresser and she complains about the exploitation she suffered. Her partner is Ecuadorian and lives with her, in the house of her parents. His mother works in cleaning, his father is a traveling oven repair-man. Thus we speak of Ecuador and the difference between the Nation and the gangs:

Ecuador?

All my friends, the area where I live, people who come around. Gang?

Group of people who have rules decided in the moment, maybe stupid rules. For example, they pick a leader and then he says the rules. Who knows what rules? I've never been part of a gang. Strange rules.

What differentiates you from a gang?

That we are not just a group of people who give ourselves a name; this thing, our thing, already exists for a long time and we are in many parts of the world. A gang is not in many parts of the world, it's just a group of kids who have this name and that's it. Instead we are much more, not only in number, but there are also adults who have children, something much more important, a family.

Federica and Lucia are very active and present on messenger and chat dedicated to the Nation, fragments of what Appadurai (1996) would call the mediascape. With Queen Gaze in Barcelona they often discuss gender issues and how to revise the masculine bias of the literature. They have a privileged relationship with King Bibo from New York, who exercises his charisma as one who was near King Tone, a mythological figure in the Nation, when he was their age.

In a transnational field, even those who are immobile, both at origin and at destination, can stay involved in transnational life. In the words of Nina Shiller and Georges Fouron (2002), in their study of the Haitian diaspora, if there are transnational households, there will also be a transnational second generation, whatever their location and their status (citizens, immigrants, ethnic minorities). Lucia, Federica, Nomad, Haiti, and all the other young people cited above have not built a home at a distance, toward which they turn with the nostalgia of cultural exile. Instead, they have given shape to a home that crosses borders, where they can stand still while moving; where one can stop oneself while moving and move oneself while stopped. To use the categories of Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004), this dimension of agency transforms unconscious transnationalism (in itself), to belonging and being reflexive (transnationalism for itself). It is also a strategic way—the strategy of the snail, actually—to make a home.

This then reverberates in different spaces and different geographies: both the official geographies of the Nation and the geography of individual practices within these transnational homes. According to Bryceson and Vuorela (2002) the transnational family is constituted through *frontiering*, practices of consolidation of family relationships across borders, and *relativizing*, practices of rewriting and re-constructing family relationships. These practices, as we have tried to illustrate throughout this chapter, are not the prerogative of adults only, but fully involve the young children of these transnational families, as individuals and as members of organizations that they do define (not casually) as a *second family*. That second family is a field of traditions and translations that are important both for understanding the birth and development of

street organizations, and for interpreting the agency and symbolic and material resistance of members to their subaltern condition.

Post-scriptum. Barcelona, June 2013

This text was written in 2009 and referred to research conducted when chat, messenger, and mail were the common tools of *hermanitos* for the global circulation of their gang experience. Nowadays I locate myself as a researcher at another point of Atlantic Latina: Barcelona. It is another historical moment, the crisis and the collapse of European social model. Nonetheless, gangs as a refuge against discrimination and as way of belonging and performing identities are still a fashionable option for thousands of young proletarians with different origins (Queirolo Palmas, 2013). With them we are now articulating action-research, a movie, a project in visual sociology called "Buscando respeto"[45]. In the scene we are now observing they reproduce their groups but are disconnected from transnationalism from above. They opt out of loyalty towards the brand administrators and their claim for *authenticity*. Globalization from below has won and groups spread in a rizomatic fashion accommodating different local and virtual contexts.

U.S and Ecuadorian leaders who had a lot of influence in developing street organizations in the first decade of the millennium in Italy and Spain have finally lost their aura. For example, Bibo is now devoted to an African religion, Sandino has been ostracized from his group in Puerto Rico for his radical policy, Padrino has lost his hegemony in Ecuador and, consequently, remittance money from the chapters abroad. King Tone is finally out of jail. When we interviewed him in Stockholm in May 2012[46] during a gang conference promoted by the Swedish Police he was discovering the existence of the Nation around the world. With him we met *hermanitos* from Sweden and Finland, who are cultivating the myth of King Tone through popular documentary. From a four star hotel we had a skype conference with Occupy New York where other Latin Kings were attending the protest. The Latin Kings and Ñetas in Barcelona,

[45] www.yougangproject.com; Fb: buscando respeto la pelicula. The research is funded by the Marie Curie Scheme.
[46] Our interview in youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1BZCDO2g4k

Genova and Milan have split into different segments, each one claiming some form of authenticity. And what about the informants, whose voices speak in this text? Some have abandoned the group and entered an evangelical church. Some had problems with drug addiction. Some raised families and have working class jobs. Some went to jail and have been deported. Others are still leading the groups, permanently moving between street policy and street economy. Some are involved with the *indignado*s movement. Others have dropped out of education, lost their job and now are in search of respect in the *dealing factory*.

The Facebook page *Buscando Respeto* is the crucial tool which we now use in order to maintain contact and develop research with different groups, members and leaderships. Looking there, it seems Atlantic Latino has definitively abandoned the arboreal form that previous gang administrators tried to impose over the flows of mobility. It appears clearly as a nexus of rhizomes, a performative field in which the logo is used freely i to grasp symbolic and social capital and counter multiple exclusion. It is also a field in which gangs, defined as public enemies of society, are scapegoated in the current crisis momentum. They continue to be socially fabricated by a gang industry (Hallsworth, 2013) in conjunction with the media apparatus, experts and academics, politics and policing.

References

Ambrosini M.. 2008. Un'altra globalizzazione. La sfida delle migrazioni transnazionali. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Anderson B. 1991. Imagined Communities. London: Verso.

Appadurai A. 1989. "Theory in Anthropology: Center and Periphery". Comparative Studies and History. 28: 356-361.

Appadurai A. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Barrios L. and Brotherton D. 2004. The Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation. Street Politics and the Transformation of a New York City Gang. New York: Columbia University Press.

Barrios L., Cerbino M. Ed. 2008. *Otras Naciones*, jóvenes, transnacionalismo y exclusión. Quito: Flacso.

Beck U. 2003. La società cosmopolita. Prospettive dell'epoca postnazionale. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Benasso, S. and Bonini, E. 2009. Giovani latinos tra estetiche e consumi, in "Mondi Migranti", 3.

Bhabha, H. 1994. The Location of Culture. New York – London: Routledge.

Botello S, Moya A. 2005. Reyes Latinos. Los codigos secretos de los Latin Kings en Espana. Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy.

Bourgois, P. 1996. In search of Respect. Selling Crack in the Ghetto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brotherton, D. 2008. ***La globalización de los Latin Kings: criminología cultural y la banda transnacional.*** **In** *Otras Naciones*, jóvenes, transnacionalismo y exclusión, edited by Barrios L., Cerbino M. Quito: Flacso.

Brotherton, D. and Kretsedemas P. 2008. Keeping Out the Other: A Critical Introduction to Immigration Enforcement Today. New York: Columbia University Press.

Burawoy, M. Ed. 2000. Global Ethnography. Forces, Connections and Imaginations in a Postmodern World. Berkeley : University of California Press.

Cannarella, M. and Lagomarsino, F. and Queirolo Palmas, L. eds. 2007. Hermanitos. Vita e politica della strada fra i giovani latinos in Italia. Verona: Ombre Corte.

Cannarella, M. and Lagomarsino, F. and Queirolo Palmas, L. eds. 2008. Messi al bando. Una ricerca-azione far i giovani migranti e le loro organizzazioni della strada. Roma: Carta - Ministero della Solidarietà Sociale.

Cerbino, M. and Rodriguez A. 2008. ***La nación imaginada de los Latin Kings. Mimetismo, colonialidad y transnacionalismo.*** **I**n *Otras Naciones*, jóvenes, transnacionalismo y exclusión, edited by Barrios L., Cerbino M. Quito: Flacso.

Clifford, J. 1997. Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Cohen, R. 1997. Global Diasporas. An Introduction, London - New York: Routledge.

Colombo, E. and Semi, G. 2007. Multiculturalismo quotidiano. Le pratiche della differenza. Milano: Angeli.

Colombo, E., Leonini, L. and Rebughini P. 2009. "Different but not Stranger: Everyday Collective Identifications among Adolescent Children of Immigrants in Italy". Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35: 37-59.

Conquergood, D. 1992 "Homeboys and Hoods: Gang Communication and Cultural Space". In Group Communication in Context: Studies of Natural Groups, ed. Larry Frey. Hillsdale, NJ.: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Conquergood, D., 1997 Handbook of Research on Teaching Literacy through the Communicative and Visual Arts, Ed. J. Flood, S. Brice Heat. New York: Macmillian Library Reference.

Faist, T. 2000, The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Feixa, C., Porzio L. and Recio C. 2006. Jovenes latinos en Barcelona. Espacio publico y cultura urbana. Barcelona: Anthropos.

Fouron, G. and Glick-Shiller, N. 2002. "The Generation of Identity: Redefining the Second Generation within a Transnational Social Field". In The Changing Face of Home: The Transnational Lives of the Second Generation, ed. Levitt P., Waters, M. C. New York: Russel Sage Foundation.

Gilroy, P. 1993. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. London: Verso.

Glick Shiller, N., Basch, L. and Blanc-Szanton, C. 1992. Towards a Transnationalization of Migration: Race,

Class, Ethnicity and Nationalism Reconsidered. New York: New York Academy of Sciences.

Guarnizo, L. 2003. "The Economics of Transnational Living". International Migration Review. 37: 666-699.

Guarnizo, L. 2007. Aspetti economici del vivere transnazionale, in "Mondi Migranti", 2: …..

Hall, S. 1996. "The Question of Cultural Identity." In Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies, edited by Hall S., Held D., Hubert D., Thompson K. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Jokisch, B. and Pribilsky, J. 2002. "The Panic to Leave: Economic Crisis and the 'New Emigration' from Ecuador". International Migration 40: 75-102.

Hallsworth, S. 2013. Interpreting Violent Street Worlds: The Gang and Beyond. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lagomarsino, F. 2006. Esodi ed approdi di genere. Famiglie transnazionali e nuove migrazioni dall'Ecuador. Milano: Franco Angeli.

Lagomarsino, F. and Queirolo Palmas, L. 2007. Essere Rey Latino in Italia. La costruzione biografica di chi viene messo al bando, in "Mondi Migranti", 1: …..

Levitt, P. 2002. "The Ties that Change: Relation to the Ancestral Home over the Life Cycle". In The Changing

Face of Home: The Transnational Lives of the Second Generation, edited by Levitt P., Waters M.C. New York: Russel Sage Foundation.

Levitt, P. and Glick-Schiller, N. 2004. "Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society". International Migration Review 37:1002-1039.

Levitt, P. and Waters, M.C. Ed. 2002, The Changing Face of Home: The Transnational Lives of the Second Generation. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Massey, D.S. and Denton N. A. 1993. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Nashashibi, B. 2007. "Ghetto Cosmopolitanism: Making Theory at the Margins". In Deciphering the Global: Its Spaces, Scales and Subjects, edited by Sassen, S. New York - London: Routledge.

Portes, A. Ed. 1995. The Economic Sociology of Immigration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Portes, A. 2005. "Convergenze teoriche ed evidenze empiriche nello studio del transnazionalismo degli immigrati". In I latinos alla scoperta dell'Europa. Nuove migrazioni e spazi della cittadinanza, edited by Ambrosini, M. and Queirolo Palmas, L. Milano: Franco Angeli.

Portes, A., Guarnizo, L. and Landolt, P. 1999. "The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promises of an Emergent Research Field". Ethnic and Racial Studies 22: 217-237.

Queirolo Palmas, L, Lagomarsino F., 2007, …… in "Mondi Migranti", 2: …..

Queirolo Palmas, L. 2013. Las políticas sobre bandas juveniles entre Barcelona y Madrid. Etnografía de un campo burocrático del Estado, www.yougangproject.com.

Ravecca, A. 2007. Buscando la istoria nelle metropoli e nelle carceri americane. In Hermanitos. Vita e politica della strada fra i giovani latinos in Italia, ed. Cannarella M., Lagomarsino F., Queirolo Palmas L. Verona: Ombre Corte.

Renan, E. 1990, What is a Nation? In Nation and Narration, ed. Bhabha H.K. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Rumbaut, R. 1997. "Assimilation and Its Discontents: Between Rethoric and Reality". International Migration Review 32: 923-960.

Santoro, M. 2007. La voce del padrino. Mafia, cultura, politica. Verona: Ombre Corte.

Sassen, S. Ed. 2007. Deciphering the Global: Its Spaces, Scales and Subjects. New York: London, Routledge.

Sayad, A. 2006. L'immigration ou les paradoxes de l'altérité. Paris: Editions Raisons d'Agir.

Valenzuela, J.M., Nateras, A. and Reguillo R. 2007. Las maras. Identidades juveniles al limite. Tijuana: Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Tijuana.

Vertovec S., 2004, "Migrant Transnationalism and Modes of Transformation". International Migration Review. 38: 970-1001.

Wolf, D.L. 2002. "There's no Place like Home. Emotional Transnationalism and the Struggles of Second Generation Filipinos". In The Changing Face of Home: The Transnational Lives of the Second Generation, edited by Levitt P., Waters M. C. New York: Russel Sage Foundation.

Chapter 5
Youth cultures in the new century: cultural citizenship and cosmopolitanism

Carmen Leccardi

Introduction

It is well known that when youth cultures are debated outside specialised circles, common sentiments tend to prevail; predominantly negative in nature. Youth cultures – above all in the European context – are held to be almost perfectly in line with the logic of the market, and confined within dominant spatial/temporal organisation; the young people who practise youth cultures are viewed as "victims of risk" (Miles, 2002). However, if we look at the experts' views of these issues (Bennett and Kahn-Harris, 2004; Hodkinson and Deicke, 2007; Machado Pais, 2000; Nilan and Feixa, 2006), the picture becomes more nuanced. On one hand the literature underlines the strong temporal pressure that young people are subject to, made tangible by the fast pace of life in cities, together with the tendency of cities to transform historical space into abstract space (Lefebvre, 1974). Youth cultures bear the marks of the cult of immediacy, held to be one of the consequences – perhaps one of the most visible – of high-speed society (Rosa, 2005; Rosa and Scheuerman, 2009). On the other hand, research highlights direct and indirect youth experimentation in the field of citizenship rights, and "cultural citizenship" in particular (Isin and Wood, 1999). In this context young people act as the new "good citizens", capable of playing an active role in the present day crisis of the *agora*, thus safeguarding forms of participation and rights of

cultural expression. As I will argue in this chapter, it is in this context that young people implement practices of "reterritorialization" (Tomlinson, 1999) of cultural spaces.

Although faced with social processes that are generating new and deep-seated inequalities, and being forced to construct their own lives in a milieu dominated by short-termism, many young people positively manifest a repertoire of creative skills. Thanks to this repertoire, they practise forms of cultural action that are often conceived and constructed in a political, conflictual key. In short, they implement forms of active negotiation with the dynamics of social transformation they encounter. They retain the ability, however contradictory, to give a subjective imprint to the times/spaces of everyday life, and open up to practices of de-privatisation and de-commercialisation. This highlights the close bond that exists today between cultural (and artistic) practices, everyday life and the reconstruction of public spaces in the city (Innerarity, 2006).

Many of the young people actively involved in these forms of cultural citizenship can be viewed as the manifestation of a new intellectual, cosmopolitan and creative elite, capable of critical thought and rich in civic culture. Moreover, many of them represent the world of the arts, a dimension that is often involved in the current battle against loss of points of reference in the political realm (Hundertmark, 2006; Schwartzman, 1985). Yet it should be underlined that active interest in the various manifestations of artistic and art-oriented cultural processes – from street art to cultural associations, from individual artistic practices to contemporary cultural movements making use of the digital world – involves a significant number of young men and women from all walks of life. Understanding these dynamics can therefore enable us to explore aspects that are central to the cultural universe of young people.

This chapter focuses on various dimensions that, taken singly or together, help highlight structural elements of the relationship between cultural citizenship practices and forms of 'domestication' of the space-times of everyday life in cities (Mandich, 2008).[47] To start with, I will look at the social space-time that forms the setting for young people's lives today.

[47] In this chapter, I make use of the results of qualitative research carried out between 2009 and 2010 (see Leccardi, Rampazi and Gambardella, 2011). 50 narrative interviews were collected in Milan. They were with young people aged 18-30, and concerned cultural practices in the city, with specific attention to the relation between these practices and active citizenship.

Living in the "absolute present"

On several occasions Agnes Heller (1999) has referred to the "absolute present" as a common characteristic of contemporary temporal experience of the modern age. In an era of increasingly rapid travel – real or virtual – we can physically move from one country to another in the space of a few hours, immersed in the culture of the absolute present. The places we visit and the relationships we forge with them are dominated by the present, the force that guides our actions and social relationships. The present ends up being our only common "home", the dimension we are all familiar with or obliged to come to terms with.

Heller underlines that the inhabitants of the modern world are obliged to engage not with fixed spaces, whether physical (a village, a particular city) or social (such as class, and the idea of a "destiny" linked to that). Instead they engage with shifting, often fleeting spaces. Furthermore, they have needed to come to terms with a new experience of time, one characterised by discontinuity and fragmentation. This phenomenon has intensified in the contemporary period, where global circuits of communication are now part of our daily lives and transform our everyday existence. The culture of the absolute present reshapes the modern structuring of time, which was based on forging a positive relationship with the future as a central historical timeframe (Leccardi, 2009; 2012). The present replaces this as the privileged point of reference not only for action, but also for planning. Planning is increasingly oriented towards the temporal arena bordering the present – the temporal space that Nowotny (1994) has dubbed the "extended present".

Heller's (1994) reflections appear to be in line with analysis of the culture of new capitalism proposed by Richard Sennett (2006). According to Sennett, instability, which has always been a pillar of the capitalist economy, is optimised in contemporary organisations by the devaluing of "two key elements of the work ethic, deferred gratification and long-term strategic thinking" (Sennett, 2006: 81). At the heart of the traditional work ethic there was a conception of time as a linear, predictable dimension, a rationalized version of time that "enabled people to think about their lives as narratives – narratives not so much of what necessarily will happen as of how things should happen" (Sennett 2006, 23).

At the zenith of modernity, deferred gratification – repressing hedonistic urges with a view to potential future benefits – represented possibly the most important principle that guided our actions in planning the future. It "defined the realm of individual agency and power" (Sennett 2006, 23). An essential part in the process of personal development, the *Bildung* of the individual, deferred gratification made a crucial contribution to the construction of meaning in the modern life story. As social phenomenology emphasises (Berger, Berger and Kellner, 1973), life plans are at the heart of the biographical narration of modernity. More specifically, in the modern age people's lives are closely bound up with the individual belief that they can plan the time ahead of them, and impose their own personal agenda. Life planning is a direct consequence of individual capacity to think in the long term – embracing, for this reason, the concept of deferred gratification. It should be underlined that this vision is directly connected to the representation of social time as time devoted to ongoing improvement and structured by the intertwined times of social institutions. In this context, individual time draws on its direct relationship with social time and its rationalised character.

In the era of the absolute present, however, planning appears inadequate when it comes to guaranteeing a positive relationship with the future. The guiding principle for action appears above all to be flexibility, the ability to follow and adapt to change without excessive resistance; the ability to make decisions rapidly and be ready to abandon a past course of action if necessary. In line with this, people construct their life stories around single "episodes", which are not infrequently viewed as distinct from one another, and not on a continuous line guaranteed by the cumulative representation of time (Bauman, 2000). The present does not appear to prepare for the future, while the past does not represent a store of experiences that can be used in the present. Social change is no longer something that marks the transition between different generations, but something that affects individual biographies with increasing rapidity, at times overwhelmingly, becoming a basic trait of the culture of new capitalism.

In this context, the idea of "once and for all", namely life choices that cannot be changed at a later date if necessary, appears obsolete, especially for young people. The idea of the irreversibility of time and the potential irreversibility of a number of existential decisions (for example those connected to reproduction) is on a collision course with the need to be ready to "seize the moment" (Bauman, 2008). Time is thus

conceived as a discontinuous series of points – marked by constantly forming deadlines. "Schedules" take the place of planning and our social life is pervaded by cultures of temporariness; intertwined with the belief that the ability to exploit the opportunity of the moment, and "ride the wave" represents the lifeline we must cling to in a universe characterised by increasing speed of change and accelerated times.

Our relationship with the future is thus transformed. Now that we no longer use life plans as a tool with which to relate to the future, our lives are characterised by programmes for action in the short and very short term, constructed around activities already under way in the present, or about to commence. Our temporal horizons contract, and our frame of reference becomes, if not the present, the extended present. Basically a plan of action ends when – in the space of a few months, rarely more than a year – the activity in question comes to an end. Examples are temporary job contracts, or being about to complete a qualification, or planning a holiday for the following summer. Elsewhere, for a minority of young people, we can observe what has aptly been dubbed an "indetermination strategy" (Lasen 2001, 90). This term highlights the growing ability of some young men and women who are richer in economic and social resources to interpret the uncertainty of the future as a realm of burgeoning opportunities, representing greater potential for action rather than a limit. They open up to unpredictability, accepting the fact that there may be rapid and radical changes of plan ahead.

It should not however be forgotten that young people's ability to react positively or negatively to this radical restructuring of temporal coordinates and biographical construction is closely bound up with economic, social and cultural resources at their disposal. The more resources they have, the more specific their response to change, and the stronger their ability to maintain control over time in their lives. The fewer their resources, the harder they battle to stay afloat and not lose their way when faced with increased possibilities for experience, caused by the acceleration of the pace of social life (Rosa, 2009).

Both of these responses - on the one hand, actions focused exclusively on the present, and on the other hand, openness to the unexpected, flexibility, and the ability to "seize the moment" - reveal young people's desire to take on the challenge of the future in the accelerated and uncertain age of neoliberalism. Contemporary youth cultures are visibly marked by these responses to the "presentism" of our era. But there is also a

different, no less significant plane of cultural responses to these dynamics. In this case responses are based on everyday *tactics* – to quote de Certeau (1984)[48], that can be employed to forge significant relationships not only with the times and spaces of the city, but also the people who live there. According to de Certeau (1984), the places that the city offers can become lived spaces by using everyday "tactics" such as walking, talking, shopping and moving around, even though those spaces are shaped by a commercial rationale (Crang 2011, 108). This is a form of "everyday art" based on the ability to manipulate events in order to turn them into opportunities for relationships and pleasure – an art that, for large numbers of young people, can be connected to genuine forms of cultural production, often conceived as political action. By means of the minute, apparently insignificant encounters with others that these tactics can elicit, social links can form, space can become public space and time can become shared time[49]. Cultural and social practices based on mutual recognition, exchange, dialogue and gratuity can take shape.

Also thanks to these tactics, some young people manage to creatively "domesticate" many spaces of the city, individually and collectively, rendering them welcoming and reassuring. They thus work to reconstruct balance between times and spaces through practices of reterritorialization and resignification that are capable of combating the frenetic pace of change that governs urban settings in particular (Leccardi, Rampazi and Gambardella, 2011). These practices put the present and future back in touch, sparking processes that restore a form of temporality that is not contracted, not exclusively confined to the present.

For these young people, focusing their energies on the small tactics of everyday life does therefore not mean disorientation or alienation. On the contrary, these practices forge a relationship with time that is positively structured thanks to a meaningful relationship with space – here everything that is "local" is constantly traversed by global circuits, producing new forms of urban spatiality (Sassen, 2000). In parallel, thanks to the creative domesticating practices of young people, public and private spheres tend to present themselves not as discontinuous, opposing dimensions, but as a modular system

[48] "I call a 'tactic' (…) a calculus which cannot count on a 'proper' (a spatial or institutional localization), nor thus on a borderline distinguishing the other as a visible totality (…). A tactic insinuates itself into the other's place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance (…) (B)ecause it does not have a place, a tactic depends on time – it is always on the watch for opportunities that must be seized 'on the wing' (…) It must constantly manipulate events in order to turn them into 'opportunities'" (De Certeau 1984, XIX-XX).

[49] On the relevance of shared times-spaces in young people's everyday lives, see Woodman (2012).

(García Canclini, 1997; Rodrigues Carrano 2002). In other words the public and private spheres mutually influence one another, each contributing to organising the meanings of the other.

Cultural citizenship

It is here, in this arena characterised by hybridisations and potential innovations, that we find the setting for the cultural citizenship (Pakulski 1997; Isin and Wood, 1999; Stevenson, 2003) of young people. This is a form of youth civic engagement of increasing strategic significance. It is defined in terms of the right to access the production, distribution and consumption of cultural goods. Through this there arises a new arena of conflict, namely the struggle to have these rights recognised (Isin and Wood, 1999). The city is the arena where these rights are most exercised. In this context social actors present themselves as citizens in the light of their desire and ability to engage actively and consciously with the world of cultural products and production

It must be emphasised that here the practices of consumption are not demonised as expression of alienation and commodification, as in the critique of mass culture advanced by the Frankfurt School. I view them as dimensions which are in themselves ambivalent, a potential arena for self expression but also, in parallel, an arena which is subjected within power dynamics (Sassatelli, 2007). For example, consumer citizenship (Lash and Urry 1994, 309-310), based on the right to access a wide variety of cultural products, services and goods, reflects these dimensions. Consumption is viewed as an empowering practice, a way of expressing agency and potential creativity, rather than just an overdetermined, passive aspect.[50]

Along the same analytical lines, it should be noted how practices connected to political consumerism (Micheletti, Follesdal and Stolle, 2003; Stolle, Hooghe and

[50] Cultural citizenship, at least in the interpretation proposed by Isin and Wood (1999), appears a broader and more critical concept than that indicated by Lash and Urry (1994). Consumption, for example, is also thematized in the context of analysing inequalities in terms of the economic, cultural and social capital at the consumer's disposal. Moreover, in post-Fordist economies, where specialised consumption has taken over from mass consumption, there is explicit recognition of the role that cultural goods play within broader dynamics of production.

Micheletti, 2005), namely practices forging close links between active citizenship and critical and/or ethical consumerism – belong, to all intents and purposes, to the arena of cultural citizenship. Activities regarding consumerism can therefore represent genuine political activities (Micheletti, 2003), opportunities for collective activism and waging democratic battles, for defending the rights of peoples who might be geographically distant.

The new cultural economy we live in is characterised by the rapid obsolescence of goods and products and an equally immediate availability of identities and lifestyles. Therefore the arena of cultural citizenship represents a socially important dimension from various points of view. Firstly, in general terms it thematizes the link, and highlights potential tensions, between citizenship and identity, thus revealing how current processes of social change have transformed the traditional notion of citizen (Turner, 1990; Isin and Turner, 2002). Today, alongside often discussed dimensions such as ethnicity, the notion of citizenship now includes aspects previously disregarded, such as sexuality, intimacy or ecology. Consequences of this inclusive spectrum include previously unknown tensions between the universalistic power of citizenship and specific demands under the profile of identity. Thus there are two intertwined issues at the forefront of reflections on citizenship: lived experience (Lister, 1997) and recognition (Honneth, 1992). The concept of cultural citizenship, in this sense, addresses the right to full participation in the cultural sphere, together with recognition of experiences and identities that are connected to this participation. As a result, attention is focused not just on the new right to produce and consume symbolic goods; it also concerns identities that take shape around these rights, and the importance of their social recognition.

Secondly, when it comes to the cultural universe and access to cultural goods, the issue of inequality raises another issue, that of capitalising on the multiple meanings, representations and differences between cultures. In short, cultural citizenship today is connected to the right not only to be active, conscious consumers, but also active producers of symbols and meanings (Isin and Wood 1999, 152), temporally and spatially constructed.

If we look at the relationships that young people forge, for example, with the city of Milan from the perspective of cultural citizenship, a number of specific traits emerge, along with dimensions that can be generalized to other European settings. The definitive

Italian metropolis, Milan symbolises two key traits of the Lombardy region: the manufacturing industry and a European outlook. Culturally advanced, and a focal point for innovative cultural trends, Milan is currently experiencing contradictions connected to the economic crisis that is affecting Southern European societies, as well as its own specific contradictions. At the start of the second decade of the new century, many of the city's most culturally active and politically aware young people take a dim view of Milan's relationship with the world of "culture"[51]. Emphasis is instead placed on the overwhelming predominance of commercial concerns; loss of public spaces; the city's failure to open up to artistic experimentation; the problems facing alternative venues for meeting and collective political activity, such as the autonomous social centres[52]; lack of open areas where forms of "doing culture" are possible; the numerous processes of urban transformation focussed on architectural and commercial experimentation rather than preserving spaces for civil society; and absence or scarcity of public support for youth cultural practices. In short, for the most part, the young people interviewed in this study show an incomplete experience of cultural citizenship. At the same time however, they express a widespread desire to take action on this front, which they viewed as a crucial arena for democratic struggle. They wanted to: assert their rights to cultural and artistic practices; defend public areas for meeting, socialising and discussion, and from the perspective of civic growth, acknowledge the importance of "appropriating" urban spaces by means of temporary use.

Young people show an impressive awareness of the potential of cultural practices to create non-accelerated times and domesticated spaces "from scratch" as it were. Several young people involved in the study had personally experienced the close bond, analysed by Lefebvre (1958-1961; 1974), between the dominance of an abstract vision of space viewed as the result of assembling equivalent points, and an equally abstract conception of time as a set of homogeneous, interchangeable instants.[53] In the interviews, accounts

[51] City administrations that governed Milan from the early 1990s to the spring of 2011 were expressly conservative. Consequently, for almost two consecutive decades, cultural policies in the city showed little or no regard for forms of youth participation. Since the summer of 2011 the city has been led by a progressive mayor, Giuliano Pisapia. The study on youth cultural practices in Milan that this paper refers to effectively captures the distinctive climate of cultural crisis but also highlights the responses that young people are capable of formulating.

[52] Autonomous social centres first came into being in Milan around the mid 1970s, and continue to be connected to youth protest movements (Gambardella, 2011). In particular, they are today involved in struggles in favour of migrants' rights.

[53] One of the young people interviewed (aged 24), already active on the national cultural scene as a novelist, underlined for example the relationship between the fact of having access to affordable space in the city and the different *quality* of time that that space contains.

indicated that young people engage in practices of cultural citizenship. They invest their time in initiatives aimed at transforming urban spaces such as collective initiatives, street art projects, they construct neighbourhood-based social spaces and so on. Here space tends to temporalize: it becomes space in movement, always changing, and represents a fundamental component of the experiences that shape it (Crang, 2001). If in cultural practices (including consumption) the "mathematization" of time is never complete, in a similar way the spatial dimension tends never to be entirely deprived of its concrete nature as a medium for interaction.

The cultural citizenship of the young people involved in the study is therefore based on the awareness that cultural practices have the power to *create* times and spaces, and not simply to exist within given times and spaces. From this point of view, young people's criticism, at times fierce, of the accelerated (and commodified) pace of city life is also a protest against the loss of value of "local" spaces – for example when rendered sterile by the absence of collective cultural practices. As we know, today the existence of local spaces is closely bound up with the growing number of global spaces, which are for the most part, but not exclusively, in line with the rationale of the market and consumerism. These are spaces that the city renders present through a continuous flow of information, images, signs and relationships with media technologies.

As a whole, this process not only tends to challenge the very idea of distance in space, but also contributes to a characteristic process of contemporary globalization, known as "deterritorialization", by which cultural experience becomes detached from place, from one or more specific places[54]. Among academics who have explored this issue, Tomlinson (1999) views deterritorialization as a complex, ambivalent cultural condition – something that goes beyond the mere destruction of "localism" or elimination of the bond between culture and place. On the contrary, he emphasises that it is the concept of locality that changes, penetrated as it is by an everyday, routine relationship with the world in its entirety, channelled first and foremost by the web. In this sense Tomlinson proposes seeing reterritorialization as complementary to contemporary processes of deterritorialization, the other side of the tendency to abandon

[54] Giddens observed the "emptying of space", as the result of the separation of space from place, and the transformation of places into "phantasmagoric" situations - "that is to say, locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant from them" (Giddens 1990, 18-19). Appadurai (1998, 49) explains how deterritorialization represents a useful point of reference for exploring the approach of many political formations, increasingly oriented at overcoming confines and territorial identities: as well as, I would add, for thinking about centres of power in the contemporary world.

the local context as a privileged point of reference for the construction of experience. The urge to reterritorialize manifests in the attempt to re-construct a "cultural home", in order to feel at home in our global age (Leccardi, Rampazi and Gambardella, 2011).

The local element therefore does not disappear, but changes: our experience of local space becomes hybrid, a threshold that is present in various different worlds simultaneously. Reterritorialization therefore becomes an active, reflective way of "reconquering" space. And this is what was revealed by the young people we interviewed. It was there in the itineraries they reconstructed in the city, the relational spaces they managed to create – including a new mix of meeting places, combining cafés, wine bars and other venues open to an informal kind of socialising with spaces for political discussion. These are the "third places" described by Oldenburg (1985): settings of informal public life, outside the home and the workplace (therefore "third"), but now playing an increasingly central role as traditional venues for political aggregation enter dire straits.

The cosmopolitan outlook

This process of reterritorialization with which the cultural practices are linked draws on a "cosmopolitan vision" – to quote the title of a book by Ulrich Beck (2004). Cosmopolitanism as global citizenship is not just the biographical preserve of young élite migrants, who use Milan's resources to advance their artistic or scientific careers (Camozzi, in this book). It also features in the biographies of young Italians (and less privileged migrants) for whom "polygamy of place" increasingly appears to be an ordinary part of life. These young people move from one country to another out of need or choice, but often find themselves in a potentially dis-located position even when they are "localized", or stationary. By means of available tools of communication and information, and through the everyday culture that these tools help construct, we increasingly find ourselves inhabiting border zones that are simultaneously inside and outside various different spaces and times. Among other elements, options for entertainment and leisure activities come to us through global flows. By fuelling our imagination, the global cultural flows that surround us contribute to forming new

horizons for biographical action and narration (Appadurai, 1998, 7), accentuating the open, multifaceted nature of the latter. Moreover, as highlighted in the case of students who move from one country to another to further their studies (Cicchelli, 2012), this process contributes to the production of forms of awareness that acknowledge the multiple nature of cultural codes. In this way new forms of cosmopolitan *Bildung* take shape.

Cosmopolitanism therefore appears to be a central feature of the new dynamics of youth cultural citizenship. In young people's experience, openness to cosmopolitanism – defined as both a "state of mind" and a "method for controlling meaning" (Hannerz 1996, 164) – in some ways represents an attitude common to the circles in which they move on a daily basis. This "cosmopolitan inclination" has two particular consequences. The first is connected to the centrality of the aesthetic dimension, linked to the pleasure derived from the variety of cultural experiences and settings that cities possess[55]. All cities are in fact little *cosmoi*, rich in hybrid places. Possible itineraries are constructed around art exhibitions, museums and musical events, but also restaurants, cafés and public venues - symbolic and material spaces that connect the "here" to the "elsewhere". This setting is fertile ground for the form of reflexivity that Lash and Urry (1994) describe as "aesthetic", as opposed to the usual cognitive interpretation of the term. While cognitive reflexivity refers to monitoring of the self and social conditions of life, aesthetic reflexivity manifests in the specific arena of producing and consuming cultural goods, and artistic phenomena. It also refers, for example, to practices that produce meaning in the context of new cultural communities[56]. Aesthetic reflexivity contributes to the creation of a sort of "aesthetic cosmopolitanism" (Lash and Urry 1994, 256), in which openness to cultural otherness and the representation of the world as a place inhabited by a plurality of different cultures (Tomlinson, 1999) is bound up with aesthetic judgements regarding the wealth of images and symbols that characterise our era.

But there is a second aspect of the cosmopolitan vision that emerges as strategic, both with regard to the study findings, and more generally in the ways that young people who are more active in the cultural arena tend to relate to global time-space. This

[55] Peter Berger (1963) reminds us that the association between cities and cosmopolitanism dates back to antiquity. Whether in classical Athens, medieval Paris or Renaissance Florence, city culture has always had a cosmopolitan imprint.

[56] On the topic of "cultural communities", collectives characterised by shared practices in terms of seeking meaning, see Lash (1995).

is the dimension that Saulo Cwerner (2000) dubbed "chronopolitanism". Cwerner's explanation combines the spatial extension of the *cosmos* – the basis of cosmopolitanism, which highlights new forms of citizenship and identity in terms of rights *across* space – with the dimension of time (*chronos*). In this framework, rights and responsibilities not only cross space, but also time. It implies looking both to the past, and therefore working on memory, and envisaging the distant future, the "political future", that of those not yet born, with a sense of personal responsibility to them (see Jonas, 1979).

Among the young people involved in this study, the chronopolitan ideal manifests itself above all in a quest. This quest is undertaken through deployment of cultural practices to forge a meaningful relationship with the political and cultural past that a given part of the city narrates. This narration can comprise major, epoch-making events (such as the terrorist attack at Piazza Fontana[57]), or smaller scale incidents which nonetheless have symbolic and political resonance, such as a social centre being evicted (or demolished, as in the case of the *"La stecca degli artigiani"* in the Isola neighbourhood), or an open square being turned into an closed area by city authorities. These places in turn embody a potentially different time, which contains a different rationale and a different relationship with values.

Once removed from utilitarian calculations, time is not considered as an abstract element. This reframing of time makes room for the subjective dimension, becoming, like space, a medium for reconstructing forms of public responsibility, and a manifestation of "the individual's inclination to contribute to collective wellbeing" (Privitera 2001, 146). In short, we can assert that by interweaving a sense of global belonging with forms of re-temporalization, the chronopolitan ideal has a positive influence on the relationship with, and domestication of, spaces of the city. Indeed this particular manifestation of citizenship contains antibodies against the overwhelming focus on the present that, as observed at the start of the chapter, now so significantly conditions young people's identity construction. Within cultural practices that bear the mark of chronopolitanism, the present opens up to the future from at least two angles. In the first place, the kind of global present on which this vision is based calls attention to

[57] On 12 December 1969 a bomb exploded in a bank in Milan, Banca dell'Agricoltura, located in Piazza Fontana. 16 people were killed and dozens more wounded in the attack, which was the work of neo-Fascist groups campaigning for more authoritarian leadership in the country. The incident was the first in a long series of terrorist attacks which went on in Italy throughout the 1970s.

differing paces of social life, starting from modes of production and exchange. The dynamic, shifting nature of the latter is naturally projected towards the future. Secondly, the bond between city and memory that chronopolitanism in a way safeguards, means that the future, as symmetrical to the past, can once more broaden our horizons. The more distant future remains cloaked in uncertainty. However, the fact of opening up to the long view, occasioned by a subjectively significant relationship with the past, appears to be a powerful antidote to the presentification that accompanies "acceleration societies" like a shadow (Leccardi, 2009).

It is important to highlight the importance of this openness when it comes to transforming cultural citizenship into citizenship as such. Through this openness, the chronopolitan young people in our study emerge even more clearly as *good* citizens (Sciolla, 2004): interested in the *res publica*, and in making mechanisms of power publically visible. They possess the competencies and commitment to take action on questions of general importance, and are capable of projecting individual and collective responsibility forward in time. Moreover, in parallel to that, they believe in the need to combine rights and responsibilities with affirmation of the subjective dimension. All of these aspects link with the concept of active citizenship that is in turn necessarily bound up with a notion of temporality open to the future. As Scheuerman (2009, 297) wrote with regard to the relationship between time and citizenship:

> Public life rests on the citizen's ability to pursue relatively long-term goals as well as basic capacity for undertaking mutual commitments; effective action in concert with our peers may be impossible otherwise.

Without the future, in a social time that is accelerated and focused purely on the present, the very idea of democracy is groundless, and symmetrically, so is that of the public sphere.

To conclude, the practices of cultural citizenship that the research highlights have a central focus on the present. Yet they seem to be bound up with a chronopolitan outlook, and thus are capable of sparking not only significant processes of reappropriation of the spaces of the city, but also cultures that can reconquer forms of historic temporality, and therefore open to both past and future.

References

Appadurai, A. 1998. Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Bauman, Z. 2000. Liquid Modernity. Polity Press: Cambridge.

Bauman, Z. 2008. New Performance of the Old vs. Young Drama, Generalitat de Catalunya, Secretaria de Joventut, Barcelona.

Beck, U. 2004. Der kosmopolitische Blick oder: Krieg ist Frieden. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Bennett, A. and Kahn-Harris, K. 2004. Critical Studies in Contemporary Youth Culture. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Berger P. 1963. Invitation to Sociology. A Humanistic Perspective. New York: Penguin Books.

Berger P., Berger B., Kellner H. 1973. The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness. New York: Random House.

Certeau De, M. 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Cicchelli, V. 2012. L'esprit cosmopolite. Voyages de formation juvéniles et cultures européennes. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

Crang, M. 2001. Rhythms of the City: Temporalised Space and Motion. In Timespace. Geographies of Temporality, edited by J. May, N. Thrift. London and New York: Routledge.

Cwerner S. B. 2000. "The Chronopolitan Ideal: Time, Belonging and Globalization". Time & Society 9: 331-345.

Gambardella M. G. 2011. Alla conquista dello spazio pubblico. In Sentirsi a casa. I giovani e la riconquista dello spazio-tempo della casa e della metropoli, edited by C. Leccardi, M. Rampazi. M. C. Gambardella. Novara: UTET.

Garcia Canclini, N. 1997. Cultura y comunicación: entre lo global y lo local, Facultad de Periodismo y Comunicacion Social. Buenos Aires: La Plata.

Giddens, A. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hannerz, R. 1996. Transnational Connections. London: Routledge.

Heller, A. 1999. A Theory of Modernity, Blackwell, Oxford. Heller,

Hodkinson, P and Deicke, W. 2007. Youth Cultures: Scenes, Subculture and Tribes. New York: Routledge.

Honneth, A. 1992. Kampf um Anerkennung. Grammatik sozialer Konflikte. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,

Innerarity, D. .2006. El nuevo espacio publico. Madrid: Espasa Calpe.

Hundertmark, C. H. 2005. Art of Rebellion: The World of Street Art. Berkeley – Hamburg: Gingko Press.

Isin, E. F. and Wood, P. K. 1999. Citizenship & Identity. London: Sage.

Isin, E. F. and Turner, B. S. eds. 2002. Handbook of Citizenship Studies, London: Sage.

Jonas, H. 1979. Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuche einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation.

Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag.

Lasen, A. 2001. Le temps des jeunes. Rythmes, durée et virtualités. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Lash, S. and Urry, J. 1994. Economies of Signs and Space. London: Sage.

Leccardi, C. 2009. Sociologie del tempo. Soggetti e tempo nella società dell'accelerazione., Roma-Bari: Laterza.

Leccardi, C. 2012 "Young People's Representations of the Future and the Acceleration of Time. A Generational Approach." Diskurs Kindheits- und Jugendforschung 7: 59-73.

Leccardi, C., Gambardella, M. G. And Rampazi, M. 2011. Sentirsi a casa. I giovani e la riconquista dello spazio-tempo della casa e della metropoli. Novara: UTET.

Lefebvre, H. 1958-1961. Critique de la vie quotidienne. Paris: L'Arche.

Lefebvre, H. 1974. La production de l'espace. Paris: Anthropos.

Lister, R. 1997. "Citizenship: Towards a Feminist Synthesis." Feminist Review 57: 28-48.

Machado Pais, L. 2000. "Transitions and Youth Cultures: Forms and Performances." International Social Science Journal 5: 219-232.

Mandich, G. 2008. "Domesticating Urban Space. Including Public Spaces in the Domestic Sphere." Paper presented at ISA Forum of Sociology, Sociological Research and Public Debate, Barcelona, Spain, 5-8 September.

Micheletti, M. 2003. Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism and Collective Action. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Micheletti, M., Follesdal, A and Stolle, D., eds. 2003. Politics, Products and Markets. Exploring Political Consumerism

Past and Present. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Miles, S. 2002. "Victims of Risk? Young People and the Construction of Lifestyles." In Young People in Risk Society, edited by M. Cieslik, G. Pollock. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Nilan, P. and Fexia, C., eds. 2006 Global Youth? Hybrid Identities, Plural Worlds. London and New York: Routledge.

Nowotny, H. 1994. Time: the Modern and Postmodern Experience. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Oldenburg, R. 1985. The Great Good Place: Cafes, Community Centers, Beauty Parlors, General Store,

Bars, Hangouts and How They Get You Through the Day. New York: Paragon Books.

Pakulski, J. 1997. "Cultural Citizenship." Citizenship Studies 1: 73-86.

Privitera, W. 2001. Sfera pubblica e democratizzazione. Roma-Bari: Laterza.

Rodrigeues Carrano, P. C. 2002. Los jovens e a cidade. Buenos Aires: Relume Dumará.

Rosa, H. 2005. Bechleunigung. Die Veränderung der Zeitstrukturen in der Moderne. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,.

Rosa, H. 2009. "Social Acceleration: Ethical and Political Consequences of a Desynchronized High-Speed Society." In High-Speed Society. Social Acceleration, Power, and Modernity, edited by H. Rosa, W. E. Scheurman. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press.

Rosa, H. and Scheuerman, W. E., eds. 2009 High-Speed Society. Social Acceleration, Power, and Modernity.

Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press.

Sassatelli, R. 2007. Consumer Culture: History, Theory and Politics. London: Sage.

Sassen, S. 2000. Cities in a World Economy. Thousand Oaks (CA): Pine Forge Press.

Scheuerman, W. E. 2009. "Citizenship and Speed." In High-Speed Society. Social Acceleration, Power, and Modernity, edited by H. Rosa e W. E. Scheuerman. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press.

Sciolla, L. 2004. "La terza sfera. La sfera pubblica tra società civile e Stato." In Sociologia ed esperienza di vita. Scritti in onore di Franco Crespi, edited by R. Segatori, C. Cristofori, A. Santambrogio Bologna: il Mulino.

Schwartzman, A. 1985. Street Art. New York: Doubleday.

Sennett, R. 2006. The Culture of the New Capitalism. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Stolle, D., Hooghe, M. and Micheletti, M. 2005 "Politics in the Supermarket: Political Consumerism as a Form of Political Participation." International Political Science Review/Revue Internationale de Science Politique 26: 245-269.

Tomlinson, J. 1999 Globalization and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Turner, B. S. 1990. "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship." Sociology, 24: 189-217.

Woodman, D. 2012. "Life out of Synch: How New Patterns of Further Education and the Rise of Precarious Employment are Reshaping Young People's Relationships." Sociology 46: 1074-1090.

Part II

Young Glocals

Foreword

Pam Nilan

The second section of this book is concerned with accounts of youth cultures that evidence space-time dimensions of the interface of the global and the local, what is sometimes called the "glocal." It deals primarily with what we have identified in this book as *body chronotopes* - private and/or intimate spaces/times for personal identity, and *corner chronotopes* - semi-public and/or clandestine intersubjective spaces/times for group identity. The authors of the chapters that follow depict real and symbolic struggles over local space-time universes of meaning that are bound up with global themes.

In his 1995 landmark essay "Glocalization: Time-space and homogeneity-heterogeneity", Roland Robertson argues that much of the talk about globalization assumes it to be a process that overrides locality, smoothing out long-lasting regional traditions and enforcing bland homogeneity on the diverse cultural richness of many places in the world. However, what is often called local is to a large extent constructed on a trans- or supra-local basis. For example, calls to protect the local can sometimes mean strategies to protect the politically-defined national interest, or to maintain a set of country-wide systems first imposed during the colonial era or under religious conversion or prosletysing. In fact, cultures are never static. The cultural traditions of all nations have absorbed and synthesized waves of influence, invasion and colonisation over the centuries. Cultural mixing is nothing new.

Yet the current youth generation is growing up in unprecedented conditions of time-space shrinkage (Harvey 1990) that accelerates the rate of transcultural influence. Two decades of new information and communication technologies have altered the space-time dimensions of youth cultures. Young people are connected through the local to the global in ways never seen before. Yet this does not set them free from their immediate context. They are still local, and they move through local space and local time. They

deal with local authorities, regulations and rigidities. They find and develop their own local spaces – real and virtual - to make globally-inflected youth practices in conditions of their own choice.

Anthony Giddens (1991, 21) maintains that the term globalization proposes "time–space distanciation." That is, the process of globalization is assumed to affect the intersection of presence and absence so that social events and social relations at a distance become interlaced with the local context. Robertson (1995) took this further, arguing that the inferred opposition and distance between local and global is an illusion. Rather, the local in the global, and the global in the local, are co-nested in the process he called "glocalization." Here, globalization and localization are not in tension but constituted in simultaneity. In brief, what happens locally has global impact, and what happens globally has local impact. Thus the concept of "glocal" in regard to youth designates constant change, flowing from local to global and back again; with no fixed beginning or end, like a möbius strip. Modern mass media and ICT networking accelerates the seamless constitution of the glocal. The global city is a space where there is rapid simultaneous blending of national, homeland and local ethnic identities with attractive identity frames that come from far away, from seemingly exotic places like the USA that are more imagined than real. Thus, urban young people in the global cities of the world may readily develop a "glocal" cultural identity relevant to both global phenomena and local culture, generating moral panic and distaste in the local adult population.

Ferreira's chapter on tattooed young bodies in Portugal offers a compelling instance of this intergenerational phenomenon. The chapter also provides an example of the *body chronotope*. There is no more private nor intimate space-time for creative expression of personal identity than the young body itself. Ferreira demonstrates that the young body as a social construction is maintained and modified, with the locus of control mediated by a network of institutions and individuals in both the public and private spheres. The youthful tattooed body is experienced relative to the time and space of the urban context. The local corporeal investment of tattooing confronts the globalised imaginary of the idealised figure of youth.

Bakhtin's concept of the *threshold chronotope* - a place for crisis and break in a life, a corridor, passages – informs the development of six multiple dimensions of chronotope in Jeolas and Kordes' chapter on young men's illegal street racing in Brazil.

These dimensions are: rift, brink, eruption, cleft, share, and burning around. All are subversive, and challenge both regulation and the status quo division of work and leisure. Confirming the extent to which information and communication technologies alter space-time dimensions of youth cultures, the researchers accessed the illegal street-racing community, initially through their different internet communities. In these virtual communication spaces the illegal street-racers discussed their practices and decisions for races conducted in the physical spaces of legal and illegal racing zones. In terms of temporality, the illegal street racers were trying to remain young, to defy time. This is a juvenilising culture that continues until the male body and spirit can no longer support it.

The chapter on hip-hop youth culture in Nigeria by Nwabueze directly addresses the engagement of the global and the local. Hip-hop is extremely popular among African youth and the internet is the means by which they observe, imbibe, learn, as well as sample, hip-hop tastes, cultures, values and ideas, not only from Western countries but from elsewhere in Africa. Nigerian youth are claiming hip-hop spaces – both virtual and real - to exercise their agency through music, language, art and lifestyle, enterprises that are distanced from adult imperatives and the traditions of the past. It is claimed that global communication and media have legitimised the appeal and adoption of western lifestyles by local youth through reinforcement of hip-hop values. Nigerian hip hop youth culture provides an example of the *corner chronotope* - semi-public and/or clandestine intersubjective space-time for creating and developing a group identity judged to be subversive in the eyes of the conservative older generation.

Iran is not exempt from the influence of global youth culture either, despite its isolationist cultural policies and a partial ban on popular music. The chapter by Shahabi and Golpoush-Nezhad on young Iranian rappers is, like the Ferreira chapter, not only an instance of the "glocal", but an example of the *body chronotope* – use of private and/or intimate space-time for the expression of personal identity. The corporeal actuality and representation of the rapper is stigmatised, especially if female. It is also an example of the *corner chronotope.* Persian rappers search for semi-public and/or clandestine intersubjective space-time to make music and thereby create a group identity judged to be subversive in the eyes of Muslim authorities. Due to strict government control, the rap music industry is primarily underground. The researchers collected data in recording venues as well as the rappers' homes and family gatherings and in some cases parks and

other public spaces. Or they used skype. In Iran, global rap youth culture has been translated, appropriated and creolised to fit into local social structures and issues, in a context where it is technically illegal.

The final chapter on young Muslim men fighting in Indonesia considers spatial, temporal and symbolic dimensions of the *body chronotope,* given that physical combat is an intimate intersubjective space for struggle over identities. Fights take place in specific urban spaces and at particular times, revealing territorial meanings and contestations. They represent threshhold events in the young men's temporal transition to adulthood. This is an example of glocalization because the fighting sides are often Muslim and Christian. In their local warrior symbolism Muslim schoolboy gangs use the imagery of the Palestine-Israel conflict as depicted and disseminated through global media.

These five chapters illustrate significant points about youth cultures in relation to space, time and the glocal; firstly through the chronotopes they exemplify; and secondly through allowing us to glimpse how the local in the global and the global in the local manifests as praxis. Through these ethnographic accounts we can read the space-time experiences of urban youth in many different countries not only as symbolic engagement, but as social practice. In their collective social practices of identity expression they are redefining the city in space and time while they struggle for autonomy in everyday life.

References

Giddens, Anthony. 1991. *Modernity and Self-Identity*. Oxford: Polity.

Harvey, David. 1990. *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Robertson, Roland. 1995. "Glocalization: Time-space and Homogeneity- Heterogeneity." In *Global Modernities*, edited by Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash and Roland Robertson, 25-44. London: Sage.

Chapter 6
Juvenilising cultures: illegal and legal road racing in Londrina, Brazil

Leila Jeolás and Hagen Kordes

Introduction

This chapter describes a young men's chronotope *par excellence*: their races and chases in motorcycles and cars. The chronotope exists between legal autodromes and illegal roads, between acceleration and accident, between death and life, sufferance and enjoyment, singularisation and conformism, between rites of passage and games of dead ends ("rites of impasse"); between an ending and an endless youth. This study deals in particular with masculinity and risk in Brazilian urban areas. We seek to comprehend life-threatening car and motorcycle manouevres and road racing stunts, beginning with the signification that young racing enthusiasts give to their experiences with speed and thrills.

Due to the illegal nature of road racing − "rachas" in Portuguese − the research process began in the virtual field of the internet community where young racers present and discuss their attraction (or even addiction) to acceleration and risk. Data were later collected in the actual research field on the roads, where these illegal races take place, and at the autodrome (the city's racing track), where the legal races occur. The urban

space for rachas as a social practice is constituted by several groups whose members differentiate themselves through contrasting preferences in cars or motorbikes, brands, music and clothing. In this process of distinction they deploy and modify their bodies, seeking for prestige and social reputation. What we see is a kind of "humachine" being constituted by the risk of a vehicle making a frenzied standstill during the race. High-tuning their engines, the "rachadores" are ready to transgress limits of speed and safety. Their wild run does not just go straight forward. Their trajectories are packed with obstacles and even obstructions. We could call this a kind of "parcours at risk". Acceleration has always to be synchronised with deceleration in order to pass by the walls and beat the curves. By means of such double manouevres their performances exhibit the combined power of body and machine. The vehicle and the driver comprise a sort of "muscle car", in which consciousness and technology are interpenetrated in the performance of steering. All this is highly attractive in poor male urban youth cultures within the framework of hypermodernity in contemporary Brazil.

We have followed a key theme of this book in describing the races and chases of the "rachadores" as a chronotope (Bakhtin, 2008). But our concept of chronotope is not limited to a Greek-classic conjunction of time (chronos) and space (topos), but is extended, through the concept of hypermodern automobilisation, to new dimensions of energy and information (Virilio, 1993): thus information energy. The interface between man and environment is displaced by the acceleration of human technology and history (Braudel, 1998). Information has became the main "difference which makes a difference" (Bateson 1977, 453). The theatre of action for illegal car and motorcycle road racers is chronotopic by definition: it takes place physically on roads and at race tracks, temporalised by the speed and acceleration of the races: chases and crashes,

wheeling and drifting, burn outs and "electric chairs"[58]. From our study we offer some specific patterns that imply "surmodern" (Augé, 1992) or hypermodern[59] configurations of acceleration (Rosa, 2010; Virilio, 1996, 1999) and risk (Douglas, 1994, 1996; Luhmann, 1992). We analyse this to be a "field"[60] of compressed space-time and energy-information (Virilio, 1993), in other words: chronotope(s) (Clifford, 2008; Bakhtin, 2008). We outline these chronotopes below.

Juvenilising cultures

To contextualise our research for an international readership we need to locate the articulations and actions of the rachadores (racers) in a broader, macrosocial, context. We would like to propose that the life journey of young men in this juvenilising culture (in Portuguese: *juvenilização da cultura*) mimics the parcours trope of acceleration and deceleration, of dealing with obstacles and engaging vertigo. These same features of parcours characterise their racing. Rachas experiences are emblematic of life in a hypermodern world. At the end of this chapter we will align these major concepts with

[58] *Wheeling:* a stunt in which the front wheel or wheels of a motorcycle, are raised so that the vehicle is balanced momentarily on its rear wheel or wheels; *Drifting* refers to a driving technique and to a motorsport, initiated in Japan, where the driver intentionally oversteers, causing loss of traction in the rear wheels through turns, while maintaining vehicle control and high exit speed; *Burn out*: makes the wheels burn and explode. Elements of destruction, agony and prestige can be found in the practice of the latter, like in the potlatch analyzed by Mauss (1974). However, here we see the effects of class and market. These young people practice burn outs with old and used tires which were going to be discarded, since they can rarely afford to buy new ones. *"Electric Chair*": a radical stunt with a car especially tuned/modified for Race Track shows.

[59] Hypermodernity is one of the currently used terms that designate the current historical epoch, like surmodern(ity). Both terms refer to exaggerated critical (economical, financial, cultural, political, biographical) developments.

[60] The ethnographic research on "rachas" (road races) was carried out in Londrina, Paraná, Brazil, between 2007 and 2009. The research adopted several techniques and approaches: internet research in communities that have a special interest in these rallies; field research carried out with the help of a student - also a rally participant - who acted as our guide and research assistant; observation and preparation of a field log; informal conversations and formal interviews registered and transcribed; pictures and videos.

the articulations and actions of the rachadores (see Jeolás and Kordes, 2010). First however, we need to make some key points.

Juvenilising cultures are not marked off by a sole age category, but expand through various generations. They are not limited to a transitional "youth culture" but are part of a longer life course. We prefer to speak here of juvenilising cultures that stretch the apparently time-bounded phase of youth over multifarious (pre/post-adol-adul-escent) groupings. Juvenilising cultures are characterised by an ongoing desire for risk, fun, more freedom and fewer obligations. They extend the world of adulescence (Anatrella, 2009) with its precarious career opportunities and time-limited sentimental connections. These juvenilizing cultures emerge in hypermodern societies.

By using the term hypermodern we fully acknowledge the excesses of "surmodernity" (Augé, 1992), its liquefying effects on communication (Bauman, 2000) and its aggravated individualising risks (Beck, 1992). More and more an "emerging" state like Brazil is affected by the turmoil of surmodernity. In this context social scientists speak of "life course" (Levy, 2005); but here we prefer the term parcours (or parkour) at risk. This may seem tautological, for in the international world of extreme sport and leisure the term parcours already connotes risk: running courses containing a multitude of obstacles and even obstructions. However, we introduce "parcours" as a new hypermodern notion that can substitute for outdated premodern concepts such as "cycle" (biological reproduction or regeneration, season of life or destiny) or the modern category of "development" (trajectory or career). The concept of parcours at risk aptly describes the life course of rachas, confronting the traditional "rites of passage" with contemporary "rites of impasse" (Feixa, 2008).

Rachas

Brazilian illegal road racers ("rachadores")[61] call their races and chases "rachas", a term that originally had nothing to do with racing. In the Brazilian-Portuguese language, it originated from the latin verb *crepare*, referring to a rift, crevice/*crevasse* or fracture/ *fissure*. The term is marked by a certain sexist character that observers from outside can easily overestimate. It is important not to assign external meanings. The rachadores use a jargon among themselves as practitioners of racing. The concept of rachas is most important in this jargon. They divert and invert terms and concepts that are crucial to their experience of racing.

We have taken their original significations as they manifest in this rachas jargon and rewritten them in six multiple dimensions of chronotope:

1. A combined technical and geographical dimension (*rift*), when their races and chases introduce a rupture in the continuum of the autodrome; exposing them to illegality and insecurity ("racha") – instead of legality and security.

2. A technological and biographical dimension (*brink*), when their high risk accelerating and decelerating gives rise to vertigo ("adrenalina") – the meaning is around losing or taking control.

3. A neuropsychological dimension (*eruption)* when their wild runs and manouevres burst out into fun ("brincadeira") and laughter – and do not end in suffering or death.

[61] Besides the fact that all participants are male, the profile of the road racers varied. For example, ages ranged from 18 to 40 years old. Youngsters from the lowest social classes prevail in the universe of low-cylinder motorcycles; they use their motorcycles not only to work but to participate in "rachas". In the universe of cars, however, most young racers come from the lower middle class. They use second-hand repaired and modified cars according to their means. Some from high income levels use brand new, tuned-up cars.

4. A socio-sexual (gender) dimension (*cleft),* when they emphasise the pleasure of their racing mastery ("domínio") – ranking it higher than the pleasure of sexual intercourse with women.

5. A socio-cultural dimension (*share*), when they oppose a common meaning of racha (*divide*) as partition ("partilha"), by freely sharing with friends – in the opposite direction to unrestrained competitiveness. They share their goods, drinks and money.

6. A biographical and at the same time historical dimension *(burning around),* when they maintain and even celebrate their state of endless, flexible, juvenilizing culture ("juvenilização") – breaking the consistency of the time-limited, stable divisions of childhood and adulthood as structures.

1. Rift: chronotope fractured in the autodrome and on the roads

In order to give some concrete representations of the chronotopes that we present and analyse in this chapter, we have transcribed some excerpts of interviews conducted with four protagonists in our parcours research. We have selected two motorcycle racers, "Techno-Titan" and "Fun-Titan", who perceive risk mainly as the desire to have fun; and two car racers, "Rock-Dodge" and "Pilot-V8", who celebrate the challenge of wild runs in their old, but extremely powerful cars with V8 motors (a Dodge Chrysler and a Ford Galaxie):

Rift

Techno-Titan[62]	**Fun-Titan**[63]	**Rock-Dodge**[64]	**Pilot-V8**[65]
Around Buddies it is very dangerous to rally. On the roads, the motorcycles can easily crash because they cross small roads at intersections all the time. Here, around 'Igapó', it's all straight forward and the road is wide and fast. The races can happen any day, often around midnight, and you just call and decide who is going to be your opponent.	*I work with my boys who like to go for a "racha", either on the roads or in the autodrome. I recommend the autodrome* [they start laughing], *but yes, it is true, the Racing Track circuit is much too short for motorcycles that need more space to pick up speed. The thrill of the street is much greater.*	*Because the autodrome is fairly straight, the challenge lies more in the preparation of the vehicle; it remains a technical game. Whereas on the road, the challenge is to beat the curves faster than my opponent, and, of course, when the cops appear, there is the illegality. I think, it is the fact that you are breaking safety rules that thrills those who really like to take risks.*	*In the eighties we were called the "invaders" because we started our rallies with four Dodges on a wild racing track built on the natural sands and stones of old roads and the police were always after us. Now, if you see me enter the autodrome, everybody gets silent and looks at me, and wonders: How can someone drive a car weighing 3000 kilos, at 200 km/h, in a straight circuit of the autodrome?*

These insights into the chronotype of *rift* give a sense of the range of experiences for rachadores and also demonstrate how our research had to move according to the race

[62] Techno-Titan works as a mechanic in a garage specialising in motorbikes.
[63] Fun-Titan has his own garage specialised for motorcycles and organizing motorcycle races. He introduced me to his apprentices and clients, who were all around us as he spoke.
[64] Being a "rachador" and social science student Rock-Dodge has become much more than an informant: a research-mediator. In the beginning, he took me to the autodrome but then quickly directed me to the real hot places: the meeting points and the roads.
[65] Pilot V8 has a great car and says he was "*born and raised in a V8"*. He races on city streets anywhere, anytime. He prefers the more radical chases ("pegas") on the roads or city highways, leaving behind even BMW and Audi drivers.

itself, across all places and phases of these rachas. However, first of all we got in touch with the different internet communities, with their virtual communication spaces in which they discuss their practices. We were allowed to "lurk" in their discussions and decisions (Jeolás, 2009). With the privileged help of our informant Rock-Dodge, we gained access to the different informal, illegal racing sites, all of them located on the outskirts of town. While the Autodrome Ayrton Senna (Londrina city´s Racing Track) and the airport (a public square and a service station next to the airport) attract both car and motorcycle racers, the other two sites, "Buddies" (a road in front of a night club) and "Igapó" (a road next to some industries), are popular mainly among motorcyclists. In the beginning, Rock-Dodge took us to the autodrome where he organised barbecues in the Dodge-Box, and prepared interviews with managers and racers. The autodrome was built by the municipality and is used to control and frame what would otherwise be illegal races. Every two weeks, the organisation board offers a "Hot Friday", when car racers can rent boxes that are strictly and even hierarchically separated according to vehicle types, brands and engine power. Old "roadside screws" of the Hot Rod generation in the fifties compete with tuned up "pocket missiles" of the latest "Fast and Furious" generation who bypass the "Wild Runner" style of the tuner generation in the seventies.

They use "Body Kits", "Crazy Paint", "Nitrous Systems", sport air filters and sport air exhaust systems. Hot Friday competitions are between two racers only, along a 200 metre track. They also save some extra time and place for parades and stunts such as wheeling and drifting, electric chair and burn outs. Thousands of visitors participate in a funfair surrounding the tracks. There is a mix of noise and smell produced by the racing cars, music blasting out from the cars, information coming out from the loudspeakers,

and the cries and screams coming from the spectators. There are a multitude of barbecue places (in nearly every box) and bars for drinks.

However, the autodrome is just a general manifestation of racha culture. The real action often starts later, around meeting places downtown. According to informants, the races in the autodrome are good just for preparation and verification. The "real" rachas are *chronotoped* on the city's roads. Motorcycle races start from the two most important meeting points: Buddies and Igapó. The Buddies site attracts the low-cylinder bikes of younger and poorer men who come from the lower class suburbs and nearby slums. There we find Fun-Titan, offering his specialised services to racers: preparation and repairing, selling and renting, but mainly tuning[66] and modifying "unrestrained" and "unbridled" engines. Buddies night club is located on a very narrow road that is usually very crowded, so the racing and chasing must take place away from the building. Races are decided in a dissimulated and coded manner. The Igapó site, on the other hand, assembles less marginal racers and fans in front of a straight and fast broad street. The local airport site is mainly for car racers. A starting point for races and chases, it hosts racers with their tuned up cars.

All these rallies are the lively expression of the *rift* that acceleration as risk introduces in the continuum of space and time. Risk behavior between autodrome and roads oscillates between legality and illegality and between security and insecurity. The *rift* chronotope synthesises dimensions of technology, energy and information (Virilio, 1993). Pilot-V8 gives us a historical example. Since his childhood he has always been in the company of the founders of the local racing track. Nowadays, he has moved beyond the "childish"

[66] Tuning or tuning up refers to the modifications made in the engine of a car or motorcycle to increase its power and aerodynamics through the use of accessories; personalising it and promoting better performance. Nowadays tuning also involves making visual changes, such as in the tires (often replaced by those with greater diameter), a body kit, a totally revised, personalised interior, and the lowering of the car body. The aim is to look different from other cars and from the original model, demonstrating one's own personality.

years of the rachas to look for wilder and faster racing experiences: “pegas” - thrilling chases on the major highways. His vision relies on the midnight “biopolitics” of opportunity that urban cityscapes offer for free youth culture practices. After a wild midnight basketball game and skating spins in the slums, they can move to post-midnight racing and chasing tracks reserved for wild runners, away from police control, yet “framed” by older professional racers.

2. *Brink: chronotope of synchronised acceleration and deceleration*

Some social scientists writing about surmodern or hypermodern (Augé, 1992; Balandier, 1994) times postulate that it is essentially “acceleration” (Rosa, 2010; Virilio, 1996) that characterises socio-cultural change rather than individualisation, global market civilisation or “flexibilisation” (Sennett, 1994). Yet we wish to avoid unidimensional explanations. In the case of acceleration we do not understand the term in its strictly technical sense. Rather, automobile technologies compress space and time, inciting human beings to increase speed and take more risks. People now engage much less with external “dangers” (Featherstone, 2004; Flonneau and Guigueno, 2009; Giucci, 2004; Sávio, 2003). Rather they compress more and more new energy and information into their life experiences. Acceleration in racing is an example of this. Furthermore the rachadores are not limited to just speed gained through acceleration. Some of their activities rely on braking manouevres (cascades): in front of walls, in sharp turns, during burn outs, and in the “electric chair”.

We can formulate it more concretely and at the same time more paradoxically: the immediacy of movements in time and space is signalled by asynchronous events such as “braking acceleration” and a “frenzied standstill” (Virilio, 1993). This complex

relationship between acceleration, braking and risk can be better understood by the comments made by four of our rachadores:

Brink

Techno-Titan	**Fun-Titan**	**Rock-Dodge**	**Pilot-V8**
To participate in a race means to drive close to your opponent. Sometimes I feel like not going, either because I do not feel well or because I fear something can happen. One should never go for a Russian roulette, never!	*This happens when there is competition: if there is only a little distance between me and the motorcycle in front of me, it is possible to grip him with my hand, and I can pull him behind me in order to overtake. But what is even more important in a race, especially when the engine is not powerful enough, is to remain in the vacuum produced by the motorcycle ahead of you; in this case you can follow him and, next to the finish line you overtake him or you take his foot and pull him , then he will lose, he must stop. I also use my hands,*	*During the races I can feel when my opponent is scared, when he fears to go too fast on a curve, to take too much risk. What will happen? He will fear to enter a curve at 100km/h. But I will go at 120km/h because surely he will get frightened, and I will give even more speed and brake only in the last second, understand? Adrenaline is much*	*Can you imagine driving a V8 which is as powerful as a Dodgster? You can go from 0 to 100 km/h in two seconds; there is no Ferrari or Porsche that can do that. That speed (acceleration) can only be managed with balanced control: total mastery and total sensibility. You see … the kids who run the race without this balance, you never see them laugh. Adrenaline means*

For me that is a risk that I can control, not a danger that could hurt me.	*with one hand I change the gears and with the other hand I hold him and pull him behind. That`s what we always do. If a friend falls, he gets up; if he does not stand up, we help him up and we continue.*	*higher because speed and suspense are also high.*	*taking care of the car, of the competitor, of the speed, of the whole performance. It`s a complicated game: between control and lack of control.*

For Rock-Dodge, to race means beating the curves. It is a question of accelerating non-stop and braking later and more smoothly. According to him, those who do not go all the way, beyond the potential limits of this thrilling experience, show they are scared. The motorcycle racha is usually between two competitors who try to pull the other racer back; the one who falls or gives up, loses the race. We note that Techno-Titan refuses this strict logic if there is a risk that he cannot control. His notion of "risk" here seems to come directly out of sociology handbooks: it relies on individual decision-making, not on collective "danger" (Luhmann, 1992). Pilot-V8 emphasizes the raw speed and utmost acceleration of the races. For him it seems much more important than funny stunts. It is a complex game between losing control and taking control, and requires a balance, he says, between "total mastery" and "total sensibility".

Although the four racers speak differently in relation to acceleration and risk, they all imply the same kind of structural process: they start up → slip out → and pick up. The French call this "démarrer" → "déraper" → "répérer". In Brazil we call it "arrancar" → "derrapar" → "controlar". In a race the rachadores start up with maximum acceleration;

then the race might slip out of control; for a moment, or until the last minute. They then pick up, recover, and master the operation to complete the race. This sequence is not necessarily logical, rather it is an art. And the art lies not only in the releasing of the brakes and on cascades but also on the release of the racer's brain and instincts. Rachadores develop a relationship with their machines which Chévrier and Moreau (2002, 88) call "manual reflexive pilotage". This kind of relationship evolves when the movements of the motor get too rapid and the motor runs too high. In this situation the flow of information from the machine challenges the usual conduct of driving which is normally operated through a more or less automatic aggregation of routines and habits. Manual reflexive pilotage at high speed can never become a habit or a competence, but remains artistic, always, since it can never be done without a touch of insanity.

The chronotope of *brink*; of accelerating and decelerating risk, confronts each racer with both intended opportunities such as the electric chair, or the unintended possibility such as skidding or letting the vehicle, for a moment or so, slip out of one's control. The time between slipping out and picking up again produces adrenaline and the thrill of "dérapage" (slipping out of control). It can produce "vertige" - vertigo (Caillois, 1986). They go from the desire to lose control to the need to control, from the feeling of dizziness (vertigo), from extreme excitement to the urgent need to take control of the machine (Le Breton, 1991, 2007a, 2007b). The experience combines all these strong feelings caused by the speed (acceleration) of the game they play. These and other risky practices trigger the continued dual search for excitement and control at the same time, thus helping the individual to exorcise feelings of impotence through the sensation of controlling his own body (Peretti-Watel, 2002) which is "part" of the machine.

What distinguishes these races is how they deal with suspense; when, in the heat of the race and chase, they accept, more or less voluntarily, that they will get rattled

and flustered. This is once again control with a mixture of fear and fun. It constitutes a sort of *brink* or verge, since the risky behavior gives rise to sharp moments of choice along the course of the race and also, of life. The racer starts up, organises acceleration, allows deceleration, picks up at the end and decides how to regain control and recover. These risk activities are similar to extreme sport. In racing there is continuous feedback between body-mind and machine, between an energised body and an informed consciousness.

3. *Eruption: chronotope of the frenzied standstill as fun and as a game*

The experiences of dizziness and vertigo lead to another joyful connection, one between risk and fun; race and game. The more this connection is strengthened by racing and chasing, and not weakened by crashes, the louder they shout and the more they act out their joy and pleasure. When we as researchers speak about the wild run of the race, we refer to its combined technological and biological dimensions from which pleasure erupts. The racers themselves articulate this in the following excerpts.

Eruption

Techno-Titan	**Fun-Titan**	**Rock-Dodge**	**Pilot V8**
For me these rachas do not mean risk, for me it is pure fun. We go for the fun and not for the risk.	*Now we have options, we have motorcycles that reach 180/190 km/h- on the roads.*	*The biggest sensation is the adrenaline in the blood, I am quite sure that endorphin too is running in the blood. Even normal drivers feel this excitement. The first time*	*A turbo-car is worth nothing in the market, but it is a pleasure having one. Look at the racha-kids: they never laugh, racha is concentration, but some guys are mad, with nothing in the brain, retarded (...) But if you want to play*

We race for fun, but the police do not like that.

The one guy who died in an accident was mentally retarded, mad. insane. To participate in rachas and feel the adrenaline you must be mentally crazy. There is adrenaline in the racha. When you stop, you cannot but tremble.

when I produced a burn out, when I let the wheels burn and explode, I could not sleep for a week. It's crazy, a great pleasure, very similar to what music can give you. I think that somebody who likes a powerful engine compares it with an old rock and roll song, something frantic, that makes you excited. Of course with age I feel the burden of responsibility: legal and financial. But when midnight approaches and another car calls me, then I go because I want to have fun.

with this Opala devil , on the contrary, you must be clever, crazy, and you must be cold-blooded. If you live to be 28, you want to buy a bigger car. And slowly you are "married" to it. Each morning, I wake up and think immediately what I will do with it (the car). It`s like a drug, you get addicted to it. It's never ready. Each week there is something else to change or remove. Engine, tire, wheel!"

Rock-Dodge indicates the joy of racing and chasing on the roads. He describes how his stunts fill his blood with adrenaline like an old rock and roll song. For him and Fun-Titan, a real road racer gets this adrenaline from being "crazy", which is not a negative evaluation. According to Rock-Dodge, a good race gives as much pleasure as an old Rock'n Roll song. For Techno-Titan, fun is the essence of the racha, not the risk. However, this joyful practice of youth culture represents a major risk to society,

especially to adults and the police who try to prevent accidents. Pilote-V8 and Techno-Titan go even further in their claims of pleasure when they suggest a distinction between "abnormally retarded" (sick, insane) and "crazy" (a positive value).

According to Sennett (1994, 2001), modernity has produced an intensification of the senses, but, at the same time, deadened them by exposing bodies to the speed of events and references, leading them to passivity. Information from the rachadores indicates intensification of the sense, but not passivity. The desire to play and have pleasure was present in all the narratives. Heightened senses were mentioned for example, the visual imagery of headlights inviting one to the race. The pleasure of hearing the sound of the engines was mentioned, and smelling the odour of the fuel and burning tires. Physical sensations were also present, such as the fearful trepidation of the body.

In the light of articulations given by the road racers, we may expand on the conceptualization that Elias and Dunning (1992) once gave to the civilizing effect of sport institutions and the distinction made between *serious excitation* and *mimetic excitation.* The autodrome races substitute the *serious excitation* produced by dangerous situations that a driver confronts every day on the road by a *mimetic excitation*, where pleasure is produced by the mimesis of real dangers. But this is an environment of controlled chronotopes. As the rachadores imply, these playful excitations are not only "not serious", but "childish". According to some of them, because they are not based on real dangers. In addition, they do not allow drivers to take serious risks which they can find only on the roads. In road racing then, they find the joy that makes danger irrelevant and irradiates individual risk-taking.

Here we find a significant dimension that rachadores identify for themselves in the rachas: the eruption of fun "that split one's sides with laughter" (in French: *éclater*; in Portuguese *arrebentar*). What they share in the rachas is playing with limits. They jump

across human constraints such as fear, as if they feel free from the conditions of earthly gravity. Why should an older generation disapprove of such an increase of fun and a reduction of suffering in the lives of urban youth? Some middle-aged and middle class researchers such as ourselves might hypothesise that the senses of the rachadores can no longer receive extreme signals: too much speed makes them inert, too much noise renders them deaf, too much light blinds. But such moral fault-finding would ignore the paradoxical source of their creative potential. Rachas do not emphasise linear acceleration but braking accelerations. It is not a straight race but one that gets around the curves.

4. *Cleft: chronotope of accelerated and decelerated performance of masculinity*

In the metaphor of the hybrid, the inter-effects between man and machine are combined. The forces of acceleration combined with the friction of rubber on the asphalt has an immediate effect on the body-minds of the racers, who gain a sense of domination. Even if they lack competence, they feel it as a body-mind sensation. While this might be seen as "machoism" in a broader phenomenological signification, interestingly, it does not always occur in the aggressive form that the sexist meaning of "racha" as cleft (vagina) might suggest[67].

The chronotope of *cleft* in the case of road racing is however strongly impregnated with meanings that come from a symbolic culture of masculine hegemony in their practices. This is self-evident for them (see Rock-Dodge above). The female co-author of this chapter cannot ignore this aspect of rachas culture. Automobile races and chases starkly divide the genders. Masculine hegemony is expressed not only in the practices of racing

[67] It is mainly in some gay urban milieux that the term "racha" is used in this sexualised sense to designate women in a pejorative manner.

but in the reactive behavior of the rachadores' girls, or of female spectators. Most of the young women are scared by too much speed, by braking too late and by too many cascades. However, at the same time they seem to be seduced by the theatrical parades that the racer boys stage for them. Acceleration in itself has a techno-sexual dimension that extends to gender relations. Some of the racers themselves alluded to this,

Cleft

Fun-Titan	**Rock-Dodge**	**Pilot-V8**
Once, a tire blew, I fell on the ground, but it was nothing serious. I had already four accidents, and nothing ever happened to me. If you fall, you simply stand up and continue. If you can't stand up, your friends will take you and up you go (...) According to my experience , the excitement you get in a race is superior to the pleasure you may have in sex. It´s better than sex.	*It is a question of masculine superiority. When you are in the traffic, you cannot accept the fact that a woman is ahead of you, …by the way, not only a woman but also a Japanese, or a senior citizen, you understand? One does not accept anything slow.*	*On Saturdays you drive, you work, you argue and fight with your wife, you leave the house, you take the car, you do the wheeling, you burn out the tires. You race the whole day. And, at night it's finished and you come back home, and you fight again with your wife. With a woman you never get full control, total mastery. With a car you must and you will. I have left a marriage of five years. Thank God, you know! Now I got married again – with my car and I feel sane.*

For these three racers, the rachas open up a wide field of significance that reproduces the personal and collective identity of hegemonic masculinity. For Rock-Dodge, it is like an allergy against the perceived slowness of women, the group he mentions first that he cannot tolerate. In his account, it is implied that all that is inferior appears as heavy, depending on gravity laws, while the accelerated race liberates him, at least temporarily, from the pull of gravity. Perhaps this is also what Fun-Titan means when he declares that falling from the machine is not something "serious", because as a man he will get up or his male friends will put him back on the right track.

The eldest of our group, Pilot-V8, stages the heroic impasse of someone who leaves his unmasterable wife in order to devote himself exclusively to his metallic spouse. He has done himself what the whole Renault enterprise claims collectively: he is the "créateur d'automobile" – the creator of his car. He painted his Galaxie (Ford) matte black and modified the engine, making it perfect: "*when the boys see it, they know it's my car*". He creates his cars according to his own image[68]. The divorce from his wife in favour of the metallic spouse is not only a compensation (from "lack of control") or substitution, but an accelerated exit out of the impasse of inter-gender relationships. In the parcours of Pilot-V8, the mastery of acceleration and chasing has removed him from his woman. Men may reinforce the tendency of individualised alienation between the genders when relationships become too *chaomplex* (Kordes, 2007; see also Beck-Gernsheim, 1980; Guattari, 1982). "Virile" processes are strongly supported by the particularities of the

[68] The globalisation processes of capital and culture include the possibility of extending consumption to other social classes, although on an unequal basis. In this way, young racers from the populous lower social classes in Brazil can fulfill their dreams for consumption and acceleration, including the search for great thrills. This has become possible because now low-income youngsters have access to one of the most popular consumption goods of the twentieth century: the automobile. In addition, they personalise their cars and motorcycles according to their means, becoming part of an exchange network of services and parts, as well as special favours. Lack of economic resources is compensated by the technological know-how they have acquired from their fathers, uncles, cousins and bosses since they were children.

automobile racing chronotope. The racing tracks and roads are not like the beaches of Copacabana (Empoli, 2007). Here the body is covered from head to toe, the personality is masked, and the penis too is in some sense, "armoured".

The young men demonstrate their mastery of knowledge on engines and speed. In an analogous manner they exercise in their life a set of values and practices of traditional hegemonic masculinity (Almeida, 2000; Calpe, 2010; Connell, 1997; Kimmel, 1998). Values such as competitiveness, aggression, and courage are reinforced during the rallies. Steering, leading and guiding their machines, the young men are permanently tested by their peers, the police and the girls. We suggest that the exercise of this traditional hegemonic masculinity reinforces the risk present in the road rallies. The challenges posed and responded to publicly can be understood as permanent rites of virility (Le Breton, 2009), with characteristics of an "institutional rite" (Bourdieu, 1982), since they institute and sanction common expectations in the way these young men act and develop their personal and social identities[69].

What is the future of this gendered constellation? We could extrapolate a "fast and furious" scenario, where more and more girls and young women begin to inhabit the chronotope of the rachas. But we must keep in mind the predominant feminine-masculine dynamic that makes it unlikely. The rite of masculinity in rachas is complex. It may signify a resistance to, and at the same time a protection of, the female role in gendered society. While in the sectors of fashion and urban lifestyle men and women seem to be moving to a more hybridised inter-gendering, in the *cleft* chronotope of the rachas, the rachadores continue to perform a certain masculine hegemony. If women

[69] Sánchez (2005) warns us not to essentialise or stereotype the configuration of masculinity and risk. In studying a rural Mexican community he demonstrated how a dominant model of masculinity does not determine significantly the occurrence of death by accidents or aggressive gestures against women and seniors. In that location, taking responsibility, being disciplined, and respectful in relationships with women, seniors and children appeared to be required characteristics for a "man of honour".

were to enter this chronotope as participants, they would have to do it under the influence of "virile" attributions: force, mastery and muscle.

5. *Share: chronotope of accelerating and decelerating the struggle for recognition*

Acceleration in hypermodern times means acceleration of life rhythms, not only through the advent of the automobile but also through all forms of post-industrial consumption; from fast food to speed dating. In this context, everything accelerates, including the rhythm of innovations and fashion dissemination. Identities are more and more webbed by juxtaposed distinctive groupings and corresponding social experiences. The metaphor of "braking acceleration" is not only synonymous with the inter-netting of global cities and world markets, but also with "cyber-segmentation" (Sassen, 2010), and, in this case, with social fragmentation, with the development of connecting communities and intranets[70] in the context of struggle for recognition.

Share

Techno-Titan	**Fun-Titan** [71]	**Rock-Dodge**	**Pilot-V8**
In our group we never quarrel or	*The autodrome management tries to*	*Our old cars, you cannot give them up. If there is*	*I am well known. When I enter the*

[70] To express the deep changes affecting youth, the metaphor used by Pais (2006) on the evolution of transportation is quite enlightening. During the post-war time in Europe, the transition to an adult life could be represented by train trips to pre-determined places, according to the youngsters' economic and cultural conditions. After this time, the transition could be compared to a car trip, during which the driver could select his/her itinerary from a number of options, also depending on their economic conditions. Nowadays, these transitions are multiple, as in a road maze in which there are right and wrong directions, traffic changes, roads already trodden and retaken and others with no exit. This promotes sensations of confusion, reversibility and uninterrupted movements of coming and going.

[71] His garage constitutes a familiar milieu of stable comrades and friends who spend most of the time together and who share the same brand, music, clothes – and an arrogant attitude towards other garages and groups.

[1]4 According to Pilot-V8, "pegas" is a wilder race which normally occurs on the outskirts of town. According to him, it presupposes risking it all to win.

fight. If I lose a race, it is because the other engine was more powerful (…) If I win, I get a name, if he wins, he gets a name (…). The road racers do not want to provoke the police. We have our agenda, we do not race during the day, only around midnight. The police have no chance to catch us, but they always take us by surprise at the meeting point, and disperse us .They want to beat us and to take us to prison. That is what they like.

ban motorcycle rachas. For them we are not good enough for the prestige and the price of the racing track (…). He was a very well-known guy. He wanted to do it too well, but to say the truth: he was foolish. He raced whereever and whenever possible, he was kwown for that … I fell from the motorbike four times, and nothing happened to me. You have accidents, you fall and if you are injuried, you get up and you start again.

somebody who wants to take you on while accelerating, you are not obliged to follow because you know your engine which is in your car. (…) One matures, you have a car that costs a lot. You have to take responsibility: legal and financial. You think a thousand times before acting. But every time when there is a car switching its warning signs, inviting you, I accelerate and pass by him, just to play with him: come and catch me! You must accept the challenges and you must show that you are not frightened.

course everybody looks at me. I no longer do rachas in the autodrome . I participate in chases along the highways. Chases are for big and fast roads. It is another business. You drive at 190km/h and a guy appears besides you, pushes you out of the road, into the bushes. Then I come behind him. I hit him from behind. I hit him in the front. I brake before him abruptly. It's an old dog stunt!

Rock-Dodge feels that the course of his life has taught him to become more conscious of the risks he takes. But, when he speaks of risks, they are always exterior ones: juridical or financial. To counter all such forms of external risk it is necessary to belong to a group of people of the same type, of the same sex, who have the same preference in car brands (Dodge, Galaxie) and by implication the same taste in music (rock and roll) and clothes. According to Techno-Titan, in order to have fun, you must live in a community ("we", "us") that does not quarrel, fight or argue, thus becoming pre-reflexive and reactive. His words indicate a larger and more democratic group than the family, and smaller and more sympathetic than the society. It is a way to extend power and control for the sake of security. Fun-Titan argued elsewhere that the domestication of rachas and its culture via the autodrome will lead to a new division. In the long run the autodrome, which was originally founded on the principle of inclusion, will exclude those who have less resources and benefits: the motorcycle racers. They will all have to return to the illegal sites that constituted their habitat in the past: the streets.

As researchers we are aware that the Brazilian state will soon install digital control systems, including cameras, to supervise the whole urban area and ultimately prosecute the illegal rally practitioners. At the same time the upcoming Olympic Games (2016) and World Soccer Championship in Brazil (2014) will demand a highly developed infrastructure of highways, thus providing the rachadores with more places to race. Further to this polarisation, Pilot-V8 alludes to friction between rachas and the far more dangerous pegas[72]. Both forms of racing mean that the rachadores reject the idea of using the autodrome for their competitions. The autodrome does not match their identity, although it may for other racers.

One of the main reasons for the apparent fragmentation of rachas into tribes and intranet groups paradoxically lies in their struggle for recognition, which encourages the development of trust, solidarity and fair competition. Among racers, to "racha" means to share not only food, drink and money, but also name and reputation. Tribalism cuts against this, splitting the rachadores according to type of vehicle and socio-economic standing. The struggle for recognition in lower class urban youth cultures has, for some time, taken the place of obvious class conflicts and generation clashes.

However, we must remain conscious of the fact that we are dealing here with only a small, and rather peaceful part, of juvenilizing cultures. Most of them seem far away from their big brothers, such as Hell's Angels and gang members who have entered mafia-like chronotopes of drugs, weapons and trafficking in women. Yet the rachadores have a similar tendency to form tribes and perhaps consume drugs, as long as consumption does not stand in the way of their courses.

In a world of changing or even reducing personal contacts ("yesterday we knew one the other, tomorrow we will separate") the rachadores strongly rely on their network community built up around the chronotope of *share.* Here they are given full recognition.

6. *Burning around: chronotope of accelerated and decelerated life courses*

The rachadores assert through acceleration and deceleration their state of endless, flexible, juvenilizing cultures, breaking or cracking open the time-limited, stable structures of childhood and adulthood. We need to think about and describe the changing world inside and outside their life course – their parcours of risk in the current period of cultural and economic change – hypermodernity. This is a transformation

place for elements of a global "hybrid" and "liquid" world market system (Robertson, 1992, Featherstone, 2004). That is why we identify a new biographical dimension of the individual life course, a "*parcours de vie*" (Sapin, Spini and Widmer, 2007), or more precisely a parcours at risk. Our informants articulated this discourse:

Burning around

Techno-Titan	**Fun-Titan**	**Rock-Dodge**	**Pilot-V8**
Since the age of seven I liked motorcycles, and I fought a lot with my older brothers. At the age of ten, I started to participate in rachas, and a little bit later I started to work here. And now the motorcycle means both to me: fun and work. Fun at night and work during the day ,	*I learned from an ancient rally master. Rachas are like a child's game. The preparation of the engine I learned by myself: I looked, I tried and I asked. However, since my daughter was born, things have changed a lot. Before I worked all weekends. Since my girl was born I have slowed down. But I feel that, slowly, I'm*	*Since my childhood I saw my father bringing home two, three cars to be repaired and sold. At the age of six or seven I got in touch with the business of negotiating and estimating cars. When my father drove, something excited him, inciting him to play, to racha. At the age of 12, my father forbade me to drive a motorcycle, but there was an uncle who had one. At the age of 14 my father suddenly decided to teach me to drive. He even took me to some rachas. But every time he said: ´Don't ever do that! But of course I did, and now he doesn't say anything.*	*I was born and grew up in a V8. In the beginning, in the eighties, it was very difficult to buy a motorcycle. Nowadays anybody can afford an automobile ... But I always wanted an old turbo Gol which I could drive until death, but these are expensive games. Meanwhile I have spent nearly all my money on cars and races …the kids take us as their models…funny cars, nice women, no drugs… motors are better for them than*

when I provide services and transportation of goods.	*coming back to the rachas.*	*drugs.*

What they all have in common is an emphasis on "fun" associated with more or less risky manouevres: so risk'n fun. Techno-Titan works during the day and goes burning around at night and on the weekends. Fun-Titan has slowed down because of his daughter's birth but he is coming back. Rock Dodge's father forbade him to racha but he entered in races and chases anyway. Pilot V8 declares himself a model for the kids? Does it matter that he has left his wife and spent all his money for motor "devils" to be used in rachas and pegas? Certainly Pilot V8 does not confront the younger generation with disciplinary standard requirements (school, economy, security). Rather he offers training in: the informally acquired performances of causing dizziness ("adrenalina"); having fun ("brincadeira"); mastering ("domínio") the metallic "demons"; and sharing goods with one's racha brothers ("partilha"). All the rachas we studied had been attracted to this discourse of risk'n fun since their early childhood. Yet while they have given up some "childish" elements in the meantime, none of them seem ready to go on to "serious" adulthood, rather; *"I could drive until death"*.

Except for Pilot-V8, who claimed to have been born in the rachas and who grew up without regular parents, they seem all to be heirs of their fathers, brothers and other masters. Their parcours of becoming rachador was informed by the encouragements and warnings of their male elders. But then they seemed to stick permanently in the racha chronotope. They are still *burning around*, even in their economic life. They engage in semi-legal activities (garages, moto-taxi) or part-time employment. For example, Pilot-V8 is a road educator. Notably, Techno-Titan and Fun-Titan do not run normal car

repair worshops; they have garages specialising in motorcycles and offer the tuning up and adjusting of engines for the rachas. They offer their services to the specialised market of (illegal) racers. All are more or less located in the "alternative" racha-business itself, a popular trend in male juvenilising cultures. Even Rock Dodge, who in recent times has been promoted to the position of auxiliary teacher, is also a member of a Hell's Angels branch, and wears a big beard and leather uniform. He has great fun provoking other teachers and shocking the students.

Pilot-V8 has, as we know, given up a regular marital relationship to dedicate himself to speeding races. But in terms of his own history he could be called a two-time "prefigurator" (Mead, 1971). Thirty years ago, he was one of the initiators (precursors) of the construction of the autodrome, now called the Ayrton Senna Racing Track. However, now he has left domesticating and "childish" autodrome stunts behind, and goes out again to illegal tracks, but, this time, on the few and very dangerous Brazilian highways, pursuing the ultimate challenge of pegas.

To describe these distinctive juvenilising movements and articulations we coined the term "burning around" out of two "native" categories that the rachadores generate themselves: "burn out" and "hanging around". The concept of "burn out" arises in their profane language and practice. Cleverly and unconsciously they invert the adult (sociopsychological) meaning of this word as exhausted with life. They literally smoke their tires until they burn. There is more than an anecdote here: in the atmosphere of smoke and smell the rachadores meet with us adult researchers; but while they rush eagerly to the stink, we run away. They do not only burn out their tires but in their hunger for excitement they also crack open normative values of the official society.

The expression "hanging around" has been recognised since the early days of Cultural Studies (see Willis, 1978). Youth hang around as a manouevre to circumvent the formal

requirements of education and security, to overplay and to overturn them. The young rachadores hang around. They may be tired of school and unnerved by traffic rules, but they are proficient in energising their rachas, having fun, dominating their machines and communicating with their brand mates. They burn around doing these things. By "burning around" we also mean the endless circulations the rachas make during nights and weekends when they race and chase.

Rachas versus hamster treadmill: risky parcours in hypermodern juvenilising cultures

Successive waves of accelerated change have succeeded in compressing not only space and time, energy and information within dimensions of the rachas chronotope as described above, but also the cycles of human life through radically extended juvenilizing cultures. Feixa (2008, 58) asks the question: "Are we witnessing perhaps the end of Youth?" The apparent timelessness of rachadore culture in Brazil suggests some truth in this provisional reflection. In a society of mass consumption are we not all contemporaries of an endless youth, a "youth culture unlimited"? In the way rachadores handle their life we can observe how their juvenilising culture can become a dominant and long-lasting style of life; starting in early childhood, moving through an extended period of youth, then open-ending their life course, up until the final point where body and spirit, and even technology and medicine together, can no longer support their racha activities.

They are neither children nor adolescents nor adults; they are all *jovens* - young (Almeida and Tracy, 2003). We note that most of the rachadores do work, at least part-time, and some of their social behavior more or less conforms to what might be

expected of an adult. So the distance they effect towards adult life on the whole has less to do with their incapacity to mature and much more to do with their willingness to keep a foot in the young life. The rachadores show us what juvenilising cultures look like. They evince fascination for risk'n fun, power and friendship, dreams and promises − doing burn outs and hanging around.

Juvenilising cultures are variously constituted in a historical and biographical sense. For example, entering into a *rachado* lifestyle might be similar to maintaining a *knackig* (crunchy, juicy, tasty) youth-extending lifestyle in Germany. The life dynamics of juvenilising cultures challenge the assumed seriousness and normativity of notable older men who match the status quo of mature masculinity. A term like *knackig* though may signify the consumption or traffic of drugs, whereas *burning around* constitutes the pursuit of excitement, before even alcohol or other stimulants. The major source of excitement is the risk'n fun in the rachas. That is what constellates their life style and their life course: remaining cool and mobile, fit and funny, strong and solid with their peer community and network. They clearly do not want to give up all the acquired pleasures discovered during their childhood and adolescence: wild runs, obscene curses, grill parties and so on.

We know that as a category, youth was invented in the beginning of modern times (industrial nation-states). Since then social science has associated youth with a "phase of transition", from family of origin to school and then to work and the making of one's own family. Youth in that sense was meant as a kind of moratorium, a preparation for becoming an adult employee and citizen. None of the rachadores has clearly passed through this latter phase. Rather they have experimented with the time-space between childhood and adulthood. Their juvenilising cultures celebrate aspects of childhood and dismiss aspects of adulthood. They express an unlimited and indefinite, durable and

desirable life course, or parcours at risk. They want to be "young for ever" (see Alphaville's song for Mitsubishi) and will remain young well beyond thirty years of age. They do no longer constitute one generation but a sort of "unigeneration" comprising several age-groups. They bear little resemblance to a melancholic Generation X, Y or Z or a self-sufficient and self-educating youth generation such as the *Jugendbewegung* – the German Youth Movement first formed in 1896.

Significantly, it is not only the attractiveness of these juvenilising cultures that dissolves the transition to adulthood. In fact this transition does not work well if the society does not offer reliable models and viable opportunities to achieve such a transition for all youth. Most of the rachadores live in a state of semi-exclusion or marginality, as shown by their precarious economic situation. They do not have too much to lose. They cannot fall down much further. Hence it should not be surprising when they claim their right to parcours at risk, to constitute a unique chronotope constituted at the same time by a public institution (racing permitted laps in the autodrome) and illegal use of public space (private racing and chasing on the roads). This is one of the reasons why these protagonists are not very much inclined to acts of resistance or revolution. Their struggle is expressed by the ways in which they "occupy" their chronotope. In this regard they assemble in garages and sub-groups, hierachally divided according to brands, speed and manouevres.

Even if they do not appear to resist or protest very much, they give the impression that nevertheless they play around with society, with the police first of all and beyond that with the hypermodern world. But the world too on its side seems to play along with them: the overdose of apparent choices and options in the media and mass consumption is restricted by an underdose of real chances and promising opportunities. Similarly, the

apparent moral-cultural permissivity (sexuality, market economy) is countered by a reinforced sociopolitical set of warnings and prohibitions (security, health).

Conclusion

We cannot measure or predict the incalculable consequences that these paradoxical "games" promoted by formal Brazilian society will have for these juvenilising cultures. It seems unlikely they will disappear any time soon. Yet we do not think that this extended youth culture is an "irreversible anthropological phenomenon" (Bégaudeau and Sorman, 2010). Such a conclusion would be a purely cultural and ahistoric interpretation.

Empirically we have seen how the rachadores themselves begin to mistrust the following "younger" generations. They consider them "brave" but also "conformist". Structurally the combined effects of global economy and demographic change could see an end to these juvenilising cultures or at least bring them back into the mainstream of the world market system. After all, in many instances the majority of youngsters "finish" their life course in the opposite direction − taking over, as early as possible, the serious and certified roles and positions of an adult.

What may be irreversible though is the wider trend of major change in life courses. While we see it most obviously in juvenilising cultures, it can be argued that hypermodernity has implicitly absorbed modern institutionalised rites of passage and transformed them into a form of parcours at risk. Parcours at risk then is like a transfer phase during which psychosexual itineraries (from suppression to expression of desires, less preponderance of filiation and parenthood) link up with socioeconomic trajectories (from stable employment to precarious McJobs, less social security). This set of

circles/cyles could be interpreted pessimistically not as rites of passage any longer, but "rites of impasse" (Feixa, 2008). We may see a favouring and even heating up of ritualised "games" of impasse, wherein juvenilising cultures and the social system outplay one another interdependently. Nevertheless, in juvenilising cultures such as the one we have depicted in this chapter, we can perhaps identify an optimistic point of view on expansion, inspiring perspectives on the potential of widened horizons across age categories, maybe later even across genders and classes.

References

Almeida, M. I. M., and Tracy, K. M. A. 2003. *Noites Nômades. Espaço e Subjetividade nas Culturas Jovens Contemporâneas.* Rio de Janeiro: Rocco.

Almeida, M. V. de. 2000. *Senhores de Si. Uma Interpretação Antropológica da Masculinidade.* Lisboa: Fim de Século.

Anatrella, T. 2009. *Interminables Adolescents*. Paris: Ethique et Société.

Augé, M. 1992. *Non-Lieux, Introduction à une Anthropologie de la Surmodernité*. Paris: Le Seuil.

Bakhtin, M. 2008. *Chronotopos*. Frankfurt, Main: Suhrkamp.

Balandier, G. 1994. *Le Dédale: Pour en Finir avec le XXe Siècle*. Paris: Fayard.

Bateson, G. 1977. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. New York: Chandler Publishing Company.

Bauman, Z. 2000. *Liquid Modernity.* Cambridge: Polity.

Beck, U. 1992. *Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage.

Beck-Gernsheim, E. 1980. *Das Halbierte Leben: Männerwelt, Beruf, Frauenwelt Familie*. Frankfurt, Main: Suhrkamp.

Bégaudeau, F., and Sorman, J. 2010. *Parce que Ca nous Plaît, l`Invention de la Jeunesse*. Paris: Larousse.

Bourdieu, P. 1982. "Les Rites comme Actes d´Institution." *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 43*: 58-63.

Braudel, F. 1998. "Gesellschaft und Zeitstrukturen. Wie Geschichte geshrieben wird." In *Schriften zur Geschichte*, pp. 132-148. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

Caillois, R. 1986. *Los Juegos y los Hombres: la Máscara y el Vértigo*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Calpe, J. M. E. 2010. "Hombres, Motos y Riesgo: Androcentrismo y Sexismo en el Mundo de las Motos." http://www.telefonica.net/web2/sword/default.htm.

Chevrier, S., and Moreau, C. 2002. "Les Jeunes et le Cyclomoteur." *Agora* 27: 86-97.

Clifford, J. 2008. *Itinerarios Transculturais*. Barcelona: Editorial Gedisa.

Connell, R. W. 1997. "La Organización Social de la Masculinidad." In *Masculinidad/es. Poder y Crisis* T. Valdés and J. Olavaria ed. Santiago: Isis Internacional.

Douglas, M. 1994. *Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory*. London: Routledge.

Douglas, M. 1996. *La Aceptabilidad del Riesgo Según las Ciencias Sociales*. Barcelona: Paidós.

Elias, N. and Dunning, E. 1992. *A Busca da Excitação*. Lisboa: Difel.

Empoli, G. 2007. *La Peste et l`Orgie*. Paris: Grasset.

Featherstone, M. 2004." Special Issue on: Automobilities." *Theory, Culture and Society*, 21: 1-24

Feixa, C. 2008. *De Jóvenes, Bandas y Tribus*. Barcelona: Editorial Ariel.

Flonneau, M., and Guigueno, V, ed. 2009. *De l´Histoire des Transports à l´Histoire de la Mobilité*? *État des Lieux, Enjeux et Perspectives de Recherche.* Rennes: Presses Universitaire de Rennes.

Guattari, F. 1982. *Caosmose. Um Novo Paradigma Estético*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora 34.

Giucci, G. 2004. *A Vida Cultural do Automóvel. Percursos da Modernidade Cinética*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.

Jeolás, L. S. 2009. "Les Courses Ilégales de Voitures: Le Cyberespace comme Terrain Ethnographique." *Altérités*, *5*: 54-64.
Jeolás, L., and Kordes, H. 2010. "Percursos Acelerados de Jovens Condutores Ilegais: O Risco entre Vida e
Morte, entre Jogo e Rito." *Horizontes Antropológicos* 16: 159-187.
Kimmel, M. S. 1998. "A Produção Simultânea de Masculinidades Hegemônicas e Subalternas." *Horizontes
Antropológicos*, 9*:* 103-117.
Kordes, H. 2007. "Interkultureller Wandel-Interkulturealitaet-Interitaet." In *Interkulturell Denken und Handeln. Theoretische Grundlagen und Gesellschaftliche Praxis ed.* H. Nicklas B. Müller and H. Kordes, 15-26. Frankfurt, Main: Campus.
Le Breton, D. 1991. *Passions du Risque*. Paris: Métailié.
Le Breton, D. 2007a. *Conduites à Risque: Des Jeux de Mort au Jeu de Vivre*. Paris: PUF.
Le Breton, D. 2007b. *En Souffrance. Adolescence et Entrée dans la Vie.* Paris: Métailié.
Le Breton, D. 2009. "Des Rites Juvéniles de Contrebande." In *Le Ritual* ed. A. Yannic, 25-44. Paris: CNRS
Editions.
Levy, R. 2005. *Towards an Introductory Perspective on the Life Course.* Amsterdam: Elsevier JAI.
Luhmann, N. 1992. *Sociología del Riesgo*. Guadalajara, México: Univ. Iberoamericana and Univ. de Guadalajara.
Mauss, M. 1974. *Sociologia e Antropologia,* v.2. São Paulo: E.P.U.
Mead, M. 1971. *Culture and Commitment: A Study of the Generation Gap*. New York: The Bodley Head.
Pais, J. M. 2006. "Busca de Si. Expressividades e Identidades Juvenis." In *Culturas Jovens: Novos Mapas do
Afeto,* ed. M.I.M. Almeida and F. Eugenio, 7-21. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar.
Peretti-Watel, P. 2002. "Les 'Conduites à Risque' des Jeunes: Défi, Myopie, ou Déni?" *Agora Débats-Jeunesses 27*:16-33.
Robertson, R. 1992. *Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture*. London: Sage.
Rosa, H. 2010. *Accélération. Une Critique Sociale du Temps*. Paris: La Découverte.
Sanchez, H. E. R. 2005. "El Varón como Factor de Riesgo? Masculinidad y Mortalidad por Accidentes y Otras Causas Violentas em la Sierrra de Sonora." Revista de Investigación Científica, México, *Estúdios Sociales XIII*: 27-65.
Sapin, M., Spini, D. and Widmer, E. 2007. *Les Parcours de Vie. De l´Adolescence au Grand Âge.* Lausanne:
Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes.
Sassen, S. 2010. "Cyber-Segmentierungen. Elektronischer Raum und Macht." In *Mythos Internet* ed. S. Münder et al, 23. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Savio, M. A. C. 2002. *A Modernidade Sobre Rodas: Tecnologia Automotiva, Cultura e Sociedade.* São Paulo: EDUC.
Sennett, R. 1994. *Flesh and Stone: The Body And The City In Western Civilization,* London: Norton.
Sennett, R. 2001. *Der Flexible Mensch: Die Neue Kultur des Kapitalismus*. Berlin: Goldmann.
Virilio, P. 1993. *L´Art du Moteur*. Paris: Galilé.
Virilio, P. 1996. *Velocidade e Política*. São Paulo: Estação Liberdade.
Virilio, P. 1999. *A Bomba Informática*. São Paulo: Estação Liberdade.
Willis, P. 1978. *Profane Culture*. London: Routledge.

Chapter 7
The tattooed young body: a body still under suspicion?

Vitor Sérgio Ferreira

> There's something really the matter with most people who wear tattoos. There's at least some terrible story. I know from experience that there's always something terribly flawed about people who are tattooed, above some little something that Johnny had done in the Navy, even though that's a bad sign... It's terrible. Psychologically it's crazy. Most people who are tattooed, it's the sign of some feeling of inferiority, they're trying to establish some macho identification for themselves. (*Truman Capote*, quoted in Grobel, 1985, 126)

Introduction

This chapter looks at tattooed young bodies in Portugal. It is argued that the corporeal languages and practices of tattooing do not so much explicitly challenge systems of domination, but tend to shatter them micropolitically, applying a brake to the globalised empire of the *young body*. The testimonies presented in this chapter come from individual, in-depth interviews with heavily tattooed and body-pierced young men and women. The fieldwork for this research was carried out in Lisbon, Portugal. An extensive description of the methods used in this research is provided in Ferreira (2014).

Generally, the body is seen in its physicality, as a living material structure with morphological boundaries. The physical body has organs with physiological functions. It has measurable and optimisable sensory capacities. It is an organic *topos,* subject to biological, chemical and physical mechanisms that require maintenance, and must be

repaired in the case of abuse, illness, accident, disease, or the wear and tear of living. Nevertheless, that same living body is also a *lived body* (Csordas, 1994); a corporeal reality experienced and perceived in the first person and among other people. The embodied individual does not experience his or her body alone. Experiencing the body is also a social affair, so we must consider the ways in which the body interacts with and learns from other bodies. The body is also an object of classifications and categorisations, value judgements and preconceptions.

Habitually perceived as individual corporeality, the human body is also a social construction. The maintenance, modification and control of the physical body are mediated by a network of institutions and individuals in both the public and private spheres. The body is both individually and socially lived and is experienced in a diverse range of ways. These ways include not only physical properties (any body is always different to the body next to it), but also in relation to the social and symbolic structures specific to a particular social formation and relative to time and space.

According to Boltansky (1975, 208), the body is lived and experienced differently depending on the *somatic culture* in which it is immersed. The concept of *somatic culture* corresponds to the set of rules, codes and conducts involved in corporeal production, perception and consumption that results from objective social conditions. It is within this framework that the body is born, develops, changes and dies.

From this perspective, the body can be symbolically and socially appropriated, reinterpreted and updated in diverse ways in different somatic cultures, which shape both the way each person perceives his or her own body, and the gaze that others direct at it. As Maffesoli (2002, 241) puts it: “the individual body owes its existence to the reality of the social body. Or rather, from a constructivist perspective, the body itself is ‘constructed’ by the social body: it is the other’s look that creates me”.

The young body and the embodiment of youth

In the somatic culture of contemporary western societies, we find that the *young body* possesses a central value as a referential and reverential corporeality. Emphasising the *referential* and *reverential* nature of the *young body* means highlighting its normative and socially instituted status as a *modal corporeality* (Berthelot 1983, 128); as a possibility in which a given set of physical characteristics and bodily techniques comes together to constitute the reference point for a social legitimacy with cult value. This youthful model of corporeality currently serves to ground society's notions of what is, and what is not, a "good-looking", "sexy", "seductive", "desirable", "healthy", "dynamic" and "energetic" body – values that flood daily life via the media.

The *young body* is an ideal type in Weber's sense (1949) – an imagined body which is consubstantiated in the obsession with maintaining a body that is active and capable, far from the threat of illness or presage of death. It inheres in the desire to stretch the skin to its limit and obtain a silhouette that matches the canons of perfection; a body that is seductive and sensual, always desirable and desiring, hedonistic and irreverent; a body that must provide enjoyment and immediate pleasure. It is on the basis of this generic model of youthful corporeality that the bodies of young people become objects of social observation and contemplation, vigilance and celebration, scrutiny and evaluation.

Youth is a category both invented and socially constructed in recent times. Whether we treat it as a *word* (Bourdieu, 1980) or as a *metaphor* (Feixa, 1993), it implicitly

refers to a body. Even from a social point of view, *being young* involves the age-based codification of a given *model of corporeality*, inasmuch as the body is a privileged forum for *visualising age* (Bytheway and Johnson, 1998).

As a physical reality that is constantly changing, the body is a space offering a subjective and intersubjective interpretation of a moment in the subject's life course, lending visibility to the signs of its passage until it eventually dies and disappears. In contemporary western societies ageing and old age constitute a stigma that urgently needs to be dealt with, "evocative of a death that makes its way among the silence of the cells" (Le Breton 2000, 146). This is why the cult of the body and the cult of youth go side by side, amplifying as they go that which Lasch (1981, 207) suggests is the "almost neurotic" desire to remain young, to adopt and maintain a certain image, posture and corporal performance, in other words a *gestalt* connoted by the public image created for youth.

Thus, when we identify *youth* as a social category, we must consider a *corporeal condition* which is consubstantiated in a multiplicity of symbolically specific images and performances. *Youth* is socially constructed and recognisable in daily interactions through the perception and categorisation of given physical traits and corporeal performances, attributed to a given condition in terms of age. The boundaries that define youth as a social condition and category involve markers of transition to adulthood (Ferreira and Nunes, 2010). Yet they also involve interpretation of corporeal attributes associated with early phases in the biological process of growth and ageing.

An example of "young" corporeal attributes is constituted by the first signs of "puberty": the first spots, appearance of body hair, menstruation in the case of girls or the first ejaculations in the case of boys. Conversely, adulthood is corporeally associated with attributes of "maturity", such as the first white hair, baldness, wrinkles,

weight gain, decrease in vitality and so on. In addition to these phonotypical signs, there is a whole complex of body images (clothes and hairstyles) and performances (postures, gestures, physical activities) that invoke the process of either experiencing and living, or getting further away from, the condition of being young.

Nowadays this process is served by a whole range of resources and services created for corporeal control and vigilance, that encourage the belief in a perfectible and preservable body. Aesthetic, cosmetic, technological, sporting, nutritional and surgical innovations aim to ensure the body is individually managed so as to produce or prolong youthfulness. This is a body which people obstinately want to maintain *young*, and which lives in the illusory hope that the paraphernalia of resources at its disposal will enable it "to free itself from age and turn into an imagined ideal" (Martín-Barbero 1998, 31). These resources and services drive the individual to preserve her or his body and make it last, in the belief of gaining time and beating time.

As pointed out above, "youth" or "being young" is a time that is socially constructed, but codified in the body. These days the period of youth lasts ever longer, and people try to make it last even longer again in corporeal terms by buying mercantile promises of the *juvenalisation* of bodies (Featherstone and Wernick 1995, 177). Relative to the goods and services that promise to prolong youth, one is young when one looks young. And the condition of being young is moved beyond when one ceases to look young. Being and appearing youthful merge in an image which, in its projection and perception, shapes the *figure* of a young person.

From conforming to the young body to contesting through the tattooed body

Commercially exploited on a global scale, the *young body* colonises the flesh of large numbers of young people and of many others who want to look young. It thereby tends to marginalise the diversity of corporeal possibilities available in youth culture contexts. At the same time, the classifications created by institutions that produce and reproduce policies on the young body are also responsible for fact that less orthodox young bodies are socially excluded. Yet social exclusion may itself be seen as productive since exclusion does not place these young people "outside the social world", but rather undoes the bonds that tie them to the orientations and institutional activities that favour the normative order of things, putting them into contact with other zones of sociability and symbolic productions.

In this sense, youth sociabilities produced within the scope of "youth scenes" or "microcultures" (Ferreira, 2008a) take on an added value and meaning for the social practices of young people who are corporeally non-conformist,

> For these young people, the group sometimes constitutes the only space of social acceptance and integration in the face of the adversity on the part of the conventional world. Without the references for the modelling of "oppositional" reactions and without the sustainment provided by the group, a non-conformist identity would certainly be much more difficult. (…) the support of the collective ties supplies the security and support needed to develop and express "oppositional" attitudes. (Ferreira 2000, 64-77)

As part of these social contexts, in a movement against the hegemonic, saturated *young body* model, many young people try to challenge the "normalising decrees" that call for investments in this ideal. They colonise the unaccommodating, plain and natural(ised) territory of the body. In their efforts to transform the "natural" body into an entity rendered significant by difference, innovation and singularisation they employ corporeal counter-models. They end up producing spectacular, hyperbolic bodies that are excessive in terms of the image they present, the movements they make and/or the sensations they explore. Such bodies challenge the civilised, contained and self-

controlled discretion prescribed by the institutionalised system of youth-corporeality production, celebration, commodification and consumption.

When we go into youth worlds: the street, the neighbourhood, the mall and the microcultural spaces where young people meet, it is easy to see the plurality of bodies that circulate there. Some display a variety of *neo-baroque* aesthetics (Calabrese, 1999), characterised by the excessive ornamentation and the cult of the detail as a strategy for achieving representation of originality. Others favour kinetic mobilisations that use body abilities and acrobatics little recognised in the traditional sporting field, such as *parcours*[73]. Some young people seek sensorial investments that involve unusual sensations, or experiment with physiological limits and the intensification of emotional reactions, involving pain, fear, vertigo, adrenaline, pleasure, and so on.

These are aesthetic, motor and sensory investments that do not *conform to*, but rather *confront* the globalised imaginary tenets that homogenise the idealised figure of youth. These other bodies – heterodox manifestations that seek to contest – signify forms of young people's corporeal experience and existence that offer alternatives to hegemonic configurations. Their rarity and spectacular nature give these forms of corporeal expression a visibility that the owners of these bodies never had before. These peripheral corporeal aesthetics are sensationalised further by the media (see Pitts, 1999). Such bodies are looked on with distrust. They are remarked on and stigmatised in certain urban circuits. They flag their owners as potentially dangerous subjects. In Portugal this is the case with young bodies that are extensively marked by tattoos and body piercings.

Marginality of the marked body

[73] Free running activity, moving quickly and fluidly through an urban area, by surmounting obstacles such as walls and railings and leaping across open spaces, as in a stairwell or between buildings.

A number of authors have documented the popularity of tattooing and body-piercing practices in the last two decades (for example, Atkinson, 2003; DeMello, 2000; Pitts, 2003). As practices within an expanding body-design industry, tattooing and body piercing have been globalised and commodified right across the western world (Bengtsson, Ostberg and Kjeldgaard, 2005; Kosut, 2006a).

However, certain types of tattooing and body piercing are far from being socially accepted, even among the younger generation. Genital piercings and facial tattoos are still seen as non-mainstream, non-normative, deviant; as extreme forms of body modification, as are branding, burning or cutting the skin (Goode and Vail, 2008; Klesse, 1999; Myers, 1992). Heavily tattooed and pierced bodies are still perceived by society as bizarre and anomalous, extreme and unusual, particularly when they are evaluated relative to corporeal modification procedures that serve to adapt bodies to the institutionalised and celebrated image of the *young body* – smooth, healthy, and discreet.

Indeed, recent renaissance of ancestral practices of extensively inking and piercing the body has led to the revival of old stereotypes of deviance and moral panic about their users. When tattoos came to the West from exotic and distant colonies, they were used by some of the lowest fringes of the social classes (Caplan, 2000). In the second half of the 19th century, extensively tattooed individuals regularly appeared in circus freak shows and travelling fairs, alongside dwarfs, giants, Siamese twins, bearded women and other "monsters" and/or "primitive" curiosities (Bogdan, 1994). At the beginning of the 20th century, tattoos became widespread in neighbourhoods of dubious repute, among social figures associated with vagrancy and criminality: sailors, dock-

workers, prostitutes, ex-convicts, labourers, gang members and other types of *scoundrel* (DeMello, 1993; Le Breton, 2002; Peixoto, 1990).

Later, inking and piercing the body were included in some youth subcultures that emerged throughout the second half of the 20th century. They served as symbols of resistance against "mainstream society" and its domination and homogenisation of the *young body* (Camphausen, 1997; DeMello, 2000; Caplan, 2000; Le Breton, 2002; Phillips, 2001; Steward, 1990). In the twentieth century, legal and medical fields worked hard to classify and institutionalise those who sported tattoos and other body marks as social deviants, or psychological patients in need of either criminal (see Lombroso, 1895) and/or medical care (for example, Lacassagne, 1881). Even today, when these body-modification practices are much more visible and widespread, there are legal and medical discourses that continue to pathologise them as indicators of potential deviance, delinquency, personality disorder, or self-harming or addictive behaviour (for example, Favazza, 1996; Hewitt, 1997; Kosut, 2006b; Putnins, 2002, Winchel and Stanley, 1991).

Although body marks originated outside the traditional norms of society, some sociologists (for example Mendes de Almeida, 2000; Sweetman, 1999; Turner, 1999) enthusiastically argue that these identity resources have become fashionable. They are now beautification accessories and included in the body-design industry. It is claimed they are thus depleted of their traditional subcultural and/or anthropological meanings. Body marks have been transformed into nothing more than sign-commodities of contemporary consumerism; hyper-cool accessories that conform to current trend fashions; or ironic, playful clichés borrowed from geographically and historically distant cultures.

It is not my intention to contradict these claims. This has indeed happened. That said though, this is only a partial view. It does not take account of the complexity and plurality of ways of consuming body marks in the contemporary world. Although tattoos and body piercings have become trendier – for example among young females (Atkinson, 2002; Hardin, 1999; Mifflin, 1997; Pitts, 1998; Riley & Cahill, 2005) and middle-class young people (Blanchard, 1991; DeMello, 2000; Irwin, 2001; Mendes de Almeida, 2000; Sweetman, 1999) – this is only true for relatively small markings. There are more extreme ways of consuming tattoos and body piercings that go beyond the mundane and acceptable butterfly tattoo on the ankle, or an eyebrow piercing. While those minor body marks are socially and physically "safe", extensive markings are not.

To have, or plan to have, a heavily tattooed body is still taken as an "extreme" decision, only carried out by an ultra-minority of young people. As some research points out, to have large portions of skin inked still evokes ideas of "madness," "perversion", "deviation," and "marginality" (Ferreira, 2003, 2008b). The extreme use of tattoos and body piercing is still generally perceived as abuse of the body, an unnecessary excess that subjects its practitioners to social suspicion. The social history of these practices in deviance and pathology feeds the distrust and fear often manifested towards heavily tattooed and pierced bodies. Such bodies socially incriminate and discredit the young people they belong to; and frame social situations in which they are daily protagonists.

The tattooed body under the gaze of others

The epidermis – largest of all the body's organs – is not just the corporeal boundary of the individual, but also the first *contact zone* with the world, subjected by the visibility

it has to the gaze of others. Its voluntary modification then suggests a strategy for presenting and representing the individual in the face of others; a representation that provokes or waits for social recognition. As Nancy (2004, 22) points out, the tattoo, for example, "is in the skin, it makes skin: an authentic exposed extension, all of which is turned to the exterior while simultaneously serving as the wrapper for the interior".

This means the symbolic expressivity of tattooed skin always implies a receiver. The implied receiver is the basis for rigorous social management of the visibility of the corporeal project. Production of tattooed skin includes a will to be seen, to attract looks, whether the tattoos are permanently available to everyone on the "public skin", or whether they are only accessible to the project's accomplices. In relation to increased demand for body-modification these days, Yan, a 23-year-old male body-piercer covered in tattoos told me, "I think that people have the need to call attention, to say hey, I'm also here! I'm also a living being! I'm also around! I think people have an enormous need to do that".

The tattooed body thus represents an "aesthetics of presence" (Le Breton 2002, 103) – an aesthetic that stimulates the social gaze, a way of staging an identity in order to fight indifference and to escape the anonymity imprinted on the daily life of the body in contexts of urbanity. When they are made visually available to the public gaze, tattoos draw attention to the social presence of the subject who displays them, granting spectacularity to a body that is brought into evidence and singularised in the eyes of others.

Simmel (1997) conceptualised the urban experience as essentially visual, with initial information about others coming primarily from their appearance. The fact is that the way other people look at the body does play a central part in social exchanges and interpersonal knowledge systems. In an environment dominated by what Simmel (1997,

35) called a "blasé" attitude - itself a reaction to the intensification of sensory stimuli in the extensive metropolis, such inspection,

> Leads ultimately to the strangest eccentricities, to specifically metropolitan extravagances of self-distantiation, of caprice, of fastidiousness, the meaning of which is no longer to be found in the content of such activity itself but rather in its being a form of "being different", of making oneself noticeable. For many types of persons these are still the only means of saving for oneself, through the attention gained from others, some sort of self-esteem and the sense of filling a position. (Simmel 1997, 40)

A body – or a considerable part of one – covered in tattoos is likely to incisively focus the attention of others, rupturing the dynamic of impersonality and depersonalisation characteristic of large metropolises. Along the same lines, Diógenes (1998) points to the *voracity of the gaze* in large cities and consequently the power of body image as a driving force in modern societies. She argues that "to look and be looked at becomes the most effective way of making oneself present in the public sphere. This need for 'social transparency' makes each individual an actor *par excellence*. Performances, styles, choreographies – in other words, 'public stage-plays' make the social event more dynamic". She observed that this was particularly true for those objectively placed in the "backstage of the social scene", who frequent more marginal and interstitial urban areas (Diógenes 1998, 181).

The *logic of ostentation* that characterises extensively tattooed bodies reveals an *excess of presence* in its ability to interpellate, to force the other to turn his or her gaze on its bearer and to take that gaze hostage, to mark and demarcate its bearer in the public space by means of the *social shock effect* it causes. The *shock effect* generated by extensively marked bodies corresponds to the "cultural noise" they cause in the life of society. The effect is greater, the further "production grammars" are from "reception grammars" (Véron, 1980). It is in the potential *space for confrontation* between these grammars that a kind of "semiotic guerrilla warfare" (Hebdige 1986, 17-18) can take place and produce a shock effect. This is an aesthetic that stimulates the eye and makes

the body a protagonist. This way the subject feels that she or he is "being seen in the world and from the world", to borrow from Sartre (1998, 339). At the same time as it provokes the eye, the marked body evokes its bearer's alternative, subterranean world, lending her or him social visibility and breadth of identity.

Marking the body is both a private and public act, an intimate inscription and a public manifestation – that cannot fail to have effects on contexts of social interaction. When the body is tattooed and pierced, it ceases to be a material vestige that "naturally" draws attention, and becomes something that marks and demarcates a particular form of presence, of the subject's insertion into the world – an effect produced by the aura of transgression and provocation. Despite greater visibility nowadays, a certain shock effect still accompanies body-modifications. Emotional reactions rarely entail indifference. Rather they range from curiosity to distrust, even repugnance. They may generate compliments or hostility, surprise or fear, complicity or mistrust, fascination or aversion, but they always constitute additional information for the ways in which others perceive, categorise and relate to, the marked subject in face-to-face interactions.

The semiotic splintering of the tattooed body

Tattooing as a device for expressing social classification is not new. However, these days the tattooed body is a semantically *disjunctive* reality where meanings are splintered. In the past, perception of a tattooed body was informed by codes that were restricted – both in the context of traditional societies and in the tattoo's stigmatised introduction into western societies. Today the production and reception grammars linked to tattoos are no longer subject to some pre-existent symbolic relationship with social role or status.

Tattoos are polysemic, available for every projection of meaning and every misunderstanding. Not only can the same mark be invested with various intentional meanings by its bearer, but this symbolic density is amplified by a plethora of significances attributed to it by the looks it receives. The textuality of tattooed skin is open; a complex semiotic territory where there can be juxtaposition of contradictory symbolic traits and properties.

Today, tattooed signs convey hybrid messages. We only have to go into a tattoo parlour and look at available catalogues to see how body-marking has entered an unrivalled state of *cultural syncretism*, amalgamating the archaic and the modern, merging designs and materials from different and sometimes antagonistic traditional cultures with the explosive creativity of the contemporary world. Dissociated from their original cultural systems, tattoos are justified by a biographically codified narrative. Even iconographically abstract tribal tattoos, which are the most sought-after at present, lead back to biographical narratives and fuel individual mythologies. Their meanings are founded on traditions that are over-simplified by lack of knowledge about sources, yet are powerful in the projection of a personal identity.

As one of my interviewees, Brian, a 25-year-old male university student, told me:

> At that time, those so-called tribal tattoos had a meaning, they used to mark different steps in the development of the man towards adulthood, within that society, within the tribe. Many of them were attributed to people according to their position, according to what the person was within the actual tribe. The hunters would have a right to a certain tattoo, the fishermen would have a right to some, and leaders would have a right to others. And now, what happens? In so-called Western society, the world of tattooing began absorbing these tattoos, and began creating others inspired by them. (…) The idea is that the design, despite not meaning anything in terms of image, has a meaning in terms of feelings. Tribal tattooing is exactly that. Nowadays, there are people who make tribal tattoos only because of the symbol, because they thought the symbol was funny, because they thought something. Often, people don't have the faintest idea what they are putting on their body. I've seen many people making designs that are typically feminine on masculine bodies. Nobody questions what they are doing.

This account shows how these days tattooing does not refer to the ethnographic or philological fidelity of the original content, about which both tattooist and tattooed may

be unaware. Rather, tattooing is an act whose intention involves the intimate sphere of personal desire and taste, notwithstanding the fact that it is commercialised and consumed under the aegis of a mythology of authenticity which evokes the primal roots of Man, *in illo tempore.* When traditional tattoo designs are inscribed on western bodies, this is no more than a formal gesture of simulation, a kind of *cultural quote* (Breton 2002, 161).

There is no longer any pre-existing symbolic equation between sign and meaning. The eagle does not necessarily signify freedom, nor the lion strength. The earring in the left ear does not necessarily state the bearer's sexual orientation, nor cobwebs on the elbows a stay in prison, nor a tear at the corner of the eye responsibility for taking a life. It is not that that such conventional equivalences have disappeared from semiotic circulation and consequently ceased to have any social effects. Indeed some of these codes live on and are reproduced in very circumscribed social circuits, in prison, LGBT circles or the armed forces, for example. However, they do not necessarily symbolise these things. Tattoos constitute increasingly fluctuating and arbitrary signs contingent on their bearer's personal biography.

According to Maria, a 32-year-old high school teacher who began being tattooed in her twenties, having an extensively inked body today is different: "[Tattoos] bring out things that we feel. And we let others see what we feel. But others don't know how to interpret them, because the interpretation is exclusively ours; only we know what that actually means". While in the past the message inscribed in the mark was an integral part of the communication system employed by a given group that possessed the code, now interpretation relies on a wide-reaching and complex system of meaning in which different symbolic constellations flow into one another.

The confrontation between current grammars of tattoo

The existing systems of meaning for the marked body do not offer any type of consensus about the meanings of the marks. Moreover, they do not in any way guarantee a link between the tattoos' *production grammar* and *reception grammar*. On the contrary, they substantially increase the impossibility of any unified *social semiosis* – a term which Véron (1980) uses to describe the intelligible circulation of any discursive or non-discursive statement between production instances and reception instances, via coincidence between the respective grammars.

In Portugal, outside the subcultural space in which tattoos are produced, there still exists a stereotypical image of them which was constructed over the course of history in the West. This stereotype relies on a perception of body marks as deviant, pathological and masochistic. They still connote delinquency, mortification, mutilation and madness. Tattoos represent a threatening aesthetic that very often gives rise to distrust and fear among subjects who are not very familiar with marked bodies (Ferreira, 2003).

These same categories of perception inform the social classification systems applied to marked subjects. Permanent body inscriptions create an interdependence between "text" and body. They are realities which unify themselves: the person who looks at the body does not separate the text he or she "reads" from the person who carries it. Whatever the interpretation is that informs the eye, it does not limit itself just to the embodied designs and objects, but is immediately extended to the person who bears them.

Tattoos thus constitute a privileged form of social production and identification, inasmuch as they grant their bearers certain symbolic properties. Given the plurality of grammars that are currently available for use in the social interpretation of body

inscriptions, there is usually a large semiotic distance – even a total divergence – between the *properties that are individually invested* in the production of the body project and the *properties that are socially attributed* to that same project. This can generate uncomfortable mismatches between the social (attributed) and personal (claimed) identities of the tattooed young person.

It is with reference to this divergence between production and reception grammars; between invested and attributed properties, that it is possible to understand, for example, the frequent parental opposition to body-marking projects adopted by today's youth. As Maria explained, even today, as a 32-year-old female graduate and respected high school teacher, her family is troubled,

> My mother, my parents, and perhaps my uncles and aunts and others, associate tattoos and piercing to…"they're all druggies!" and "they are all robbing shops!" That kind of thing. (...) First I tried to explain that I had nothing to do with the drug scene or anything like that, right? Then I even tried to explain that some of my female students also had some, and that it doesn't mean anything, period. Perhaps it would have been like that quite a few years ago, but not anymore.

The reception grammars that inform the symbolic properties attributed to bearers of tattoos remain broadly anchored in social information that has been historically accumulated, crystallised and legitimated in relation to tattooing. To a large extent, this information continues to condition the value and meaning of these epidermal inscriptions. It also fuels the social categorisation processes through which adepts are targeted, and fosters social situations in which they are daily protagonists. Tattoos continue to make people think of a social history that incriminates, pathologises and socially discredits people who have them.

The social reputation of a heavily tattooed young person is at risk of *stigma* (Goffman, 1988). Her or his social identity continues to be compromised by *an identity at risk*: the risk of being connoted as something she or he is not, or of overexposing something he or she is and shouldn't be. The extensively marked body is still a

suspicious body, increasing the likelihood of recriminatory, incriminatory or discriminatory effects for its owner. These effects show in situations of inequality in the way in which society treats the latter, compared to the owners of other, unmarked bodies. Effects occur in their day-to-day circulation and dealings, and in their access to certain social circuits, segments of the labour market and so on. One informant, Susan, had been extensively tattooed since she was 15 years old. Now aged 34, she works as a receptionist and body piercer in a tattoo parlour and as a clerk in a store selling "alternative" clothes. Susan told a long story of social situations that she felt were discriminatory, for example,

> People talk a lot about racism in relation to races, but I'm also a victim of that, aren't I? Because no matter where I go, for example, I don't get the same customer service in shops as other people do; I have to wait until the girlies get over the giggling, the tomfoolery, all that. Of course, when I go in somewhere (…) people are always distrustful. Actually, that happened to me this morning! I left, and I left on purpose, because I had the security guard always behind me! It's very strange, but it's true. (…) And that happens all the time, in supermarkets and all that, it's common. I'm always being monitored!

Feeling themselves to be constantly observed in daily life is a common experience for those who display tattooed bodies. The *look* is ostensible for the person who feels it in the flesh. In apprehension of the look that is going to come their way, and as successive social experiences suggest to them, they assume that observation will be impregnated with judgemental or categorising processes, often of a negative and stigmatising nature. Others may suspect or accuse the bearer of having a marginal past or present, relegating them to the status of less reputable social figures, like the "inmate", the "druggie", or the "hooker".

The social mechanisms of censure, recrimination and/or incrimination install themselves in daily life precisely "on the basis of the designations, names and classifications that are attributed to the others and the things that escape our immediate understanding of normality. (…) From the moment at which the label circulates as an

attribute of the person, this fact cannot fail to lead to psychological and social consequences" (Ferreira 2000, 664). When extensively marked young people like Yan (see above) who was fully covered in tattoos, become aware that they are being looked at, they feel they run the risk of allowing themselves to be defined by the world; of seeing their condition as a *person* being subsumed by their condition as a *figure*:

> It's less now, but there is still that tendency for people to judge: "Look, that one has earrings, he's a druggie! That one has tattoos, he was in prison!" There is still a bit of that mentality among people nowadays. (…) I don't like those people who pass me by, look and comment, but in a whispering way. I think it's a bad sign. And I think that that person, right there, is putting me a bit aside. Even if he/she doesn't know me from anywhere, he/she is already setting me apart from everyone else.

When a tattooed young person presumes to see in the eye of the person looking at him or her the value historically associated with marked figures, that look ends up being invested with a structuring power over the young person's attitudes and behaviours. This results from the expectations and predictions the young person formulates with regard to potential social reactions to her or his body. Within this context, when body-marking projects attain an extent that substantially exceeds socially tolerated limits, that visibility becomes the object of social negotiation in given spheres of life (Irwin, 2000).

Strategies for socially managing public skin: confrontation, avoidance, and covering up

Given the reception grammar that still hangs over it, the extensively marked body corresponds to a *commitment to a corporeal place* that *compromises the social place* of the person who has created it. Apart from anything else, such a project compromises its bearer's access to certain social spheres that are more conservative and normative.

The reflexivity underlying the elaboration of these body projects thus includes both an awareness of the risks difference brings with it, and an acknowledgement of

conditions for its social visibility. This is a calculation made on the basis of anticipating other people's potential (re)actions. It results in the social management of the body project's public visibility. Along the trajectory of their social experience as extensively marked subjects, these young people gradually learn to be careful about how, when and where their tattooed bodies are going to be admired, merely tolerated, or vehemently repudiated. As Maria, the 32-year-old high school teacher, said: "Essentially what I thought about was what that [the tattooed body] would bring me in the relationship with others – others who were basically my parents. (...) And in fact, they didn't know for quite a while".

In the light of the contingencies they encounter in face-to-face interactions, extensively tattooed subjects develop strategies for socially managing their body projects that entail *confronting* and/or *avoiding* the constraints they come up against in their daily experience. Options depend on their prior assessment of the expected context and protagonists. These are strategies common to people who have a similarly stigmatised "moral career"; a succession of like learning experiences in relation to their discreditable condition, with an equally similar sequence of personal adjustments (Goffman 1988, 41). Aware of the discreditable social condition that a heavily tattooed body can generate for its owner, these young people learn early on to deal with ostensibly recriminatory, suspicious and/or incriminatory looks and reactions, and to challenge and/or avoid them. From the first marks onwards, possible social risks are foreseen and preferrably avoided.

Confrontation strategies tend to be activated in situations that are momentary, where the young person is not very well prepared. Such situations are experienced primarily with unknown others in daily life. Confrontation strategies are used to manage the social tension generated by the body project's visibility in certain social situations. They

may reduce or minimise the effects of stigma and thus make it easier for the subject and others to co-exist. Brian, the 25-year-old male university student informant, gives an account of how he reacts to looks he presumes express disapproval of his body: "At first I was revolted by the fact that people said this or that... Now it doesn't make any difference whatsoever (...) used to react, yes. It caused me some hassles, but nothing I couldn't get over".

Confrontation strategies can begin by taking the form of a *revolt*, when the young tattooed person confirms reception of the stigmatising look through a break and conflict with the other, to whom he or she reacts with indignation and verbal or even physical violence. However, in a later phase, when faced with reactions, these young people may opt for the confrontation strategy of *indifference*. They devalue the reaction of others by scorning it. Or they may confront with an attitude of *ironic provocation*, as though confirming the aggression and symbolic violence the other has interpreted their body project to contain. As Thomas, a 28-year-old electrician, describes it thus:

> When I hear some buzz, like a group of old ladies walks by and I hear: "look at that guy!" And whatever, that's when I suck in a huge greenie to disgust them and hit them with everything I've got! I sort them out there and then! You see, when I feel that people are disgusted with me, that's when I try to disgust them even more. That's my punk attitude to really shock them. The more they don't like it, the more I do for them not to like it.

As this indicates, in certain daily social situations, above all with *generalised others*, the extensively tattooed subject makes a point of affirming and radicalising their individual distinctiveness. They constitute the relationship with the untattooed other in terms of rebellion and provocation. However, in other, more intimate social spheres, the same subject may calculate the possible risks of conflict, tension and/or social sanctions and decide otherwise. He or she may end up slightly betraying their identity in order to reduce or resolve those risks.

Avoidance strategies may be employed by extensively tattooed young people who are uncertain about the way in which the social information inscribed on their bodies may be read and the discredit that it may cause. These avoidance strategies seek to neutralise negative reactions. These eminently defensive strategies are characterised by the *prevention* of critical judgements and adverse reactions. That is, implementation of the strategy is foreseen and prepared in advance, so as to facilitate the course of daily interaction with non-tattooed others, and avoid or minimise any possible conflicts.

These are strategies through which the individual adjusts his or her self-image to the other's expectations. Before a social appearance in a given social sphere or in the presence of certain figures, the young person does some prior translation work, anticipating the reception grammar that may be applied to her or his body and any tensions that may result thereby. As a result of this calculation, the young person may dissimulate his or her body image. *Dissimulation* here refers to the effort that the potentially stigmatised person makes not to impose his or her presence as different – the art of making oneself the same. This provisionally creates a façade that matches the expected identity, as Thomas, the 28-year-old electrician, explains,

> I think there is always a certain fear too (…) in relation to possible friendships that I'll make, in relation to their family members. I never quite know how to react towards them. Perhaps the best way is to really conceal things and not show them, so as not to give them a reason to speak, to bother me, to say "but if that guy is like this and so on, I don't like you dating him!" (…) Therefore, so as not to let that happen, I think the best thing is really (...) Well, when I feel like walking around in short sleeves, I walk around in short sleeves. But when I go somewhere like that where I'm not very familiar with people, I put on a shirt or a sweatshirt or something, and I cover my arms.

The avoidance strategy here is not that of managing the tension generated in social contacts, as in confrontation strategies, but of managing information about the differential attribute in question. To reveal or to hide it, where, and to whose eyes it will be shown: these become habitual decisions in the social routine of young people covered in tattoos. More than managing the tension produced by the project's visibility,

avoidance strategy tries to manage the social information that is given out by the body and circulates as a result of the looks it encounters. Avoidance strategies entail weighing up and negotiating the public limits of the young person's corporeal expression, such as attempting to keep the body project partially or entirely secret, using techniques that involve "covering up" the façade (Goffman 1993, 72).

It begins with a rigorous weighing up of the *corporeal geography* of the marks, in such a way as to anticipate and prepare for the possibility that the project will remain unknown in social situations which, in principle, imply a greater danger of body-based discrimination. For example, as Yan said of working in his sister's tattoo parlour: "As a rule, we mustn't mark the parts of the body from the wrists to the hands, or from the neck to the head, right? These are the most difficult parts [to conceal]. Nowadays it is always very complicated for a person to find work, isn't it? So society demands that it be that way!"

Prior experience of discrimination produces the effect of social management of the body-marking project so as to be situationally disguised. Given their permanent nature, the inscription of marks, and above all of extensive tattoos, should be avoided on the *public skin*, corporeal territory that is hard to camouflage with clothing. If the forearm to the hand and from the neck upwards is avoided, then it is easy to dissimulate the body project in certain social situations. The most socially risky spheres, in which avoidance strategies are most often implemented, include the *family* sphere and the *work* sphere.

The first body marks, or the corporeal extent to which the project is advancing, are very often hidden from the eyes of the family, as in the case of Patrick, a 28-year-old restaurant cook who still lives with his parents:

> [My parents reacted] Badly! Very badly! (…) Even today the reaction continues to be negative. But the exact quantity [of tattoos I have], they also don't know how many there are, or how

> extensive, because they are limited by what they see and not by what in fact exists. (…) If I need to change clothes for example, I am unable to change in front of my father.

Sarah, a 27-year-old female designer, also described her avoidance strategies in the work environment:

> The same thing tends to happen in situations involving job interviews or integration into new working environments: [The piercing in the chin...] It always brings problems, you know?... Every so often I have to take it out. (...) I know that if I go to look for a job, I will have to take it out! (…) Of course if I perceive that the person [who is interviewing me for a job] does not like tattoos, I'm never going to show it, nor will I go to the workplace with the tattoos on display. (…) When I went to the interview for the job that I had previously, the man just stared at my ears; but I was also smart enough to wear my hair loose, so that it wouldn't be that noticeable.

Thus, in the work sphere, avoidance strategies may go as far as the partial or total reconversion of the young person's appearance in favour of the normative. This social integration is necessary for his or her social survival in the working context. Brian, the 25-year-old university student, is working at present in an accounting office:

> From the moment at which we entered the labour market, the majority of them [friends with tattoos and piercings] had to give that up in order to start presenting themselves differently. (…) It is the labour situation that forces many people to give up ways in which they would like to dress or to present themselves. It is the imposed model, it is the stereotype. (…) I am at a moment in my life in which I've had to prostitute myself a bit to the stereotype, to the existing model. And I don't feel okay. I don't feel okay not wearing my earrings. I don't feel okay at having to go to work and having to hide parts of the tattoos – some I can't actually hide, no matter how hard I try. And that hurts!

The world of work configures a social zone in which there come into play normative social constraints on visual appearances which mean that the individual does not always seem to be what he or she is. So this is a space that pushes people to engage in personal reflexivity on the principles of reality (what I can do), duty (what I should do) and will (what I want to do), thus leading to interesting phenomena of *split identities* in the individual performance of social roles (see Goffman, 1993).

In these circumstances it is understandable that extensively tattooed young people perceive and experience the labour market as one of the main spaces in which they are constrained in their ability to develop and publicly assume the body they have. In this

sphere of social life, they quite often accept renouncing their authenticity, "being themselves", in order to manage the potential *recognition deficit* which their body might engender (Schaut, 1999).

Having said this, when they hide their body marks these young people feel that they are being obliged to give up one of the personal traits which they most value and through which they seek to be recognised and valued by others. When the dissimulation occurs, they experience it as an obstacle to their authenticity and individuality – an assault on the full realisation of their identity project. Avoidance strategies cause a major discrepancy between *real social identity* and *virtual social identity* (Goffman 1988, 12).

It is in their daily experience of social discrimination that these young people want to deconstruct the bodily stereotypes rooted in their difference. At the same time they want to collectively legitimate their social normality and moral integrity realised through their capacity to work. In both cases they attempt to restore their condition of being a *person*, not a mere *figure* reduced to a historically and socially discredited corporeal attribute.

Conclusion

The discussion above allows us to see a major tension that surrounds the material life experiences of young bodies. This tension is between conformity and alternative production. On the one hand, there is pressure to conform to the ideal notion of the *young body* – a body/object made into a material thing, capitalised on the stage of consumption and fashion, and trafficked in media images and the market. On the other hand we see in the body project the production of corporealities of contestation. Here

the body/subjects are criss-crossed by a multiplicity of non-submissive forces that resist the capitalist, standardised programming of the body design industry. The languages and practices of these corporealities of contestation attempt to shatter the system of domination micropolitically, applying a brake to the globalised empire of the *young body*. They refute the prescriptive criteria of "normality" whose rigidity and degree of institutionalisation is capable of turning any radical difference into *stigma*.

The extensively tattooed young person's body, often interpreted in the light of a hegemonic reception grammar as a symptom of a fragile psychological state, actually reflects a fragile form of social *struggle for subjectivity* (McDonald, 1999). It symbolises a fight for the recognition, respect and dignity of a subjectivity constructed on the basis of values of authenticity, singularity and freedom of action.

Therefore, the aesthetic of body marks cannot be seen as an empty and fashionable framing trend. The extensively marked body expresses convictions, values and representations regarding the way in which the subject defines him or herself, both to him or herself and in the eyes of the society in which he or she lives. It expresses symbolic distancing in the face of a world which its user feels restricts her or his action in social space (Ferreira, 2007). In the "ocularcentric" society we live in nowadays (Campos, 2010), we cannot effectively ignore the way in which youth microcultures use the body's visuality in its aesthetic, kinetic and sensorial excesses as a privileged space in which to affirm their identity. Here they play and take pleasure, but also fight for a place in the world, claiming a space in which to exist as a *singular* ("be different"), *authentic* ("be myself") and *free* ("be who I want to") person; to present and have themselves represented in the world.

From this perspective there is an urgent need to broaden the research on body-expression formats adopted by young people, those through which they try to

surreptitiously introduce a degree of disorder into the imposed corporeal order. Response to the question put forward by Lopes – "What body for what society?" (2004) implies questioning not only the canons of the *legitimate body* in each space/time and the respective ways in which legitimacy is constructed, but also the canons of bodies that figure as less legitimate or *illegitimate* in their respective spaces of production, reception and social experience. "The body is only the 'measure of all things' if we understand the modalities by which the body conforms and deforms the dominant order" (Lopes 2004, 124). One of these modalities is the political aesthetic of the body-marking project.

References

Atkinson, M. 2002. "Pretty in Ink: Conformity, Resistance, and Negotiation in Women's Tattooing." *Sex Roles* 47: 219-235.

Atkinson, M. 2003. *Tattooed. The Sociogenesis of a Body Art*. Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press.

Bengtsson, A., Ostberg, J., and Kjeldgaard, D. 2005. "Prisoners in Paradise: Subcultural Resistance to the Marketization of Tattooing." *Consumption, Markets and Culture* 8: 261-274.

Berthelot, J-M. 1983. « Corps et Société. Problèmes Méthodologiques posés par une Approche Sociologique du Corps. » *Cahiers Internationaux de* S*ociologie* 74: 119-131.

Blanchard, M. 1991. "Post-bourgeois Tattoo. Reflections on Skin Writing in Late Capitalist Societies." *Visual Anthropology Review,* 7, no. 2: 11-21.

Bogdan, R. 1994. "Le Commerce des Monstres." *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* 104: 34-46.

Boltantsky, L. 1975. « Les Usages Sociaux du Corps. » *Annales – Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 26, no. 1: 205-233.

Bourdieu, P. 1980. « La Jeunesse n'est qu'un Mot. » In *Questions de Sociologie*, 143-154. Paris: Minuit.

Bytheway, B. and Johnson, J. 1998. "The Sight of Age." In *The Body in Everyday Life,* edited by S. Nettleton and J. Watson, 243-257. London: Routledge.

Calabrese, O. 1987. *A Idade Neobarroca.* Lisbon: Edições.

Camphausen, R. C. 1997. *Return of the Tribal. A celebration of Body Adornment*. Rochester, VT: Park Street Press.

Campos, R. 2010. "Juventude e Visualidade no Mundo Contemporâneo. Uma Reflexão em Torno da Imagem nas Culturas Juvenis." *Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas* 63: 113-137.

Caplan, J. ed. 2000. *Written on the Body. The Tattoo in European and American History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Csordas, T. ed. 1994. *Embodiment and Experience. The Existential Ground of Culture and Self*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

DeMello, M. 1993. "The Convict Body: Tattooing among Male American Prisoners." *Anthropology Today* 9, no. 6: 10-13.

DeMello, M. 2000. *Bodies of Inscription. A Cultural History of the Modern Tattoo Community*. London: Duke University Press.

Diógenes, G. 1998. *Cartografias da Cultura e da Violência. Gangues, Galeras e o Movimento Hip Hop*. São Paulo: Annablume.

Favazza, A. R. 1987. *Bodies under Siege. Self-mutilation and Body Modification in Culture and Psychiatry*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Featherstone, M. and Wernick, A, ed. 1995. *Images of Aging: Cultural Representations of Later Life*. London: Routledge.

Feixa, C. 1993. *La Joventut com a Metàfora*. Barcelona: Secretaria General de Joventut.

Ferreira, P. M. 2000. "Controlo e Identidade: A não Conformidade Durante a Adolescência." *Sociologia – Problemas e Práticas* 33: 55-85.

Ferreira, V. S. and Nunes, C. 2010. "Les Trajectories de Passage à l'Âge Adulte en Europe." *Politiques Sociales et Familiales* 102: 21-38.

Ferreira, V. S. 2003. "Atitudes dos Jovens Portugueses Perante o Corpo." In *Condutas de Risco, Práticas Culturais e Atitudes Perante o Corpo,* edited by J. M. Pais & M. V. Cabral, 265-366. Lisbon: Celta.

Ferreira, V. S. 2007. "Política do Corpo e Política de Vida: A Tatuagem e o Body Piercing como Expressão Corporal de uma Ética da Dissidência." *Etnográfica* 11, no. 2: 291-326.

Ferreira, V. S. 2008a. *Marcas que Demarcam. Tatuagem, Body Piercing e Culturas Juvenis*. Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.

Ferreira, V. S. 2008b. "Ondas, Cenas e Microculturas Juvenis." *Plural – Revista do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Sociologia da USP* 15: 99-128.

Ferreira, V. S. 2014. "Becoming a Heavily Tattooed Young Body: From a Bodily Experience to a Body Project." *Youth & Society* 46(3): 303-337.

Goffman, E. 1963. *Estigma. Notas sobre a Manipulação da Identidade Deteriorada*. Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara.

Goffman, E. 1959. *A Apresentação do eu na Vida de Todos os Dias*. Lisbon: Relógio d'Água.

Goode, E and Vail, D. A. 2008. *Extreme Deviance*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.

Grobel, L. 1985 *Conversations with Capote.* New York: Plume.

Hardin, M. 1999. "Mar(k)ing the Objected Body: A Reading of Contemporary Female Tattooing." *Fashion Theory* 3, no. 1: 81-108.

Hebdige, D. 1979. *Subculture. The Meaning of Style*. London: Methuen.

Hewitt, K. 1997. *Mutilating the Body. Identity in Blood and Ink*. Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Press.

Irwin, K. 2000. "Negotiating Tattoo." In *Constructions of Deviance. Social Power, Context, and Interaction,* edited by P. A. Adler and P. Adler, 469-479. Belmont: Wadsworth.

Irwin, K. 2001. "Legitimating the first Tattoo: Moral Passage through Informal Interaction." *Symbolic Interaction* 12: 119-173.

Klesse, C. 1999. "'Modern Primitivism'. Non-mainstream Body Modification and Racialized Representation." *Body and Society* 5, no. 2-3: 15-38.

Kosut, M. 2006a. "An Ironic Fad: The Commodification and Consumption of Tattoos." *Journal of Popular Culture* 39: 1035-1948.

Kosut, M. 2006b. "Mad Artists and Tattooed Perverts. Deviant Discourse and the Social Construction of Cultural Categories." *Deviant Behavior* 21, no.1: 73-95.

Lacassagne, A. 1881. "Recherches sur les Tatouages et Principalement du Tatouage chez les Criminals." *Annales d'Hygiène Publique, Industrielle et Sociale* 3: 288-304.

Lasch, C. 1979. *Le Complexe de Narcisse. La Nouvelle Sensibilité Américaine*. Paris: Robert Laffont.

Le Breton, D. 1990. *Anthropologie du Corps et Modernité*. Paris: Quadrige/PUF.

Le Breton, D. 2002. *Signes d'Identité. Tatouages, piercings et autres Marques Corporelles*. Paris: Métailié.

Lombroso, C. 1895. *L'Homme Criminal.* Paris: Félix Alcan.

Lopes, J. T. 2004. “Que Corpo, para que Sociedade? Formas Contemporâneas de Alienação.” *Manifesto* 5: 121-126.

Maffesoli, M. 1992. *La Transfiguration du Politique. La Tribalisation du Monde Postmoderne.* Paris: La Table Moderne.

Martín-Barbero, M. 1998**. “**Jovenes: Des-orden Cultural e Palimpsestos de Identidade.” In *Viviendo a toda. Jóvenes, territórios culturales y nuevas sensibilidades*, edited by H. Cubides, M. C. Laverde, and C. E. Valderrama, 22-37. Bogotá: Universidad Central / Siglo del Hombre Editores.

McDonald, K. 1999. *Struggles for Subjectivity. Identity, Action and Youth Experience*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Mendes de Almeida, M. I. 2000. “Nada além da Epiderme: A Performance Romântica da Tatuagem.” *Psicologia Clínica 12*, no. 2: 100-147.

Mifflin, M. 1997. *Bodies of Subversion. A Secret History of Women and Tattoo*. New York: Juno Books.

Myers, J. 1992. “Non-mainstream Body Modification. Genital Piercing, Branding, Burning and Cutting.” *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 21: 267-306.

Nancy, J.-L. 2004. Cinquenta e Oito Indícios sobre o Corpo. *Revista de Comunicação e Linguagens,* 33: 15-23.

Peixoto, R. 1990. “A Tatuagem em Portugal”. In *Etnografia Portuguesa,* pp. 15-43. Lisbon: Dom Quixote.

Phillips, S. A. 2001. “Gallo’s Body. Decoration and Damnation in the Life of a Chicago Gang Member.” *Ethnography* 2: 357-388.

Pitts, V. 1998. “’Reclaiming’ the Female Body: Embodied Identity Work, Resistance, and the Grotesque.” *Body & Society* 4, no. 3: 67-84.

Pitts, V. 1999. “Body Modification, Self Mutilation and Agency in Media Accounts of a Subculture.” *Body & Society* 5, no. 2-3: 291-303.

Pitts, V. 2003. *In the Flesh. The Cultural Politics of Body Modification*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Putnins, A. 2002. “Young Offenders, Tattoos and Recidivism.” *Psychiatry, Psychology and Law* 9, no. 1: 62-68.

Riley, S. and Cahill, S. 2005. “Managing Meaning and Belonging: Young Women’s Negotiation of Authenticity in Body Art.” *Journal of Youth Studies* 8: 261-279.

Sartre, J.-P 1943, *O Ser e o Nada. Ensaio de Ontologia Fenomenológica*. Petrópolis: Editora Vozes.

Schaut, C. 1999. « Dénis de Reconaissance et Stratégies de Réparation. » *Recherches Sociologiques* 2 : 85-101.

Simmel, G. 1903. “A Metrópole e a Vida do Espírito.” In *Cidade, Cultura e Globalização* Ed. C. Fortuna Oeiras: Celta.

Steward, S. M. 1990. *Bad Boys and Tough Tattoos. A Social History of the Tattoo with Gangs, Sailors, and Street Corner Punks 1950-1965*. New York: Haworth Press.

Sweetman, P. 1999. “Anchoring the (Postmodern) Self? Body Modification, Fashion and Identity.” *Body & Society* 5, no. 2-3: 51-76.

Turner, B. S. 1999. “The Possibility of Primitiveness: Towards a Sociology of Body Marks in Cool Societies.” *Body & Society* 5, no. 2-3: 39-50.

Véron, E. 1980. *A Produção de Sentido*. São Paulo: Cultrix.

Weber, M. 1949. *The Methodology of the Social Sciences.* Glencoe: The Free Press.

Winchel, R. M., & Stanley, M. 1991. “Self-injurious Behavior: A Review of the Behavior and Biology of Self-mutilation.” *American Journal of Psychiatry* 148: 306-317.

Chapter 8
Hip-hop culture and youth in Lagos: The interface of globalisation and identity crisis

Ndukaeze Nwabueze

Introduction

Hip-hop culture came into Nigeria about 1989 and rapidly became a dominant feature of youth culture. It changed the type of music played and enjoyed by Nigerian youth, the way they dressed, spoke and behaved. The songs have been criticised as noisy and beat-based, meaningless, lewd, and immoral; dance is said to be sexy and erotic; dress is described as "riotous". It is claimed women are disrespected and exploited and the music is over-commercialised. Motivated by this recent debate, this chapter explores the influence of hip-hop on youth culture in Lagos. It looks at sexual morality and a possible crisis of youth identity. It also asks whether hip hop is a sub-culture or a contra-culture.

An incontrovertible reality of social life today is globalisation (McLuhan, 1968; Van

Der Bly, 2005): the shrinking of social and geographical space and diminution of the significance of physical space between continents, cultures, peoples, economies and countries. This process has been variously described as homogenization of world culture or Americanization (Schiller, 1976), mondialisation (Cerami, 1962), complex

connectivity (Tomlinson, 1999), incorporation into single world society (Albrow, 1990), and McDonaldisation (Ritzer, 2000). Other western scholars have identified hybridisation (Neverdeen Pieterse, 1995), the clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1993) or McWorld vs Jihad (Barber, 1995). Yet certainly it is not yet *Uhuru* (victory) for the dependent global South. Moreover, the prospect for a level playing ground for rich and poor countries or even of universal global wealth and prosperity for all comers is not foreseeable.

Debate over the ravaging effect of globalisation by way of continued cultural hegemony of America and Europe against the dependent half of the world is gradually shifting focus from economy and finance to fashion, aesthetics and expressive aspects of culture. The driving force in the new agenda is information and communication technology (ICT). A powerful medium of cultural penetration and take-over, particularly among youth in the global south, is hip hop music and culture. Hip hop penetration and ICT strongly influence youth due to their receptivity, experimental attitude and impressionable disposition. ICT globalisation is said to have created a window and a gazing effect that allows young people to observe, imbibe, learn, as well as sample, other tastes, cultures, values and ideas (Siziba, 2009). Guguleti Siziba identifies this as the origin of what he calls Africa's crisis of "rebellious youth" and identity crisis. He argues young people are claiming spaces in which to exercise their agency and through music, language, art and lifestyle. Here they generate their own identities, divorced from adult imperatives.

In our view, hip hop in Nigeria has emerged as a popular cultural form through which young people are projecting their own identity and contributing to the production of dominant or mainstream culture of their society in the contemporary world. In this process they are looking outside their own society,

> The worldview of children and young people are being shaped by phenomena in ways that often make them look for role models or aspire to things outside their own societies. With far broader horizons than the youth of previous generations, their aspirations can easily go beyond what the material conditions of the societies where they live in can allow. A strong urge and, in some instances, desperate attempts to migrate to the industrialized countries are among the consequences (Sall et. al 2009, 1).

There is a compelling urge to think act, appear and behave like European or American youth, the direction from where new ideas, values and tastes are coming. Caught between the local and the global milieu, they are faced with difficult choices . The attraction of Nigerian youth is to get closer to youth in other parts of the world and to key into the universalising global culture of young persons though hip hop.

Characteristics of hip-hop culture and the story of its penetration

Children and youth in Lagos are greatly influenced by hip hop culture. In addition to received American hip hop, a burgeoning industry for the local reproduction of the Nigerian genre has taken root. We argue that hip hop has become the single most powerful movement driving the globalisation, even Americanisation, of Nigerian youth culture. Children and youth dress, play, talk, sing, reason and share social and ethical values that characterise the hip hop culture tradition that came from New York. Yet the dynamics of its diffusion and receivership is rather complex because it has mixed with local music and languages in the process of gaining legitimacy.

Hip hop as a cultural movement was introduced into the US from outside, especially from the West Indies. Similarly, hip-hop in Nigeria was diffused into the country from outside. Hip hop developed from the racially structured US society where people of colour were at a relative social, economic and political disadvantage. It began as protest, a movement of defiance, and a contra-culture of sorts to the white-dominated American mainstream. The music form did not come into America with these defiant features. It acquired them within the context because orthodoxy resisted its penetration and devotees felt the need to fight back. The development of American hip-hop into a tool of political protest and racial emancipation was given impetus by the Black civil rights movement. It gave a voice to structurally marginalised and voiceless African and Latino youth.

Hip hop spread throughout the world after the 1970s. Rap, break dancing, DJing or miming, beat boxing or mouth drum beating, but not graffiti, expanded in Nigeria about the turn of the century. Features include: hip hop slang, sportswear fashion, unconventional modes of dressing and disdain for formal dress, poetry singing, social commentary running, and wearing jewellery. However, hip hop in Nigeria, like its Japanese counterpart, was and still is, analytically classless. Unlike in America, it did not come in as the music of the underdog. And due to the fact that it came from America, irrespective of its humble origins, it was enthusiastically embraced across ethnic, religious, educational, economic and ideological divides. Attack on constituted authority or disdain for officialdom, particularly the police, is not a marked feature of Nigerian hip hop. However, some local hip-hop artists have occasionally sung protest songs in disapproval of some unacceptable social, economic or political conditions or policies. There is no connection with guns and neither do hip hop personalities have any association with street violence, guns, street fights, rape, crime, and so on.

Like its American forebear, Nigerian hip-hop is electronic rather than band-based. Emphasis is on external features rather than expertise in playing instruments. Hip hop projects the singer. It is television driven and live performance is often based on miming of studio-produced musical movies. Female dancers are used to to sell musical works. However, the gender disrespect dimension of hip hop appears not to have gained public acknowledgement or opprobrium in Nigeria. Young women seem to pounce on the invitation to perform and this role is not yet defined as exploitation or misogyny. There is as yet in Nigeria no American Queen Latifah with the U-N-I-T-Y song to draw the attention of females to the alleged "ignoble" status of females in hip-hop culture or degrading sexist roles they may be called upon to play. Hip hop is overtly commercialised. Dance competitions are regular and attractive prizes are won. Hip hop is used to advertise everything from football, to cell phones, GSM services, sanitary items, toiletries, detergents and air fresheners.

Yet Nigerian hip hop is not consumed in controversy. Although critical observations are seeping in, this has not damaged its popularity. In the public domain Nigerian hip hop is characterised so far in the positive rather than in the negative. It is entertainment and it is providing youth with their own voice. The society is compelled to listen because of the energy, vibrancy, and showmanship of the progenitors. The possibility of unhealthy connotations has taken a back seat.

Information and communication technology (ICT)

An ICT message rapidly reaches a large audience simultaneously and, as encoded, without alteration. The internet and cell phones are at the heart of the new technology that enhances the spread of hip hop. With the Bluetooth device instant camera shots and

videos taken on mobile phones are instantly transferrable and shared across regions and continents. The Blackberry device has further extended the functionality of the cell phone. Cheaper sets are making the services accessible to people of low income. Global satellite television and radio has its own effect. Thousands of channels update the latest in everything to the African continent. Music channels like MTV, MTV Base, Trace, Channel O, Sound City and a host of others play hip hop videos on an on-going basis. The preponderance of items broadcast originate from Western societies, so Africa performs essentially the consumption role. Similarly, Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and devices like the I-pad have intensified global peer influence of social media on the life of African youth. ICTs are now a symbolic element of youth culture in contrast to other technologies (Oumar, 2009; Lo-oh, 2009). Moreover, these technologies have greater influence on the lifestyle of the younger generation (Sall, Cardoso and Bangirana, 2009). They are the ICT generation. In Nigeria, ICTs and social media have tended to legitimise the appeal and adoption of Western lifestyles by local youth through consistent and continuous reinforcement of those values in what may be understood as international peer pressure. Hip hop music and culture has become a main influence defining the character of youth culture in Lagos.

The study setting

Lagos presents an ideal setting to study the interface between globalisation, the popular youth culture of hip-hop and the question of identity crisis. Lagos is a city-state and can be described as a microcosm of the complex country of Nigeria (Otokiti, 2008). It is a melting pot of Nigeria's 374 ethno-linguistic groups (Otite, 1987). Although Lagos ceased to be the capital in December 1991, it remains the industrial, commercial, and

entertainment and fashion hub of the country. Lagos houses the most successful and visible traditional and contemporary artists and performers of all kinds. Almost all the leading hip-hop stars are domiciled in Lagos and conduct their business there.

The influence of Lagos is shown by its contribution of a monthly average of 30 billion Naira Value Added Tax to the Federation account (*The Guardian*, Fri. June 1, 2012). Opportunities which the state provides for jobs, education, business, trade and commerce accounts for the high and persistent rate of migration into the city. Around 1.4 million persons (or 4000 per day) migrate into the state every year (Soyombo and Shokoya, 2011). Lagos State is highly urbanised. About 95% of the population live within the metropolis (Ogunleye & Awomosu, 2011). Although the Yoruba constitute the dominant ethnic group, Igbo, Hausa, West Africans, Europeans, Americans and Asians are all represented (George, 2009). Indeed, 87% of the population are from states other than Lagos (NPC, 1998). Lagos people work hard and enjoy themselves at various entertainment and leisure venues, providing opportunity for regular use of musical works and for engagement of the services of musicians.

Ikeja is the capital of the state. Here residents have a disposable income far above the national average. Their purchasing power is second to none and this adds to the attraction of the city for artistes of all descriptions. Young people therefore have a relatively higher income to spend on music, fashion and accessories. Those that are in school and those that have finished school but are unemployed enjoy support from parents and guardians. On the other hand, owing to the fact of more opportunities for employment, there is a higher proportion of gainfully employed youth in the city than other parts of the country.

Study aim

The question here is: what is the impact of hip hop culture on young people in Lagos? We know that hip hop in America is credited with providing a medium of expression for the voiceless, poor inner city black youths. Leslie (2009) claims hip hop songs promote self-confidence, optimism and self-appreciation. However, hip hop has also been accused of misogyny and the exploitation of women (Ayanna, 2009); of promoting violence, immorality, drug abuse, the trivialisation of sex, indecent dressing, vulgar lyrics, racism, lack of respect for authority, hatred of the police, and crass materialism. Banjoko (2007) claims hip hop promotes: sexism, negativity, pornography, criminality, homophobia, sexist and degrading lyrics, a casual, cavalier attitude to sex, disrespect of women, tribalism and guns, noise and gangsterism. For Diawara (1998), hip hop romanticises violence, law breaking and gangs. Pareles (2007) says of hip-hop that it is too commercial, too commodified and promotes global hypercapitalism. Another observer, Serpick (2006) accuses hip hop culture of profanity and obscenity.

Hicks (2009) points out that hip hop is not just a style of music; it is a culture born of poor, inner-city life in America that has evolved into a rallying cry for those who do not negotiate the nuances of the mainstream. However, now it serves to glorify stigmatised lower class characteristics, preventing the impetus for upward mobility among African-American males. It is implied that hip hop destroys the potential of black youth by erroneously inferring that black youths who emulate mainstream attitudes are exhibiting weakness.

Recently Nigerian hip hop has come under critical focus. The debate was sparked by an editorial by Reuben Abati, Chairman of the Editorial Board of the Guardian Newspapers (*The Guardian on Sunday*, June 21, 2009). Entitled "A nation's identity crisis", the editorial condemned hip hop music because of "vulgar, meaningless

lyrics". Elsewhere, seasoned flautist Tee Mac dismissed hip hop in a television interview for selling sex rather than music. Soon after, on a Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) nation-wide programme, hip hop dance, among other influences, was held responsible for young children doing erotic and seductive dance styles (NTA Newsline, Sunday 21st June, 2009). Presenters on government-owned radio in the same month of June accused hip-hop music of meaningless, noisy, sexy and lewd lyrics which corrupted Nigerian children. They complained that there was no positive message in "unhealthy" musical works (AM Lagos life, Metro FM 97.6 Lagos, 24 June 2009, 8.00am). The television anchor of "The CEO", Yinka Ogundimu, similarly raised concerns about meaningless and immoral lyrics and dance styles with front line hip hop music video producer, Dayo Adeneye of Prime Time Entertainment and Kenny Records. The interviewee agreed with Ogundimu, explaining that they were simply producing to meet popular demand and satisfy the taste of the buying public (STV, Thursday, July 9, 2009). When the Director-General of the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) was asked to comment on these observations, he agreed (Newsline, NTA, June 21, 2009).

Against this scenario of unfolding criticisms, the aim here is to investigate whether hip hop culture might have a positive or negative impact on the behaviour of children and youth in Lagos. Specifically, the influence of hip hop on the individual and Nigerian identity of young persons in Lagos will be explored. Youth are the leaders of tomorrow. If today's youth, unlike those of the generations before them, indulge in imagining themselves first as global citizens or even American or European citizens before seeing themselves as Nigerians, this portends danger in the future for nationalism and nation-statehood in a rapidly increasing competitive world. The wisdom in the developed world is that citizens should think globally and act locally. The danger in

Nigeria is that youth might do the reverse by thinking locally and acting globally, to the detriment of national interest.

Nigerian youth

In the Social Development Policy for Nigeria 1989, a youth was defined as a person falling between 12-30 years. That definition has however been discarded in the National Youth Development Policy 2001, which defined youth as a person of age between 18 and 35 years. Persons between 15 – 29 years of age constitute 28% of the total national population (Oyekanmi, 2011; NPC, 2009; UN, 2008). However, although the official definition of youth in the country is a person aged 18-35 years, a lower age limit was chosen for the study of 12-35 because this better reflects where the popularity of hip hop can be seen.

Younger people tend to have a stronger need than older people for belonging, for recognition by others, for getting attention and feeling relevant. They easily adopt new modes of dance, talk, dress, walk, speech as a way of winning the acceptance of their peers. Unlike adults who are more calculating and critical, young persons are more likely to go deep into movements even where they project values that run counter to dominant social ideals (Nwabueze, 2006). Soyombo (2012) claims youth are characterised by rapid physical, emotional and mental development, accompanied by notions and desires of freedom and individuality. This is the stage where they construct their identities and personalities. They value freedom and feel like breaking away from the constraints and restrictions from adults. Young people are remarkably energetic and active, exploring avenues to burn off accumulated energy. So the fact that hip hop is beat-based and the dance styles somewhat acrobatic and sportsmanlike perhaps accounts

for its extraordinary appeal to young people. It is compatible with their physical drive and their psychological desire and disposition.

Identity is an imperative socio-psychological characteristic of individuals as they grow up. In a person's biological development, the question "who am I?" will arise and need to be confronted and resolved by the individual. An extensive body of literature has been accumulated on the processes, theory and empirical trajectories of identity. Erikson (1970, 18) defined identity as "a subjective sense as well as an observable quality of personal sameness and continuity of some shared world image". The real me, he theorised, is coherent and expected to remain more or less the same through life. A person's identity is located both at the core of the individual and at the core of the culture or community and thereby binds and connects the person to his community. Goffman (1959) and Berger (1966) concur that identity is socially bestowed, socially sustained and socially transformed. Scott and Marshall (2005) find that there is no clear concept of identity in modern sociology. They put forward two contrasting sociology perspectives. The agentic view emphasises that people choose and construct their personal identity, while the structuralist view contends that identity is mainly an imposition of society and the surrounding culture through socialisation. And so identity in modern sociology is used widely and loosely in reference to one's sense of self and feelings and ideas about oneself. Even if the individual is free to construct what self image s/he might prefer, the building-blocks of ideas, values, tastes and ethics are likely to be socially defined, given and legitimated.

Identity crisis

Erikson (1959, 1968) associated "identity crisis" with the fifth of eight development stages. That is, adolescence: from 13-19 years. No clear social role has yet been developed and no clear attachments. The person is still oscillating between self as everything or as nothing at all or as something yet undefined. The identity crisis during adolescence signifies the existence of a gap, a confusion, uncertainty, ambiguity, equivocation in the definition of the self among the adolescent. However, in most societies now the crisis does not disappear at 20 years of age but lingers owing to rapidly changing socio-economic and cultural realities, which delay social transition to adulthood. Marcia (1966) distinguishes four identity statuses as follows:

1. Identity diffusion status - occurs when there is neither an identity crisis nor commitment;
2. Foreclosure status - when a person has made a commitment without attempting identity exploration;
3. Moratorium status - is where a person is actively involved in exploring different identities, but has not made a commitment;
4. Identity achievement status - occurs when an individual has gone through an exploration of different identities and made a commitment to one;

Of the four options, the identity status of Lagos youth is perhaps between foreclosure and identity achievement. Local hip hop stars, Euro-American hip-hop and R&B and ICT message inundation are all influential against the background of a run-down domestic economy where youth face a gloomy picture. Some may have made a commitment to an American hip hop identity in place of local music, culture and identity. This identity crisis is choice-based, a swapping of local Nigerian identity in

favour of off-shore preference. There is confusion as to national identity. They may ask: "Am I Nigerian? Am I American? Is it good being Nigerian? Is it better being European or American indeed Asian?"

Lagos youth are beset with severe daily challenges of existence, including unemployment, inability to gain admission into tertiary education and high cost of living. They also face moral decadence, corrupt public bureaucracies and political office holders. Poorer youth are under pressure to abandon school or other skills training to earn income to support the family as many parents are losing their jobs. Boys may engage in theft, internet fraud (locally called yahoo yahoo), commercial motorcycle (*okada*) operations, kidnapping, or even child and female trafficking for prostitution and domestic service. Girls may engage in prostitution or simply attach themselves to affluent, older, usually married adult males (or *aristos*).

At the same time, these young people are constantly bombarded with messages emanating from innumerable ICT sources promising an easier and better life in Europe and America. The result is a blurred image of the difference between the local and the foreign. They may prefer to see themselves as American. As they project the image of themselves onto the character of American hip hop and R&B idols, that identity status becomes legitimated, normative and ideal. The general expectation of mainstream culture of a Nigerian youth is to be an embodiment of local tastes, values, beliefs, norms, aspirations and interests. They are expected to give love and commitment to the local ethos. To turn away from all that is a process of identity renunciation, denial and re-construction.

Research methods

Firstly, the intention was to tap the views of young people themselves away from the tradition of adults speaking for them. In parts of Africa, owing to institutionalized gerontocracy and patriarchy, male youths are excluded from contributing to mainstream culture by age while female youths are hampered by both their sex and age. Although young people constitute over 4 per cent of the population, their alienation by those cultural processes means not only that others talk for them, but their voices are usually not heard. They are most often misunderstood when they try to get their views across.

Secondly, experts have expressed worry over methodological fault lines in the study of African youth. Siziba (2009, 21) for instance, regrets that the study of African youth relies on Western theoretical perspectives that fail to capture the Africanness of African youths. Writing on the same subject Lah Lo-oh (2009, 33) observed that scholars have tended to create or recast African and other non-western adolescents in the shadow of Euro-American adolescents so that no direct image of African adolescence is recorded. In reacting to these views, Sall et al. (2009) call for refocused and redesigned studies on African youth. Moreover, childhood and adolescence in the South must be understood in the context of the ICT revolution and the globalisation process driven by neo-liberalism. Accordingly, specifically youth-focused methods were adopted.

The study covered 43 musical artists, 15 of whom were hip hop artists. Another 7 hip hop artistes were closely profiled, including some top hip hop stars. A total of 293 young people aged 13 – 35 were surveyed from the University of Lagos community. They were secondary school students, undergraduates and postgraduates. Focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted for the three categories with informants other than those surveyed. They are designated A, B and C. Interviews were also conducted with the executive of the Performing Musicians Association of Nigeria [PMAN] at their

office in Ikeja, which yielded a general profile of the industry and the situation of musicians. Over 150 hours of structured observation was made of local and international hip hop videos on entertainment television channels. The close affinity and similarity of content and value of local and foreign hip-hop productions was remarkable.

Findings

Findings are presented under different dimensions of the relationship between hip hop culture and identity for Lagos youth. One is the actual self image of the Lagos youth. The second is the Nigerian identity of Lagos youth. Both were characterised by uncertainty.

Characteristics of Nigerian hip hop artists

The Performing Musicians Association of Nigeria (PMAN) estimates that Nigeria has close to 3,000 hip-hop artists. About 30 have gained pan-Nigerian and international recognition. The rest are still struggling to make it. More and more artists are springing up by the day. Devotees of hip-hop are swelling too. There is therefore a huge market because hip hop culture is a fashionable status symbol among the young. African-Americans hip hop idols dominate. However, there has also been an emergence of indigenous hip hop performers, notably: D'Banj, Psquare1, Wizkid, Bracket, Tuface Idibia, 9ice, Terry G, Timaya, D'Jinee, Wande Coal, D Prince, Naeto C, J Marins, Dr Sid, Ikechukwu, Omawumi, Banky W, Tony Tetuila, M.I, Wizboy, Duncan Mighty and Zaaki.

Just like America, the Nigerian hip hop scene is male-dominated. Females feature mainly as back-up singers and dancers although a few such as Omawumi, Asha and Sasha have become successful in their own right. Local performers have largely Nigerianized hip hop, infusing local songs, languages, usage, characters, dress, instruments and dance forms from across the multitude of domestic culture and language groups. Hip hop is beginning to adapt itself to the Nigerian music scene and to enjoy the acceptance of the adult population also. Another factor is "collabo", that is, collaboration between popular hip-hop musicians and their American counterparts. For example, PSquare and Akon have recently recorded an old song "Chop my money" to the admiration and applause of a much wider audience. Similarly, D'Banj is working with Jay Z and Kanye West. There are sponsored talent hunts, celebrity dance competitions such as West African Idol, Nigerian Idol, Maltina Dance All and Nigeria Mega Jam. Fabulous prizes lure many talented youths to these competitions.

Yet at the same time hip hop has swept indigenous music forms out of contention for most young people. As can be seen in Table 1, most devotees who become performers get involved between the ages of 12-30. The typical successful Nigerian hip hop artist is well educated. Five out of the seven in Table 1 obtained at least a bachelor's degree. Most are unmarried, which is typical for educated men around this age. The profiled hip hop artists prefer hip hop culture over local musical forms. On the issue of indigenous music, they were split. None believe hip hop has a corrupting influence on the morals or behaviour of youth.

However, five out of the seven agree that loyalty to hip hop culture is a veritable source of identity crisis for youth. This is not necessarily contradictory and should be understood within context. Corruption is a national scourge and is strongly condemned by the ordinary person who lives face to face with the disabling effects of corruption

among top public officials. Hypocritically, people tend generally to dissociate themselves from the concept but not from the act. The responses on music preference, sidelining of indigenous music and impact on crisis of identity are therefore more representative of the actual situation than outright denial of the corrupting influence of hip-hop culture in Lagos. The denial is perfunctorily against the concept, not necessarily against the effect of hip-hop as the other responses tend to indicate. The changing educational status of hip-hop musicians is a welcome departure from an unenviable tradition where, in the past, the Nigerian music scene was a museum of school drop-outs and illiterates.

Indeed the story of many musicians show that the artist had to abscond from home to join a band as family approval was sure not to be granted. Musicians were regarded as failures and ne'er-do-wells. Fifty years ago, many sang only in their indigenous languages and appealed to the limited audience in their immediate environment who understood the language of the lyrics. Although in a few cases, some were popular outside of their ethnic base or place of domicile depending on the type of music they played. As it is said, good music sweetens the soul and has appeal across social and physical boundaries. With the notable exception of a few like the Afro Beat King, Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, Onyeka Onwenu and Chris Okotie, the majority of pre- and immediate post-independence musicians all over the country had only the first school leaving certificate or less. But in the 1970s, the situation improved somewhat when the West African School Certificate or an unsuccessful attempt at it (S-75) became the modal qualification. The Nigerian music scene has therefore benefited from the massive educational awareness that characterized the post-independence social transformation in the country. Hip-hop inherited this advance to its credit.

Table 1: Profile of seven Nigerian hip hop artists

Name	Sex	Age	Educ	Status				
					Music preferred	Corrupting?	Displaces indigenous	Identity crisis?
Naeto C	M	28	M Sc	Single	Hip hop	No	No	Yes
DJinee	M	33	B Sc	Single	Hip hop	No	Yes	Yes
Tosin Martins	M	33	LL/BL	Single	Hip hop	No	Yes	Yes
Sasha	F	28	LLB	Single	Hip hop	No	Yes	Yes
Goldie Harvey	F	N/A	WASC	Single	Others	No	No	Yes
Slick P	M	37	B Sc	Married	Hip hop	No	Maybe	No
Zdon Parporella	M	32	WASC	Single	Hip hop	No	Can't say	No

Source: Author's profiling of selected leading Nigerian hip-hop stars July – December, 2011 (Many thanks to Miss Judith Audu for painstakingly handling data gathering).

Comparatively, the views of musicians are more objective, detached and consistent than that of young persons or the adult population on the local effect of hip-hop culture. Close to 84 per cent of them are optimistic that hip-hop music is not only of today but will survive into the future. This is due perhaps to the fact that local hip-hop has been domesticated or Nigerianized (57%) through the infusion of Nigerian languages, musical instruments, song themes and dress, etc. Musicians are equally divided on how meaningful hip hop songs are. The proportion that agrees (40.5%) that hip-hop songs are meaningless is same with those that disagree which is 40.5%. As some musicians have claimed openly on television earlier, 40% disagree that hip-hop songs are immoral but 35% think this is the case. However, 72% agree that hip-hop dance is sexy, erotic and seductive. And this buttresses the fear of another commentator about the negative influence of hip-hop on the sexy style of dance by infants and

children in Lagos at parties, on television, in short, everywhere. They, however, do not agree that hip-hop songs portray unfriendliness with the public authorities but they agree that hip-hop culture engages in the worship of material things such as cars, money, clothes, jewellery, shoes, accessories, houses, that is, the indices of wealth.

On dressing, while most of them (51%) disagree that hip-hop musicians are indecent, rough and clumsy, 49% agree that this is the case. About 73% agree that while male artistes dress better, the body of female artistes are unduly exposed. And so majority (67.5%) agree that hip-hop tends unfortunately to exploit the body of females to sell musical works. More (43%) however disagree that hip hop sells sex rather than music but a 39% share this view. Similarly, most musicians (53.7%) agree that hip-hop portrays female dancers as sex objects. Musicians tend to have a better knowledge of the history and origin of hip-hop than the young and adult respondents. For example, 68% agree that hip-hop music has connection with street and slum culture at its origin and that this may have had an impact on what the content of hip-hop culture grew to become in subsequent years in America.

On effects of hip-hop culture on youth behaviour, 74.4% agrees that it has had a negative influence. However, for musicians; song, dance, and dress, in that order are aspects of the culture responsible for negative influence on behaviour. Moreover, they think that lack of guidance of children and the tendency to imitate wrong values and habits is also to blame. On influence of hip-hop culture on indigenous music, 54% believe that this is diverting attention of young ones from indigenous music and thereby slowly diminishing their love for local music. Most of them (86%) acknowledge that hip-hop is a commercial success and is making young persons rich but many (74.4%) are unhappy that the musical form breeds occupational laziness as artistes do not learn how to play instruments or manage a band. Most hip-hop performances are based on

electronic back-up. On the positive side, 90.5% agree that hip-hop connects the Nigerian youth with the youth of the world; 74% agrees that it gives voice to the voiceless youth; 80% agree that the dance is energetic and provides an arena for youth to burn of excess 'gas', 70 % agree that it turns youth away from societal frustrations and about 60 % claim that there is nothing to worry about over the influence of hip hop on youth culture. As they say, it is children and youth culture and that when they grow out of this age bracket, they will turn away from its magnetic field off attraction, loyalty and influence.

On gaps and uncertainties in the self-image of young people, most musicians, just the same way as hip-hop artistes, share the view that there is a strong likelihood that youth that are strong devotees of hip-hop culture might experience difficulties in identifying with aspects of local culture owing to conflicting values inherent in them. Most (70%) of them are of the opinion that it would have been easier for Nigerian youth to imbibe local cultural values if they were faced with difficult choice as between the local and the foreign. Musicians acknowledge the widespread character among hip-hop artistes to want to speak with American accent as a symbolic denial of their Nigerian identity. Finally, they describe identity confusion as simply situational and transient as it will melt away as the youth cross over to become responsible adult members of their society.

Hip-hop and youth preference for the alien culture

Evidence from the survey and focus group discussions (FGD) indicates a strong identification with what is Western and an equally strong tendency not to identify with the domestic among Lagos youth. For instance, almost all the 293 youth respondents

tend to love Nigeria but at same time hate aspects of her culture and would rather emigrate to a Western county. About 97% love Nigeria and 98% are proud to be Nigerians. But while feeling strongly Nigerian, 75% prefer hip-hop and R&B to any music indigenous to Nigeria. Close to 87% would rather leave Nigeria to various Western preferred destinations. The love of hip-hop is total and unflinching. About 64% are not aware of any controversy concerning hip-hop in America. Moreover, 64% claim that hip-hop is like the live blood to their generation, while 85% agree that Hip-hop culture had made positive contribution to youth behaviour in the country. Close to 56% of youth detest the dressing habit of hip-hop artistes, 49% subscribe to a reformed dressing code while 50.5% regard this as unnecessary. Conversely, only 6.9% of that total prefers music that is Nigerian. As between foreign and Nigerian hip-hop music, more young people prefer foreign [54.5%] to Nigerian [45.5%] hip-hop music. The views of the youth are similar whether hip-hop artiste or not. Of the 7 hip-hop artistes profiled, 6 prefer Hip-hop to any other musical form. None of the 7 agreed that hip-hop culture has a corrupting influence on the youth; 4 argued that it has a displacing effect on indigenous music while 5 out the 7 opine that it is a volatile source of identity crisis for youth in contemporary Lagos. Not all musicians are youth though. Forty three Lagos based performing musicians 15 of which were hip-hop artistes were interviewed on perceived effect of hip-hop culture on the youth. More than half [54%] believes that hip-hop diverts the attention of youths and diminishes the appeal of local music among them. They moreover acknowledge that it is likely to present youths with the problem of choice, allegiance and preference.

An American-based Nigerian international fashion label [Jimi King] owner, Mr. Olujimi King, with outlets in Brazil, South Africa, Ghana, and the Middle East while commenting on the problems facing African labels in the contemporary world remarked

that "our excessive appreciation of western culture does no good to our identity as Africans" (*The Guardian*, Sat, June 16, 2012. P 48]

Music and fashion are in the same industry and are exposed to very similar experiences. It is indeed the over appreciation of Western musical culture as embodied in hip-hop that consumes the attention and triggers instability of self-image and national identity crisis among Lagos youths. The embrace of hip-hop culture was total - song, attitude, dance, dress, sexuality, social values, etiquettes, world view, etc. In many ways, the norms and values of hip-hop culture are at variance with Nigerian domestic cultural norms. Its wholesale embrace did no good to preserve the expectations held of the youth by the rest of society. Against a legacy of colonial behaviour conflict between Westernism vs Nigerianism, where what is western is generally seen as superior to what is local, Nigerian youths have more information about events about issues in the West than at home. They tend to select the positive from abroad and exaggerate them also select the negative at home and also exaggerate them as they compare these to the Eldorado that the West is presented by Western-centric media. The youth condemn unemployment, poverty, poor state of infrastructure, corruption, lack of opportunities for young persons, impunity and insensitivity by the government and general insecurity, most of which is true, thereby strengthening their Western commitment. Thus, in addition to hip-hop culture, the colonial hangover of Westernism and the opaque and incomplete picture of life in the West as painted by the Western media in Africa is also responsible for the identity crisis.

Nigerianization of hip-hop culture

One strategy by which hip-hop gained a narcotizing penetration into youth culture in Nigeria is the domestication of hip-hop culture by the youth. This occurred when local young musicians saw the huge potentials in the new culture and took advantage of them. In so doing the rest of the Nigerian youths followed their local music idols and crossed over in droves into the new music form. They took along Nigerian languages, local speech forms, local dressing styles, and local musical instruments and fused them into hip-hop, thus Nigerianizing hip-hop and obscuring its alien identity. In the process of ascendancy, the Nigerian hip-hop developed its own lexicon. What hip-hop has done is to legitimate a new way of life among the youth in the eyes of the adult population. Hip-hop created a platform for defying the disapproval of its elements seen as not accepted to the adult population. For the up and coming young people, hip-hop culture has been packaged and presented as the in-thing, 'the culture' and imbibing it as a sign of modernity and conformity with accepted norms.

Age and identity crisis

Focus group discussions [FGD] were conducted separately for three categories of Lagos youths based on age and educational status. These variables relate to the capacity of young persons to access, appreciate and form an opinion about hip-hop. Group A comprised 13 junior and senior secondary school adolescent pupils aged between 13-18; Group B comprised 12 undergraduates aged 18-27 and Group C is made up of 13 postgraduate students of age 25-35 years. The difference in reaction to identify crisis across the age and status groups is presented below.

GROUP A

This group is not aware of any crisis of identity in their lives. They are proud to be Nigerians. They love the country because it is the only one they have. But they also love hip-hop culture. It is the future of the youths of the world, they opine. Hip-hop music is good, danceable, free, universal and entertaining. The dress style is crazy but it is good. Nigerian dresses are not shared by the whole world. They think that local dresses are for the "old school." So also is the local culture, that is, music, dance, tastes proverbs, jokes, etiquettes, social values, etc. They are not suitable for our generation, they summarize. They believe that there is nothing wrong in a Nigerian youth taking fancy in things that children and young ones all over the world are doing. Majority would prefer to continue their studies abroad. Most would rather settle to marry and work abroad. Almost all will come back home regularly. They concluded thus: "Nigeria is okay but many things are too difficult to reach. An example is university admission. It's too competitive and too many qualifying examinations. In some other countries, these things are easier. If anybody calls this identity crisis, it is okay and we do not think it is bad. That's the norm among youth the world over today, we guess."

GROUP B

This group is of the opinion that the youth are aware of the effect of hip-hop and do not deny experiencing identity crisis. It is just that they may not be aware that that is what their behaviour may be described as. Those that deny the fact do so defiantly because the adult population and government frown at the penetration of Western culture. They use hip-hop slangs, some tattoo their bodies and boys pierce their bodies and wear ear rings all over. They weave their hair like women. Girls dress completely like boys.

These are all alien to domestic youth culture. They copy these from hip-hop and the Western culture. What is all this, they ask, if not culture conflict or identity crisis? They do these things as a way to identify with current global fashion trends. This group believes that identity crisis is underscored by value crisis, which is prevalent in the wider society. The people put premium on things imported from the West. They also note that Nigerian culture suppresses the youth while hip-hop tends to provide an escape. The success of hip-hop idols attracts the youth and fastens their loyalty. Hip-hop culture, they say, is necessary and beneficial social change for the youth and anybody who describes it as crisis merely resists change. Hip-hop, they say, in some ways also contributes to the propagation of Nigerian identity through the infusion of local songs, language, dress, Nigerian instruments, dance steps, etc, into hip-hop. They agree though that this is cultural hybridization. Rather than describe the central effect of hip-hop as identity crisis, they opine that it should be seen as an inevitable social change, which can play a role in advancing local culture. Lack of clear state policy on what to bring into the country or not is the bane of the crisis. In such an open arena, identity crisis is inevitable. In conclusion, this group submits that the love of hip-hop and its effect on Nigerian identity among the youth is only for a time and not a permanent feature. Youth, they agree, is a passing phase in life and as they grow they will leave behind the crisis of identity as experienced at that stage.

GROUP C

The apex youth category was strong and unequivocal on the view that the imbibing of hip-hop values has created a socio-psychological platform for identity crisis. The group opines that it dilutes their Nigerian identity and their self image. The church, they say,

promotes hip-hop music; families buy and play it instead of Nigerian music. Hip-hop, they agree, connects youth to the global stage, gives them a voice, money, separate and unique identity through the newly acquired image. though it might be contrary to their expected Nigeria identity. Hip-hop is a medium for transmitting the ingredients, including values and tastes, of globalization to youth. Hip-hop culture, they assert, is not negative though it alters the way youths dress, perceive reality, and react to local things and situations. It is globalization personified. The group raises a critical question thus: is there pure, exclusive undiluted Nigerian culture and identity? If there is, how much of those pure Nigerian values, tastes, habits and cultures have been transmitted to the young ones? How much of it have they imbibed? Do they believe it to be worth preserving? Do they share the same values as the adult population? Are they to blame for the value and identity crisis which they face? This group blamed the government, church, family, and adult population for neglecting adolescents and young members of society whom they treat as nobodies. So, when hip-hop provides a source of escape from irrelevance, neglect and obscurantism, they rush at the opportunity. Hip-hop culture, they regret, has come to stay because ours is a "copy-copy" society; the environment does not encourage creativity and originality and without globally acceptable local alternatives, the youth have just hip-hop to fall back upon. The whole society does not identify with anything indigenous as things that are locally produced are looked down upon. The lifestyle of Lagos youths is markedly hip-hop and Western culture determined. The family and school are weak in influence while the peer group and the media are taking over their influence on youth identity re-configuration to meet global tastes and standards. They are supported by adult artistes, footballers, and comedians who adorn hip-hop outfit. The children of most educated elite, "the being tos" and celebrities do not speak indigenous languages or dress like Nigerians. Speaking

with an American accent is a status symbol. The group agrees that secularization of education in Nigeria from 1976 by the taking over of Mission schools by the government was also a contributory factor to identity crisis. They advocate the return of primary and secondary schools to the Missionaries, which emphasize moral and civic education.

Intergenerational Differences in Evaluation of Youth Culture and Behaviour

A marked difference between hip-hop artistes and young persons, on one hand, and adults and parents, on the other, was found in the assessment of impact of hip-hop on youth culture and youth behaviour. The views of 102 adult members of the University of Lagos community were sought on this subject. As reported above, young persons tend generally to view hip-hop as a positive influence on people of their age group. On the contrary, the adults surveyed tend to recount the negative side of the movement. They quarrelled about the effect of hip-hop on the dress sense of youth. Quick reference was made to the habit of "sagging" of trousers by boys through which their underwear is exposed to public view. They expressed concern over what they called lust for material things, such as jewellery, cars, houses and the get-rich-quick syndrome especially among males. Others mentioned lack of respect for elders, indecent body exposure by girls, craze for western fashion, obsession with modern electronic gadgets and general decline of interest in academic work. They also mentioned immorality, new and strange trends in youth sexuality and lack of sufficient respect for the female gender in hip-hop culture. Close to 70% of the adult respondents believed that hip-hop culture exerts a negative influence on the behaviour of Lagos youth. With respect to the reliability of their responses it is instructive to point out that 92% of them admitted

adequate familiarity with hip-hop movement and the involvement of young persons in it. Respondents were relatively well educated with about 80% having the Ordinary National Diploma (OND) or National Certificate in Education (NCE) or above. On age, 76% fell between 35 and 65years. Close to 60% were currently in marriage while 32% were not. About 60% of them had at least a child 13 years or above. Some were familiar with hip-hop history. As to which aspect of the movement, that is, dance, lyrics, songs, dress, speech, values and attitude they would ascribe the negative influence to, 77% said 'all of these'. About 77.6% assessed hip-hop lyrics as meaningless, 56% felt that most of them are contextually irrelevant while 80% described the majority of them as lewd and vulgar. About 68% saw hip-hop dance as sexy and erotic while 58.7% said the single distinguishing character of dress was "indecent exposure". They admitted that the male youth dress better than females whereas female nudity is appropriated to achieve commercial success of the video musical works. About 58% were concerned that hip-hop introduces some indecent local jargon to children. The frequently mentioned include *hammer* -to make it; *swagger* –pride; *maga don pay*- the fool has fallen for the bait. All of these, though related to cyber crime, are made to sound popular and usable while they connote acts and values that should be discouraged. Others mentioned *kokos and kokolets* -for bigger and young girls; *ride*- for car; *big boy*- for wealthy young male; *on-point*- for being current; *correct*- for conforming to expectation and so on. Sometimes, they complained, young people inadvertently drop this jargon into formal communication. Perhaps the style of dressing was the single most objectionable aspect of hip-hop culture as viewed by the adults. On the effect of hip-hop on youth dress a female parent interviewed in the course of the fieldwork observed that young ones copy the behaviour of hip-hop idols, some of whom are negative role models. She volunteered as follows:

> For female stars they put on mini-skirts, beach pants and bras; small, tight spaghetti sleeveless tops; they reveal the breasts, belly, thigh, pump up the buttocks, making girls look like the only thing they have is their womanhood; with this outfit, they engage in erotic, sexy dance movements corrupting the dress culture of girls out there as well as lowering their self-image and dignity. In one sentence, I can say that the girls come to the stage naked. On the other hand, male stars wear three shirts at the same time without fastening the buttons in the hands or body of any of them; wear shirt and tie without tucking in the shirt into the trouser; wear trousers to stop mid-way down the buttocks (i.e. sagging) exposing the upper divide of the two lobes of the buttocks, sometimes with a hand towel dangling out of one of the two back pockets; the trouser so low that it sweeps the ground, dirty, torn and unsightly at the base; the face cap turned facing the back; decked in jewellery, head tie, with ears, nose, lips sometimes pierced with rings; elaborate tattoo inscriptions on the body; a dress culture that turns sport wears, track suits, sneakers and boxer shorts into party and outdoor dress.

The generation gap is a strong influence on the divergence of opinion between young ones and their parents. This factor also influences the character of the relationship between young persons and their parents. It accounts for the conflict of values and ideas and constrains intergenerational understanding between young persons and adults at home, at work, in the school, and everywhere. Hip-hop culture is a subject on which this traditional distance is maintained rather than narrowed down. The adult population tends to stick to its preconceived ideas about how youth should behave without yielding

space to understand youth from their own perspective and not the way they want to be seen.

Resurgence of adult disapproval of youth culture and youth resistance

Observations made in the above section indicate resurgence rather than recession of the traditional disapproval of current youth culture by the adult population. Adult disapproval is complemented by strong resistance by the youth to any imposition or dictation from adult members of society on how they should run their lives. The cultural definition of youth as rebellious and insubordinate resonates with the views of adults. Youth are conceived as lacking in wisdom, experience and maturity and therefore susceptible to derail in life if not monitored and closely and properly guided. The association of hip-hop culture by parents and adults with emboldening youth, availing them of new and global conduct norms and offering cross-cultural and universal justifications, is worthy of note. Hip-hop also provides rationalizations to legitimize and consolidate the new attitudes of youth and this is perhaps an explanation for the love-hate disposition of adults towards hip-hop culture. Some adults like the beat. They play, listen and sometimes enjoy, dance and admire the music but also complain about other elements of the movement, particularly lyrics, dress, materialistic values and disrespect by the youth of the vested cultural preferences and sensibilities of elders. The counter-refusal by young people to compromise their unfolding collective cultural emancipation by remaining within the boundaries defined for them by the dominant culture of society tends to reinforce the "rebellious youth" label by the mainstream. The mutual misunderstanding between the two social categories of youth and adult is far from ending. Uneasy calm, mutual suspicion and conflicting social values and norms persist.

The desire by the youth to consistently and persistently reject the social position and resultant status and role reserved for them by the dominant culture and society and to assert their own idea about new status, role and social image compatible with their modern day reality, has pitched them against the mainstream which they variously describe as "uncompromising" or "unyielding" or "unrelenting." This fundamental conflict of intergenerational values and social ideals accounts for failures in youth empowerment policies and resonates in most conflict and insecurity in parts of the country being perpetrated principally by young people. Adults, observing youth to be poor, lacking in focus, rebellious and vulnerable, find them suitable as soldiers of fortune, mercenaries, militants, political thugs and prostitutes. Hopeless for the future, young men are willing canon fodder in any armed attack. Intergenerational conflict is a call to society to adjust to seeing youth through the eyes of youth and to see society as a whole from a new prism devoid of traditional prejudices and stereotypes that do not accommodate the contemporary world view of young people in Nigeria.

Discussion

The connection between ICT-driven globalization, hip-hop culture and identity crisis arises as a vehicle for mainstreaming youth culture into the corpus of the dominant culture of Lagos society. Mainstreaming is imperative given the background of institutionalized marginalization of youth culture by the operation of the twin customs of gerontocracy and patriarchy. Having been traditionally regarded basically as consumers and not as partakers in the production of the dominant culture of their society by the older generation, the emergence on the scene of hip-hop culture emboldens youth and asserts their right to be part of the defining of their life style and

the new direction of change in their society. This trend is readily loathed by adults who see it as a rebellious alternative that challenges orthodoxy. The older adults would like things to remain as they have always been while the youth desire change centred on cultural liberation and status emancipation in a rapidly changing world. Hip-hop defines a new way of life that gives a voice to the youth. It creates a unique identity through new dress style, speech forms, vocabularies, new conduct norms and values, attitudes, preferences, tastes, habits and rationalizations. Through persistent defiant dressing style, for example, young people are achieving forceful legitimization of hip-hop appearance in the psyche of the people. In addition to a voice, the movement creates a platform to break the crippling dominance of the adults by creating lucrative business, entertainment and commercial opportunities for youth. A rising number of the youth are involved in the industry as musicians, dancers, disc jockeys, stand-up comedians, singers, song writers, producers, promoters, managers, marketers, writers, and accessory producers, for example. Quite a few have become rich role models through their involvement in the industry and many more have been provided with gainful employment. Thus, despite adult hostility, the movement has succeeded in creating for itself some kind of messianic role among the youth. It is turning young people from "problems" or "rebellious" to "innovative" with relevant "assets". Slow positive change in this regard can be gleaned from the rather receptive character and dwindling hostility among a few but growing number of parents in hip-hop culture.

Inter-generational value differences and conflicts were found in the study. First there was conflict between economic dependence of youth on the adult population and youth demands for deference, autonomy and attribution of responsibility by adults. Due to widespread unemployment among young school leavers, a high proportion of youth are still relying on their parents, relatives or other family members for housing, food,

school fees, pocket money, well into the their late twenties and early thirties. Many cannot marry and form their own families or live apart because they cannot. Unlike their counterparts in Western societies, Lagos youth do not have state welfare intervention programmes that can turn their fortunes around in such circumstances. The family's capacity to provide settlement support in those situations has dwindled over time owing to similar reasons and only a few families are able to start off new couples in accordance with prevailing norms. There are widespread cohabitation and "marriages" that defy traditional and customary rules and procedures. In short, this is a classic case of the general delay of transition of youth into adulthood in developing economies. From such a position, it is not an easy task for youth to garner respect from adults. The adults persist in regarding them as not yet responsible and immature, not taking into account the circumstances that gave rise to their plight. The youth on their part blame the adults for mismanaging the economy and for destroying their future through corruption and abuse of power. The youth see a bleak future and hope, perhaps, that an outward orientation may provide an escape.

There is also a conflict between cosmopolitanism versus cultural nationalism. The elders place pride and premium on loyalty to the local cultures. The youth place higher value on having or showing a wide experience of people and things from many different countries. The youth also take pride in being influenced by these different cultures, readily savouring a mixture of the local and the foreign. The adults interpret such a tendency as loss of personal or national identity, a behaviour that is frowned on because of its replacement of domestic identities with identities borrowed from outside. This cosmopolitan outlook tends to pitch younger ones against the adult members of society. While adults prioritize national pride, the youth see themselves more as part of a continuous and universal global community rather than being limited to the

boundaries of a country. As mentioned earlier, this is a concrete dimension of the ICT-propelled globalization. Hip-hop as a movement and culture is a medium and context where those realities play out. The older generation would rather preserve their culture and identity but the youth would prefer that boundaries and differences be abolished. The youth are more in contact with the rest of the world and share more universal values through the modern strands of social media than the adult who are less persuaded or fascinated by the messages, values and tastes propagated in those media.

Another area of intergenerational value divergence is on the concept and role of musical works in society. This is metaphorically represented as conflict between the *Old School* and the *New School* representing the adult and the younger population respectively. For the old school, music is a medium of social communication for remoulding society, reinforcing positive behaviour, sanctioning deviance, promoting indigenous language, costumes and attires and instruments. Music should mirror contextual culture, promote morals, encourage productivity, patriotism, national and sub-national identities, and motivate people and society to rediscover their glorious past. It should not simply be sound and beat that is danceable and enjoyable, commercial and financially profitable. It should not embody meaningless lyrics, lewd commentaries, and should not deliberately promote nudity, and indecent exposure of the erogenous parts of either the male or female body. These are the charges against hip-hop from the court of the elders. The youth counter these allegations by insisting that the beat in a musical work must be danceable. Unlike the elders, they insist, they want to dance not just listen and nod their heads. They challenge the right of elders to assess lyrics as meaningful or meaningless without taking into account the disposition and preferences of the youth. The old school derogates hip-hop videos for sending wrong materialistic signals to youth. However, the youth counter that those are the values they desire, that is the type

of society they seek to create and that is the dream of their generation and they should be left to be what they choose to be.

To conclude this segment it is instructive to point out a basic difference between Western and African societies with regard to the attitude toward the youth. Young people in the West generally have attained a higher level of status liberation from parental and adult control, from denial of the right to self-determination, the right to be heard, the right to participate and freedom to dissent compared to their African counterparts. Through well enforced laws, these rights are guaranteed. Official policy puts in place necessary institutions and social support services required to protect these rights. The states in Africa count up the cost of such interventions and take into account the traditional social structures and cultures in the various countries to conclude that these leverages are yet inconceivable. State and society in Africa tend to stick to the tradition of restricting, controlling and determining the life of young people rather than creating a platform for them to be themselves and realize their potential to the fullness of their capacities. It is against this backdrop that the intergenerational conflict that runs through the entire discourse of hip-hop must be contextualized.

Conclusion

There are some noteworthy findings from this study. Firstly, older youths readily agree with the claim of an identity crisis while the adolescents display some equivocation on the subject of an identity crisis. Secondly, the crisis of youth identity in Lagos, although a reality, differs in character from that proposed by Erik Erikson. The observed identity crisis in the study is divisible into confused self-image on one hand and national identification crisis on the other. The identity crisis in the study setting is not limited to

young people but rather is a colonial legacy historically rooted in the post-colonial culture and experience of the whole people and the whole society. Among the youth, the source of the crisis is not necessarily related to departing from childhood without yet fully assuming adult roles. The general preference for Western culture, the advent of the hip-hop culture and movement, the take-up of ICT as a vehicle of cultural diffusion, the general lack of opportunities for youth in Nigeria and the exaggerated impression of greener pastures in Western societies presented by the Western media are all at the root of the crisis of personal and national identity among Lagos youth. Hip-hop culture is a coalescence of the ingredients of Western youth culture, the deep penetration and general adoption of which is at the root of the crisis of their self-image and national identity. Thirdly, the external orientation of young people is not unconnected with the universal drive toward cosmopolitanism, the desire to blend with the youth of the world as a single, homogeneous entity. Finally, the denial of the crisis may, on one hand, represent a manifestation of deeper crisis of identit, or on the other, a measure of the depth of value conflict between the young ones and the adult population.

Lagos youth are likely to continue to be described as culturally deviant by the mainstream if mutual value adjustment and accommodation does not occur across the generational divide. Young people are vehement in seeking liberation from their parents to redefine their world in line with their conviction in the same way that youth in the rest of the world are doing rather than continue to perceive the world around them from the eyes of their parents. In reality therefore, hip-hop is a split social reality across the generations. On one hand, it has created a new voice for voiceless youth and provided an escape from traditional relegation, as well as giving an opportunity for involvement in mainstreaming youth culture, and a bridge between the local and the global. On the other hand, it is seen by parents as herding young people in a movement away from

cultural nationalism as well as a possible source of socio-psychological dependency on the external sector for future generations.

To conclude, the circumstances that delay transition to adulthood, coupled with the economic dependence of most youth on their parents or on other adult members of society, are critical factors that work against the capacity of youth to assume greater social responsibility and authority, including having a say or being part of the determination on how their life should be organized, evaluated or changed. Thus broadening the window of opportunity for Nigerian youth, including creating more employment, easing access to education, and liberalizing access to vocational, craft and technical training will reduce their dependence on the older generation and earn them more respect and social control of their lives.

References

Albrow, M. 1990. "Introduction." In M. Albrow & E. King (eds.), *Globalization, Knowledge and Society*, (pp. 3-16). London: Sage.

Ayanna. 2007. (November 8). The Exploitation of Women in Hip-hop Culture. Retrieved from http://www.mysistahs.org/features/hiphop.htm. [2011/05/11].

Banjoko, A. 2007. "Hip-hop and the New Age of Ignorance." Retrieved from http://www.daveyd.com/FullArticles/articleN980.asp. [2009/05/25].

Barber, B. 1995. *Jihad vs Macworld*. New York: Belemnite Books.

Berger, P. 1966. *Invitation to Sociology*. New York: Pelican Books.

Diawara, M. 1998. *In Search of Africa*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Erikson, E. H. 1959. *Identity and the Life Cycle*. New York: International Universities Press.

Erikson, E. H. 1968. *Identity, Youth and Crisis.* New York: Norton.

Erikson, E. H. 1970. "Reflections on the Dissent of Contemporary Youth." *International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 51,* 11-22.

George, O.K. 2009. *The Challenges of Urbanisation in Nigerian Urban Cities: The Lagos Megacity Situation - Town Planners' Perspective.* Lagos: Libro Gem Books.

Goffman, E. 1959. *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Hicks, J. 2009. "Hip-hop Destroys the Potential of Black Youth." Retrieved from http://www.nationalcentre.org/p21NVHicksHipHop90706.html. [2009/05/25].

Huntington, S. P. 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs, 72*(3), 22-49.

Lo-oh, J. L. 2009. "Youth Transitions to Adulthood: Changes, Trends and Implications for Preparing the Next Generation of Africa." *CODESRIA Bulletin, 3&4,* 33-42.

Marcia, J.E. 1966. "Development and Validation of Ego Identity Statuses." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3,* 551-558.

McLuhan, M. 1968. *War and Peace in the Global Village*. New York & London: Bantam.

NPC. 1998. *Lagos Megacity Population Trend.* Abuja: National Population Commission.

NPC. 2009. *2006 Population and Housing Census of the Federal Republic of Nigera (Volume 1*). Abuja: National Population Commission.

Nederveen Pieterse, J. 1995. "Globalization as Hybridization." In M. Featherstone, S. Lash & R. Robertson (eds.), *Global Modernities* (pp. 45-68). London: Sage.

Nwabueze, N. 2006. "The University and Regeneration of Traditional Values among Nigerian Youth." In F.A.D. Oyekanmi & N. Nwabueze (eds.), *Education and Regeneration of Traditional Values in Nigeria* (pp. 249-265). Lagos: Department of Sociology, University of Lagos.
Ogunleye, M. & Awomosu, T. 2011. "Lagos as a Region." In M. Ogunleye & B. Alo (eds.), *State of the Environment Report – Lagos 2010*. Lagos: Ministry of the Environment.
Otite, O. 1987. *Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnicity in Nigeria*. Lagos: Macmillan Press.
Otokiti, S. 2008. "Lagos: Indeed a Mega-city." *Lagos Organization Review, 5*(10), 17-28.
Oumar, S. 2009. "Youth Game-playing in Ivorien Public Space: Involving the Youth of the Street. Dialogue Spaces in Politics." *CODESRIA Bulletin, 3&4,* 43-50.
Oyekanmi, F.A.D. 2011. "Population and Development: Myths and Realities in Nigeria." *Inaugural Lecture.* University of Lagos, 17 August 2011.
Ritzer, G. 2000. *The McDonaldization of Society*. Thousand Oaks, CA & London: Pine Forge Press
Sall, E., Cardoso, C. & Bangirana, A. 2009. "Child and Youth Studies in Africa." *CODESRIA Bulletin*, *3&4,* 1-2.
Schiller, H. 1976. *Communication and Cultural Domination.* New York: International Arts and Sciences.
Scott, J. & Marshall, G. 2005. *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Serpick, E. 2006. (July 9). "MTV: Play it Again." Retrieved from (http://www.ew.com/ew/article/commentry/0,6115,386104_3|16756||0_0_,00.html). [2009/11/05].
Siziba, G. 2009. "Redefining the Production and Reproduction of Culture in Zimbabwe's Urban Space: The Case of Urban Grooves." *CODESRIA Bulletin*, *3&4*, 19-28.
Soyombo, O. 2012. "Culture and Youth Development: The Role of Kegites Club International." Unpublished Lecture delivered at the Maiden Public Lecture of Kegites Club International, April 27, at Afe Babalola Auditorium, University of Lagos, Lagos.
Soyombo, O. & Shokoya, O. 2011. "The People, Culture and Socio-Economic Setting." In O. Ogunleye & B. Alo (eds.), *State of the Environment Report – Lagos 2010.* Lagos: Ministry of the Environment.
Tomlinson, J. 1999. *Globalisation and Culture.* Cambridge: Polity Press.
UN 2008. *World Population Prospects. The 2008 Revision, Volume II: Sex and Age Distribution of the World Population.* United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division ST/ESA/SER.A/291, 694-695.
Van Der Bly, M.C.E 2005. "Globalization: A Triumph of Ambiguity." *Current Sociology*, *53*(6), 875-893.

Newspapers

Abati, R. 2009. (June 21). "A Nation's Identity Crisis." *The Guardian on Sunday*.
Cerami, C. A. 1962. (October 9). "The US Eyes Greater Europe." *The Spectator.*
King, O. 2012. (June 16). *The Guardian*, 48.
Pareles, J. 2007. (March 13). "The Message from Last Night: Hip-hop is Rock 'n' Roll, and the Hall of Fame Likes it." *New York Times*, 3.

Chapter 9
Rap music and youth cultures in Iran: serious or light?

Mahmood Shahabi and Elham Golpoush-Nezhad

Introduction

This chapter explores the underground Persian rap culture in Iran. It aims to understand what a rapping experience in Iran is like and how Iranian rappers make sense of it. In this chapter we will discuss six reasons why Iranian young people tend to like rap culture. We also categorise Iranian rappers based on a number of criteria, and then introduce two different types of rappers in Iran, namely "serious" and "light" rappers. Serious rappers are mostly preoccupied with social, political and cultural issues, whereas light rappers mainly strive for fame, leisure and wealth.

These two different kinds of rappers were identified during our ethnographic study in which the subjects' own accounts of, and reasons for, their actions and reactions to social, political and cultural issues were explored. The study is based on engaged participation observation and also interviews with 29 male and female rappers, both first generation (founders of Persian rap) and second generation rappers, including street rappers. This ethnographic research was conducted in some of the main cities of Iran: Tehran, Mashhad, Babolsar, and Karaj, during 2009-2011. The field work was

carried out in various studios, home recording places as well as the rappers' homes and family gatherings and in some cases parks and other public spaces. To interview the Iranian rappers living outside the country, we used Skype.

Background

Mashhad, Tehran and a few other big cities in Iran are currently home to a small but vibrant rap community. Rap in Iran has some different characteristics if compared to American hip-hop rap culture. In this chapter we identify some elements which indicate the uniqueness of rap culture as it has emerged in Iran**.** Although there are many expressive elements of hip-hop culture the only one practiced in Iran is rapping itself, which has turned into a culture in its own right. While hip-hop culture in western or other countries is a visual musical culture, acted out through breakdancing, graffiti and fashion, along with the genre of rap (Gelder, 2007), this is not the case in Iran. For example, although there are a few rappers doing graffiti, it's not a part of the culture (Field notes, 2010). Therefore in this chapter, we use the specific term "Persian rap" instead of the generic term "hip-hop".

Due to Iran's specific social, economic and political conditions and the government's complete control over both private and public spaces, it is difficult to establish any independent public space. This would reveal the vast gap between the mainstream culture promoted by dominant discourse and unofficial underground culture moving under the layers of society, pointing to profound conflict between the official public arena and any unofficial public spaces. This conflict has characterised Iranian society since the revolution of 1979 (Kedi, 2003). Ever since those drastic and profound political, economic and cultural changes some people have tended to favour unofficial

political and cultural subcultures, sometimes opposite to the accepted values of the Islamic Republic government. These subcultures have already been studied in general (see Shahabi, 2006). In recent years more specific elements of Iranian youth subcultures have been studied, including "party-going subculture" (Yousefi, 2007), and "car culture" among Tehrani youth (Houshangi, 2009). However, when it comes to the youth music culture of post-revolution Iran, to the best of our knowledge no academic study has been done so far on music-based subculture in general, or on underground rap subculture in particular.

Rap music in Iran is very young. Most music had been banned for a long time and it was only in 1995 when the Islamic Culture and guidance Ministry announced that pop music was allowed that things changed. Rap culture emerged in Iran in 1997 when a boy named Mohsen Sabbah made a recording and broadcast it through the internet. After a while he and his friend, Soroush Hichkas (known as the father of Persian rap), together recorded some songs they called rap, which were actually translations of American Gangsta rap songs. Later on, Hichkas set up a group named *Samet* (mute) and started to write some "texts" (the term for the lyrics of rap songs among Iranian rappers), again following the American Gangsta rappers of the 1970s.

After 1995, lots of studios were developing new material under ministry supervision. Cultural life became more flexible than in the initial years after the Islamic revolution. Rap music was included at the end of some serials like *The Accused Escaped* (2000), movies, and even shows like *Oxygen* (1999), a very popular chat show with a wide ranging audience on national TV. There was also the officially endorsed release of a pop album called *Eskenas* (money) by Shahkar Binesh-Pajouh, who has been described as "Iran's self-styled rapping aristocrat" (Harrison, 2004). He used rap music mixed with Persian classical poetry in order to criticise poverty, unemployment, and the "chi-chi" women of Tehran wearing too much make-

up under their chiffon headscarves. “I am criticising the *nouveaux riches* who have no taste”, says Shahkar. Moreover,

> If a guy is driving a BMW without having the culture that goes with driving a BMW, he is still a village man, but he just has more money than before. (Shahkar, cited in Harrison, 2004)

As Persian rap music turned critical of the status quo, the Iranian government couldn’t cope with the new subculture founded beneath the official city layers. By the year 2005, the beginning of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, these subcultures were strictly suppressed. As commentator Mardomak reports in 2008, Mohammad Saffar Harandi - the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance - called on all the country’s security bodies to counteract the “unhealthy music flow”:

> Unhealthy music flows like rap have made music a tool to reach out their damaging goals. Fortunately the police and security bodies are fully equipped to fight these groups. (www.mardomak.ir)

Now however, new technology opens up new opportunities. Unofficial rap music is produced every day by any interested person in a home studio and is spread out through the internet and may be shown on satellite TV channels all over the world. For those who have no access to the internet or satellite TV channels, Bluetooth comes to the rescue. It is therefore important to clarify the nature of this popular rap genre.

According to mainstream culture, Iranian rappers are deviants and anti-Islamic figures (Ferani, 2010). This is primarily because they don’t use the metaphors, similes and literary allegories common in Iranian poetry. Rap uses free articulation and a totally different literature is referred to in its lyrics. The phenomenon illustrates significant changes in modern Iran. The particular lives of urban young people lead them to use the most familiar and everyday language they know to express their feelings. Mainstream discourse has continued to attempt to suppress the rappers by labelling them “deviants”,

"Satanic", or even "the great Satan's spies". These criticisms have been made even in newspapers like *Hamshahri* (2008), and *Keyhan* (2009) and in TV programs. For example a programme called *Shock* (2007) induced a moral panic about rappers. The programme attempted to link rappers to Satanism through interviewing some paid rappers, mostly drug addicted ones (Fieldnotes, 2010). The *Shock* hosts then talked about the false actions of rappers, how they are deviant and of course a threat to Islamic society. On the other hand the media out of the country depicted rappers as "resisting youth", "the youth voice", "the Iranian youth voice", and so on (BBC Persian, 2008; Manoto, 2011; VOA 2008).

In summary, Iranian rappers have been represented in terms of both fear and hope. Certainly attention has been paid to the Iranian rappers' ability to bring a change to the society, a potential recognised by their critics and admirers alike. Yet in all these controversies, rappers themselves have received little direct involvement in the interview and research process. We have tried to rectify this, in the study presented in this chapter.

Methods

In this study, a variety of techniques were used to access Persian rappers in Iran and abroad.

Since rapping is considered illegal, we had to find rappers through friends or accidentally in public places or parks, through the internet, and Skype. Furthermore they would guide us to others they knew of, following the snowball method of sampling. Given the legal implications, it was impossible for us to make recordings, so as Thornton (1996) aptly puts it, we had to take any minute and opportunity to escape from

the environment and put notes down. The second author has befriended a lot of Iranian rappers in three years (2009-2011) and she observed and interviewed 29 rappers (male and female) in Tehran and other cities of Iran (Babolsar, Karaj, Mashhad) as well as three street rap groups in parks. All the data have been analysed thematically and in an interpretive phenomenological way characteristic of ethnographic research (Jones & Watt, 2010).

As Bennett maintains, the most important matter of concern is the researcher's "insider knowledge" of the group being studied. The ethnographer should report on his/her feelings when communicating about the researched group (Bennett, 2002). As Muggleton and Weinzierl put it, to get to the actors' subjective meanings and their lifestyles, the researcher needs to have an intimate interaction with them. Following Max Weber, social research should be conducted by studying an "individual meaningful act" (Muggleton & Weinzierl 2003, 33). To put it in another way, to understand an individual action, one should take into consideration the concept the individual has in mind of his/ her actions. Therefore in this chapter we have tried to examine the Iranian rap subculture and individual rappers' conceptions of their cultural acts from the inside and from the point of view of un-official discourse. Obviously looking at them from the outside, applying official discourse has already (mis)led social commentators and social workers in the country to some unreal presuppositions and categorisations, thereby hiding the important identity these young people are looking for in rap.

Findings

Being a rapper

Our first interesting observation in the research was the way Persian rappers thought of themselves or their activity. For example, when we asked "Why rap? Why not pop?", or "why this text not another?" we got almost the same answers every time. One typical response was: "well, pop costs, rap doesn't". Other common responses were: "what the hell else to sing?", and ''there is no one there to tell you sing this, sing that, for rap". The preoccupation with sentimental romance was deplored, for example, "pop is all about the damned love, how many times can you sing about that?", and perhaps more critically, "can you speak about your lost virginity in a pop song?". Some rappers understood themselves to be a mere imitating rapper when they were asked about the origin of rap. That is, they believed themselves to be following the themes and notions of American Gangsta rap with no innovation at all. Conversely, some others considered rap to be a global phenomenon which they themselves turned into Persian form and added some Persian essence to it.

Our second observation regarding the rap community in Iran was the attitude some of the illegal studio owners (Eshagh, Alireza, Mansoor) showed towards rap and rappers in Iran. They were mostly young men of the upper middle class who look down on rap and rappers in Iran, believing them, for example, to be "some alcoholic, drug addicts willing to be famous enough to have as many girl friends as they want." They didn't take rappers seriously. They thought the rappers are not serious about what they do. The owners believe rappers are only looking for a place to spend time and have something to drink. Most of these owners are just making money out of the rappers. It seems that such studio owners do not recognise rap as a kind of music with an independent existence. They were most interested in profit. They were involved in rap culture due to the financial benefits the young rappers brought to them. Their dismissive conception of rap and rappers seems similar to the dominant Iranian discourse about

rappers, understanding them to be delinquent subcultures; as a form of Satanism spreading the immoralities of western modern culture to Iranian Islamic culture. That is, the same fear expressed elsewhere in the world when it comes to the "moral milieu" of American "little worlds" (Gelder, 2004). From this state of judgement, no one could understand the inner perspective of the "rap artist", let alone their insights and self-concepts of rap. In this regard this chapter aims to clarify the firsthand feelings of being a rapper, of any kind, in Iran.

A typology of Iranian rappers and their objectives

As outlined above, most reports written on rap in Iran have focused on rap pathology. Almost all

accounts categorised rappers according to a thematic content analysis of their song lyrics (Nazer Fasihi, 2008; Khademi, 2010). More insightfully, Kowsari (2009) has summarised the themes of Iranian rap songs in terms of social, political and cultural criticism. He claims that Iranian rappers are not willing to remain underground and welcome any opportunity to go to the surface, to the public arena. He believes the only reason for rappers to remain underground is because they are banned by the Islamic Culture and Guidance Ministry. However, Sedaghat-Pishe (2010) believes some of those involved in underground music are happy to remain so. Thus, one way to categorise Iranian rappers is according to their preference for underground or public lives.

Another way to categorise them is to look at them chronologically. By this criteria, we can talk about first generation (or founders of Persian rap) and second generation (Persian rap followers). Pioneers of Persian rap include Soroush Hichkas,

Yas, Tataloo, Hossein Tohi, ZedBazi, Saloomeh, Felakat, 0111, Reza Pishroo, Eblis and Bahram. Among the second generation we can name Farinaz, Atousa, Mehran, Sasi Mankan, Milad, Hossein Mokhte, Alishams, Shahin Najafi, and street rapper groups. A third way to categorise Iranian rappers is to divide them according to their place of activity: inside or outside the country. It is worth mentioning that many of the rappers examined in this research are still living in Iran and remain as rappers, despite all the barriers. We have also interviewed Iranian rappers now living out of country but who influenced rap culture in Iran while they were inside the country. We have not interviewed Persian rappers who started their rap activity while living abroad.

When we started the research on rappers in Iran we were looking for valid criteria with which to categorise rappers, for instance, through symbols and semiotics (Hebdige, 1979), or kinds of resistance (Hall, 1975; Cohen, 1972; Willis, 1977) or leisure time patterns (Bennett, 2002; Muggleton & Weinzierl, 2003). Yet, bearing in mind all the different types we observed among these young artists, we came to the conclusion that classifying individual rappers based on their concerns and aims seemed the most logical. Studying closely as observing outsider (first author) and participating insider (second author), respectively, we realised how complex, diversified and complicated rap cultures are in Iran. Since different artists bring different concerns and aims to bear, this seemed the most fruitful point of analysis. After thematically analysing the interviews along these lines, we extracted six important objectives for rapping in Iran. We explain them in turn and in detail.

1. *Expressing emotions*

To be in Iran and to rap is one of the most challenging activities youth participate in; by doing so, young rappers, like Nana, seek to reveal their emotions and lived experiences. Some of the Iranian rappers called themselves the "revolution generation", a term originally used to refer to children born after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, but now used satirically in recent years by young people. It is an ironic term because as a generation they feel they never had the chance to talk about what they like, or what they dislike, or what they need. They cannot talk openly about even their natural human needs like sex and finding a partner, nor even the quest for money. In rap they simply seek to share their experiences with others and to engage with all the complexities they have been facing since childhood. Yas is a main figure in this regard. He explains his objectives in rapping:

> I started writing songs. By and by I was thinking to myself, when I can write, I definitely can sing it. I sing about things we've always seen and felt, like a child begging on the street or a girl running away from the family. I like my audience get to know what misery these children and girls are going through. (Yas, male, 30, serious rapper, Iran)

As discussed earlier in the chapter, some rappers wish to open up about things natural to human beings. Talking about such things has been always restricted and harshly treated by the mainstream culture. They may suffer this judgement even from their own families. They try to express their anxiety, hate and anger in the text they write by using words that are not only irregular, but also taboo and discarded in the official discourse in the country. Speaking frankly, the rappers feel free to talk about anything in their text. This is the likely reason teens and young adults in Iran are attracted to the new culture.

In the wide range of rappers we interviewed there are some who consider their singing a way to tell, for example, the story of the nation; they describe themselves

national historians: Griots (Stapleton, 1998). Nakisa, a street rapper, believes himself to be the one to "wake people up". He had this to say to the second author,

> Look I say whatever I see, in my text. For example, [have] you been out on the street after 12 am? Seen what happens to the young? Have you seen those injecting drugs on the corners? Have you seen a girl of your age hop in a car and take off? We cry for them by our texts. (Nakisa, male, 25, serious street rapper, Iran)

Although rap music and hip-hop culture has been considered a conspicuous outpouring of "liberating" and "radical" ideas and expressions of what young people need (Peoples, 2008), this has been primarily from a masculine viewpoint. Performance by a female rapper has always been a matter of debate (Peoples, 2008; Khan, 2009). Sharing feelings and emotions with others in rap is totally different again for Iranian female rappers, since they, on the one hand, have to express themselves in the masculine environment of rap culture, and on the other, resist the existing legal ban on females singing.

2. *Resistance and opposition*

Male and female rappers in Iran have adopted different objectives of resistance in their rap lives; each gender explains their specific different social experiences and aims. Yet, one mutual objective is fighting censorship. This has been the main theme of many rap songs produced in Iran by artists who feel uncomfortable about censorship in different aspects of Iranian everyday life. They are concerned with the important issue of "self-censorship", both verbal and non-verbal. For example, Saloomeh, a female rapper who now lives in Europe, affirmed that she broke the laws made for controlling the "body" and "language" in order to talk about experiences and feelings that are rendered invisible. Another rapper, Mojrem (the Criminal), stated that:

> Rap has given us such fine space that I can say the words I have been always told not to say, for example … [swearing, unable to be translated]. (Mojrem, male, 25, serious street rapper, Iran)

Shahin Najafi, a political singer and former sociology student who left for Germany in 2007, summed it up as follows,

> It [censorship] is a way to exert your power on people's minds better, it is part of a broader process of planning for the people who should be constrained in order to make your progress [to clasp to power and keep it under your wings] possible. Two things are essential to control the people: keeping the people in need of their essential necessities of everyday life, and censorship (Najafi, male, 31, serious rapper, outside Iran).

He added that his version of rapping is aimed at exploding taboos. However, this kind of explosion sometimes might prove self-suicidal. Shahin Najafi now lives in hiding in Germany. He has been called the Salman Rushdie of music after more than 100 people joined an online campaign to "execute" him after the release of a song on May 7, 2012, in which it is claimed he mocked and satirised the Iranian government and one of the 12 imams or religious figures revered by Shia Muslims. This has not been without consequences for other rappers, even for non-political rappers. Since then the Iranian Police crackdown on rappers has been intensified and many of them have been arrested.

A second objective sought by Iranian rappers is fighting patriarchal values, which we think is unique to Iranian rapping. Shahin Najafi is one of those feminist male rappers who believe Iranian women are oppressed by the laws that support male domination. He suggests women remain "women" in so masculine a thing as rap:

> Unfortunately in the mainstream culture in Iran men won't accept the woman as a "woman". You cannot define art as mono-gendered. That's because art is not a subject of gender. It is the uniqueness and nakedness of art that makes it neutral, equal for man and woman. (Najafi, male, 31, serious rapper, outside Iran)

Female rappers believe in the protest nature of rap music which gives them the right to sing, as Saloomeh says,

> It is said American hip-hop is masculine and also it is often asked "how many female rap singers have you seen around the world?" But well, don't they say that rap is the voice of the voiceless? Well in Iran we, the women are the voiceless. (Saloomeh, female, 25, serious rapper, outside Iran)

Despite the invisible role of girls in subcultures from the 1960s on (McRobbie & Garber, 1997) and in rap music in particular (Khabeer, 2007; Khan, 2009) Iranian female rappers have created a marginal subculture of their own within the marginal rap culture in the country. They can be categorised in two groups: those who find rap to be a source of protest, and those who seek fame and fun in it. The former includes rappers opposed to all sexual and gendered boundaries and harassment structurally assigned to them on the basis of "normative conceptions of femininity", (see O'Brien et al, 2009). This category also includes those who are politically against the government. Notably, there is some notion of resistance to the stereotyped gaze of patriarchal society on women among all rappers of this group. These rappers believe they are acting and speaking independently for the whole society of women in Iran. Female rappers in this category not only don't depend on men to be famous or to record a song, but also co-operate on equal terms with some male rappers in taking political stances. In the latter category though, there are female rappers, who merely seek fame and fortune in rapping. They are more concerned with the fun that comes with rapping. For example, when asked about why she chose to be a rapper, Azade said,

> Boys, sex, drinking, money, this is what I call rap. (Azade, female, 24, serious rapper, Iran)

The third objective we characterise as resistance is direct political opposition. If one can describe the culture shaped around hip-hop as inherently marginal to the mainstream, then we can talk about what Rose (1994) calls the centre of the margin. This margin has its own space, its own "dynamics" and "can create its own narratives" (Khan 2009, 233). Early attempts at political rapping in Iran began in 2005 (Kowsari, 2009) and political rap continues up to the present. It can be argued that political rap grew from the time of political changes in Iran which was the end of the reformist administration. Hichkas, known as the father of Persian rap, points out that the early

rappers "didn't know that music and rap could be a device to talk about political matters and economic unjustice". Once they realised, rappers followed different political directions. They can be categorised in three groups:

Fuming rappers

These rappers are infuriated by the government and the repressions, they think it imposes on youth. While the Birmingham school critics believed youth participation in subcultures to be a form of resistance toward the parent class culture (Clarke et al., 1976), Iranian rappers resent the economic, social and cultural problems of modern Iran. They express this in a kind of articulate violence. Being furious is a common feature of these rappers as Bahram, a political rap singer, now in Israel, enthusiastically explained,

> Look this is the anger stored in all of us; we all know that the government is to blame for all this. (Bahram, male, 26, serious rapper, outside Iran)

However, among resisting rappers, both female and male, this approach to rap music is not much endorsed. Shaya, a feminist female rapper, describes fuming rappers as the ones to blame because of their lack of willingness to accept their faults,

> You know I think they, fuming rappers, don't even know why they are rapping. They think they are the best and they should sit and wait for democracy to come to them. But it is not like that. You should fight for it not just say something to bring anguish to yourself and the ones you love with no result to come. Everything needs a plan to get to… actually they don't plan for freedom they just want others to deliver freedom to them. (Shaya, female, 24, serious rapper, Iran)

Protesting rappers

Stapleton (1998, 221) argues the political landscape of hip-hop culture to be one of "protest". She believes that "protest music is characterised by objections to injustices and oppressions inflicted on certain individuals and groups". Similarly, resisting "dominant elites" and "members of dominant groups" is the key feature of rapping for

this group of individual rappers in Iran. As Mojrem puts it, they are opposing present injustices, only some of which "the government is to be scolded for". Hichkas believes;

> Most of the problem in Iran is because of the people. You cannot always blame the governments for the problems people cause because of their irresponsibility and lack of tact. We are saying that this government does something cruel to people. But if they act for the good of the people why should we be mad at them? We only want our freedom back, that's the thing. (Hichkas, male, 27, serious rapper, Iran)

The fuming rappers, according to some of the protesting rappers, do not love their country. As Shaya explains,

> It seems that they just want to have a good reason to take refuge in other countries. If you are working for the people you stay with them. (Shaya, 24, female street rapper, Iran)

Imitating rappers

Another kind of resisting rapper in Iran is the imitating rapper. They believe that rap and hip-hop are not Iranian things, so they should remain true to the original essence of the music. That is to be a real rapper as they see it. Shayan, a street rapper, introduced himself as a follower of Shakur by imitating his appearance, manners and ways of behaving. He had seen Shakur on CDs and movies made about him. The distinctive baggy clothing of hip-hop singers is considered a "cultural invasion" in Iran according to the dominant discourse and a wearer may be sentenced to punishment. Street rappers are the only active rappers in Iran who insist on wearing such clothing in public. They thereby show their resistant identity as a rapper both to "alarm people about the fact of their existence and to be different from the ordinary people" (Mojrem, male, 25, serious street rapper, Iran). Although these street rappers are not famous, because their poverty doesn't let them record any songs, they are the ones shown on national TV to (mis)represent rap culture in Iran. As Shayan clearly denotes, they are,

> There to be found [us]. We don't like those stupid well-born assholes. We are on the floor risking our lives. This is us, the rappers, not them. (Shayan, male, 25, serious street rapper, Iran)

As the discussion so far reveals, some of the concerns of different kinds of rappers connect with each other. As an example, Hichkas, Shaya, Najafi and Nana (a female rapper), are all aware of social problems and at the same time protest politically. As Najafi enlightens us:

> Iranian modern life is a chaos in which you can't point to a specific matter as the problematic one. I can't talk about politics and leave the poverty alone. I can't talk about freedom and take women for granted in it. Everything is tied up together. (Najafi, male, 31, serious rapper, outside Iran)

This point is manifest for young female rappers. Nana, widely recognised as a female rapper, thinks silence towards what has been imposed is a kind of death sentence,

> [You should fight them back], an eye for an eye strategy. Injustice is injustice whether it is towards women or all the people in the country. You should say something to defend yourself. Rap is always there to give you the courage you never had. (Nana, female, 24, serious street rapper, Iran)

The fourth major objective among the rappers we studied is to combat socio-cultural problems through rapping using lyrics related to social problems. They are concerned about problems like poverty, prostitution and drug addiction. For example,

> We have to save our people, they deserve a better life. We shouldn't see poverty and prostitution in the streets. Why are our young people getting addicted? Why are our people indifferent and don't care about these problems? (Yas, male, 30, serious rapper, Iran)

The fifth objective among rappers committed to resistance is to fight dullness in everyday life. They want to be distinct and special, not like everybody else. Shervin, a male rapper said,

> We don't want a repetitive life, we don't like to be like others, and we don't want to go to study, or to go to work, or to get married. (Shervin, male, 26, serious street rapper, Iran)

Nakisa, a male rapper, looks down on the way his mother has been living, for example,

> She has to clean the house every day, help my newly-married sister to cook new meals for her husband, and wash and iron my father's clothes. It is not a good life, no fun, no excitement. (Nakisa, male, 25, serious rapper, Iran)

3. *Making money*

Earning money was found to be one of the ultimate goals for young males in becoming a rapper, but not for females. In Iran, female singing is forbidden by the religious laws and culturally it is not accepted easily by the people. Thus, female rappers can only hope to be known among audiences of rap. They cannot perform even in an underground setting for fear of arrest. Also they can't sing at weddings like male rappers do, not least because their themes are not much suited to a party. The pioneers of Persian rap music, Hichkas, Yas, Bahram, and Salome, didn't care about the money-making aspect of rapping, as implied earlier in the chapter. But the second generation of rap singers seems to take this opportunity seriously. In a way, it identifies their rap "career".

In terms of Iranian money-making, hip-hop is an "economic potentiality" (Peoples, 2008) similar to its American counterpart, but in a different way. As Kowsari (2009) puts it, Iranian rap music doesn't have any marketplace in or out of the country except for concerts held in neighbouring countries, to which of course a lot of fans come from Iran to take part. Toméh explains the different money-raising ways for rappers in Iran:

> Well, they [the police] take [arrest] us if we have a concert. So we sell our not-so-good lyrics to newcomers in rap. Or, we charge those not famous girl or boy rappers who want to be famous because they are singing with us. There is another way too: singing for parties and wedding ceremonies. (Toméh, male, 20, light rapper, Iran)

Generally these are common ways of earning money among male rappers in Iran. But it is very different for females. As Shaya explains:

> It is not because rap is for men, it's not and they know it well. It is because our culture cannot accept it. There is nothing a girl can do to escape from it. I can change my looks, I can change my way of talking, I can rebel against the traditions but I can't force them to accept me as a person or a singer to pay money to. They don't spend money on me or any other girl rappers. That's it. (Shaya, female 24, serious rapper, Iran)

To some rappers rapping is a "job". The majority of those who hold that opinion that we interviewed say they think nothing of rap and believe it to be "all bullshit" or "not a gentleman's job". Some say they actually don't care if they are rapping or singing a pop or a folk song, "as long as it makes me money, I'm in" says Mokhte (Out of My Mind). He separated himself or any similar rapper from the ones he named "real rappers". "We don't have anything to say, we sing and take our money, we rap but we're not rappers… Hichkas is a rapper. He wants a good thing and he sings for it, not me" (Mokhte, male, light rapper, Iran). They can make quite a lot of money if they hit the road of fame. While this is similar to their well-known counterparts in the US, they operate in an illegal underground setting in Iran.

4. *Fame and reputation*

The aim of becoming famous is a common ambition that attracts Iranian youth to Persian rap as a postmodern form of American hip-hop (Peoples, 2008), despite all the threats and limitations imposed by the dominant power of the state over them. Tataloo, a pioneer of Iranian rap, believes most of the young people involved in rap culture in Iran are looking for a reputation either good and bad,

> Some of these rappers just want to be known. It doesn't matter that people think they are good people or bad people; it's enough for them that people point their fingers at them and show them to each other. Some of them want to have as many girl friends as they can by rapping. They are all idiots. (Tataloo, male, 26, light rapper, Iran)

5. *Leisure and fun*

The aim of having fun is an initial reason some rappers started rapping and ended up by earning money. These rappers wished to spend their spare time following the "fashion" of rapping. Leisure and fun options are limited for young people in Iran. In other words

not having alternative entertainments and fun has led a lot of rappers to choose rapping as a form of free entertainment. Young rappers can spend time expressing themselves among peers with little money.

6. *Social recognition*

Some active rappers in Iran change their styles, lyrics and even in some cases their friends, just to be accepted. Although there is no market for rap in Iran, these rappers try to make a market of their own. Tataloo is one of the rappers who grants the audience more - he believes,

> I can't sing "To Ey Pari Kojaee"[74]. I should sing a song according to the age of my audience. I choose the topics my audience would like. We try to choose the moments people try to say something but they can't. For example they are happy, sad and… Satisfying people is not a hard thing. (Tataloo, male, 26, light rapper, Iran)

By the same token, Sasi Mankan was also very careful not to lose his market,

> You have to be very careful about what you are singing; you have to know how to please your audience even when you are using swearing and bad language. (Sasi Mankan, male, a very famous light rapper, Iran)

Some of these rappers define an "Other" from whom they want social recognition, usually Los Angeles-based Iranian singers, ordinary people and other rappers who matter to them. Practically gaining acceptance from these groups is something important in their lives. However, our observations perhaps unexpectedly show a number of the rappers who try to gain the acceptance of others are also concerned to change something in people's minds, which is also a form of social recognition.

There is another aspect of recognition that these rappers mention and that is freedom of speech, which means they don't follow a regular or standard way of speech

[74] A very famous classic Iranian song.

or diction. They try to express whatever they are not allowed to say, and say it loudly using some odd words and taboo phrases. For example, the members of a street rap group explained that,

> We say whatever we can't say. We say these words and want to make the assholes vanish from the earth. (Syrus, Alireza and Payam, all male rappers, aged 17, Iran)

Tataloo believes that rapping means freedom: "if I say shut the hell up, nobody minds, because they expect me to be like this. But if Dariush [a political Iranian pop singer] does this no one would ever listen to him." Yas goes further and tries to reach his social aim which is protesting against poverty and prostitution. He said: 'I think I can positively influence people'.

Serious and light rappers

Bearing in mind the above-mentioned reasons, meanings and motives attached to Persian rap music, we come to our final categorisation of Iranian rappers: serious versus light rappers. A serious rapper in Iran is one who defines a specific and sometimes different identity for him/herself in the society. We can define Yas, Shahin Najafi, Bahram, Bi Bak, Hichkas and Salome and the street rappers, as serious rappers. In this case an "Other" is implicitly defined by the rapper and he/she sings in reference to this "Other-making". For example, for Yas the "Other" is western countries whose policies or enmities towards Islamic world lead to atrocities in Palestine or the release of anti-Iranian Hollywood movies like *The 300*.

> I feel sad whenever I leave Iran. Iranians are the most genius people in the world, but they have been always victims of the colonial countries. Look at what they [the West] are doing in Gaza in Palestine, I hope, someday, they will pay for what they have done over there. I like people around the world, but I am an Iranian and remain Iranian and sing for Iranians. If I go to America, nothing will be left for singing. (Yas, male, 30, serious rapper, Iran)

For Najafi, the "Others" are those in power,

> I address the people who are witnessing all atrocities but keep silent. I address all men who practice their mastery through secluding women, and also all women who comply with this. (Najafi, male, 31, serious rapper, outside Iran)

Female rappers have their own Other; male rappers and the whole society (patriarchal society). For street rappers, all Iranians living the good life with no intention to help the poor constitute this Other. Serious rappers define a goal to protest against and try to fight for it through rapping.

In contrast, light rappers don't define a "self" or "me as the rapper". In fact, the light rappers lack an independent and fixed identity; the self is always the subject of redefinition. In other words, rapping is just a way among other ways to reach their goals of fun and money. The Other for this group of rappers is mostly non-rapper young people. Nazy (a light female rapper, 20, Iran) believes that all non-rapper girls are boring; only rapper girls are "cool" and "brave".

Rap lifestyle among serious and light rappers

Lifestyles of rap practitioners depend on whether they are serious or light rappers. The lifestyle is totally different for the first group (serious rappers) from that endorsed by mainstream Iranian culture.

Serious rappers

Through a sort of conspicuous cussedness, serious rappers exaggerate their style of dressing, behaviour, speech, and lyrics to challenge the negative representations made by the official culture about them. They may go to extremes on some provocative issues in the presence of their father, older brother and peers, although they may not really believe that much in what they say. For instance, serious rapper Felakat departs from

gatherings with family and friends using the excuse that he cannot stand it any longer without drugs. He escapes to his room, mocking the shocked family and friends, but then starts reading a novel or a poem.

The situation is tougher for serious rapper girls who regard rap as a real lifestyle. They may try to establish their own identity by revealing their open sexual relationships. Nana explains her aim clearly,

> Let them think that it is doomsday. Let them pray and pray… all my life I have heard, "don't talk to the neighbour's boy", "why did you look at that boy?", "girls should be self-possessed". Let them see if you do wanna be that kind of girl nothing would be changed. (Nana, female, 24, serious rapper, Iran)

There are some rappers who pay no attention to the pathological viewpoints of mainstream culture on rap, but act out their own rap lifestyle. According to Shahin,

> Our life is rap. It is the only thing that makes us happy. The way I dress - baggy clothes - shows I am free. We are not like others who work all the time and wait for the night to sleep with the girl. We want to say that life is not just that thing. There should be some excitement; we should give ourselves a shot to be free. We like to think that we are changing something. (Shahin, male, 24, serious street rapper, Iran)

Although these serious rappers claim to have a different lifestyle, it seems that there is no strict rule for shaping this unique identity. In fact because of the restrictions they face within the society they have to be flexible about the rules of the subculture they represent. A very good example is the way rappers dress in Iran. A group of street rappers mentioned that there is no rule for clothing for rappers; "you wear whatever you like". And while they make fun of those who don't wear baggy clothes and label them as "*zakhar*" - a rapper who doesn't show up in public in his/her baggy clothes - it is not a rule to them, just like it is not a rule in western hip-hop to do breakdancing. The risk of being stripped of these kinds of clothes by the authorities is one of the strongest reasons for this flexibility. Shahin clarifies this situation,

> We wear baggy clothes but if there is a possibility of being busted we wear other clothes but still different to show who we are. We don't work we don't wanna work because living a job in this country is equal to a dog's life. (Shahin, male, 24, serious street rapper, Iran)

In addition to clothes, consuming drugs and drinking are other factors important in defining the lifestyle of rappers in Iran. Some rappers consider consuming drugs and drinking as inseparable from rap identity. So not consuming drugs and drinking will represent a rapper as false, leading to cold treatment and in some cases exclusion from the group. This way of living is believed to characterise a true rapper for some serious rappers such as Hichkas. “From the outset”, Hichkas says, “we knew rap along with crystal [ice]”. As we explained in the beginning of this chapter, Iranian rappers imitated American Gangsta rappers. Here a covert influence of the American style of rappers can be traced. The use of drugs has become part of rapping although perhaps not the main purpose of rapping which can be resistance or other motivations. At the same time there is another group of serious rappers who started to rap with the presupposed intention of resisting through rap, such as Salomeh, Shahin Najafi and Bahram. They may also consume drugs but it’s not so much part of their lifestyle. Yet neither of these two groups of serious rappers see any contradiction between their so-called “deviant” lifestyle and the socio-political nature of their rapping. Many see their deviant lifestyle as a way to challenge the hegemonic discourse in Iran.

In sum, serious rappers are very committed to their lifestyle; they are not quick to change or modify their rap lifestyle even when requested to do so by those whom they like or love very much, such as parents and partners, even if they get exiled or imprisoned. In terms of class position, serious rappers mainly come from the lower classes and practice consuming drugs and drinking.

Light rappers

In marked contrast, the lifestyle of light rappers is not that distinct from conventional culture. They are ready to change their rap lifestyle. For example, Reza Pishro, a male light rapper, stopped rapping after he got married and Tataloo also adjusted himself to what his partner wanted him to do. These rappers respect the social norms and the expectations of their significant others. They rarely drink alcohol or take drugs. For example, Tataloo believes that: "no one could ever tell me not to go to parties, because I do nothing wrong, I don't drink, I don't use any drugs".

They still keep their religious beliefs. For example, Hossein Tohi, one of the pioneers of Persian rap, released a song called *Agha Joon* (My Dear Saint) in which he gave homage to Imam Hossein, the third Shia Imam. This song proved popular among Iranian young people. To take another example, during our interview, Amir Qiamat, a male rapper who teaches English language in private institutes in Tehran, like many religious people in Iran repeatedly used phrases like "God willing" or "whatever God wishes, it will happen", or "nothing will happen without God's will". Razim, another male rapper, told us: "I am fearful of God, and don't do anything against his will". Most male light rappers believe a girl should not become a rapper and should not smoke cigarettes, let alone drink or use drugs at parties.

The light rappers also consider rap as part of their lives. But they try to adjust their lifestyle with the mainstream culture, for example they are careful about the lyrics they write and are always aware of the audience's ideas about their works. They mainly belong to the upper middle class.

Conclusion

After hip-hop made its first debut in the United States, it became a worldwide phenomenon, influencing music in all corners of the globe, even China (see Khan,

2009) and Iran. However, it was not taken up the same way everywhere. As we have tried to show in this chapter, Iranian rap music cannot be described as a derivative outgrowth of the African-American hip-hop scene. As Tony Mitchell's edited collection (2001) *Global noise* demonstrated, the global reach of hip-hop has had many different ramifications throughout the world. In some places it has promoted Marxist politics. In the hands of Basque separatist rappers a punk rock hip-hop syncretic genre has been used to espouse their nationalist cause. French rap artists of Moroccan and Algerian heritage have challenged social issues in France today and questioned France's role within the Algerian civil war (Mitchell, 2001).

As hip-hop scholar Durand argues, hip-hop is an idealised limited community around which part of contemporary youth, both urban and multi-ethnic in nature, can identify itself, protest, contest, propose, act, and create (Durand, 2002). In Europe, rap music has played a large role in expressing the feelings, thoughts, and desires of minority communities. For example, Swedenburgh (2001) has pointed out that Islamic hip-hop in Europe is fighting Islamaphobia. Among Muslim countries there is evidence of the existence of a vibrant community of rappers, for example, in Turkey (see Solomon, 2005) or in Egypt. However, rap culture in every society has its own distinct or unique characteristics. In Egypt, for example, Egyptian hip-hop is distinct from other genres around the world, not only in terms of the traditional musical instruments played, but also in terms of limits on the un-Islamic elements present in hip-hop such as the objectification of women. Moreover, many observers confirm Egyptian hip-hop took a revolutionary position during the 2011 Egyptian revolution against President Hosni Mubarak. Elsewhere in the so-called "Arab Spring" hip-hop and rap may be playing a similar role.

Therefore, while African-American hip-hop has changed a lot during the past years and is nowadays criticised because of its commercialisation and its objectification of women in music video clips and songs, it is wrong to conclude that rap culture in

other socio-cultural contexts has had, or will have, the same meaning or fate. Our observations on the Iranian rap community do not confirm such generalisations.

The experience of rapping in Iran confirms Mitchell's observation that "rap music and hip-hop culture has in many cases become a vehicle of various forms of youth culture" (Mitchell 2001, 10). We go further to claim that even in the same cultural environment in a country like Iran, various versions or brands of the same youth cultural form, in this case rap culture, co-exist whether in peace or unease, and compete for public attention. The socially critical genre created by the Iranian serious rappers confirms Rose's observation that "oppressed people use language, dance and music to mock that in power" (1994, 100). It also confirms Abdel-Alim's observations in Europe, where he sees Muslim hip-hop as able to: "within the hip-hop cultural movement ...create a counter hegemonic discourse that threatens the ruling class and their ideas" (2006, 46).

Moreover, the experience of rapping in Iran is another example of the dialectic between the global and the local, or what Robertson (1992) terms "glocalisation". As Bennett (1999) has already shown, "hip-hop in Newcastle, England, and Frankfurt, Germany, is used to handle very different local sociocultural issues". Jenkins (2004) points out "how the process of appropriation and recontextualization of mediated imagery across cultures often leads to metamorphoses of meanings that make these meanings both unpredictable and contradictory in relation to their origin of broadcasting' (Cited in Kjeldgaard & Askegaard 2006, 233-4).

In relation to our study, the light genre created by the Iranian light rappers is similar to what Abdel-Alim calls Islamic hip-hop in the context of European Muslim hip-hop. Abdel-Alim, argues "I use the term Islamic rather than Muslim to distinguish a genre of hip-hop music and culture created by American Muslims that seeks to comply with Islamic religious standards and practices" (Abdel-Alim 2006, 46). Therefore, in regard to the meaning of Persian rap culture, just like the meaning of many other issues among Iranian people, there is a divide

among Iranian rappers themselves. This divide at the micro level of music subculture is in parallel to a similar divide at the macro level of Iranian society.

Our study of Persian rap shows how young people as cultural consumers can appropriate the symbolic resources produced by global consumer culture for their own expressive purposes. It significantly demonstrates how global genres such as hip-hop acquire distinctive meanings within the context of a given society where young people's discourses of identity are concerned. In Iran, hip-hop youth culture has been translated, appropriated and creolised to fit into local social structures and issues, in a context where it is technically illegal.

References

Abdel-Alim, H. S. 2006. "Re-inventing Islam with Unique Modern Tones: Muslim Hip-hop Artists as Verbal Mujahedin." *Souls* 8: 45-58.

Bennett, A. 1999. *Popular Culture: The Metropolitan Experience.* London: Routledge.

Bennett, A. 2002. "Researching Youth Culture and Popular Music: A Methodological Critique." *British Journal of Sociology* 53: 451-466.

Cohen, P. 1972. "Subcultural Conflict and Working Class Community." In *Working Papers in Cultural Studies*. Birmingham: University of Birmingham.

Clarke, J., Hall, S., Jefferson, T. & Roberts, B. 1976. Subcultures, Cultures and Class - A Theoretical Overview. In *Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain,* ed. S. Hall & T. Jefferson, 9-74. London: Routledge.

Durand, A-P. 2002. *Black, Blanc, Beur: Rap Music and Hip-hop Culture in the Francophone World.* Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press.

Ferani, L. 2010. "Why Iran is Cracking Down on Rap Music." *The Telegraph,* November 10.

Gelder, K. 2004. *Popular Fiction: The Logics and Practices of a Literary Field.* New York: Routledge.

Gelder, K. 2007. *Subcultures: Cultural Histories and Social Practice.* London: Routledge.

Hamshahri 2007. "Who is at the Door? Iranian Rap?" (In Persian). *Hamshahri Javan*, 22 March. http://www.hamshahrionline.ir

Harrison, F. 2004. Iran's Self-styled Rapping Aristocrat. *BBC News Website*, December 2004. www.bbc.com/news.

Hebdige, D. 1979. *Subculture: The Meaning of Style.* London: Routledge.

Houshangi, T. 2009. "Car Culture and Young People in Tehran." MA Dissertation, Tehran: Allameh Tabatabai' University.

Jenkins, H. 2004. "Pop Cosmopolitanism: Mapping Cultural Flows in an Age of Media Convergence." In *Globalization: Culture and Education in the New Millennium,* ed. M. M. Suarez-Orozco & D. B. Qin-Hilliard, 114-40. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Jones, J. S. & Watt, S. 2010. *Ethnography in Social Science Practice.* London: Routledge.

Keddi, N. 2003. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Keyhan [daily newspaper in Persian], (2009). "A Group of Rappers Arrested in the City of Isfahan." *Keyhan*,

22 June.
Khabeer, S.A. 2007. “Rap that Islam: The Rhyme and Reason of American Islamic Hip-hop.” *The Muslim World*
97: 125-141.
Khademi, H. 2010. “Underground Rap Music.” (In Persian). Retrieved from www.peykemostanad.com.
Khan, K. 2009. “Chinese Hip-hop Music: Negotiating for Cultural Freedoms in the 21st Century.” *Muziki* 6:
232-240.
Kjeldgaard, D. & Askegaard, S. 2006. “The Glocalization of Youth Culture: The Global Youth Segment as
Structures of Common Difference.” *Journal of Consumer Research* 33: 231-247
Kowsari, M. 2009. “Underground Music in Iran.” (In Persian). *Journal of the Sociology of Arts* 1: 127-158.
McRobbie, A. & Garber, J. 1997. “Girls and Subcultures.” In *The Subcultures Reader,* ed. K. Gelder & S. Thornton,
112-120). London: Routledge
Manoto, 1. 2011. “TV: Me and You 1.” A Persian Satellite TV Channel based in London. Soroush Hichkas [a
famous Iranian rapper] on Sakkou [platform, a TV show programme], broadcast on December 20, 2011.
Mitchell, T, ed. 2001. *Global Noise: Rap and Hip-hop outside America*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
Muggleton, D. & Weinzierl, R. 2003. *The Post-subcultures Reader.* Oxford: Berg.
Nazer Fasihi, A. 2008. “A Comparative Study on the Resistance Music in Iran, Before and After the Islamic Revolution of 1979”. (In Persian). MA Dissertation, Tehran University.
O’Brien, K., Ryan-Flood, R. et al. 2009. “Inside Doorwork: Gendering the Security Gaze.” In *Secrecy and Silence in*
the Research Process: Feminist Reflections, ed. R. Ryan-Flood, & R. Gill, 117-132. London: Routledge.
Peoples, W. A. 2008. “’Under Construction’: Identifying Foundations of Hip-Hop Feminism and Exploring Bridges
between Black Second-wave and Hip-hop Feminisms.” *Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism* 8: 19-52.
Robertson, R. 1992. *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture.* London: Sage.
Rose, T. 1994. *Black Noise: Rap and Black Culture in Contemporary America.* Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
Sedaghat-Pishe. A. 2010. “Studying Underground Music.” Seminar on Underground Music in Iran. Tehran,
Centre for Strategic Research.
Stapleton, K. R. 1998. “From the Margins to Mainstream: The Political Power of Hip-hop.” *Journal of Media, Culture & Society* 20: 219-234.
Shahabi, M. 2006. “Youth Subcultures in Post-revolution Iran: An Alternative Reading.” In *Global Youth: Hybrid*
Identities, Plural Worlds, ed. P. Nilan & C. Feixa, 111- 125. London & New York: Routledge.
Solomon, T. 2005. “’Living Underground is Tough’: Authenticity and Locality in the Hip-hop Community in
Istanbul, Turkey.” *Popular Music* 24: 1-20.
Swedenburgh, T. (2001). “Islamic Hip-hop vs. Islamaphobia.” In *Global Noise: Rap and Hip-hop outside America,* ed. T. Mitchell 57-85. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press.
Thornton, S. 1996. *Club Cultures: Music, Media, and Subcultural Capital.* Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
VOA (Voice Of America). 2008. “Persian Rap-Fars Rap.” TV Programme Zan-e- Emrooz, Today’s Women, United
States.
Yousefi, H. 2007. “The Carnivalization of the Private Sphere: An Ethnographic Research on Private Home Parties in
Iran.” (In Persian), MA Dissertation, Tehran: Allameh Tabatabai’ University.
Willis, P. 1978. *Profane Culture.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Chapter 10
Space, time and symbol in urban Indonesian schoolboy gangs

Pam Nilan

Introduction

This chapter considers some spatial, temporal and symbolic dimensions of schoolboy fighting in urban Java, Indonesia. Using selected data from a study of masculinity and violence in 2009-2010, three propositions are advanced. First, male peer fighting takes place in specific spaces and places in the urban Indonesian landscape, revealing territorial meanings and contestations. Second, the period of transition for Indonesian young men is an important episode in their lives. For many, identity claims are established and defended through peer rivalry and fighting, but this intense stage of engagement in violence is temporally bounded by graduation from high school. Third, teenage schoolboy gangs in urban Central Java refer both implicitly and explicitly to heroic masculine narratives from the past and present in their efforts to accomplish local "symbolic domination" (Bourdieu, 2001) and territorial sovereignty.

The definition of violence used in the project from which the data are taken was:

> Any act – physical, verbal or emotional – that is intended to, or results in, harm to another person or group. For example, verbal abuse, harassment, bullying, intimidation, extortion, fighting, rioting, assault, rape, torture, manslaughter, murder.

In giving an account of traditional martial arts in Java, Wilson (2011, 312) stresses "the capacity for violence and its spectacular display to the instantiation of authority.

Violence is thus better understood as a cultural repertoire". Throughout this chapter the collective violence of young men is understood as a cultural repertoire for achieving specific outcomes of authority and legitimation, rather than as a pathology or instance of primordialism.

In his study of urban violence in the capital Jakarta, French geographer Jérôme Tadié (2006, 67) claims there is no Indonesian city where teenage schoolboy fights are not a feature of daily life. Such battles serve as an instance of *la violence quotidienne* experienced by ordinary people. The male youth depicted here are not the wealthiest young men, nor the very poorest. Rather they are located in the upwardly aspirational working class, a socio-economic group that dominates the poor urban sprawl of contemporary Indonesian cities. Schoolboys fighting each other in groups is a common phenomenon in working class and marginal neighbourhoods in Indonesia. Two further signifying characteristics of such everyday violence are masculinity and youth (Messerschmidt 1994, 81).

For young men in Java who routinely fight with peers in their high school years, sense of self is constituted in specific locations of physical space, and in a specific period in the life course. Leccardi (2006, 16) maintains that "young people are asked by society to delineate the course of their own biographical time, to build a meaningful relationship with social time. This means constructing significant connections between an individual and collective, past, present and future". As Brannen and Nilsen point out, "the way that young people navigate the transition to adulthood is influenced by their perception and experience of time" (2007, 531). The lower middle class boy in Java can make a heroic masculine social identity for himself through fighting as a school gang member during his teenage years. However, his connection to the ontologically reassuring position of street warrior is temporally bounded. For most, it ceases as the school gates close for the last time and the young man proceeds into the rather uncertain realm of adult life.

Tellingly, some young male workers and university students return sometimes to their old school gates in the afternoon to urge on the current *geng* recruits and reminisce (Hatib Kadir, personal communication, Yogyakarta, November 2009). Involvement in violent collective fighting while at school appears to give young men a solid sense of purpose, an ontologically strong masculine identity. Yet this is confined to a relatively

short period of the now extended transition to male adulthood. Once they leave school it is all over.

Young men and peer fighting

Indonesia's population is almost 250,000,000; the fourth-most populous nation in the world and the largest Muslim-majority country. A secular constitutional democracy currently ranked 108 on the Human Development Index, Indonesia is growing economically at around 4 per cent per annum. The population is relatively young and increasingly urbanised. In 2008, around half the population lived in urban areas, with 28 per cent under the age of 15 (UNDP 2008, 245). The current youth generation is the most educated in history, yet competition for jobs and university places is intense. Youth unemployment remains high and a tertiary qualification does not guarantee lucrative employment. As elsewhere in the world, there is considerable anxiety and tension in the current generation of Indonesian youth about the future. Traditional expectations and fixed life roles have been unsettled, yet for young men the path of transition to adulthood still favors the hegemonic subject position of powerful and dominating masculinity, a position which they struggle to achieve in conditions of uncertainty (Nilan 2009, 341).

In less than a hundred years, Indonesia has moved from a largely agricultural colonised nation where most young men entered the work force in early puberty, to an independent, democratic, urbanised nation where young men are expected to stay at school until the age of 16 or more, with many now completing senior high school and tertiary education. In Indonesia, as elsewhere, the transition of young people to adulthood in late modernity not only takes longer these days, but is ever less readily described as a linear phenomenon. It is widely claimed that youth transitions in the West are both fragmented and extended (Skelton, 2002). Prior research by the author finds this argument holds true for Indonesian youth to some extent (Nilan, 2009).

The journey to adulthood is not only extended by education, but rendered more episodic by the inevitable upward credentialling of the labor market in a rapidly

developing economy. Generally speaking, young Indonesian men are spending longer in schooling, entering the workforce later, and marrying even later again (Jones, 2010). Yet the most important signifier of legitimate adult status still remains marriage and parenthood for both sexes (Nilan, 2009), and the marriage prospects for young men depend on their capacity to earn a solid, steady income. Young men from lower socio-economic backgrounds may spend long days in the classroom in the hope of eventually entering the middle class labor market, but they find school life trying and frustrating. For many, "school is emasculating" (Messerschmidt 1994, 89).

On the other hand, an exciting "deviant career" (Becker, 1966) in a schoolboy gang is compelling and thrilling. In Yogyakarta, Central Java, peer fighting at school may be fondly recalled,

> In Indonesia it is a common sentiment that being a high school student (siswa SMA) is the most beautiful "moment" in a young person's life. It is striking then, for the young men studied here, that the sweetest memories of high school are … being involved in mass fighting. (Kadir, 2012: 352)

In contrast to the dull routine of lessons and tests, the boys took great pleasure in planning strategies and running with the gang. Actual combat was exciting and victory was exhilarating. They were saddened when their comrades were wounded, devastated when they lost a fight, but ecstatic in the moment of victory.

Gang *(geng)* membership while still at school appears to support an ontologically strong masculine identity. As Messerschmidt (1993, 119) argues, "men situationally accomplish public forms of masculinity in response to their socially structured circumstances". Once they leave high school, peer fighting to defend symbolic territory stops for most. The circumstances change and so does the practice. The practice of schoolboy peer fighting can therefore be identified as both spatially and temporally bounded by the institution of school, constituting a discrete episode in the life course.

The fact that some young Indonesian men highly value peer fighting seems to bear out the hypothesis that violence may re-affirm a legitimate masculine identity for men who lack other means of demonstrating control and authority in particular conditions and fields of practice (Messerschmidt 1993, 84). Cavender (1999) pointed to the expression of "compensatory" masculinities through violence. Connell (1995) used the term "protest masculinity" to capture the contradiction between young men's

perceptions of the powerful and their sense of powerlessness. In short, for disadvantaged populations the expression of male adolescent resentment and disappointment is more likely to involve violence. Also relevant is Albert Cohen's (1955) finding for street gangs: that power is asserted through physical prowess, not negotiation. When Indonesian male teenage groups fight on the street, not only are corporeal risks taken and civic rules broken, but gang members have a direct means of proving themselves in terms of honour between men. Honour and respect are important for male self-esteem. As Bourdieu concludes, "*l'homme d'honneur est par définition un homme* [the man of honour is by definition a man]" (1990: 7). Honour and respect are closely tied to the broader concept of recognition. Honneth (1997) identified recognition as an important heuristic for understanding how feelings of injustice and inferiority can lead to protracted social conflict and civil unrest.

The data considered below show that peer fighting established and consolidated hierarchies of "symbolic domination" (Bourdieu, 2001) between groups of young men. In his study of the traditional martial arts form *Pencak Silat* in Java, Wilson (2011, 301) finds that in this stylised male combat "power is perceived to be relational, hierarchical, and instantiated through performance". Although the young men depicted below were not using *Pencak Silat* techniques as such, this cultural paradigm of stylised combat is useful for what it reveals about hierarchical power relations in Java and the performance of violence between men. As we shall see below, there are distinct ritualistic elements in schoolboy gang fights that echo some of the specialist knowledge capacities of traditional martial arts. Like them, peer fighting employs modalities of violence within a transformative cultural repertoire that goes to the heart of sovereign practices of governmentality over urban spaces. The apparent invulnerability of young fighters in a victorious gang stands as testament to a reversal of the hegemonic relations that inhere in the dominating authority of older men, placing the youthful champions of the moment on a par with the most feared adult men in the land. At the same time though, there is more to the story. We need to pay attention to the "temporal and spatial complexity" of male youth identities in peer violence (Dillabough & Kennelly 2010, 3).

Theorising spatial, temporal and symbolic elements of collective peer violence

Public battles between rival gangs in Central Java do indeed seem to delineate appropriation, reappropriation and transformation of spatial relations in the urban setting. As Phil Cohen's (1999) youth gang research indicated, defense of territory and attempts to seize it represent the spatial dimension of ontological struggles enacted by young men to establish social respect and status. In the densely-populated cities of Java, scales of contested urban space are inter-related. The area immediately surrounding schools, public transport hubs, sporting arenas and open air markets, are all spaces of contestation in which scores can be settled. Some of the public spaces had belonged to particular schoolboy gangs for so long they were spoken of in local folklore. The strong drive to protect defined territory may take its cue from time-honored surveillance responsibilities of young men in Javanese villages. For centuries the young men of villages have conducted nightly security patrols around the home compounds of inhabitants, sometimes accompanying their rounds with loud percussion on metal vessels and drums to set a boundary against intruders, both corporeal and supernatural. Similarly, in schoolboy gang warfare, territorial boundary crossings by defined others represent challenging imaginaries of risk and retaliation. Ideas of magical strength and invincibility (Wilson, 2012) to be proven in victory, are never far away either.

In terms of the temporal dimension, we can productively view the intense period of peer collective fighting while Indonesian boys are at high school as an "episode" in the now fragmented life course (Leccardi 2006, 15). As Bauman wrote, "fragmented life tends to be lived in episodes, in a series of unconnected events" (2001, 160). In the "sweet", temporally-bounded experience of peer fighting, young men can briefly be heroes and villains before they finish the dull business of education to become dutiful workers and family men. The relatively short episode of membership in a schoolboy gang constitutes significant connection between an individual youth and powerful collective identity (see Leccardi, 2006). Dillabough and Kennelly (2010, 3) remind us that "the residual weight of the past retains a hold over young people's cultural expressions and practices". The composition and loyalty conventions of schoolboy gangs echoe traditional forms of subcultural solidarity – village and kin brotherhood;

comrades in arms against the Dutch colonial forces. The gangs themselves practice culturally distinct forms of self-governance and modalities of authority, drawing on mythologies of heroic collective resistance.

As Dillabough and Kennelly (2010, 108) point out in their study of school gang fights in Canada, peer rivalry and conflict "retain unifying temporal and moral traces of tradition and ritual". One source of symbolic salience in the peer fighting reported here was Javanese mythology, primarily the Hindu war epic *Mahabharata.* Several boys made reference to gang heroism using the term *pasopati* – which sometimes means Prince Arjuna's magic invincible arrow, and other times means a magical royal *kris* (Javanese dagger) with extraordinary powers of conquest. *Pasopati* can also refer to warriors who wield such weapons. The connotation in either case is straight, swift and invincible in battle. Another important symbolic source was the contemporary Islamist struggle. Muslim schoolboy gangs made use of spatial metaphors taken from the present fight for sovereignty in the Middle East, referring implictly to the Golden Age of Islam when they mentioned the conqueror *Saladin* or *Salahuddin*, for example.

Invincibility in battle was certainly a common theme. The Canadian study found that turf battles between schoolboy gangs represented for individual participants a "fantasy of power that fed into their desires for a recognizable high-status identity" (Dillabough & Kennelly 2010, 109). Arrayed in gangs, the young men depicted below fought pitched battles in the moment of the street that embedded layered meanings from the past as a kind of temporal reflexivity. Their peer violence constituted a cultural repertoire for the production of their legitimacy as (adult) men.

Methodology

The data considered below was collected for a two year study of masculinities and violence in several cities of Java. The broader project was a funded multi-method investigation of masculinity and violence in two Asian countries[75]. Studies in Java

[75] Project: Nilan, P., Broome, A., Demartoto, A., Nayar, K.R., Doron, A. and Germov, J. (2008-2010) "Masculinities and violence in Indonesia and India", Australian Development Research Award funded by AusAID.

included fieldwork observation as well as interviews with local men, NGOs and key informants. A focus group with young men was conducted in the city of Solo.

Observational notes and transcripts were analysed and cross-referenced, then selected quotes were translated into English by the author. The project built on earlier research with youth in Central Java conducted by the author between 2005 and 2008. At that time it was concluded that conflicts between young men occurred when apparent or real affront necessitated defense of honor, religious principles, territory or all three. Early observations of young men and peer fighting in Java were confirmed by later findings (see Nilan, Demartoto & Wibowo, 2011). This chapter uses observational, interview and focus group data from the masculinity and violence project to focus on schoolboy fighting in its spatial, temporal and symbolic dimensions.

Typically, the schools from which gangs come are not in the first rank of secondary education. Poorer institutions: technical training schools and Muslim boys' schools, appear to be the most common sites of schoolboy gang formation. Layers of graffiti reveal years of *geng* (gang) rivalry between certain schools. The cycle of spatial contestation encoded in *geng* graffiti articulates competing identity claims. While most encounters between rival gangs are primarily non-lethal, injury is quite common and death is not unknown.

Young men and civil violence in Java

The patriarchal order among Indonesian men is a hierarchy built on two distinct contrasts. The first contrast is between youth and maturity. Young men and older men in Java are perceived as corporeally and spiritually dissimilar (Nilan & Demartoto, 2012). This is neither a biological nor a social model of the body. Rather, a physical body of a certain age is thought to enable either a primal chthonic power or a refined higher power to manifest more readily (Nilan, Demartoto & Wibowo, 2011). Young Javanese masculinity is understood as unrefined, governed by *nafsu* (emotion and lust)

(Van Wichelen, 2009; Peletz, 1995). In keeping with these understandings, a key point to emerge from case study data was that being a young male is significant, for example,

> The most common form of violence is teenage boys fighting each other. (Slamet, 24, university student, Muslim, Solo, 24 July, 2009)

Teenage males are deemed in principle to be highly emotional and volatile,

> Those most likely to get involved in violence are young lads still at senior high school. They are adolescents and volatile. They can't control their emotions. (Zainuddin, 25, bank clerk, Muslim, Jakarta, 3 August, 2010)

Different expectations are held for the behaviour of younger and older men in Java. Older men, especially if they are married with children, are idealised as favouring a *halus* (refined, controlled) persona and presentation of self because they are closer in essence - both corporeal and spiritual - to divine entities. Conversely, young unmarried men are idealised as favouring a *kasar* (coarse, uncontrolled) persona and presentation of self because they are closer in essence to animals. In short, the young man is imagined as a conduit for powerful emotions - *nafsu* (Van Wichelen, 2009; Peletz, 1995), with the potential to explode into physical violence. This is neither a biological nor a social model of the body, but a physical body of a certain age through which either a primal chthonic power or a refined higher power is perceived to move more readily (Nilan, Demartoto & Wibowo, 2011). So young men are considered by nature to be more prone to spontaneous physical aggression.

A 2004 United Nations report on Indonesian civil violence found that clashes between groups of male youth were the single most important trigger for wider civil conflict (Varshney, Panggabean & Tadjoeddin, 2004). Similarly, Tadié's (2006) Jakarta study found that drug wars, civil militias, crime gangs and religious clashes accounted for much of everyday violence, but schoolboy rivalries also played a significant part. Using the French term *bande de jeunes,* Tadié (2006) describes *bandes* from different vocational and academic schools in Jakarta fighting each other regularly, moving strategically around on foot and in buses. The number of major schoolboy battles in any one year numbered around 200 and there were 26 deaths in 2000 (Tadié 2006, 48-55).

The second important contrast in hierarchies of masculinity is between classes (blurred with castes). A man interviewed in Jakarta identified the salience of economic marginality,

> There are fights and clashes among rival groups of men from the lower social class (...) Such men find it so hard, their emotions tend to overwhelm them quickly and they tend to get into fights. (J13, 32, soldier, married, Muslim, Jakarta, August 10, 2010)

As indicated above, the country demonstrates a wide gap between rich and poor so this is a significant claim that goes to the heart of tradition and culture. In Indonesia the fact that one man is poor and another rich is likely to be "ascribed" to a "status steeped in history" (Farid 2005, 170). In other words, the feudal past is the touchstone for explaining why one man in Indonesia struggles to support his family while another lives in luxury. Ancient feudal kingdoms of the archipelago drew a sharp distinction between aristocrats and peasants (Maulana & Situngkir, 2009). In Java, for example, aristocratic masculinity was celebrated as *halus* – refined, courtly and highly controlled – while peasant or lower class masculinity was constructed as *kasar* – "impolite, rough, uncivilized" (Geertz 1960, 232) – and likely to react violently. As Wulan (2009) demonstrates, even today members of Javanese aristocratic families, including young boys, are expected to show far more refined behavior than people of peasant origins, who might produce outbursts of rough, uncivilised behaviour throughout their lives. So it is assumed that any Indonesian male from a privileged background will behave in an orderly, peaceful manner because such behavior is expressive of high status masculinity, while any man from a background of poverty is likely to exhibit toughness, emotional volatility and physical aggression because of his peasant origins. These ideas came through strongly in the views of men in interviews. Their comments often sketched out the thesis of "compensatory" masculinity (Messerschmidt, 1993; Cavender, 1999), for example,

> A guy like that is accustomed to behaving that way. The first cause is hard difficulty in his life, such as no money, little education. That forms a hard character early on. So he always feels like he has nothing, and violence is the main way of getting satisfaction. (J2, 40, ex-prisoner, married, Muslim, Jakarta, August 12, 2010)

In summary, the data indicate that preference for physical fighting is considered to be the preserve of young men from working class or marginal backgrounds. Notably, the pugilistic schoolboy gangs studied by Tadié (2006) and Kadir (2012) were active in schools catering for boys from such a background.

The "buzz" of fighting

To gain a sense of the profound emotional engagement of young men in peer fighting, it is productive to examine an account told by an informant about his own experience of schoolboy violence,

> You know, once I was truly involved in violence with other boys. It started because of some graffiti aimed at us which was done by some guys that we knew were *geng* members. Yeah, so I was involved in that fight but I didn't get hurt because me and my friends ran away. I was keen to get away because I was scared that later, friends of the guys I had been fighting would bring the *geng* to really get me. Well, the police didn't get involved, there was no official report or anything. But I can tell you, my heart was really going like a hammer. I could hear it beating loud and fast. I was so scared that later when I got home I had an attack of the terrors. (Eko, 24, university student, Christian, Solo, 10 July, 2009)

Eko and his friends physically attacked some members of an opposing *geng* they deemed responsible for demeaning graffiti. It seems this was a brief, strategic strike against unwary opponents, since Eko and his friends were able to run away. However, they had been identified, so Eko expected a timely retaliation by the opposing *geng.* He does not say whether this happened, but focuses on how he felt. An "attack of the terrors" means uncontrollable shaking and crying. Yet even though the teenage Eko had been terrified at the time, looking back he told the story with some pride.

This is the kind of thrilling schoolboy gang experience that compensates for the emasculating boredom and humiliation of school, "participating in a schoolboy gang is seen by its members as a requirement for having fun and not missing out on the kinds of events that become legendary within the oral tradition of their local youth culture" (Kadir 2012, 357). As stories of collective risk and retaliation are told and retold over time, they make and remake the teller and his listeners as heroic young men. Being seen as "singularly male … is achieved in social relations and specific contexts" (Retsikas

2010, 484). Legitimate masculine gender construction in Java is accomplished rather than attributed, and it is constituted in particular places, at specific times.

Space and place

Public battles between rival schoolboy gangs are conducted in key places in the city, particularly transport, market and sports areas. Both sides in a dispute conduct seasonal campaigns to either gain control of territory or defend it. One informant included contested urban spaces in his list of common triggers for violent disputes,

> Disputes arise very often when a young man is drunk with his friends even though he may not intend to do that. Quarrels over women take place. There are also conflicts over motorbike parking areas, and *geng* battlegrounds. (Joko, 21, factory worker, Muslim, Solo, 27 July, 2009)

The latter two triggers are territorial disputes over specific urban spaces important to young men: designated areas for parking their motorbikes, and certain areas where schoolboy gangs regularly do battle, especially public transport hubs and terminals.

The collective noun for a gang in the national language *Bahasa Indonesia* is *geng*. *Geng* is a recent term derived from English, implying the iconic significance of gangs and gangsters in global popular culture. However, a local schoolboy *geng* in Central Java is quite different to a highly organised, long-lasting Latino gang in the USA or Europe (Feixa et al., 2008), for example. A Latino gang has a primarily socio-cultural identity and a criminal/business agenda with regional and even global reach. It comprises older and younger members, and may even have female members, while a schoolboy *geng* consists of aggressively-inclined male teenage peers defined by the name of a local school. Boys normally spend only a couple of years in the *geng*. Since their main activity is peer fighting, not involvement in organised "illegal activity", the typical Javanese schoolboy *geng* does not match what Klein (2005, 135) calls the "consensus Eurogang definition" of a gang. However, like other gangs, schoolboy *geng* members have a strong sense of themselves as a band of fighters challenging the odds in a hostile world. Moreover, in keeping with gangs worldwide, the cultural logic of the

geng indicates "an aggressive masculinity expressing values of respect and honor and condoning violence as a means to settle disputes" (Hagedorn, 2003), including informal ownership of public space. One of the young men in Java gave a useful explanation of this dynamic,

> If it's a matter of principle between one *geng* and another *geng,* when they meet, they'll clash. Or it will be the issue of territorial control between this *geng* and that *geng.* (Soemardi, 20, university student, Muslim, Solo, 27 July, 2009)

Soemardi implies that some areas of public space in Solo city are divided into territories, each ostensibly "owned" by a *geng* and liable to be contested by another *geng.*

Territorial domains are significant in terms of graduated distance from a schoolboy *geng* homebase. The immediate neighborhood in which the school is located is the inner sanctum. Even boys from the school who are not *geng* members rush to help defend it. Further away are public transport hubs, especially train and bus depots through which boys must pass each day. These are spaces routinely contested by opposing schoolboy gangs. Further away again, and less frequently traversed, are motorbike parking areas near sport stadiums, soccer fields and popular eateries. Battles may take place for control of these more distant spaces depending on the circumstances, the event and the time of day.

Some of the public transport areas become politicized by association. For example, one of the Muslim schoolboy gangs studied by Hatib Kadir in Yogyakarta used the term *jalur Gaza* (Gaza Strip) to refer to a public transport area where they fought with Christian schoolboys (Kadir 2009, 8-11). Another Muslim schoolboy group took its name, an acronym, from a politicized spatial metaphor. The Dr PAY gang is dedicated to handing out "strong medicine" to create a *DaeRah Pemuda Anti-Yahudi* (Anti-Jewish Youth Zone). This is a semantic claim to territory. The name Dr PAY makes reference to the Muslim Palestinian struggle against the Israeli state, as well as implying "payback", making someone "pay". The reference does not point to the active persecution of local Jews, since there are almost no Jewish people in Indonesia. Rather, in the objective to expel non-Muslims from a bounded urban space it serves as a symbolic assertion of Islamist identity. The Dr PAY *geng* routinely fights Christian and

other schoolboys in a public transport area that serves a number of schools (Kadir, 2012).

Schoolboy gangs model themselves on existing heroic paradigms of struggle (Kadir, 2010). In the development of the modern state of Indonesia, violent civil militias have a long and often romanticised history (Brown & Wilson, 2007; Anderson, 2001). For example, the independence struggle of the late 1940s is immortalised as a time of martyrdom and swashbuckling heroism for the young freedom fighters. "The cowboys stood in the middle of the road with revolvers on their hips and knives in their belts" (Idrus et al., 1968" 1). In accounts like these the youthful revolutionary hero of Indonesia was born (Vickers 2005, 98). Yet local struggles meant there was only rarely mass unanimity of purpose on the part of these young revolutionaries.

Taking the Central Javanese city of Solo between 1945 and 1950 as an example, within the local pro-communist movement there were many splinter factions with localised identities and objectives. Soejatno (1974, 102) reports in late 1945, "a variety of different laskar organizations sprang up in the towns and in the villages. Each laskar organization had its own particular form and style", tied to the place it came from. Although the many *laskar* groups joined together sometimes in the national independence struggle they also fought each other locally. Van Klinken (2007) notes the change in civil conflict after the 1998 move to democracy from a top-down, state-driven pattern of violence, to a pattern of lateral power struggles between different groups that echoes the fragmentation of local *laskar* groups during the independence struggle. Local "ethnoreligious identities" were reinvigorated and politicised after 1998, providing significant symbolic capital for those seeking status advancement through membership of place-based gangs, militias and Islamic *jihadi* movements (Brown & Wilson 2007, 8). This history of fragmented in-fighting is reflected today in the plethora of criminal gangs, political militias and *jihadi* cadres in the towns and cities of Java.

Heroic re-enactments of past victories in local space therefore reinforce a culture of masculine violence rooted in ancient and recent factionalism. Collective male youth violence in urban Java expresses a powerful "hypermasculine" identity in the present that references the heroic past. In terms of everyday confrontation, youthful members of local *jihadi* organisations create fear in inner-city streets, for example,

> Today *Laskar Jundullah* [local *jihadi* gang] were *berkonvoi* – motorbikes, trucks, banners going along the road. The young men were wearing the black and white Arab headcloth and black Arabic clothing. They were very loud and threatening. Ordinary locals seemed cowed by them and people were leaving the street and ducking off into side streets and lanes. People were saying, "Don't look at them, don't make contact". (Fieldnotes, Solo, 31 August 2007)

Central Java is renowned for Islamic radicalism (Ricklefs, 2008). Well-muscled young *jihadis* chanting loudly in Arabic and clothed as Middle-eastern warriors often take training runs through the streets of the major cities. This display of threatened aggression on the street signifies "symbolic domination" (Bourdieu, 2001) over inhabitants and achieves a temporary territorial sovereignty over public space. Such examples illustrate the significance of ontological struggles by marginalised and self-marginalising young men in Java to establish social respect, honour and status.

Temporal relations

As implied above, the time of youth for working class men is seen as characterised by a tendency to uncontrolled behaviour. Smith-Hefner (2005, 444) maintains males from non-aristocratic Javanese families were traditionally allowed to do more or less as they pleased during their childhood, presumably including fighting with each other. Unlike girls they were not expected to control their public behaviour. However, times have changed. The labour market demands more qualifications. Boys from poorer families who would have been working at the age of 12 just 50 years ago now stay at school until the age of 19 in the hope of getting a job. Just as time at school has been prolonged, so has the phenomenon of schoolboy fighting. A significant temporal dimension is the cycle of the school year. Senior boys come to occupy gang leadership positions only in their final, third year. In June of the following year they leave. A new set of senior boys then rises from the ranks to compete for leadership positions in early September. According to Kadir (2012) the peak fighting period is mid-to-late September. During this period new seniors in the gang demonstrate their authority and blood new gang members in battle. October through to December are characterised by major actions of attack and "retaliation" (Kadir 2009, 13). January through to March are quieter months. There is little fighting in April and May because the seniors are

involved in examinations. Nor is there much during the vacation period. In September the cycle begins again. Boys are rarely expelled from school for gang fighting unless a fatality results.

An important temporal dimension also inheres in initiation rituals associated with the yearly cycle of renewing the gang,

> At the start of term in a Muslim boys' high school in Yogyakarta, new boys demonstrate their interest in becoming *geng* members. There is an open-air canteen and lunch area that is dominated and controlled by seniors. The new boy aspirants tackle each other, physically bully smaller boys and use strong language to attract attention. If they impress with their tough attitude they can be selected to undergo the initiation ritual. A boy has to fight for three minutes against seven to ten older *geng* members at once. A senior acts as timekeeper. The point of attack is the face using *pukul dan tendang* (fists and kicks). The initiation test is rarely failed because the *geng* needs new members each year. (Fieldnotes taken by the author from discussion with Hatib Kadir, Yogyakarta, 20 November 2009)

There are a number of important points here. First, this is a ritual of transition that signals a move from one state to another. Through the transformative physical violence of the attack, the boy moves from one stage in the life course (still a child) to the next (neophyte adult warrior). Second, in the moment when a new boy rises to his feet, reborn as a potential man and a warrior, the gang is also reborn as a fighting force with recruits who have corporeal knowledge of violence and suffering. Third, we should note the time limit of three minutes, and the appointment of a timekeeper. Both limit damage. Moreover, the number three has a sacred meaning in Java. For instance, the number three is significant when a youth is accepted to study Sufi-influenced martial arts,

> After taking the oath, the student takes a *sirih* leaf, dips it into a glass of water blessed by the guru, and drops water three times into his or her right eye. The water is then applied three times to the right arm and hand, the forearm and shin, and the same procedure is followed for the left side. The water is dripped into the eye to sharpen one's vision and to "cleanse" one's sight in order to look upon the world in a just manner. The repetition of the ritual cleansing during the *kecer* is held to be cognate with the ablutionary prescriptions of the Islamic faith, hence the procedure being repeated three times. (Wilson 2011, 314)

Indonesian schoolboy *geng* initiation can be understood as both as a symbolic rite of passage to an advanced cultural repertoire of violence, and entry to an intense episode in the transition to adult masculinity, one characterised by the experience of risky pleasures. In the heroic, symbolic world of the schoolboy *geng,* boys can "build a

meaningful relationship with social time" (Leccardi 2006, 16) through connecting themselves imaginatively to the mythical past and the local present. However, for most there is no future in peer fighting because it ends at the end of school,

> I fought a lot when I was at junior and senior high school with my peers. But after I enrolled in university I didn't do that any more. (Hasan, 30, traditional martial arts enthusiast, Muslim, Jakarta, 5 August, 2010)

The distinctive structures of school life that provided opportunities and reasons for peer fighting are no longer there. The young man enters the male adult realm of paid work, even if his main activity is looking for work. He is no longer all day with his age peers. Obtaining a desirable apprenticeship or job requires neat clothing and good manners. Paid work demands long hours. Finding and keeping a girlfriend requires steady, responsible behavior. In short, a completely different set of social and cultural conditions prevail that do not favour peer fighting. Neither employers nor university authorities are tolerant of young men who regularly get into fights.

The temporal boundary between schoolboy fighting and the adult world of work, in that sense, confirms Messerschmidt's (1993) thesis about the transformative force of paid work in men's lives. Whereas in the past there might have been persuasive political and ideological reasons why some middle class young men would continue to be involved in militant groups well into adulthood, those reasons have largely faded as Indonesia moved into full democracy and the middle class expanded exponentially. The exception is radical Muslim groups. In such groups schoolboys can proceed to become life initiates.

Symbolic dimensions

In the legend of how the magical warrior *Sengkuni* rose to power, and in many other tales from the *Majapahit* period in Java, a process of transformation takes place. The immature boy or young man is transformed into the mature, supernaturally-endowed warrior. In schoolboy gangs and street gangs in the modern era this process of

transformation into the warrior may take the form of initiation. The goal of strength and immunity in battle through a symbolic shedding of blood seems to inform initiation rituals such as that described by Kadir above. The rite is a painful ordeal for the applicant. Older gang members do not hold back from delivering blows and kicks to the boy on the ground, who curls up and uses his hands to protect his face. He must demonstrate stoic endurance to fulfill the symbolic value of "suffering" (Dillabough & Kennelly 2010, 114) as a component of legitimate gang identity. Endurance of the physical attack prepares the novitiate for fear and pain in battle. Blood and bruising mark his body as a warrior. Reborn through the ritual, he is taken up (wounded and bleeding) on the leader's motorbike and given specialised knowledge about enemies and territory to be defended. Subsequently the boy must answer questions about gang leaders at the enemy schools. Later in the first set of battles he must prove himself to be knowledgeable and skillful in combat.

At the same time, the Yogyakarta school gang initiation rite described above resembles the Chicano gang initiations in America described by Vigil (1996) and Husted (2008), among many others. Husted maintains that violent gang initiation "can be viewed as a form of rebirth: the pre-initiation individual is ritually murdered and a new gang member is born" (Husted 2008, 6). Yet while global discourse of gangs and gangsterism may be a point of reference, there are local mythic sources too. For example, the Javanese warrior *Gatotkaca* possessed supernatural strength, invulnerability and bravery only after he was magically reborn. As *Jabang Tutuka* (the young *Gatotkaca*) he had the powerless body of a boy child still attached by the umbilical cord, which had to be cut. It bled. "The weaker body, represented by Jabang Tutuka, must be destroyed … the body is brought back to life as the hero Gatotkaca" (Weintraub 2004, 110). *Gatotkaca* has long been a popular choice for warrior symbolism in Java. For example, first President Sukarno held up *Gatotkaca* as a brave and loyal model for young activists in newly independent Indonesia (Anderson 1965, 28). Later under the New Order government, young men experienced "discursive and social pressures to exist as 'strong males' modelled after Gatotkaca" (Sunardi 2009, 464). Desire for invulnerability in battle through a symbolic shedding of blood echoes the *Gatotkaca* transformation and might well inform the schoolboy *geng* initiation ritual described above. In a study of sorcery in Java, Retsikas (2010, 490) notes that through

ritual, the sorcerer "is said to achieve a self capable of deliberately destroying others through becoming hyper-masculine".

To grasp the way young men experience themselves subjectively in such battles, it must be remembered that the concept of Javanese personhood distinguishes between humans and animals using some of the same terms used to distinguish older and younger men. Javanese are not surprised if young men exhibit coarse, even animalistic behaviour. An account by one young informant used animal symbolism to describe the violent anger of his classmates,

> It [the dispute] can't be resolved mutually except by fighting … they just snarl, "I'll rip your head off!" They growl like that. They only want to offer that face because they are so worked up. (Herry, 21, apprentice plumber, Solo, 3 December 2009)

Herry used verbs that translate as "snarl" and "growl", reiterating understandings of youthful Javanese men as embodying animalistic tendencies (see Peletz 1995, 88). As explained above, the wild and volatile personhood of young unmarried men (Scherer, 2006) is of a different order to the personhood of married older men who embody reason, restraint and moderate behavior (Brenner, 1995; see also Sutarto, 2006). Several informants implied young men had a short fuse, for example,

> If a lad gets teased or made fun of he becomes very angry and straight away starts to fight. (Joko, 21, factory worker, Muslim, Solo, 27 July, 2009)

As stated earlier, the schoolboy fighters studied by Kadir (2012) came from working class and lower middle class families. Herry also confirmed in his account that it was not schoolboys from high status backgrounds in Solo who routinely fought each other, but lads from poorer backgrounds,

> What I observed from my friends is that kids from technical school who were lower class liked to fight and drink strong liquor, they were without much money. Whereas the kids from higher classes they were running off to modify their motor bikes and playing around with girls … so it [whether you fight] probably depends how much money you have. (Herry, 21, apprentice plumber, Muslim, Solo, 3 December 2009)

In short, boys from privileged families already occupy a position of powerful masculinity through their wealth and display it symbolically through customised

motorbikes and girlfriends, whereas boys from poor backgrounds engage in physical struggles to achieve respect and honour from others. In the words of another informant, "we could say that the law of the street is that he who is strong will be he who wins" (Bara, 22, musician, Muslim, Solo, 3 December 2009). Both comments echo Messerschmidt's (1993) argument that violence may re-affirm a legitimate masculine identity for men who lack other means of demonstrating status and authority in their immediate social environment.

The final example of the symbolic dimension in schoolboy fighting comes from Muslim religious practice and the global Islamist struggle. As indicated above, Muslim schoolboy gangs blur Christian and Jewish faiths in their construction of symbolic boundaries. There was a marked symbolic dimension in the battle strategies of one Muslim schoolboy *geng* studied by Kadir (2012) that constructs the identity of boys as warriors of Islam. The term *shaf* refers to orderly rows of Muslim men engaged in *sholat* (prayer) in the mosque. In battle, *shaf* is an attacking strategy where the first line of troops is the bravest; the second line is for defence, and the third for control and back-up. The *geng* leader is in the third line, controlling the attacking line, and defending against an attack from behind. It is believed the strength of *shaf* determines victory in *tawuran* (fighting), just as the orderliness of prayer lines is believed to bring greater blessing (Kadir 2009, 12).

Similarly, the strategy of *kloter* refers to waves of Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca by plane. A *kloter* is a group position from which attack is launched in waves rather than lines. For defence, each position acts like a garrison, from outer defence to inner defence so that the garrison nearest the school has the strongest *kloter*. Another strategy - *ishlah* (reconciliation), is a temporary tactic of ceasing hostilities between opponent gangs for some larger strategic purpose, like combining to attack a third gang – a sociospatial alliance. These Islamist military strategies are taught to new members every year in September (Kadir 2012, 360) as part of the yearly cycle for that particular schoolboy gang.

Conclusion

Spatial, temporal and symbolic elements of schoolboy fighting in urban Java have been considered in this chapter. For teenage boys from aspirational lower middle class and working class families, legitimate masculine identity claims are established and defended through peer rivalry and fighting. However, this episode in the transition to adulthood is bounded in time by the end of high school, when they leave the institution. This excision reveals the temporal and spatial complexity of male youth identities constructed in peer violence.

The physical places and identity spaces attacked and defended in schoolboy battles transcribe territories of contested ownership. Threatening or occupying enemy or neutral space achieves symbolic domination within a discourse of masculinity that values physical prowess over negotiation. Gang life is not only a powerfully emotional experience involving risk, danger and pleasure, but operates on a symbolic and fantasy level so that heroic tales and myths of warfare are recreated. Referring to the work of Honneth (1997), schoolboy battles can be identified as relational practices of recognition. In the intersubjective space of violent encounter, the young men mutually recognise one another as warriors, foot soldiers engaged in a mythic battle for territory and honour in the urban setting. The fights themselves are territorial practices that constitute identity and protection of identity, brotherhood and control. The dynamics of power that inhere in schoolboy battles may be identified as relational, hierarchical, and instantiated through performance. Peer fighting employs modalities of violence within a transformative cultural repertoire that goes to the heart of sovereign practices of governmentality over urban spaces.

References

Anderson, Benjamin. 1965. *Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese.* Ithaca: Cornell University.

Anderson, Benjamin. 2001. *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2001. *The Individualized Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Becker, Howard. 1966. *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*. New York: Free Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. "La Domination Masculine." *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* 84: 2-31.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2001. *Masculine Domination.* Translated by Richard Nice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Brannen, Julia, and Ann Nilsen. 2007. "Young People, Time Horizons and Planning." *Sociology* 41: 153-160.

Bytheway, Bill and Julia Johnson. 1998. "The Sight of Age." In *The Body in Everyday Life,* edited by Sarah Nettleton and Jonathon Watson, 243-257. London: Routledge.

Brenner, Suzanne. 1995. "Why Women Rule the Roost: Rethinking Javanese Ideologies of Gender and Self-control." In *Bewitching Women, Pious Men: Gender and Body Politics in Southeast Asia,* edited by Aiwa Ong and Michael Peletz, 19-50. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Brown, David and Ian Wilson, 2007. "Ethnicized Violence in Indonesia: The Betawi Brotherhood Forum in Jakarta." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 13: 367-403.

Cavender, Gray 1999. "Detecting masculinity." In *Making trouble: Cultural Constructions of Crime, Deviance, and Control,* edited by Jeff Ferrell and Neil Websdale, 157-175. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Grangler.

Cohen, Albert 1955. *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang.* New York: Free Press.

Cohen, Phil. 1999. *Rethinking the Youth Question: Education, Labour and Cultural Studies*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Connell, Raewyn 1995. *Masculinities.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Dillabough, Joanne and Jacqueline Kennelly. 2010. *Lost Youth in the Global City: Class, Culture and the Urban Imaginary.* New York: Routledge.

Feixa, Carles, Noemi Canelles, Laura Porzio, Carolina Recio and Luca Gilberti, L. 2008. "Latin Kings in Barcelona." In *Street Gangs, Migration and Ethnicity,* edited by Frank van Gemert, Inger-Lise Lien and Dana Peterson, 63-78. Devon: Whillan Publishing.

Farid, Hilmar. 2005. "The Class Question in Indonesian Social Sciences." In *Social science and Power in Indonesia,* edited by Vedi Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae, 167–196. Jakarta: Equinox.

Geertz, Clifford. 1960. *The Religion of Java.* Glencoe: The Free Press.

Hagedorn, James. 2003. "Gang." In *Encyclopedia of Masculinities,* edited by Michael Kimmel and Amy M. Aronson, 329-331. New York: Sage.

Honneth, Axel 1997. *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts.* London: Polity.

Husted*,* Auni. 2008. "Street Baptism, Machismo and Inner-city Street Culture: Purity and Danger among Contemporary Chicano Gangs in Los Angeles." *Verge* 5: 1-16. 31st of March, www.goucher.edu/documents/verge/papers4/ant08.pdf.

Idrus. 1968. "Surabaja." Translated by Una Nababan and Benjamin Anderson. *Indonesia,* 5*:* 1-28.

Jones, Gavin. 2010. "Changing marriage patterns in Asia." Asia Research Institute Working Paper 131, Singapore: National University of Singapore. 2nd of March, http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/docs/wps/wps10_131.pdf.

Kadir, Hatib. 2012. "School Gangs of Yogyakarta: Mass Fighting Strategies and Masculine Charisma in the City of Students." *Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 13: 352-365.

Kadir, Hatib. 2009. "Youth and Political Gangsterism Post New Order: Gang Hostility and Mass Fighting among High School Students in Yogyakarta." Paper presented to Australia-Netherlands Conference on Growing Up in Indonesia: Experience and Diversity in Youth Transitions, 28-30 September 2009, Australian National University.

Kadir, Hatib. 2010. "GPK (Ka'bah Youth Squad): Islamic *Gangsterism* Facing Democracy and Civil Society." Paper delivered to the Workshop on Peace and Conflict ,February 2010, in Asia, Bangkok.

Klein, Malcolm, W. 2005. "The Value of Comparisons in Street Gang Research." *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 21:135-152.

Leccardi, Carmen. 2006. "Uncertainty, temporality and biographies in the New Century." In *A New Youth: Young people, Generations and Social Life,* edited by Carmen Leccardi and Elisabetta Ruspini,15-40. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Maulana, Ardian and Hokky Situngkir. 2009. “Study to Ancient Royal Bureaucracies in Indonesian Archipelago.” SSRN working paper. Social Science Research Network online. 14th of August, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1371313 [2011/08/14].

Messerschmidt, James. 1993. *Masculinities and Crime.* New York: Rowan & Littlefield.

Messerschmidt, James. 1994. “Schooling, Masculinities and Youth Crime by White Boys.” In *Men, Masculinities and Crime: Just Boys Doing Business,* edited by Tim Newburn and Elizabeth Stanko, 81-99. London: Routledge.

Nilan, Pam. 2009. “Contemporary Masculinities and Young Men in Indonesia.” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 37: 327-344.

Nilan, Pam and Argyo Demartoto, 2012. “Patriarchal Residues in Indonesia: Respect Accorded Senior Men by Junior Men.” *European Journal of Social Science* 31: 279-293.

Nilan, Pam, Argyo Demartoto and Agung Wibowo. 2011. “Young men and peer fighting in Solo, Indonesia.” *Men and Masculinities* 14: 132-153.

Peletz, Michael. 1995. “Neither Reasonable nor Responsible: Contrasting Representations of Masculinity in a Malay Society.” In *Bewitching Women, Pious Men: Gender and Body Politics in Southeast Asia,* edited by Aiwa Ong and Michael Peletz, 76-123. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Retsikas, Kostas. 2010. “The Sorcery of Gender: Sex, Death and Difference in East Java, Indonesia.” *South East Asia Research* 18: 471–502.

Ricklefs, Merle. 2008. “Religion, Politics and Social Dynamics in Java: Historical and Contemporary

Rhymes. In *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia,* edited by Greg Fealy and Sally White, 115-136. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Scherer, Savitri. 2006. “*Tuna Karya*, *Jilbab* and Cow-boy Hat: Youth in Suharto’s Indonesia as Reflected in the Works of Remy Sylado and Emha Ainun Nadjib.” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 34: 197–211.

Skelton, Tracy. 2002. “Research on Youth Transitions: Some Critical Interventions.” In *Young people in Risk Society,* edited by Mark Cieslik and Gary Pollock, 100-116. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Smith-Hefner, Nancy. 2005. “The new Muslim Romance: Changing Patterns of Courtship and Marriage Among Educated Javanese Youth.” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 36: 441–459.

Soejatno. 1974. “Revolution and social tensions in Surakarta 1945-1950.” Translated by Benjamin Anderson. *Indonesia* 17*:* 99-111.

Sunardi, Christina. 2009. “Pushing at the Boundaries of the Body: Cultural Politics and Cross-gender Dance in East Java.” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 165: 459-492.

Sutarto, Ayu. 2006. “Becoming a True Javanese: A Javanese View of Attempts at Javanisation.” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 34: 39-53.

Tadié, Jerome. (2006). *Les Territoires de la Violence à Jakarta.* Paris: Belin.

UNDP. 2008. *Human Development Report 2007/2008.* Washington: United Nations Development Program.

Van Klinken, Gerry. 2007. *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars*. London: Routledge.

Van Wichelen, Sonya. 2009. “Polygamy Talk and the Politics of Feminism: Contestations over Masculinity in a New Muslim Indonesia.” *Journal of International Women’s Studies* 11: 173-188.

Varshney, Ashutosh, Rizal Panggabean and Muhammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin. 2004. “Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia 1990-2003.” UNSFIR Working Paper - 04/03. Jakarta: United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery.

Vickers, Adrian. 2005. *A History of Modern Indonesia.* Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.

Vigil, James, Diego. 1996. “Street Baptism: Chicano Gang Initiation.” *Human Organization* 55:149-153.

Weintraub, Andrew. 2004. *Power Plays: Wayang Golek Puppet Theater of West Java*. Singapore: ISEAS.

Wilson, Ian. 2012. “The Biggest Cock: Territoriality, Invulnerability and Honour amongst Jakarta’s Gangsters. In *Men and Masculinities in Southeast Asia,* edited by Michele Ford and Lenore Lyons, 121-138. London: Routledge.

Wilson, Lee. 2011. “Beyond the Exemplary Centre: Knowledge, Power and Sovereign Bodies in Java.” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 17: 301-317.

Wulan, Nur. 2009. “Masculinities in Colonial Indonesian Children’s Literature.” *Explusultra* 1: 7–24. 4th of April, http://explusultra.wun.ac.uk/index.php/extra/test/23.

Part III

Young Protesters

Foreword

Carles Feixa

The third section of this volume focuses on ethnographic researches about what we can conceptualize as a "viral chronotope", that is, an accelerated and condensed time-space, which involves cosmopolitan youth in glocal arenas, expanding at different stages from social networks and *peripheral* sites to some economic, political and geographical *centres*, converging in a specific moment - the year 2011- and in a specific place – the occupation by youth of central squares and public places of many cities across the planet. This "viral chronotope" is an illuminating example of what has been defined by *agora* in the introduction to this volume. It concerns a physical place in the centre of the *polis*, traditionally used for commerce and social exchange, and suddenly occupied by people – mainly but not only young - who construct tents and try to create a precarious but vivid "micropolis" – a temporary *utopia*; a virtual place at the centre of the cyberspace, traditionally used for entertainment, social exchange and gossip, and suddenly collapsed by claims for protest and revolution; a political place where the *polis* becomes *politics*. This "viral chronotope" has (re)created a social actor that – according to *Time* magazine - became the protagonist of the year in 2011: the (Young) Protester.

According to the established rhetoric, the so-called "Outraged", or "Indignant" protests of 2011 started in Cairo (Egypt) on January 25, following the "viral" effect of the protests in Tunis in December 2010, and prefiguring a new wave of social revolts in many countries of the Arab Mediterranean – a tsunami known as the Arab Spring. Actually, there was an important precedent in Greece in December 2008, when some youth protests expressed for the first time the consequences of financial crisis and austerity policies in Europe. The Greek uprisings emerged again in 2011 in Athens, the city where both Agora and Democracy were invented twenty-five centuries ago. In May 15, 2011, the Spanish *Indignados*, viralized by their Eastern Mediterranean counterparts, occupied most of the Iberic squares. A similar protest emerged one month before in Portugal by the *Geração à Rasca* (Generation in Trouble). The following

summer in Chile, the decade-long student movement known as '*los Pingüinos'* (the Penguins) – due to the uniform used in high schools - was revitalized and become an expression of uprising against neoliberal policies in education. Similar uprisings also occurred in countries like the UK and Israel. The summer was "hot", with riots and occupations in the periphery and in the city centers. Finally, in the same year, September of 2011, this seeming Global Revolution arrived at the world's economic centre – Wall Street - expanding from there to other North American cities and to the rest of the planet (with particular expressions in Colombia and Brazil). Beyond the global village of co-terminous uprisings, the protesters meet in very local worlds: the central squares and streets of Athens (Syntagma), Cairo (Tahrir), Madrid (Sol), Barcelona (Catalunya), Santiago de Chile (Moneda), São Paulo (Viaduto do Chá), New York (Zuccotti) and Boston (Dewey), and so on. In these squares an evanescent "viral chronotope", the "corner chronotope" of the information age - was transmuted into a more stable - even though temporary - "utopian chronotope", a hybrid between body and agora chronotopes as described in the introduction.

Interpretations of this wave of "new new" social movements (Feixa, Pereira, Juris 2009) follow several analytical keywords including: "microblogging" (Loewenstein 2008), "precariat" (Standing 2011), "rhizomatic" (Castells 2012), "feral" (Harvey 2012), "technopolitical" (Datanalysis 15M 2012), "postcolonial" (Nair 2013), "hashtag generation" (Feixa 2014). Beyond the question of whether this trend should be conceived as a "movement" – a structural new cycle of protests - or as a "moment" – a conjunctural stage due to the quick viral diffusion, these uprisings of young people have been used as a potential laboratory for investigating the emergence of new social trends, including debate on whether they are post-modern, post-fordist, post-colonial, post-liberal, post-national, post-capitalist, or post-informational formations. In spite of the heterogeneity of local and national causes, roots and derivations, and acknowledging the diversity of social actors involved, what all these movements have in common is the centrality of one goal – "occupation" - and a significant way of communicating and constituting the event – "microblogging". Thus we can justify the use of a single label – the #Occupy movement.

The five chapters included in this section approach some specific 2011 chronotopes in seven countries on three continents: Greece, Egypt, Spain, Chile, Colombia, Brazil and the USA. In all the case studies, the starting point is the occupation of a physical

space - a school, a square, the streets - but also the occupation of the virtual space – blogs and social networks: the "viral chronotope". The central point is *aggregation,* the confluence of heterogenous people in face-to-face meetings: an "embodied chronotope". And the end point is more than *disgregation* – the dismantling of those precarious *utopias* by the security forces or by the protesters themselves. The end point is the multisited proliferation of new time-spaces through the global city – a "rhizomatic chronotope". The appropriation of schools (Greece) and universities (Colombia), the occupation of central squares (Egypt and Spain) or semi-central (USA) squares and avenues (Chile, Brazil) generate "micro-utopian" communities where the "dialogical imagination" can be practiced. These are "occupied chronotopes".

The first chapter by Yannis Pechtelidis explores forms of knowledge that emerged from the anti-austerity mobilisations in Greece in 2011, with a particular focus on the students' occupation of secondary schools. Those events are seen in correlation to the youth uprisings in 2008 that followed the killing of Alexis Grigoropoulos. The author argues that physical space is still highly politically significant in late modernity. The relationship between space and power is two-fold; it has the dual function to both control and liberate people. Pechtelidis analyses the hegemonic discursive antagonism between the authorities and the students, addressing it as a "battle of signifiers". The density of space contrasts with the fluidity of time: the occupations lasted one entire academic year, and were connected to a cycle of protests that started three years earlier. Schools were appropriated by the pupils who created their own territory, far from adult control and surveillance. This "occupied chronotope" was very local and micropolitical in that the space was related to young people's daily life. However, at the same time it was very global and political - a space that connected this generation to broad social issues like the national financial crisis and the wave of global protests.

The chapter by José Sanchez-García explains the Arab Spring from the observation point of two specific sites: one peripheral – the *hara* or popular neighbourhood – and one central – the *midam* or the main square. The author explores the interconnection between mental and physical space through the everyday practices of occupancy and corporeality. In this case the focus is on another "occupied chronotope", one much more visible than Greek high schools: Tahrir - the central square of Cairo - in the 18 intense days that followed the January 25 revolution. This was a liminal time in which it was renamed Revolution Square. The extreme visibility of this space – not only to the

country and to the political elites but to the whole world that acknowledged Tahrir as the temporary capital of this global city - contrasted with the invisibility of young people in their daily lives. Based on previous fieldwork, the author returns to other less visible urban chronotopes where the Tahrir Revolution was conceived: the *mulid* and the *cafés*. In the *mulid* celebration, a popular religious local ritual, boys join up the irreverent and the serious; the dance permits the stopping of space and time. This "body chronotope" was connected to a "corner chronotope" – the cafés with their virtual cyberterritories. Both counter-cultural forms of dissidence – the *mulid* and the *cafés* - prefigured the meanings of the *midam* in Tahrir Square, the 18 days of vivid sit-in, a space without centralized supervision, where all the social groups could be present and work together to create a space/time for political discussion and lived experience: the occupation of Tahrir transformed the square into an "agora chronotope".

The chapter by Jordi Nofre analyses the #SpanishRevolution through the lens of some geographical and demographic dialectics. Using geolocation data, the author sees the occupations as a struggle between urban, young, modern Spain and rural, old, traditional Spain. The "tent cities" of the occupations are placed in their context – at local, regional, national and international levels. To occupy a square and take over major streets challenges the domination of space by the hegemonic political authorities of the inner city. Like in Tahrir, the occupations of Sol and Catalunya Squares were "agora chronotopes" where the confluence of juvenile actors expressed political counter-hegemonic discourses. Nevertheless, the Spanish occupations were more extended in time (more than two months), in space (more than a hundred cities in all the country), and had less visible political consequences. The eventual violent expulsion of occupiers and demonstrators constituted a highly visible sequel to the pattern in European *banlieues* of criminalizing youth because they are youth. This operates by means of post-Fordist processes. The increased precarity of everyday life, not only for young working class people, but for young middle class people, must be acknowledged as one of the main causes of the European Spring occupations.

The chapter by Oscar Aguilera interprets the student movement in Chile in the context of cycles and repertoires of mobilization and protest. The author traces back the roots of '*la Revolución Pingüina*' (the Penguin revolution) - that reached public attention in the summer of 2011 - to repertoires of collective action and youth movements in Chile after the end of the dictatorship. Though a process of inter-

generational dialogue, those repertoires were transmitted between student leaders and pupils of different age-grades, creating a "politics of youth culture" rooted in the "traditional culture" of street movements, but also in the innovative culture of emerging "new new social movements". In contrast with Greece, the movement did not focus on school occupations but on marches to and through central avenues. This new repertoire of *rhizomatic* forms of protest multiplies from emergent conflicts. These new forms of protest focus on different audiences for the action and are widely identified as youth movements.

The chapter by Liliana Galindo compares two movements that emerged during the same 2011 period: the *MANE* in Colombia and *Ocupa Sampa* in Brazil. The first is a student movement that has similarities with the cases of Greece and Chile. The second is an urban movement that mixes local factors with many of the symbolic elements of the #Occupy movement. The study focuses on the political uses of the internet, analysing battles for visibility in the streets and on the net. The concept of the "network chronotope" is used to understand the hybrid forms that integrate online and offline spatio-temporalities. Comparing activity graphs based on the Facebook sites of both movements, a multicentered and a multitemporal social reality emerges: a mixture between several centres and peripheries and between several past-present-future moments, that creates a new microcosm, a new interpretive framework for the protests, shared by the activists and sometimes by the surrounding society. This is a kind of micro-utopia where young people can imagine that other worlds are possible.

Last but not least, the chapter by Jeffrey J. Juris focuses on the movement that became the signifier for the viral chronotope – #Occupy. He does so through the specific microcosm of what actions succeeded in a big but not strictly global city – Boston, USA. Social movements operate through multiple temporalities and across diverse spatial terrains. Based on his previous fieldwork research about the alterglobalization movement, and on an ethnographic account of the Boston camp, the author compares two logics: the first one – the *logic of networking* - characterized the alterglobalization movement and involved constant social media activism and periodic mass actions; the second one – the *logic of aggregation* - characterized the #Occupy movement and involves the assembling of masses of *individuals* from diverse backgrounds within concrete physical spaces, taking advantage of powerful "small-world" effects to generate massive viral communication flows (Postill 2014). The

occupations were liminal spaces where participants put into practice alternative values related to direct democracy, self-organization, and egalitarianism. They were fighting for the "small slice of utopia we are creating" as one of the campers expressed it.

In all the chapters there is triangular connection between the physical or formal centre of the cities – the square, central streets, public school buildings, the centre of cyberspace where actors and information viralized – the social web, and the centre of the institutions against whom the protesters react –the *panocticum*. What maintains the unity of this triangle are the internal personal and social ties among protesters – the rhizome - and also external labelling discourses and practices – the neoliberal penal state stigmatization of being young. Despite using different sources of information - written and online documents, interviews, geolocation data, historical accounts, multisided and focused ethnography - to investigate those "insurgent encounters" (Juris and Khasnabish 2013), all the authors in this section approach the "occupied chronotope" from a dialogical perspective: through the "gates" that connect the protesters, the audience and the researchers. These gates could be ignored, closed or destroyed, but during the intense days of the occupations were used as a *rite of passage* from absence to public presence: these gates became the "spaces of experience" (Pleyers 2010) for the #Occupy movement.

References

Castells, M. 2012. *Networks of Outrage and Hope*. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press.

Datanalysis 15M, 2013. *Technopolitics. The Potential of Connected Multitudes*. Barcelona: UOC. Accessed August 30, 2014. http://datanalysis15m.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/technopolitics-15m-summary.pdf.

Feixa, C. 2014. *De la Generación@ a la #Generación. La Juventud en la Era Digital*. Barcelona: NED.

Feixa, C., Pereira, I. and Juris, J. S. 2009. "Global Citizenship and the 'New, New' Social Movements." *Young* 17(4): 421-442.

Harvey, D. 2012. *Rebel Cities*. London and New York: Verso.

Juris, J.S. and Khasnabish, A. eds. 2013. *Insurgent Encounters*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Loewenstein, A. 2008. *The Blogging Revolution*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Naïr, S. 2013. *¿Por qué se Rebelan? Revoluciones y Contrarrevoluciones en el Mundo Arabe*. València: Clave Intelectual.

Postill, J. 2014. "Democracy in an Age of Viral Reality." *Ethnography* 15 (1): 51-69.

Pleyers, G. 2010. *Alterglobalization*. London: Pluto.

Standing, G. 2011. *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*. London: Bloomsbury.

Chapter 11
Occupying school buildings in the Greece of *The Memorandum*: Discursive formations around pupils' political activism

Yannis Pechtelidis

Introduction

2011 was probably the hardest and most strenuous year since the beginning of the Greek debt crisis in 2008. It was the year it became evident that the austerity measures imposed by the first Memorandum[76] were unbearable; the heterogeneous social movement of the Greek "indignants" (*aganaktismenoi*) emerged; the Greek parliament passed the second austerity bill and protesters were violently subdued by the police; the government voted for a highly contested reform in higher education, and public spending on education and health was slashed.

There was a significant participation of pupils in the movements, culminating with a massive wave of school occupations in the fall of the same year. In particular, almost immediately after the beginning of the school year, serious problems such as the lack of books and scarcity in teaching personnel inhibited everyday school life. Pupils

[76] The 2010–12 Greek protests began on 5 May 2010, sparked by "The Memorandum": a plan to cut public spending and raise taxes as austerity measures in exchange for a €110 billion bail-out, aimed at solving the 2010–2011 Greek debt crisis. On 29 June 2011, violent clashes occurred when the Greek parliament voted to accept the EU's austerity requirements.

responded through massive mobilizations that took the form of participation in assemblies, voting, demonstrations and school occupations. The spread of school occupations, in particular, was massive (over 700 occupied schools), and lasted almost the entire fall-trimester. Here we must take into account that the same phenomenon also occurred during the previous year, albeit on a smaller scale. School occupations and student movements are not something new; nevertheless, it is interesting to look at this form of political protest in the context of the current economic crisis. What differentiates protests and occupations in 2010 from 2011 is their agenda against The Memorandum. Thus the pupils' struggle is part of a broader series of local struggles, that emerged and multiplied due to the dislocation of the social and economic web in Greece; a result of the global monetary crisis, and the implementation of the bailout plan and subsequent austerity measures.

This chapter explores forms of knowledge produced around the significant 2011 school occupations and mobilizations. The occupations inaugurated a discursive struggle about their meaning and the prospects of dealing with them. This created antagonism amongst divergent discourses, each producing a specific understanding of the situation, and proposing a way to handle it. Hence, those discourses competed for hegemony; to prevail as "the truth."

This chapter addresses the following questions:

- How were the school occupations and pupils' political activism discursively constructed?
- Which discourses informed the attitudes towards pupils' mobilizations?
- What were the consequences of such discursive constructions?
- Which discourses did the state, the political parties, the media, sociological theorising, and the pupils themselves articulate?
- What meanings were established and excluded?

- Did different discourses define the nodal points in different ways, so that there was a struggle to fix meanings in terms of one discourse rather than another?
- Which meanings were taken for granted across different discourses?
- What subject positions and identities were discursively constructed?

Discourse analysis

The concept of discourse is used here as a methodological tool for developing a theory on the relationship between knowledge about pupils' occupations and the diverse forms of social control imposed upon both young people and adults. By focusing on discourses about the occupations and other forms of youth political mobilization, we may explore which subject positions and experiences are open to them, and accordingly, which subject positions belong to the adults. Discourse analysis allows us to explain how and why only certain statements about childhood and youth and their correlation to adulthood, schooling, politics, public life etc. are taken as "natural" and are considered true, whereas others are not (Phillips and Jorgensen 2009). According to discourse theory (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Torfing 1999; Howarth 2000; Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis 2000), the truth, the subjects and the relation between them, are constructed within the discursive field; access to an objective truth is therefore impossible. As reality is always already mediated by various discourses, discourse per se becomes the object of analysis.

Discourses are a form of representing a specific topic such as pupil mobilization, occupation of school buildings, young people's politics, childhood and youth; hence they produce particular forms of knowledge about their topic of interest.

Such knowledge affects social practices, and has real consequences for the subjects involved. For example, the hegemonic discourses that were articulated by the school, the media, researchers, and political parties about the occupations and the competence of children and youth to participate in public life, determine how adults who drew from those discourses, handled the young people who participated in the mobilizations. In brief, discourses are a means of imposing power on subjects, in this instance youth or children. The purpose of analyzing various discourses of the school occupations is therefore to expose dominant beliefs and ideas about children's and youth's political activity and their entitlement to participate in public life. The analysis attempts to uncover broader underlying symbolic structures, and to explore the social consequences of such representations about childhood and youth politics in late modernity.

It is acknowledged that the limits between the terms 'childhood' and 'youth' are blurred and indiscernible, because they are constructed in various ways in different discursive and social contexts. Precisely because they are social constructions, they bear different social connotations according to their discursive use. It is not by chance that, in this case, adults (state school authorities, politicians, journalists, and parents) tended to define pupils who occupied the school buildings mainly as children, recalling dominant discourses about childhood. In the social context of dominant discourses, 'childhood' produces negative connotations such as immaturity, incompetence, lack of skills, dependence, etc., which justify and legitimize the intervention of adults on children's bodies to control and regulate them according to specific ethical-political criteria.

In order to bring the discursive construction of pupils' political activism to the fore there is focus on statements about school occupations in the fall trimester of 2011.

Statements were collected from a variety of sources such as university students, pupils, teacher's organizations, blogs, various Internet posts, TV and radio interviews, and articles in newspapers. These statements (posts, texts and declarations) were analysed by employing discourse analysis (Foucault 1989; Laclau and Mouffe 1985) in search of the various discourses inscribed into these texts. A central task is to unveil the drive of hegemonic as well as non-hegemonic discourses to exert ideological influence, and to unmask power relations and the domination they entail. Hence, the chapter traces the limits of these discourses, and acknowledges their conceptual discontinuities, in order to contest their power over youth.

The chapter commences by critically presenting prevalent interpretations of youth participation in school occupations and social mobilisations in Fall 2011. Subsequently analysis is presented of the formation and consequences of the discourse articulated by pupils about these occupations and political mobilisations in general. In accordance with the "new sociology of childhood" (James and Prout 1997) and "youth studies" (Furlong 2013), childhood and youth are acknowledged as historical and social constructions. The purpose is to expose and challenge the hypotheses produced by hegemonic or counter-hegemonic discourses around concepts of childhood and youth.

Moreover, the relationship between space and power will be explored. It will be argued that physical space is still highly politically significant in late modernity (Gordon et al. 2000; Furlong and Cartmel 2007; Gordon 2010; Rheingans and Hollands 2013). It is a popular claim that virtual experiences have reduced the significance of physical space. Based both on empirical data and theoretical insights that assertion by famous sociologists such as Beck and Giddens, and elsewhere in the youth studies literature, can be challeged. We will see that the built environment of the school played a vital role in the pupils' occupation movement in both political and practical ways.

Thus the chapter attempts to explain the political significance of the occupations, and to locate thinking about the 2011 occupation movement within a wider sociological debate about the dynamics and limitations of young people's politics in late modernity. We must take into account the relevant literature on the political participation of children and youth, as well as changing political values and young people's relationship to educational space.

Occupying School

School occupations, obstructing lessons and recurrent demonstrations during the hours the pupils were supposed to be in class, provoked serious social preoccupation, which caused, in turn, the intervention of school authorities and the state. The occupations were described as anti-social behavior, and fear of anomie was strategically implied to present the mobilizations as a form of social pathology with serious consequences for pupils and society in general. State officials, representatives of pro-Memorandum political parties, and the majority of the media, treated the occupants as delinquents, which eventually led to the suppression of the mobilizations. In what follows we will see that fragments of heterogeneous discourses, which have been integrated into a cohesive narrative, and have formed a hybrid hegemonic discourse, helped construct the occupants' identity in a particular light.

Notice, for example, the following statement by the under-secretary of education (at the time) Evi Christofilopoulou on Greek public television:

> I respect and understand the bitterness and quandary in the pupils' families. But to occupy a school in protest is not right. There are other peaceful means of protest. That is what democracy is all

about. Today pupils close the schools; but afterwards they will need to go to school on Saturday, to replace every single school-hour they lost, both for their own sake and for the benefit of education.

I shall refer to a couple of recent events that occurred during the weekend. If you visited the 5th Zografou[77] High School you would encounter a tragic picture. You would see the gym demolished along with other destructions. At the 8th Patisia[78] High School all the computers were stolen from the lab. There has been a burglary! And of course similar incidents happened in other schools all over the country.

We must discuss the problems in education; it is normal that there will be some kind of opposition, but I really do not understand why the schools have to be closed. Eventually this will turn against the pupils. The occupants, who are merely a minority, only bring harm upon themselves.

In recent years school occupations in October have become something of a trend. I have to admit that occupations have been more widespread this year due to reasons you [the anchor] have already mentioned. But we are dealing with a dangerous situation here! I should mention that at schools in two cities, Ioannina and Patras, we have recorded alcohol consumption.

Authorities ought to be notified in such cases. School personnel have the obligation to inform the authorities on occasions like this. It is impossible for the Ministry of Education to be present at every school

(NET, October 10, 2011).

Subsequently in a radio broadcast the secretary of education (during that period) Anna Diamantopoulou demanded an immediate stop to vandalism at occupied schools:

The issue that emerged at a school in Komotini was merely the triggering event and not the cause; besides it is not the first time for such a thing to happen. Nevertheless, it is the first time school occupations are so widespread. The initial estimation of the damages is 100.000 euros. You face the image of a destroyed school - computers on the floor, wrecked furniture, writing on the walls everywhere - and no one is held responsible.

All this is happening in a small town, where it would be easy to instantly notify the police, the authorities, and the principal; but nobody is arrested and no charges are pressed. This is a major issue. [...] over the last few years occupations emerge customarily at the beginning of each school year, when children between 13 and 16 years of age simply decide to shut the school down and inhibit the educational process. There are specific groups at certain schools who are responsible for the occupations. No one can just go and occupy a school; moreover, such behavior cannot remain unpunished. This is why, at the beginning of the school year, we specifically sent an administrative circular, which clarified that school councils and committees (consisting of parents, teachers, and a representative of the pupils) are responsible for dealing with this problem; it is their responsibility to decide what to do. This is a basic duty of a democratic school [...]

Occupations entail dangers [...] pupils will also be held punishable. It must be clarified that this kind of discipline is not authoritarian; it is just how society works

(Papamattheou, 2011).

Evident in the statements by the secretary and the under-secretary of education is the government approach to the occupations which drew on a discourse on juvenile delinquency. Deviance is the nodal point around which various other signifiers are articulated: “vandalism”, “anomie”, “financial default”, “loss of school hours”, “disruption of order”. State school authorities ascribed a delinquent identity to the

[77] An Athens neighborhood.

[78] Another Athens neighborhood.

pupils in the mobilizations; they were seen as troublemakers, rabble-rousers, anti-social, indifferent or bad at school. Supportive teachers were considered instigators, accomplices, or serving their personal interests or the interest of their political party. In this framework, the state appears as an omniscient subject that dictates the proper ways to protest, and ordains that the deviants be punished. The discourse of delinquency underscores the importance of protecting and restoring order for the sake of society and the individual. School occupations are, therefore, seen as a threat to the pupils' future careers as well as a sign of institutional and adult incapacity to effectively control youth. The moral incentive behind this discourse is to maintain order, and the means to achieve it are discipline and punishment.

Aspects of this discourse of delinquency included: threats to call the police and press charges, prosecution of pupils for obstructing regular school life and the indictment of parents held responsible for their children's actions. Also relevant were advance notices and warnings to teachers considered lax or non-compliant, and blackmail by the Ministry of Education that it would ban school excursions and enforce classes on weekends and holidays (to make up for lost school time). These strategies aimed at reassuring public opinion and restoring order and adult authority. They were hardly criticized at all by the majority of the media. Moreover, the media often reinforced the image of the delinquent child, focusing on those cases where behavior contradicted the nostalgic ideal of children's inherent innocence (Such, Walker and Walker 2005, 303; Ennew 1994; West 1999). It is interesting, however, to examine convergences and variations in the assessment of the occupations by different political parties.

In particular, Aris Spiliotopoulos, the Head of the Education Sector of New Democracy (a conservative party, and the main party of opposition at the time), made an

appeal to stop the occupations. Mr. Spiliotopoulos asked pupils to keep schools open, while professing that "the government is hugely responsible for the current degradation in education". He underlined the duty of the government to protect public buildings from the rage of the occupants, implying that school occupations are a form of delinquency, which he strategically attributed to outsiders. In this way he did not consider the political dimension and the social causes of this particular practice (school occupations), and furthermore he failed to take into consideration the occupants' demands:

> The school year started without basic resources; there was no appropriate teaching material, and hardly enough staff. Instead of books, pupils were told to use photocopies, notes and dvds, and there were thousands of vacant teaching positions, all because of the inefficiency and the lack of organization by the Ministry of Education.
>
> This unprecedented situation was exacerbated by school occupations, the loss of teaching hours, but also by incidents of destructive rage against public buildings; this is happening under conditions of unparalleled ferocity, provoked not by the pupils, but by instigators from outside and by anarchist agitators. Such incidents don't honor our History, our Education, or our Culture; besides they curb the struggles and efforts made by all those pupils who aspire to a better education. Even more, those events have been a shock to everybody in this country.
>
> The damages inflicted upon the occupied school buildings by various instigators (...) usually cost us tens of thousands of euro. There are quite a few questions to be answered by the political leadership at the Ministry of Education: What measures are taken to protect public school property? What is being done so that the offenders will be held accountable, especially in the current economic situation? And how will our schools become safe again for both pupils and teachers?
>
> However, there are political responsibilities for the current mess in education. The pupils and their parents are the last to blame. For this reason, in sympathy for the difficulties they are facing, we appeal to the pupils to return to their classes and to keep schools open.
>
> (Spiliotopoulos, 2011)

Equally interesting was the stance of DIMAR, a social-democratic party, that (although it voted against The Memorandum) distanced itself from the other anti-Memorandum parties of the Left, SYRIZA and KKE. In a press statement on the school occupations, DIMAR criticized the government for its stance on education; however, it stressed that schools must remain open to facilitate dialogue about the problems in education between pupils and school bodies. It is also implied that school occupations are a form of delinquency. The DIMAR party youth wing expressed apprehension about the protests, but declared that:

> We consistently advocate that schools need to stay open. Pupils should be in their classrooms, and struggle for improvements in education through dialogue with their teachers, and by employing the lawful means available to them […]
>
> The new school year began with the usual shortage in teaching staff, but this year's "new school" (in summer the government passed a very controversial reform in education) arrived with a surprise-shortfall: The "new school" was inaugurated without any books, which is the exclusive responsibility of the government and the competent authorities.
>
> (DIMAR, 2011)

The discourse on delinquency was articulated within a certain discourse about childhood and adolescence. Youth delinquency was explained in emotive terms such as anger, rage, spontaneity, uncontrolled feelings, unpredictable emotional vicissitudes, immaturity, and irresponsibility. In this framework, children and adolescents are understood to be driven by impulse rather than reason; consequently, they are considered incomplete, imperfect, weak, dangerous but also in danger, and incapable of expressing rational judgment or participating in public life. In other words, they are discursively constructed as emotional, irrational, and therefore menacing. For this reason they need adult guidance, caretaking and education, and they are socially marginalized and excluded from the realm of politics. This pigeonholing further magnifies the supposed threat posed by youth, and so adult intervention becomes an imperative. This discourse also describes school occupiers in derogatory terms; as children they are considered inherently weak, lacking judgment, suggestible, and easily influenced and directed by adults, who use them to serve their own individual, trade union, or party interests. The following example is telling of the dominant position held by the media:

> At many schools all over Greece occupations continue under the direction and influence of the parties of the Left, especially the Workers' Militant Front (PAME) that belongs to the Communist Party (KKE). As a result, things are getting out of hand with all the vandalism and destruction; and this at very dire times, both financially and psychologically, when the country is desperately trying to recover.
>
> The Left in Greece sees this difficult juncture as a "revolutionary condition", and tries to stir up the "revolutionary" process to overthrow the system. Ergo, we witness an unprecedented series of trade unionist interventions in schools. Children - that is minors - are instructed to occupy schools primarily by the Workers Militant Front, who still seem to believe that pupils are the gears in the boisterous train of the revolution!...

> It must be a real novelty to defend education by suspending it, because, by closing a school, you invalidate it. It is obvious that underage pupils are not completely aware, nor can they be held fully responsible for their actions; this is why they are supervised by their families and the state, and NOT THE WORKERS' MILITANT FRONT, which attempts to disintegrate Greek society in the name of the revolution. It is also plain to see how highly irresponsible it is to exploit young pupils in an attempt to raise meager polling rates, and to aspire an aberration with unpredictable consequences. [...]
>
> Their unprecedented irresponsibility will have grave consequences! Those people literally toy with the future of the children, their families, as well as the patience of Greek society that, besides its own problems, also has to put up with trade unions which inhibit it from operating by circumventing any sense of democratic legitimacy and order.
>
> (Broudsakis, 2011)

The way childhood is perceived today is the result of a long series of overlapping material and discursive practices. Children's exclusion from public space, the abolition of child labor, and the establishment of compulsory schooling became part of a universal ideal about childhood (Prout, 2005). Nevertheless, this ideal is neither cohesive nor coherent. Rather it comprises contradictory ideas about children, who are seen, on the one hand, as innocent, dependent, pure, unfit to work, and in need of adult protection and caretaking; on the other hand however, they are considered inherently fierce, cruel, and menacing, putting themselves and society in danger because they lack the necessary cognitive and normative principles that would enable harmonious social cohabitation; hence they must be disciplined (Jenks 1996; Pechtelidis and Kosma 2012). Although these ideas are contradictory, they coexist as dominant discourses about childhood; both contribute to the exclusion of children from public life, and legitimize their meticulous surveillance and strict social control.

This particular socio-political management and governance of children corresponds to the generalized interest of modern states to control, put under surveillance and manipulate the entire population, both at the level of social groups and individuals (Rose, 1989). "Modern" disciplinary power exacts social consensus about the legitimacy of its preventive and corrective practices through its refined and subtle ways of surveillance and control, which are closely related to a utilitarian discourse about the usefulness of its proclaimed causes. This way power effectively

manages to conceal the restrictive and coercive consequences it has for its subjects. In this light, the child is the quintessential object of control and surveillance of adult society (Rose, 1989); control is masked as protection, prevention, and preoccupation in the children's interest, while surveillance takes the form of attention to their health and wellbeing (Jenks, 1996).

It is not by coincidence that an important consequence of modernity has been a radical transformation in the understanding and the attitude towards childhood. Children are culturally defined as "other"; childhood is constructed as the opposite of adulthood inside a binary framework (Jenks, 1996; James and Prout 1997; Gittins, 1998; Mayall, 2002; Qvortrup et. al. 2009). In particular, children are connected to nature, irrationalism, dependence, disability, immaturity, play, and the private sphere, whereas adults are seen as related to civilization, rationalism, independence, ability, work, and the public sphere. Modernity is therefore connected to a specific conceptualization of childhood founded upon the rigorous separation of children from adults.

However, through their active intervention in public life, children are challenging this division in late modernity. Through their mobilizations, young people prove to be dynamic, critical, complex, and in possession of significant social skills and abilities. Not only do they identify the problems they face in the family, in school, or in the community at large, but they also speak out. They challenge common beliefs about childhood, and they show that children are not "the same everywhere"; they are neither inherently innocent and pure nor savage and menacing; childhood is not a golden age; and adults do not necessarily respect children's rights. Hence they undermine and subvert previously stable ideas about what childhood is, or at least

what it is supposed to be, and at the same time they compromise adult authority, which largely depends upon the control of knowledge and public life (Freeman 2000).

Another important discursive strategy that aimed at the devaluation and downgrading of pupils' school occupations and participation in demonstrations, was the equation of such forms of mobilization with common school dereliction. In particular, such forms of resistance were represented as opportunities for truancy, skipping class, or hanging out at cafeterias. Even more, there was the common belief that the occupations were an end in themselves; teachers were just too lazy to work; staying at home was an opportunity for pupils to rehearse for their finals (utilitarianism); and that there were no actual demands behind the mobilizations. Hence, occupations were represented as customary, a mere trend, or a bad habit.

The main problem with this approach is that occupations were perceived as a cohesive and undifferentiated phenomenon repeated annually. Because of this attitude, mobilizations were regarded as a form of anomie and are rejected in advance, ignoring any social causes behind them. This is a tested and trusted strategy in the formation of public opinion towards youth protests. As shown in various studies (Such, Walker and Walker 2005; Makrinioti 2012), by addressing youth mobilizations through negative stereotypes, and by equating resistance with common dereliction, pupils's actions are stripped of every political dimension. The main reason is because their actions take place in a school setting and are exclusively subject to school rules. Political protest is transformed into a school dereliction, and "delinquents" are punished as such. Sometimes, negative assessments of the protests even appeared in selected statements by certain pupils. The following examples come from a blog active at the time:

> What can I say... I think occupations are a good opportunity to review your lessons... However, in high-school occupations should not last more than a couple of days, because the seniors lose classes, which is bad because they have to prepare for their finals. That's my opinion!

1. No teacher, and definitely no pupil, has the right to obstruct public services.
2. Whoever wants to skip school, should stay at home. Nobody is forced to attend.
3. Some schools do not even have any actual demands... the occupation is just a way to skip class and kid around.
4. Before people decide to occupy the school, they should first exhaust all other options (dialogue, written reports, etc.)
5. Only the pupils who participate in the occupations should be obliged to go to school in summer to make up for the classes they lost... Unfortunately, those are usually the daft, anyway...
6. At the end-of-school-exams, the pupils who participated in the occupations do not have a clue anyway, because they simply do not care. However, even those who have been studying all year long do not do well, because they were not taught the material properly...

I will stop writing now, or I will never finish!!!!

(Portal of Zefiri[79] Public School, 2011)

The selective presentation of such statements by the Greek media had the clear intention of reinforcing the strategy of equation of pupils' school occupations and demonstrations with common dereliction by foregrounding the point-of-view of pupils who felt deprived of their right to education. Here we might consider how the discourse on human rights is exploited to legitimize the exertion of power.

At this point it would be interesting to see what protesting youth had to say; what their demands were; and from where they drew their arguments. Notably, the anti-Memorandum Left press mostly promoted their positions. Below pupils from Vironas and Kareas[80] announce their decision to occupy their schools to their teachers and parents:

We are pupils from the schools of Vironas and Kareas who want to express our discontent against the new measures (as part of the reform in education), which concern and affect us directly!

We are pupils who are willing to fight for the school that we deserve, and the future that we hope for!

We say no to: the merging or closing of schools; the discontinuation of free school books (and the closing of the publishing agency for school books); the reduction of public funding for education, and the passing of the expenses to the parents; the filing of pupil records, and the penalization of mobilizations; the shortage in teaching personnel; the abolishment of the status of universities as sanctuaries (which was introduced by law 1288/82 after the collapse of the military junta).

Who can expect us to back down? We organized, we protested, we raised our voice, we resisted. Our collective struggle will continue with greater force.

We do not want this school; this is not our school. We shall reclaim the right to schooling, to higher education and work.

We say no to the school of The Memorandum - We demand free public education for all.

[79] An Athens suburb.

[80] Athens' suburbs.

> We will not stop here! We will fight as hard as we can! We will prove that they should have taken us into account! If we do not succeed, we will at least have learned to stand up for our rights, our future, and our lives.
>
> Besides, the only lost battles are the ones you never fight. Are you with us?
>
> (Avgi, 2011a)

Demands of pupils who participated in the mobilizations were articulated around elements from the counter-hegemonic discourse produced by leftist parties, anarchist groups, and local and global social movements against neoliberal policies, such as the "indignants". It is important to note that pupils participated actively, and often creatively, in the production of this discourse. They tried to express specific problems they and their parents faced every day, which were not only related to school, but to the general socio-political situation that emerged from the imposition of The Memorandum, and the hegemony of neoliberalism in European and international politics. It can be argued that the pupils' discourse owes to the reserve of political experience and knowledge youth accumulated during the events in Greece in December 2008 (Pechtelidis 2011a).[81] This reserve included effective strategies and practices of resistance, negotiation, debate, and coordination of mobilizations. Articulating their own response to The Memorandum, pupils drew from this previous experience. They attempted to communicate their unique interpretation of the crisis from their particular point of view as children, young people, and pupils, but also to form a common front, or "chain of equivalence" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) with their teachers and parents. The Teachers' Union (OLME) also took a stand on the pupil mobilizations by criticizing state authorities and government policy on education.

[81] Protests and riots took place in Greece in December 2008. These riots occurred after the assassination of a 15-year-old pupil by a police officer in the center of Athens. The uproar caused by the event had a major impact not only everywhere in Greece but also all over the world. Young students played a leading and central role in the protests so that the majority of journalists as well as many politicians and theorists claimed that it was a "revolution of the youth", a "democracy of children" and so forth.

The Teachers' Union board denounced assaults against pupils participating in the occupations of high schools and junior high schools by school directors and deputy directors. According to the report:

> The deputy director of the high-school in Galatsi seriously injured a female pupil.
>
> At a junior high school in Argyroupolis an 'exasperated' parent attacked a pupil who participated in the occupation with a cutter. The incidents of violence against pupils are so many, that it is impossible for our union to register them all.
>
> Threatening, insulting, and exerting physical violence on pupils is pedagogically unacceptable, and teachers who do so have no place in a public school.
>
> Colleagues who behave this way have no place in the union.
>
> The Ministry of Education is morally responsible for this unacceptable situation.
>
> (Avgi, 2011b)

The union documented its position by invoking a circular that the ministry had communicated to schools on September 20, 2011. According to the Teachers' Union, the specific circular encouraged harsh disciplinary methods, which it presented as reasonable pedagogical practices, and tried to turn parents against their children by the old "divide and conquer" tactic. It is quite clear that the Teachers' Union addressed the pupil occupations in terms of social and political struggle. The union attempted to confront and invalidate the government strategy of "divide and conquer", and to create a "chain of equivalence" between pupils, parents, teachers, and public opinion. It should be noted that OLME was generally opposed to The Memorandum and the subsequent austerity measures. We could, therefore, consider the union's outlook on school occupations to be part of a general reaction to government policies, which induced deep salary cuts and generally deteriorated working conditions for teachers.

In that sense, the Teachers' Union attempted to construct a "chain of equivalence" between teachers, parents, university students and pupils by highlighting struggle against a common enemy, which was the government and the parties that supported The Memorandum. Something similar was sought by Greek university students:

> Pupils do not need any update from us to know that they do not have any books. Besides, the reform in education concerns them directly, stresses Georgia Diamantogianni, student at the National Technical University, who participated in the information campaign at the 4th high-school in Peristeri.82
>
> At many pupils' assemblies, the children also discuss problems such as their parents' unemployment, or heavy taxation that burdens their families, which have a direct impact on their day-to-day lives. This year the public expenses for education were cut by one third in comparison to last year, claims Costas Papageorgiou, biology student and member of the general assembly of university occupations.
>
> (Vasileiadou, 2011)

The formation of a common front between university students and pupils (and teachers) became evident in the articulation of a similar anti-hegemonic discourse against The Memorandum:

> In Peristeri thousands of jobless people have already filed applications at the employment service; at many homes electricity has been cut off because the residents could not afford to pay the bills; and there are more individuals everyday who rummage through the garbage to find something to eat. With the education reform, at university you'll not be awarded a degree anymore; instead you'll be handed a file with credits. The European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS) begins at junior-high-school, and school awards also count as credits. Already as pupils we are drawn into a cut-throat competition, states Nicolas Kavaklis, pupil at the 4th high-school in Peristeri. He adds:
>
> We reject: the merging or closing of schools, further cuts in public funding for education, the discontinuation of free school books and the passing of the expenses to the parents, pupil records, the reduction of teaching personel, and abolishing the status of universities as sanctuaries.
>
> They are saying that we are closing the schools. We reply that Ms Diamantopoulou (the Secretary of Education) is the one who is closing the schools. We ask for our teachers' support. Besides, in our demands we also include issues such as the teachers' salaries, claims Orestis Kattis, pupil in the first year at the same high school.
>
> (Stefanakou, 2011)

In its announcement the General Assembly of Schools in Peristeri emphasized that:

> Not only was Ms Diamantopoulou's "new school" inaugurated without any books, but she also had the nerve to sustain that pupils and teachers should use dvds and photocopies instead.
>
> (Stefanakou, 2011)

Notably, 25 out of the 32 university teachers' associations in Greece aligned with the pupil front by expressly rejecting the new policy framework for higher education at their Panhellenic meeting. In an announcement they called for chancellors to block the reform, and protested against the new cuts in public spending for higher education.

An important role in the defense of the pupil mobilizations, the formation of "chains of equivalence", and the reaction against government policy and aligned political forces, was taken by the parties of the Left, which rejected The Memorandum.

[82] An Athens suburb.

The following statements are telling, although unfortunately they partly overstate pupil participation in the occupations and the mobilizations in general, and they tend to stereotype childhood and adolescence.

> The school occupations, which spread out all over the country day by day, foreshadow the rise of a new pupil rioting. Pupils occupy schools, take the streets, rally, communicate their positions, and sit-in at the Ministry of Education. For the second day in a row pupils from Heraklion and Nea Ionia[83] protested in front of the Ministry in Marousi. Even more of them gathered today, and expressed their dissent by shouting catchy and fervent slogans.
>
> The authorities of the Ministry also hardened their response; special police forces were called in and a police coach blocked the entrance to "protect" the Secretary of Education from an unarmed "enemy" aged 16.
>
> The internet is also on fire with adolescents who vehemently express their indignation and commit to win the day and reclaim the future. Tens of thousands of pupils respond to peer initiatives on facebook, who invite them to participate in occupations all over the country, with the 3 October as a milestone.
>
> The occupations are about the lack of books, teachers, and resources; against the merging of schools; in defense of free public education and higher education; and the status of universities as sanctuaries. The children's demands are all inclusive; they range from the smallest to the most crucial of issues. And yes, they even demand that [...] there should be no increase of the VAT rate for items at the school canteen.
>
> (Avgi, 2011b)

We see that in order to denounce government policies and stir public opinion, the text presents the pupils as children, or as "the unarmed 16-year-old-enemies", who are incapable of harming the Ministry. This way, however, the power of youth to actively play a part in social and political life is seriously undermined. On the other hand, "the adolescents' indignation and their decision to win the day" are presented to have universal consequences. Adolescence is idealized (Lesko 1996), because it is constructed as inherently revolutionary, able to sway all other age groups. The stereotyping of adolescence is quite evident in the following statements that present the pupils' local struggles as part of a wider political mobilization against The Memorandum:

> Everybody [...] had probably long been expecting an outrage by the pupils. To be honest, it would have been strange if it did not happen. [...] Now the children are indeed protesting; and they express their dissent about everything; from the tiniest to the gravest issue. They protest about the books they did not get, the teachers that are lacking, the education system that drains them (when schools are open), the library that was closed down, the kilometer-long way to school (in districts where

[83] Athens' suburbs.

schools have been merged), the horrible school buildings, the dirty classrooms, the authoritarian principals, the meager pocket money (due to the crisis), and that everything in the school canteen is getting more expensive...

Kids are in revolt. They revolt for their parents who had their salaries slashed, or lost their job; who calculate their limited income hoping that there must be some mistake, because the money is not enough to cover the expenses. What will they tell the landlord? How will they pay the bills? "We can't afford to give you any pocket-money right now, do not you understand? Maybe you could go to the cinema some other time." Children express their frustration because even the grandfather has nothing to offer any more; his pension was also diminished. How far will this situation go? What else is ours to see?

They protest for the present. They do not even think of the future; they do not want to, because it seems even bleaker than the present. "I do not have any money, my child", ordinary people say. They are the people who, when the children asked "are you with us?", responded with a big "yes".

It is the first time that school occupations, which are more than 630 by now, have gained such support from the pupils' families. These are the families that have been deeply affected by the crisis, yet are struggling to survive and provide for their children.

Pupils also protest on behalf of their parents, and this is a completely unprecedented phenomenon in pupils' mobilizations. Maybe this is precisely the trait that outrages the government of The Memorandum, making it so willing to suppress the occupations at any cost. If the shock doctrine succeeds at breaking the youth, then nobody else will dare to react anymore...

(Stefanakou, 2011)

A fundamental issue that emerges from the antagonism between hegemonic (pro-Memorandum), and counter-hegemonic (counter-Memorandum) discourses about the occupation of school buildings and grounds, pupil mobilizations, and the subsequent loss of school-hours, is the relation between young people, educational space and politics.

Space and power

Compulsory education and the confinement of pupils to determined disciplinary spaces embody dominant stereotypical ideas and assumptions about the social position and the nature of childhood. Children are therefore considered to depend on adults (parents or teachers); to lack experience and knowledge; to have a limited participation in decision-making about matters that concern them; and to need their everyday lives to be monitored and controlled. Moreover, educational practices are the material evidence that childhood is generally addressed as coherent and universal, as they claim to equally

serve the needs and interests of all the pupils. School is a social field where the limits between children and adults are clear, discernible, and strict; consequently children are constantly surveilled and controlled. Drawing from Simmel (Lechner 1991, 198), we could claim that a rigidly restricted and enclosed space such as the school might make subjects even more aware of a specific social order. However, the school's detailed spatial arrangement not only intensifies the imposed order, but also makes more evident the antagonisms and conflicts between pupils and teachers. The schools were appropriated by the pupils who redefined space, and created their own territory, separate from adult control and surveillance. The exclusion of adults from school grounds upset dominant power relations between children and adults, challenging fixed beliefs about the meaning of being or acting as a child, and certainties about age categories and child development.

Moreover, the occupation of institutional spaces such as schools invalidates their panoptical purpose (Solomon 1992; Pechtelidis 2011b), which depends on a particular organization of time and space, and the way teachers operate to achieve specific ethical and political aims, such as the formation of docile bodies and the preservation of school and public order. To "blind the surveilling eye" of school and social authorities, reinforces the threatening and menacing presence of the young people who participated in the occupations. From the perspective of hegemonic discourse, school occupations were an indicator of insufficient structural organization, of absence of rules, excessive freedom, and bad influences. Consequently, in the social imaginary, occupations symbolized danger, because they challenged the limits of young people's accepted mobility, activity, and social contacts. Young occupants were out of the reach of adult surveillance and control, outside the realm of authority, and thus they were considered out of place.

Every day young people face an adult world that is prejudiced and indifferent towards their problems; therefore, they often have no other choice than to engage in symbolic forms of protest like the occupation of an emblematic territory, such as a school building. Obviously, youth mobilizations begin from their own social locations. This means they have to construct their own spaces within spaces that are alien to them (Roche, 1999). Occupation is their last resource of political protest. It has been established by various research findings (Gordon 2010; Rheingans and Hollands 2013) that occupying space is one of the most powerful strategies of pupils and students, because it enables them to sustain a political campaign and attract public interest, something they consider impossible to achieve otherwise.

As Rheingans and Hollands (2013) claim, the built environment is a battleground, and the relationship between space and power works both ways; acting both to liberate as well as to control. Dominant sociological ideas (Giddens 1991; Beck 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2003) about youth and space fail to consider education as a significant political space. However, according to Rheingans and Hollands (2013) the educational built environment remains a physical space that young people occupy for significant periods in order to promote and sustain their interests and demands. For instance, the school becomes the pupils' territory, where they can create unofficial forms of community; "communities of protest" (Diani 2009, 66), and produce new forms of subjectivity based on solidarity and bonding given similar experiences (Hopkins et al. 2011; Salter and Kay 2011; Biggs 2011; Casserly 2011; Rheingans and Hollands 2013). The actual act of taking space from school authorities' control offers an opportunity for embodied hierarchies in the institution to be reversed and resisted (Gordon 2010). Occupations are threatening precisely because their dynamics

undermine traditional forms of control that adults impose on young people's social contacts and experiences.

Young people's political participation and schooling

Makrinioti (2012, 56) claims that young people's political participation gives prominence to contradictory beliefs about the uneasy relationship between children and politics, and brings to the fore the need to control childhood, which is considered potentially threatening. Cunningham and Lavallete (2004) claim that whereas childhood is perceived as a time of schooling, children are hardly instructed on political issues, as neither society or school give them any opportunities to engage politically. Consequently, "citizenship education" involves nothing more than a strictly apolitical individualistic version of the political (Cunningham and Lavallete 2004). Makrinioti (2012, 56-57) refers to citizenship education both in Greece, and in the U.K., which she considers a telling expression of the school's attitude towards political education, stressing the enormous gap between its proclaimed aims and actual educational results. Typically, citizenship education aims to prompt critical thinking, and public engagement. In effect though it channels pupils into predetermined (that is controllable) social and political roles (Makrinioti and Solomon 1999). Citizenship education as taught in schools foregrounds specific moral responsibilities that meticulously delineate what citizens should (or should not) do at the level of social interaction. However, it does not mention the citizen's right to criticize, to protest, to change, or to subvert bad laws and unfair policies (Makrinioti 2012, 57). This way the pupils' preparation for public life is more or less a spoof, because "it begins and ends with activities such as

planting trees, cleaning beaches, or in the worst case the Adolescents' National Parliament" (Makrinioti 2012).

We could claim that this apolitical and individualistic version of the political, produced through citizenship and school education as a whole, is related to the hegemonic discourse of post-political, neoliberal bio-power (Douzinas 2011). The term post-politics (Ranciere 1991; Crouch 2007; Mouffe 2008) refers to the reduced autonomy of political authority and its subordination to financial powers and external interests. Post-political governance ceases to form and to organise social relations; it is limited to an administrative role within a fluid and unstable environment that is constantly influenced by fluctuations of financial capital and shifts in the interests of the power bloc of the financial and political elites. The technocratic "realism" of post-politics is correlated with bio-power. Bio-power (Foucault 2008) is understood as a technology of governance in the broad sense of guidance towards specific ethical and political goals; it aims directly at the subject's body and spirit (for example, children and youth), and it controls them through their formation. In this sense bio-power is power over human life. The neo-liberal socio-economic system is based upon the bio-political control of subjectivity and desire. Along with commodities, the bio-political system produces subjects who accept a totalizing mode of economic, social, and ideological production, thus conforming to the choices they are given by the system. Characteristics of the neo-liberal subject are individualism, consumerism and lack of political interest.

Thus "citizenship education" is a bio-political technology, which in practice sidelines any participation of young people in public life. Even more, it produces an apolitical and individualistic version of the political. Nevertheless, pupils involved in the occupations demonstrated a will for collective action. They sought collective

solutions to collective problems such as the privatization of public education, poverty, degeneration of democracy, precarious life chances, etc. Additionally, young occupants wanted a compromise between collective and individual interests. This way, they challenged both the bio-political governmental technology of "citizenship education" and dominant theoretical ideas about youth politics in late modernity, which have underestimated the possibilities of collective action in favor of more individualized and post-materialised forms of politics (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007; Rheingans and Hollands, 2013). They challenged Giddens' (1991) and Beck's (1992) ideas about young people being incapable of acting collectively due to an inevitable move towards a more individualized society and the subsequent dissolution of traditional political institutions and affiliations. Collective actions like the occupation of school buildings and grounds also question the "apathy or disinterest model" which underlines low youth political awareness and participation, and argues that the individualization process is incomplete and changeable (Marsh, et al. 2007; Furlong and Cartmel, 2007; Rheingans and Hollands, 2013).

Furthermore, the involvement of young participants in the occupations challenges the division made by Giddens (1991) between "emancipatory traditional politics" with a focus on reducing social inequality and oppression, and "life politics" with concerns about "lifestyle", "choice" and "self-actualization" (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007; Rheingans and Hollands, 2013). Pupils located their struggle within a broader critique: against neoliberalism, cuts in the public sector, and the current monetary crisis. Thus they challenged the sharp division between material values with reference to the essential human needs, and post-material political values (Inglehart 1977; 1990) with focus on self-expression, quality of life, autonomy and belonging. Furlong and Cartmel (2007, 134) argue for the changing style of young people's involvement in politics and

their increased participation in new social movements (Feixa et al. 2009) and "single issue" politics. In this context, the pupil occupation movement in the time of The Memorandum was not a typical class-based movement, although it is clear that the occupants addressed class issues such as exploitation and inequality, rights and life chances provided by education at the core of their political agenda. Most of the occupations raised issues not only about public education cuts, future job prospects, and austerity measures, but also considered the purpose of education in society. It is important to consider that political activity is differently perceived by adult researchers and young people in many cases (Henn et al. 2002). In addition, it has been claimed that young people participate more in politics if they are allowed to define political activity in their own terms (White et al. 2000).

Conclusions

What became evident from the school occupation demands and the pupil mobilizations, and which is confirmed by findings of relevant research, is that young people are very much aware of the political, social and financial situation, they reflect upon it, and react accordingly. When young people reclaim educational spaces they in turn declare the need for a politicized understanding of the educational built environment. The school's built environment embodies particular values and hierarchies, and attempts to ideologically discipline young bodies. However, forms of political action such as school occupations challenge precisely this form of discipline.

The school occupations in Greece 2011 generally caused confusion about the role and participation of young people in public life. This bemusement arose from inevitable uncertainty around the nature of "childhood" and "youth", and the shift of power between young people and adults. The mobilizations of youth in December 2008, and in fall 2010 and 2011, which included rallies every day at the center of major cities in Greece, students' meetings, general assemblies, and the occupation of school and university built environments, are evidence of such a shift.

It is quite interesting that at one level the hegemonic discourse expresses apprehension about young people's contempt for politics. At a different level, however, youth are materially and symbolically excluded from active political participation, and collective action. Whenever the young transcend the limits of their exclusion from the political, they produce a series of subversions that threaten the given order of things. This usually results in the attempt to control any kind of disturbance, in order to restore social order. In this context pupil's political mobilizations and the subsequent subversion of the status quo, invite various explanations, which usually underestimate, and seek to control juvenile political action. Generally, the Greek media, the government, and political parties in support of The Memorandum interpreted the pupils' protests and political interventions:

a) As a form of delinquency (focusing on the vandalism).

b) As impulsive. Children and adolescents are considered to be inherently driven by spontaneity, rage, and anger; hence, they are supposed to react emotionally, instead of rationally.

c) With depreciation. Because of their young age, pupils are considered vulnerable, weak, and easily carried away, encouraged and manipulated to serve alien interests.

d) With anxiety about the pupils' future careers.

e) As an indication of adult incompetence and institutional inadequacy to effectively control youth.

In conclusion, representation of the pupils' occupation movement on television, on the Internet, and in the press, and the declarations and operations of state education authorities reveal perplexity, anxiety, and fear. On many occasions the way the events were handled by the media, by political parties, and by social and educational bodies disclosed the exploitation of youth protests by various groups. Furthermore, the adults' response to the protests was telling of their political views and reflected their stance towards The Memorandum.

Pupils demonstrated a need and will for collective action and they also emphasized the political process of merging not only collective and individual interests, but also materialistic and post-materialistic values. In late modernity young people are still likely to locate their struggles within a broader critique of cuts in the public sector, unemployment, and capitalism. In this empirically grounded framework, it is proposed that childhood and youth studies should re-consider young people's political involvement (Skelton 2011; Such, Walker and Walker 2005; Rheingans and Hollands 2013), as well as their potential for social change.

References

Avgi. 2011a. "Are you with us." *Avgi*, September 30. Accessed March 3, 2012. http://www.avgi.gr/ArticleActionshow.action?articleID=642151.

Avgi. 2011b. "Pupils revolt with 600 school buildings occupations." *Avgi*, September 30. Accessed April 2, 2012. http://www.avgi.gr/ArticleActionshow.action?articleID=642150.

Beck, U. 1992. *Risk society: towards a new modernity*. London: Sage.

Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim, E. 2003. *Individualisation: institutionalized individualism and its social and political consequences*. London: Sage.

Broudsakis, X. 2011. "We do not 'go' to school." *Topontiki*, October 7. Accessed April 21, 2012. http://topontiki.gr/article/23238.

Crouch, C. 2004. *Post-Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity.

Cunningham, S. and Lavalette, M. 2004. "'Active Citizens' or 'Irresponsible Truants'? School Student Strikes against the War." *Critical Social Policy* 24 (2): 255-269.

Diani, M. 2009. "The Structural Bases of Protest Events: Multiple Memberships and Civil Society Networks in the 15 February 2003 Anti-War Demonstrations." *Acta Sociologica* 52 (1): 63-83.

DIMAR. 2011. "School buildings occupations: Announcement of DIMAR's party youth." October 4. Accessed April 2, 2012. http://www.dimokratikiaristera.gr/to-komma-mas/i-neolaia/2291-2011-10-04-11-30-29.

Douzinas, K. 2011. *Resistance and Philosophy in Crisis. Politics, ethics and Syntagma stop* (in Greek). Athens: Alexandria.

Ennew, J. 1994. "Time for Children or Time for Adults." In *Childhood Matters: Social Theory, Practice and Politics*, edited by J. Qvortrup, M. Bardy, G. Sgritta and H. Wintersberger, 125-43. Aldershot: Averbury.

Feixa, C., Pereira, I., and Juris, J. 2009. "Global citizenship and the 'New, New social movements: Iberian connections." *Young* 17(4): 421-442.

Foucault, M. 1989. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. London: Routledge.

Foucault, M. 2008. *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978--1979 (Lectures at the College de France)*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Freeman, M. 2000. "The Future of Children's Rights." *Children and Society* 14 (4): 277-93.

Furlong, A. 2013. *Youth Studies: An Introduction*. New York: Routledge.

Furlong, A. and Cartmel, F. 2007. *Young people and social change: new perspectives*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.

Giddens, A. 1991. *Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gittins, D. 1998. *The Child in Question*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Gordon, H.R. 2010. *We fight to win: inequality and the politics of youth activism*. London: Rutgers University Press.

Gordon, T., Holland J. and Lahelma, E. 2000. *Making Spaces. Citizenship and Difference in Schools*. New York: St. Martin's Press, INC.

Henn, M., Weinstein, M., and Wring, D. 2002. "A generation apart? Youth and political participation in Britain." *British journal of politics and international relations* 4 (2): 167-192.

Hopkins, P., Todd, L., and Newcastle Occupation. 2011. "Occupying Newcastle University: student resistance to government spending cuts in England." *The geographical journal.* Accessed August 20, 2013. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4959.2011.00436. x/abstract.

Howarth, D. 2000. *Discourse*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Howarth, D., Norval A. and Stavrakakis Y. eds. 2000. *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Inglehart, R. 1977. *The silent revolution: changing values and political styles among western publics,* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. 1990. "Values, ideology, and cognitive mobilization in new social movements", In *Challenging the political order*, edited by R.J. Dalton and M. Kuechler, 43-66. New York: Oxford University.

James, A. and Prout, A., eds. 1997. *Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood*. London: Falmer Press.

Jenks, C. ed. 1982. *The Sociology of Childhood – Essential Readings*. London: Batsford Academic and Educational Ltd.

Jenks, C. 1996. *Childhood*. London: Routldege.

Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. 1985. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. London and New York: Verso.

Lechner, F. J. 1991. "Simmel on Social Space." *Theory, Culture and Society* 8: 195-210.

Lesko, N. 1996. "Denaturalizing adolescence." *Youth and society* 28: 138-162.

Makrinioti, D. 2012. "Redefining Childhood: A Discussion About the Limits, Protection and Autonomy". In *Childhood and the Mass Media* (in Greek), edited by E. Kourti, 47-69. Athens: Herodotos.

Marsh, D., O'Toole, T., and Jones, S. 2007. *Young people and politics: apathy or alienation?* Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Mayall, B. ed. 1994. *Children's Childhoods: Observed and Experienced*. London: Falmer Press.

Mayall, B. 2002. *Towards a Sociology for Childhood - Thinking from Children's Lives*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Mouffe, C. 2008. *On the Political*. London and New York: Verso.

Papamattheou, M. 2011. "Confrontation between the Ministry of Education and teachers and pupils about occupations." *Tovima*, September 29. Accessed April 22, 2012. http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=422465.

Pechtelidis, Y. 2011a. "December Uprising 2008: Universality and Particularity in Young People's Discourse." *Journal of Youth Studies* 14 (4): 449-462.

Pechtelidis, Y. 2011b. *Sovereignty and Resistance: Post-structural Approaches of Education* (in Greek). Athens: Ekkremes.

Pechtelidis, Y. and Kosma, Y. 2012. *Savage/Saintly Children* (in Greek). Thessaloniki: Epikentro.

Phillips, L. and Jorgensen, M. 2002. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*. London: Sage.

Portal of Zefiri Public School. 2011. "An occupation." December 9. Accessed April 5, 2012. http://2gym-zefyr.att.sch.gr/Portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=326:katalipsi&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=63.

Prout, A. 2005. *The Future of Childhood*. London and New York: Routledge Falmer.

Qvortrup J., Corsaro, W., and Sebastian-Honig, M. eds. 2009. *The Palgrave Handbook of Childhood Studies*. London: Palgrave.

Ranciere, J. 1991. *Disagreement*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Rheingans, R. and Hollands, R. 2013. "'There is no alternative?': challenging dominant understandings of youth politics in late modernity through a case study of the 2010 UK student occupation movement." *Journal of Youth Studies* 16 (4): 546-564.

Roche, J. 1999. "Children: Rights, Participation and Citizenship." *Childhood* 6 (4): 475-93.

Rose, N. 1989. *Governing the Soul*. London: Routledge.

Salter, L. and Kay, J.B. 2011. "The UWE student occupation." *Social movement studies* 10 (4): 423-429.

Skelton, T. 2010. "Taking young people as political actors seriously: opening the borders of political geography." *Area* 42: 145-151.

Solomon, I. 1992. *Power and Order in the Contemporary Greek School. A typology of school spaces and practices 1820-1900*. Athens: Alexandria.

Spiliotopoulos, A. 2011. "Pupils must keep the schools open." *Tovima*, September 29. Accessed April 24, 2012. http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=422428.

Stefanakou, P. 2011. "Students revolting all over Greece." *Avgi*, October 2. Accessed March 19, 2012. http://www.avgi.gr/ArticleActionshow.action?articleID=642516

Such. E., Walker, O. and Walker, R. 2005. "Anti-War Children: Representation of Youth Protests Against the Second Iraq War in the British National Press." *Childhood* 12 (3): 301-326.

Torfing J. 1999. *New Theories of Discourse – Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Vasileiadou, N. 2011. "University students return to high-school." *Kyriakatiki Elefterotypia* 38, October 2.

West, A. 1999. "They Make Us Out to Be Monsters: Images of Children and Young People in Care." In *Social Policy, the Media and Misrepresentation*, edited by B. Franklin, 253-67. London: Routledge.

White, C., Bruce, S., and Ritchie, J. 2000. *Young people's politics: political interest and engagement amongst 14-24 year olds*. York: York Publishing Services.

Chapter 12

From *hara* to *midam*: Public spaces of youth in Cairo

José Sánchez García

Introduction

> January 25th 2012 proved that no one can run the country without the revolutionaries and the Square and the Egyptian People… The Parliament is not a replacement of the Square, and the Square is vital to the Parliament.
>
> (Declaration of the Presidential Candidate of Destour Party, Hamdeen Sabahi, in an interview granted to the Egyptian on line newspaper *Al Ahram*, March 4, 2012).[84]

There has been an intense debate over the role social electronic networking has played in the so-called Arab Spring.[85] However, it is evident that social activism here has also thrived on the streets. It was in urban spaces that people transformed into a strong political force.[86] The agora of the "Arab street" is a protagonist in the struggle. It has been privileged territory for carrying revolutionay demands. In Cairo, Tahrir Square was where citizens voiced their discontent, showed their power and articulated political counter-discourse. Significant political events of the "revolution' took place there: the

[84] On 25th January 2012 thousands filled Tahrir Square to protest against the military Council and the direction of the political transition. Accessed July 15, 2013. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wFkgqo1UBvI.

[85] This text is based in the research project GENIND (2013-15). *The Indignant Generation. Space, power and culture in the youth movement of 2011: a transnational perspective*. Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Spain). VI National Program of Scientific Research, Development and Technological Innovation, 2008-2011. [CSO2012-34415]. http://lageneracionindignada.blogspot.com.es/

[86] As Foucault remarks: "the people comprises those who conduct themselves in relation to the management of the population, at the level of the population, as if they were not part of the population as a collective subject-object, as if they put themselves outside of it, and consequently the people is those who, refusing to be the population, disrupt the system" (2007, 65).

sit-in against first Mubarak and then SCAF; Islamist and secularist demonstrations of power; the first public speech of president-elect Morsi. Later, popular demonstrations there resulted in the downfall of Morsi. These events immediately direct attention to this significant *agora*.[87] Simply, public space cannot be seen just as something that people merely use. People make meaning out of space through how they use it and through this meaning they change the perception of who controls it - and sometimes they take control of it. Thus, "space is filled with politics and ideology; it is not simply the stage of social relations and an arena for actions; it is operative in the assembly of these, showing the interconnection between mental and physical space" (Lefebvre 1974, 135).

In that sense, the dissident counter-cultures assembled in Egypt during long years of authoritative governments occupied the Square, highlighting a message that had been for a long time subterranean but what in fact massive in scale. Their constant, quotidian opposition constitutes a significant element for understanding how the space of Tahrir Square articulated and extended political dissidence. In the Revolution, young people became fundamental political subjects and the *midam* (or agora) was transmuted into a decisive political space: into a political subject. Young people, male and female, they appropriated a central public space. They combined activism with the lived street experience of local culture at the same time, for example, as ritualistic religious orientation: Friday prayers, mass *jutbas*, breaking of Ramadan abstinence, and *mulid* practices. Here there were also musical and theatrical players and humorous, satiric expressions that manifested political dissatisfaction and disobedience against Egyptian

[87] Mohammed Morsi addressed the crowd on June 29, 2012. There was a symbolic oath in Tahrir Square one day before the official oath. See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/9366199/Egypts-President-Mohammed-Morsi-takes-a-symbolic-oath-in-Tahrir-Square.html

political practices. These expressions were local grammars for resistance to adult-centrist Egyptian hegemony that created a youthful counter discourse.[88]

After the derogation of the Emergency Law by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces *(al-Mağlis al'Alā lil-Quwwāt al-Musallaḥah*) all the downtown district - *wust al balad* - was transformed into a lived space for protest against inequalities and injustices, a space privileged for alternative political practice. Political graffiti represented this transformation – even on Cairo's administrative Mogamma building, the Supreme Court or Mohammed Mahmoud Street near the Ministry of the Interior – and thereby converted public space into both a site and instrument of struggle. This new Cairo had its roots in the Cairennes of *hara* and *ashabiyat* – informal neighbourhoods where young people gather. In these places, youth groups created spaces of experience (Pleyers 2010) in a negotiated urban space (Duhau and Giglia 2008). Despite different social discourses, this affected all age groups at the time.

Hegemonic discourses, social structure and youth cultures in Egypt

In the Egyptian case, hegemony[89] is a form of dialogical dispute rather than a process of top-down political domination. Different societal discourses propose diverse ways of understanding social life. It is through their cyclical encounters that there results an unconscious assimilation of a determined model. So hierarchies maintain their

[88] Discourse is "a system of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak" (Foucault 1972, 24). By local grammars I mean local cultural expressions owned in the place they are produced.
[89] "Hegemony is the spontaneous consent that the popular populations give to the ways in which social life is imposed by the dominant group" (Gramsci 1971, 12). It is an essential element in power relations in modern societies, where this consent operates in a more significant way than force.

dominance for a time until the emergence of a referent symbol that impugns, undermines and opposes them, which is what resistant youth cultures attempt. Among the different cultural capitals that construct dominant discourse in the Egyptian public sphere, we can distinguish three symbolic fields manipulated by different ideological orientations. Each struggles to establish itself hegemonically. At same time, all share a common Islamic counterpublic discourse: "The deliberative practices that constitute this arena are grounded in evolving Islamic traditions of civic duty as they were revived and reformulated within by Egyptian reformists in the context of an engagement with institutions, concepts and technologies of modern political life" (Hirschkind 2001a, 4). This pervasive religious referent crosses all social groups in a country where 99 per cent consider it necessary to believe in God to behave ethically - including Coptic Christians. The appeal to what is pious acts continuously in the public sphere. Even the most modernized groups convert Islam into a relevant mechanism to consolidate political legitimacy.

The first symbolic discursive field is a secularist and modern one as described by Talal Asad (2003). The symbolic references here were imposed by external influences from the 19th century. The colonial system adopted by the Egyptian ruling classes favored a westernized model that frankly confronted the traditional world. This model made use of public education and media to achieve hegemony and take control of public and private life. Principal arguments were the idea of progress and the creation of a new middle class. It was proposed that, step by step, modern Egypt would see the withering of popular cultural forms – *shabi* - which had never before been broken definitively (Armbrust, 2000).

The second symbolic field emerged at the end of 19th century as a reaction to colonialism. Here Islam was positioned in new readings of religious legacy, firstly by

moderate groups and later by radical groups far more rigorously. This model proposes opposition to modernity which is understood as an alien form of social organization and far from Egyption recorded traditions. Both moderates and radicals tamed the secular orientation according to principles of religion *usul ud-din*. The concept of a primarily private religion is intolerable to Islamist thinkers. As a consequence, the social discourse of Islam entered strongly into the public sphere.

The third symbolic field is linked to the popular classes – *shabi* – a group that is habitually manipulated by different political contenders.[90] *Shabi* defines a social group with an ample range of native practices, tastes, styles and behavioral patterns in everyday life and also designates a speech community. In political terms, *shabi* express certain values, standards, tastes and practices that are opposed to the moral values and lifestyle of the upper classes which attempt to dominate the Egyptian State and the public sphere. However, there is great disparity among the *shabi*. Members of this group occupy a social position with blurred frontiers to do with occupational mobility, including construction workers, craftsmen and small shopkeepers and low-level workers of the third industrial sector. Moreover, the popular classes - *shabi* - are distinguised from other social strata by the authenticity – *asil'* - of their cultural practices as they define them. As a result, regime intellectuals and elites accuse them of being uncultured, with vulgar values and practices. In fact there are a myriad of *shabi* expressions and symbolic messages; from going to the movies to popular music through to street practices full of double meanings and ironic products. In all they embody a discourse of refusal. Thereby, the popular classes place themselves in open opposition to the two symbolic fields previously defined in the dispute for hegemony in the public sphere. Yet in many instances, the symbolic referents of these three fields intertwine or juxtapose

[90] *Shabi* means popular; a form of the noun *shab* meaning people, it always has a collective politically charged connotation.

themselves at the same time so that the process of self-definition itself becomes a political dispute. Thus in the social construction of youth, from modernism to rigorous Salafism to the fluid popular *shabi* constituency, each political grouping makes their own "youth" in agreement with their own moral values.

In summary, modernity in Arab societies is experienced by youth groups as the point at which state secularism and modern consumption overlap with old and new patterns of social organization, on the one hand, and limited resource realities and unequal powers on the other. In the case of political imagery, it is produced from a dialectical encounter between the post-secular and the religious post-Islamic, through certain everyday practices of social space occupancy and corporeality.

The youth generation in Egypt

A portion of this generation has been trained in college and professional systems for leadership positions in political and economic life, even though they are denied repeatedly by a monolithic system which prevents regeneration of leaders. However, the majority of young Egyptians do not go to university. There are low numbers enrolled in secondary education (76%) and higher-level education (17%). Notably lower percentages of females are enrolled in post-primary education. After high school, working in precarious jobs becomes the sole option for youth in low income populations. Unemployment figures show that youth seeking a first job are 77% of the total unemployed. They are primarily high school and college graduates. Forced into the informal economy, they become dependent on networks established around the family and the neighbourhood. In contrast, youth from the privileged class mostly build their communities through social networking. Their cultural references are cosmopolitanism

and they often use foreign language, especially English. They often enter the job-market in professions related to communication technologies, their socialization is based on western models (movies, magazines, music) and they consume imported goods, all of which facilitate the emergence of local forms of the so-called "new new social movements" (Feixa, Pereira and Juris 2009).

In contrast, youth from the lower classes spend their leisure time talking with friends in cafés, sharing computers and reinforcing their primary ties in the local backstreets. Reciprocity, class solidarity and communitarianism are the fundamental mechanisms of *shabi* youth based on local residence. Thus, the peer group is one of the main determinants of their identity and class affiliations. The dynamism of networks constructed in this way allows the inclusion of young people in informal economic frames, whose main illegitimate activities can be listed as: monitoring street stalls, collection of rent from informal street vendors, and trafficking in drugs, alcohol and pornography.

Macro-sociological analyses explain little about the life experiences of different youth groups in Egypt. Secondary education attendance figures, for example, do not reflect that in most cases, absenteeism occurs when trying to find ways to get additional income. Family income differences may facilitate the development of educational inequalities, with inability to reconcile work and study for poor youth. Furthermore, the moral obligation to contribute to the maintenance of the family forces poor youth to leave school at an early age, contributing to later income inequality. Yet by and large, all of them, advantaged and disadvantaged, will access jobs that never reach a wage level that facilitates emancipation. The norm is precarious employment for young people with work schedules that extend beyond nine or ten hours. However, despite

heterogeneity of social practices, youth share a fixed marginality in generational hierarchies within their primary groups, and their voices are rarely given legitimacy.

Youth (*shabab*) are constructed as a cultural model by different hegemonic groups that try to appropriate the ideal of youth, founding their unity in a social consensus based in the contrasting binomial cultural scheme *futuwa/muruwa,* which is used in conflict between the different groups in the struggle for cultural hegemony (Sánchez García, 2010c). The *futuwa* is a set of moral values assigned to young people by various adult-centrist discourses. It appears always in contrast with the moral characteristics of adult life, the *muruwa*. Thus, the prototypical characteristic identified by all groups insists on lack of reason as an attribute of young people in Arab Societies.

PLACE FIGURE 1 HERE

The classificatory system constructs youth in contrast with adulthood, considered in the Arab world as the stage at which the individual, the person, has completed his/her cycle of socialization and can take decisions on his/her own life. Marriage and the birth of the first son establish the end of the youth stage in the life cycle. "The state of being single is considered as something that should be modified. It is the married status which is regarded as the normal and desirable state, and the 'not yet married' state is a state of readiness and the anticipation of a status not yet done" (Rugh 1987, 130). This adulthood threshold is tacitly accepted by most young people as the reason they are stigmatized socially. However, the difficulty of achieving marriage forces young people into an extended liminal position of youth. Thus juvenile groups remain in a subordinated position in the social structure (Sánchez García, 2009).

They can therefore become the referent subject of social criticism to draw attention away from overt political agendas proposed by the three different symbolic fields. Youth are stigmatized for causing the worst evils in society. They are seen as conducting drug abuse, homosexuality and *urfi* marriage.[91] Consequently it is common to blame them for family crisis, violence and moral decadence (Haenni and Holtrop, 2002). Hegemonic impositions – secular, Islamist or popular – combined with economic precariousness and political instability, restrict the possibilities to expand and develop youth cultures and, therefore to renew their cultural values, norms and social relations. The young live in an ambivalent situation hinged on "the possibility of assigning an object or an event [an individual] to more than one category" (Bauman 1991, 1). Like Simmel's concept of the "foreigner", the young Egyptian is not fully integrated into society. Youth is an intermediary stage between different ways of considering the world. Thus the "other", the stranger, deprived of full humanity and without the constraints of social responsibility, can challenge the repressive system and build demonstrations, expressions, emotivities and symbols to face it (Simmel, 1971).

Youth exclusion in the period before the revolution meant that young people were located on the margins of public space and yet were very central to it. The more formal and visible public space was dominated by the social, cultural and political values that belonged to a much older generation that was set in its ways and not ready to empower a younger generation. However, young people created their own spaces in creative and innovative ways embedded at the very heart of public space, albeit relatively unperceived by the older generation. Youth occupation of public space was the result of social, cultural and political gaps between an old unchanging, decaying

[91] The *urfi* marriage, legalized in 1999 by the new Law of Civil and Personal Status, does not need family consent to sign the matrimonial contract. As a result it can permit the marriage of the couple without traditional strict parental control (Sánchez García, 2009).

world and a vibrant world of young people who were calling for change and exercising their citizenship in unique ways. Their resistance was rooted in urban and virtual space.

Counter-cultural territory: Cosmopolitan young virtual space/time places

The concept of counter-culture[8] seems applicable to Mubarak's Egypt. Lack of youth legitimacy and the State's incapacity to achieve the political integration of young Egyptian people opened up spaces for the expression of cultural ideas and policies, creating ideal conditions for the emergence of different counter-cultures in diverse space/time territories. In the last years of the 20th century, privileged young people had the necessary means to enter into the new communities constructed by online social networking that had appeared in Egypt. They were attracted by symbolic global referents to create social cosmopolitan capital through their lifestyles. At the same time, *shabi* young people were also transformed into cosmopolitan youth (Koning, 2009) to a limited extent by online social networking. Thus it was not necessary to belong to a high economic class to be a young cosmopolitan.

Oppositional youth online relied on a historic legacy of rejection practices and discourses. For example the student revolts of 1968 and 1972 facilitated the rise of an opposition based in Socialist and Communist ideologies. After Sadat's murder and the Iranian revolution, activities and discourses of illegal Islamist associations combined with leftist activities and discourses. During those years, dissident thoughts were disseminated by the distribution of cassettes containing the most important discourses of exiled sheiks and the sermons of imams (Hirschkind, 2001) or in novels such as

[8] The term counter-culture refers to subordinated groups (especially youth) that express in an explicit way their impugning will, creatively attempting alternatives to the imposed system. They produce cultural expressions that confront hegemonic cultural currents (Hall and Jefferson 1983; Roszak 1969; Willis 1978).

Respectable Sir (Naguib Mahfuz, 1975); denouncing the corruption of the system. In the new millenium, technological advances enabled new tools for the extension of earlier ideologies of rejection, both leftist and Islamist. Practices of cybernetic activism saw the gradual dissemination in the underground sphere of concepts like dignity, human rights, freedom and social justice. These discourses appeared in the web pages of groups like *Young People's 6 April Movement*, *Khourriya* and *Kifaya* – especially after the North American intervention in Iraq. They also appeared in apparently ingenuous blogs like *Misr Digital* where young people expressed their individual identity (http://misrdigital.blogspirit.com/). Cybernetic activists like Wael Abbas, Mahmud Salem and Ashma Mafhfuz denounced violations of the human rights committed by the secret police of the Egyptian regime; the repression of striking workers in *Mahalla al-Kubra* – an industrial area in north Cairo; the diffusion of images of the slain Khalid Said in Alexandria, and manipulations committed by the government in the November 2010 Parliamentary elections.

This shared horizon of discourse – aesthetic, ethical, philosophical and metaphysical - allowed members of the social electronic networks to construct a community of recognition in the same ideological universe, even though it was physically dispersed. They exchanged information and affection in a matched temporal flow, that although re-interpreted and changed constantly, guided their action in the shared world (Padilla, 2011). The Internet was tolerated by Mubarak's regime until protests against the 2007 Constitutional Reform Referendum. Those manifestations saw the increase of repressive measures towards net bloggers; imprisoning political users of all kinds regardless of ideological affiliations. The most representative case was blogger Karim Amer, member of the Muslim Brotherhood, condemned to four years jail in 2007 for "spreading information that disturbs the peace and damages the reputation of the

country, abets the hatred of Islam, and defames the president of the Republic. In spite of repression, virtual practices such as blogging helped to define a space of freedom as an alternative means of communication and helped to circulate oppositional discourses. Consequently, in the Egyptian blogosphere a directly political counter-culture emerged, which was harshly suppressed. However, it managed to establish political capital that activists turned into real assets after the 25 January Revolution, in urban space.

Urban spaces of dissent: the hara

However, this manifestation of political Egyptian counter-culture is only one type of activism. Along with virtual space it is pertinent to give special emphasis to the informal urban space of neighborhoods – *hara*, for example *Dar al Ahmar, Dar as Salaam* and *Bulaq Abu al Alaa.* In the last 30 years, the Egyptian State has attempted to gain control of the popular class neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, the emergence of "spheres of dissidence" enabled autonomy of management of communal needs (Ismail, 2000). Young people of these popular neighborhoods preserved the community against State incursions, as they had done in historic times from the *hara* governors and other Government agents (Sánchez García, 2012). The populous neighborhood constituted a defensible area conspicuously delimited through space markers indicating where public space began and finished. This territorialized space constitutes local perception and a manner of living in urban space that Duhau and Giglia (2008) define as "negotiated spaces." There are the true communal spaces in the neighborhoods. There is the *darb* – the neighborhood's central street, and the alleys – *zuqaq,* alleys without exit – *cafta* - and wide open places appropriate for an outing - *fusha* (Elsheshtawy 2006). This is popular urban geography. The spatial hierarchy enables the maintenance of social autonomy and the strengthening of social norms established there. As a social unit the

hara has persisted in the populous traditional quarters of the city, along with many of the rules and regulations which made the local neighbourhood operate as an extension of the family. In the 20th century context of rapid social transformation, the old social practices grounded in traditional neighbourhood space are being reworked.

In informal cairenne urban spaces live the *shabi.* Until recently, the term referred to residents of the old quarters. Large-scale development of informal housing communities is a recent occurrence, dating from the mid-1960s. In simple terms, these communities arose in response to the increased popular need for urban housing and the State's failure to meet that need. Population growth, dislocation, resettlement and rural-urban migration were all factors contributing to urban expansion. State urban housing and planning did not keep up with this expansion. As a result, responsibility for much urban management and housing provision was assumed by the people themselves. This translated into the appropriation of public land and illegal construction in Cairo. The process of informal housing development has, thus far, resulted in the emergence of 74 informal settlements in twelve areas of the city. The physical characteristics of these new *shabi* neighbourhoods are different from the old, but, as Singerman points out, the popular classes "take the *hara* culture with them" (1995). According to Denis (1997), these neighbourhoods are veritable cities: popular districts with commerce, markets, and a multitude of private services that make up for the absence of the state and its schools, clinics and bus lines. Through community organization and the establishment of informal networks, the groundwork for autonomy was laid.

In the new places, residents follow strategies of connecting and disconnecting with the authorities depending on their needs. They employ mechanisms of dissidence and rejection defined as "quiet encroachment" by the Iranian sociologist Asef Bayat (2003). It is characterized by episodes of collective struggle without apparent

leadership, obvious ideology, or a structured formation. The self-organization of education, health and home-building represents a challenge to formal management systems. These acts of interposition, individual or collective, have political implications. Local authorities were legitimated by means of the creation of networks anchored in communal solidarity. Here religion, kinship, residence and birthplace constituted traditional forms of the politicization of quotidian life in Egypt. Institutions like the informal markets, the mosques, Sufi leaders and economic associations are relevant for the establishment of local alliances and loyalties, joining common interests. The result was the construction of a culture that challenged hegemonic norms, a form of counter-culture. Accordingly, the concepts of authority and legitimacy in the contemporary political economy were transformed and enlarged by the significance of the oppositional discourses of the popular classes against the privileged classes that challenged the state in a secondary role. The neighborhoods emerged as a political subject and were transformed in spaces of experience. They were "places sufficiently autonomous and distanced from capitalist society [distanced from hegemonic discourses and models], which permit actors to live according to their own principles" (Pleyers 2011, 39).

Dar as Salaam youth *mulid:*[9] The young *shabi* space of experience

Dar as Salaam is a neighbourhood facing Dahab Island in Cairo with a population estimated around 100,000.[10] This *hara* is isolated from other adjacent parts of the city like Misr al Qadima or Helwan by Line 1 of the underground which links El Marg with

[9] The term *mulid/mawlid* (pl. *mawālid*) designates the date, place or celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad or a saint [*wali*], or a panegyric in honour of the Prophet. Colloquially, in Egypt and Sudan, the term designs a festival of honour of a saint. The tradition of *mulid* celebration has been extended to historical figures as Sayyida Zeynab or Al Hussein in Cairo. *Mulid* celebrations have become associated with informal youth groups in Cairo neighbourhoods. In modern times, every year sees around 3000 in Egypt (Sánchez García, 2010).

[10] *Dar as Salam* is where I usually conduct my fieldwork.

Helwan on the east; and the Ring Road on the west. So, the quarter is a bounded urban area that provides its inhabitants with a specific identity. Neighbours define their community as peaceful, with strong communitarian ties. Absence of State services means the Government is a distant body that creates the obligation to establish neighbourhood solutions to people's needs (Sims, 2003). A good example of the capability of the informal local network is the organization of Sidi Agami's *Mulid* which is celebrated in the second week of the month of *Yumada.*

Mulid festivities have a multitudinous character; they are outrageously ambivalent events. Sufism is appreciated in the religious fervour of rituals. Yet there is also staging of the collective identity of the neighbourhood with the celebration of carnivalesque street parades - financed by locals - where government authorities are criticized openly. *Mulid* have their own order, flexible and ambiguous, therefore they are criticized for the activities they develop (Schielke, 2012). On the one hand, their uncultured and vulgar character have been condemned by some cultural authorities of the regime as the "survival" of superstition. On the other hand, the *mulid* has been accused of constituting a blasphemous invention - *bid'a* – principally by Islamist groups proposing its prohibition (Peterson, 2011). The effect of these criticisms culminated in different attempts to reform these festivities. The State cultural institutions made an effort to give *mulid* a more civilized appearance by planning the celebrations.

In fact, the character of *mulid* has been considerably modified by the introduction of new *shabi* practices which have transformed the *mulid* into suspension of the quotidian order in a symbolic way. The *mulid* has been opposed both by secular cultural hegemony and Islamic puritanism. The Islamist opinion considers it a religious heretical manifestations. Yet there is no doubt as to its cultural authenticity – *asl'*. It just corresponds to a different way of manifesting popular religiosity. *Mulid* practices

represent *shabi* cultural activity that comes from the participants. During the festivity the reign of the *shabi* is decreed and everyone is forced to follow correct behaviour – like eating with the hands, showing solidarity and hospitality to pilgrims and to all of the people who want to participate. Therefore, the *mulid* is a way to interiorize the ideology and the symbolic referents that characterise popular counter-culture. This is one of the main attractions for young people of these mass festivities. *Mulid* practices correspond with the potential for political rejection of the hegemonic discourses of the social order, especially those governmental and Islamist forces that make the cultural expression of Egyptian youth so difficult.

In these festive circumstances, youth groups take over an empty space for the installation of a portable sound system, large loudspeakers and coloured light bulbs for illumination. The informal youth associations of the *hara* pick up donations during the year for the rent of the portable music system. Usually along with the sound system, they hire a disc jockey who mixes *inshad* themes with *shabi* music and electronic instrumentation. This results in a hybrid dance music style constructed from a youthful perspective.[11] Sufi spirituality is conveyed in the repetition of known religious sentences and pious formulas by the DJ. He exalts the love of God, the Prophet and *wali.* However, at same time, his exhortations can be perceived like unrequited and frustrated love due to the strict laws against gender relations in the social order. The result is a dance product coming from the big loudspeakers that is popularly known as *Mahraganat* music.[12] Recorded *Mahraganat* music is popular with all social groups.

[11] The *inshad* style is urban music played by some Sufist Tariqas. Repetitive rhythm permits long instrumental and voice passages which facilitates body trance. *Shabi* music has rural roots, speaks about the unlucky, informal jobs, illicit sexuality and passion crimes. It challenges the respectability and modernity of high and middle classes using humorous, satirical language (Sánchez García, 2010).

[12] *Mahraganat* literally means party music in reference at the context in which is played: marriages, birthdays and, especially, *mulid.* From the time of the Tahrir occupation *mulid* became important media to criticise the military control of the government. Example of the style: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kkUWdQEXU9Aandfeature=player_embedded#

You can hear this music style in a shopping centre. It is a cultural artefact whose function can be to extend counter-culture discourses.

In the *mulid* space/time, boys dance adapted *dhikr'*, with movements of the arms and hands that are close to the rap and breakdance genre. They are allowed to pass beyond the limits of what is allowed, blurring the division between the sacred and profane. In this identitarian time/space they try to reproduce the state of mind attained in a typical Sufi *mulid,* but with an innovative character. They join up the irreverent and the serious in this local celebration, yet inside the limits so that it is perceived as *halal*. In spite of the ambiguous approximation of spirituality, this type of musical act is accepted as a part of the *mulid* festive atmosphere. When you look for a word to describe the ambience of this type of street celebration, the same word for the atmosphere of a wedding is utilized: *farah*, because the members of the family participate without distinction. Youth perception is that the *mulid* permits the stopping of space and time. It is therefore a utopic space/time between the genres, between sacred and profane, between public and private, between *haram* and *halal*. This kind of celebration is not incoherent with its source of inspiration since the *mulid* has always included music and dance and specific use of the body itself.

The *mulid* constitutes "the ambiguity of what's sacred, it consists in the possibility of such transmutations" (Durkheim 1912 [1982], 383). The youth-oriented *mulid* represents a temporary transcendence of the normal profane order of existence to reach an abnormal sacred order (Leach, 1958). During *mulid* time, the world is good, free of oppression and greed; quotidian worries disappear and there is no worry for the future. But when the party finishes the order of quotidian life inevitably returns. So, the experience of *mulid* festive time can be seen as a corner chronotope for the youth of the lower class. The ambience is liminal, located in an interstitial utopic time and space.

Transgressions of the social order in relation to gender and age regulation, combined with religious practice, means it is a chronotope that allows for contagion of the sacred.

In summary, the celebration of a *mulid* is considered extraordinary time – "a time without time", which is what some Tahrir Square campers expressed in relation to the 18 days of sit-in the *midam.* The mulid, as a communal management experience, allows the organization of social life in Tahrir to be transmuted into an agora by the counter-discursive practices of the young. At the same time, purifying actions, behaviours and cultural elements appear as powerful social transgressions. In conclusion, the celebration of a *mulid* can be understood as a background experience that young people of the popular classes brought to the occupation of Tahrir Square.

Cafés in downtown Cairo: youth culture meeting points

Cafés in downtown Cairo are a defining element in social relationships which are constructed not only among young people themselves, but also between young people and the rest of the community. Cafés appeared in Cairo in the 18th century as an importation of Turkish lifestyle and were converted to a special site for sociability among diverse social cairenne groups (de Koning, 2009). In every neighbourhood - upper, middle or poor – there are many such social centres that are central to the economic, politic and cultural life of the quarter. The different kinds of coffee shops in Cairo are places shaped by a particular set of social relations which interact in a particular location (Massey, 1994). After revolutionary action there is gravitation towards one kind or another; the choice of café is a mark of cultural identity and associated with different ideological perspectives on politics. Therefore, by considering

three main types of café that represent the principal hegemonic discourses in the public sphere, we can understand the play of politics in public space in downtown Cairo.

First, there are cosmopolitan "coffee-shops" (so-named in English by young Cairennes). They are relatively recent. Coffee-shops appeared in the mid-1990s in some upper-class districts such as Zamalek or Mohandisseen. A decade later, they could be found downtown. Mirroring their counterparts in the West, they offer global food such as Caesar salads and branded-sandwiches; huge satellite TV screens play music videos of jazz or Anglo-Saxon pop music. These coffee shops are set apart from other venues and immediate surroundings by their western style, immaculate cleanliness, and interior maintenance, as well as air-conditioning creating a constant comfortable climate. Their relevance as free places often termed "*THIS IS NOT EGYPT*" permits a certain westernized cosmopolitanism which is consumed as social distinction. Cilantro Coffee Shop in Mohamed Mahmoud Street is typical. Here there is a desired socio-cultural level of clientele, and appropriate behavior is strictly required of them. To conserve their "distinguished" style, social control is set up; first by luxurious prices - between 5 and 10 L.E; and second by hyper-surveillance in access control to prevent the entry of "dangerous" young members of *shabi* and poor social groups.

Coffee shop patrons are affluent young Cairennes. They are young people in their twenties and thirties who have expanded in number due to the modernization process which has diminished the traditional marriage model. This has seen the extension of the liminal period of partial adulthood, and points to the independence that many single upper-class professionals experience. This is based on the fact that many of them live for prolonged periods with their parents; but the fact of having middle or high purchasing power allows them to have some sort of personal independence. Moreover, mixed-gender conversations in coffee shops are negotiations regarding liberal social and

religious discourses sanctioned by popular preachers such as Amr Khaled. Due to the social closure of these spaces, a class-specific normalcy has been created with upper-class codes regarding youthful mixed gender behaviour. These are safe "public" spaces for young women beyond the family. While they are not marked as Islamic, their aura of respectability is assured by the absence of alcohol and closure regarding social entry. Coffee shops thereby negotiate around religious prescription and the desire for conspicuous consumption. They are, for many patrons, part of their reconciliation between "religion" and the "world"; they concern the possibility of being "modern" in Egypt for upper-class young groups.

The second type of café is known as *'ahawi* in colloquial Egyptian. There are traditional cafés in all Cairo areas. In contrast to coffee shops, *'ahawi* have neither a door nor access control. Prices are affordable and if you don't eat you can smoke a *shisha* - water pipe. *'Ahawi* have existed for centuries. They are traditionally places where male commoners meet to spend leisure time after a long day. Here they can socialise, listen to a singer, play backgammon and dominos, and talk about life. These cafés cover the street with tables and chairs during night-time hours if they are not situated in an alley.

It is important to note the difference between the traditional *'ahawi* called *baladi;* a place for sociability, especially in neighbourhoods, and some other kinds of *'ahawi* to be found in downtown Cairo that are nowadays full of young people, male and female, who show the same characteristics of independence as patrons of coffee shops. But in contrast with coffee shops patronage is not exclusive to one social class. People from different socio-economic and cultural backgrounds share the same space-time in *'ahawi*. Students, musicians and artists mix with *shabi* youth. They chat and are connected by electronic medium. El Borsa *'ahawi* is a good example. Located in front

of the stock market building it is the only *'ahawi* that opens during Ramadan days, a mark of secularism that confronts devout patrons. It is a mark of counter-culture. Before the revolution it was popular with activists and NGO workers. They would meet for food and drink from the nearby outlet during the evening. They used the café to hold meetings, prepare strategies and build sites of discussion. During the time of revolution it was the place where activists rested during the sit-in of Tahrir Square. Post-revolution, together with El Bustan *'ahawi* it remains a meeting point for human rights and political activists. El Bustan is a centre for intellectual exchange and El Borsa hosts youthful gatherings and political activism where not everyone wants to engage in intellectual or political discussion. Since both cafés were symbols of activism in Cairo, the Military Government wanted to stamp out meetings in these place so they were attacked in September 2011. The ostensible reason, which is amusing in a noisy city like Cairo, was that neighbours had protested about acoustic contamination by young people in the cafés. Thus criminalization of young people occupying central spaces is demonstrated to be a strategy of socially and politically cleansing public space in the interests of the elite according to competitive needs in the global city.

The third symbolic field of ideological/political orientation was the Islamist movement. In downtown Cairo it is difficult to find a specifically Islamic-oriented café as you might experience in Arab Gulf Countries. However, in Medinat Naser there is a special kind of new café. It is modern, clean and has a perfectly maintained interior, as well as air-conditioning. Yet here there is no music. These are gender segregated spaces and they do not sell alcohol beverages. In that way they resemble cafés and restaurants in Arab Gulf countries, offering authentic halal consumption to the new affluent Muslim middle class.

The café as a place can be understand as a semi-public and/or clandestine intersubjective space/time for group identity (see the introduction to this book). Thus it is a corner chronotope. But each of the three kinds of café operates differently. In Cairo coffee shops, patrons do not transform public space order against the logic of hegemony. Their closed clientele and high prices prevent the mixture of youth social groups while offering resources both modern and Islamic. Yet after the revolutionary events and the hardline ideological direction of political transition, moral control of public space became stronger in Egypt. In some cosmopolitan coffee shops downtown gender mixing became problematic. They became more like the modern Islamist cafés.

The second type of café, *'ahawi,* is perhaps more like an agora chronotope. It constitutes an open public, political collective space/time. In downtown *'ahawi* the meeting of diverse social groups of youth fosters a deliberative space of expression, strong emotion and solidarity. This everyday cultural work facilitates the building of a counter-discourse for impugning the hegemonic order. Encounters engender discourses that confront hegemonic cultural streams – in an explicit or implicit mode. This kind of informal counter-culture "rejects" more than it opposes, resists or rebels against hegemonic culture (Roszak, 1969). In summary, in these places young people set up an imagined community that critically interrogates the nation and State. In short, in the three types of cafés you can find activities, emotivities and uses which could be classified as the three main kinds of chronotope. For example, in the cafés young people can chat virtually - a body chronotope -, and physically - an agora chronotope. Thus in the "public" spaces of youth, they work together and construct a counter-discourse.

Midam Tahrir as an Agora Chronotope

So who was involved in the occupation of Tahrir Square? Islamists, cybernetic and political activists, NGO members, students, *fadda* - literally "those who do nothing," football hooligans, street kids and *zabalin* – urban material informal recyclers. It can be argued they shared an ideological horizon forged during years of struggle; their common symbol was the demand for freedom, dignity and social justice. As on other occasions during the 20th century, these diverse groups of youth attracted other age groups and professionals into the massive protest.[13] Also the imam of the mosque of Umar Makram - in a corner of the square - offered the prayer call to the campsite and his speech in the Friday *jutbas* to critics of the regime.

The young campers were accused of indecent acts, drug abuse and dancing to the rhythms of foreign fashion by the rulers, intellectuals and mainstream media. Yet the agora renamed by the campers as Revolution Square was on the world stage, challenging the distinctions established by the Egyptian social structure. And it was well-organized. All the knowledge was at their fingertips and was informed by counter-cultural forms articulated over previous years of struggle. The self-organisation of everyday life required in the *hara* equipped young people to organize a large-scale society at the square. The crowd crystallized in the square for a specific reason with a visible and tangible result: the creation of a *communitas* whose expressions were counter-cultural artefacts and means. Yet it was also an anti-structure that - far from

[13] For example, the 20th century uprisings against the British; the 1967 demonstrations against Israel and against political disaffection in 1968; the occupation of Tahrir Square during five days in 1972 to demand the return of the Sinai Peninsula; the 1980s bread riots; the 1990s Islamist protests. Furthermore, demonstrations against the regime in the new millenium demonstrate the young protagonist in political activism in Egypt uses traditional ways to organize protests (Sanchez García, 2012).

being ephemeral - became ubiquitous through social networking sites that added strength to the demonstrations. The occupation of Tahrir Square – the *midam* - by counter-cultural forms of dissidence transformed the square in an agora chronotope. The *midam* was a space without centralized supervision, where all the social groups could be present and work together to create a space/time for political discussion and lived experience. All the alternative subjectivities of the Egyptian sphere were there.

In the *midam* the campers were structured in residential areas according to different Egyptian social options. The upper classes had sophisticated tents, coolers and fans; using social networks to keep the world informed of events despite government computer outage. Even internal public space was organised:

> The first night the tents were next to each other, in an unstructured formation. Immediately, people started having disputes with those passing by: asking disturbing questions, watching them. So the next day, the formation of the tents changed to create more of a circle of tents with a big space in between, to allow visiting friends and people without tents a place to sit, socialize and sleep, and create a single gate into the circle of tents.[14]

In this tent circle the local Internet activists, with the help of anonymous online participants anywhere in the world, managed to immediately organize a parallel system of communication, using also the telephone and fax. Thus, the square became a broadcast centre for complaint and also a show of force against the bloody excesses in the death throes of the regime. They made new connections in the neighbourhood of the "twitterers" at the central rotunda in the square. They therefore held current first-hand information of what was happening in the square until the fall of the *Raïs*.

For their part, the *shabi* groups settled in using the usual *mulid* tents and by building shelters of cardboard and plastic. They prevented the attacks of the police and supporters of Mubarak. In the square this was done by so-named Popular Defence

[14] Interview with a young cybernetic activist from Muhandisin quarter in a modern district on the west bank of Nile in August 2011 in a cosmopolitan cafe called "Muhammad Ali."

Committees conducting internal security to prevent police infiltration and Baltagi[15] using violence. Control filters were installed to prevent use of hazardous building barricades at the entrances to the square and to provide safe passage to those who had to go in and out. In the end this was done using designed ID cards. Meanwhile, the defence points of the liberated square were supported by warning systems and ammunition supplies - stones and Molotov cocktails - with ropes and baskets for upload to the bridges, catapults and improvised defence positions. This arrangement was able to resist the attack of camel riders who were actually undercover police officers. Their identity was revealed in seized documents. In this defensive system, football hooligan groups - especially *Ahly* fans, *futuwah* of neighbourhoods forgotten by the government, youthful Islamists, *zabalin* and street kids, were the main protagonists.

However, some structural problems typical of cairenne society emerged. For example, there was dispute between pacifists and NGO groups about what to do with counter-revolutionary prisoners. The Popular Defence Committees decided to install a detention room in the Saddat underground station. Some people used violent practices against the prisoners and members of human rights groups accused them of violations. At same time, some street kids and tea sellers were accused of committing robberies in the high class youth tent camp.

However, there was also evidence of unity. Convergence in Tahrir Square of popular neighbourhood networks and opposition organizations created a heterogenous crowd led by young people from different social groups. Like in a *mulid,* the square, during the revolution, became a space for social inversion and transgression of the values and norms of everyday life. The occupation allowed their suspension, the

[15] Baltagi derives from Turkish *balta,* axe, meaning literally "the ones that take the axe." These are gangs which maintain control of informal markets, informal rent payments or drug commerce (Haenni, 2003). During the regime's last years they were contracted to manipulate the elections and maintain the public order in the quarters through violent practices.

inauguration of the new, and a renewal of time. Time was transformed into transcendental time – Revolutionary time - challenging profane time - pre-revolutionary time. The *chronotope* of the converted Square allowed purifying practices, behaviours and cultural elements that would normally have been powerful transgressions of the social order. Hierarchies of an economic and political nature, gender and age were suspended. Adults followed the slogans of the boys and girls, empowering them for the period that came after the revolutionary explosion. In short, like the *mulid* religious celebrations, the occupation of the Square "represent[ed] a temporary transit of the normal profane order of existence to the abnormal sacred order" (Leach 1971, 209). In the period of the Revolution the world was free from oppression and greed, and quotidian worries disappeared. But with Mubarak's fall, the order of quotidian life returned, the military kept on controlling the system and the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis attempted political hegemony, as they had always done in neighbourhoods and rural regions.

Thus it is possible understand the 18 days of sit-in in Tahrir Square as a recuperation of politically controlled space through a grammar articulated by young people that, mixing local and global expressions, manifested their rejection of the hegemonic order. The public space became a lived space for the airing of inequalities of injustice; a space privileged for alternative political practice. Dissenter actions during the revolt asserted the conviction that beyond political powers, the only way to direct their revolution was taking to the street as a privileged place to extend the culture of rejection. Notably though, following these revolutionary events, public space was entrenched as a place and an instrument for struggle against hegemonic domination contested between the three main symbolic fields of political ideology presented above.

From *hara* to *midam*: Public space in post-revolutionary Cairo

The city area around Tahrir Square represents a mixture of social and cultural forms of experiencing urban space. If we view this urban space as Duhau and Giglia (2008) have for the Mexico City context, the downtown - *wust al balad* - could be seen as "disputed" urban space between the different forms of living in the public space of the metropolis, including the alternative practices of counter-cultures that emerged during the days of the Revolution. During the pre-revoluionary regime the streets, squares and alleys were run by the State. In malls, gated communities, parks and some cinemas the presence of *shabi* people was forbidden. The police demanded to see the identification card of every *shabi* youth in the street. Informal street vendors took over some central areas such as *Talaa't Harb o Attaba* Square until the police appeared. This was everyday street politics. However the uprising transformed the manner of conceiving of, and living in, this urban space.

The Revolution that began on 25 January was certainly a re-appropriation of public space by different young groups that tried to impose their own perspective. Yet at the same time this quiet encroachment (Bayat, 2003) challenged fundamental aspects of State prerogative, including the meaning of order and control of public space. Before the riots, confronting a quiet encroachment was difficult for the government. Street politics meant negotiation between the authorities and popular classes about what was forbidden and permitted in the street. So the perception of public space differed between the official and the informal viewpoint. The Revolution changed the game. Now, without the Emergency Law in place, occupation of public space is a battle between different groups. It has produced a relocation of forms of defining the fabric and use of urban space. Reclaiming public space – squares, streets and also cafés, lies in different

modes of using them. It is not simply a fight over them. Rather, the different ideological discourses are expressed in the moral and political use that is made of them.

The follow ethnographic vignette offers an example. In the hot Ramadan of 2012, I was taking tea in a café in Marouf Street near Tahrir Square. A group of young people including girls wearing *nikab* were there taking a cup of tea and chatting about religious topics after *iftar*. After a few minutes, one of the boys tried to kiss the hand of his girlfriend. Immediately, two men wearing beards admonished the couple and begun a discussion about this kind of behaviour during Ramadan. After a few minutes all the café customers were divided in two factions: mainly bearded adult men against the couple and young men on behalf of the couple. Thereafter the two groups of men went outside and a fight began. This is an example of a kind of Islamic counterpublic discussion, initiated about an innocent kiss that escalated into a moral debate between different views on Islamic lifestyle. Yet it is also a good example of the situation of public space post-revolution. Without police in the street, everybody tries to control behaviour in public spaces like cafés.

In fact the struggle for control of public space in the post-revolutionary Egyptian context is anchored in specific places. While coffee shops like *El Borsa* or *El Bustan* remain meeting points for cosmopolitan youth, the transformation of Tala'at Harb Street into an informal market during Ramadan, Thursday nights and religious festivals by popular class youth, for example, demonstrates that the appropriation of public space by different youth cultures represents informal political confrontation manifested in everyday life. In that sense, the youth in the period before the revolution were perceived to be located on the margins of public space and yet were very central to it. Formal public space was dominated by social, cultural and political values that belonged to a much older generation set in its ways and not ready to empower a younger generation.

Nevertheless, young people created their own spaces in creative and innovative ways embedded at the very heart of public space but relatively invisible to the older generation. Cairo public space was being subtly transformed by the vibrant world of young people who were calling for change and exercising their citizenship in their own way.

Conclusion

Cairenne pre-revolution youth discourses and practices constituted a political counter-culture that could at any moment become visible. The public space of downtown Cairo - *wust al balad;* a disputed space, was the physical place of meetings. Downtown streets, squares, malls, cinemas, modern cafés and *'ahawi* were frequented by cosmopolitan, Islamist and *shabi* young people manifesting an ensemble of diverse youth cultures. Many youth activities in the space/time of the *hara* were based in local culture and religious orientation. Yet these chronotopic spaces of urban youth became mediators that channelled back into youth dissidence in conflictual political contexts. The union of many different kinds of youth constituencies meant that a heterogenous crowd converged at the *midam* of Tahrir Square, just as they did in other public spaces of North Africa and the Middle East during the Arab Spring.

Cafés and *mulid* as examples of chronotopes of youth, were mediators that fed back into youth dissidence in these political contexts of conflict. While these spaces are traditional in Egypt, the practices of groups of young people transformed them into hybrid social space. *Mulid* and *'ahawi* constitute two different ways of youth inhabiting both cosmopolitan and traditional urban space simultaneously. *Mulid* constitute traditional appropriation of urban space in *hara* and *ashabiyyat* that is important for the construction of a space of experience. And *'ahawi* constitute a cosmopolitan kind of

appropriation of urban space in downtown Cairo or *Wust al Balad;* a meeting point of the cultural dissent expressed by young people.

Within these youth appropriations that produce a counter discourse, it is essential to understand youth agency not as a natural category, or an age characteristic. On this point, after the "Arab Spring" Agrama (2012) has drawn attention to the capability of young people to break the secularist/religious dichotomy. In their work on language in the protests, they noted that the vindications of the demonstrators were perhaps expressed in secular or religious terms, but embraced none of them. "In the sense that it stood prior to religion and politics and that it was indifferent to the question of their distinction, the bare sovereignty manifested by the initial protests stood outside the problem-space of secularism. In that sense, it represented an asecular power" (Agrama 2012, 29).[92] This young "asecular" counter-discourse is now located in the post-revolution Egyptian public sphere and emphasises the contextual discursive framework. "Asecular discourses" signal new forms of understanding and seeing the global world by young people in Egypt. Moreover, the grammars of expression used in protests and manifestations – as *mulid* and political cafes downtown show, can be seen as the tools through which these "asecular narratives" are expressed.

In this age of global crises, two legitimacies are in conflict. There is the legitimacy of representative democracy and on the other hand the legitimacy of participatory democracy. The latter is rooted historically in subterranean activism practices of the streets. In conclusion, while not ignoring the importance of social electronic networks, examples of the subversive and contested use of Cairo public space in this chapter lets us see the transcendent nature of public space appropriation in

[92] Agrama justify their designation in this manner: "Why have I chosen the term asecular and not, say, non secular or post-secular to describe the power manifested by these protests? The term nonsecular is too easily confused with the notion of the 'religious.' In addition, unlike postsecular, asecular is not a temporal marker. It allows for the possibility that asecularity has, in different forms, always been part of contemporary life, even from within the traditions on which state secularity is based" (Agrama 2012, 29).

protest, demonstrations and manifestations that challenge neoliberal politics all over the world.

References

Agrama, H. 2011. "Asecular Revolution. Immanent Frame." Accessed May 15, 2014. http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/03/11/asecular-revolution/.

Agrama, H. 2012. "Reflections on secularism, democracy, and politics in Egypt." *American Ethnologist* 39 (1): 26–31.

Armbrust. W. 2000. *Mass culture and modernism in Egypt*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Asad, T. 2003. *Formations of the secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity*. New York: Stanford University Press.

Bauman, Z. 1991. *Modernity and ambivalence.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Bayat, A. 2003. "The "Street" and the politics of dissent in the Arab world." *Middle East Report* 226 (Spring): 10-17.

De Koning, A. 2009. *Global dreams: Class, gender, and public space in cosmopolitan Cairo.* Cairo: American University in Cairo Press.

Denis, E. 1997. "Urban planning and growth in Cairo." *Middle East Report* 202 (Winter).

Duhau, E. and Giglia, A. 2008. *Las reglas del desorden; habitar la metrópoli.* Mexico: University Press.

Durkheim, E. 1982. *The elementary forms of religious life.* New York: Collins.

Elsheshtawy, Y. 2006. "Urban transformations: Social control at al-Rifa'I Mosque and Sultan Hasan Square." In *Cairo cosmopolitan: Politics, culture and urban space in the new globalized Middle East*, edited by D. Singerman and P. Amar, 235-250. Cairo: The American university of Cairo Press.

Feixa, C., Pereira, I. and Juris, J. S. 2009. "Global citizenship and the "New, New" social movements: Iberian connections." *Young* 17(4): 421-442.

Foucault, M. 1972. *The archaeology of knowledge and the discourse on language*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Foucault, M. 2007 [1979]. *Security, territory, Population. Lectures at the collège de France, 1977-78.* London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Gramsci, A. 1971. *La política y el estado moderno.* Barcelona: Península.

Haenni, P. and Holtrop, T. 2002. "Mondaines spiritualités : Amr Khalid, shaykh branché de la jeunesse dorée du Caire." *Politique africaine 87* : 45-68.

Hall, S. and Jefferson, T. 1976. *Resistance through rituals: Youth subcultures in post-war Britain.* London: Hutchinson.

Hirschkind, C. 2001. "Civic virtue and religious reason: An Islamic counterpublic." *Cultural* Anthropology*,* 16 (1): 3-34

Ismail, S. 2000. "The popular movement dimensions of contemporary militant Islamism: Socio-spatial determinants in the Cairo urban setting." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42(2): 363-393.

Leach, E. R. 1958. "Magical hair." *Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute* 88 (11): 147-64.

Lefebvre, H. 1974. *La production de l'espace*. Paris: Anthropos.

Massey, D. 1994. *Space, place and gender*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Padilla, M. 2011. "Politizaciones en el ciberespacio*". Posiciones.* Accessed April 15, 2014. http://www.espaienblanc.net/IMG/pdf/3_politizacionesenelciberespacio.pdf.

Peterson, M. A. 2011. *Connected in Cairo: Growing up cosmopolitan in the modern Middle East*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Pleyers, G. 2010. *Alter-globalization.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Roszak, T. 1969. *The making of a counter culture.* New York: Anchor Books.

Rugh, W.A. 1987. *The Arab press.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Sánchez García, J. 2009. *Juventud en sociedades árabes: ¿Cómo construyen su identidad? Un ejemplo etnográfico: El Cairo*. Ph.D Dissertation. http://www.tesisenxarxa.net/TDX-0610109-115345/index.html#documents.

Sánchez García, J. 2010. "De las celebraciones para los santos a la Mulid Music Dance: utopia, identidad y juventud en espacios comunitarios en Egipto." *Revista Trans de Etnomusicología/Revista Transcultural de Música* 14. Accessed April 15, 2014. http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=82220947018.

Sánchez García, J. 2012. "La sociedad contra el Estado... egipcio: enfoques etnohistóricos de una revolución inacabada." *Quaderns-e* 16 (2): 34-55.

Schielke. S. 2012. *The perils of joy: Contesting mulid festivals in contemporary Egypt.* New York: Syracuse University.

Simmel, G. 1971. "The stranger." In *Georg Simmel: On individuality and social forms*, edited by D.N. Levine, 143-149. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Sims, D. 2003. "The case of Egypt". In *Understanding slums: Case studies for the global report on human settlements.* Nairobi, Kenya: UN-HABITAT. Accessed April 15, 2014. http://web.mit.edu/sigus/www/NEW/ challengecourse/pdfs/pdfscities/Cairo.pdf.

Singerman, D. 1995. *Avenues of participation: Family, politics and networks in urban quarters of Cairo*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Willis, P. 1978. *Profane culture.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Chapter 13
Geographies of the European Spring: The case of #SpanishRevolution

Jordi Nofre

Introduction

This chapter aims to make some geographical reflections on the #SpanishRevolution Movement. We know that countries cannot be treated as homogenous bodies. For example, the fact that mass youth protests occur in countries worldwide including such different nations as Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Chile, Spain, Italy, Portugal, USA, and the UK implies that geographical factors in the nation play a key role in fuelling such uprisings. In that sense, while the sub-regional scale analysis below takes some socioeconomic data into account, the chapter offers a geographical approach to understanding what became the Spanish 15M Movement. It proposes that geographical reasons shaped the fact that while there was a Spain that protested in the #SpanishRevolution during the third week of May 2011 - in industrialized regions such as Madrid, Catalonia, Comunitat Valenciana, and Western Andalucía - there was another Spain that stayed at home. This group was countryside Spain (for example, Ebro River Valley: Aragón and La Rioja; Castilla-La Mancha, and Castilla-León).

Contemporary youth movements have usually played a very important key role in the social and political evolution of countries. Examples of this include: youth revolts in French suburbs in November 2005; the so-termed Arab Spring; the "*Geração à Rasca* Movement" in Portugal; the youth riots in 2011 in some British working-class neighborhoods, and the #SpanishRevolution – also known as "Los Indignados", that

became the 15M Movement. Such recent events in the history of Europe seem to confirm youth as an agent of social and historical change, suggesting that generational succession might overcome class struggle as the main paradigm of political, social change in capitalist countries (Mannheim 1928; Ortega y Gasset 1935). However, that kind of reflection did not characterise the 20th century.

In fact, after the late 19th century, social and labor movements in western countries progressively converged into struggle for the creation of a completely new socioeconomic and political order that would mainly benefit the working class. This influenced many academics who studied social movements after World War II. They tended to understand social movements as a collective effort that deliberately sought to promote changes in any direction and by any means. These movements were usually fuelled by social conflicts including class, race and community. The consisted of conflicts, rebellions, insurrections, revolutions, riots, civil unrest and strikes (Wilkison 1971; Oberschall 1973; Castells 1977; Álvarez and Escobar 1992). Oberschall (1973) claimed a movement needed to have very active participation of its members in order to be defined as a social movement *per se*. However, Castells (1977) defined an urban social movement as the system of practices that emerged in a certain context that aimed to transform – or substantially modify - a certain urban system in structural terms. Castells argued that the strength of urban struggles to bring about social and political change was conditioned by the interclass-based nature of urban social movements themselves.

For neo-Marxist scholars, the success of an urban social movement largely depended on two factors: firstly, the kind of objectives targeted by the movement itself; and secondly, the process of how a social basis became an active political force (Castells 1977; Bettin 1979). However, in the 1980s urban social struggles began to incorporate new claims on collective identity and everyday space-time, among other issues (Melucci 1985). Thus Giddens (1985) identified four kinds of new social movements operating in contemporary western societies: 1) democratic movements; 2) labor movements; 3) ecological movements, and 4) peace movements. They were defined as the "new social movements" (Brands 1987). Mostly composed of young middle class people, they aimed at influencing public opinion in the continuing search for improving individual and collective life (Klandermans 1986; Russell et al. 1992). However, the progressive "carnivalization" of their demonstrations and performances in public spaces led to a

devaluation of their social power and loss of influence on public opinion, while their legitimacy often continued to be violently denied by State authorities.

Today's social protests in Europe have a new face. In the last decade a new politicized generation has arisen. Mainly composed of young people aged between 20 and 35 (Feixa et al. 2002), this generation is (re)produced largely thanks to virtual social networks, blogging (wordpress®, blogspot®) and microblogging (Twitter®) technologies. These communication and information technologies constitute today's most efficient tools for the social and political struggles of NGOs, new social political and cultural associations, neighbourhood associations, informal groups for social justice, ecologists and solidarity groups (Feixa et al. 2002; Stein 2009; Reygadas et al. 2009; Feixa et al. 2009; Sánchez 2011). However, most of the works published on the current apparent global youth revolt tend to miss three significant facts: 1) the socioeconomic causes of events like the European Spring; 2) the criminalization of being young (Castells 2011) as part of the politics of urban security that socially sanitize the competitive city and thus ensure the process of urban branding; and 3) the geographical factors in youth revolt worldwide.

Fortunately, socioeconomic understanding has been represented. For example, the UK newspaper *The Guardian* published *Reading the riots. Investigating England's summer of disorder* (Roberts 2011). This book offers some outstanding essays by authors from the London School of Economics, analysing the riots that occurred in August 2011 in London, Birmingham, Manchester, Saldford, Nottingham and Liverpool. It appears that 59% of the arrested people came from the most deprived 20% areas in the United Kingdom, indicating widespread anger and frustration, not only at the police but at the increase in university tuition fees, the closure of youth services and the scrapping of the education maintenance allowance. Many complained about perceived social and economic injustices (Roberts 2011). It is clear we need more detail about which economic injustices foster youth revolt. Certainly there has been evident middle-class downward mobility that has been especially reinforced in European-Mediterranean countries over recent years (López and Rodríguez 2010; 2011). I will later recover this socioeconomic approach in explaining geographical factors in the rise of the Spanish 15M Movement. But first some other issues must be pointed out to better understand the complex social and political context of youth revolts in Southern Europe.

Youth dissent in Southern Europe

As indicated above, scholars have to some extent sidestepped deep analysis of the nature of those social and economic injustices fuelling recent mass protests worldwide. However, some recent work on different socioeconomic trajectories in the last 50 years allows us to highlight the nature of such social and economic injustices in Spain (see López and Rodríguez 2010, 2011; Navarro et al. 2011), which may also apply to Southern Europe more generally. First, there is the progressive loss of social rights gained a few decades ago in a then-more-favorable macro-economic context. Second, there is the lack of socioeconomic stability from income which would eventually permit young individuals to partner and plan a family. Third, there is the privatization, increasing elitism and commodification of public university education. Finally, there is the increased precarity of the labor market. Among other factors these can be seen as the main reasons fuelling today's social protests by youth in Western Europe. Youthful protesters are against the increasing harsh precarity of the workforce where they are obliged to accept either high rates of unemployment or junk jobs devoid of social security and labor rights. They feel they are without any prospect of individual stability (Feixa et al. 2002).

When young people and the unemployed are faced with such a daily scenario, Castells (2011) warns about the rupture between citizens and politicians. Similarly Wieviorka (2011) points out in an online publication in Spanish that "the old way to do politics is gone. There arises a new way, subordinated to individual as well as collective demands crying out for human rights, respect and the recognition of particular identities while not calling universal values into question. Those political parties that do not understand such demands are doomed to disintegration". He adds "Up to now, new social and cultural actors have had more success in questioning politicians rather than weakening dominant economic logics. The social is placed above the cultural".

The emergence of neoliberal urban governance has occurred during the last two decades in cities worldwide (Leitner et al. 2007). As a transition this has ranged from a low intensity politics of social sanitization of the inner city and its working-class suburbs (Nofre 2009), to the establishment of a violent politics to eradicate perilous social noise in the process of urban branding for the elite of the city (Garnier 2010). In fact, acknowledgement of increasingly harsh processes of neoliberal governance makes

it easier to understand reasons behind the violent expulsions of occupiers that recently occurred in several "occupied" cities, among others, Madrid (May 16, 2011), Barcelona (May 27, 2011), New York (November 19, 2011) and London (February 28, 2012). The violent expulsion of occupiers and demonstrators constitutes the most visible sequel to the European *banlieues* pattern in criminalizing youth because they are youth. This pattern is a real everyday scenario in our post-Fordist cities. It seems to be the case in, for example, most Southern European countries, like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

Why did the 15M movement emerge? A geographical approach

Some relevant work on the emergence of the 15M movement seems to offer some answers to the question above (see García Ajofrín et al. 2011; Abellan Bordallo 2011; Fernández de Rota 2011; Hughes 2011; Chamock et al. 2012). Chamock et al. (2012) carried out a productive analysis of the role played by social networks in the 15M Movement. Network communication emphasized dissatisfaction with the two-party political system, the venality of political and economic elites, widespread corruption, and the economic crisis and the politics of austerity. These were foregrounded as the main causes to take the streets. On the other hand, Durgan and Sans (2011) carried out a highly political, class-based analysis of the Spanish 15M Movement. They noted that 15M demanded no more support for the banks. They argued for the defense of public services. They demanded the rich pay for the crisis of the poor. They also proposed the need to take on the system in its entirety. Durgan and Sans (2011) conclude that the prolongation of the crisis and threat from the right means that the situation remains explosive for youth in dissent. However, despite these laudable studies, no study of 15M published up to now has focused on the spatialities of the #SpanishRevolution, that is to say, on the geography of how the 15M Movement emerged.

It is not surprising to find a certain apathy now in regard to scholarship on the 15M Movement, which may be relevant to the lack of geographical analysis of it. Despite titles on the 15M Movement flooding bookshelves of bookstores in Spain, most of them are sociological reflections or ethnographic essays, and almost all reach a common conclusion: nobody has any idea on the future of the 15M Movement. However, they also reflect a far more interesting issue: they tend to deal with Spain's 15M Movement as a single homogenous entity. Yet this is very far away from the reality/ies. The case

study here of the #SpanishRevolution from a geographical perspective is thus of scientific interest because it recognises the political-historical particularities of Spain, which are unique in the whole of Europe. The geographical framework of analysis can also deal effectively with Spain's complex political-administrative structure, which features secular territorial tensions between peripheral nations-without-state (such as Catalonia, Galiza and the Basque Country) and the Spanish central State.

So how did this case study come to be written? When the #SpanishRevolution initially arose on May 15, 2011, I followed my twitter account paying special attention to the locality of each protest encampment announced. I quickly perceived a certain absence of countryside Spain, so I started to register all encampments by continuously checking four sources of geo-located real-time data. It permitted me to build a geo-referenced database of those Spanish plazas which were occupied on the evening of 21 May 2011. Data sources were Twitter® *hashtags* related to the #SpanishRevolution (#acampadasol; #acampadabcn; #acampadacadiz, and so on), real-time data server IkiMaps, leftist blog TechnoAnt; and the first website for the so-called United Global Change (www.yeswecamp.org). Because data corroboration *in situ* was obviously impossible, a methodology was created that could ensure maximum credibility of data. Therefore every related hashtag was tracked. Once any encampment was notified, data were confirmed to be part of the geo-referenced database for the case study. This procedure was repeated until eventually a total of 219 towns and villages were validated. It was surmised that the #SpanishRevolution might be understood as yet another episode in the secular clashes that have occurred along with the industrialization of the country. These historical clashes have long been between the so-called Twin Spains (Oliver de Santos 1906; Machado 1915); now a struggle between urban, young, modern Spain and rural, old, traditional Spain.

To investigate this, I carried out a sub-regional scale analysis of the process of the arising of the #SpanishRevolution in the third week of May 2011. Socioeconomic data was taken into account. It was geo-analyzed to demonstrate the very urban nature of the #SpanishRevolution. Thus, whereas protesters occupied plazas in 93.1% of Spanish cities with 200,000-500,000 inhabitants, only 1.48% of Spanish municipalities with less than 10,000 inhabitants registered any kind of protest act during the third week of May 2011. This suggests differentiated behavior between urban and rural Spain.

New citizen activism

Over the past five years, many social network platforms have emerged due to the blogging and microblogging revolution (Loewenstein 2008). They have nothing to do with traditional forms of politicization of citizens, nor traditional union trades, nor those neighborhood movements initially sponsored by clandestine left-wing parties under the Spanish fascist regime. As Bob Dylan sang, "the times they are a'changing." As the online presentation of the Spanish newly-formed platform "Real Democracy Now" shows, a new citizen activism is emerging:

> This call for a non-partisan protest rally has been created throughout internet and social networks, and it has being promoted from an informal discussion group named "Platform for the Coordination of Citizen Pro-Action Groups", whose sole purpose is to promote an open, public discussion among all those who want to be involved in preparing and coordinating common actions. People of all conditions are dissatisfied with the current and economic system. Some of us act as individuals while others belong to citizen platforms, discussion forums, blogs or groups born from several virtual social networks.
>
> (Accessed May 29, 2011. http://www.democraciarealya.es/?page_id=264).

Some social urban movements in Spain such as "NoLesVotes" (Do not vote for them), "Con V de Vivienda" (With H in Housing), "Juventud Sin Futuro" (Youth with no future) and "Democracia Real Ya!" (Real Democracy Now!) call for protest marches. They demand the right to housing. They protest against the poor quality of democracy in Spain, the precarity of the labor market and denounce widespread corruption carried out by politicians. There was a massive protest on Sunday 15 May 2011 at 7 p.m. in many Spanish plazas under the motto "Real Democracy Now." Maximum crowds gathered – as already expected - in Madrid, the Spanish capital, where participants came together at Plaza del Sol. After two days and two nights of 24 hour occupation, police decided to violently clear this occupied square. The response was to protest indefinitely not only for the initial motives, nor just because of the violent repression by the police, but also to show their discontent and dissatisfaction about many issues which daily constitute the everyday life of most Spanish citizens: high mortgages, lack of housing, low salaries, and so on. Thousands of people took to the Plaza de Sol Square and camped as #SpanishRevolution until the day of the local elections, May 22, 2011. The following table shows the main areas of citizen concern in a household survey.

Table 1: Responses to Question 7: “What is the main problem that currently exists in Spain?”

Variable	% multi-answer
Unemployment	82,50
Economy	47,20
Politics and corruption*	26,65
Terrorism	14,00
Immigration	12,00
Insecurity	8,00
Housing	5,50

* “Politicians”, “Fraud” and “Corruption” responses are included.

Source: Jordi Nofre © 2012, from Barometer April 2011, Nº. 2886. Social Research Centre of Spain (CIS).

Obviously, a survey (see Table 1) does not show in detail the very nature of problems that collectively or individually affect citizens. In that sense, investigating an alternative data source is useful for gaining awareness of the real problems affecting citizens. Analysis of discussions posted on the #SpanishRevolution online forum between May 21, 2011 at 00:0 a.m. and May 28, 2011 at 2:03 p.m. allows us to see which are the main (real) problems reported by users of that forum:

Table 2. List of most popular discussion strands in the Forum.

Issue	Votes	Followers	Visitors	Comments
Which ideas or suggestions do you think are needed?	4	1	1800	110
The only real choice: A Popular Legislative Action.	7	1	1400	72
Ideas to reduce unemployment	4	3	1100	51
Create a new "party" to remove this fake and set up a real democracy	0	2	904	37
Others	2	2	871	30

Source: Jordi Nofre © 2012. Accessed May 28, 2011. http://movimiento15m.org/movimiento-15m-el-foro.

These five most popular discussions in the virtual forum highlight a certain desire to change the political and administrative organization of the State. However, a full reading of the issues posted in the forum reveals several concerns that go beyond a simple political and administrative reform. They include a wide spectrum of concerns, from the need to stop public funding public for the Catholic Church to reforming the Spanish Constitution and the cleaning up of political corruption that is so widespread in certain areas of the country (see Map 1 below). But if there is an issue that is particularly relevant, it is that which Friedrich Engels denounced in his 1844 book on the conditions of the working class in Manchester, UK. In that sense, the principles in the manifesto of the 15-M Movement bring together key points that have characterized class-based struggles throughout contemporary western history:

> The priorities of any advanced society must be equality, progress, solidarity, free access to culture, ecological sustainability and development, welfare, and happiness of people. There are some basic rights that should be covered in these societies: the right to housing, employment, culture, health, education, political participation, free personal development, and the right to consume the goods necessary for health and happiness. The current operation of our economic and governmental system does not address these priorities and is an obstacle to human progress.
>
> (Accessed May 29, 2011. http://movimiento15m.org/foro/discussion/4/manifiesto-democracia-real-ya).

The manifesto emphasizes that the Spanish government fails to address key priorities identified by most citizens. The map of political corruption shows a significant resemblance to the map of protest encampments that took place on the afternoon of May

21, 2011 (see Map 1 below). The reasons for similarity should be sought in the polarized socioeconomic scenario that characterizes everyday life in Spain: corruption, fraud, significant rates of embezzlement of public funds, a national unemployment rate of more than 22% which could continue for another 17 years (OECD 2011), and increased police violence against young protesters in the last ten years. All of these issues constituted important reasons to occupy Spanish plazas during the third week of May. To illuminate this further, we can analyze geographical factors to explain the emergence of the #SpanishRevolution.

#SpanishRevolution as a clash between urban (new) Spain and rural (old) Spain

HERE PLACE MAP 1

On the afternoon of 21 May 2011, a day before the scheduled local and regional elections in Spain, encampments and/or protest rallies took place in a total of 219 municipalities (see Map 1 above). However, this accounted for only 2.7 per cent of municipalities in the whole of Spain. Despite this relatively small percentage of locations, the occupations provoked a notable frenzy in the mass media. This was because the two biggest cities, Madrid and Barcelona, had clearly become the main focus of the #SpanishRevolution. However, a very detailed reading, beyond simple description of the spatial distribution of encampments, reveals the primarily urban nature of the #SpanishRevolution. The maps actually highlight a key phenomenon: there is a Spain that protests in contrast to a Spain that stays at home. The discussion below indicates that his polarised behavior refers to the existence of an urban, industrial and young Spain that differs from the rural, traditional, old Spain. In order to characterize those municipalities in which encampments and/or protest acts took place on the afternoon of May 21, 2011 - the day which registered the greatest number of protesters – an initial geo-statistic data analysis was conducted for the 219 municipalities. Thus:

a) Only in 10 of 5,788 villages with populations less than 2,000 was there any kind of encampment or rally related to the #SpanishRevolution;

b) An encampment and/or rally took place in 25 of 1,575 villages populated between 2,000 and 10,000;

c) An encampment and/or rally took place in 81 of 606 small-sized cities populated between 10,000 and 50,000;

d) An encampment and/or rally took place in 76 of 116 medium-sized cities populated between 50,000 and 200,000;

e) An encampment and/or rally took place in 21 of 23 Spanish cities populated between 200,000 and 500,000;

f) An encampment and/or rally took place in 4 out of 4 cities populated between 500,000 and 1,000,000;

g) An encampment and/or rally took place in both Spain's biggest cities, Madrid and Barcelona, populated by more than 1 million.

In other words, encampments and protest acts took place in 93.1 per cent of urban centres with over 200,000 inhabitants. They also took place in all cities with populations of more than 500,000. Conversely, only 1.48 per cent of villages with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants registered any kind of protest act. Thus protests did not spread across all the country. A detailed reading of the geolocalization of encampments allows us to see the greater participation in the most populated areas of Spain. Reasons for such differentiated behavior in the #SpanishRevolution in the third week of May 2011 is proposed to lie in the differentiated modernization of the country (Perpiñá Grau 1952; Méndez and Molinero 1993).

Differentiated results of the process of modernization in Spain during the last two centuries explain the leading role of the two biggest Spanish cities, Madrid and Barcelona, in contrast to the non-participation of rural Spain. However, it was the case that some traditional industrial regions of the country (like the marginal provinces of Asturias, Pontevedra and Cádiz) also registered a high number of protests. These traditional industrial regions outside major cities have not fully participated in the transformation of the productive structure of Spain since the entry of the country into the European Economic Community in 1986 (Méndez and Molinero 1993). The active role of university cities in fuelling the initial #SpanishRevolution was also noted, indicating the 15M Movement is primarily a youth movement, although here the concept of youth has a broad range.

HERE PLACE MAP 2

Table 3. Socioeconomic characterization of those provinces that actively participated in the #SpanishRevolution (top) and those that did not (bottom).

Province	TM 2011	Encam pm.	UR2008 (%)	UR2010 (%)	IN. Turnov. 2009	AEPH2005	AHPC2005	AHPC=100
Cádiz	44	8	19,36	27,97	52.612.930,00	23619,819	7.533,71	87,08
Málaga	100	10	18,50	27,97	52.612.930,00	23.619,81	7.533,71	87,08
Pontevedra	62	6	10,07	15,40	33.376.071,00	22.866,29	7.549,77	87,27
Barcelona	311	28	8,72	17,75	116.662.011,00	25.324,32	9.296,70	107,46
Madrid	179	16	8,69	16,08	54.060.054,00	31.528,96	10.653,93	123,15
Murcia	45	4	12,63	23,35	13.413.410,00	21.859,88	7.242,15	83,71
Ciudad Real	102	8	13,26	20,99	23.192.640,00	20.952,70	7.277,13	84,12
Alacant	141	11	13,50	23,30	47.815.115,00	25.844,78	9.094,86	105,13
Asturias	78	6	8,44	15,97	12.456.141,00	22.323,39	8.160,48	94,33
Av. Value	-	-	12,58	20,98	45.133.478,00	21.591,13	8.260,27	95,48

Province	TM 2011	Encam pm.	UR2008 (%)	UR2010 (%)	IN. Turnov. 2009	AEPH2005	AHPC2005	AHPC=100
Zamora	248	1	9,37	15,78	32.125.294,00	21.437,72	8.104,38	93,68
Teruel	236	1	6,35	14,77	21.881.725,00	25.003,04	9.041,33	104,51
Palencia	191	1	9,39	15,78	32.125.294,00	21.437,72	8.104,38	93,68
Soria	183	1	5,42	15,78	32.125.294,00	21.437,72	8.104,38	93,68
Burgos	371	3	9,04	15,78	32.125.294,00	21.437,72	8.104,38	93,68
Cuenca	238	2	7,80	20,99	23.192.640,00	20.952,70	7.277,13	84,12
Lleida	231	2	6,41	17,75	116.662.011,00	25.324,32	9.296,70	107,46
Vizcaya	112	1	7,67	10,55	44.636.849,00	29.508,79	10.330,71	119,41
León	211	2	9,51	15,78	32.125.294,00	21.437,72	8.104,38	93,68
Segovia	209	2	9,82	15,78	32.125.294,00	21.437,72	8.104,38	93,68
Valor Medio	-	-	8,08	15,87	39.912.498,90	22.941,52	8.457,22	97,76

Note: All data refers to the respective Autonomous Community or Region, as indicated in the left column. TM: total of municipalities per province; UR: Unemployment rate; IN.Turnov: Industrial turnovers; AEPH: average expenditure per household; AEPC: average expenditure per capita; AEPC=100: index 100-based average expenditure per capita.

Source: Jordi Nofre © 2012, from data provided by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics, 2011.

The leading role of most of the Spanish university cities indicates that, first, there is increasing anxiety among young people largely due to the lack of individual labor-related perspectives; a 49.8 per cent youth unemployment rate. Second, this fact implies

consolidation of a no-future scenario in the collective imagination of young Spaniards. In fact, the Spain that took the streets in May 2011 had higher annual rates of unemployment (20.98 per cent on average) than the Spain that did not protest, at 15.87 per cent on average (see Table 3). Moreover, there was a high increase in unemployment rates during the period 2008-2010, especially in those territories that took a leading role in the 2011 #SpanishRevolution (see also Table 3) and these were university cities. In fact, most involved university cities are located in territories which have been highly specialized in agroindustry, real estate construction and low-cost tourism since the late 1950s (López and Rodríguez 2011). The transition to post-productivist agriculture still remains incomplete in most of rural Spain (Ilbery and Bowler 1998; Hoggart and Paniagua 2007). Even today those regions continue to be marked by rejection of any initiative to begin eliminating public subsidies that have been funding rural Spain since the 1950s (López and Rodríguez 2011).

Table 4. Regional Tributary Resources per capita (2006), and Total Guaranteed Regional Funding per capita (2006).

REGIONAL TRIBUTARY RESOURCES PER CAPITA			
Region	Euros/capita	i=100	Order
Madrid	2,536.00	147	1
Catalunya	2,148.00	125	3
Comunitat Valenciana	1,779.00	103	6
SPAIN	1,724.00	100	-
Castilla y León	1,481.00	86	10
Castilla -La Mancha	1,384.00	80	11
Extremadura	1,055.00	77	14

TOTAL GUARANTEED FUNDING			
Region	Euros/capita	i=100	Order
Extremadura	2,643.00	119	1
Castilla y León	2,438.00	109	4
Castilla -La Mancha	2,228.00	103	9
SPAIN	2,227.00	100	-
Catalunya	2,143.00	96	10
Madrid	2,094.00	94	12
Comunitat Valenciana	2,046.00	92	14

Source: Jordi Nofre © 2012, from data provided by the Catalan Business Center [www.concat.cat]

Generous state subsidies to rural Spain to further the interests of the wealthiest territories, in other words unequal wealth distribution between the richest and the poorest autonomous regions of Spain, is another key factor differentiating collective response between the Spain that took the streets and the other Spain that stayed at home. Regional funding in Spain is mostly supported by the richest regions, namely the Autonomous Community of Madrid, Catalunya, Illes Balears, and Comunitat Valenciana – these three belong to the Catalan Counties. As stated in the Organic Law on the Financing of Autonomous Communities (LOFCA), both the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund and the Regional Economic Incentives System are the established compensatory mechanisms to finance countryside Spain. Table 4 above clearly shows the most favored territories in receiving State funding as well as European Regional Development Funds (ERDF). For example, Extremadura and Castilla y León are typical of rural constituencies that stayed at home in the third week of May 2011. This subsidy-driven inequality does not constitute the main grievance fuelling the 15M Movement, but it has fuelled social unrest in urban Spain.

Young Spain rising up against old Spain

Youth social unrest during the #SpanishRevolution was expressed in many ways, but especially in graphics. Some posters shown in Plaza del Sol (Madrid) and Plaça Catalunya (Barcelona) pondered why it is necessary to study so much if, after all, it is impossible to get a job. In fact, the labor market in Spain has collapsed. Moreover there are two adult generations blocking the insertion of young people into the segment of the labor market that has had a minimum of decent conditions since the 1990s. There is an urban adult generation commonly known in Spain as the Old School Generation (skilled wage-earning workers between 55 to 65 years) and also a new adult generation of technocrats – highly-educated, skilled technicians aged between 40 to 50 years, some of them belonging to the new middle classes (Florida 2000). Young people have been willing to earn less than these older generations, but now there are far fewer jobs for them. This feature of today's labor market in urban Spain is different from the countryside where farming labor market structure continues to be partially marked by

some traditional family dynamics that were established in the middle ages. There are fewer young people seeking jobs here. Many have moved to the cities.

Table 5. Aging rates in those Spanish provinces where there was more protest (top) and where there was little protest (bottom), 2009.

Province	No. of Municipalities / Prov.	No. of Encamp.	Aging Rate (Spain=100)
Cádiz	44	8	76,17
Málaga	100	10	84,80
Pontevedra	62	6	134,96
Barcelona	311	28	104,38
Madrid	179	16	91,49
Murcia	45	4	73,16
Ciudad Real	102	8	116,51
Alacant	141	11	101,52
Asturias	78	6	194,12
Average	-	-	108,57

Province	No. of Municipalities / Prov.	No. of Encamp.	Aging Rate (Spain=100)
Zamora	248	1	259,63
Teruel	236	1	177,21
Palencia	191	1	188,98
Soria	183	1	187,70
Burgos	371	3	157,45
Cuenca	238	2	157,15
Lleida	231	2	115,97
Vizcaya	112	1	150,91
León	211	2	212,03
Segovia	209	2	147,29
Average	-	-	175,43

Source: Jordi Nofre © 2012, from data provided by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics, 2011.

The relationship between old Spain - rural, older people - and urban, industrial Spain - young and modern - has a long and complex trajectory. The cases of Asturias, Pontevedra (Galicia), and Lleida (Catalonia) offer a good example. The first two provinces demonstated a high number of occupations, even though they have high rates of aged population respectively (see Table 5 above), much more so than some other provinces which registered a low number of encampments or protest rallies on 21 May 2011. However, they are provinces traditionally marked by a very long trajectory of class struggle: the Metal Workers Trade Union from Pontevedra fought against the fascist regime and, later, the de-industrialization of shipyards and iron and steel

industries in the 1980s (Méndez and Molinero 1993). Similarly, Asturias also has a long class struggle tradition.

However, the case of protest participation in the province of Lleida (Catalonia) is not explicable in terms of class struggle, but relates to the problem of the scale of analysis. Although this province had an aging index rate of 115.97 per cent in 2009, its capital city, also named Lleida, had a lower index, nearly 93 per cent. The reason for the discrepancy lies in the presence of two university campuses in the city that have played a part in the rejuvenation of the city. However, there is also the presence of a strong local political claim related to the independence of Catalonia. This was not a marginal issue in motivating extensive local participation in the #SpanishRevolution in Lleida (or #CatalanRevolution, as somebody hashtagged). Therefore in the case of the Lleida occupation it was not only about young Spain against old Spain, but a mixture of claims of a different nature. Yet even so, they converged at the same point: the desire not to belong to an outdated Spain.

United for Global Change Day: 15M as example of a new urban phenomenon

After the #SpanishRevolution that began in the third week of May 2011, youth occupations took place across not only across the whole of Europe, but worldwide. From Syntagma Square to Rothschild Avenue in Tel-Aviv or Zuccotti Park in New York occupied by the #OccupyWallStreet Movement, youth protests were extensive. With the primary objective of coordinating a global protest day, several protest assemblies (neighbourhood organisational units) under the umbrella of the 15M Movement decided to organize a global protest day on 15 October 2011. In the case of Spain, this global protest day had much more meaning than in other countries. In comparison to the initial #SpanishRevolution protests in the third week of May, the 15M Movement on 15 October almost exclusively belonged to urban Spain:

a) None of the 5,788 Spanish villages populated with less than 2,000 registered any kind of 15M-related event on October 15; there were 10 in May 21, 2011.

b) In only 2 of 1,575 villages populated between 2,000 and 10,000 was there any kind of protest on October 15, meaning a decrease of 92 per cent with respect to May 2011 when there were 25.

c) They were protests in 23 of 606 Spanish small towns populated between 10,000 and 50,000, while there were 81 in May 2011, a decrease of 71.6 per cent.

d) There were protests in 42 of 116 medium-sized towns populated between 50,000 and 200,000, while there were 76 in May 2011, a decrease of 44.74 per cent.

e) There were protests in 19 of 23 Spanish towns, meaning a small decrease of 9.52 per cent in comparison to May 2011 when there were 21.

f) Protests took place in all Spanish towns populated between 500,000 and 1 milion, as occurred in May 2011.

g) Mass protests took place in Barcelona and Madrid, just as they did in May 2011.

A total of 142 of the 219 urban centres where protests took place in May 2011 during the #SpanishRevolution saw no protests on October 15, 2011 (64.84%). Although 66.9 per cent of these 142 settlements can be defined as urban because they are populated by more than 10,000 (INE, 2011), their morphology, their physical emplacement, and their highly specialised and productive agricultural systems mean they are more like large villages than modern towns or cities. The other places where protests had previously occurred but which did not participate in the global protest day of October 15 were in the metropolitan areas of Madrid and Barcelona.

HERE PLACE MAP 3

Comparing the number and typology of those towns that participated in the birth of the 15M Movement and those ones that did not, allows the hypothesising of some mid-term scenarios for the "Los Indignados" Movement in Spain. First, there seems to be growing disinterest or discouragement among 15M activists. Second, the 15M Movement has become even more urban and is invaded by a collective apathy from lack of motivation in its social bases. The "big city" protest has perhaps become irrelevant; it is quasi-anonymous and reflects just any topic of protest. This would explain the resounding failure of the invited protest by the 15M Movement in front of the Royal Academy of Television on November 14 at the conclusion of debate between presidential candidates of the two major Spanish political parties, Popular Party (PP) and Socialist Party (PSOE). Another failure of the 15M Movement was the attempt to

re-occupy the Plaza del Sol in Madrid one day before the Spanish legislative elections held on November 19, 2011. The number of people concentrated in the central square of the Spanish capital was very different from May 21, 2011. Although a significant number of protesters came during the morning, it was far away from the vast number of occupiers that overflowed the square half a year before.

Given this very different response half a year after the #SpanishRevolution, the question must be raised about the wisdom of decentralizing the 15M Movement assemblies into neighborhoods. Many authors have emphasized the political power of formal public place (for example, Lefebvre 1968, 1974; De Certeau 1984; Pred 1985; Agnew 1989; Hershkovitz 1992, Mauger 2007; Juris and Pleyers 2009; Kimmelman 2011). To occupy a square and take major streets challenges the domination of space by the hegemonic political authorities of the inner city. It creates a schism where those who have neither power nor economic capital – young people and their supporters - challenge the exercise of hegemony in the symbolic place where it is (re)produced. The center of the city is occupied, appropriated and transformed to make visible the practice of political dissidence (De Certeau 1984). However, it might be that the internal decentralization and the internationalization of the 15M Movement has led to a depoliticization among supporters. The answer to that question is not easy. The 15M movement took the strategy of decentralizing their actions in contrast with what happened in Syntagma Square (Athens) and Tahrir Square (Cairo), but it is not clear how the decision to adopt that decentralizing strategy was made, or by whom. The initiative to "Take the Neighborhoods" can be seen as a strategy of assimilation of social resistance that subtly worked in the interests of the State. The possibility arises that the #SpanishRevolution was a "controlled" social uprising permitted by the State to avoid critical social scenarios of escalating youth dissent.

Conclusion

The growing indignation of young people against job loss/precarity and economic austerity has been targeted at the dominant classes of the inner city in recent years (Mauger 2007; Garnier 2010; Feixa 2011). Although the global mass media have drawn some parallels between the French *banlieues* revolt in November 2005 (Jaurreau 2005; Lagrange 2005; Brossat 2006; Mauger 2007) and some episodes of the European

Spring, much academic scholarship tends to avoid such comparisons. Notably, this has occurred at the same time as depoliticization of youth studies and consolidation of a neoconservative research agenda among scholars worldwide. Thus concepts such as class struggle and social conflict have disappeared, to be replaced by non-political terms such as negotiation, hybridization or "neo-tribalism" (Maffesoli 1988). Perhaps this "decorative sociology" (Rojek and Turner 2000) has to do with lack of capacity to propose a research agenda to decode the very nature of this apparent global youth revolution.

It seems clear that if we do not take social class into account as a key analytical concept in social science, no relationship can readily be established between the youth revolt in French *banlieues* in mid-autumn 2005 and the youth-driven revolts of the European Spring. They are apparently not connected. To connect them we need a class-based analysis of the criminalization of being young in contemporary conditions. However, the criminalization of being young has not been much explored up to now (Castells 2011), even though the criminalization of spaces of protest is one of the most visible faces of the penitential trend of the neoliberal State. As a first stage in exploring the criminalization of being young in post-Fordist societies I would suggest it mainly operates by means of five processes: labor precarity, housing insecurity, financial insecurity, and health consequences deriving from the stigma of being young. The role that everyday criminalization of being young plays in the increase of emotional, anxiety, depressive, panic, phobia, and obsessive-compulsive disorders, among others (Murali and Oyebode 2004) should not be dismissed.

Increased precarity of everyday life not only for young working class people, but for young middle class people must be acknowledged as one of the main causes of the European Spring, the #OccupyWallStreet movement, the #SpanishRevolution/15M movement and other recent mass youth protests across the world. Faced with these events, the State deploys a rhetoric of city-securitization and zero-tolerance to socially and politically control the re-emergence of class consciousness in youth; following a period of apparent de-politicization after the earlier youth revolution symbolised by May 1968 (Mauger 2007; Garnier 2010). Re-politicized, implictly criminalized youth worldwide tend to express their demands at central, symbolic spaces of the inner city. These spaces are often affected by urban renewal or gentrification, thus they are perhaps central "spectacle-oriented" urban spaces (Débord 1970) and youth protesters, implied

as criminal by sero tolerance policies, do not fit into the image of a secure, competitive global city (Dangschat 2001; Zinganel 2003; Nofre 2009; Edthofer 2011).

Like any Southern European country today, Spain is suffering an uncertain long-term socio-economic scenario. Low-intensity social unrest has been constant; it might have some similarities to the frustration that led to the Arab Spring, or not. We do know that middle class youth have started to suffer many of the problems traditionally associated with working class youth. The penetration of insecurity and fear in the everyday life of urban young middle class people has contributed to the emergence of a global youth movement which seeks to strongly reformulate and strengthen the western welfare state. And the demand to re-think and defend the welfare state has emerged not only from major cities, but also from small-sized university cities such as as Salamanca, Granada, Bologna and Ghent, among many others. As this process unfolds, the universities are, once again, agoras of the new millennium.

Acknowledgement

This work was supported by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT, Government of Portugal) and the Centro de Estudos Sociológicos da Universidade Nova de Lisboa (CesNova). I also would like to express my gratitude to Professors Carles Feixa and Ignasi Aldomà (University of Lleida, Catalonia) and colleagues from the Centre d'Estudis de la Joventut (CEJ) at the University of Lleida who participated in the Seminars on Youth Studies during 2011 (Maurício Perondi, Luca Palmas, and many others).

References

Abellán Bordallo, J. 2011. "De la red a la calle: un estudio del proceso movilizador que condujo a las manifestaciones del 15 de mayo de 2011." Accessed on September 21 2011. http://www.aecpa.es/uploads/files/modules/congress/10/papers/522.pdf.

Agnew, J.A. 1989. "The devaluation of place in social science". In *The power of place: Bringing together geographical and sociological imaginations*, edited by J. A. Agnew and J. Duncan, 9-29. Boston: Unwin Hyman.

Álvarez, S.E. and Escobar, A., eds. 1992. *The making of social movements in Latin America: Identity, strategy and democracy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Bettin, G. 1979. *I sociologi della città*. Bologna: Società Editrice Il Mulino.

Brands, K. 1987. “Kontinuität und diskontinuität in den neuen sozialen bewengungen”. In *Neuen sozialen bewengungen in der bundesrepublik Deustchland*, edited by R. Roth and D. Rucht, 19-29. Frankfurt: Campus.

Brossat, A. 2006. “La plèbe est de retour. Le soulèvement des banlieues,” *Lignes* 19: 15-34.

Castells, M. 1977. *La question urbaine*. Paris: Revue Editions.

Castells, M. 2011. Crisis y sistema, *La Vanguardia*, July 30, 2011.

Chamock, G.; Purcell, T. and Ribera-Fumaz, R. 2012. “¡Indígnate!: The 2011 popular protests and the limits to democracy in Spain.” *Capital and Class* 36(1): 3-11.

Dangschat, J. 2001. “Gentrification – Die Aufwertung innenstadtnaher Wohnstandorte”. *Dérive-Zeitschrift für Stadtforschung* 4, 27:31.

De Certeau, M. *The practice of everyday life.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Durgan, A. and Sans, J. 2011. “No one represents us: the 15 May movement in the Spanish state.” *International Socialism*. Accessed on March 6, 2012. http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=757.

Edthofer, J. 2011. “This is what radical democracy looks like! Reclaiming Urban Space in Vienna.” In *Everyday life in the segmented city*, edited by C. Perrone, G. Manella and L. Tripodi, 95-119. Wellington: Emerald Books Press.

Feixa, C. 2011. “La Generación indignada.” *El País*, September 20, 2011.

Feixa, C., Pereira, I. and Juris, J.S. 2009. “Global citizenship and the ‘New, New’ social movements: Iberian connections.”*Young* 17(4): 421-442.

Feixa, C., Saura, J. R. and Costa, C., eds. 2002. *Movimientos juveniles: De la globalización a la antiglobalización*. Barcelona: Ariel.

Fernández de Rota, A. 2011. “Las políticas de la multitud. De la antropología reflexiva al movimiento por una democracia real*.” Etnicex* 2, 53.

García Ajofrín, L., Miralles Lucena, R. and Carbonell, J. 2011. “El movimiento 15M.” *Cuadernos de Pedagogía* 414.

Garnier, J.P. 2010. *Une violence éminemment contemporaine. Essais sur la ville, la petite bourgeoisie intellectuelle et l’effacement des classes populaires*. Marseille: Agone.

Giddens, A. 1985. *The nation-state and violence*. Polity Press: Cambridge.

Hershkovitz, L. 1992. “Tiananmen and the politics of place.” *Political Geography* 12 (5): 395-420.

Hoggart, K. and Paniagua, A. 2007. “The restructuring of rural Spain?” *Journal of Rural Studies* 17(1): 63–80.

Hughes, N. 2011. “’Young people took to the streets and all of a sudden all of the political parties got old’: The 15M Movement in Spain.” *Social Movement Studies* 10 (4): 407-413.

Ilbery, B. and Bowler, I. R. 1998. “From agricultural productivism to post-productivism”. In *The geography of rural change*, edited by B. Ilbery, 57-84. Essex: Pearson.

Jarreau, P. 2005. “Un petit Mai 68 des banlieues.” *Le Monde*, November 5, 2011.

Juris, J.S. and Pleyers, G. 2009. “Alter-activism: emerging cultures of participation among young global justice activists.” *Journal of Youth Studies* 12 (1): 57-75.

Kimmelman, M. 2011. “In protest, the power of place.” *The New York Times*, October 16, 2011. Accessed on March 6, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/sunday-review/wall-street-protest-shows-power-of-place.html?_r=1&ref=michaelkimmelman.

Klandermans, B. 1986. “New social movements and resources mobilization: the European and American approaches.” *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters* 4: 13-19.

Lagrange, H. 2005. “Nuit de novembre 2005. Géographies des violences.” *Esprit* 32 : 5-21.

Lefebvre, H. 1968. *Le droit à la ville*. Paris: Anthropos.

Lefebvre, H. 1974. *La production de l’espace*. Paris: Anthropos.

Leitner, H., Peck, J. and Sheppard, E.S. 2007. *Contesting neoliberalism: Urban frontiers*. New York: Guildford Press.

Loewenstein, A. 2008. *The blogging revolution*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

López, I. and Rodríguez, E. 2010. *Fin de ciclo. Financiarización, territorio y sociedad de propietarios en la onda larga del capitalismo hispano (1959-2010*). Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños.

López, I. and Rodríguez, E. 2011. “The spanish model.” *New Left Review* 69: 5-28.

Machado, A. 1915. “A una España joven.” *España*, 1: 5, January 29, 1915.

Maffesoli, M 1988. *Le temps des tribus*. Paris: Méridiens Klincksieck.

Mannheim, K. 1928. “Das problem der generationen.” *Kólner Vierteljahreshefte für Soziologie* 7(2): 157-185.

Mauger, G. (2007). *La revuelta de los suburbios franceses: Una sociología de la actualidad.* Buenos Aires: Antropofagia.

Melucci, A. (1985). “The symbolic challenge of contemporarny movements.” *Social Research*, 52(4): 789-816.

Méndez, R. and Molinero, F. (1993). *Geografía de España.* Barcelona: Ariel.

Murali, V. and Oyebode, F. (2004). “Poverty, social inequality, and mental health.” *Advances in Psychiatric Treatment* 10: 216–224.

Navarro, V., Torres, J. and Garzón, A. (2011). *Hay alternativas*. Madrid: Sequitur and Attac España.

Nofre, J. (2009). “Les politiques culturelles et de jeunesse à Barcelone et ses banlieues, un essai critique. Du la colonisation culturelle á l'homogénéisation social.” *Sud-Ouest Européen* 26 (1): 83-96.

Oberschall, A. (1973). *Social conflict and social movements*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

OECD (2011). “Persistence of high unemployment: What risks? What policies?” *OECD Economic Outlook* 89 (1), May.

Oliver de Santos, M. (1906). *Entre dos Españas*. Barcelona: Gustavo Gili.

Ortega y Gasset, J. (2001[1935]). *La historia como sistema*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.

Perpiña Grau, R. (1952). *De estructura económica y economía hispana*. Madrid: Rialp.

Pred, A. (1985). “The social becomes the spatial, the spatial becomes the social: enclosures,social change and the becoming of places in Skane.” In *Social relations and spatial structures*, edited by D.A. Gregory and J. Urry, 337-365. London: MacMillan.

Reygadas, L., Ramos, T. and Montoya, G. (2009). “Pandora's Box: The implications of social movements on development: Lessons from the Lacandona jungle in Chiapas.” *Social Movement Studies* 8(3): 225-241.

Roberts D., ed. (2011). *Reading the Riots: Investigating England’s summer of disorder*. London: The Guardian and London School of Economics.

Rojek, C. and Turner, B. (2000). “Decorative sociology: towards a critique of the cultural turn.” *The Sociological Review* 48 (4): 629-648.

Russell, J., Kuechler, M. and Bürklinm, W. (1992). *Los nuevos movimientos sociales: un reto al orden politico*. València: Edicions Alfons el Magnànim.

Sánchez, J. (2011). “La revolución egipcia: jóvenes, política y sociedad.” *180 Latitudes*. Accessed on March 6, 2012. http://180latitudes.hl137.dinaserver.com/analisis/la-revolucion-egipcia-jovenes-politica-y-sociedad.html.

Stein, L. (2009). “Social movement web use in theory and practice: a content analysis of US movement websites.” *New Media and Society* 11(5): 749-771.

Wieviorka, M. (2011). “La indignación como solución.” *La Vanguardia,* July 19, 2011.

Zinganel, M. (2003). *Real Crime. Architektur, Stadt and Verbrechen. Zur Produktivkraft des Verbrechens für die Entwicklung von Sicherheitstechnik, Architektur und Stadplanning*. Vienna: Edition Selene.

Chapter 14
Youth movements, politics of identity and battles for visibility in neoliberal Chile: Penguin Generations [93]

Óscar Aguilera Ruiz

Introduction

Chilean society faced a powerful student movement in the fall of 2011. This intense social mobilization had two main sets of actors: university and high school students. The latter had already performed their protest repertoires in the year 2006 during the so-called *penguin*[94] *rebellion* (Aguilera 2006; 2011). Both in 2006 and 2001 hundreds of students mobilized on the streets, occupied their high schools and universities and questioned the neoliberal principles that organize Chilean society. Both student movements in those periods allowed their participants to experience the values and ways of life they struggled for.

The "penguins" who mobilized in 2006 raised political and social questions about education, and displayed a potent cultural politics that questioned citizens about their role in transformations or continuities of the educational system. University students who mobilized in 2011 similarly identified vindications surrounding the pillars of the neoliberal model. They challenged the subsidiary role of the State in financing education and its connivance with the understanding of education as a commodity

[93] My gratitude to The Latin American Social Sciences Council (CLACSO-Research Scholarship) and the National Commission for Science and Technology of Chile (CONYCIT-PCI 12050) which supported through funding the research on which this article is based.
[94] The word "penguin" [*pingüino*] refers to the uniform of high school students in Chile (black and white with a tie – which resembles the polar species).

regulated by supply and demand. They were critical of the link with private interests that the government was reluctant to regulate, as demonstrated by the closure of *Universidad del Mar* (20,000 relocated students) and the research for profit carried out at various private universities.

This process of revitalization of the Chilean student movement and youth politicization in general can be approached through two broad perspectives, both inscribed in the cultural field. The first perspective is one of youth cultural politics, and refers to characterization of the discourses and practices of young people in the political institutional field. This perspective focuses on procedures, actors and practices and has been developed primarily from within the disciplines of sociology and social psychology. Yet there is also work of this kind from a social anthropology perspective, including Fernández Poncela (2003) and Weinstein (1988). Also significant is the work by Lechner (2002), who is preoccupied with the political processes he refers to as social subjectivity. Work from this perspective emphasizes the production of meanings that guide the actions of the subjects. It assumes the intersubjective nature of social phenomena and is inscribed in general terms in the social science denomination of social constructivism.

This emphasis on the discursive nature of practices does no give sufficient attention to systematic analysis of the practices of subjects and the forms in which objectified structures relate to the social (which signifies as politics for example). It neglects the processes by which forms of objectified structures are produced and/or reproduced, as well as the strategies of youth actors to transform them. The second perspective does emphasise this kind of analysis however. It seeks to read cultural processes from a political perspective. This second perspective is what guides the research reported in this paper in global terms, and allows us to point out the importance of youth culture politics (Escobar et al. 2001; Aguilera 2008). It focuses on constituent processes of social and political order that evidence the tensions and dynamism of cultural changes experienced by contemporary societies. This is a perspective from which relevant considerations are made for studying student movements. It is proposed that: a) collective actions and youth movements, far from constituting a starting point for the analysis of politics, should be considered as an arrival point and a result of a process that required them to be (re)built as a way of finding cultural and historical answers for political questions; b) collective action is carried out in a spatial and temporal context

that allows for the problematization and re-signification of reality, making possible a consensus about changes in the social order; and c) youth collective actions express in a metaphorical way the constituent tensions of a new way of thinking and representing social links.

In this chapter, some research results are presented that relate to identity politics and visibility disputes present in student movements. It is based on biographical research with leaders of the Chilean student movement 2006-2011.

Repertoires of collective action and youth movements in Chile 2000-2012

Analysis of the constitution of the ongoing Chilean student movement, as well as its distinctive youth political practices, has been reported previously (see Aguilera 2010). However, the specificity of their forms of social protest has not been discussed or carefully considered so far and thus represents the topic of this chapter. Social mobilization practices undertaken by young Chilean people in the past decade are represented here through two analytical categories: repertoires and cycles of mobilization. As stated by Traugott (2002, 16), "repertoires are able to be used as a crystallization nucleus around which new cyclical guidelines of movement precipitate, even after a long period in which society has remained relatively quiescent". Thus repertoire is a form of joint action that unfolds from social actors is a strategy to achieve shared interests. It involves:

> A limited set of learned routines, shared and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice. Repertoires are learned cultural creations, but they do not descend from abstract philosophy or take shape as a result of political propaganda, but arise from struggle. It is in the protest where people learn to break windows, attack prisoners subject to stocks, knock down dishonored houses, stage public rallies, make requests, hold formal meetings or organize special interest associations. However, at a particular moment in history people learn fairly limited alternative ways of collective action. (Tilly 2002, 31)

We must point out that the historical period of interest (2000-2012) is not arbitrary but responds to a distinct sociopolitical period in Chile. In that time the relationship between social movements and youth was influenced by a previous social and political

demobilization (1989-1999) that resulted from the transition to democracy. A relative invisibility of youth political practices occurred in that decade that was classified as "youth apathy". This was a narrative of denial about what young people are not, about what young people do not do (Aguilera 2003). Hence the question about repertoires of youth action refers to changes in the public staging of the movement (2000-2012). It refers to forms of visualizing conflicts that were observed in this period. These forms of protest had their highest expression in the mobilization of high school and university students. Thus the main change lay in a displacement of the call for political and legal recognition by a call for symbolic and cultural recognition.[95]

It is argued that repertoires, far from being individual or collective attributes comparable to the fixed capitals that subjects deploy, are better understood as variable flows with a relational characteristic that always occurs between actors in conflict. Repertoires can therefore be understood as a kind of language that requires knowledge of the grammar that orders actions affecting others, "even when individuals and groups are the ones who know and unfold the actions of a repertoire, these connect sets of individuals and groups" (Tilly 2002, 37). In this sense certain manifestations can be "read" as creative and playful as soon as they begin to affect the sensitivities of society; they become dangerous actions. For example, there was initial wide acceptance of the carnivalesque actions of public denunciation of Chilean human rights transgressors performed by *La Funa*[96]. These enactments attracted many youth and youth organizations to get involved, but *La Funa* soon began to be criminalized by the political and judicial authorities and the media as the mobilizations wore on. Notably, the social carnival-like protest form moved on to other protest groups who began to use it as an active part of their manifestations[97].

Regarding the languages and grammars of protest, here emerges one of the first difficulties for institutions in accommodating to the "new logics" therein. There are processes of change in the repertoires of protest, but the official treatment of conflict is

[95] Regarding the high school student movement, a change took place in the Student Democratic Committees that existed in every high school in the late 1980s. The struggle had as its main objective the democratic election of Student Unions. This struggle by student groups developed after the year 2000. They did not see validity in the institutionalisation of student unions.

[96] La Funa is an organization of young people who conceive as their political task the denunciation of people and institutions involved in human rights violations during the military dictatorship (1973-1990). La Funa takes its name from the slang word *funar* - meaning to make clear.

[97] The literature on youth tells a similar process when analyzing the practice of charivari in Europe in the nineteenth century. The practice referred to disorder and a symbolic alteration of domestic roles. It became an expression of political criticism of political and religious authorities (Schindler 1996).

often performed on the basis of outdated schematic thinking and not on the new logics of repertoires. Looking at the political authorities' initial treatment of high school students who mobilized in 2006, we can see that it primarily consisted of debate in the field of "demands" which is a traditional or "old" repertoire. However, the actual logics of collective student mobilization pointed to a set of concerns of a "relational" kind between authorities and students and were therefore part of a "new" or emerging repertoire. This political and cultural gap in understanding emerged as a key defining element in the relationship between political institutions and collective action in the period.

The displacement of youth claims had shifted from the "material" plane to the "symbolic" plane. Here the main objective was not economic benefit or services claimed, but to change the place and manner of the social relationship between institutions (adults) and movements (youth). This shift had implications for specific modalities of developing mobilizations and for the visibility of the conflict. According to Tilly (2002) traditional student movements formed part of a national dynamic. They were modular and autonomous. They were national because the movements made demands about "one problem" that affected many people or groups, or entered into conflict with "one power" that impacted on various locations. Thus the visual manifestation of the conflict unfolded independently of places, actors and specific issues; they were modular. Autonomy was present because through collective action it was possible to establish a direct relationship with the central powers. In short, there was a "special vacuum" and a "representative" form of conflict management. However, today we see a new repertoire characterized by:

a) Specific locations and singular conflict areas and objectives to conquer. This does not necessarily imply a fragmentation of protest and division of collective action, but instead may benefit deep processes regarding the multiplication of conflicts and thereby increase the associational capacity of young people.

b) Diversification and innovation of mobilization strategies and ritualization of the conflict. This refers not only to ways of staging the protest, such as carnivalesque forms. In universal modalities of protest such as a high school takeover, the process by which they are achieved can be quite different from one place to another. This was the case for some private schools in 2006 in which students took over the

school through written authorization from their parents which meant that the authorities had to "accept" the action. (2000-2012)

c) The multi-relational origin of conflicts. The development of a protest action does not only obey the autonomous decisions of the young actors, but often different institutional areas generate the conditions and enable the emergence of social protests both locally and nationally. This was the case for failed negotiations around the quality of education in which the pertinent authority was launched in 2005. However, when it did not fulfill its purpose, it generated the protests of 2006. Another example was the decision of the Constitutional Court to ban the distribution of the "morning-after" pill which generated a wide range of mobilizations in late 2007 and early 2008.

This new repertoire in formation can be characterized as rhizomatic and molecular[98] because it diversifies social spaces of conflict. It multiplies existing conflicts and focuses on different audiences for the action as identified by youth movements. The notion of repertoire deployed here refers not only to "doing" but goes further. It infers a special relationship established between knowing "how to do and what society has come to expect to be chosen within a set of culturally sanctioned options and empirically legitimized" (Tilly, cited in Tarrow 2002, 101). This knowledge has been installed us in through what Bourdieu (1972) called habitus, "a system of durable, and transposable dispositions - structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures - that integrate all past experiences and work in every moment as a structuring matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions of the agents facing a situation or event and that it contributes to produce".

Moreover, changes in repertoires are slow processes influenced by economic, political and cultural factors. Hence, what took place in the student protests during this period, and later became the 2006 high school student rebellion and later yet, the 2011 university mobilizations, illustrate a cycle of mobilization. We can compare this cycle to the one that preceded the end of the dictatorship during the period 1986-1989. Thus "cycles of protest are the crossroads where the moments of madness are tuned to become permanent tools of the reply repertoire of a society" (Tarrow 2002, 103). This

[98] Deleuze & Guattari (1988) emphasized the heterogeneity, multiple relationships and breakups that we find in the creation and realization of the forms of social protest and collective youth action. Elements and principles that form the rhizome follow the definition used by these authors.

means that they provide answers and are part of internal movements towards the field of collective action.

The temporal historical context in which are located current Chilean collective practices is characterized by simultaneous mobilizations and social conflicts. These have created at least four major collective actors that are developing new forms of action and social protest:

- High school students: in the rebuilding of the 2012 conflict we can see the impact of the high school student movement in 2006, which built on the process that began in 2000 with the establishment of the ACES (Coordinating Assembly of Secondary Students).
- National Home Debtors Association (ANDHA): a movement characterized by mass actions of denunciation of the President of the Republic; achieving high levels of "spectacularity and visibility" in the protests, including interrupting the *Viña del Mar* Festival, protesting on boats in front of President Bachelet's holiday house, and disrupting the public acts of political authorities. Their actions show the appropriation of modes and repertoires of young actors as in the case of the denunciations by *La Funa.*
- Subcontracted Workers Movement; the neoliberal framework of the Chilean economy has generated a broad field of subcontracted and precarious workers (through intermediary companies) that offer their labor to large public and private companies. In 2004-2007 workers movements were established with high levels of commitment and success in their negotiations, in key areas of Chile's export economy; copper, forestry, and salmon.
- University Student Federations; since the 2006 mobilizations, students have revitalized their actions. They first participated in the Presidential Advisory Council for Education (2006-2007). From there they built an upward dynamic of social mobilization that reached a pinnacle in 2012; incorporating claims to: end the possibility of profit in education; give more state funding for universities; and modify university governance to include academic authorities, administrative staff and students.

The remaining sections of this chapter use as a foundation the biographical interviews carried out with student leaders of the high school and university movements in the period 2006-2013. For codification and analysis purposes they are identified by their initials.

Organic forms present in the student movement

The diversity of youth aggregations in the broad student movement include those that are completely consolidated, as well as those that are still emerging. Perhaps one of the organizational forms to draw most attention are the student collectives. In this regard it is acknowledged that student collectives did not "appear" in 2006 but were already functioning as forms of political and cultural aggregation, for example,

> We kept an alliance with FEL, which was very different from today´s FEL and were made up mainly by high school students and which had good relations with CREAR and other collectives that belonged more to those from the *Liceo de Aplicación* who were always the leaders. Those collectives started to appear at the end of 2004. (JHC)

Although within youth worlds and student space these dynamics were under development before the mobilizations in 2006, for the adult and institutional world their emergence represented main news and served as an argument to point out the decline of political parties in Chile. However, based on the testimonies of the actors themselves, the collectives were essentially different in nature from political parties. To eventually replace them would be a gradual process. It was established that the collectives expressed political traditions and cultures on many occasions. Political styles were recognizable even in a decentralized manner; the organization and practices of their politics often reproduced the logics of a traditional political group. In fact, from the political dynamic of the student movement questions arose about the institutionalization of the collective form. Yet a party-like transformation by student collectives sometimes did occur in the student movement during the recent period:

> Well after the collective consolidated itself we won the federation of the University of Chile and other spheres. The collective grew with that and we, some of us, created a foundation which is where I work now, that is the *Nodo Veintiuno* Foundation. We want to contribute to provide a

> more solid base to our current politics, get it? Students are not understood, but we want to change it into a stronger political organization within the movement and this needs not only student action and activism, but needs to train people, create critical thinking, etc. So I am dedicated to that. (FF)

This account from FF does not contradict what most participants themselves maintained about their actions in the student collectives in regard to the rejection of traditional forms, times and spaces of political action. This rejection generated criticism not only of the parties, but also towards the emerging collectives themselves. Maybe this explains the persistence of dynamics of informality; of associative groups with non-institutionalized political practices that did not even recognize themselves as groups or communities but rather as informal movements and groups that came together based on intellectual, cultural and entertainment interests to allow their communities to question themselves politically about their environment, for example,

> My interests when I was a high school student were part of a strong countercultural movement within the *penguin* generation which was a more politicized generation. This countercultural movement had its roots in hip hop, but also punk influences and from punk countercultural movements. Many of us who started to listen to this music also began to politicize ourselves with more leftist ideas, including anarchism. Then I began to move through aspects of Marxist study, but it was through this whole countercultural movement that had been generating in those years and which was strong. (SF)

In the case of high school students, in the context of smaller cities, participation was distinguished not so much by organizational recognition but by other aspects such as the way of dressing. In the street rally context that allows for the recognition of "others" who are not really part of the original group but who become interested and participate in the actions, and in this manner consolidate larger new groups. In this way, we can see how over time the category of "high school students" comes to include and mean the coexistence of many different groups that make up the movement:

> Although until today rallies pass by there and one yells out; I think that in 2006 the slogans have changed. It is no longer high school voices, but rather slogans of a political party, of an organization, of a different platform or carrying other flags, coloured ones and in that I see a difference that has taken place over these years. (FE)

The process of recognition and distinction alluded to by FE allows us to see how the constitution of emerging collectives and groups is elaborated. The context and space of

the mobilization allows for the convergence of people and afterwards the articulation of collectives:

> And we started going downtown to what became the first meeting that took place between alliances of high school collectives that came from 2001-2002. *Dario Rebelde, Promedio Rojo* and other emblematic high school collectives and the *Jota* that had separated from the *Concerta*[99]… Then, in 2003, I started working in a space called CREAR that was the convergence of two strands of collectives, PROSA and CREA one belonging to the west and the other to downtown Santiago. And in CREAR, once I joined, the idea of creating a school collective began. This was a the beginning of 2004, with a segment that did not adhere to *Frente [Patriótico*] nor the *Juventudes.* (JCH)

Even if a group did not eventually translate into an established organization, these meeting dynamics between emerging and traditional forms of political action allowed for inclusive participation mechanisms that even transcended the space and limits of the institution itself:

> The Presidents´ Plenary session took over power at the university. It was about a new organization where all the degree presidents were present, and this continued to be the maximum political and administrative configuration of the student body at UCM. After the destitution of the Federation by the university, we founded something called *"Frente Amplio en Defensa a la Educación Pública"* (Open Front for the Defense of Public Education). We sought to bring together all organizations of the district, from neighborhood associations to people involved in the *Mapuche* demands and also ecologists, with the purpose of crosscutting everything. I remember that at some point everyone arrived and there were like sixty organizations in a meeting. (MJ)

Here we see how the student mobilization of 2011 was not only centered among collectives, parties and youth groups but also sought to widen the movement and take it out from its "student" condition in order to bring forth something bigger. It indicates the plurality of practices and meanings associated with the student movement. In the context of a school takeover, for example, a group was based more on their associative interests rather than a clear and rational politicization:

> At the takeover there were different groups with different interests. There were those that would stick around so they wouldn´t be at home and wanted to be there because it was cool to take over the school, go to the takeover at the other school at night and drink with the guys on the corner because it was fashionable. There were those who allowed this situation and were a bit more aware but in the end they switched around; stopped following the trend of the takeovers. (JM)

[99] This refers to the Parties Consortium for Democracy, a political conglomerate that was born after the fall of the military dictatorship and which governed the country until the arrival of Sebastian Piñera to the presidency in 2010.

JM points to the coexistence of groups as well disputes in the context of the takeover mobilizations that expressed existing tensions between student collectives and informal groups. In synthesis, it is recognized that in 2006 there was considerably less diversity of high school student organizations and also an organic decomposition of university spaces. In sum, student collectives practised activist logics very close to traditional forms. To that extent, the diversity of the student movement was still anchored in traditional political cultures.

By 2011, student collectives were common practice. Elsewhere, spontaneous individual or group incorporations due to affinity marked new ways of organization; for example, groups would organise to carry out a video, a staged performance, and so on. Despite this, activists in the movement were still defined more as available for mobilizations and not just as contributing something to the spaces of the organisation. In the case of students who were not active in the short or medium term, they had to either end up definitively activist or they were displaced by activists themselves in a short time. The expulsion of non-activists from the high school movement had been explained as due to their inability/ignorance in reading the codes and political strategies that developed under the heat of internal discussions and dialogues with the authorities. Ever since, there remained strong tension between the traditional groups of student protest organizations and student groups of a new kind. The latter depend upon outreach and not on the political character of traditional organizations. Organizations of the new type adapt situationally to rallies and protests summoned by the leading and student based movements. However, it is recognized by both sectors now that it is beneficial to act together.

Limits and diversity of practices inside the movement

During the mobilization processes of the Chilean student movement, strategies and stagings, including protests and takeovers, incorporated a highly visible diversity of actors and practices. They ranged from the partygoers; those who only went to drink at the school takeovers for example, to the carnavalesque, to those involved in violent

confrontations with the police over the occupation of an establishment. All that diversity makes it difficult to conceptualize the student movement in Chile in a universal manner.

Yet we can identify some general points. First, there were demands by demonstrators that challenged the authorities about the use and occupation of the streets in the downtown area of each city; constituting the limit from where street mobilizations could be authorized or not. The establishment of limits in the city by the authorities was carried out in a paternalist and restrictive way, even though its political existence is usually invisible. The inherent politics were revealed by discourses such as "buses cannot pass" and "vendors cannot open". Establishment of limits to mobilizations was understandable for the movement (or for its leadership at least), but the institutional world found it them difficult to carry out and agree with. The diversity of interlocutors meant variation in the limits and possibilities of differentiated action according to who one was speaking to, for instance: "In reality, I had the most progressive dean of all, he was for public education, the man tolerated our mobilizations, but for example he couldn´t stand it if we supported a strike or takeover, so we always had to deal with that double face" (SF).

In fact the limits of mobilization process were also felt by the university authorities themselves. They were pushed from institutional positions of power. Before taking a course of action under which to negotiate, they turned to pressure strategies such as taking away scholarships and benefits:

> Then, they applied measures in order to put on pressure. I think the most noticeable was that in September they began to pressure us to stop protesting … telling the students that they would lose their benefits and that was a huge conflict. When the deans stood against us, I think there we lost a big part of the battle. They began to threaten us and a lot of student groups stepped away due to fear of losing their credit, scholarship. People got scared. Then in the end the deans, of course, at one moment we were able to get blessing from them, but then they showed their face, their face of guarantor of order inside the university. (SF)

At another level the question about limits, that which is accepted or not as a legitimate resource in the context of mobilizations, refers directly to ways of administering and organizing coexistence:

> Naturally there were some confrontations there, but it was a normal and given coexistence. That is, people who live differently and who come together suddenly. Yet in the aspect of working and organizing something, putting together an activity, there were initiatives and a lot of people

> participated which allowed in one way or the other for us to meet people and have them participate with us. (FE)

Yet tensions can affect and wear the movement out. Protest situations forced questions that until then were not part of the preoccupations of the mobilizing students, for example, when it came to evaluate collateral damage caused by their actions:

> Once a parent hit me when we took over the school. It was our elementary and high school, and parents from the elementary section wanted their kids to go to class and nothing else interested them. I understoodthem in a way, the concept that many don´t have a way to leave their small kids with someone to care for them, and in fact later we gave them a part of the elementary school and the takeover was only in the high school part. (JM)

In the context of the school and university takeovers in 2011, the limits of the protests constituted a preoccupation and translated into organizational features under the charge of their own committees. These committees carried out duties to control participating subjects and their entrances/exits in the place of occupation:

> The security committee was concerned that only students from the university or students from outside who were accredited should be able to enter in order to have some kind of control and to be able to give the buildings back with the least damage possible after the takeover. (NE)

However, conflicts inside the universities, which in various cases ended up with the destitution of university federations in 2011, generated a tense climate and a difference of allowed limits within the mobilization contexts, giving rise to some structural reflections:

> Besides when we were in the takeover there was organization, there was participation on behalf of teachers and we had good communication with the dean. In fact they criticized me for that, they said I had sold out to the dean but it was just maintaining a good relationship. Maintaining diplomatic relations with other people. In this aspect newer groups were more radical. (JP)

It is here where the disputed limits among peers in the student movement can become conflicts based on relationships among the leaders. On one hand, there were minimal norms established in the context of the takeover for those who participated. On the other hand, there were certain limits that did not match with what the participating subjects imagined. Lack of agreement had important consequences in terms of broken trust with

authorities when alliances were made at some point. There was also personal exhaustion of some leaders in trying to maintain an agreed-upon order:

> In the month when the takeover started, we were like 120 students who participated. We made up the rules so that the takeover would not become anything and from there a lot of people started going such as those who were not willing to not drink in the classrooms and destroy them, nor burn computers because we did not come from a school with many resources. Therefore burning a computer meant not having a computer later, or that maybe computers wouldn´t be lent to us. I sometimes felt certain people rejected me , and in fact I divided a class, I divided many things. Sometimes I felt like taking all my things and go home to cry, but I think I participated until the end of the takeover even though there were discussions where we all thought differently. This helped me to realize which people are really with you in the difficult and complicated times, sometimes I had to fight alone with the guys who broke in to steal. In that sense I was the one who said at some point: He stays or I leave! It went bad for me, I went home. But with time I proved to be right even if my classmates didn't want to openly recognize it, they considered us afterwards … the conflicts that developed in the school were more of human character because they had zero political awareness of the place they were intervening. I would have never thought of entering the grandmother´s school kiosk, those things are unthought-of by me and I can´t think of fighting for an education because I am poor because I won´t have the means to pay for it and then break into the grandmother´s food kiosk and steal her goods. (JM)

The everyday nature of such disputes created conflicts among them. Personal weaknesses were translated into political weaknesses as an effect of the continuity/discontinuity of the political processes. In synthesis, the taken-over educational establishments were spaces liberated by the students from the authority at that moment. Yet even so there were authoritarian interactions inside the educational buildings that were as vertical in nature as the ones that existed previous to the schools being taken over. This was due to the levels of central leadership. The context of occupation was one without adult institutional hierarchies; without the presence of principals, parents and teachers. The occupying school students replaced them with signs that were even stricter in order to keep things in order. The correct use of the occupied buildings demonstrated the ability of high school students to banish the old authorities and replace them on their own in a differentiated manner in order to handle sharing the responsibilities of cleaning, food, security, and so on. The following declaration summarizes that point: "This is like our new home, a bigger house, how do we take charge of it?" They estimated they could face the challenge by reproducing everyday orderliness in the spaces taken over.

Identity expansion

As indicated previously the process of student mobilization slowly and progressively involved new social actors. In 2011 there was a questioning of the "authorities" as well as other actors relevant to the student movement: from family to teachers and professors. The results of trying to expand their support base were not always favorable to student ideas and mobilizations: "We tried to involve all these actors and obviously there were two quite marked groups. On one side the workers-students and we had half of the professors; and the other half of the professors were with the rectors and the church" (NE). The push for expansion of support, in temporal terms, constitutes the year 2006 as more conservative for the movement than the year 2011 due to 2011 efforts to incorporate university students and private institutions:

> What I hear from the people that I relate to is on balance in 2011 we had much more success in the media due to the difference that in the year 2006 and 2008 we were something more "high schoolish". I feel like the year 2011 was a bit more global. The universities started to mobilize and even private schools had takeovers. (FE)

This temporal shift in the student movement can be explained because the education protests in 2011 coincided with a series of social manifestations in Chile that developed in parallel, and with less and/or more intensity in relation to the student movement. The different groups and people that were manifesting in these spaces speak to us of identity expansion and different interests at the base of the movement.

> After 2008 and beyond high school people, I met more people and activist groups. Here in Talca the topic of *Mapuche* political prisoners was present in 2011 and they carried out weekly rallies surrounding the hunger strike. Also the topic of *Hidroaysen* was present. I also participated and there one could meet people or remember people one had met before and that was enough to start recognizing people whom I´m friends with until this day. (MJ)

However, it seems as if it is only students of whom we are speaking. It may be that the opening-up of identity was relatively invisible because the hegemonic articulations continued to come from traditional political structures:

> On a certain theoretical and political basis, we got involved with MESUP. In MESUP, hegemony belonged to the more "progressive" sectors, the UNE was there, in a certain way the *Izquierda*

> *Autonoma,* and the FEL which now has progressive politics. After a Congress carried out at the *Silva Henríquez,* we tried to restructure organically and unfortunately *Jota* got in. *Jota* ended up exploding the space which was its intention, to grab onto others without coming to an agreement. The *Izquierda Autonoma* was intelligent in directing the votes representing the anti-*Jota* discontents. It was then that the organic discussion blew up and ended up preventing change in the organic structure and so MESUP continued to be an assembly, a direct participation assembly with hand voting and a series of other things. (JCH)

In other words the process was questioned by the "least ideologized" participants. We can see here the different levels of intensity of participation. That crowd involved society as a whole and not only a group of students or party activists:

> I believe that in 2011, for students who participated in the mobilization, there was a feeling of being definite protagonists, and I am not referring just to those in front of the cameras but also those who were at the takeover or who participated by going to the rallies. It was that importance that allowed the conflicts to enter the homes. (NE)

In 2011 high school students rose up more radically. They were involved in disruptive actions in the main centres of cities in Chile. Yet in 2011 the main focus was on university students and the reality of high school students was less visible. This could be explained by the fact that high school students were located in marginal sectors of the student movement and via this process violence in the mobilizations became a symbolic strategy to reclaim a place in the discussion. Finally, there were solidarity dynamics that flourished such as in the case of student centres at non-mobilized private establishments that contributed to supplying the food needs of schools that had been taken over. It was not so much about the creation of alliances or collectives, but internal processes that were strengthened in less political spaces. In the post-2011 period there is much diversity in participation forms and a transversal constitution of the student actor in the Chilean student movement.

Times and spaces of the student movement

Just as Pechtelidis (this volume) has stated, spatial dimensions continue to make up the main cleavage of the symbolic and physical battles displayed by social movements. The Chilean case does not escape this consideration, and this is how we recognize three

main spaces where a specific temporality was constituted: schools and universities with takeovers, the streets and the expanded public sphere. The occupation of high schools and universities has a long tradition in the social struggle of student movements and can be traced to what took place during the time of the dictatorship (1983-1988). It has been very well described in the documentary *Actores Secundarios* (Secondary Actors) which refers precisely to the anti-dictatorship penguin movement. Also a closer chronotopic reference is added: the process of occupation and takeover of schools and high schools in the year 2006 within the framework of the continued *penguin* rebellion.

From the occupations of educational establishments in Chile can be taken some fundamental teachings for student movements. First, that territorial and physical control of educational centres has an impact not only on society as a whole but also contributes to the constitution of a youth subjectivity which experiences that which it struggles for. Second, that the maintenance of the occupation activity engages the conjugation in a permanent way of the diversity of youth identities that participate along with the contractual elaboration of a set of policies for coexistence. It is not about eliminating the chaos nor the eventual excesses that take place in these moments of occupation, but rather of having available mechanisms and political ways to resolve this temporary state of affairs. Finally, occupation allows operation and maintenance without the need of hundreds or thousands of students: just a dozen are enough to organize the control of these territories. A strategic distribution of mobilized (human) resources can be implemented. These processes make up a chronotopic memory that is transmitted through the contact between young people of different generations but also through cultural productions that represent these experiences.

The second space of Chilean student protests, temporary again, are the streets where manifestations and performances take place. Disputes about rallies in the main avenues of a city must be understood as challenges to perceive the existence of the conflict and directly face the central powers that are in the way. Every rally must necessarily question not only society in general by altering the everyday use of the streets, but must also dramatize the confrontation with the political authority of the moment by making the march pass by the main government building such as *La Moneda*. Yet often the space of the protest and collective action moves off-centre. Geographical and symbolic peripheries are politically occupied and interventions sown. The territorialization of the rally has made possible the reconstitution of the link between students and their places

of residence. While the traditional model of the protest "towards the center of the city" operated symbolically as a rupture of the students with their territories, current forms of mobilization described in the Chilean case recover this lost link and connect actors of education with society as a whole. These ritual forms of protest feed themselves from the political memory regarding how a territorial rally is expressed; therefore, they have larger levels of violence and confrontation between police and demonstrators than the ones that take place in the centre of the city.

Finally, the third space/time of the protest is made up by an expanded public sphere. It is not only recognized and disputed with traditional means of communication, but also incorporates social networks and the internet. In this way, if high school students of 2006 saw themselves mainly inside the system of hegemonic media, thus becoming panellists in prime time TV programs, by 2011 they displayed and built their own communication products to influence the media. They went from communication audience to producers; indicating change throughout time and space of youth protest. In terms of time, the communication task begins with the preparation of the rally via its audiovisual products, then there is the registration and live broadcast (online/streaming) of the actual events and performances and the multiplication of these products in prime time in the TV news and the next day newspapers. Not only there is a reaction with an opinion once the facts have occurred, but a communication of the protest in extended time. In the Chilean student movement protests of 2011, we saw the possibility of using the classrooms and homes of the youth as streamed protest spaces. Flashmobs, *gendikamas* and musical productions were added. All of these take elements from mass culture to make them operative in the register of protest; they disseminate in a wide public sphere that can reproduce/repeat into the infinite thanks to social networks.

For this project, methodologically speaking, the biographical interviews were found to be a key strategy for the recuperation of student movement experiences, as well as the reinvention of past and future chronotopic projections. The biographic accounts were products of the dialogic relationship/imagination of participants in the student movement and the participant-researchers. Reinvention of the past through biographical stories presumes a reflective process that re-reads the experience and locates it in a relationship to the present. Future chronotopic projection occurs both in biographical relationships that are constituted in future struggles, as they become part of intergenerational material and memory.

Based on Tarrow (2002, 103-107) the main cyclical elements of the contemporary Chilean student movement can be summarised as follows:

- Escalation of the conflict: various dimensions of the Chilean social system are crossed today by deep social conflicts; the main areas of conflict are education, employment and housing.
- Geographical and social sector diffusion: inverting the classical logic of centre-periphery diffusion, current protest forms operate from territorial peripheries (communes and provinces) and from social sector peripheries in the way that social performances are built. These include: secondary students (not teachers or university students), subcontracted workers (not labor unions) and home debtors who have conflict with banks (and not people in squatter settlements, the usual source of hegemonic popular movements in Chile and Latin America).
- Multiplication of social movement organizations: the re-organization of various "previous" organizations that have made possible, in each of the areas of conflict, the emergence of "derived movements" (McAdam, in Trugot 2002) which if not read properly can give an appearance of spontaneity[100].
- New frameworks of meaning: modalities of social protest (repertoires) are tested during mobilization cycles and begin to be adopted by all collective actors and movements according to their specificity, becoming an integral part of their symbolism and political cultural meanings.
- Expansion of repertoires: the redefinition of forms of social protest such as increasing incorporation of direct action, interruption of public events, and use of political violence. It implies a shift towards "relational staging" which subordinates moments of "representational delegation" (negotiations between "experts") thus reconfiguring public spaces of protest.

The new mobilization characteristics and social protest forms developed by the contemporary student movement in Chile are defined by their tactical flexibility. They not only challenge the authorities to accommodate their "collective action frames" but challenge all social movements to rearrange their own practices. In Chile there have

[100] This reading refers to: a) an etic (external) vision which assumes spontaneity over an emic (internal) vision of joint and collective action processes, and b) the absence of traditional organizations, far from weakening collective practices, shows the formation of new collective identities (Tarrow 2002*;* Pizzorno 1991; Iñiguez, 2003).

certainly been some progressive changes that result from youth collective action. The "Citizenship and Youth Inclusion Unit" of the Ministry of Education was re-installed as a result of 2006 student mobilizations. There was a new legitimacy achieved by student groups in relation to traditional students' union. In sum, massive public support was generated by student demonstrations between 2001-2012.

It seems that the concept of a national political culture for Chile was re-defined by young people during this period. In terms of representation, performativity and a heuristics of praxis, the political activism of youth is better understood in terms of the contemporary politics of youth culture than in terms of the traditional political process as it has previously taken place in Chile. This is a significant generational shift that demands a new epistemological paradigm for understanding contemporary youth movements.

Conclusion

This chapter set out from the life stories of participants in the Chilean student movement 2006-2012 to interpret the diverse generational constructions present inside the student movement. The heterogeneity of activists and the associative meanings and practices of Chilean youth activists have been identified. The main focus of visibility was the year 2011 in company with the *Indignados* movement (Spain), Occupy movements worldwide, anti-austerity demonstrations and strikes (Greece), and democratic reforms such as the "Arab Spring". Yet the Chilean student movement protests have a specificity that is reflected in the pages of this chapter. The movement has been conceptualized as a cycle of mobilization and the multi-centric and rhizomatic characteristics of that mobilization performance have been recognized.

The Chilean student movement faces an unprecedented political and cultural challenge in the post-dictatorial period, which has seen the installation and subsequent problematization of a neoliberal Chile. This has three central dimensions. Firstly, there is a politicization of the discussion about the educational system that passes from a labour-union debate to a discussion of the political basis of educational instutions and

that stay expressed in the need to recover a public system of education. Secondly, in the political arena there is a refutation of post-dictatorial institutional procedures at the constitutional level in regard to educational topics, deadlines and ways of organization that clash with what ensures the construction of a public system of education. Here alliances are built between the youth and adult worlds. Even though they are not free of tensions, wide sectors of the student movement become involved in campaigns and electoral disputes. Thirdly, the student movement itself has been adjusting to the dynamic emergence of expanding youth collective action. For example, there are now two national high school student organizations: the *Confederación de Estudiantes Universitarios de Chile* (CONFECH) now includes sectors that did not have access to participation previously, and the *Mesa Coordinadora de Educación Superior Privada* (MESUP) has been formed.

This process relies on both recognition of the diversity of participation journeys and on the experience of student actors who have joined throughout time. The label of activist is no longer exclusive to young people who participate in collectives or political parties, but has necessarily expanded to include members of specific youth aggregations. Under the cycle of mobilization they constitute the same demand for recognition inside the Chilean student movement as traditional groups. Not only do we find leaders with previous experience and political capital, family and individual, but those who constitute their political capital in the heat of the movement itself. There is no school for the movement, rather with every day the movement constitutes more its own school.

Moreover, there are new actors and voices that do not speak from traditional places nor have wide prerogatives to tell, negotiate and agree independently from the student base. Communication vigilance is imposed that has its main expression in open access to meetings by different organizations as a precaution against the personalization of the movement. If this is the society of entertainment, let us not become just another offering from the media - say the activists and leaders of the student movement.

Notably, there has been an expansion of identity models in the core of the Chilean student movement. Different forms of identity acquire their specificity and re-elaborate their particularity in the heat of the movement itself. *Mapuche* students are discovered. Poor students identify themselves. Members introduce themselves as women, as persons of sexual diversity. This identity richness in the student movement impacts and modifies

not only the ways the movement presents itself to society, but the organizational forms they take on in order to put forth their student politics. The student movement is not singular, it is multiple. The conviction seems to be that there is space for all particularities. This is an heterogeneous articulation promising a different life and society to that offered by the neoliberal model. It is about a generation with no fear that speaks to Chilean society and transmits its conviction that things can be different, that society can be different. This mobilized generation is a contemporary metaphor of change in Chile.

References

Aguilera Ruiz, O. 2011. "Acontecimiento y acción colectiva juvenil. El antes, durante y después de la rebelión de los estudiantes chilenos en el 2006". *Propuesta Educativa,* 35, 20 (1): 11-26.

Aguilera Ruiz, O. 2012. "Repertorios y ciclos de movilización juvenil en Chile (2000-2012)". *Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana,* 57 (17): 101-108.

Aguilera Ruiz, O. 2010 "Cultura política y política de las culturas juveniles". *Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana*, 50 (15): 91-102

Aguilera Ruiz, O.2008. Movidas, movilizaciones y movimientos. Cultura política y política de las culturas juveniles en el Chile de hoy. Tesis de Doctorado en Antropología: Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona.

Aguilera Ruiz, O. 2006. "Movidas, movilizaciones y movimientos. Etnografía al movimiento estudiantil de la Quinta Región". *Revista Observatorio* 11 (3).

Bourdieu, P. 1972. *Esquisse d'une theorie de la practique*. Géneve Paris: Droz.

Deleuze, G; Guattari, F. 1988. Rizoma: introducción. En *Mil Mesetas. Capitalismo y esquizofrenia*. Valencia: Pre-Textos.

Escobar, A; Alvarez, S; Dagnino, E. 2001. *Política Cultural & Cultura Política. Una nueva mirada sobre los movimientos sociales latinoamericanos*. Bogotá: Editorial Taurus- ICANH.

Iñiguez, L .2003. "Movimientos sociales: conflicto, acción colectiva y cambio social". In *Psicología de la acción colectiva*, edited by F.Vázquez. Barcelona: EDIUOC.

Lechner,N. 1988. *Cultura política y democratización*. Buenos Aires: Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO).

Mc Adam, D. 2002. "Movimientos iniciadores y derivados: procesos de difusión en los ciclos de protesta". In *Protesta Social. Repertorios y Ciclos de acción colectiva,* edited by M. Traugott. Barcelona: Editorial Hacer.

Pizzorno, A.1991. "Intercambio político e identidad colectiva en e conflicto laboral". In *El resurgimiento del conflicto de clasesen Europa Occidental a partir de 1968. Tomo II,* edited by Crouch,C & Pizzorno, A. Madrid: Ministerio del Trabajo y Seguridad Social.

Schindler, N.1996. "Los guardianes del desorden. Rituales de la cultura juvenil en los albores de la era moderna". In *Historia de los jóvenes. Vol. 1 De la Antigüedad a la edad moderna*, edited by G. Levi & J.C Schmitt. Madrid: Editorial Taurus.

Tarrow, S. 2002. "Ciclos de acción colectiva: entre los momentos de locura y el repertorio de contestación". In *Protesta Social. Repertorios y Ciclos de acción colectiva,* edited by M. Traugott. Barcelona: Editorial Hacer.

Tilly, CH.2002. “Repertorios de acción contestataria en Gran Bretaña:1758-1834”. In *Protesta Social. Repertorios y Ciclos de acción colectiva,* edited by M. Traugott. Barcelona: Editorial Hacer.

Traugott, M. 2002. *Protesta Social. Repertorios y Ciclos de acción colectiva*. Barcelona: Editorial Hacer. In *Protesta Social. Repertorios y Ciclos de acción colectiva,* edited by M. Traugott. Barcelona: Editorial Hacer.

Weinstein, J.1988. (1988) *Los jóvenes pobladores en las protestas nacionales (1983-1984). Una visión sociopolítica*. Santiago: Cide.

Chapter 15
The network as chronotope: Internet and political practices in the Colombian student movement *MANE* and Occupy São Paulo[101]

Liliana Galindo Ramírez

Introduction

At the beginning of this current decade, a series of mobilizations and movements took place in the world which saw the internet and social networking take a leading role of mediation. Some of these movements, such as the so-called "Arab spring", the *Indignados* in Spain and the Occupy Wall Street movement, achieved visibility through international media deployment. However, other movements of occupation and protest that took place in Latin America had little or no exposure in international media. This was the case for educational reform movements and occupation movements in several Latin American cities. Their relative invisibility was correlated with the extent and magnitude of these mobilisations, their disruptive rallying against political orders, and the interrelationships between many of them. This was a context of spatio-temporal mutations of related action that took place within a specific network.

From case studies of the Colombian student movement and the movement Occupy São Paulo, both in 2011, it seems that from a transnational perspective, there emerged some new forms of communication. It was evident that digital technologies offered an

[101] Two papers precede this text: "'The Invisible Spring': Internet in the indignation and occupation movements and the cases of Colombia and Brazil", Arab Media Institute, University of Westminster, April 2013; "'Invisible Spring': Internet and political practices in Colombian and Brazilian mobilization", RC 34: Youth Sociology. ISA World Congress of Sociology, Yokohama, Japan, 13-19 July 2014.

appropriate means of reconfiguring political action to denote a new process of *politicity* in emerging hybrid space-time configurations. The "Invisible Spring" is perhaps a suitable metaphor for the origin and deployment of these Latin American movements, for the connections between them, for their actions in contexts of political invisibility and their forms of protest and mobilisation which were mediated by the internet and Facebook in particular. The term "Spring" expresses a double connotation. On the one hand, it refers to notable youth uprisings in the Maghreb and their influence, impact and links with other similar movements in the world. On the other hand, the term “Spring” concerns the non auto-produced character of these movements, because it is a term attributed by actors outside: an external designation expressive of the power relations involved. The term "Invisible" denotes not only the multiplicity of what does not appear but the social conditions that produce invisibility: invisibility is not only absence of the visible but a social and political production of what does not appear. The term “Invisible” also refers to the reconfiguration of space-time in the action network; indicating the emergence of new forms of being in the contemporary world. Thus "Invisible Spring" is a way of referring to those Latin American movements, their specific dynamics and links, which did not interest the global academy and the international mass media but which are represented in this chapter. Below, the two case studies are presented first, through the problematization of notions of *politicity* in the network, their visibility and invisibility, and the nature of the network as chronotope. The chapter finishes with some thoughts that do not seek to conclude but raise issues for further research.

Colombian and Brazilian movements in 2011: the cases of *MANE* and *Ocupa Sampa*

The cases here are the *Mesa Amplia Nacional Estudiantil* - *MANE* in Colombia, and *Acampa Sampa Ocupa Sampa* or Occupy São Paolo in Brazil. These movements imply a double condition: on the one hand they belong within a typology of emerging political action with characteristics in common with other discursive and organizational dynamics at the contemporary international level, such as those mentioned above. On

the other hand, they express the contextual distinctiveness of the production of knowledge and new forms of collective political action in the continent.

MANE

The *MANE* movement in Colombia was influenced mainly by the Chilean student movement (see Aguilera, this volume). It was also inspired by the Arab uprisings (see Sanchez, this volume) and by the *Indignados* of Spain (see Nofre, this volume). *MANE* was a student movement unprecedented in the last 40 years, its closest antecedent being the student movement of 1971 which was recorded as the largest mobilization of students in the history of Colombia (Pardo and Urrego 2003). The relative invisibility of *MANE* in the international media does not indicate that the movement was irrelevant. In fact the situation was created and deployed quickly. It became far-reaching in terms of its ability to call and mobilize young people in Colombia. *MANE* successes included: the creation of a national structure of articulation, coordination and collective action²; progressive rapid access to public discourse in the face of conservative political and mass media national actors, and the victory of winning public support for the withdrawal of the project to reform the law on higher education which had been proposed by the national Government to the Congress with a majority favourable to President Juan Manuel Santos. The project was to reform law 112 "by which the system of higher education is organized".

The student movement against the law reform was articulated around the *MANE* of Colombia - a national open student space reconfigured for the meeting and coordination of various student organizations and also for non-organized groupings of students[102]. All of them converged in their opposition to the law reform project in question. Their mobilization was a national phenomenon; the protests took place for several months during the year 2011, from the announcement by the Government of the reform project in March until the retirement of it in November. The students' ambitious demands were

[102] The five large national organizations were: *Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios – FEU*, *Organización Colombiana de Estudiantes – OCE, Federación Universitaria Nacional - FUN*, *Proceso Nacional Identidad Estudiantil, Asociación Colombiana de Estudiantes Universitarios – ACEU.* There was also a multiplicity of groups of students and young people not affiliated with any party or student organizational structure or adhesion process.

to consider an educational model very different from the one proposed by the Government and in particular to demand the removal of the proposed reform of the general law on higher education in Colombia. Colombia is a country where claims and demands made to the Government and the Congress of the Republic usually fail to reverse initiatives put forward by executive and legislative branches of government. Yet contrary to the expectations of the movement itself, as well as the expectations of several of their spokespersons in various interviews, finally the draft law in question was removed from the Congress of the Republic. After several months of protests, demonstrations and a prolonged massive national strike in universities, a request for withdrawal of the law reform project, signed by the then Minister of Education Maria Fernanda Campo, was formalised on 11 November 2011[103]. His removal of the bill became effective shortly afterwards and the *MANE* movement ended the university strike.

Acampa Sampa Ocupa Sampa

In Brazil, there were various mobilizations and acts of occupation of squares and public places which became known as *Acampa Sampa Ocupa Sampa, Ocupa Sampa* or Occupy São Paulo. This movement arose within the framework of the global appeal for 15-O - October 15, 2011, the day on which protests were called across the world; inspired by the *Indignados* movement in Spain and the Occupy movement in the United States. It is in this context that was born the movement Occupy São Paulo. People in São Paulo who were critical of the so-called democratic system that they knew and who supported real, direct democracy, attended the call to mass action which came mainly through the social networks of Facebook and Twitter. After that rainy October 15, 2011 evening they camped on the *Viaduto do chá* - located in the *Vale do Anhangabaú*, in the centre of São Paulo; they were a group of young people who began to manage forms of protest organization with claims in turn anchored in the local and the global.

Within the international protest movement, the movement Occupy Wall Street had the biggest impact on the occupation in São Paulo. Occupy Wall Street was the first

[103] http://www.senado.gov.co/images/stories/pdfs/retiroreformaley30.pdf. Accessed 07-12-2014.

mass youth protest movement that took place on September 17, 2011 in New York. The movement then mobilised in other cities and countries around the world. However, little is known about their mobilisation dynamics in countries such as Brazil. In the case of *Acampa Sampa Ocupa Sampa,* the occupation movement in São Paulo was born from the world call for Occupy camps in different cities in October 2011. The terms *Acampa* - "Camping", and *Ocupa* -"Occupy", refer to the modalities of action of the movement: occupation and camping. "*Sampa*" refers to the city of São Paulo. Firstly, the name of the movement expresses its global origin and character; in direct relation with the Occupy movement and the *Indignados* of Spain. Secondly, the name indicates its local roots while emphasizing that it was an occupation and not just a camping trip. Around 600 young people camped in *Viaduto do chá* from October to December (Alves 2014), developing various offline and online collective expressions. These young people developed and maintained their own organizational structure.

Methodology

The research data was collected online and offline. The methodological strategy mainly included:

- Face-to-face interviews with activist youth in the two movements, with those identified as most active online and offline[104]. Nine semi-structured interviews were conducted for the Brazilian case study and ten for the Colombian case study. The selection of interviewees did not aim for a representative sample of activists in the quantitative sense. This research took a qualitative approach.

- Online data collection. The heart of this research data component was two databases built from the contents of the two movements' Facebook pages (*MANE* Colombia and *Acampa Sampa Ocupa Sampa*). These databases resulted from the hard work of capturing and transferring data by hand because it was not possible to use any program to automatically perform these steps. These databases include the

[104] The most active online were identified through the Netvizz application that allowed views of profiles with the greatest number of "likes", reviews and times shared in the pages of the movements' Facebook pages. The most active offline were identified as spokespersons or were recognized as such by the movement activists.

administrators' posts and comments. The *post* information included: contents of the post published by the pages' administrators, with date, time, type of post (video, text, link, and image), number of likes, number of comments, number of times shared. The *comments to the post* information included: the contents of the comments, the Facebook profiles of the authors of the comments, the date, time and number of likes. The defined periods were as follows: for *MANE,* from 3 October (the Facebook registration date) until 24 November 2011, the day of the (Latin American) Continental March for Education convened by *MANE,* which was joined by Occupy São Paulo. For *Acampa Sampa Ocupa Sampa,* the defined period was from 15 October 2011 (the Facebook registration date) until 28 December, the day of its last meeting in that year.

Politicity **in the network: visibility, in-visibility and online-offline dynamics**

The idea seems widespread that in the contemporary internet age we are in a process of intensive and extensive visibility of individual and collective life. According to this view, the phenomenon is due to the viral spread of information through virtual platforms associated with the digital universe. However, contrary to the belief that this is simply due to the dynamics of new visibility *online* of the previously concealed *offline* life, it can be argued that we are in fact seeing a complex reconfiguration of processes of visibility and invisibility both online and offline.

Concerning the notion of visibility, Bourdin (2010) indicates that if a person who can perceive does not see something, that is due to a double reason. On the one hand, their perception is conditioned by social frameworks; on the other hand, the object is not perceived due to the political conditions of its emergence. In that sense the character, whether visible or not, of certain social phenomena is not just a matter of perception, but rather refers to a questioning of the social and political conditions of production of what is perceptible or not for certain actors. That is, the why, who and how of what is visible or not, varies according to the specific context. In the contemporary context of mass social action, the question of visibility depends equally on the space-times that reconfigure the framework of similarities and differences between online and offline dynamics.

Thus, it can be argued that there were various forms of invisibility in the 2011 Colombian and Brazilian cases of occupation, that were similar for other Latin American movements of protest and occupation. These can be verified as: a) the general invisibility of these Latin American movements in the international media; b) efforts made by respective Latin American governments to keep invisible the political nature of the demonstrations; and c) the invisibility of the impact and connections between these Latin American movements and protests and other global forms of revolution in 2011 such as the *Indignados*, the "Arab Spring", and the Occupy movements that took place at the same time. There were also some notable visibilities, such as discursive constructions which appeared on digital platforms that showed the actions, claims, ways to convene and organize, tensions and infighting of the movements themselves. Action in the digital space is understood as a social practice in the same way as speech in critical discourse studies is understood as social practice (van Dijk 2000). In that sense, mass protest speeches, images and other discursive forms circulating on the internet are objects for understanding the social world that imply a synthesis of a set of social, technical, economic, cultural and political circumstances of emergency. They consequently imply potential for revealing the contexts, realities and actors that produced them. Now, mutations and processes are produced in the digital world that are not always comparable or reducible to those in the offline world.

Concerning the activities of the contemporary Occupy movements that happen through virtual platforms like Facebook, new forms of invisibility pose another type of challenge. For example, in terms of questioning and standing up to the national government, there can be uncertainty about the movement's capacity to realize or not on the streets the latent potential of non-conformity that is expressed and crystallised online through social networks. It comes down to a question of the "number" (Boullier 2013), that can be assembled. This is not a simple quantitative premise but a classic matter of importance in the field of political science. It concerns disputes over, for example, the actual number of demonstrators attending a rally as an indicator of strength, capacity of mobilization and legitimacy. This question is different in the context of the digital universe, where the specific number of people who support a particular cause, protest or claim is uncertain and perhaps less important. Digital space-time makes visible both visits and expressions of sympathy (likes) expressed in

numbers. However, it does not make visible the number of people willing to move onto the streets.

At the same time, we cannot understand both presence in the streets and those who remain at home if we do not take into account the types of relevant activity on the web. There are activists who consider they have participated through action on the internet such as publishing content, making calls to mobilize, or inviting friends to events of protest. They do not consider their physical presence on the streets to be essential. Others share the indignation that circulates through the web and find out from the internet about demonstrations which they subsequently attend. The dynamics of *online* action, although interconnected with what happens *offline*, are not a mere reflection, as it were a “virtual” mirror of the "real". Nor can *online* and *offline* activism be reduced simply to a relationship of opposition where one denies the other. The dynamics of *online* and *offline* correspond to two different orders of complex interlaced reality impossible to elucidate *a priori*. The relationship between online and offline universes of protest action correspond to an overlapping and hybridization of those same realities. Thus chronotopes offline intertwine in relations of flow or tension with digital chronotopes.

The political practices of the movments, with their distinctive logics, conceptions and modes of organization, were indicative of a kind of justice that involves processes of rupture or discontinuity in relation to previous conventional forms. They signalled transformation processes in the horizons of meaning and forms of being in the social and collective world. This kind of justice, understood as the set of processes of emergence, deployment, configuration and reconfiguration of the political in the context of the digital age, define and reconfigure the network. The notion of network must not be reduced to digital networks alone. Social media *in extenso* exist because there is social, interpersonal and collective interaction. What conveys the notion of network is relative and variable according to the context of space-time in which the networks in question are inserted. The context of network here is that of a co-existence of different orders of reality where the practices, means and dynamics of online and offline dimensions of the social life of young people and their environment, are juxtaposed.

According to Foucault (1988) power is not held or owned, but is exercised. Thus the powerful actions of the young protesters were mediated by the use of digital platforms such as Facebook. They operated in the reproduction and reconfiguration of correlations

of strength, of strategies of visibility and invisibility, of the positioning and expansion of the legitimacy of their claims and demands; as a result of the juxtaposition of online and offline realities. It is precisely these areas of intersection that produced more powerful dynamics of mobilization and collective action. It happened not only by conventional means such as physical action but through the practice of "clicking". In sum, both dimensions translated into dynamics of powerful mobilization and visibility.

In this scenario, the "Invisible Spring" denotes a contemporary form of relationship between Latin American processes of mass mobilisation and global processes of production of hybrid realities (online-offline). In media contexts, mass media sources and politicians mutate, define and redefine the power relations that are at stake. Thus the term "Arab Spring" is not the result of self-description by demonstrators in Arab revolutions but a denomination initially given by a political elite that was later affirmed by the international mass media. This example is evidence of disputes that arise over the power of naming and what becomes visible in the public space. In a similar way the "Invisible Spring" in Latin America indicates the phenomenon of the *invisibilization* of multiple expressions and dynamics of mobilisation and protest. The invisibilization of Latin American mass protests took place in the context of Arab revolts and revolutions as well as deployment of the movements of *Indignados* and Occupy.

Latin American cases and global movements

As indicated, in 2011 the international media disseminated information concerning the *Indignados,* the so-called "Arab Spring", and the Occupy movement. This was in contrast with other movements that received far less international media attention. Little is known about the many and varied local expressions of protest that were taking place in the world at that time. When talking about student movements for example, reference was frequently limited to just the Chilean student movement. In regard to other student demonstrations, a large international media presence recorded information about protests in Canada against the increase in tuition fees. Neither the international press nor the academy seemed to have much information or analysis relating to the Colombian

student movement and local movements of occupation, such as that which took place in São Paulo.

Notably, the 2011 global context of protest was that of economic crisis. This was associated with the emergence of various movements in Europe and the United States. However, in the case of *MANE* - Colombia and *Ocupa Sampa* in Brazil, the Colombian and Brazilian economies respectively were in a different situation. Indicators of economic growth in both countries remained in positive figures. According to the Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics – *DANE,* during the year 2011 the Colombian economy grew by 5.9% compared to the year 2010 and GDP grew by 6.1% in the fourth quarter of 2011, compared with the same quarter of the previous year. GDP in Brazil grew 6.2% in relation to the year 2010. In Colombia, such economic growth masked high levels of inequality so that the country was ranked as one of the most unequal in Latin America and the world. On the other hand, Brazil gained the lowest level of inequality in its history[105].

The economic crisis in Europe in 2011 is frequently cited as a source of citizen unrest, particularly for youth. While clearly this was not the case for Colombia and Brazil, what matches European cases of mass protest such as the *Indignados* was a strong leadership of young people hostile to the inequalities and social injustices of the existing economic system. Similarly again there was broad participation of other sectors and actors in *Ocupa Sampa*[106] and in *MANE*[107]. In both cases there was a display of action and forms of appropriation of public space both physical and digital. Digital space was occupied through web pages, blogs, Youtube, Livestream, and social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook. Physical space was appropriated through different scenarios. In the case of *MANE,* protests and occupations took place in the street, the universities, the buses of the public transport system and the squares. In the case of *Ocupa Sampa,* protests and occupations took place in the *Viaduto do chá,* the streets and squares. In virtual space, content was produced, circulated, distributed

[105] http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15607. Consultado el 07-12-2014.

[106] "They were people from all over the place. We had professors, students from other states, other countries (who would LiveStream), workers, outraged citizens and activists. We had punks, anarchists, street people, adults and children, office staff, cyclists, some of the homeless movement" (interview with young activist from *Ocupa Sampa*).

[107] Movement was initiated and led by students from public universities. Later broad sectors from the private universities, teachers, workers and progressive movement members won the sympathy and support of parents, recognized artists, and much of the citizenry.

and consumed. In these interconnected spaces the online publications reached people that the movement had not engaged through mobilization on the streets. At the same time, mobilization in the physical space encouraged initiatives deployed on the web.

As happened in the revolts of the *Indignados*, the "Arab Spring" and Occupy Wall Street, in Latin America there were three phases in the cycle of visibility: i) initial invisibility in the mass media such as television and the national and international press; ii) later intensive and extensive visibility on social networking sites; iii) later again - visibility in mainstream media. Prior to the start of the cycle for the Latin American mass protest cases, the third moment of the cycle in the "Arab Spring" protests coincided with the consumption of relevant information by young Brazilians and Colombians from various media sources such as television and Facebook. The Colombian and Brazilian demonstrations that occurred in the streets at first were not reported in the major national media of those countries. Later, when this did start to happen, the earliest reports carried a negative connotation that maligned the young people. These early reports highlighted episodes of violence, showed inconsistency of demands and minimized the size of the mobilizations. At the same time, young people mobilized their digital resources and expanded the counter-information dissemination beyond their own networks of close friends. They sent messages and posted content as text, image, sound, video, and hyperlink. This information circulated through digital networks to reach a level of saturation in the space of social networks to the point where it became impossible to hide the extent of the mobilization. Subsequently, big national media (television, press and radio) ended up spreading the news in different ways, through content, interviews and information relating to the movements, their demands, actors and actions. This dynamic final phase in the visibility cycle demonstrates the co-existence of mobilisation practices for youth online and offline.

The mass protests of youth in both Colombia and Brazil saw the coming together of several factors in the offline-online nexus. Firstly, many of those who were the most active members offline had experience of previous militancy. Secondly, there was a free flow of information over the internet that implemented contact between those who were on Facebook and the physical face-to-face encounter that embodied the mobilization in the streets. In the case of the Brazilian protests this dynamic corresponded to the origins of the movement. In the Colombian case this dynamic corresponded more with the

nature of how the protest operated in the sense that it was strengthened through the online flow.

From the streets to the internet, from Latin America to the world... and vice versa.

> First it was Tunisia, then it was Egypt, and later in a large area of Northern Africa and the Middle East, then in Spain, Ireland, Greece and Israel; hundreds of thousands of students, unemployed, workers and common citizens filled the squares and parks, against an unfair international economic world order that is in a declining phase. In Latin America, students from Puerto Rico, Colombia and other countries mobilized under the North of the social struggle in Chile which has already concluded more than three months of occupations and student protests (activist from *MANE*).

In this manner the Declaration of *MANE* began its first meeting in Bogotá on 20-21 August 2011. A sense of belonging to a global dynamic of mobilization and protest is condensed in the words. Beyond existing differences in terms of cultural, social and economic specificities, in each of the places in which these mobilizations took place, the involvement of young people was confirmed as not only a student battle but also an intergenerational one that managed to capture the attention of other social sectors, transforming the scene for global social and political activism.

As elsewhere, in Colombia the mobilization took place in a global context of protests. *MANE* came up with a clear local anchoring of the thousands of students that showed up in opposition to the proposed reform of the law on education, as proposed by the national Government. The movement became quickly visible in the digital social networks and flowed on into national mass media (radio, press and television). It highlighted the dynamic of mass mobilization; the *movement that goes from the streets to the internet* (especially digital networks) and from there to the wider national press. The Colombian student movement had not previously appeared in the national press with the importance that it then acquired. This prominence would not have taken place but for a saturation process in digital social networks that made impossible its continued concealment by the national media. Thus we see a *transit of visibility moving from the street to digital networks to conventional media*. This was a dynamic flow of transition that co-existed in conventional media and digital networks, revealing similarities and differences among the layers of the online and offline realities. The Colombian

movement had a deployment that went from the streets to the web, while in the Brazilian case it was from the web to the streets.

> Occupy the streets and change the world!
>
> (One of the slogans of *Ocupa Sampa)*.

> If it weren't for the inspiration from Spain, that global interconnection provided by the internet for occupation would not have happened.
>
> (Interview with young activist from *Ocupa Sampa*).

As explained above, in Brazil the Occupy São Paulo movement originated within the context of 15-O, with strong inspiration derived from Spain's *Indignados* movement. Some pre-existing circumstances contributed to the materialization of the meeting of the minds and initiatives of different young people who set up the occupation. There were young people with experiences of militancy in other organizations. There were those who were uncomfortable with the democratic system that they knew and the resulting social and political exclusion. These different resources and capacities were translated into a potential which manifested in the occupation camp. Prior to 15-O, during the peak period of the Occupy movement, several young people who had connected themselves through digital social networks met face-to-face to agree about the start-up of the initiative. One of them gave this account,

> A year before *Ocupa Sampa,* I went into a collective called *manifestação.org,* which had its peak and its end in Occupy São Paulo. In this collective, we realized that many social movements failed at communication, so then we included journalists, designers, anyway, we did this to help all collective social movements and establish a link between them. When he got the call from Spain, via Facebook, the first person to call a meeting, in fact, was a staff member in the academic center of the USP [University of São Paulo]. This USP staff member arrived at meetings with a partisan perspective. We also had some collectives attend like *mine*, the punks and some staff from MPL (Free Pass Movement). The meeting was at the MASP (Museum of Art of São Paulo), with approximately 50 people. In this first meeting, the question of parties was decided. We didn't want to let political parties in, that was clear already at the first meeting (Interview with young *Ocupa Sampa* activist).

There is another example that shows the effectiveness of an online/offline approach to mobilization. It also ties together the two cases studied here. There was a Continental March and Conference for Education on 24 November, 2011. This was an initiative of *MANE* Colombia. Organisations in several countries and Latin-American political

movements were associated with this event, among them *Ocupa Sampa.* In the two sets of Facebook pages we can find record of this coming together. The March also included young people in other countries, crossing the borders of the American continent,

> From *MANE* we contacted student organizations in Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Argentina and Mexico, especially in Mexico. (…) We bore in mind the situation in Brazil and Argentina, the union of the Fech [University of Chili Student Federation] and *MANE.* This call was what gave the jump, that was what moved all of them and of course social networks, they were moved a lot by social networks to join the Continental March. For us it was a success. We did not expect that they might leave. We did not expect expressions of mobilization in Canada, in the United States, in Spain, or in Puerto Rico. There appeared a lot of things that we didn't expect (interview with young spokesman of *MANE*).

Several of the young speakers of *MANE* were in contact with activists in other movements from other parts of the world, both in person and in virtual ways, "in particular I met with the guys of the student movement in Spain" (interview with young spokesman of *MANE*). Other speakers took part in political meetings and events with organizations and social movements in different countries of America and Europe. One interviewee said, "I have been invited to give talks about what happens in Colombia and such at social organizations and political meetings".

In short, the analysis so far of the Latin American cases shows features and aspects in common with other global movements. There was no clear leader. The youthful non-partisan constituency was characterised by a horizontal and decentralized organizational structure and collective collective decision-making. Creative innovation was demonstrated in the use/appropriation of technologies and digital networks. Finally, the symbiosis between online/offline dynamics is the key to understanding the origin and deployment of the movements. In this context, a singular way of acting is set up in each local context. The *politicity* of the visibility and invisibility orders is reconfigured as direct and indirect global connections among emerging different movements in distant latitudes of the world. The movements confound conventional ways of practicing politics. They enact a political expansion mediated by the appropriation of physical public and digital spaces. We can perceive a transversality in discursive and organizational aspects of different global movements, and thus becomes evident the need to investigate how the local re-thinks the global. The richness of what emerges in specific and hybrid contexts is the wealth of the contemporary social and political world in transformation.

The network as chronotope: spaces in times of mutation and spatial-temporal mutations.

What are real spaces? Are they only physical spaces such as the street or the public square? What is real time? Only that which is transmitted as "live and direct" events? We need to rethink the way we formulate questions and thereby review the principles that are behind them. To make a distinction between the real and the virtual, the not-digital and the unreal respectively, leads to a wrong path of understanding contemporary phenomena.

Space-times of the network do not correspond to either real or unreal spaces, but to *multi-centered and multi-temporal realities*. These are realities that correspond to specific material, social and symbolic production processes. They can be understood in terms of both the production of an underlying technological and scientific basis which makes possible the existence of devices, platforms and digital tools, and in terms of individual and collective actions and social applications that create, deconstruct and recreate meanings, aesthetics, interactions and ways of being in the world. They are *multi-centered* because in the current era nobody controls the internet. However, neither do we all control the internet. Rather we are witnessing a variety of structures of action in the network. In some cases this manifests a horizontal operation such as lateral usage of the network in demonstrations and protests. In other cases there is a structure of central administration fueled and sustained "off-center" by millions of users such as Facebook. In all cases though there are levels of nesting and centrality, though these levels are not targeted on a unique and absolute centre. Space-times of the network are *multi-temporal* because they conjugate linear time (past, present, future), the self and social time. Space itself cannot be clearly separated from these realities since it is constituted in spatially located dynamics that knit this set of elements together to generate contemporary phenomena that pass through the internet.

For such an understanding, the notion of *chronotope* allows us to locate, expand and specify non-binary and fragmentary conceptions of space and time. This notion comes originally from Bakhtin in the field of literature. It has been reconfigured by Feixa,

Leccardi and Nilan (introduction to this volume) to refer to spaces and times of contemporary youth - "chronotopes of youth". Here the term is reconfigured again to talk about the network as chronotope.

Firstly, the *time of the network space* corresponds to the multi-temporal global space. Here are combined: a) the immediacy of the click with the mediacy of what stays or goes beyond - the actors, actions and contexts that are intrinsic; (b) the past that is present in the future of the action network - the resulting future of mobilization, online and offline, which contains in itself the accumulated collective trajectories, mobilized claims and organizational communication as well as social and political structures that are involved in producing results sought, expected or obtained; (c) the future that is present in the past of the action network, such as the utopias, demands, expectations - the prospect of future present in the individual and collective actions that crystallize in the combination of online and offline action.

Secondly, *the timeframe of the network* is cross-border, transnational and translocal (see 2013). This is a dynamic and mutant space that links the local, global and spatial references that occur through the exchange and the bond between different individual or collective actors whose action is mediated by the internet. It concerns actors who are not always face to face but connect through the internet with looks and claims, actions and meanings that carry implications at different levels, in the *glocal* space[108].

According to Feixa, Sanchez and Nofre (2014, 87), we can analyze visible phenomena in the web as chronotopical events, "as emblematic events that condense the spaces and times of a given society". Thus, we can think about the network as a chronotope in which physical and virtual spaces are juxtaposed as part of a same complexity, and through which you can see flows between online and offline realities. This chronotope expresses the materiality of action as a realization of the times and places of the online actions that are crystallized in the network. Examples of this are the *likes*, *comments* and *shares* in Facebook, which are entities of the digital universe, but not exclusively derived from it.

Rather than an anomic and timeless non-place, the chronotope of the network can be seen as a nomic space-time that builds new temporalities and social relations, a space-

[108] As Feixa indicates (2014, 325): "While Generation@ experienced the globalization of mental and social spaces of youth, Generation# is experiencing the withdrawal towards closer and more personalized spaces (...). This is not a return to the traditional spaces 'face to face' but a reconstitution of the social spaces in hybrid forms, combining the local and the global –in a glocalized way".

time *sui generis* which condenses and accelerates at certain times, as the Colombian and Brazilian cases here demonstrate. This approach starts by gathering specific information concerning the specific movements studied. Social network analysis (supported by the use of the program NODE XL) allows the presentation below of two graphs from the database established for each case from information collected from Facebook pages, as indicated in the methodology section above. These graphs put in relation the *post* published on the Facebook wall by the same administrators (represented by triangles) and people who made comments in response to these posts (represented by circles).

The first victory of MANE and the first internal fracture

The figure below concerns the post of 17 November on the *MANE* Facebook page.

HERE PLACE FIGURE 1

The densest of these areas corresponds to the post published on 17 November 2011 when the government decided - controversially – to withdraw the education reform bill from the Congress of the Republic of Colombia and the university strike was lifted. This density is precisely the hybrid expression (online-offline) of this controversy. The lifting of the strike marked two events for the Colombian student movement. On the one hand, it was a symbol of victory against the Santos-led national Government, which unexpectedly gave in to the demand to withdraw the draft law in question. This was an unusual event in a country with a long tradition that the Government and the Congress remain inflexible against demands and social mobilizations. On the other hand, the lifting of the strike saw the first big internal disputes and fragmentation of the movement, because the decision to lift the strike was not the result of consensus.

This dispute made visible the tension between conventional practices and mutations of the movement. It revealed partisan and non-partisan activity along with practices and expectations associated with either side of the question about whether to lift the strike. The evidence for this lies in the interviews with the most active young people, and also

in online data, with 348 likes for the post about lifting the strike, 809 registered comments, and 101 shares. Content analysis of 374 comments against the post allows us to see the intensity of the fracture. These disputations focus on the relationship between *MANE* and the national Government. They also question the operation of democracy. This occurs in a two-axis interrelationship; one internal and relative to tensions at the heart of *MANE*, and the other external and relative to the limits of Colombian democracy and the expansion of democratic practices, mainly in education, although not exclusively. The link between the two is expressed in distrust of the Government as an abstract representation and as a concrete representation (the Government of Juan Manuel Santos), along with anger regarding specific actors who operate in a relationship of tension.

The action network of Acampa Sampa Ocupa Sampa

HERE PLACE FIGURE 2

The graph here is multi-centered and not very dense. The lower density visible here shows that this movement had less of a tendency for a massive online reaction. Its action was more focused on the territory of the occupation and the physical space where many more people, with respect to those that appear on the Facebook page, were participating in the occupation of the camp installed in *Vale do Anhangabaú.*

One of the most commented posts was: "METROPOLITAN CIVIL GUARD ACTS ON WITHDRAWAL OF CAMPING TENTS" published on 26 November 2011. It was a post with 18 comments, authored by 13 accounts or profiles. The post announced over the internet an attempt to dislodge the camp; a communicative production that used the resources of the web to register and report an event in the physical space of the occupation. Here we have a unit of space-time that condenses the place of the camp with the time and presence and actions of eviction by local security forces. The comments included questions, complaints and statements of solidarity.

Another popular post, 57 times shared, was made a day later on 27 November: "During the early hours of Saturday, at around 4 am, riot police came face to face with the protesters and forced the *Acampa/Ocupa Sampa* to withdraw their tents". We see how the internet-mediated action makes visible action in the streets and tensions between the movement and the local authorities. The post did not have many comments but was characterized by the greatest number of likes, which is an indicator of sympathy. The post with the largest number of likes was on 18 December 2011:

> An intervention just took place during the "Christmas Concert" of Bradesco from Av. Paulista (near MASP). The protesters criticised the Bank's participation in financing the construction of the *Belo Monte* by *Vale do Rio Doce*. Denounced also was the extermination of the indigenous populations. Soon a video with everything that happened. Note: no-one was detained.

This post gained attention. It was shared 18 times, a total of 21 comments were made by 14 persons and there were 89 likes. Like the other posts, this post refered to an episode where the movement was present in physical public space but the security forces were also present. Comments expressed solidarity and joy such as, “Full force, brothers!", "What tenacity!!! Congratulations!”. Some comments on the post demonstrated the visibility of an action that goes from the streets, through internet and flows back to the street again, for example, "I'm going to Av. Paulista!”, “Have people already left?", "This day tonight I’ll get there. Finally. Without fail!!". The comments articulate motivation to expand the mobilization in the streets. Stressful situations are indicated, actors in dispute are identified, and spaces are revealed where protest actions and resistance are taking place. Evident here are temporary flows connecting people who are close to the movement to what is actually happening in the occupation through posts published on the web by the administrators of the page, and through the comments of those who read them.

Final remarks

Running in relative parallel to the actual presence of the movements in the streets and the wide multiplicity of public spaces and mass media they used, the use of the web

and social networks operate as platforms of deployment by other means. They point to a reconfiguration of the ways we conceive and exercise the action of protest. Protest is still to take to the streets, but it is also about mobilizing demands, speeches and agendas of the protest movement through the web. Creating content for posts and putting them into network circulation ensures the widest possible "shared time" within the movement. The Facebook posts generate comments on the “wall” and they get an increasing number of “likes”. Activists can shoot videos of demonstrations and upload them to the network then promote their dissemination as strategies of visibility and positioning on the public stage. In doing so they gain presence, they enlarge the broadcast range and increase their capacity to mobilize. The appropriation of Facebook by contemporary protest movements recovers, differentially, certain potentialities of the network that operate as systems of production, circulation and consumption of meanings; they can multiply protest actions through the lines of their supporters.

Digital networks are not only a means of expression but a new stage for dispute, controversy, visibility and communication, a coming together of forces. The older sense of political communication has been substantially transformed. Old-fashioned two-way communication is surpassed by *telematic* (networked) communication[109]. The singular appropriation by the young protesters in Colombia and Brazil of the Facebook social network created a platform for the extension of processes of contestation, while without coordination structures they might have been described as libertarian technophiles. This network platform is dependent on the particular modalities of appropriation and not the digital tools themselves. Facebook is not who produces the answers.

The game of visibility and invisibility has become a reshuffle. Action on the web makes visible action in the streets and this in turn is disseminated through the network to expand the mobilization in the streets. Disputes about visibility and power are redefined in a socio-political and media mutation. Accentuation of the processes of digitization of social and political life complicates the orders of reality. Disputes of visibility and invisibility transform political protest practices and produce a “pop-up” that generates new conceptual and methodological challenges which demand the deepening of transnational and comparative readings of justice. We need to be alert as

[109] Cardon and Granjon (2010, 81-82) cite the neologism *telematics* in reference to the Nora-Minc (1978) report, which noted that vertical information is not as well received as that which allows extension of power and handling. This idea is based on what the authors describe as the entry of *mediactivisme* into the internet era.

we advance towards the construction of new analyses and interpretations that we recognize the diversity of actors and the heterogeneity of practices. These are processes of the reconfiguration of online and offline realities, but we should not lose sight of their contextual character.

One can also ponder the role of actors in invisibility. Arguably the mass media produce invisibilities that correspond to that which they do not show. That invisibility is the other side of the visibility built according to media formats, and the dynamics of selection criteria for what is “news". The actors that are mobilized also produce invisibilites. The power of online mobilization capacity is not visible *a priori.* Digital platforms such as Facebook also produce specific forms of visibility and invisibility. For example, the number of likes is visible but not the total number of people who will then take to the streets or who are willing to do so. Despite this, indicators of sympathy (likes), opinion (reviews) and outreach (shares) give input and let us see what they mean and express. Consequently, the network as chronotope is not a source of answers but a way of questioning the cohabitation of realities. The spatio-temporal action and mobilization in the current network is significantly digital.

References

Alves, Rita de Cássia. 2014. *Web Activism in São Paulo: New Political Practices*, http://www.booksandideas.net/Web-Activism-in-Sao-Paulo-New.html.

Boullier, Dominique. 2013. *Plates-formes de réseaux sociaux et répertoires d’action collective*. Paris: Sciences Po Medialab.

Bourdin, Jean-Claude. 2010. “La invisibilidad social como violencia”. *Universitas Philosophica*, Vol 27, No. 54.. http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?pid=S0120-53232010000100002&script=sci_arttext

Cardon, Dominique and Granjon, Fabien (2010), *Médiactivistes*. Paris: Les Presses de Sciences Po.

Feixa, Carles. 2014. *De la generación @ a la # generación*. Barcelona: NED.

Feixa, Carles; Sánchez, José, Nofre, Jordi. 2014. “Del altermundialismo a la indignación Cronotopos del activismo político juvenil en Barcelona”. Nueva Sociedad, 251. http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/4030_1.pdf

Foucault, Michel. 1988. «Le sujet et le pouvoir», in: *Dits et écrits*, tome IV, pp. 222-243. Paris: Gallimard.

Pardo, Miguel-Ángel; Urrego, Miguel-Ángel. El movimiento estudiantil de 1971 en Colombia. In: http://www.renovacionmagisterial.org/boletin/boletin28/ponencia71.pdf

Valenzuela, José Manuel. 2013. *El futuro ya fue. Socioantropología de l@s jóvenes en la modernidad*. México: Colegio Frontera del Norte.

Van Dijk, Teun. 2000. “El estudio del discurso”, en: *El discurso como estructura y proceso*. Gedisa: Barcelona.

Chapter 16

Reflections on #Occupy Everywhere: Social media, public space, and emerging logics of aggregation [110]

Jeffrey J. Juris

Introduction

October 15, 2011. When I exited the T-station in downtown Boston on the day of global actions in support of #Occupy Wall Street and the burgeoning #Occupy Everywhere movements,[111] I immediately opened my Twitter account. The latest tweets displayed on my android phone indicated a large group of protesters was on its way from the #Occupy Boston camp at Dewey Square, and would soon turn a nearby corner. Minutes later hundreds of mostly young energetic marchers appeared in an array of styles ranging from jeans and brightly colored tees to black and khaki army surplus attire to various shades of plaid. I eagerly jumped in and joined in chanting, "Banks got bailed out, we got sold out!" followed by the emblematic, "We are the 99%! We are the 99%!" We soon turned to onlookers and began interpellating them, "*You* are the 99%! *You* are

[110] Reproduced by permission of the American Anthropological Association from *American Ethnologist*, Volume 39, Issue 2, pages 259-279, May 2012. Not for sale or further reproduction.

[111] My use of the Twitter hashtag sign (#) to refer to the #Occupy Movement mirrors activist practice, reflecting the importance of the social networking platform to the ongoing organization and development of the occupations (see also Postill 2014). Hashtags are used to highlight particular key words, making them more likely to appear in Twitter searches and to "trend," increasing their viral diffusion. I use the "#Occupy Everywhere" hashtag, which was common during the October 15 global day actions, to emphasize the global dimension of the movement.

the 99%!" After a few minutes I moved to the sidewalk to take photos and observe the signs, which ranged in tone from the populist "End the Wars and Tax the Rich!" to the inspirational "1000 cities, 80 countries Today!" to what could be interpreted as a slightly defensive "Our message is clear, read the fine print!"

Today's protest would be the second mass march of the week. The previous Tuesday thousands of workers and students joined #Occupy Boston for one of the largest marches the city had seen in years, culminating in the arrest of 140 people that evening when the Boston Police forcefully evicted occupiers from a second patch of grass along the Rose Kennedy Greenway across from Dewey Square. Like the viral images of New York City police pepper spraying two women from #Occupy Wall Street,[112] videos of the eviction and the aggressive police response, including wrestling to the ground several clearly non-violent members of Veterans for Peace, circulated widely via social and mainstream media platforms, generating widespread sympathy for the movement. This afternoon's march to mark the ten-year anniversary of the hostilities in Afghanistan and to challenge the escalating costs of wars in that country and Iraq would again draw several thousand protesters. It would also be one of more than a thousand #Occupy protests around the world that day, a testament to the viral circulation of protest in an era of social media (see Rasza and Kurnik, 2012).

Networks of resistance

[112] According to the online Merriam-Webster dictionary, "viral" refers to something "quickly and widely spread or popularized especially by person-to-person electronic communication" (www.merriam-webster.com, accessed January 2, 2012). See Postill 2014 for an analysis of digital media virals in the context of social movements, and the Spanish *Indignados* movement, in particular.

When a new mass wave of global activism breaks out, casual observers and reporters often wax eloquent about the ways in which new media technologies are transforming social protest. During the actions against the World Trade Organization Summit Meeting in Seattle in 1999, for example, news reports fixated on the innovative use of Internet-based listservs, websites, and cell phones, which were said to provide unparalleled opportunities for mobilizing large numbers of protesters in globally linked, yet decentralized and largely leaderless networks of resistance. More recently the focus has shifted to how social networking tools such as Twitter and Facebook transform how movements organize, whether we are talking about the so-called Twitter Revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia,[113] or the overwhelming attention afforded to social media during the initial outburst of protests around the globe inspired by and modeled after #Occupy Wall Street.[114]

In opposition to such techno-optimistic narratives, inevitably come skeptical accounts reminding us of the importance of deeply sedimented histories and politics of place for understanding the dynamics of protest in concrete locales, or the tendency for social movements to organize through decentralized, diffuse, and leaderless networks since at least the 1960s, if not long before (Calhoun 1993; Gerlach and Hine, 1970). Skeptics also remind us that many protesters in places like Tahrir Square did not have Internet access and were mobilized as much through face-to-face networks as social media.[115] Similarly, while many #Occupy Everywhere participants were certainly avid users of Facebook and Twitter—hence the widespread use of the 'hashtag' sign as a

[113] See Peter Beaumont's piece in *the Guardian* entitled, "The truth about Twitter, Facebook and the uprisings in the Arab world," www.guardian.co.uk (accessed November 11, 2011). For scholarly analyses of how activists in the Middle East actually used social media during the Arab Spring, see the special edition of *International Journal of Communication* (Vol. 5), http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc (accessed January 4, 1012).
[114] For example, see *The Guardian* news blog, "Occupy Together: how the global movement is spreading via social media," www.guardian.co.uk (accessed November 11, 2011).
[115] See Malcolm Gladwell's blog post on *The New Yorker* website, "Does Egypt Need Twitter?" www.newyorker.com (accessed November 11, 2011).

diacritic—not every occupier and supporter used social networking tools and smart phones. Indeed, the movement also spread through the occupation of physical spaces as well as the diffusion of evocative images through traditional mass media platforms.

However, debates between techno-optimists and skeptics are rather beside the point. It is clear that new media influence how movements organize, *and* that places, bodies, face-to-face networks, social histories, and the messiness of offline politics continue to matter, as exemplified by the resonance of the physical occupations themselves. The important questions, then, are precisely *how* new media matter; how *particular* new media tools affect emerging forms, patterns, and structures of organization; and how virtual and physical forms of protest and communication are *mutually constitutive*.

In my previous ethnographic work on the movements for global justice (Juris 2004, 2005, 2008a), I pointed out that network-based forms of social movement organization are not new. Networks, for example, also characterized the so-called "New Social Movements" of the 1970s (Offe 1985; Melucci 1989), but digital tools such as listservs and websites facilitated the diffusion of global justice movements and enhanced their scale of operation by allowing activists to more effectively communicate and coordinate across geographic spaces without the need for vertical hierarchies. Moreover, networking technologies not only facilitated the expansion of network forms, they shaped new political subjectivities based on the network as an emerging political and cultural ideal—e.g. there was a *confluence* between network norms, forms, and technologies. The point was not that everyone used new media or that digital technologies completely transformed how social movements operate, but that as new media were incorporated into the ongoing practices of core groups of activists they helped diffuse new dynamics of activism. Networking logics were shaped by particular

cultural political histories in concrete locales, they were always contested by competing verticalist practices and ideas, and they were inscribed into physical spaces during mass actions. The question now arises as to whether the increasing use of social media such as Facebook or Twitter has led to new patterns of protest that shape movement dynamics beyond the realm of technological practice and to what extent these are similar to or different from the networking logics characteristic of global justice activism.

This essay is an initial reflection on the #Occupy Everywhere movements based on my observations and participation in #Occupy Boston between late September 2011 and the early weeks of 2012, including the post-eviction period after the dismantling of the camp on December 10, 2011. I especially focus on how social media have shaped the forms and practices of #Occupy, comparing and contrasting the occupations to a previous wave of global justice activism that was also significantly influenced by digital media (Juris, 2008a). How are the #Occupy movements using new technologies? What difference does employing *social* as opposed to other forms of new media make? How do virtual and physical forms of protest intersect? What are the strategic and political implications of emerging dynamics of organization and protest within #Occupy, particularly in terms of issues such as sustainability, racial diversity, as well as political demands and movement impact?[116]

In this article I propose a distinction between a "logic of networking" (Juris, 2008a), a cultural framework that helps gives rise to practices of communication and coordination across diversity and difference on the part of *collective* actors, and a "logic

[116] By social media I am referring to web-based channels for social networking, micro-blogging, and the sharing of user generated content. Typical examples of social media according to this definition, and in popular usage, are corporate-driven websites and channels such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube that are often associated with the rise of Web 2.0. Other kinds of digital platforms and tools such as email, listservs, wikis, and traditional blogs and webpages (e.g. those not primarily used for social networking and sharing user generated content) fall outside of the bounds of this definition.

of aggregation," which involves the assembling of masses of *individuals* from diverse backgrounds within concrete physical spaces. I argue that whereas the use of listservs and websites in the movements for global justice during the late 1990s and 2000s helped to generate and diffuse distributed networking logics, social media contributed to powerful logics of aggregation in the #Occupy movements, which continued to exist alongside, rather than entirely displacing, logics of networking.

As we shall see, social media such as Facebook, YouTube, and especially Twitter were particularly important during the movement's initial mobilization phase, while networking logics became more salient after the eviction of the largest camps around the U.S. from mid-November to early-December 2011. This shift toward more decentralized forms of organizing and networking beyond the physical occupations contributed to the initial continuity of #Occupy in its post-eviction phase—although sustainability became a significant challenge given the movement's vulnerability to disaggregation in the absence of more deeply rooted network structures. A foundation was thus laid for a movement that would be *potentially* more enduring, tactically diverse, and strategically flexible, even if this ultimately failed to occur, which can be largely explained, I would argue, by its underlying logic of aggregation.

Meanwhile, beyond the issue of protest tactics, debates also raged around movement demands and political strategy. Whereas the diversity of individualized actors and ideological viewpoints associated with logics of aggregation within #Occupy placed constraints on the development of a singular set of demands or an all-encompassing strategy (indeed, many participants are committed to a vision of direct democracy that stresses political autonomy and strategic diversity), occupiers did begin to develop collaborative processes that allowed them to articulate shared visions and

goals from the bottom up, while potentially avoiding the trap of political homogenization and being co-opted.

In what follows, I begin by discussing the rise of #Occupy Everywhere and #Occupy Boston, in particular, including an ethnographic account of the encampment at Dewey Square and an initial analysis of the demographics and politics of #Occupy Boston. I then examine the relationship between social media and the #Occupy movements, comparing the emerging logics of aggregation within the latter to the networking logics characteristic of a previous wave of global justice activism. Next, I consider the intersections between virtual and physical protest within the occupations, again comparing the #Occupy and global justice movements, this time with respect to the relationship between digital media and urban space, particularly in relation to tactics and movement sustainability. The argument then shifts to the relation between logics of networking and logics of aggregation during the post-eviction phase of #Occupy, including an ethnographic account of the dismantling of Dewey Square and an analysis of the subsequent trajectory of #Occupy Boston. The final section considers a series of wider issues related to movement strategy and demands, racial and class diversity, and political impact.

Occupying Boston

#Occupy Wall Street emerged in September 2011 in the wake of renewed resistance struggles around the world such as the Arab Spring, the occupation of Wisconsin's Statehouse to defend collective bargaining rights (Collins, 2012), and the May 15 *acampada* or camp-out movement in Spain (Taibo, 2011). The initial protest followed weeks of organizing in response to a call for the occupation of Wall Street by the online journal AdBusters, which described the new tactic as “a fusion of Tahrir with

the *acampadas* of Spain."[117] Videos and messages attributed to the hacker collective Anonymous initially helped to spread the word about #Occupy Wall Street, while the Gay Fawkes mask, an image of resistance appropriated by members of Anonymous from the film and novel "V for Vendetta," became an early symbol of #Occupy. Two thousand people attended the first rally and march on Wall Street in downtown Manhattan on September 17, 2011, and nearly two hundred occupiers camped out that night in Zucotti Park.

The occupation continued to build during subsequent days and weeks, propelled in part by the viral spread of images of the movement and of police violence via social and mainstream media and in part by the effectively vague, yet powerfully simple and resonant frame that called on people from all walks of life to identify with the 99%, against the disproportionate influence of the "1%" (symbolically linked to Wall Street) over our politics, our economy, and our lives. This was an egalitarian, radically democratic grassroots movement that provided a progressive alternative to the right-wing populism of the Tea Party and a framework for understanding inequality and economic stagnation that resonated with wide swathes of the public from students, to workers, to professionals, and to the unemployed. Like the earlier protests in Wisconsin, #Occupy Wall Street helped to shine a light on the ongoing effects of "accumulation by dispossession" (Collins 2012; Harvey 2003), in this case the 2008 Wall Street bailout and the perceived abandonment of the working and middle classes.

After gaining visibility on Wall Street, #Occupy quickly spread to other cities, including Boston, where I took part in the first planning assembly and joined in the initial occupation on Friday September 30, 2011. The occupation in Boston began when a young woman, upon returning from a visit to #Occupy Wall Street, started a twitter

[117] See www.adbusters.org/blogs/adbusters-blog/occupywallstreet.html (accessed October 24, 2011).

account called @Occupy_Boston and called for an open planning assembly on Tuesday September 27 in the Boston Common. Much to her surprise, the meeting drew more than two hundred people (Personal Conversation, October 23, 2011). After two evenings of deliberation, a place and time for the occupation were decided on Wednesday night, and the occupation began that Friday, including an impromptu march through downtown Boston. The movement subsequently diffused to cities around the country and the globe—indeed, the global day of action in support of the occupations on October 15 involved some 1,500 protests in 82 countries (see Rasza and Kurnik, 2012).

When I arrived at the Boston Common, where hundreds of other marchers had already gathered for the #Occupy Everywhere protest on October 15, 2011, I started to monitor dozens of local, national, and global #Occupy related twitter feeds from the U.S., *indignados* movements in Spain (including feeds from Madrid and Barcelona where I had done research on global justice movements), and Mexico (where I had recently spent a year conducting fieldwork on free radio activism). Hundreds of thousands of marchers had already gathered in the *Plaza de Sol* in Madrid and the *Plaça de Catalunya* in Barcelona, occupiers were preparing for events in Mexico City, several thousand occupiers and supporters had gathered in Zucotti Park in New York City, while another large group had gathered in the Bronx. During global justice actions in the late 1990s and 2000s I had to wait until evening to learn what had happened elsewhere that day via movement listserves and webpages, often on computers set up in temporary Independent Media Centers (see Juris 2008a; Kidd 2003; Meikle 2002). Now I was able to simultaneously participate in and follow events in dozens of cities around the world from my handheld phone set.

Meanwhile, as the crowd in the Common began chanting "people's mic, people's mic!" to cajole the first speaker at the pre-march rally, the mother of a soldier

killed in Afghanistan, to swap her electric mic for the human voice amplification system widely used at the #Occupy camps.[118] She readily agreed in a show of support for #Occupy Boston, and I then quickly turned back to my twitter feeds, reading analyses of the quickly expanding movement. After two more speakers talked about the escalating costs of the wars on our service people, our communities, and our federal budget, the crowd, now a couple thousand strong, began to march out of the Common toward the occupation at Dewey Square, stopping at several sites along the way, including a military recruitment center, a Bank of America headquarters, and a Verizon Wireless store, to denounce the cost of war, bank bailouts, and unfair labor practices. Upon reaching the #Occupy Boston encampment, the marchers filled the open section of the square in front of the grassy area housing the bustling tent city. Some listened to additional speakers and others began watching a youth group performing an Aztec dance, while others walked through the camp itself, in some cases provided with "official" tours by volunteer guides. I had spent several days hanging out at the camp, but each time I arrived new tents and structures had sprung up, so I decided to wander through again.

A few minutes later I made my way past the bike racks that marked the entrance to the camp and stopped at the logistics tent to check the day's schedule. In addition to the anti-war march and student rally, myriad meetings, assemblies, performances, and 'people's university' workshops, including "An Introduction to the Solidarity Economy," "Neoliberal Dispossession and the Demand for Demands," and "Whiteness and Ally-Ship," were scheduled throughout the day. I then walked down the main 'street' inside the camp, past the donations area on the left and student and legal tents and the large kitchen area that had sprung up with the help of many local Food Not

[118] The people's mic is a practice where everyone in listening distance of a speaker collectively repeats after them, establishing a mass call and response that significantly expands the circle of those who can hear.

Bombs members on the right. As with #Occupy Wall Street and the occupation of Wisconsin's Statehouse (Collins, 2012), supporters donated pizza and other prepared meals, although the food working group also cooked food from scratch. Moreover, six or seven dozen sleeping tents were set up around the camp, and on any given night several hundred occupiers might spend the night, while the crowds would swell into the thousands for marches and rallies.

A new library tent was being erected next to the media tent near the main plaza at the end of the camp where the General Assemblies were held twice each day. As I walked by I noticed a handful of activists busy writing press releases, sending tweets, and editing webpages in the media tent, and a group of forty people or so listening to the people's university workshop on solidarity economies on the plaza. During the evening general assemblies, particularly on the weekends, two or three hundred people, sometimes more, might fill the plaza and take part in a complex process of consensus decision-making facilitated by hand signals, speakers' stacks, and an established order for announcements and proposals. Although frequently long and tedious, many occupiers pointed to these open, participatory assemblies as embodying an alternative to the current representative democratic order disproportionately influenced by the 1% (see Rasza and Kurnik, 2012).[119]

After passing the direct action and sign tents at the far end of the camp, I walked back along the busy surface road dividing Dewey Square from the Federal Reserve Bank and South Station. It was here where dozens of occupiers displayed signs to passing cars, eliciting frequent honks of approval, and the occasional insult. On this particular day the highlight was clearly a group of four young men decked out in tiny

[119] Most #Occupy camps also had a working group structure, where the ongoing work and coordination of the camp was carried out in smaller groups around activities such as logistics, media, food, legal, security, direct action, and outreach, as well as particular constituencies, including women, students, labor, and people of color.

red speedo bathing suits holding whimsical signs such as “Speedos Now!” and “1% of this SPEEDO is covering 99% of my ?*@!” There were also many serious messages, of course, including this poignant personal admission, “Make too much money for government assistance, but not enough to support myself: I AM THE 99%!” My self-led tour concluded with a brief visit to the faith and spirituality tent, where a handful of occupiers were quietly meditating.

#Occupy Boston was an autonomous, self-managed city replete with its own housing, media, newspaper (Occupy Boston Globe), people's university, security, legal team, library, and even spaces for meditation and worship. I had been to many similar camps in Europe during my previous research on global justice movements (Juris and Pleyers, 2009), but such camps are rare in the U.S. In terms of the social composition of #Occupy Boston, there are still no available surveys,[120] but data from visitors to the #Occupy Wall Street website (www.occupywallstreet.org) in early October 2011 suggested that responders were largely white (81.3%), male (61.7%), young (64.2% younger than 35), well-educated (64.7% have a college degree or better), and non-affluent (71.5% make less than $50,000/year).[121] It is difficult to say how these findings relate to the percentages of actual movement participants, and it is important to keep in mind the effects of the rapidly closing but still significant digital divide, but in the case of #Occupy Boston, my observations indicated similar movement demographics, with significant numbers of young adults, students, and those who were unemployed or independently and/or informally employed. At the same time, many women and people in their forties and older were active participants, particularly in the working groups and

[120] A national survey of occupations around the U.S. is currently underway coordinated by a decentralized network of activist researchers called #Occupy Research (http://occupyresearch.wikispaces.com, accessed January 4, 2011).
[121] Hector R. Cordero-Guzman, "Main Stream Support for a Mainstream Movement. The 99% Movement Comes From and Looks Like the 99%, Profile of web traffic taken from occupywallstreet.org," October 19, 2011, http://occupywallst.org (accessed January 4, 2011).

assemblies. The campers in Boston tended to be younger and were more likely to be male—although not exclusively so, with a large contingent of homeless residents.[122] There was also a visible presence of Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay, Transgender, and Queer (LBGTQ) activists and a handful of active Latinos, African Americans, and Asians.

Nonetheless, one of the main internal critiques within the movement was that it was failing to represent the diversity of the 99%, and that it was skewed toward the upper end of the spectrum of socio-economic power and privilege. To address such imbalances in the representation of historically marginalized peoples, an informal network of labor and community-based groups—including Jobs with Justice, City Life/Vida Urbana, and other groups associated with the national Right to the City coalition, which has a strong base among working class people of color, began meeting regularly to coordinate with #Occupy Boston. Meanwhile, two autonomous, yet linked initiatives in Boston—"Occupy the Hood" and "Occupy the Barrio," the first part of a national process, the latter restricted to Boston—also emerged, building on the "Occupy" discourse but using more traditional community organizing methods to mobilize poor and working class communities in largely African American and Latino neighborhoods, respectively. The U.S. global justice movement exhibited similar racial and class dynamics, although it seems to me that #Occupy's focus on domestic inequality and unemployment connected more viscerally with the experiences of marginalized communities. Indeed, given the historic racial and class tensions in Boston, which have manifested in divisions within and between progressive movements, the fact that so many community-based organizations were willing to support and engage the movement, albeit critically, represented a significant development. #Occupy Boston also mobilized and received support from the city's

[122] Indeed, one of the most notable aspects of #Occupy Boston, like many other occupations across the country, has been the commitment to providing shelter for "houseless" occupiers during both the pre- and post-eviction period.

mostly White progressive religious and peace communities, various anarchist and socialist formations, and existing social and economic justice movement spaces such as *Encuentro Cinco*.

Politically, a survey of 198 individuals at Zuccotti Park on October 10-11 found that just under a third of respondents identified as Democrats and another third did not identify with any political party. Meanwhile, 5% identified as anarchist and 6% as socialist, independent, and libertarian, respectively.[123] Based on my own observations and interactions at #Occupy Boston, I would say that the movement in Boston exhibited a similar level of political diversity, including radicals (anarchists, socialists, anti-capitalists), Left-leaning democrats, moderates, and even a sometimes vocal group of libertarian Ron Paul supporters. However, what was striking about #Occupy Boston—and this corresponds to what I heard from colleagues at other camps in the U.S. and Spain—was the large number of people who had previously not been politically active. Compared to the global justice movements, #Occupy Everywhere thus seems to have penetrated the social fabric more deeply, reflecting the resonance of the issues addressed and the ability of social media to reach far beyond typical activist circles.

In sum, like the global justice movements before it, #Occupy Everywhere arose to challenge corporate greed and unaccountable financial institutions, quickly "cascading" (Appadurai, 1996) through the use of alternative and mainstream media from discrete singular protests to a global movement field linking together diverse sites globally. Both movements were also decentralized and made use of direct democratic decision making based on consensus process. In addition, many specific practices including novel forms of alternative media, activist camps, and the use of hand signals and the people's mic diffused from one movement to the next, often brought by

[123] Douglas Schoen, "Occupy Wall Street Survey Topline," www.douglasschoen.com (accessed January 4, 2012).

particular activists and groups. Beyond such similarities, however, were critical differences related to modes of organization and communication that can be explained, in part, by the rise of new dynamics of protest shaped by social media.

Social media and logics of aggregation

As I have argued (Juris 2004, 2005, 2008a), global justice movements during the late 1990s and 2000s were characterized by a pervasive cultural logic of networking that arose as activists began to use digital media. This logic entailed a set of embodied social and cultural dispositions shaped by informational capitalism that oriented actors toward: (1) building horizontal ties and connections among diverse, autonomous elements (e.g. movements, organizations, groups, etc.); (2) the free and open circulation of information; (3) collaboration via decentralized coordination and directly democratic decision making; and (4) self-directed networking. A cultural logic is a semiotic framework—produced and reproduced through concrete practices of interpretation that are shaped by specific technological, social, and economic contexts—through which people make sense of their world and their interactions with others. It is a logic of action, a "process of people collectively using effectively identical assumptions in interpreting each other's actions—i.e. hypothesizing as to each other's motivations and intentions" (Enfield 2000, 36). In this sense, a cultural logic of networking (hereafter a networking logic or a logic of networking) is a meaningful framework for grasping the actions of others shaped by our interactions with networking technologies and which in turn gives rise to specific kinds of social and political networking practices. Networking logics not only involve a disposition toward building horizontal connections across diversity and difference, they help other political actors interpret such practices.

A logic of aggregation, by contrast, is an alternative cultural framework that is shaped by our interactions with social media and generates particular patterns of social and political interaction that involve the viral flow of information, and subsequent aggregations of large numbers of individuals in concrete physical spaces. Whereas networking logics entail a praxis of communication and coordination on the part of *collective* actors that are *already* constituted—including particular organizations, networks, and coalitions (Fox, 2009), logics of aggregation involve the coming together of actors qua *individuals.* These may subsequently forge a collective subjectivity through the process of struggle, but it is a subjectivity that is under the constant pressure of disaggregation into its individual components—hence the importance of interaction and community building within physical spaces. Whereas networks are also given to fragmentation, the collective actors that compose them are more lasting (Juris, 2008).

Cultural logics may also give rise to normative political visions or models of how the world *should* be organized. In this sense, what we might call a *politics* of networking or aggregation refers not so much to an interpretive framework as, on the one hand, to an organizing strategy and a political model that is shaped by a particular cultural logic—for example, the way an emphasis on physical occupations to the *exclusion* of other tactics is shaped by a logic of aggregation—and, on the other hand, to the struggles and tensions that arise when alternative cultural logics and normative visions interact—as reflected, for example, in debates over the importance of maintaining centralized occupations versus developing multiple and decentralized alternative tactics (see below).

Listservs, the primary mode of digital networking and communication in the global justice movements, are a particular kind of networking tool with a unique set of socio-political "affordances" (Hutchby, 2001), allowing users, on the one hand, to

circulate and exchange ideas and information by posting and reposting, while, on the other hand, to interact, collaborate, coordinate, and debate complex ideas. Global justice movement listservs brought together individuals committed to a common goal, project, or set of interests, helping to build not only discursive communities or publics but also constituting a communicative infrastructure for the rise of network-based organizational forms that allowed groups of actors to communicate and coordinate at-a-distance.

In this sense, global justice mobilizations against the WTO in Seattle in 1999 or the World Bank and IMF in Prague in 2000 were organized via listservs, distributed tools allowing for complex patterns of coordination and communication that gave rise to network formations such as local Direct Action Networks in the U.S. or the Movement for Global Resistance in Catalonia. An array of shifting, overlapping, multi-scalar, and rhizomatic networks emerged, mobilizing activists across geographic regions, campaigns, forms of protest, and political visions (Juris, 2008a). The listserv as the primary tool of communication and coordination thus helped give rise to a model of networked organization based on decentralized coordination among diverse, autonomous collective actors. These new diffuse network formations frequently outlived the mobilizations for which they were created, cohering into more or less sustainable movement infrastructures beyond any specific set of protests or actions. The global justice movement was thus widely referred to as a "network of networks" or a "movement of movements."

Although working groups within the emerging occupations continued to use listservs, social media such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter became the movement's primary means of communication, particularly during the initial phase of mobilization. Significantly, although #Occupy Boston working groups had their own listservs, there was no overall email list for the occupation. This is important because

different networking tools produce varying effects given their distinct socio-technical affordances. In contrast to listservs, which allow for more complex communicative exchange, interaction, and coordination, and can thus facilitate the development of discrete communities, social networking channels are mainly used by activists for micro-broadcasting, that is to say they allow individuals to quickly, cheaply, and effectively blast out vast amounts of information, links, and updates via person-to-person, ego-centered networks (group pages and accounts also act as individual nodes), taking advantage of powerful "small-world" effects to generate massive viral communication flows (see Postill, 2014).[124] The combination of Twitter and smartphones, in particular, allows individuals to continually post and receive updates as well as to circulate images, video, and text, constituting real time user-generated news feeds. The use of Twitter and Facebook can also produce a sense of connectedness and co-presence, potentially eliciting powerful feelings of solidarity as protesters read about distant and not-so-distant others engaged in the same or kindred actions and protests. However, social networking tools, and particularly Twitter given its strict character limit, are far less effective than listservs at facilitating complex, interactive discussions regarding politics, identity, strategy, and tactics.[125]

Although social networking tools allow activists to rapidly circulate information and to coordinate physical movements across space, with respect to protest, they are perhaps most effective at getting large numbers of individuals to converge at particular

[124] "Small world" networks are constituted by nodes that are linked to every other through a small number of connections or steps (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).

[125] Social networking tools can induce a sense of belonging to a wider public, and it is true that organization pages on Facebook provide a platform for more directed information exchange and commentary, but neither allows for the kind of coordination and elaborate discussions and debates facilitated by listservs that can help form communities of practice. Moreover, as Tufekci (2011) pointed out in a blog about the challenges Egyptian protesters face in expanding their movement beyond online circles, "Social media is more useful for disseminating one message—we are fed up and want Mubarak out—to as many people as possible than for targeting different messages to different audiences." None of this is to overlook the problems posed by listservs, however, such as off-topic posts, spamming, and flame wars.

sites. Rather than generating organizational networks, these tools primarily link and help to stitch together inter-personal networks, facilitating the mass aggregation of individuals within concrete locales through viral communication flows. In this sense, rather than "networks of networks" the use of Twitter and Facebook within social movements tends to generate 'crowds of individuals.'[126] At the same time, as commercial platforms that link individuals with friends and colleagues from multiple social milieus, social networking sites, far more than the listservs and autonomous media platforms, such as Indymedia, that were prevalent at the height of the global justice movements, are more widely used than the latter, have lower barriers to access and participation, and thus penetrate wider social networks,[127] helping to explain the broader degree of participation in the #Occupy movements beyond traditional activist communities compared to movements of the recent past. During the post-eviction phase of #Occupy, however, which in Boston was characterized by lower levels of public mobilization (e.g. mass marches, rallies, direct actions, and solidarity events) and more submerged forms of decentralized networking, digital communication increasingly shifted to a proliferating nexus of listservs used by particular working groups (e.g. media, ideas, logistics, facilitation, etc.) suggesting the rise of a fragmented mode of interaction combining elements of networking logics and logics of aggregation.

The rise of what I have called a logic of aggregation presents a more serious problem of sustainability than that posed by the diffuse networks of a prior generation. Indeed, whereas global justice networks (with the exception of the world and regional

[126] Stefania Milan (2011) also recently noted in a blog about "cloud protesting" that many of the "nodes" in contemporary social media powered protests, including the occupations, are made up of individuals rather than networks or organizations.

[127] Interestingly, Milan (2011) points out that many "computer-savvy activists" from an earlier generation, including many of those involved in the movements for global justice, would be wary of commercial media platforms such as Twitter or Facebook. In this sense, movement-developed media and communication platforms such as Indymedia contribute to the creation of autonomous movement infrastructures and can help protect against surveillance and repression, yet they also have a much more limited potential reach.

social forums, which have been around since 2001) often lasted a few years, social networking tools have been most effective at generating protests organized as temporary "smart mobs" (Rheingold, 2003), which disaggregate as easily as they aggregate. It is only with the long-term occupation of public space that such "mobs" (it is no small irony that Eric Cantor used precisely this term to *dismiss* #Occupy protesters!) are transformed from "crowds" of individuals into an organized movement with a collective subjectivity—albeit internally contested—alternatively defined by occupiers themselves as the "Occupy Movement," the "99%," or "the people."[128] This suggests another important difference between logics of networking and logics of aggregation: the relationship between the virtual and the physical, between the online world and the square (or agora).

Embodying protest

Mass direct actions such as the blockade against the WTO meetings in Seattle in 1999 or the 2001 "siege" of the G8 Summit in Genoa, as the primary tactic of the movements for global justice, allowed activists to not only make their struggles visible—to themselves, the media, and the wider public—and to shine a light on the inequities of global corporate capitalism, they also provided a platform for networks to build collective identities, to become physically embodied, and to represent themselves to themselves and others (Juris 2008a, 2008b). At the same time, the widespread "diversity of tactics" ethic meant networking logics were often physically inscribed into urban space as alternative networks that divided action terrains into distinct spaces characterized by diverse protest performances ranging from non-violent sit-ins to

[128] Regarding Eric Cantor's use of the term "mob" to depict #Occupy protesters, see, for example, http://motherjones.com/mojo/2011/10/occupy-wall-street-eric-cantor (accessed November 11, 2011).

mobile, carnivalesque street parties, to acts of militant confrontation with the police. In this sense, mass global justice actions were temporary performative terrains along which networks made themselves and their struggles visible. Once a particular action concluded, movement networks would continue to organize in submerged spheres until the next mobilization. The global justice movement was thus associated with the mass direct action as a tactic, but the overall movement was not *identical* to this tactic. Nonetheless, the movement had difficulty adjusting its strategy when mass actions became more difficult to reproduce over time given waning media interest and decreasing emotional intensity.

The link between physical protest and logics of aggregation is somewhat different. Rather than providing spaces for particular networks to coordinate actions and physically represent themselves, the smart mob protests facilitated by social media such as Facebook and Twitter made visible crowds of individuals aggregated within concrete locales. At the same time, given that social networking tools are primarily used for micro-broadcasting, they are less facilitative of lasting organizational networks, although, sustainability can be achieved via other means that compensate for the specific affordances of a given communication tool. In light of such logics of aggregation and disaggregation, one way to create more sustained movements is to indefinitely extend smart mob protests, physically occupying space to intervene through time, and ultimately building community, affective solidarity, and alternative forms of sociality. This dynamic produces a powerful incentive for politically motivated crowds of aggregated individuals—in the case of #Occupy participants were motivated to address grievances such as rising inequality, unemployment, and increasing corporate influence over electoral politics—to come together to maintain a physical presence in public places, even as they continued to inhabit online worlds of social networking. The

logics of aggregation associated with #Occupy meant that, at least initially, it was widely perceived, by participants and observers alike, as coterminous with public occupations as its primary tactical expression—hence the powerful impetus to continue occupying regardless of the shifting circumstances.

Logics of aggregation helped to shape emerging tactics and strategies of the #Occupy movements at a critical early stage, but once the physical occupations took hold they were quickly understood by occupiers as the primary source of movement vitality. *Logics* of aggregation thus helped to facilitate and reinforce a widespread *politics* of aggregation that conceived the occupations as both an effective protest tactic *and* as a model of an alternative, directly democratic world. Not only did the tactic succeed in eliciting significant and often positive media attention, thus contributing to a partial, albeit limited shift in the U.S. (and to some extent global) political conversation away from an almost exclusive focus on budgetary discipline and austerity and toward a countervailing concern for the consequences of inequality and unemployment, the occupations were also emotionally vibrant sites of human interaction that modeled alternative communities and generated intense feelings of solidarity (Collins 2012; Juris 2008a, 2008b).

In the #Occupy Boston encampment, myriad expressions of self-organization and consensus-based assemblies involving hundreds of people deliberating and making decisions constituted powerful expressions of direct democracy in action (Juris 2008a; Graeber 2009; Maeckelbergh 2009; Polletta 2002; Rasza and Kurnik 2012). Like similar camps organized during European global justice protests or world and regional social forums, the occupations were liminal spaces where participants put into practice the alternative values related to direct democracy, self-organization, and egalitarianism they were fighting for. Indeed, during one general assembly in Boston, a young female

occupier explained that the best part of the occupation was the "small slice of utopia we are creating," referring to dynamics such as the participatory assemblies, the community building, and the horizontal collaboration. At the same time, the Boston encampment provided a focal point for the movement, an autonomous platform and space for launching all manner of protests, marches, and public activities.

Indeed, as the number and pace of evictions across the country started to mount occupiers and sympathetic observers began to articulate the advantages of the tent cities. These might be summarized in terms of their *tactical* role—occupying space and provoking conflict in order to garner media attention and inspire participation, making visible the disproportionate influence of monied interests, and creating a symbolic contrast between the concerns of the powerful and those of everyone else; their *incubating role*—providing a space for grassroots participatory democracy, ritual and community building, strategizing and action planning, public education, and prefiguring alternative worlds that embody the visions of the movement; as well as their *infrastructural role*—facilitating ongoing interaction, collaboration, and networking, establishing a point of contact between the movement and interested members of the public, and furnishing concrete spaces for meetings and activities (see for example, Schradie, 2011 and Marcuse, 2011).

Occupiers thus came to realize the vital importance of space (Schradie, 2011). This is so on a micro-level, where the occupations challenge the sovereign power of the state to regulate and control the distribution of bodies in space (Foucault 1978; Feldman 1991; Fernandez 2008; Juris 2008), in part, by appropriating and re-signifying particular urban spaces such as public parks and squares as arenas for public assembly and democratic expression (Tilly, 2000 and Sewell, 2001; Zazko, and Beland, 2008). #Occupy encampments were thus "terrains of resistance" (Routledge, 1994), physical

sites of contention involving myriad embodied spatial struggles with the police *and* symbolic sites of contention over the meaning of space. As Marshall Ganz pointed out in a talk at Northeastern University on November 3, 2011, for example, occupiers succeeded by following a classic civil disobedience strategy: placing their bodies where they were not supposed to be. Such "matter out of place" (Douglas, 1984) was portrayed by mayors around the U.S. as a source of great consternation, and many cities reacted by raising concerns about public hygiene in order to justify the dismantling of camps as acts of literal and metaphorical “cleansing” (Jansen 2001, 45).

On a macro-level, the occupations challenged the transformation of social space into abstract space under the calculus of exchange value that drives neoliberal capitalism. As Henri Lefebvre (2000 [1974]), argued, the globalization of capital implies a shift from the production of things in space to the production of space itself: "a 'second nature' of territorial infrastructures, spatial configurations and institutions through which capital is valorized” (Brenner 1997, 142). Projects of social change thus seek to reappropriate abstract space and recast it according to an alternative calculus of use value (Dirlik 2001, 36). This is precisely what urban squatters, indigenous communities, unemployed and landless workers, and direct action activists do when they take abandoned buildings, shuttered factories, and commercial farms and transform them into lived or “representational” spaces (Lefebvre 2000 [1974]) for community building, autonomous self-organization, and directly democratic decision-making (see Chatterton and Hodkinson, 2007 and Pickerill and Chatterton, 2006). In this sense, #Occupy camps, particularly when situated near financial centers, have sought to redefine urban space in ways that contrast with dominant socio-economic orders, embody the utopian values of the movement, and give rise to alternative forms of sociality.

Spatial struggles were thus critical to the politics of aggregation within the #Occupy movements, but as Peter Marcuse (2011) has pointed out, maintaining and defending around-the-clock tent cities is not the only way to generate the effects associated with physical occupation. Indeed, fetishizing the camps, as Marcuse put it, and focusing too much on their defense also carried with it a potentially significant downside: fatigue and burn-out, demobilization during the cold winter months, internal conflicts and safety issues, divisions between campers and non-campers, the eclipse of the larger issues animating the movement, increasing repression, loss of media interest, etc. In my own experience in Europe and Mexico autonomous spaces are usually either more permanent (long-termer squats, rented or owned political and cultural centers, autonomous rural communities, etc.) or more ephemeral (as in the temporary protest camps set up during mass direct actions), thus helping to avoid some of the potential problems outlined above. Indeed, I had been to many similar protest camps, but I had never observed the same intense commitment to remaining in the streets over such an extended period of time.

The best way to understand the powerful drive to keep the physical occupations going, I argue, is to recognize that participants largely related to the occupations not merely as a tactic, but rather as the physical and communal embodiments of the virtual crowds of individuals aggregated through the viral flows of social media. As an occupier suggested during an emergency #Occupy Boston assembly to discuss an impending police raid on the evening of October 15, 2011 if the occupation were evicted, “we can always go back to the organizations that have long been struggling in our communities.” Not that this was a bad idea, but given the enthusiastic nods of approval it did seem to indicate what I observed as a widespread reluctance at the time to imagine the #Occupy movements beyond the physical occupations. The benefit, then,

of the evictions was that they forced occupiers to develop new strategic and tactical repertoires that established the conditions of possibility for the development of a potentially more diverse, flexible, and sustainable movement. The challenge, as expressed by many #Occupy Boston participants, was for the occupations to find new modes of appropriating space beyond the centralized encampments, while developing innovative ways to achieve public visibility, something activists were largely unable to accomplish over the longer-term despite some initial successes (see below).

Although global justice movement networks generally extended in time beyond short-term ephemeral gatherings, most lasted a couple years before dissolving or morphing into new formations. The one example of a lasting network-based form to arise from the movements for global justice was the World Social Forum and its regional and local variants, a hybrid model integrating horizontal and vertical practices and forms. The sustainability problem was even more acute for #Occupy Everywhere, given the constraints imposed by a logic of aggregation with respect to the need for #Occupy to reproduce itself in the absence of the physical occupations. To achieve lasting change, occupiers had to find ways of communicating and coordinating *as a movement* beyond the square. One solution in Spain was to shift to neighborhood organizing after several months in the plaza, punctuated by periodic protests, but this was only partly successful in creating an ongoing sense of momentum (Postill, 2014). The key, in my view, would be to flexibly combine strategies, tactics, and forms in ways that integrate logics of networking and aggregation, allowing for continued collective organizing through distributed movement networks beyond the occupations. As the Zapatista inspired Mexican National Indigenous Congress (CNI) put it, "act in assembly when together, act in network when apart."[129] Acting in network beyond the

[129] Notes from (Nowhere 2003, 64).

square initially gave rise to multiple tactics and strategies including public education, community organizing, neighborhood meet ups, electronic civil disobedience, as well as marches, protests, and decentralized direct actions. In Boston, for example, Occupy the Hood and Occupy the Barrio, along with efforts to cultivate relationships with neighborhood groups, reflected a desire to build connections with grassroots communities, while teach-ins and panels at universities and community centers represented further attempts to expand beyond Dewey Square. This shift toward decentralized networking as well as greater tactical and strategic diversity was greatly facilitated by the eviction of #Occupy Boston from Dewey Square, to which we now turn.

The eviction of Dewey Square and #Occupy Boston 2.0

I received a message on the morning of December 8, 2011 from #Occupy Boston's emergency text system. Mayor Menino had given the occupiers a midnight deadline to clear Dewey Square. The order was not unexpected, given the lifting of a temporary injunction against the clearing of the camp the prior day, and the recent spate of evictions against #Occupy encampments across the U.S.[130] Indeed, many activists, civil rights lawyers, and observers pointed to the use of similarly obscure health and safety regulations to justify the raids as evidence of a nationally coordinated effort.[131] Mayor Menino had been expressing such concerns for weeks, as well as a general loss of patience with the occupation. The pending raid of #Occupy Boston was thus widely anticipated, and it galvanized supporters from around the city to come defend the camp.

[130] Occupations in Oakland and Portland were also evicted on November 15, #Occupy Los Angeles and #Occupy Philadelphia were raided on November 29, and #Occupy San Francisco was cleared on December 7. #Occupy Boston had been for a time the last remaining occupation of a large U.S. city.
[131] See Karen McVeigh, "Civil Rights Lawyers Move to Fight Occupy Evictions Nationwide," *The Guardian*, December 1, 2001, www.guardian.co.uk (accessed January 1, 2012).

I finally got to Dewey just after midnight. Hundreds of people were milling about the perimeter of the square and across Atlantic Avenue, while dozens more seemingly arrived by the minute. After confirming that the raid had not yet occurred, I entered the camp, surprised to see that so many tents had been removed, including many of the larger logistical structures such as the library, food, and media spaces. Having watched the camp grow and evolve over the past two months, it was sad to see so many empty spaces—a glimpse of what was to come. For the time being, however, a few dozen occupiers who were willing to risk arrest were planning their strategy of defense, ultimately deciding to form two concentric circles around the remaining tents and to peacefully resist their removal. I briefly considered joining in, but I soon heard drumming coming from Atlantic Avenue and decided to see what was happening.

Hundreds of people had filled the street, closing off one of the largest thoroughfares in downtown Boston. Soon a radical honk band started playing, and the drumming circle grew in numbers and intensity, with people dancing, smiling, and sounding occasional chants, such as "We are Unstoppable, Another World is Possible," and the ever popular "Whose Streets, Our Streets!" A few minutes later a twitter message was sent out indicating that the eviction would not happen tonight. A loud cheer rang out and the spontaneous street party continued to grow, ultimately reaching upwards of 2,000 people. Everyone knew this was a temporary reprieve, but it still felt good to declare victory and revel in our collective strength and solidarity, recalling the similar euphoria at Occupy Wall Street on October 14, 2011 when the initial order to “clean” Zuccotti Park was called off. Indeed, during post-eviction assemblies many #Occupy Boston participants would refer to this brief “liminoid” moment (Turner 1982; Juris 2008a), as a highpoint of their #Occupy experience.

Another emergency text message went out the next day calling on supporters of #Occupy Boston to come out to defend the camp again that evening. This time I made it for the General Assembly at 7:00 pm and was surprised to see only a few hundred people. Over the next five hours the numbers barely grew. Outside of a core group of campers and non-resident occupiers, most supporters seemed ready to move on to the movement's next phase. Not knowing when the raid would take place I left to catch the last subway train just before midnight. As had occurred in other evictions around the country, the raid finally occurred in the early morning, at just before 5:00am. The city's strategy of waiting out the crowds had been effective. Forty-six occupiers were ultimately arrested non-violently defending the camp, and the Mayor took credit for the relatively "peaceful" eviction, where in contrast to other raids in cities such as New York and Oakland, there was no pepper spray and no beatings.

For me, the most interesting part of the evening prior to the eviction was observing the subtle tension during the General Assembly between those who expressed their willingness to defend the camp but who also admitted that they were ready for a strategic and tactical shift and those who stressed the ongoing importance of maintaining the physical occupation. As a young male occupier pointed out in his critique of those who had removed their tents and equipment the prior night, "Some people see the camp as a leftist think tank that is promoting political change, while others of us view the camp as an important experience in its own right that is attempting to build the world we want to see. What is important is the sense of community that is created and all the work groups and different forms of self-organization. We have to be clear about that and defend the camp until the end!" (Fieldnotes, December 9, 2011). He was referring to the classic divide between a strategy of political pressure and advocacy, and a politics of prefiguration. Indeed, for some, the occupation had become an

alternative utopian community, the main expression of the politics and vision of the movement itself. This reflected a subtle rift between a core group of on-site campers and those participants in the wider movement for whom the occupation had been a critical tactic, but did not exhaust the totality of the movement.

Regardless of where one stands on this divide, the eviction meant #Occupy Boston, and #Occupy movements elsewhere, were confronting the need to reinvent themselves, to assume a more diffuse, distributed networked form, while developing a multiplicity of tactical repertoires. There was ample evidence to suggest this was already beginning to occur soon after the #Occupy Boston camp was dismantled. For example, at the first post-eviction assembly on December 10, 2011 on the Boston Common—which was attended by nearly 700 people and recalled the first #Occupy Boston Assembly in late September—people chanted, "Occupy will never die, evict us we multiply!" During a series of ritual "mic checks" before the assembly began, one participant after another declared, in call and response fashion, their commitment to continuing the struggle in new forms, initiating what one facilitator dubbed "Occupy Boston 2.0." As one occupier passionately exclaimed, using the people's mic: "The city thought…Dewey Square…was a tumor...on the city's butt…but what they don't remember…is that when you poke a tumor…it metastasizes!... We…are everywhere!"

Perhaps most clearly symbolizing this new emphasis on distributing networking was a public art initiative to produce hundreds of miniature tents and to place them at strategic sites throughout the city, including Dewey Square, City Hall, and Bank of America lobbies, among others. Meanwhile, during immediate post-eviction assemblies and gatherings, representatives from various #Occupy Boston working groups such as logistics and signs—often identifying themselves based on the former locations of their tents in the camp—declared their intention to "go mobile" and to set up at meetings,

actions, and protests around the city in support of the movement. Moreover, decentralized neighborhood occupations sprang up in communities such as Jamaica Plain, Alston, and Somerville, among many others, while plans were in the works to initiate a series of "Town Hall Meetings" around the Boston area to reach out to residents who may be sympathetic to the ideas of the movement but who have not yet become involved.

Such small-scale occupations and meet-ups, although garnering scant media coverage, combine logics of aggregation and decentered networking logics in new and innovative ways. At the same time, despite the shift toward decentralized networking, a logic of aggregation continued to generate ongoing calls to find new spaces for larger-scale occupations, including alternative parks, abandoned buildings, closed school houses, or foreclosed homes. At one post-eviction visioning session I attended at *Encuentro Cinco* involving thirty people from various working groups, several participants talked about the importance of public space in which to gather—and where the movement's "houseless" participants might find shelter—whether new occupations, rented storefronts, or donated union halls. Meanwhile, General Assemblies and other collective gatherings in churches and community spaces around the city replaced Dewey Square as the movement's primary sites of physical aggregation and community building. Indeed, what was particularly striking in the immediate post-Dewey period was the sheer quantity of meetings and gatherings, ranging from continued four-times-a-week assemblies, to ongoing working group meetings (often multiple meetings on any given evening), to weekly communal gatherings and open houses on Monday nights, to various special planning and strategy sessions.

Conclusion: Key issues and challenges

Such post-eviction momentum was ultimately difficult to maintain, as was the ability of the movement to reproduce its former visibility through periodic public actions and events. Multiple meetings and gatherings on most nights of the week were surely unsustainable, particularly if the movement wanted to reach out more broadly, including to marginalized communities where residents possess neither the time nor the resources to attend so many activities. Moreover, it was also exceedingly difficult, even for seasoned activists, to keep up with the sheer number and diversity of communication channels, including myriad twitter feeds, working group listservs and forums, as well as #Occupy-related websites and wikis, a drawback of organizing in a social media age that mirrors the proliferation and fragmentation of the movement's physical gatherings. Indeed, #Occupy Boston was a complex, rhizomatic, self-organizing machine par excellence.

Despite such challenges, as #Occupy Boston participants pointed out, the eviction was an opportunity for the movement to renew itself, and it did so—at least initially—in a way that, in my view, began to integrate logics of aggregation and networking, *potentially* setting the stage for, but ultimately failing to produce, a broader, more diverse, and more sustainable movement in an era of #Occupy 2.0. For a time, #Occupy Boston did begin to build a more decentralized community-based networked infrastructure rooted in directly democratic neighborhood and city assemblies. However, future movements will also have to find new ways of achieving public visibility involving creative combinations of direct actions, marches, large-scale public assemblies, and even temporary physical occupations and encampments.

Another particularly important concern for Occupy and for other movements going forward is the strategic need to reach out to working class people and people of

color who are disproportionately affected by issues such as inequality, unemployment, and the mortgage crisis. After some initial missteps in communicating with a coalition of community groups that work with these constituencies (for example, #Occupy Boston began on the same day as a march and anti-eviction action organized by the Right to the City coalition, resulting in the partial overshadowing of that action and the mistaken media identification of those arrested as occupiers), #Occupy Boston took some positive steps in this direction. These included holding an anti-oppression workshop focusing on racism and white privilege and the public support of the occupation for an autonomous action in Roxbury (one of the city's historic African American communities where a large number of people of color as well as poor and working class residents reside) organized by Occupy the Hood. #Occupy Boston participants also supported the efforts of Latino organizers to mobilize area Latino communities under the umbrella of Occupy the Barrio. In addition, meetings continued for a time between representatives of community-based organizations and members of #Occupy Boston's outreach committee regarding how to more effectively reach out to people of color and build more sustainable relationships of trust and solidarity. These and additional future efforts will be necessary if a new movement is to more closely reflect the 99%.

Another major challenge confronting the Occupy and future movements involves the contentious issue of goals. Many observers were perplexed that occupiers could not seem to come up with a clear and concise list of demands, while ongoing debates raged within various #Occupy sites, including #Occupy Boston, about whether and how this should be done. In order to grasp these dynamics it is important to consider the broader cultural logics I have been exploring here. Specifically, the complex amalgam of networking and aggregation logics made it unlikely that occupiers

around the country (not to mention the world) would be able to reach consent on the kind of short list of specific, actionable demands that would readily translate into dominant media and political formats. On the one hand, logics of networking compel diverse *collective* actors to come together across their differences without losing their autonomy and specificity. Within the global justice movement networking logics meant specific networks and groups could develop discrete goals and demands such as an end to the policies of structural adjustment, the imposition of a small tax on global financial transactions (Tobin Tax), the putting into practice of fair trade practices, or the end of global capitalism itself, among others, but larger spaces of convergence such as world and regional social forums were characterized by broader statements of principles providing umbrella spaces as wide as possible for diverse movements and networks to communicate and coordinate across their differences. As I have argued (Juris 2008a), the idea of "open space" represented the inscription of a networking logic into the organizational architecture of the forum itself. Although the occupations did not develop such an explicit self-conception, they seemed to operate as similar kinds of open spaces rather than as singular political actors.

On the other hand, logics of aggregation within the #Occupy movements posed an even greater challenge in terms of developing common proposals. As I have argued, rather than generating organizational networks, social media primarily operate via inter-personal networks, resulting less in "networks of networks" than in "crowds of individuals." If the occupations largely operated as aggregations of individuals from diverse backgrounds and with varying levels of previous movement experience (including those who may belong to existing networks and organizations, but many others who do not), then agreeing to the need for a uniform set of demands, let alone the contents of such demands, was always going to be difficult. Certainly there were widely

shared grievances, as mentioned above, regarding issues such as inequality, lack of economic opportunity, and the influence of corporate money in politics, among many others, but boiling these down to a short list of specific and actionable demands would have been a much more complex undertaking given the diversity of individual interests and political affiliations.

While both the issues raised and the proposals forwarded by the global justice movement were also extremely diverse, the fact that so many established *collective* actors—networks, non-governmental organizations, collectives, etc.—were involved, there was a more developed starting point for the process of building shared visions and programs, whether they involved specific institutional reforms such as re-envisioning the role of the World Bank, IMF, and WTO, cancelling Third World debt, and imposing global financial regulations, or more far reaching goals of abolishing global financial institutions and working toward local economic, political, and cultural autonomy. Many concrete proposals also circulated among occupiers related to policies such as a more progressive income tax, the end of corporate personhood, or the public financing of elections, while a similar reformist-radical divide meant that some occupiers supported reforms such as those mentioned above, while many others saw themselves as engaged in a more radical set of challenges, whether to the global capitalist system, structures of racial domination and patriarchy, or the corrupted state of our representative democracies. Indeed, the public assemblies, the consensus decision making, the collective spaces in the camps, and the diverse forms of collaborative self-management constituted a set of concrete alternative practices that served as powerful symbolic, yet embodied contrasts between an inclusive, grassroots, and participatory democracy as it ought to be and the current configuration of a representative democratic system that serves the interests of the 1%.

Nonetheless, the individualized nature of participation in the occupations, which primarily involved aggregations of individual actors, including many with little previous political experience, presented a particular challenge in terms of bringing these diverse proposals and alternatives together as a unified set of demands. Moreover, the political differences within #Occupy were perhaps even greater than those within the global justice movements given the majoritarian populist impulse that welcomed not only progressives, but also many libertarian supporters of free markets, such as the followers of Ron Paul. In many ways, then, the politics of the occupations as crowds of aggregated individuals were more ambiguous than the expressly anti-neoliberal (or anti-capitalist) politics of the movements for global justice, while the tension between directly democratic and populist impulses within #Occupy was more pronounced.

In sum, whether one considers #Occupy's perceived lack of specificity (as opposed to the myriad proposals generated by individual participants) a weakness, the combined logics of networking and aggregation militated against, but did not *necessarily* preclude, the development of common demands. Indeed, many occupiers were hard at work creating both online and offline systems for aggregating and synthesizing the manifold experiences, proposals, and ideas generated by occupiers and sympathizers around the country, ranging from the "We are the 99%" Tumblr, to handwritten messages on paper banners, to declarations such as the one released by the #Occupy Wall Street General Assembly, to various wikis springing up on #Occupy websites around the country, including one dedicated to creating a statement of purpose on the #Occupy Boston wiki. These wide ranging experiments in horizontal collaboration reflected the collaborative ethic of the free software movement (see Juris 2005, Postill 2014), and also recalled similar experiences in the movements for global justice, including a project called the European Social *Consulta* that I examined during

my ethnographic fieldwork in Barcelona (Juris 2008a). Given the prevalence of social networking tools such as Twitter and Facebook and the associated logics of aggregation, there is reason to believe that such experiments will continue to reach ever greater numbers of people, making new movements that arise in the wake of #Occupy particularly powerful laboratories for the production of alternative democratic practices.

How ought we to view, then, the achievements of the #Occupy Movement? First, it should be pointed out that the occupations succeeded in achieving a great deal of visibility in an extremely short period of time, due in part to the positive feedback loops that obtained between mainstream and viral social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. In this sense, the occupations raised awareness about issues such as inequality, unemployment, financial deregulation, and the influence of corporate money in democracy, helping to shift public debate away from a nearly exclusive focus on market discipline and budgetary austerity, even as these discourses remained widespread. Going forward, however, it is important to remember that social movements operate through multiple temporalities and across diverse spatial terrains (Juris and Khasnabish 2013). This recognition can help us move beyond an overly rigid binary opposition between policy-oriented and prefigurative conceptions of movements like #Occupy.

On the one hand, movements are oriented toward short- and medium-term goals related to the immediate material and cultural needs and/or the political rights of constituents, and on this register, movements direct their activities, however indirectly, toward institutional political spheres. However on the other hand, influencing policy outcomes does not require direct institutional intervention and is thus not necessarily incompatible with prefigurative strategies. As mentioned above, the impact of the #Occupy movements can be partly gleaned by subtle shifts in public discourse,

including that of U.S. politicians who increasingly talk about unemployment, poverty, and inequality. In order to have a more tangible impact, though, such discursive shifts will ultimately have to be translated into concrete policy changes. In my view, however, and that of many, but certainly not all occupiers, this is the domain of progressives in government, *not* social movements as a whole. In this sense, individual activists may meet with, lobby, or otherwise seek to influence legislators, even as wider movements maintain their distance from formal political institutions.

In other words, the #Occupy movements both responded to and helped to create new discursive and political conditions of possibility (or what social movement scholars refer to as "political opportunities," (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996), but it is up to elected officials to develop and shepherd through concrete policy reforms. Moreover, occupiers were rightly, in my view, wary of the dangers of being co-opted given the potential for demobilization and divisiveness. Indeed, given the powerful logics of aggregation in the occupations, which assembled individuals from diverse backgrounds and traditions, it is particularly important for movements like #Occupy to remain autonomous from any given partisan program or political party, which, as occupiers around the country pointed out, are all implicated to one degree or another in the complex web of corporate finance being denounced. That said, the extent to which movements after #Occupy can use collaborative tools and processes to gradually assemble and synthesize key statements, proposals, and even demands, the more effective they will be at communicating their message to a wider public through mainstream media channels. In other words, there may be creative ways to transcend the tension between calls for greater clarity of focus and a directly democratic impulse toward diversity, decentralization, and autonomy.

At the same time, social movements are also oriented toward longer-term horizons, promoting deep structural changes aimed at transforming social and economic relations and overcoming multiple forms of domination around axes such as race, class, and gender. At the broadest level, social movements struggle to build deeper versions of democracy (Appadurai 2002) and new, more egalitarian forms of sociality. Unlike in the short- and medium-term, the terrain for such future-oriented struggles is not the state, but the autonomous, self-generated networks of movements themselves (Juris 2008a; Cohen and Arato 1992), spaces for the generation of alternative practices, codes, and values that have the potential to both aggregate and migrate into wider spheres of everyday life (Juris 2005; see Melucci 1989). Indeed, many occupiers called for radical transformations in the organization of society, politics, and the economy, even as they struggled to address internal racial, class, and gender hierarchies inside the camps. Meanwhile, continually evolving forms of consensus decision making, self-organization, and collaborative networking represented ongoing experiments that prefigured alternative models of sociality and popular democracy. Such practices were at the heart of the movements for global justice, but new viral forms of communication are potentially diffusing them into wider social spheres. In my view, the strategic key for post-#Occupy movements is to develop more sustainable forms of movement beyond the physical occupations, while addressing shorter-term political goals *and* longer-term cultural and democratic aspirations.

References

Appadurai, A. 2002. "Deep Democracy." *Public Culture* 14(1): 21-47

———. 1996. *Modernity at Large*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Arquilla, J., and Ronfeldt, D. 2001. *Networks and Netwars*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporations.

Brenner, N. 1997. "Global, Fragmented, and Hierarchical." *Public Culture* 10(1): 135-167.

Calhoun, C. 1993. “New social movements of the early nineteenth century.” *Social Science History* 17(3): 385-427.

Chatterton, P and Hodkinson, S. 2007. "Why We Need Autonomous Spaces in the Fight against Capitalism." In *A Handbook for Changing our World*, ed. Trapese Collective, 201-215. London: Pluto.

Cohen, J. and Arato, A. 1992. *Civil society and political theory*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Collins, J. 2012. "Theorizing Wisconsin's 2011 Protests." *American Ethnologist* 39(1): 1-15.

Collins, R. 2001. "Social movements and the focus of emotional attention." In *Passionate Politics*, edited by Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper and Francesca Polletta, 27–44. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Diani, M., and McAdam, D. eds. 2003. *Social movements and networks*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dirlik, A. 2001. "Place-Based Imagination." In *Places and Politics in an Age of Globalization*, edited by Roxann Prazniak and Arif Dirlik. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.

Douglas, M. 1984. *Purity and Danger*, second edition. New York: Routledge.

Fox, J A. 2010. "Coalitions and Networks." In *International Encyclopedia of Civil Society*, edited by Helmut Anheier and Stefan Toepler. New York: Springer Publications.

Gerlach, L., and Hine, V. 1970. *People, power, change*. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill.

Graeber, D. 2011. 2009. *Direct action*. Oakland, CA: AK Press.

Hutchby, I. 2001. "Technologies, Texts and Affordances." *Sociology* 35: 441-456.

Jansen, S. 2001. "The Streets of Beograd." *Political Geography* 20: 35-55.

Juris, J. S. 2004. "Networked social movements." In *The network society*, edited by Manuel Castells, 341-362. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

———. 2005. "The New Digital Media and Activist Networking within Anti-Corporate Globalization Movements." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 597: 189-208.

———. 2008a. *Networking futures*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

———. 2008b. "Performing politics." *Ethnography* 9(1): 61-97.

———. 2012. "Reflections on #Occupy Everywhere: Social media, public space, and emerging logics of aggregation." *American Ethnologist* 39(2): 259-279.

Juris, J. S. and Alex Khasnabish. 2013. "Conclusion." In *Insurgent Encounters*, edited by Jeffrey S. Juris and Alex Khasnabish. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Juris, J. S. and Geoffrey Pleyers. 2009. "Alter-activism." *Journal of Youth Studies* 12(1): 57-75.

Kidd, D. 2003. "Indymedia.org." In *Cyberactivism*, edited by Martha McCaughey and Michael D. Ayers, 46-69. New York: Routledge.

Lefebvre, H. 2000 [1974]. *The Production of Space*. Malden, Mass: Blackwell.

Maeckelbergh, M. 2009. *The will of the many*. London: Pluto Press.

Marcuse, P. 2011. "The Purpose of the Occupation Movement and the Danger of Fetishizing Space," www.pmarcuse.wordpress.com (January 4, 2012).

McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., and Mayer N. Zald, eds. 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Meikle, G. 2002. *Future active*. New York: Routledge.

Melucci, A. 1989. *Nomads of the present*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Milan, S. 2011. "Cloud protesting." Blog posted on October 18, 2011. Accessed November 11, 2011. http://stefi.engagetv.com/node/103.

Notes from Nowhere. 2003. *We are everywhere*. New York: Verso.

Offe, C. 1985. "New social movements." *Social Research* 52(4): 817-868.

Pickerill, J., and Chatterton, P. 2006. "Notes Towards Autonomous Geographies." *Progress in Human Geography* 30: 730-746.

Polletta, F. 2004. *Freedom is an endless meeting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Postill, J. 2014. "Democracy in an age of viral reality: A media epidemiography of Spain's indignados movement." *Ethnography* 15 (1): 51-69.

Rasza, M., and Kurnik, A. 2012. “The Occupy Movement in Žižek’s hometown: Direct democracy and a politics of becoming.” *American Ethnologist* 39(2): 238-258

Rheingold, H. 2003. *Smart mobs*. New York: Basic Books.

Riles, A. 2000. *The network inside out*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Schradie, J. 2011. "Why Tents (Still) Matter for the Occupy Movement." Accessed January 4, 2012. www.commondreams.org.

Taibo, C. 2011. *El 15-M en sesenta preguntas*. Madrid: Los libros de la Catarata.

Tufekci, Z. 2011. “Too many messages and only one Facebook page.” *Technosociology*. Blog posted on September 19, 2011. http://technosociology.org, accessed November 11, 2011.

Watts, D. J., and H. Strogatz, S. H. 1998. "Collective Dynamics of 'Small-World' Networks." *Nature*: 440-442.

Weinstein, A. 2001. "We are the 99% Creators Revealed." Mother Jones, October 7, 2011. Accessed January 5, 2012. http://motherjones.com.

Cover Back

This book engages with the experience of space and time in youth cultures across the world. Putting together contemporary case studies on young transnationalists, young glocals and young protesters in cities on five continents, it analyzes new agoras in global cities. It is based on a selection of papers first presented to the International Sociological Association (ISA) Research Committee 34 session on Youth, Space and Time that took place during the ISA World Congresses of Sociology in Gothenburg, Sweden (2010), and in Yokohama, Japan (2014). The value of this volume for youth researchers worldwide is twofold. Firstly, the chapters exemplify innovative approaches to understanding the fluid and dynamic urban space-time dimension in which young people's cultural and bodily practices are located. Secondly, the volume offers a transnational perspective. Chapter contributors come from countries across the world, and give account of very diverse youth culture phenomena. They represent both established researchers and new voices in youth research.

CARLES FEIXA is full professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Lleida (Catalonia-Spain). He is the author of several books including *De jovenes, bandas y tribus* (On Youth, Gangs and Tribes, Ariel, 1998, 5th edition 2012), and *Global Youth?* (with P. Nilan, Routledge, 2006).

CARMEN LECCARDI is Professor of Cultural Sociology at the University of Milano-Bicocca (Italy). Her latest books include *Sociologie del tempo* (Sociologies of Time, Laterza, 2009) and *A New Youth? Young People, Generations and Family Life* (edited with Elisabetta Ruspini, Ashgate, 2006).

PAM NILAN is Professor of Sociology at the University of Newcastle (Australia). She has three books on youth: *Australian Youth* (Pearson, 2007), *Global Youth?* (Routledge, 2006) and *Indonesian Youth* (Routledge 2013).