This work in progress consists of an adaptation of an already published book-chapter - Orsini, G. Sergi, A. (2018) 'The Emergency Business. Migrants, Reception, Mafia Interests and Glocal Governance: from Lampedusa to Rome'. In Van Duyme, P. C. et al (eds.) *The Janus-faces of cross-border crime in Europe*, The Hague: Eleven Publisher. Pp: 49-72 - which had a strong criminological angle. Our goal here is to use the three cases (i.e. Crotone, Lampedusa and Rome) to challenge/expand on most common perspectives on the crime-migration nexus, while also providing a view on how the local functioning of Europe's governance of migration favours the interests of mafia groups.

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Title – Turning the crime-migration nexus upside-down. Mafia interests in the management of migrants and asylum seekers' reception facilities in Italy.

Abstract – Within the framework of the increasing securitization of migration, institutional perspectives on the crime-migration nexus concentrate on undocumented migrants and asylum seekers as potential criminals and, thus, as a danger for the host society. Alternatively, the emphasis stays on smuggling and human trafficking networks. As such, over the years national and regional governments of the most affluent countries have designed and implemented a series of security centred policies to better govern migration and ensure safety for the host societies. Yet, as discussed here, a closer look at the management of unauthorized migrants and asylum seekers arriving in Italy, subverts mainstream views on the relation between crime and migration. By concentrating on the national reception system(s), here we show how securitized policies implemented in time of emergency are actually exploited by criminal organizations to expand their activities and diversify their sources of income. In the past years the Italian *Antimafia* prosecutors have repeatedly confirmed the involvement of the Calabrian mafia *'ndrangheta* in the management of many reception facilities set by national and European institution to deal with migrants and asylum seekers entering Italy unauthorized. By relying on data collected during a long fieldwork in the iconic border island of Lampedusa and Sicily, combined with the analysis of judicial documents and public sources relative to the cases of Crotone – in Calabria - and Rome, here we show how mafia groups succeeded gaining access to the substantial financial resources allocated there by national and European institutions. According to our findings, the infiltration of criminal groups is facilitated when new public funding become available over emergencies. Since authorities rely on exceptional measures and procedures, controls on transparency and due diligence tend to be overruled. This is even more the case when public money comes from geographically and institutionally distant authorities in Brussels.

Increasingly since the last decade of the twentieth century, migration became a major security concern for most affluent societies. In Europe and elsewhere, migrants and asylum seekers came to be constructed as an existential threat for the host countries. Besides the emphasis on the potential negative impact of migration on national welfare systems, labour markets, or cultural identities, frequently the nexus is made between migration and crime. On the one hand, migrants are often depicted as potential criminals and, consequently, as a danger for public order (Huysmans 2006). On the other hand, many emphasize the role that criminal organizations play in profiting from unauthorized migration either through smuggling or human trafficking (REFERENCE).

As migration turned into a top societal threat, governments introduced policies to increase control on specific groups of unwanted third country nationals. A major shift which translated on the ground into the designing and implementation of a variety of surveillance and control strategies - including for instance the intensification of stop and search operations, the installing of border fences, or the opening of detention and reception facilities to constrain the mobility of unauthorized migrants and asylum seekers (Longo 2016).

While, however, there is little evidence demonstrating any positive correlation between immigration and an increase of crimes in the receiving countries (REFERENCE), many have also questioned the policing of human trafficking and smuggling *vis a vis* the increasing number of restrictions imposed to potential migrants willing to migrate legally (REFERENCE). As we discuss here, however, a closer look at the management of reception and detention facilities in one of Europe's key countries for the governance of (unauthorized) migration – that is, Italy – allows to provide an alternative view on the relation between crime and migration – and the governance of it. Due to a series of migration emergencies declared by national and European authorities in the country, and the substantial inflow of public money which was mobilized to manage them, numerous opportunities generated for criminal organizations – i.e. mafias – to profit. According to what indicated by a number of investigations of the *Direzione Investigativa Antimafia* (Investigative Anti-mafia Directorate, DIA), more or less powerful mafias have taken over the (mis)management of some of the biggest and more important reception and detention facilities in Italy.

Empirically, this paper concentrates on a primary case study and two corollary, but connected to one another, ones. First, and most importantly, we look at the iconic borderland of Lampedusa. The case of the tiny Sicilian island is extremely emblematic of how emergency became the new normal of migration management in Italy – and in Europe. More importantly, the analysis of the events involving the local migrants and asylum seekers' reception centres demonstrates how emergencies attracted increasing EU funds to this otherwise isolated community. It also shows how the emergency allowed for the expansion of a grey area which favoured corruption and, with it, the infiltration of mafias' interests in the local governance of migration.

Thus, we move northwards, in Calabria, to concentrate further on the involvement of local mafia – the *'ndrangheta* - in the management of the biggest reception centre of Europe, in

Crotone. This case confirms how the inflow of substantial public funding in a territory with dense mafia presence favours concurrent predatory governance practices.

Finally, we briefly look at the Mafia Capitale case in Rome, which involved a local criminal group that, according to prosecutors, organized itself as a mafia group. This latest case shows further how the availability of EU and national funds distributed within a declared emergency, provide a set of opportunities for criminal groups with the right institutional connections - up to the office of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Before thus moving to the analysis of each of these three cases, next we provide a broader view on the way(s) in which mafias operate within emergencies, and across different institutional levels.

Of mafias and emergencies as business opportunities

The dangerousness of mafia power is certainly linked to the possibility that the employment and exploitation of personal and social networks might grant a fast-track access to both legal and illegal markets. In other words, a successful mafia presence in a territory leads to situations where corruptive pacts, malpractices and sleaze become a social norm so that for locals it becomes very difficult to qualify them as deviant or criminal. In this scenario, the more rooted the mafia group is on a specific territory - in terms of cultural bond with the community together with the availability of social and personal networks, the deeper will be its capability to exercise local governance – thus increasing the vulnerability of local institutions and licit sectors.

Particular events or particular conditions can increase the likelihood or the speed of success of mafia involvement in the public and private governance of a given territory. Two examples can best illustrate this: first, the availability of (new/more) funding or diversified sources of capitals, such as new investment opportunities; second, emergency situations, such as natural disasters. When different or new sources of funding become available from public funding bodies, mafia groups – as predatory forces – use their networks to both participate in tenders and receive the funds while masking their use afterwards. This has been studied both in relation to public funds (Calderoni and Caneppele, 2009) and European Union's funding (Sergi and South, 2016). This is especially true when it comes to situations of emergency, such as the aftermath of natural disasters, *i.e*. earthquakes or floods. In these cases, not only special funding is likely to become available, but also – and more importantly – controls over transparency and due diligence tend to be overruled by the necessity to speed up the recovery (Green, 2005).

Authorities have confirmed the involvement of organised crime/ mafia-type networks in the re-construction after the earthquake of 2009 in L'Aquila, in the Central Italian region of Abruzzo (Sergi, 2017). DIA's investigations (for example Operation Lypas in 2011) related to the 'ndrangheta have shown how various clans had successfully obtained contracts and gained access and control to construction and development firms in the area. The contacts they used in the occasion of the earthquake had been previously secured for the cocaine trade as the clans were present in the area before the earthquake occurred. Moreover, as shown by Operation 'Isola Felice' – Happy Island – in 2015, due to ineffective regulation more and different clans are now involved in the re-construction in the area. The poor quality of their construction works (for example, because of the use of less secure and cheaper materials) as well as the costs associated to their presence in the industry (judicial, administrative and economic) are all elements that can contribute, and have contributed, to the poor environmental conditions of Central Italian regions.

In these scenarios, one fundamental aspect is the link between corruption and mafia groups. That corruption is an enabler and a systemic feature of the operations of many organised crime groups, especially when it comes to operations in the public and political sectors, is proved by the multiple cases recorded in the recent Italian history (Smith et al., 2016; Lavorgna and Sergi, 2014; CSD, 2010). However, the degree to which mafia groups benefit from, and employ, corruption techniques requires a more refined discourse.

In dense mafia environments – territories where mafia clans are not just numerically more present and criminally active, but also socially and culturally more embedded – it is not unusual to observe overlapping of roles and functions between criminal groups and ruling classes. In some cases, criminal groups and ruling classes share the same individuals in different functions or use the same networks. Ties between different people are indeed multiple as people are linked through multiple roles (Boissevain, 1974).

This is particularly true in small communities and in territories where local economy struggles. In Calabria, for example, the ruling class and mafia groups 'both consume resources without an intent to support innovation or development and allow a careless accumulation of debts in the name of personal gains' (Sergi, 2015: 43). This is exacerbated in situations where there is an exceptional influx of capitals and/or a condition of emergency, which imply more predatory techniques on the one hand, and lower legal controls on the other hand. In these cases, together with local administration corruption – which presupposes an exchange of favours, a pact – there is a situation which can be defined as concurrent predatory governance. Both legal and illegal actors such as politicians, administrators and mafia groups, act within an informal grey area, where the more a territory is prone to dense mafia presence, the higher the risk of such a grey area to resist. Different factors contribute generating such vicious circle:

1. The links between mafia clans and their community, from an economic but also social-cultural perspective; mafia power feeds on local relationships to exploit local opportunities, the stronger the former the more successful the latter.
2. The socio-cultural sets of behaviour of mafia groups and individuals include the ability to establish instrumental friendships and to maintain or gain proximity with local politicians and/or public administrators and/or entrepreneurs to access key functions and key offices. The more effective and the tighter are the links with the territory and the local culture of reference, the stronger will be the ability to establish forms of concurrent governance of the territory thanks to these connections and proximity.
3. Instrumental relationships and concurrent governance are particularly effective and can be used to foster new business ventures when, in situations of emergency, transparency regulations are partially or completely disregarded.

When public funding reaches territories with these characteristics in response to an emergency, the risk of widespread corruption is high.

In the following pages we thus present three relatively different cases – e.g. in terms of type of mafia territories, size of corruption, the structure of the criminal organization, the involvement of institutional actors – which show how emergencies translate on the ground into an expanding grey area offering several opportunities for mafia groups to profit. Even more when emergencies are funded by distant authorities such as the EU.

The case of migrants and asylum seekers' reception in Italy: making money out of the (permanent) emergency

In 2016 the DIA stressed how elements of crisis and emergency are key in the way mafia groups work. Presenting some of their findings on Sicilian Cosa Nostra, DIA prosecutors (2016: 64) notice how the various clans 'continue undisturbed in their short and long-term strategies, by exploiting emergency situations determined by the dysfunction of the overall system [...] at times creating the conditions of the emergency themselves'. This modus operandi, continues the DIA, 'can be exported to the business of migrants' reception centres [...] which could be among the sectors where Cosa Nostra manages to allocate and distribute public contracts through synergies with white collar criminals.'

As we will see in the next sections of this paper, what prosecutors noted is not limited to operations of the Sicilian mafia Cosa Nostra, but can be extended to other regional mafias.

The emergency business: the case of Lampedusa

Boat migrants' arrivals in Lampedusa begun already in the nineties, even before Italy joined the Schengen (Friese, 2010). Initially, the few Italian law enforcement officials present on the island would largely overlook arrivals (Cuttitta, 2014). What changed with the integration of Lampedusa into the Schengen space, was that arrivals started to be managed differently, as securitisation progressively replaced the previous *laissez faire* and improvised approach (Léonard, 2011; Van Houtum and Pijper, 2007). A local activist described this shift:

> *Once authorities started to organize themselves to deal with the issue – for instance with the opening of the first detention centre at the airport – the strategy aimed at separating the phenomenon from locals. Authorities' strategy was to hide all they could from the eyes of Lampedusans. As soon as migrants arrived on dry land, a bus took them to the centre and they disappeared from [the] islanders' sight*.

With the introduction of the Immigration Act 40/1998 Italian legislators adjusted the national rules to the Schengen parameters (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009). Now, unauthorised migrants had to be detained so that new facilities were built in Lampedusa (Tsianos and Karakayali, 2010). Initially, migrants only occasionally encountered Lampedusa and landed there during their journey to Italy. However, since several European sea-border patrolling missions launched from and around the island (Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006), boat migrants started being detected and rescued many miles away from Lampedusa and were then also taken to the island. Thus, an expensive maritime border had been established around Lampedusa thanks to the use of navy and coastguard ships, helicopters and even drones. At the same time, the first migrants' reception and detention facility was established in Lampedusa in 1996. At the beginning, authorities opened a gated camp for the migrants' temporary stay with a maximum capacity of almost 200 individuals, inside the area of Lampedusa's airport (Monzini, 2008). After authorities and medical teams had checked each person, direct flights would transfer migrants to mainland Sicily within a few days (Gatti, 2005).

Nevertheless, in 2005, the centre went under the lens of national as well as European media attention, as the inhuman conditions of migrants' detention had raised objections by the European Parliament and continental media (Andrijasevic, 2010; Gatti, 2005). Following these scandals, the Italian authorities began planning the construction of a new migrant centre in the inner valley of Contrada Imbriacola, the building of which started in 2007. This bigger facility, primarily used for medical checks and identification, had a maximum capacity of almost 400, and up to more than 800 people in case of emergency. Today, the centre of Contrada Imrbiacola is the first hotspot ever established in Italy, and it is the only facility used to detain migrants on the island (Dines et al., 2015).

Overall, with the European external border in Lampedusa, public funding started arriving at an unprecedented speed on this territory of 26 square kilometres and less than 6.000 registered residents (Orsini, 2015). With national and Communitarian institutions busy fortifying the border, public investments came from both Brussels and Rome (Andersson, 2016; Völkel, 2014; Andrijasevic, 2010). For what concerns border control, public funding ends primarily in the hands of law enforcement agencies, the military, and a series of major corporations that develop surveillance technologies which are used at sea (Bigo, 2000). Yet, substantial Communitarian transfers reached Lampedusa also to establish and run the local migrants' reception and detention centre. It is mainly there that a series of opportunities arose for mafia/illicit entrepreneurial networks to profit from the 'borderization' of Lampedusa (Cuttitta, 2014), as an almost permanent state of emergency was declared on the island.

In fact, the Italian government declared first the state of emergency for Lampedusa in 2006 (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 2006). The official scope of such declaration was the necessity to deal with the many migrants' boats left on the island. Presented as an environmental threat and, therefore, based on the law number 225 of 1992[1] designed to deal with natural disasters, the emergency status allowed the Civil Protection Department to circumvent the public tender procedure and assign directly to private companies the contracts for the disposal of the wrecks (Friese, 2012).

In the following years, several other emergencies were declared, providing other opportunities to reduce transparency and public scrutiny. Possibly the most noteworthy emergency took place in 2011 when, due to the revolution in Tunisia and the civil war in Libya, thousands started reaching the island. Since the beginning, Italian authorities did nothing to

[1] Available on the Italian Civil Protection Department's website: http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/amministrazione-trasparente/provvedimenti/dettaglio/-/asset_publisher/default/content/legge-n-225-del-24-febbraio-1992-istituzione-del-servizio-nazionale-della-protezione-civile [accessed last 08 June 2018]

transfer people to mainland Sicily, and simultaneously refused to offer accommodations to the newcomers. The island was soon packed with people forced to sleep in the open air. Soon, a humanitarian emergency exploded on the island and it was projected from there to the whole of Europe (Campesi, 2011). It is at this stage that the then Italian Ministry of Interior officially declared another emergency, demanding for extra Communitarian efforts – mainly, economic – to deal with the situation. Brussels did not wait too much, and soon Italian authorities received '25 million euros of emergency funding' (McMahon, 2012: 6) to address the situation on the island.

It is in Lampedusa that emergency management went normalized with respect to the governance of migration in Italy. Since the tragedy of the 3rd of October of 2013 - when almost 400 migrants lost their lives as their boat capsized at less than one nautical mile from the island - and throughout 2014, 2015 and 2016, Italy received a series of other emergency transfers from Brussels to cope with a migrant emergency that, as we have seen, lasts on the island from more than two decades (Cuttitta, 2014; Perkowski, 2016). Overall, tens of millions of Euros of European taxpayers reached Rome, to be spent mainly in Lampedusa (European Parliament, 2016). Allocated within relatively short periods of time, no open tender is published, which allows for those with the right institutional connections to be selected. While only a few Lampedusans seems to have received any direct benefit from the inflow of money, the state of emergency is pivotal on the island to facilitate the spread of criminal practices carried out by local administrators. This is what a local lawyer, and personal assistant of the mayor of Lampedusa in 2013, Paola, explained:

> *I collected several evidences of the institutional commitment to suspend the rule of law in Lampedusa with the excuse of the border [...] Many members of the last municipal administration [...] committed serious irregularities during their mandate. [After years of protests from locals] the provincial authority nominated an inspector who had the power of resolving the local administration in case she detected any irregularity. [...] After [...] more than two years of investigation, the inspector finally published a report where she denounced the administration's numerous criminal offences – mainly related to corruption. However, she concluded her report with what [...] summarizes perfectly the relation between the border emergency and the rule of law on this island. […] Reading from the original report[2]: 'Given that the administration demonstrated the ability to maintain good relations and efficient cooperation with national and Communitarian authorities [...] during the serious emergency of 2011 [...] I nominate a superintendent'. This meant that she recorded irregularities and yet, she decided not to take any legal actions against local administrators. [Instead, she] nominated a superintendent [who is] an unclear and unspecified legal figure [in the Italian legal system. As she reported, the superintendent role was] 'to remove the irregularities carried out by the administration.' […] Over the two months the superintendent spent in Lampedusa, he did not take any single action against the former administration*.

The document mentioned by Paola confirms what most interviewees said they experienced daily. The emergency is used in Lampedusa to justify a system of connivance amongst national and local institutions. It creates a sort of stasis where no institutional actor feels safe enough to

[2] A version of which is available here: https://www.scribd.com/doc/82861656/Commissariamento-Comune-di-Lampedusa-e-Linosa [accessed last 8 June 2017]

denounce the criminal activities of the other (Orsini, 2016). In fact, this proves to be an extremely fertile soil for mafia-type behaviours to flourish.

Here, the case of the management of migrants and asylum seekers reception and detention on the island is emblematic. Since 1996, the centre that was opened in the local airport was run by the volunteers of the Italian Red Cross: migrants received first aid there and they were taken to mainland Sicily within few hours or days later. At the time, there were only limited financial transfers from Rome to Lampedusa. Nevertheless, a few years later, in 2002, as the terms of the contract to run the centre changed, at the national level the Misericordia - a Calabrian religious association/charity which is under investigation by the Antimafia since the first half of 2017 - replaced the Italian Red Cross. As noted by Cuttitta (2014: 103) this happened when volunteers became 'employees, and the volume of funds paid by the Ministry of Interior was made dependent on both the number of detainees and the number of days spent by each of them in the centre. Since then [...] migrants would remain for longer periods on the island.' Clearly, a series of incentives generated to detain longer migrants, while providing them with the cheapest possible services (Martone, 2016).

Moreover, since the access to this facility was denied to journalists, activists and political actors of all kinds, public funding was handled basically without public scrutiny. This situation lasted until 2005 and until, first of all, the denounces of a delegation of the European Parliament finally allowed inside the centre. Second, the inhuman living conditions in which migrants were kept were denounced to the public that same year, when an undercover journalist entered the centre as an undocumented migrant (Gatti, 2005).

Following the scandal, the facility was turned again into a reception centre where migrants remained only for a few hours before being transferred to mainland Sicily. Here, the Red Cross took back the internal management and the centre was open to public scrutiny, as journalists, researchers and politicians were finally allowed inside. After all, Lampedusa was to become a management model for the whole of Europe, and further funding became available within the Communitarian project 'Praesidium' (Cuttitta, 2014). With increased resources, in 2007 a new and bigger centre was finally opened in the island's inner valley of Contrada Imbiriacola to substitute the one in the airport.

With the opening of the new centre, a public tender was released and a consortium of cooperatives – Lampedusa Accoglienza srl – offered the cheapest price and won over the bid made by the Misericordia. Nevertheless, as noted by Friese (2012: 73), the cooperatives constituting the consortium 'had already sealed the deal before the tender was released and thus had excluded other regional competitors. In addition, both coops [could count on] political affiliations and clientelist relations.' At the time the centre of Contrada Imbriacola was a CPSA – first assistance facility - and migrants could be detained only for relatively limited periods of time – that were anyway exceeded through institutional mismanagement.

In October 2014, another scandal involved the management of the centre, as the Italian public broadcaster Rai 2 screened a video[3] showing the inhuman ways in which detained migrants were washed in the open air by the personnel of Lampedusa Accoglienza. Following national and international protests, the consortium of cooperatives agreed with the then Ministry of Interior to consensually break the deal. A new deal had now to be finalized, with national authorities opting for a negotiated procedure. Here a pool of few companies was directly selected by the Ministry to compete. According to the prefect of the Sicilian province of Agrigento – which includes Lampedusa – due to exceptional migratory pressures on the island only little time was left for authorities to proceed with a tender, making thus necessary to opt for a less transparent but faster procedure (Camera dei Deputati, 2015). Surprisingly enough, despite the scandal of 2005, the Misericordia was among the selected competitors. Even more surprisingly, the Misericordia won the bid and today runs the management of the migrants' centre of Lampedusa. This, regardless of another scandal involving the Calabrian religious charity in the management of the biggest reception centre of Europe: that of Sant'Anna, in Crotone.

The bigger the better: the case of the Sant'Anna centre of Crotone, in Calabria

That of Lampedusa is not the only migrants and asylum seekers' reception centre to be managed by the Misericordia. Actually, the charity is one of the country's main contractor for the management of facilities of this sort. More importantly, the Misericordia's is in charge of the (mis)management of the biggest reception centres for refugees and asylum seekers of Europe, the CDA/C.A.R.A. - first-line support centres/reception centres for asylum seekers - of Sant'Anna in Crotone, which is located in the south of Calabria. It must be understood here that in Italy the allocation of funding to run migrants and asylum seekers reception facilities took place over various emergencies, which were declared by different national governments with an increasing frequency since the 2011 crisis in Lampedusa (Vassallo Paleologo, 2011; Marchetti, 2014).

The alleged involvement of the Arena mafia clan in the management of services for the Sant'Anna Centre and the Misericordia charity has led to 67 arrests made by the Antimafia on the 15th May 2017[4]. Charges include mafia association, embezzlement, and fraud. The Misericordia is officially under investigation by the Antimafia District prosecutors since the first half of 2017 and went under scrutiny by local and national media since 2014 for suspicious connections between its governor and the local mafia family – the clan Arena. While the governor of the Misericordia disclosed threats from the 'ndrangheta to a Parliamentary Inquiry in 2015 (Camera dei Deputati, 2015), an investigation into the charity's activities had actually already started in 2013.

The charity – which is one of the largest employers in the region (Stranges and Wolff, 2016) - also participates as shareholder to a social enterprise called Miser.Icr, which invests in social

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[3] Here a link to the incriminated video screened first by Rai 2 news, TG2: https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2013/12/17/lampedusa-centro-di-accoglienza-come-lager-video-esclusivo-del-tg2/258464/ [accessed last 4 April 2019]

[4] Fermo di Indiziato di Delitto, Proc. Pen. N. 4456/2013 RGNR mod. 21 DDA - Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Catanzaro - Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia

activities in the local communities – such as a cinema and a sport centre; this means that the association seeks to reinforce ties within the local community. As reported also by the national media (Pipitone, 2017), recently the Miser.Icr has invested in the local football club of the town, once directed by the son of the mafia boss in the Arena clan. Moreover, the same enterprise has also acquired shares of the local airport. These were all considered profiles of risk, red flags, for the Antimafia investigation. As declared in the arrest warrant[5]:

> [The Arena clan] was close to various entrepreneurs who, in exchange for participation in the financial gains of the business run by affiliates, could count on the enrichment of their client portfolio, often through imposition of mono-oligopolies and through an activity of credit recovery thanks to the force of intimidation of the clan – as they could be recognised as 'friends' entrepreneurs.

Moreover, the clan 'gained control over sub-contracts for the Misericordia, among which the catering services, through catering enterprises managed and owned by affiliates'[6]. The local coordinator and founder (who is also a priest) and the Governor/President of the Misericordia have been arrested because of their apical role of "organisers" for the clan. As reported in the arrest warrant, they 'allowed for significant sums to enrich the clan's wealth'[7]. This was done thanks to the support of those, also under arrest, who managed the subcontracts for the Misericordia – such as the refectory services for the migrants' centre in Crotone.

Through a series of crimes, such as false invoicing and different types of fraud and the constitution of a shell company, they were able to "save" some of the allocated money for the services to the clan's benefit. The evidence of this case in the territory and in relation to the asylum seekers and migrants' centre, portray a scenario of concurrent predatory governance or, as defined by the Antimafia prosecutors[8], of 'circular relationship between the protagonists of the commercial decisions of the CARA [the reception centre] and the local 'ndrangheta families.'

A dossier published on the website[9] of the Misericordia in 2015 accounts for the various expenses and the supporting legal materials for both the Misericordia and the Miser.Icr, openly in response to allegations of mafia infiltration since 2013. Aside from the fact that these allegations now turned into arrests, the proximity of the manager of the Misericordia to the former Italian Minister of Interior had raised doubts when the Misericordia was allocated the contract for the reception centre in Lampedusa for the second time, in 2015 (Tizian, 2017). Indeed, interceptions made public by Antimafia prosecutors in the arrest warrants of May 2017 in Calabria, confirm that the destiny of the reception centres of Crotone and Lampedusa are tied together.

[5] Fermo di Indiziato di Delitto, Proc. Pen. N. 4456/2013 RGNR mod. 21 DDA - Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Catanzaro - Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia, page 5

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid, page 9

[8] Ibid, page 1322

[9] Misericordia Isola Capo Rizzuto - Dossier sull'organizzazione dell'accoglienza dei migranti e sulla gestione dei Centri d'accoglienza affidati alla Misericordia di Isola Capo Rizzuto: http://www.misericordiaisola.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Dossier-2015-pt2.pdf [accessed last 12 May 2017]

The bond is to be found in the activities, the investments and the contracts of the Misericordia whose President/Governor in Calabria – who has been now arrested - was also Vice-President of the charity at the national level between 2012-2015. This gives thus an insight of how concurrent predatory governance flourish in times of emergency management, by efficiently operating within Europe's complex governance system where policies are implemented through a multiplicity of institutional levels – from the local to the regional, the national and the European. It is in fact thanks to the permanent emergency and within such complex net of criminal and institutional interconnections placed at different geographical levels, that the most infamous scandals related to the (mis)management of migration and asylum in Italy generated: that of Mafia Capitale.

From the peripheries to the metropolis: the case of Rome

As reported in the arrest warrants issued by the Antimafia Prosecutors in Rome within the frame of the operation Mondo di Mezzo – the In-between World - in 2014, a local criminal network had invested heavily in the management of Rome's many reception facilities. Convictions in first degree arrived in July 2017. Indeed, as recorded in one of the many taps collected by the investigators, the involved criminals had profited from the business of managing migrants' reception in the Italian capital, more than they had from drug trade. One of the interceptions between one of the alleged bosses of Mafia Capitale and one of the brokers for the Mancuso 'ndrangheta clan sees the former revealing to the latter[10]: 'this year we ended with 40 million, but all the money, all the gains we have made on the [...] emergency of reception centres and on the migrants [...]'. In the same investigation, one of the men in charge of the management of the network's interests in the reception centres discussed his role in "moving" migrants assigned to one of the CARA centres –that of Mineo, with over 2.000 places available - towards other centres where his and the network's interests lie, due to the emergency situation. He says to his finance advisor[11]:

> In Rome [...] I can get centres, buildings that are available […] thanks to my ongoing relationships at the Ministry I am able to direct the migrants coming from [other reception facilities in] the South [...] as they often go through the Mineo centre and then…from the Mineo they are sent around Italy [...] some in Rome [...] So, if they have buildings that can be turned into reception centres quickly, in emergency cases, without tenders, these buildings are occupied and I sent them [...] work [...]

Here it seems clear the participation of members of the Calabrian 'ndrangheta clans to the Mafia Capitale network, in the management of the funding for reception centres (Sergi and Lavorgna, 2016). Yet, for the purposes of this paper it is also interesting to notice that this investigation confirmed how, when emergency calls for speediness of responses, informality of

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[10] Operation Mondo Di Mezzo, Ordinanza di Custodia Cautelare, Procura di Roma, No. 30456/10 R.G.N.R. DDA. P.1170

[11] Operation Mondo Di Mezzo, Ordinanza di Custodia Cautelare, Procura di Roma, No. 30456/10 R.G.N.R. DDA. P.1136

relationships feeds into corruptive pacts and facilitates a systemic violation of laws and regulations (Dalla Chiesa, 2015; Sergi, 2016).

Here, one could conclude that this is a matter of business opportunities, a matter of profit-making more than anything else. However, the most worrisome part of the involvement of the Mafia Capitale criminal network into the funding of reception centres happens when and if resources are allocated within the framework of a declared emergency – when thus there is no time to set public tenders so that companies are selected via direct call made by local and national institutional actors. Certainly, it does require (criminal) business acumen to capture and exploit the potential of this sector. Eventually, however, the network can successfully do all that thanks to the ties, to the political proximity, to the informality of contacts with key stakeholders. These networks of relationships could be easily and promptly activated in moments of crisis of a sector.

The cases of the centres of Crotone and Lampedusa described before, mirror many of the conditions which allowed the criminal organization to cumulate enormous illicit profits in Rome. In our view, the three cases constitute a sort of continuous confirming the centrality of these complex intertwining of criminal networks, institutional connections and emergencies which take place within Europe's complex governance system where power – and accountability – blurs across multiple and geographically distant layers.

Does 'governing at distance' favour mafias?

There is consensus concerning the fact that mafias are based on the development of 'social ties providing access to profitable criminal opportunities' (Kleemans and de Poot, 2008: 75). They exhibit a certain set of socio-cultural behaviours which are highly dependent and embedded in local cultures (Sergi and Lavorgna, 2016). These socio-cultural conducts characterise the network, but also the way individuals in, or close to, the network exploit that concurrent predatory governance.

Additionally, mafias are criminal networks that necessarily rely on different forms of interactions with other powers across society to reach their goals. As noted by Mische (2003) all networks are constituted through communicative interactions that we can understand through immersions in local culture.

Interactions, links and ties among individuals in and out of a network create different types of relationships, which are more or less beneficial to the network's success. Mafias are understandable under this conceptualisation, even when their interests seem not to be local. The interests of different mafia clans and related networks in the management of the businesses and the money that surrounds the migration crisis in Italy provided an extremely significant case to study the interplay of this *glocal* dimension of the mafias' businesses.

In Lampedusa, mafia's interests could strive as law enforcement concentrates exclusively on the border by somehow neglecting eventual criminal activities taking place on the island. Even more since policies – and funds – are imposed from distant authorities located in Brussels, to be handled by local and national institutional actors at high risk of infiltration from below. In Crotone, instead, the Sant'Anna centre was opened where mafias are present and well rooted.

There, the criminal organization could count on a network of friendship, alliances and personal interests sustained by local clans who detain social standing, political power and money in that area. Finally, the case of ‘Mafia Capitale’ in Rome tells us that mafia method can emerge thanks to emergencies – which decrease transparency and allow for ad hoc measures.

While the three cases analysed here present thus a series of distinguishing features, their study provides a view on at least some of the factors which allowed mafias to integrate into the complex mechanic of Europe’s governance of migration. First, this is facilitated when a significant inflow of public funding reaches peripheral and neglected territories – as the one of Crotone and Lampedusa. Even more, if this happens over a declared emergency, when thus transparency requirements according to which public money is distributed locally are limited. Third, if emergencies take place in territories which are under the pervasive control of mafia, these organizations will count on a series of informal, clientelistic relations which allow them to maintain a grip – if not, the complete control – on the governance of the local.

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