

Medieval
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*Claus A. Andersen
Jacob Schmutz
(eds.)*

DISTINCTION AND IDENTITY IN LATE- SCHOLASTIC THOUGHT AND BEYOND



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Julia Jorati / Dominik Perler / Stephan Schmid (eds.)

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Distinction and Identity in Late-Scholastic Thought and Beyond

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Contents

Introduction

<i>Claus A. Andersen: Subtle Scholastic Distinctions and Where to Find Them</i>	9

I. The Fourteenth Century

<i>Garrett R. Smith: Francis of Meyronnes and Petrus Thomae on the “Less Realist” Interpretation of the Formal Distinction</i>	49
<i>Vitaly Ivanov: Modus intrinsecus rei in Petrus Thomae’s Quaestiones de modis distinctionum</i>	79
<i>William Duba: Nicolas Bonet’s White-Tie Formalism</i>	113
<i>Apaoan Ramos Machado: Vienna Formalism. Mental, ex natura rei, and Formal Distinctions in Johannes Meyger’s Tractatus distinctionum</i>	143

II. The Fifteenth Century

<i>Claus A. Andersen: Parisian Formalism. Brulefer and Sirect on Petrus Thomae’s Seven Distinctions</i>	169
<i>Sylvain Roudaut: Diverging Views on Modes in Fifteenth-Century Scotism. Sirect vs. Trombetta on the Modal Distinction</i>	207
<i>Rafael Ramis-Barceló: Scoto-Lullism. Concept, Development, and Authors</i>	237

III. The Sixteenth Century

<i>Igor Agostini: The Controversy over the Mutual Inclusion and the Genesis of the Doctrine of the <i>distinctio virtualis minor</i> between the Divine Attributes</i>	265
<i>Daniel Heider: Suárez on the Formal Distinction. A Shift in Opinion?</i> ...	297

IV. The Seventeenth Century

Gabriel Müller: David Gorlaeus (1591–1612) on Real, Fictional, and Modal Distinctions 321

Roberto Hofmeister Pich: A Century of Scotistic Metaphysics in Colonial South America. Jerónimo Valera, Alfonso Briceño, and Juan de Fuica on Being, Distinction, and Identity 347

Daniel D. Novotný: Distinctions in Caramuel’s *Metalogica* (1654). A Survey of Book III 383

Jean-Pascal Anfray: Leibniz on Distinctions and the Simplicity of Monads 405

List of Editors and Authors 437

Index of Names 439

Introduction

Subtle Scholastic Distinctions and Where to Find Them

Claus A. Andersen

We distinguish all the time, both in our everyday lives and, if we are philosophers, in philosophy. We distinguish between right and wrong, subjective opinions and objective facts, between the left and the right side of a column, between knowing and willing, between Peter as a subject and Peter as a predicate in the proposition ‘Peter is Peter,’ and between singular things. The distinctions between matter and form and between potency and actuality are central in Aristotelian philosophy. In the Christian theological tradition, the kind of distinction that holds between the persons of the Trinity (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit) and the divine essence is hotly disputed, and the same goes for the distinction between the divine attributes among themselves. In the monotheistic religions, God and creature are distinct. And there surely must be some kind of distinction between a thing and its mode, albeit only a sophisticated metaphysics might be able to tell what kind of distinction that is (depending on what one understands as a ‘mode’). There would seem to be as many kinds of identity as there are kinds of distinction – if identity may be taken as the flipside of distinction. This would seem to result in a flexible concept of identity, one with a plurality of degrees of unifying commonness. And that might be worth thinking about, especially in this time of ours with its preoccupation with identity politics. Would a flexible concept of identity not be useful for theorizing about all the identities we participate in, as expressed in the proposition ‘I identify as...’?¹

The publication of this volume and the conference behind it, along with a follow-up workshop, have been funded by the EU as parts of my MSCA-project FORMALITAS – The Formalist Tradition in Late Scholastic Philosophy: A Renaissance Forerunner of Formal Ontology (project nr. 101064452). The project, the conference, and the workshop were hosted at the University of Louvain (UCLouvain). At this place, warm thanks are due to my co-organizer and co-editor Jacob Schmutz (UCLouvain), to Apaoan Machado (UCLouvain) for enriching this introduction with important references, to Robert Andrews (Kristineham) for proofreading of the introduction, to an anonymous reviewer for prompting important improvements, and not least to Christian Barth and Ruth Vachek from Schwabe for patience and efficiency.

¹ Just to mention one example from present-day philosophy, the latest edition (2023) of Alyssa Ney’s *Metaphysics – An Introduction*, includes a chapter (an expanded version of a chapter in the previous edition) called “The Metaphysics of Race and Gender,” at 158–83. I submit that current debates on this subject might benefit strongly from the rich late-scholastic discourse on distinctions and identity.

This present book is not about *identity politics*, but rather about *identity metaphysics*. Medieval and Early Modern philosophers and theologians were specialists in this field, which they often approached from the side of distinction. They were especially good at telling the difference between various kinds of distinctions. To take some of the examples mentioned above, the same kind of distinction does not seem to apply in the example of the left and the right side of a column as in the example of singular things. Whereas in the first case some intellectual activity projects a distinction onto the real column, in the second case the distinction exists already before any such activity. While these two cases seem clear enough, things get much more complicated when we turn to metaphysical and theological matters. Exactly what kind of distinction obtains between the internal features of a composite object, or between the persons of the Trinity and the divine essence? Does a distinction imported into reality by an intellect or rather a real distinction apply in these cases, or maybe some kind of distinction that is neither fully real nor only rational (or conceptual, mental)? The scholastic philosophers and theologians famously advocated strongly diverging answers to these questions, answers originating in the fundamental ontological assumptions at the core of their metaphysical systems.

Distinction theory, along with its ontological implications, was in the focus of a special literature that developed from the early fourteenth century onwards. The concepts of identity and distinction were thus under special scrutiny in the so-called Formalist treatises that had roots in Late-Medieval scholasticism, especially in the works of the Franciscan John Duns Scotus († 1308) and his early followers. This literature enjoyed vast diffusion during the Renaissance and still played a significant role in textbooks of scholastic philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Formalist tradition has never before been the subject matter of a collective volume. While the scope of the present book is much wider than just the Formalist tradition and its peculiar literature, the contention of the book – and certainly of this introduction – is that this particular tradition within late scholasticism had an enormous impact both on contemporary and later thought. Much of the development, external to Formalism properly speaking, in philosophical and theological discourse concerning distinctions and identity may be viewed as – immediate or more remote – repercussions exactly of the Formalist tradition. This insight itself is not new. In his research classic *The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus – A Study in Metaphysics* from 1944, long used as a guide to the formal distinction in Scotus, Maurice Grajewski aptly pointed out the historical importance of the Formalist tradition:

The Formalists, or the writers of the *Tractatus Formalitatum*, wielding enormous influence in their age, were responsible for the growing distaste for subtleties and Scotistic doctrine. A historical and doctrinal study of the Formalists is indispensable for a com-

plete knowledge of the history of philosophy from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century and, more so, for the history and development of the Scotistic School.²

The Formalists were indeed extremely influential in their age, and they were so not only within the Scotist tradition. The German scholar Wolfgang Hübener, in a seminal article from 1987, likewise strongly emphasized the influence of the Formalist tradition, calling it a “discourse formation” of unparalleled diffusion in the history of Early Modern metaphysics.³ This is no exaggeration, and scholarship, since the time when Grajewski and Hübener wrote on the subject, has done much to elucidate important aspects of the Formalist tradition.⁴ And yet, Formalism as a discourse formation of the magnitude signaled by Hübener has hardly received the amount of attention it deserves, and it has certainly not yet entered the broader historical consciousness of present-day academic philosophy. There is a concatenation of reasons for this neglect. The “distaste for subtleties” mentioned by Grajewski is a part of the story; the conceptual complexity cultivated among the Formalists clearly always was, and still is, a challenge for readers of their treatises.⁵ Another reason is that key writings of the Formalists

2 Grajewski, *The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus*, 198. Grajewski’s observation on the indispensability of research into the Formalist tradition for an adequate understanding of both Scotism and, more broadly, of the history of metaphysics from the Middle Ages to Early Modernity is as relevant today as when the book came out. In other respects, the book is outdated. The considerable progress since made in Scotus scholarship includes a better understanding of the evolution of Scotus’s thought on the formal distinction (as reflected in Garrett R. Smith’s article in the present volume, with references to further literature). Also in regard to the Formalist tradition, Grajewski’s indications are not reliable, as when he refers to the seventeenth-century Scotist Bernard Sannig as a source for the doctrine of seven different kinds of distinctions (Grajewski, *ibid.*, xiii), when this was in fact a key doctrine in Formalist literature from the early fourteenth century onwards (about which see below).

3 Hübener, “Robertus Anglicus OFM,” 329: “Die in zahlreichen Formalitätentraktaten seit etwa 1320 bis ins späte 17. Jahrhundert versuchte schulmäßige Klärung der metaphysischen Metabegrifflichkeit *ad mentem doctoris subtilis* ist zugleich die historisch am weitesten ausgreifende Diskursformation der neueren Metaphysikgeschichte.” Hübener touched on the Formalist tradition in various other publications, always stressing its historical importance; see in particular his articles “Leibniz’ gebrochenes Verhältnis zur Erkenntnistheorie der Scholastik” (1985) and “‘Objektivität’ und ‘Realisierung’” (2007).

4 See the following general studies: Poppi, “Il contributo dei formalisti padovani”; Bolliger, *Infiniti contemplatio*, 218–362; Marrone, *Res e realitas in Descartes*; Andersen, “*Scientia formalitatum*.” For new research on particular aspects of the Formalist tradition, including its beginnings in the fourteenth century, see below.

5 Criticism of this kind may be found in Erasmus of Rotterdam’s († 1536) *Praise of Folly*, when he mocks the scholastics for their over-abundant use of distinctions, with which they will always be able to cut themselves loose of any doctrinal problem they may encounter; see Erasmus Roterodamus, *Moriae encomium*, 146: “[...] nec Vulcaniis vinculis sic possint irretiri, quin elabantur distinctionibus (quibus nodos omnes adeo facile secant, vt non Tenedia bipen-

are available only in manuscripts or early printed editions.⁶ A further factor, and probably the most crucial one, lies in the transepochal nature of late-scholastic Formalism: We are dealing with one continuous tradition running directly across the historiographical divide between the Middle Ages and the Early Modern period, with the result that neither Medievalists nor scholars of Early Modern philosophy, bound by the conventions of their fields, will attempt a grasp of the Formalist tradition as a whole. Both of these perspectives, that of Medieval Studies and that of Early Modern Studies, are necessary for an adequate understanding of the historical significance of the Formalist tradition.

The conference in the background of the present book gathered scholars working on various aspects of Late-Medieval and Early-Modern metaphysics.⁷ The book accordingly has articles with focus on the emergence of the Formalist tradition in the fourteenth century, its development in the fifteenth century, and its legacy in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century discussions of distinctions, thus presenting one important development within metaphysical thought from the immediate wake of Duns Scotus up until the time of Leibniz. In addition to this book, a website (www.formalitas.eu) has been launched for the purpose of facilitating further research into the Formalist tradition. The website features catalogues of both manuscripts and early printed editions of Formalist treatises and related literature, including Early Modern university dissertations on identity and distinction, as well as a full research bibliography.⁸

nis melius).” Of the same sort is Francis Bacon’s (1561–1626) advice, in his essay *Of Studies*, 253–54: “So if a man’s wit [...] be not apt to distinguish or find differences, let him study the schoolmen; for they are *cymini sectores*.” One could also mention Immanuel Kant’s teacher at Königsberg, Martin Knutzen (1713–1751) who, in his *Elementa philosophiae*, 31, submitted that in fact the scholastics did not contribute much else to the history of philosophy than “infinitely many sorts of distinctions” (*Praeter infinitas distinctionum formulas, parum huic genti Philosophia debet*). The criticism we encounter in these authors does not specifically target the Formalist tradition, but rather the extravagant scholastic recourse to distinctions in all sorts of contexts. However, insofar as one may see Formalism as the theoretical foundation of such recourse, all of this criticism indirectly attests to the diffusion of Formalism in the Early Modern period.

6 I am currently preparing a volume with editions of a selection of Formalist treatises.

7 See the published conference report: Andersen, “Distinction and Identity.”

8 The catalogue of Late-Medieval manuscripts of Formalist literature was generously contributed by Garrett R. Smith. See the review of the website: Knebel, “www.formalitas.eu,” with a succinct discussion of some of the reasons, why the Formalist tradition never entered the modern historiography of philosophy; this negligence is paradoxical given that Formalism standardly figured in pre-twentieth-century historiographies, as evidenced by Trent Pomplun in his essay “John Duns Scotus in the History of Medieval Philosophy from the Sixteenth Century to Étienne Gilson (†1978).”

Hierarchies of Distinctions from Henry of Ghent to Early Modernity

The defining aspect of the Formalist tradition is its preoccupation with a variety of kinds of distinctions, often paired with a series of kinds of identity as their counterparts. Where did this tradition arise? Where did it go? Medieval Studies may provide an answer to the first question, Early Modern Studies to the second. Many details of the development and legacy of the Formalist tradition are investigated in the individual articles of the present book. To set an adequate frame for these investigations, in what follows I shall trace the development of the key Formalist motif of a hierarchy of distinctions from the late thirteenth century up through the Early Modern period.

1. Before Formalism: Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus

The theme of a variety of hierarchically ordered distinctions is found already in Henry of Ghent (ca. 1217–1293), a secular master with a decades-spanning teaching career at the University of Paris. Henry of course did not appear from nowhere, but was himself rooted in the scholastic debates of his time and was in particular influenced by Augustine, Avicenna, and the early Franciscan tradition at Paris. We should also not forget that both identity (sameness) and distinction (difference, diverseness) have been key concepts of philosophy and theology since Antiquity. However, because Henry has long been recognized as a primary source of inspiration for Scotus – even despite Scotus’s overt criticism – and as the originator of much of what in later times passed as Scotist doctrine,⁹ it seems reasonable to begin our story with him, and specifically with his discussion of distinctions in his fifth *Quodlibet*, a text that reports a disputation held at Paris in 1280 or 1281.¹⁰ The sixth question is devoted to the problem of how real relations in God differ from God’s essence – “according to intention” (*secundum intentionem*) or in some other way.¹¹ Other options would be a real or a rational

⁹ Schmutz, “Les paradoxes métaphysiques,” 146; Hoffmann, “Henry of Ghent’s Influence,” 339; Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions*, 223–24 and 416. Especially in regard to distinctions, see Noone, “Alnwick on the Origin, Nature, and Function of the Formal Distinction,” 240–44, remarking at 242 that Scotus and the early Scotists, despite their criticism, agreed with Henry on a deep level – so much so that “they could not refrain from pointing out repeatedly the remarkable basis of agreement prior to the grounds of disagreement.”

¹⁰ Wilson, “Henry of Ghent’s Written Legacy,” 6.

¹¹ For an extensive analysis of this text, see Teske, “Distinctions in the Metaphysics of Henry of Ghent,” 235–41; see also Teske’s discussion of a passage on distinctions in Henry’s *Summa*, art. 27, q. 1, at *ibid.*, 229–35.

distinction. The context of Henry's discussion is the problem of God's unity vis-à-vis the Trinity, the relations in question being those of the Trinitarian persons (such as sonhood and fatherhood). A real distinction is irrelevant in this context, because real relations hold only between things that have a proper nature or essence. Such things can be either simple (form and matter are examples) or composite (the species human being and donkey are examples). There is no real distinction, but rather real *identity* between a thing and its relations. The thing is the foundation of a variety of intentions and notions (*rationes*).¹² An intention is something that pertains to an essence, but which can be conceived separately. Henry gives an etymological definition of it as a "tending within" (*intus tentio*), because it occasions a certain concept about an aspect of the essence. Owing to such intentions, an intellect may form various concepts of one and the same thing.¹³ The notions, or *rationes*, give rise to concepts of aspects that are not only really identical, but also identical according to intention. The divine attributes are examples of this, and so are the divine essence and its relations – which is indeed Henry's solution to the disputed problem.¹⁴ Between the real and the rational distinctions, however, there is a spectrum of six different intentional distinctions that all apply within creation:

But in those that differ according to intention, there are degrees according to greater or lesser difference. Concerning those that are really the same in the same, sometimes diverse concepts are formed, such that none of them includes the other in its concept, as with the concepts of diverse differences that concur in the same [thing], as is the case with 'rational,' 'sensible,' and 'vegetative' insofar as they are differences in human beings. And likewise the concepts of genus and difference which constitute a simple species, as is the case with 'animal' and 'rational.' And in these two kinds there is a maximal difference of intentions. There are four further kinds, in which there is a lesser difference because the concept of one intention includes another, but not conversely, as with the concept of a species that includes the concept of a genus and that of a difference, but not conversely; likewise, the concept 'to live' in creatures includes the concept of being, but not conversely; likewise, the concept of a supposit, such as human being, includes the concept of nature, such as humanity, but not conversely; and likewise, the concept of a relation, such as being, includes that of essence, but not conversely. And here one must note that in these four kinds that which includes the other does not differ in intention from what is contained by it, but rather due to the *ratio* of that other part contained in the signification of the same. So that those two are properly said to differ in intention, as happens in the aforesaid two kinds. But in these last four kinds the whole itself, which contains the other, is not properly called an intention, nor is it properly said to differ in

¹² Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* V, q. 6, ed. 1518, 161rK.

¹³ Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* V, q. 6, 161rL.

¹⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* V, q. 6, 161vM–N. For Henry's theory of Trinitarian relations, see Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions*, 227–57; for the rational distinction between them, see especially *ibid.*, 245–46 and 253.

intention from that which is like a part of it, unless insofar as it includes in itself something other with which it posits some *ratio* of composition in the whole. For as conceived in itself it must be said to be an intention.¹⁵

The six intentional distinctions are ordered into two groups according to the extent of the diversity they express. The two first stand out from the rest, because they hold between intentions that are not included in one another. There is a wider difference between them than between such pairs of intentions, where one intention is included in the other, while that other is not included in the first. The first example given is that of a species (for example, human being) that includes, or is composed of, its genus (living being) and difference (rationality), but is not itself included in them. The distinction between genus and difference rather falls in the first group, because none of these items includes the other. The six intentional distinctions are all explained by way of examples. A particular order within the two groups is not discernible. The most interesting thing about Henry's examples is that they represent a variety of conceptual levels at which the created world may be analyzed: properties, predicables, suppositis and natures, being and essence. The being of creatures is called a relation, because Henry sees it as a relation to God as the efficient cause of actually existing creatures (like the essences of creatures being relations to God as their exemplar cause).¹⁶ Absolute being is only found in God, and so, for Henry, there is no univocal concept of being applicable to both God and creatures, but rather an analogical

15 Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* V, q. 6, 161rL–vL: “Sed in eis quae intentione differunt sunt gradus secundum differentiam maiorem et minorem. De eis enim quae sunt idem re in eodem, aliquando sic formantur conceptus diversi, ut neutrum eorum in suo conceptu alterum includat, ut sunt conceptus diversarum differentiarum quae concurrunt in eodem, sicut sunt in homine rationale, sensibile, vegetabile, inquantum differentiae sunt. Et similiter conceptus generis et differentiae, quae constituunt simplicem speciem, sicut sunt animal et rationale. Et in istis duobus modis est maxime differentia intentionum. Sunt et alii quatuor modi, in quibus minor est differentia quia conceptus unius intentionis includit alterum, sed non e converso, ut conceptus speciei conceptum generis et differentiae, non autem e converso. Similiter conceptus vivere in creaturis, conceptum esse, non e converso. Similiter conceptus suppositi sicut hominis, conceptum naturae ut humanitatis, non autem e converso. Et similiter conceptus respectus sicut entis conceptum essentiae, non e converso. Et est hic advertendum quod in istis quatuor modis id quod alterum continet non differt intentione ab illo quod ab eo continetur, nisi ratione alterius partis contentae in significato eiusdem. Ita quod ista duo proprie dicuntur differre intentione, sicut contingit in praedictis duobus modis. In istis autem quatuor ultimis modis ipsum totum quod alterum continet non proprie dicitur intentio, neque proprie dicitur differre intentione ab eo quod est sicut pars eius, nisi quatenus includit in se aliquid aliud cum quo in toto illo ponit aliquam rationem compositionis. Quia si secundum se concipiatur proprie debet dici intentio.” All translations in this introduction are my own.

16 See, among other places, Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, art. 21, q. 4, vol. 1, ed. 1520, 127vO; see also Teske, “Distinctions,” 232.

concept that expresses the order between them.¹⁷ Fundamental features of Henry's onto-theology are presupposed in his teaching on distinctions. Crucially as regards later developments, the list of intentional distinctions taken together with the real and rational distinctions, totaling a hierarchy of eight distinctions, expresses an ontology of all of reality.

We see something similar in Scotus, who discusses distinctions at many places throughout his works. At just a few of these places, he also touches, more or less explicitly, on the idea of a hierarchy of distinctions. Since Duns Scotus's formal distinction has absorbed most of the scholarly attention devoted to Scotist distinction theory, it may seem surprising that the discussion of a variety of kinds of distinctions should become so central in the Scotist tradition. A comparable case is that of univocation and analogy: while Scotus is generally associated only with a doctrine of univocation, the long Scotist tradition was always, with a few exceptions, fond of the dictum that "analogy is compatible with univocation" (*analogia stat cum univocatione*). Recent research has revealed the extent to which this view may in fact already be found in Scotus's own works.¹⁸ In the case of distinctions too, the Scotists could find some support in Scotus's texts. Of particular importance is a passage from the first book of his Oxford commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (called the *Ordinatio*), where Scotus only indirectly speaks of distinctions. Although the context of the quote is a discussion of the formal distinction (in the wider context of a discussion of the Trinity, as in Henry of Ghent), Scotus's focus in this passage is on various kinds of unity and identity:

Just as we can find many degrees of unity – first, the least one is that of a heap; in the second degree there is the unity of order, which adds something to the heap; in the third [degree] there is unity by accident, where beyond order there is formation, albeit an accidental one, of one from another of those thus united; in the fourth [degree] there is *per se* unity of what is composed by the essential *per se* actual and *per se* potential principles; in the fifth [degree] there is unity of simplicity, which is truly identity, for whatever is here is really the same as something and is not only one with it in the unity of union, as it is the case in the other degrees; – so too, beyond this, not all identity is formal. Now, I speak of formal identity where what is thusly identical includes that with which it is thusly identical in its formal or quidditative description and according to the first mode of *per se* predication. But in the case at hand, the essence does not include the property of the supposit in its formal quidditative description, nor the other way around. Hence, it may be conceded that prior to any act of an intellect there is a reality of the essence, which is communicable, and the reality of the supposit as supposit is incommunicable,

17 See Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, art. 21, q. 2, vol. 1, 124rI–F.

18 Smith, "The Analogy of Being in the Scotist Tradition"; Pini, "Before Univocity," 214; for the diffusion of the *dictum* that analogy is compatible with univocation in the later Scotist tradition, see Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 386–87.

and before an act of an intellect this reality formally is not that [reality], or it is not formally the same as that one.¹⁹

There are five degrees of unity; the weakest is that of a mere heap and the strongest one that of true identity. But this true identity itself has degrees: one is “formal” and in accordance with Aristotle’s first mode of *per se* predication, where the identical items are essentially included in one another; a lesser degree of identity, corresponding to Aristotle’s second mode of *per se* predication, allows for identity between items not essentially included in one another, such as an essence and its properties. In the case under discussion in Scotus’s text, the divine essence is shared (“communicable”) by the divine persons, whereas the divine persons, being suppositi, cannot be shared (“incommunicable”).²⁰ Thus, even though there is *real* identity between the divine essence and the Trinitarian persons, there is room for some distinction between them – namely, a formal distinction, at this place cautiously called a “formal non-identity” by Scotus.²¹

William Duba has argued that since the context of this passage is a discussion of the formal distinction, Scotus “creates the expectation that he will draw a parallel between degrees of unity and degrees of distinction.”²² There would indeed seem to be as many kinds of distinctions as there are kinds of unity and identity, simply by their negation. Yet, in order not to make the impression he is introducing any actual discrepancy into God’s perfect unity, Scotus here avoids the language of distinctions. However, that Scotus was not unfamiliar with the idea of a hierarchy of distinctions is clear from a passage in his *Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, book 7, *quaestio* 19, a text belonging to Scotus’s later

19 Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–4, n. 403, ed. Vat. 2, 356–57: “[S]icut possumus invenire in unitate multos gradus – primo, minima est aggregationis; in secundo gradu est unitas ordinis, quae aliquid addit supra aggregationem; in tertio est unitas per accidens, ubi ultra ordinem est informatio, licet accidentalis, unius ab altero eorum quae sunt sic unum; in quarto est per se unitas compositi ex principiis essentialibus per se actu et per se potentia; in quinto est unitas simplicitatis, quae est vere identitas (quidquid enim est ibi, est realiter idem cuilibet, et non tantum est unum illi unitate unionis, sicut in aliis modis) – ita, adhuc ultra, non omnis identitas est formalis. Voco autem identitatem formalem, ubi illud quod dicitur sic idem, includit illud cui sic est idem, in ratione sua formali quiditativa et per se primo modo. In proposito autem essentia non includit in ratione sua formali quiditativa proprietatem suppositi, nec e converso. Et ideo potest concedi quod ante omnem actum intellectus est realitas essentiae qua est communicabilis, et realitas suppositi qua suppositum est incommunicabile; et ante actum intellectus haec realitas formaliter non est illa, vel, non est formaliter eadem illi.”

20 This distinction between two kinds of *per se* predication, treated by Aristotle in *Post. Anal.* I, cap. 4, 73a34–b5, is the single most important Aristotelian motif discussed in the subsequent Formalist literature; see Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*, 20–21.

21 Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–4, nn. 404–8, ed. Vat. 2, 357–58.

22 Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine*, 180.

production and that may indeed be his final word on distinctions; Scotus here talks of three kinds of real distinctions (called *differentiae*):

But the real difference is posited to have degrees. The greatest is the one between natures and suppositis; the middle one is between natures in one supposito; the least one is between various perfections or perfecting *rationes* unitively contained in one nature.²³

In contrast to Henry of Ghent, Scotus places the hierarchy of distinctions under the real distinction, not under a distinction that is intermediary between the real and the rational distinction (his first real distinction holds between the properties of the Trinitarian persons and the divine essence, the second between the two natures in Christ, and the third between, e.g., animality and rationality in human nature). Timothy B. Noone has shown that with this maneuver, Scotus manages to stress the real character of his formal distinction, being the third distinction in his list, and thereby avoiding the criticism that had been levelled (by Godfrey of Fontaines) against Henry's intentional distinction for violating the principle of the excluded middle.²⁴ Since all being, and hence also any distinction, is either real or mind-dependent, there is no room for a kind of being, or a kind of distinction, between them, so this argument goes. This criticism was indeed soon levelled against Scotus's formal distinction too, and from there entered the standard repertoire of Thomist arguments against this central Scotist doctrine.²⁵ A flexible conception of what may count as a real distinction was the Scotist way out.

In two other late works, his Parisian *Reportationes* and a newly edited *Quaestio de formalitatibus* (also called *Logica Scoti*) from Scotus's last years in Paris, the real character of the formal distinction, i.e., that it holds between *ex natura rei* distinct formalities, is confirmed. Instead of avoiding the language of distinctions, Scotus there says the formal distinction is a distinction in a "quali-

²³ Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, VII, q. 19, n. 44, *Opera philosophica* 4, 370: "Sed realis differentia ponitur habere gradus. Est enim maxima naturarum et suppositorum; media naturarum in uno supposito; minima diversarum perfectionum sive rationum perfectionalium unitive contentarum in una natura." I thank Lukáš Novák for pointing out to me the very late date of this text.

²⁴ Noone, "Alnwick on the Origin," 242–43.

²⁵ For the early application of this argument against Scotus, see Schneider, *Die Trinitätslehre*, 143, quoting the Dominican John of Naples's *Quodl.* 11 (John read the *Sentences* at Paris in 1310–11). For just one example, out of many, of the use of this argument in later anti-Scotist discussions of distinctions, see Manzoli, also a Dominican, *Formalitates secundum viam Sancti Thome* (published in 1518), cap. 10, 34rb: "Omnis distinctio aut est realis aut rationis; probatur, quia omne ens aut est reale aut rationis; ergo omnis distinctio aut est realis aut rationis; probatur consequentia, quia distinctio est ens." Manzoli then reports the strategy of subsuming the formal distinction under various kinds of real distinctions; *ibid.*, 35rb: "Dividitur autem distinctio realis in essentialem, accidentalem, formalem ex natura rei, et subiectivam."

fied sense” (*secundum quid*), since it does not express an “unqualified non-identity” (*non-identitas simpliciter*). Scotus further lists various criteria that, beyond expressing unqualified non-identity, must all be met by an unqualified distinction, namely that the distinguished items enjoy actual not potential being, that they enjoy formal not virtual being, and that they have their own proper and distinct being rather than being in something else.²⁶ Like so many other implications of his teachings, left undiscussed by Scotus is whether the lack of fulfillment of any of these criteria would result in a specific type of *secundum quid* distinction; it is at least possible that his list of criteria could be used to work out a list of distinctions. Scotus did not invest much energy in exploring the idea of a hierarchy of distinctions, but the approach was not alien to him, and what he did say on the matter involved central aspects of his ontology, including in particular the ontological status of the formal distinction.

2. Early Scotism:

Francis of Meyronnes and Petrus Thomae

In the earliest phase of the Scotist school, we see Franciscans trying their best to spell out the implications of Scotus’s teachings, give them more elaborate formulations, and defend them against their critics.²⁷ Lists of degrees of commonness, conceived as univocity or conceptual transcendence, flourished from early on, some of which had a long-term impact on the Scotist tradition, especially on the above-mentioned flexible doctrine of univocation, allowing for compatibility with forms of analogy, cultivated throughout that tradition.²⁸ The gradation of commonness may be seen as one way of expressing so many kinds of identity, since whatever items have something in common are, in this respect, identical, and more or less so depending on the degree of commonness. Lists of degrees, or

²⁶ Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A, dist. 33, q. 2, ed. Wolter and Bychkov, vol. 2, 328; Duns Scotus, *Quaestio de formalitibus*, ed. Emery and Smith, 176. For a discussion of Scotus’s late teaching on the formal distinction, see Dumont, “Duns Scotus’s Parisian Question.”

²⁷ For the emergence of Scotism in the first decade after Scotus’s death, see the complementary studies Courtenay, “Early Scotists at Paris,” and Pini, “Scotus’s Legacy”; for general observations on the development of the Scotist school, see Andersen, “Short Introduction to a Long Tradition,” 9–15, with references to further literature.

²⁸ Both Antonius Andreae and Francis of Marchia proposed models of degrees of univocation that were cited in the Scotist tradition long after the Middle Ages; see the references in Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 364–68. For the degrees of transcendence in Francis of Meyronnes and Petrus Thomae, see Möhle, *Der Tractatus de transcendentibus*, 44–45, and Andersen, “Introduction,” 63–65. Note here too that William of Alnwick paraphrased the hierarchy of distinctions from Scotus’s *Quaest. Met.* VII, q 19; see Noone, “Alnwick on the Origin,” 235–36 and 250.

kinds, of distinctions flourished too, and these lists came to form the backbone of the emerging Formalist literature. The two key authors of such lists of distinctions are Francis of Meyronnes († ca. 1328), reader of the *Sentences* at Paris in 1320–21, and Petrus Thomae († ca. 1340), who had a teaching career in the Franciscan *studium* in Barcelona.²⁹

Francis of Meyronnes bequeathed to posterity three different versions of his commentary on the *Sentences*. One section of the earliest version, called *Ab oriente*, circulated as a separate treatise on formalities.³⁰ Francis elaborated a list of four different distinctions that all apply to levels of mind-independent being, meaning they are not merely rational distinctions. William Duba has suggested this doctrine of Francis may be read as a fulfillment of the expectation planted by Scotus's hierarchy of kinds of unity and identity in the *Ordinatio*.³¹ Francis refined his doctrine over time. In the last version of his commentary, called *Conflatus*, printed thrice during the Renaissance, Francis presented his four distinctions, including their hierarchical order, as follows:

I say that there are four degrees of distinctions not made by an intellect or a soul. The first is the essential distinction; in this way God is distinguished from creature, and this, taken properly, occurs when a quiddity with its existence is distinct from another quiddity with its existence. The second is real; in this way there is a distinction between the Father and the Son. Hence, a real distinction is the one which is between a thing and a thing. The third is formal, and this one is between a quiddity and a quiddity; we thus say that a man and a donkey in objective potency are distinguished, and this distinction properly pertains to distinct *rationes*. The fourth distinction is not between quiddity and quiddity, but between a quiddity and an intrinsic mode, such as between the quiddity of man and its finitude or between the quiddity of whiteness and its remission and intensification. These distinctions are essentially ordered, because the greatest one is the essential [distinction], and thus what is essentially distinguished is distinguished according to all the other distinctions. The second greatest after the essential [distinction] is the real one. After that comes the third, namely, the quidditative and formal one. The fourth is the least of them all, namely, that of quiddity and intrinsic mode. For a distinction is smaller when it remains within the same specific and formal *ratio* than when it goes beyond it. But there is no departure from the formal *ratio* through the mode, because it pertains to

29 For literature on these two authors, see the bibliographies to the contributions to this present volume by Garrett R. Smith and Vitaly Ivanov.

30 Hübener, "Robertus Anglicus OFM," 334. This important text, dist. 8 of the first book, has not been edited yet. For a list of manuscripts containing the separate treatise, see the entry for Francis of Meyronnes in Garrett R. Smith, "Inventory of Unprinted Treatises," listing as of November 2024 16 manuscripts.

31 Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine*, 185, remarking that "Francis of Meyronnes takes the path signaled but not followed by Scotus," and 195–96, with a full quote of the doctrine as formulated in the middle version of Francis's commentary, called *Summa simplicitas*.

that formal *ratio* and to none other, because an added mode does not change the formal *ratio*.³²

In comparison to the treatment by Scotus, a high level of systematization has occurred. In Meyronnes, we thus find a neatly worked out hierarchy of four kinds of *ex natura rei* distinctions, ordered according to the distance bridged by the distinctions, with the “greatest” distinction bridging the gap between God and creatures and all other actually existing quiddities, and the “smallest” one holding only between one quiddity and its intrinsic mode. The doctrine of intrinsic modes is a central aspect of Francis’s ontology and itself signals an important development after Scotus, who also operated with intrinsic modes, but failed to formulate a general theory of modes.³³ The real distinction, illustrated by the example of the Father and the Son, holds between things or *res* – in keeping with Augustine’s understanding of the Trinitarian persons as *res*.³⁴ The formal distinction is said to hold between quiddities or formal aspects (*rationes*) not in actual existence, but in objective potency; this does not mean there is no formal distinction among actually existing quiddities, but rather that it already applies to them before they actually exist and only enjoy objective being in the divine power to produce them.³⁵

32 Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus* I, dist. 8, q. 1, ed. 1520, 43vbO–P: “Dico quod sunt quatuor gradus distinctionum non fabricati ab intellectu sive ab anima. Prima est distinctio essentialis, eo modo quo distinguitur deus a creatura, et ista proprie accipiendū est quando quidditas cum sua existentia est distincta ab alia quidditate cum sua existentia. Secunda est realis, eo modo quo est distinctio inter patrem et filium. Unde distinctio realis est illa, quae est inter rem et rem. Tertia est formalis, et ista est inter quidditatem et quidditatem; sic dicimus, quod homo et asinus in potentia obiectiva distinguuntur, et ista distinctio proprie est rationum distinctarum. Quarta est distinctio non quidditatis et quidditatis, sed quidditatis et modi intrinseci, sicut est inter quidditatem hominis et eius finitatem et quidditatem albedinis et eius remissionem et intensionem. Ista distinctiones sunt essentialiter ordinatae, quia maxima est essentialis, et ideo quae essentialiter distinguuntur omnibus aliis distinctionibus distinguuntur. Secunda post essentialē maior est realis. Post illam est tertia scilicet quidditativa vel formalis. Quarta est minor omnibus scilicet quidditatis et modi intrinseci. Nam minor est distinctio ubi statur intra eandem rationem specificam et formalem quam ubi est exitus. Non est autem exitus a ratione formali per modum eius, quia ad rationem formalem et non ad aliam reducitur, quia modus adveniēns non variat rationem formalem.” Vitaly Ivanov is currently preparing a working edition of *Conflatus* I, dist. 8, q. 1; I am grateful to him for pointing out to me that whereas all four distinctions are discussed in the *Ab oriente* version, the specific doctrine of the hierarchical order among them is not yet worked out there.

33 See Möhle, *Formalitas und modus intrinsecus*, 286–336.

34 For references to Augustine, see my own article “Parisian Formalism” in this present volume.

35 For the development of Francis’s take on this motif, see Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine*, 202–5.

Petrus Thomae takes his cue from Francis of Meyronnes. Peter discusses various kinds of distinctions in primarily two places, the first being the seventh question of his *Quodlibet* (identical with q. 10 of his large treatise *De modis distinctionum*). In that text he proposes a model of eight distinctions: 1) a rational distinction, 2) a distinction between an intrinsic mode and its subject, 3) a distinction between a formality and a thing, 4) a distinction between a formality and another formality, 5) a distinction between a reality and a thing, 6) a distinction between a reality and a reality, 7) a distinction between a thing and another thing, and 8) a distinction between an essence and another essence (*distinctio rationis, distinctio modi intrinseci et eius cuius est, distinctio formalitatis et rei, distinctio formalitatis et formalitatis, distinctio realitatis et rei, distinctio realitatis et realitatis, distinctio rei et rei, distinctio essentiae et essentiae*).³⁶ The list has several overlaps with Francis's four distinctions but is more detailed and importantly includes a rational distinction, missing in Francis's system. Peter revisited the topic in his late *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*,³⁷ where he provides a more polished version of his doctrine of distinctions, drawing on key features of his highly original ontology laid out in other works. In this enormously influential treatise (printed once during the Renaissance, in 1517), he presented seven kinds of distinctions: 1) a rational distinction, 2) a distinction *ex natura rei*, 3) a formal distinction, 4) a real distinction, 5) an essential distinction, 6) a subjective distinction, and 7) an objective distinction (*distinctio rationis, distinctio ex natura rei, distinctio formalis, distinctio realis, distinctio essentialis, distinctio se totis subiective, distinctio se totis obiective*).³⁸ The latter two distinctions are novelties: they hold between items that do not share in what Peter calls "subjective" and "objective being," respectively.³⁹

A special feature of Petrus Thomae's late doctrine of distinctions is its high level of systematicity. In the first of two corollaries, added after his discussion of each kind of distinction, Peter explains there are as many kinds of identities as there are kinds of distinctions, and that they are related to one another as counterparts:

36 Petrus Thomae, *Quodl.*, q. 7, ed. Hooper and Buytaert, 119–20. For discussion, see Andersen, "Introduction," 95–99.

37 There exist two versions of this treatise; both of them have been edited, one by Egbert P. Bos under the title *De distinctione predicamentorum*, the other by Celia López Alcalde under the title *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*. For convenience's sake, I shall here refer to the latter version; for a discussion of the complicated relationship between the two versions, I again refer to Andersen, "Introduction," 47–81.

38 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, nn. 2–4, ed. López Alcalde, 286.

39 For discussion and references, see the contributions by Vitaly Ivanov and myself in this present volume.

There are as many identities as there are distinctions, according to the first book of the *Topics*, “of opposites there are as many kinds of one item as there are of its counterpart”; since same and diverse are opposites, thus also distinction or diversity and identity. Therefore, some are the same according to reason [*ratio*], others *ex natura rei*, others formally, others really, others essentially, others subjectively, others objectively, such that the descriptions of these kinds of identity are taken from the opposition to the descriptions of the kinds of distinctions given above.⁴⁰

In the second corollary, Peter explains the peculiar hierarchical order among the distinctions and identities:

The aforesaid [kinds] either imply each other affirmatively or negatively, depending on whether we are speaking of distinctions or of identities. About this, one must first know that, when these kinds concern distinctions, they are such that whatever is distinguished objectively is distinguished in all the other ways, and so on in regard to all the other kinds of distinctions in regard to those that precede them. For whatever is subjectively distinguished is essentially, really, formally, and rationally distinguished, and so on with the others, though not in the other direction. [...] Secondly, one must know that the aforesaid kinds work in the reverse direction when they concern identities, because whatever items are rationally the same, are the same in all other ways, and so on with each one of them consecutively, but not contrariwise, because not everything that is objectively the same is the same in all the other ways, as is clear from what has been said, and so on with all the preceding kinds.⁴¹

40 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, nn. 35–36, ed. López Alcalde, 310: “Quantum ad tertium articulum principale, est primum corollarium quod quotiens dicitur distinctio totiens et identitas; primo *Topicorum* ‘quot modis dicitur unum oppositorum tot et reliquum’; sicut enim idem et diversum sunt opposita, ita distinctio et diversitas et identitas. Quaedam ergo sunt idem ratione, quaedam ex natura rei, quaedam formaliter, quaedam realiter, quaedam essentialiter, quaedam se totis subiective, quaedam se totis obiective; ita quod descriptiones istorum modorum identitatis sunt accipiendae per oppositum ad descriptiones superius dictas de modis distinctionum.”

41 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, nn. 37–39, ed. López Alcalde, 312–14: “Secundum corollarium est quod praedicti aliter se inferunt affirmative, aliter negative, aliter quando accipiuntur cum distinctione, et aliter quando cum identitate. Circa quod est sciendum primo, quod primo, quando determinant distinctionem, sic se habent, quod quaecumque se totis obiective distinguuntur, omnibus modis aliis distinguuntur et sic de omnibus aliis modis distinctionum respectu aliorum praecedentium. Quaecumque enim distinguuntur subiective, distinguuntur essentialiter, realiter, formaliter et ratione et sic de aliis, non autem e contrario. [...] Secundo est notandum quod per oppositum se habent praedicti modi quando accipiuntur cum identitate, quia quaecumque sunt idem ratione, sunt idem in omnibus aliis modis et sic de singulis respectu sequentium, non tamen e contrario, quia non omnia, quae sunt idem se totis obiective, sunt idem in omnibus aliis modis, ut apparet ex praedictis et sic de omnibus modis aliis praecedentibus.”

Petrus Thomae's late teaching on distinctions is a remarkably polished doctrine and may be seen as the culmination of the development of the idea of a hierarchy of distinctions from Henry of Ghent through Duns Scotus and Francis of Meyronnes to Peter himself. Interestingly, the systems of distinctions proposed by Francis and Peter complement each other: Whereas Francis's system lacks a rational distinction (apart from a distinction between formal *rationes*), Peter's (in its final version) lacks a modal distinction (unless one of the seven distinctions is interpreted as such a distinction). Accordingly, the authors of the emerging Formalist tradition very often copied from both systems, Francis and Peter's doctrines constituting the "twofold origin" of that tradition, to speak again with Hübener.⁴²

There is quite a lot to unpack in Francis of Meyronnes's and Petrus Thomae's doctrines of distinctions. Help may be found in the articles of the first two sections of this book, which deal with aspects of Francis's and Peter's doctrines or their legacy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In his contribution, Garrett R. Smith investigates their diverging views about the formal distinction and shows how both of them found support in Scotus's works. Vitaly Ivanov investigates Petrus Thomae's doctrine of intrinsic modes and shows that his modal theory is just as original as Francis's (which has hitherto received more attention in scholarship). William Duba focuses on a third early Formalist, Nicolas Bonet († 1343), and, among other things, shows how Bonet both subscribed to Meyronnes's doctrine of modes and vocally defended the formal distinction, claiming its place in Aristotelian philosophy. Other contributions focus on the reception and transformation of Formalist doctrines in the later tradition. Apaoan Machado presents one eclectic Formalist treatise from the early days of the University of Vienna, an important example of how the Formalist tradition developed in the late fourteenth century and assembled various motifs from the authors considered above. In my own contribution, I show how the number of distinctions was debated at Paris in the 1480s – my focus is on Étienne Brulefer (1450/55–1496/99) and Antoine Sirect († ca. 1510), whose works were printed up until the beginning of the seventeenth century, and who set the agenda for the Post-Medieval Formalist tradition. Sylvain Roudaut investigates the diverging views of intrinsic modes in late-fifteenth century Scotism, especially in Sirect and in Antonio Trombetta (1436–1517), author of a commentary on Sirect's Formalist treatise. Finally, Rafael Ramis Barceló focuses on an important aspect of the legacy of the Formalist tradition, namely the adoption of Formalist motifs and the specific format of the Formalist treatise by school traditions other than Scotism. Authors of Lullist provenance showed an interest in the Formalist literature from the late fifteenth century onwards, and they did so to an extent that

42 Hübener, "Robertus Anglicus OFM," 339; see also the contribution by Vitaly Ivanov in this present volume.

justifies using the label “Scoto-Lullism” for this particular sub-tradition. In the sixteenth century, this same phenomenon can be observed in other school traditions as well, such as Thomism, eclectic Aristotelianism, and the Aegidian school (that is, Augustinian Hermits cultivating the thought of Giles of Rome).⁴³

3. Early Modern Scotism: Bartolomeo Mastri

The absurd idea that scholasticism was confined to the Middle Ages keeps haunting the historiography of philosophy. Scholasticism, and with it the Scotist tradition, thrived throughout the Early Modern age and had a continuation in the later Neo-Scholastic movement.⁴⁴ When Early Modern scholasticism is taken into account, usually members of the Jesuit order (and then first of all Luis de Molina and Francisco Suárez) attract most attention. Interestingly, we do in fact find reception of Petrus Thomae’s seven distinctions among Jesuits, for instance Jesuit teachers of philosophy and theology active in Rome and Naples.⁴⁵ Here, however, I should like to emphasize the significance of the Early Modern Franciscan tradition. Scotism was never more widespread than in the seventeenth century, when it even travelled to the New World along with the Franciscan missions. The Scotists produced Formalist literature at least into the second half of the seventeenth century and also discussed Formalist topics in their philosophical manuals (*Cursus philosophicus*). Discussions of Petrus Thomae’s seven distinctions are found in such manuals at least until as late as around 1740.⁴⁶ The

⁴³ For this development, see also Andersen, “*Scientia formalitatum*,” 210–15; Andersen, “Javelli and the Reception of the Scotist System of Distinctions in Renaissance Thomism”; Andersen, “Anti-Scotism, Plagiarism, and Distinctions in the ‘*via fundatissima*’.”

⁴⁴ For a synthetic overview of Early Modern scholasticism, see Ramis Barceló, *La segunda escolástica*; for the current state of the art in this field of research, see the articles in Langella and Ramis Barceló (editors), *¿Qué es la segunda escolástica?* For a critical historiographical discussion, see Knebel, *Jesuit und Neuzeit*, 1–81. One interesting development in this field is that Richard Cross has extended his research on the history of Christology to cover the Early Modern period, including its scholastic school traditions; see Cross, *Christology and Metaphysics in the Seventeenth Century*. For Early Modern Scotism, see Schmutz, “L’héritage des Subtils,” and the literature cited in the following.

⁴⁵ For Rome, see Capri, *La Metafisica Annotata e Dubitata*, 324–28, documenting Francisco Toledo’s *additiones* to a commentary on the *Metaphysics* by Pedro Para; Toledo there briefly discusses the seven distinctions. For Naples, see the lengthy discussion of Formalist topics in Recupito, *Theologia, Tractatus primus de Deo uno*, pars prima, q. 4, ed. 1637, 165–247, and the comprehensive survey of various views of distinctions in Amico, *Tractatio de variis formalitatum et distinctionum generibus dilucida et exacta*, published in 1638. I thank Apaoan Machado for the reference to Toledo and Sven K. Knebel for the reference to Recupito.

⁴⁶ See Andersen, “Introduction,” 259–67, discussing Alipius Locherer’s presentation of the seven distinctions in his *Clypeus philosophico-scotisticus*, completed in 1732 and printed in

single most influential Early Modern Scotist *Cursus philosophicus* was the one Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673) and Bonaventura Belluto (1603–1676) jointly drafted from the mid-1630s onwards; the project was completed with the publication of Mastri's own two volumes of *Metaphysical Disputations* in 1646–47.⁴⁷ There, Mastri provides an instructive doxographical account of the state of debate concerning distinctions:

There are so varied opinions about this topic, because each and every school speaks in its own peculiar idiom about this matter, and not one of them agrees with another, and therefore the followers of each school have composed their own treatises on Identity and Distinction according to the principles of their school. Thus, Bartolomeo Manzoli edited a treatise on formalities in the spirit of Saint Thomas, and the same did Aquario; similarly, Agostino Museo [of Treviso] produced a treatise on distinctions in the spirit of Giles [of Rome], and Antoine Sirect composed a most erudite treatise on formalities in the spirit of Scotus, and he was followed by his commentators Trombetta, Vallone, Maurice [of Port], Lorenzo of Brescia, Arretino, Du Douet, [Girolamo of] Pistoia, and François Leroy; and still others from our school wrote about formalities, such as Meyronnes at the end of his theology, Bonet in the third book of his Metaphysics, Zerbi at the end of his Metaphysics, Fabri at the end of his Philosophy, Étienne Brulefer in his proper treatise on this subject, and finally Petrus Thomae. Besides, Achillini composed a treatise on Distinctions in the spirit of Averroes, whose follower he was, and also the Nominalists Ockham, Gabriel [Biel], Gregory [of Rimini], and Auriol handed down their peculiar opinions about identities and distinctions. It will be helpful to briefly report what each of these schools has to say about this matter, before we decide what should be said according to the truth and Scotus's doctrine.⁴⁸

1740. I have so far not found discussions of the seven distinctions in material from later than 1740.

⁴⁷ For Mastri's life and works, see Forlivesi, *Scotistarum Princeps*; Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 30–38.

⁴⁸ Mastri, *Disp. Met.*, disp. 6, q. 7, art. 2, n. 154, ed. 1646, 746b: "Tot, adeoque variae extant de hac re sententiae, ut unaquaeque schola peculiari idiomate de hac materia loquatur, nec una conveniat cum alia, unde cujusque scholae sectatores proprium compilarunt tractatum de Identitatibus et Distinctionibus juxta principia suae scholae; ita Bartholomaeus Manzolius peculiarem edidit tractatum de formalitatibus ad mentem D. Thomae, ac etiam Aquarius; Augustinus Museus pariter tractatum fecit de distinctionibus ad mentem Aegidii, Antonius quoque Sirectus eruditissimum compilavit tractatum de formalitatibus ad mentem Scoti, quem commentando secuti sunt Tromb. Vallon. Maurit. Laurentius Brixiensis, Aretin. Doduet. Pistoriens. Franciscus de Roy, et alii etiam de formalitatibus scripserunt in nostra schola Mairon. ad finem suae Theologiae Bonet. lib. 3. suae Met. Zerbi. ad finem Metaph. Fabri ad finem suae Philosoph. Stefanus Burlifer in proprio de hac re tractatu; ac denique Petrus Thomas. Praeterea Achillinus tractatum de Distinctionibus composuit ad mentem Averrois, cujus ipse sectator erat, et Nominales denique Ockham, Gabriel, Gregorius, et Aureolus peculiarem tradiderunt sententiam de Identitatibus et Distinctionibus, quarum scholarum varios dicendi modos in hac re breviter referre juvabit, resolvendo postea quid nobis videatur dicendum secundum veritatem et Scoti doctrinam." Poppi, "Il contributo dei formalisti padovani," 615, already empha-

This is what the Formalist tradition looked like for an expert on the subject writing in the 1640s. Mastri may partially be drawing on similar lists of authors compiled by his contemporary scholastics, but was clearly familiar with parts of the material – exclusively consisting of printed works – to which he refers. In regard to Francis of Meyronnes and Petrus Thomae, it is striking that Mastri believes the Formalist treatise appended to an edition of Meyronnes's *Conflatus* and other works printed in 1520 is an authentic work, when it is in fact a compilation of passages from various Formalist authors, including Petrus Thomae; and similarly that he only mentions Petrus Thomae at the end of his long list of Scotists, clearly not aware that Petrus Thomae was – along with Meyronnes – an originator of the Formalist tradition.⁴⁹ Mastri is not familiar with this part of the material. For him, Sirect and his commentators – the Post-Medieval Formalist tradition – are much more important. Mastri knew of the septenary of distinctions through their works. He was not, however, particularly impressed by that doctrine, since most of the distinctions therein are reducible to others, as he thought.⁵⁰ Mastri's own main contribution to the discourse on distinctions does not lie in a new interpretation of the original Formalist distinctions, but rather in a peculiar Scotist adaptation of a motif of Thomist provenance, namely, the employment in various metaphysical contexts of the so-called *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* or rational distinction with a foundation in the thing, in contradistinction to the *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*, a rational distinction without such a foundation.⁵¹

Mastri is also interesting as a witness to a new development in contemporaneous scholasticism, especially as cultivated among the Jesuits, where the focus gradually shifts from distinctions to “precisions” (*praecisiones*), especially “objective” and “formal” precisions. Notably, Leibniz took notice of this development and mentioned the doctrine of precisions among other doctrines that only

sized the informative value of this passage. For all the Formalist authors mentioned by Mastri, and their works, see Andersen, “*Scientia formalitatum*.”

⁴⁹ Mastri may even have taken over the reference to Petrus Thomae from Ambrogio Sassi (Lat. Saxius), a contemporary Scotist active in Bologna, who likewise only casually mentions Peter in his short catalogue of Formalist authors (called *Formalistarum catalogus* in the margin); see Saxius, *Catastrosi philosophica, ac theologica*, vol. 1, disp. 6, q. 1, nn. 3–4, ed. 1640, 163; cf. Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 686. Petrus Thomae is otherwise seldom mentioned in the seventeenth century, and so it seems safe to conclude that whereas his doctrine of distinctions continued to be discussed, its origin was forgotten.

⁵⁰ See Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 685–721, with references to further literature.

⁵¹ See Novák, “Making Room for the Virtual Distinction”; Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 781–820. Whereas Novák sees Mastri's interest in the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* critically, I rather emphasize Mastri's creativity in his employment of this distinction; we agree that this is a crucial point in Mastri's metaphysics.

had become “*en vogue*” after the Council of Trent.⁵² While Leibniz may have known the doctrine from various sources, he certainly was familiar with the treatment of it in Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz’s (1606–1682) *Leptotatos latine subtilissimus* from 1681, a work which Leibniz annotated, including the passages on precisions; this Cistercian scholastic in his turn was familiar with Mastri’s works, but may as well have picked up the doctrine of precisions from other seventeenth-century scholastics.⁵³ Mastri, however, is an interesting case, because he, being a Scotist, was predestined to compare the new Jesuit doctrine with the core doctrine of his own school’s doctrine of distinctions, the formal distinction. He accordingly appended two *quaestiones* to his long treatment of identity and distinction – placing them right after his discussion of the two kinds of rational distinctions:

Since we have explained the rational distinction with a foundation in the thing [*distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*] in such a manner that by its force some rational distinction is posited in the object which it concerns, [namely] insofar as through this distinction the inadequately conceiving intellect conceptually divides into many parts or formalities what is completely indivisible in reality; and one [item] is objectively prescinded from another, because one [item] is represented by one act with which another is not represented, and in this consists the precision of one from another; – so, in order that we may see what is at stake, to complete this treatise on identities and distinctions the task is to examine the announced topic [of precisions], which is indeed not found treated in such terms in the old authors, because in those times it was a sacrilege to deny objective precisions; for everyone, except a few Nominalists, unanimously granted the intellect the power to prescind formalities that are really identical in the object, as for instance animality and rationality in a human being, or the relations of origin and the essence in God.⁵⁴

The formal distinction is one kind of objective precision, the other being the rational distinction with a foundation in the thing. The doctrine of precisions

52 Leibniz, *Essais de Théodicée*, I, n. 39, ed. Gerhardt, 124.

53 For literature on Caramuel, see the contribution by Daniel Novotný in this book. Regarding Leibniz’s annotations, see Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 821.

54 Mastri, *Disp. Met.*, disp. 6, q. 7, art. 2, n. 154, ed. 1646, 746b: “Quia distinctionem rationis ratiocinatae, ita explicuimus, ut ex vi ipsius ponatur aliqua distinctio rationis in objecto, supra quod cadit, quatenus per eam intellectus inadaequate concipiens indivisibile prorsus a parte rei dividit conceptibiliter in plures partes, seu formalitates; et unam objective praescindit ab alia, quia uno actu repraesentatur una, quo non repraesentatur alia, in quo consistit praecisio unius ab alia; ne videamur supponere id quod est in controversia; pro complemento hujus tractatus de identitatibus, et distinctionibus, opus est propositum examinare quaesitum, quod quidem apud Antiquiores in terminis motum non reperitur, eo quia piaculum fuisset tunc temporis praecisiones negare objectivas; omnes namque unanimiter, paucis quibusdam Nominalibus exceptis, vim intellectui tribuebant praescindendi ex parte objecti formalitates realiter identificatas, ut v.g. in homine animalitatem a rationalitate, in Deo relationes originis ab essentia.”

prompts Mastri to explain the epistemological aspect of the formal distinction, especially how an intuiting intellect, always directed toward things existing in their own right, may focus on individual formalities of an object; a formality, which exists due to its real identity with an integral object, is granted its own existence precisely when it is present to an intuiting act.⁵⁵ As for Mastri's remark that the old (we would say 'Medieval') scholastics did not speak of precisions, it is worth noting, as Garrett R. Smith has emphasized, that already Petrus Thomae spoke of a "precise abstraction" in his *Questions concerning Being*. Peter there described this kind of abstraction as taking place when something that has several aspects (*rationes*) is conceived according to only one of them, not the others (they are left out of consideration). Peter too employs the example of animality in a human being.⁵⁶ It is doubtful that this motif in Petrus Thomae had any direct impact on the Early Modern discussion of objective and formal precisions; these rather appear to have been modelled on the widespread doctrine of formal and objective concepts. Besides, Mastri, with his focus on intuition rather than abstraction, at any rate goes beyond Peter's discussion. Nevertheless, Peter's talk of a precise abstraction (along with frequent use of '*praecisio*' and '*praecise*' in other authors) does falsify Mastri's remark about the old scholastics – while at the same time revealing some discontinuity between Late-Medieval and Early-Modern scholasticism: not every interesting innovation necessarily had a long-term impact on the later tradition.

Again, much of what has been said here needs further unpacking, and again there is help in this present book, especially in the two sections concerning the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. In his contribution, Igor Agostini shows how the debate concerning the distinction between the divine attributes and the divine essence and among the divine attributes themselves developed in the Thomist tradition from the fifteenth to the twentieth century, taking a decisive turn in the sixteenth century when the Thomists (Dominicans and, later, Jesuits) no longer saw the Scotist formal distinction as their main challenge but rather among themselves developed starkly diverging positions, basically for or against a new doctrine of mutual inclusion of the divine attributes (let me add that if and how the dynamics of these debates also affected contemporaneous debates among the Franciscans remains to be seen; Mastri's interest in the *distinctio ra-*

⁵⁵ See Andersen, "Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition," 231–32. For other aspects of Mastri's discussion of precisions, see Novák, "Confusion or Precision?"; Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 820–39, with references to further literature.

⁵⁶ Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, q. 4, art. 6, ed. Smith, 46: "Abstractionem praecisivam voco illam secundum quam aliquid habens seu includens plures rationes potest praecise concipi secundum unam illarum vel una illarum potest praecise concipi secundum se ipsam, ut concipiendo animalitatem praecise vel hominem secundum istam rationem praecise." See also Garrett R. Smith's introduction to this edition, at cciii–iv.

tionis ratiocinatae is clearly owed to the role of this distinction in scholastic debates outside of the Scotist school). Daniel Heider provides a survey of Francisco Suárez's (1548–1617) economy of distinctions and then focuses on Suárez's discussion of the distinction between the parts of the soul (vegetative, sensitive, and rational), defending the view that Suárez applied the formal distinction in this specific corner of scholastic psychology, where Scotus, curiously and interestingly, did not. Roberto Hofmeister Pich introduces the reader to the state of the art concerning Latin American Scotism, focusing on the discussions of distinctions in the philosophical and theological works of three of the most prominent Latin American Scotists (Jerónimo Valera, Alfonso Briceño, and Juan de Fuica, all of them Franciscans). Daniel Novotný investigates Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz's eclectic, yet in its own way – with its anticipation of the linguistic turn of modern analytical philosophy – highly original, doctrine of distinctions, one that, without being directly dependent on Formalist literature, bears witness to a continued interest in a variety of distinctions.

4. Distinctions in Protestant *Schulmetaphysik*: Bartholin and Alsted

Formalist literature properly speaking does not seem to have been produced in Protestant milieus. Martin Luther (1483–1546) himself was dismissive of Scotism, including in particular the use of the formal distinction in discussions of the Trinity, the only place William of Ockham († 1347) – if only for lack of better options – had granted use of this Scotist tool.⁵⁷ Not all of the early reformers shared this view of Scotism. The Calvinist theologian Huldrych Zwingli (1484–1531) owned, annotated, and learned from works by Scotus and a number of Scotists, among whom was Étienne Brulefer, one of the most influential Formalists in the Post-Medieval period.⁵⁸ Another case from the early phase of the Reformation is that of Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt (1486–1541), who studied with the Dominicans in Cologne, then taught philosophy (logic and metaphysics) in Wittenberg, where he came under the influence of Martin Luther and joined the reformers, a trajectory that finally led him to become a follower of Jean Calvin. While still a Thomist teacher in Wittenberg, Karlstadt published a Thomist treatise on distinctions in 1508, displaying a comprehensive

⁵⁷ For Luther, see the collection of dismissive remarks about Scotus quoted by Vignaux, *Luther*, 25–30; see also Bolliger, *Infiniti contemplatio*, 426 (also drawing on Vignaux): “Luther überbietet [...] die ockhamistische, bereits scharfe Kritik an der Formaldistinktion.” For Ockham, see the succinct discussion in Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions*, 608–28.

⁵⁸ See Bolliger, *Infiniti contemplatio*, 365–521, especially the chapter “Zwingli als ‘Formaliciens’,” at 424–59. For Zwingli's interest in Brulefer, see also Zahnd, “The Epistemological Limits.”

grasp of the previous Thomist tradition and clearly reacting against Scotist Formalism – an edition of Antoine Sirect's *Formalitates moderniores* had been published at Wittenberg only in 1505 (and Pierre Tartaret's manual of Scotist philosophy in 1504). Karlstadt did not spend much energy on criticizing the Scotist tradition, though, but rather appropriated the very format of the Formalist treatise and presented a multitude of distinctions deemed defensible on Thomist terms:⁵⁹ alternative distinctions, so to speak. Karlstadt's treatise appears to have been the first piece of Thomist Formalist literature to appear in print.⁶⁰ Despite the later turn(s) Karlstadt's life took, his early treatise can hardly be counted as a genuinely Protestant piece of Formalism.

By far the most manifest evidence of Protestant, both Lutheran and Calvinist, interest in a multitude of distinctions is found in the eclectic school philosophy cultivated at Protestant universities, a conglomerate of Aristotelianism, Ramism, and Scholasticism.⁶¹ The rich dissertation literature (*theses* defended before a jury and often printed along with longer treatises by the defendants' professor) produced in these milieus often focused on kinds of distinctions and identities. Wilhelm Ursinus (1578–1613), from the circle around the Reformed polymath Rudolph Göckl senior (1547–1628) authored one long *Disputation on the Real and Rational Distinctions*, published with a preface by Göckl in 1603 and again in 1610. Ursinus's interlocutors are not Scotists, but rather contemporary Aristotelians, such as the Jesuit Pedro da Fonseca (1528–1599) and Jacopo Zabarella (1533–1589), and the Humanists Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484–1558) and Peter Ramus (1515–1572).⁶² The situation is similar in Protestant manuals of metaphysics. As a standard, such manuals included sections structured on the doctrine of the disjunctive transcendental properties of being, a chapter "On the Same and the Diverse" (*De eodem et diverso*, or similar) being a standard ingredient of such sections – and here was the seat of the discussions of various kinds of both distinctions and identities. The doctrine of disjunctive transcendental properties of being was of Scotist provenance, and Bartolomeo Mastri too discussed (much more comprehensively) kinds of distinctions and identities quite

⁵⁹ Karlstadt, *Distinctiones Thomistarum*, 28r–v. Regarding this treatise and its Wittenberg context, see Bollbuck, "St. Thomas in Wittenberg"; Bolliger, *Infiniti contemplatio*, 358–62.

⁶⁰ Others soon followed, e.g., Bartolomeo Manzoli's *Formalitates secundum viam Sancti Thome* from 1518; see Andersen, "Javelli and the Reception," 160–64.

⁶¹ For a recent assessment of this conglomerate, see Burton, *Ramism and the Reformation of Method*. The authoritative study concerning Protestant metaphysical literature remains Leinsle, *Das Ding und die Methode*.

⁶² Notably, Fonseca is Ursinus's primary source for Scotist opinions; see Ursinus, *Disputatio de distinctione reali et rationis utilissima*, q. 10, ed. 1603, 218, with a table of distinctions according to Scotus and Fonseca ("pro Scoti et Fonsecae opinione"). Fonseca discusses the number of distinctions in his commentary on the fifth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (ed. 1599, col. 395–410).

exactly in the context of a disputation on the disjunctive *passiones entis*.⁶³ Even if the framework is Scotistic, the content of this part of Protestant *Schulmetaphysik* comes from a variety of sources and as such testifies to the widespread interest in kinds of distinctions. The metaphysical textbooks produced by the two contemporary polymaths, the Danish Lutheran Caspar Bartholin (1585–1629) and the German Calvinist Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588–1638), are ready examples of this.

Bartholin's rudimentary (high school-level) textbook of metaphysics was first published under the title *Enchiridion metaphysicum* in 1608. It was subsequently reissued many times as *Metaphysica major* with supplementary *scholia*; it gains importance from the fact that it was the most often printed textbook of this discipline in Protestant Europe.⁶⁴ The short chapter on sameness and diversity includes a separate paragraph on distinctions. In the *Enchiridion* version, Bartholin starts out with a division of distinctions into real and rational ones. Real distinctions are either positive and hold between positive things, such as (the species of) human being and lion, or they are negative and hold between being and non-being (like chimeras or "not seeing a stone") or between privations (such as darkness and blindness). Rational distinctions are either *rationis ratiocinantis* or *rationis ratiocinatae*; the first ones have no foundation *in rebus* and are "pure" rational distinctions, as Bartholin says with reference to Pedro Fonseca. From Fonseca he also borrows a division of the second kind of rational distinction into one that is called 'virtual' and one that is called '*ex natura rei eminenter*'; this latter distinction is further subdivided into a formal, a modal, and a potential distinction. However, the formal distinction, remarks Bartholin, is added by some people to the real and the rational distinctions as a separate kind of distinction. This short sketch is the entire content (with some short explanations and examples) of Bartholin's chapter on distinctions in the original

⁶³ For this doctrine and its role in Protestant manuals of metaphysics, see Lay, "*Passiones entis disiunctae*." For the adoption of Formalist topics into the *Cursus philosophicus* among the Scotists in the seventeenth century, see Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 659–83. Whereas the doctrine of the disjunctive transcendentals was standardly used as a structuring principle in Protestant metaphysics, this phenomenon is much less widespread in Scotist presentations of metaphysics; on the other hand, it does resemble the extensive discussions of various divisions of being frequently placed at the beginning of Formalist treatises since Gabriele Zerbi (1482); see Ivanov, "*Quaestio de prima divisione entis*." For Zerbi's contribution to Formalism, see also Hübener, "'Objektivität' und 'Realisierung,'" 53–60.

⁶⁴ See Leinsle, *Das Ding und die Methode*, 288–92; for Bartholin's other output and career (including a readership in rhetoric and later professorships in medicine and theology at the University of Copenhagen), see Fink-Jensen, *Fornuften under troens lydigbed*, 231–359.

version of his textbook of metaphysics.⁶⁵ In his *scholia* included in later versions, he adds some details, first of all a refinement of his taxonomy of distinctions, again with support in Fonseca. The real distinction may thus be subdivided into a formal-essential distinction (holding between diverse genera, species, or souls belonging to different individuals), a causal distinction (between the four Aristotelian causes), a subjective distinction (between properties of different subjects, such as whiteness of snow and whiteness of a swan), an accidental distinction (between subjects with different accidents), a simple modal distinction (between different modes), and finally a comparative modal distinction (between beings with different modes). The rational distinction without a foundation in reality holds between something defined and its definition (human being and ‘rational animal’) or between abstract and concrete items (humanity and human being); for this latter point Julius Caesar Scaliger is referenced. The Dominican Thomist Thomas Cajetan (1469–1534) is cited for his view of the virtual distinction, and so is the German Aristotelian Jakob Schegk (1511–1587) for his view of the formal distinction.⁶⁶ Bartholin merely reports what he finds in these authors and does not express any personal view of the issues, including whether or not a separate formal distinction should be assumed, or whether it belongs under the rational distinction (as assumed in the main text), or rather under the real distinction (as assumed in the *scholia*). Neither Scotus nor any Scotist is mentioned, but in the following chapter, dealing with the parts of being (God and creature, substance and accident), Scotus is cited for favoring “purely univocal predication” of being (*Scotus praedicationem esse pure univocam statuit*), a view Bartholin dismisses as absurd, especially given the unequal status of God and creatures.⁶⁷

Alsted’s *Metaphysica* from 1613 is likewise a fairly simple textbook. A comprehensive sketch of metaphysics is also included in the various versions of his *Encyclopedia of All the Sciences* (first version published in 1620).⁶⁸ In both of these texts, Alsted provides a list of distinctions that resembles what we find in Bartholin, including references to Fonseca (who thus emerges as a popular authority on distinctions in Protestant milieus). But beyond that, Alsted interestingly, in both works, also reports the subjective (*se totis subiective*) and objective (*se totis obiective*) distinctions from Petrus Thomae’s system of distinctions. His source for these distinctions, however, is not any Scotist treatise on distinctions, but rather the Dominican Thomist Chrysostomo Javelli (ca. 1470–1540), who

⁶⁵ Bartholin, *Metaphysica major*, “De distinctione,” ed. 1629, 206–9 (the edition of 1629 has both the original text and the *scholia*). I here refrain from retrieving Bartholin’s sources; his sheer eclecticism is the point.

⁶⁶ Bartholin, *Metaphysica major*, “De distinctione,” *scholia*, ed. 1629, 209–15.

⁶⁷ Bartholin, *Metaphysica major*, *pars specialis*, ed. 1629, 215–16.

⁶⁸ See Leinsle, *Das Ding und die Methode*, 369–93.

in the twelfth book of his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* reports all seven distinctions – which Javelli in his turn had appropriated from Brulefer (a Scotist critic of those seven distinctions). Alsted may in fact have known the doctrine from multiple sources, including Scoto-Lullist literature, but Javelli is the source he quotes (explicitly so in 1613, implicitly – using formulations from the earlier work – in the *Encyclopedia*).⁶⁹ That is quite as complicated as can be. It is hard to draw any philosophical conclusions from Alsted's patchwork of sources, or Bartholin's for that matter.

In the two examples considered above, Scotism is certainly in the background, but Thomism and the new Jesuit scholasticism are in the foreground. Numerous other examples could be adduced in support of this observation, both in other textbooks and in the many university dissertations on identity and distinction from Protestant universities.⁷⁰ Two contributions to the present volume complement our knowledge of the Protestant discourse on distinctions. In his article, Gabriel Müller analyses the chapter on distinctions in the posthumously published *Exercitationes philosophicae* (1620) by the Dutch Calvinist David Gorlaeus (1591–1612), a contemporary of Bartholin and Alsted who in spite of the brevity of his life achieved posthumous fame for his radical atomist philosophy. Jean-Pascal Anfray shows how Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), at the other end of the seventeenth century (and the beginning of the eighteenth), grappled with the distinction between the constituents of simple monads, arguing that while Leibniz rejected the formal distinction in his early dissertation at the University of Leipzig (1663) on the principle of individuation, he later, in his mature writings on monadology, employed a 'distinction by form' that may be interpreted as a kind of formal distinction. Gorlaeus and Leibniz had similar interests (Gorlaeus did not have much time to develop his). With them – arguably partially also with Caramuel y Lobkowitz – we have gradually moved beyond the realm of scholasticism. Most manifestly so with Leibniz, of course, despite his profound knowledge of traditional and contemporaneous scholastic thought. Notably, Leibniz's dissertation was in fact altogether scholastic (and as such it was just one among many others of the time). Of special interest to us is that he there referred to the followers of Scotus as "Formalists" (*formalistae*) due to their interest in the formal distinction (conceived as a middle distinction be-

⁶⁹ Alsted, *Metaphysica*, lib. 1, cap. 29, ed. 1613, 239–40; *Encyclopediae*, lib. 11, cap. 26, ed. 1649, 35. For Alsted quoting Javelli, see Andersen, "Javelli and the Reception," 7; for Alsted's manifest interest in Scoto-Lullism, see Andersen and Ramis Barceló, "Jaume Janer OCist," 197–99.

⁷⁰ See Andersen, "A Catalogue of Printed Formalist Literature and Early Modern Dissertations Concerning Identity and Distinction." For knowledge of Scotist distinctions in later Reformed theology, see Beck, *Gisbertus Voetius*, 251–69.

tween the real and the rational distinctions).⁷¹ Scholasticism was still the reality at Early Modern universities. Leibniz's career in diplomacy took him beyond that bubble. In Early Modern Europe, the passage from scholastic to non-scholastic thought could take place in the course of just one scholarly career, and scholastic themes, if in other guise, would travel along.

5. Repercussions in Early Modern Philosophy: Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Kant

At the beginning of this introduction, I cited Wolfgang Hübener's assessment of Formalism as a discourse formation of unparalleled diffusion. That would be a gross exaggeration, if the Formalist tradition did not have significant repercussions outside of the core Formalist literature. We have seen that this is clearly the case in Protestant *Schulmetaphysik*. Classical Early Modern philosophy was also affected. Leibniz is a case in point. René Descartes (1596–1650) is another. Since no article in this volume is devoted Descartes, a brief remark on his taxonomy of distinctions is warranted at this place.⁷² In the first part of his *Principles of Philosophy* from 1644, Descartes lays out the epistemological tools of his philosophy, among them three kinds of distinctions:

Number [i.e., numerical difference] in things arises from their distinction. There are three kinds of distinction: real, modal, and rational. The real ones hold between two or more substances; and we can recognize that they are really distinct from one another simply from the fact that we can understand one of them clearly and distinctly without

⁷¹ Note though that Leibniz does not seem to have ever quoted directly from Formalist literature; see Hübener, "Leibniz' gebrochenes Verhältnis," 66. Leibniz, *Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui*, n. 13, ed. 1663 [unpaginated, 5r], does refer to Nicolas Bonet, but only via Fonseca. Leibniz also refers to other Scotists. For Leibniz's dissertation, see Jean-Pascal Anfray's article in the present volume, with references to further literature. For Leibniz on distinctions, see also Bender, *Leibniz' Metaphysik der Modalität*, 110–11.

⁷² For other Formalist or Scotist motifs in Descartes, see Marrone, *Res e realitas in Descartes*, 239–90 (especially regarding the concept 'objective reality,' *realitas obiectiva*), and Ariew, *Descartes and the Last Scholastics*, 39–57. For a critical assessment of Descartes's theory of distinctions (without consideration of its historical sources), see Hoffman, "Descartes's Theory of Distinction." For the following, see also Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 810. Typically, Early Modern approaches to identity (especially identity over time) rather than distinction has attracted scholarly attention; see, e.g., Barber and Gracia (editors), *Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy*. I think it may be plausible to say that as soon as the flipside of identity, distinction, comes into focus, the scholastic debt of Early Modern philosophy appears much more clearly.

the other. For since we know God, we are certain that He can make whatever we understand distinctly.⁷³

There are two kinds of modal distinctions, namely one between the mode properly speaking and the substance to which the mode pertains, and another one between two modes of the same substance. The first one is recognized from the fact that we can perceive a substance clearly without the mode that we say differs from it, but we cannot, on the other hand, understand that mode without the substance. [...] The second is recognized from the fact that we can grasp one mode without another, and vice versa, but we cannot grasp any of them without that substance in which they are.⁷⁴

Finally, there is a rational distinction between a substance and any of its attributes without which the substance cannot be known, or between two such attributes of one and the same substance. And it is recognized from the fact that we cannot form a clear and distinct idea of that substance if the attribute is excluded from it, nor can we clearly perceive an idea of one of those attributes if we separate it from the other.⁷⁵

The hierarchical structure of this taxonomy is easily discernable. Descartes moves from the most manifest distinction over a less manifest distinction to the least manifest one, where adequate knowledge of the distinguished items is even impossible when they are taken separately. As such, this taxonomy resembles that of Francis of Meyronnes, also because Descartes does not include a pure rational distinction in his list. In a letter to an unknown addressee from the mid-1640s, in the wake of the publication of the *Principles*, Descartes explicitly explains that he never accepted the *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* due to its lack of a real foundation (meaning, it is of no use in the analysis of reality). In comparison with that extreme kind of rational distinction, all the distinctions in his list,

73 Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, pars prima, n. 60, AT vol. 8, 28: "Numerus autem, in ipsis rebus, oritur ab earum distinctione: quae *distinctio* triplex est, *realis*, *modalis*, et *rationis*. *Realis* proprie tantum est inter duas vel plures substantias: et has percipimus a se mutuo realiter esse distinctas, ex hoc solo quod unam absque altera clare et distincte intelligere possumus. Deum enim agnoscetes, certi sumus ipsum posse efficere quidquid distincte intelligimus."

74 Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, pars prima, n. 61, AT vol. 8, 29: "*Distinctio modalis* est duplex: alia scilicet inter modum proprie dictum, et substantiam cujus est modus; alia inter duos modos ejusdem substantiae. Prior ex eo cognoscitur, quod possumus quidem substantiam clare percipere absque modo quem ab illa differre dicimus, sed non possumus, viceversa, modum illum intelligere sine ipsa. [...] Posterior vero cognoscitur ex eo, quod unum quidem modum absque alio possumus agnoscere, ac viceversa; sed neutrum tamen sine eadem substantia cui insunt."

75 Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, pars prima, n. 62, AT vol. 8, 30: "Denique *distinctio rationis* est inter substantiam et aliquod ejus attributum, sine quo ipsa intelligi non potest, vel inter duo talia attributa ejusdem alicujus substantiae. Atque agnoscitur ex eo, quod non possumus claram et distinctam istius substantiae ideam formare, si ab ea illud attributum excludamus; uel non possumus unius ex ejusmodi attributis ideam clare percipere, si illud ab alio separemus."

including the rational one, may be said to be “real.” The *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* conceived as “real” is in fact something very close to a formal distinction. But Descartes’s terminology is wavering (he admits his confusion with the excuse that the messenger has to leave shortly with his letter): at first, he says the modal distinction perhaps better should be called ‘formal,’ and later he speaks of the rational distinction as equivalent to the formal distinction.⁷⁶ I think we may interpret this vacillation to mean that as soon as we move beyond a scholastic context, where each school has its own language (as Mastri said), terminology matters less; actual clarity of thought matters more. Descartes’s taxonomy of distinctions is a free adaptation of the most central tenet of the Formalist tradition.⁷⁷ Notably, besides this continuation of tradition, Descartes’s taxonomy also features elements peculiar to his own philosophy, such as the crucial role of clear and distinct perceptions and ideas.⁷⁸ The real distinction is interestingly illustrated by the perception of a thinking thing (*res cogitans*) of itself as distinct from any other thing (whether extended or thinking).⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Descartes, Letter to an unknown addressee from 1645 or 1646, *Correspondance* no. CDXVIII, AT vol. 4, 349–50: “Atque ideo dico quidem figuram et alios similes modos, distinguui proprie modaliter a substantia cuius sunt modi, sed inter alia attributa esse minorem distinctionem quae, nonnisi late usurpando nomen modi, vocari potest Modalis, [...] et melius forte dicetur Formalis; sed ad confusionem evitandam, in prima parte meae Philosophiae, articulo 60, in qua de ipsa expresse ago, illam voco distinctionem Rationis (nempe rationis Ratiocinatae); et quia nullam agnosco rationis Ratiocinantis, hoc est, quae non habeat fundamentum in rebus (neque enim quicquam possumus cogitare absque fundamento), idcirco in illo articulo verbum *Ratiocinatae* non addo. [...] Sic igitur pono tantum tres distinctiones: Realem, quae est inter duas substantias; Modalem, et Formalem, sive rationis ratiocinatae; quae tamen tres, si opponantur distinctioni rationis Ratiocinantis dici possunt Reales, et hoc sensu dici poterit essentia distinguui ab existentia.” In his *Primae responsiones* (reply to Caterus’s objections), AT vol. 7, 120, Descartes says there is no difference between the formal and the modal distinction.

⁷⁷ I should be clear that I am not here claiming that Descartes took over the taxonomy directly from one specific Formalist treatise; I am claiming instead that the Formalist tradition certainly is in the background of Descartes’s taxonomy.

⁷⁸ Note that in particular the Scoto-Lullist tradition stressed that distinctions are means for gaining “clarity” (*claritas*); see Andersen and Ramis Barceló, “Jaume Janer OCist,” 193–94; for further literature, see the contribution by Rafael Ramis Barceló in this present book. While it is difficult to tell whether this sub-tradition had any impact on Descartes, it is important to stress that the connection between *distinctio* and *claritas* was an established motif in at least one part of scholastic Formalism.

⁷⁹ Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, pars prima, n. 60, AT vol. 8, 28–29: “Itemque, ex hoc solo quod unusquisque intelligat se esse rem cogitantem, et possit cogitatione excludere a se ipso omnem aliam substantiam, tam cogitantem quam extensam, certum est unumquemque, sic spectatum, ab omni alia substantia cogitante atque ab omni substantia corporea realiter distinguui.”

In Cartesianism, Descartes's taxonomy of distinctions had a mixed fate. To name but two Cartesians, Johannes Clauberg (1622–1665) accepted it, including its hierarchical structure,⁸⁰ while Adriaan Heereboord (1613–1661) saw no need to assume a third kind of distinction between the real and the rational ones (the real one holds between objective concepts, the rational one between formal concepts, and there is no third kind of concepts – Heereboord thus reformulates the classical *tertium non datur* argument against the intentional and the formal distinctions and turns it against Descartes's modal distinction).⁸¹ Most interestingly, Baruch de Spinoza (1632–1677), another Cartesian voice, in his *Cogitata metaphysica* (an appendix to his exposition of Descartes's *Principia*), adopted Descartes's taxonomy in his explanation of divine simplicity: Since there are no distinct substances (real distinction) and no distinct modes (modal distinction) in God, there is no composition of such items in God, but rather only attributes without which God cannot exist, and these are distinct from God by a rational distinction only, i.e., in reality (*revera*) they are not distinct at all.⁸² This conception is confirmed in the *Ethica*, where the identity (*quod idem est*) between the infinitely many attributes and the divine substance, the one and only substance that exists, is highlighted,⁸³ albeit we now learn that among themselves the attributes are *realiter distincta*, simply due to their ability to be conceived independently from one another.⁸⁴ Read from a Formalist perspective, Spinoza's mon-

80 Clauberg, *Metaphysica de ente*, cap. 16, n. 266, *Opera omnia*, 327–28: “Distinctio maxima est inter duas res sive substantias, quae inde *realis* appellatur [...]. Distinctio media est inter rem et modum rei proprie dictum, vel inter duos modos ejusdem rei [...], quae inde *modalis*. Distinctio minima est inter rem et modum cogitandi seu attributum generaliter dictum [...], vel inter duo talia ejusdem rei attributa, quae rationis vocatur. Haec etiam *formaliter* distingui dicuntur, quoniam formales eorum rationes seu definitiones diversae sunt.” For an assessment of Clauberg's relationship to Scotism, see Gellera, “Univocity of Being.”

81 Heereboord, *Meletemata philosophica*, pars 2, cap. 29, ed. 1654, 287a: “Distinctio realis et rationis, prout a me explicantur, per conceptum alium atque alium, vel objectivum, vel formalem, opponuntur immediate, ac proinde non datur tertium genus distinctionis.” For Scotus on distinctions, Heereboord, *ibid.*, 287b, interestingly refers to the aforementioned Wilhelm Ursinus (who in his turn relied on Fonseca regarding this topic).

82 Spinoza, *Cogitata metaphysica*, pars 2, cap. 5, *Opera*, ed. Gebhardt, vol. 1, 257–59, here at 59: “Atque hinc jam clare possumus concludere, omnes distinctiones, quas inter Dei attributa facimus, non alias esse, quam rationis, nec illa revera inter se distingui: intellige tales rationis distinctiones, quales modo retuli, nempe quae ex eo cognoscuntur, quod talis substantia non possit sine illo attributo esse.”

83 Spinoza, *Ethica*, pars 1, propositio 5, demonstratio, *Opera*, ed. Gebhardt, vol. 2, 48. For a critical discussion of Spinoza's doctrine of distinctions, see Crane and Sandler, “Identity and Distinction in Spinoza's *Ethics*”; for a Scotist reading, see Proietti, “Distinzione formale.”

84 Spinoza, *Ethica*, pars 1, propositio 10, scholium, *Opera*, ed. Gebhardt, vol. 2, 52: “Ex his apparet, quod, quamvis duo attributa realiter distincta concipiantur, hoc est, unum sine ope

ism may be seen as a late confirmation of Petrus Thomae's insight that a weaker kind of distinction corresponds to a stronger kind of identity.

David Hume (1711–1776) had a particular interest in the rational distinction. In his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739), Hume tells us that this kind of distinction, “which is so much talk'd of, and is so little understood, in the schools,” is behind all abstract ideas: It is through repeated practice in the use of the rational distinction that we become accustomed to seeing as distinct what is “in effect the same and undistinguishable,” albeit the distinctions drawn have some basis in the “different resemblances and relations” found in things (Hume thus clearly has the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* in mind).⁸⁵ The notion of a rational distinction, explicitly taken over from *school* philosophy, is here unmistakably combined with a key theme of Hume's empiricist epistemology.⁸⁶ There is an important critical aspect to Hume's approach, since it is only through the scholastic tool of rational distinctions that ideas, really not distinct from sensual impressions, come about; *custom*, here clearly associated with scholastic practice, makes us blind (“renders us [...] unsensible”) to the empirical origin of theoretical constructs.⁸⁷ If need be, misguided distinctions can be corrected, or indeed “cut off.”⁸⁸ A scholastic motif is here being redirected against scholasticism.

A similarly critical, yet more subtle, appropriation of the scholastic discourse on distinctions may be found in Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Both in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and in his *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790), Kant employs the Latin terminology of *entia rationis ratiocinatae* and *entia rationis ratiocinantis*: ‘beings of the reasoned reason’ vs. ‘beings of the reasoning reason.’ Kant explains that “practical reason,” via necessary postulates, may provide some objective foundation for the first kind of beings of reason, which then work as “regulative ideas” (cases in point are ‘soul,’ ‘world,’ and ‘God’), but not for the latter ones, which he also calls “empty” beings of reason.⁸⁹ We are here at the heart of Kant's critical refurbishment of traditional meta-

alterius, non possumus tamen inde concludere, ipsa duo entia, sive duas diversas substantias constituere.”

⁸⁵ Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, book I, part 1, sect. 7, 24–25. For a critical discussion of Hume's view of this distinction, and various interpretations thereof, see Hoffman, “Hume on the Distinction of Reason.”

⁸⁶ Butler, “*Distinctiones rationis*,” 165, went so far as to call Hume's use of the rational distinction “the kingpin of his system”; indeed, there is, according to Butler, *ibid.*, 167, exactly a rational distinction between the subject matters of the two books of Hume's treatise, human understanding and the passions.

⁸⁷ Hume, *Treatise*, book I, part 1, sect. 7, 25.

⁸⁸ Hume, *Treatise*, book II, part 3, sect. 1, 399.

⁸⁹ Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Akademie-Ausgabe, vol. 3, 449/B709 (*ens rationis ratiocinatae*), and 442/B697–98 (*ens rationis ratiocinantis*); *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, § 91, Akademie-Ausgabe, vol. 5, 468.

physics. Kinds of distinctions are not in focus at this place, but the Latin terminology used is strongly reminiscent of the assumption, widely discussed throughout Early Modern scholasticism, of the two kinds of distinctions of reason already mentioned above, the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* and the *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*. At least from the early seventeenth century onwards, this terminology was applied to the doctrine of beings of reason. From the scholastic *Cursus philosophicus* literature it entered German *Schulmetaphysik*, from where Kant picked it up (it is found in the textbooks of metaphysics he used in his own teaching at Königsberg).⁹⁰ The two kinds of rational distinctions are, of course, usually associated with the Thomist tradition; they were not discussed only in Thomist theology but also in the Thomist Formalist literature of the sixteenth century. Moreover, though Scotist Formalism decided for the distinction of reason without a foundation in reality, the alternative of the two kinds of rational distinctions was already addressed in the earliest phase of this tradition. The distinction between the two rational distinctions thus holds its own place in the Formalist orbit.⁹¹ Formalism, clearly, is the remote, or enabling, source of Kant's Latin terminology.

As we have now seen, the answer to the question of where to find subtle scholastic distinctions, neatly ordered in hierarchies or otherwise, is: in Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, the whole Scotist tradition, in Protestant *Schulmetaphysik*, and in Early Modern philosophy. The Jesuit and Thomist traditions have at least been touched upon, and they are also treated in this book. In the preceding pages, I have not elaborated on normative distinctions, such as the one between right and wrong mentioned at the beginning of this introduction. To work out if and how the distinctions of the Formalist tradition, or the scholastic discourse on distinctions taken more broadly, might apply in this field would be an interesting challenge in itself.⁹² A similar challenge concerns the connection between the subjective and objective distinctions in the Formalist septenary and later discus-

⁹⁰ For this development, and references to sources, see Andersen, "The Doctrine of Beings of Reason," 319–21.

⁹¹ See Karlstadt, *Distinctiones Thomistarum*, 2v–3r; Manzoli, *Formalitates secundum viam Sancti Thome*, cap. 15, 48vb–49ra; Aquarius, *Formalitates iuxta doctrinam Angelici doctoris D. Thomae Aquinatis*, cap. 10 and 12, 19–21 and 23. For distinctions in Thomist theology, see Igor Agostini's article in the present book. Mastri, *Disp. Met.*, disp. 2, q. 9, art. 1, n. 249, ed. 1646, 246a, refers to the terminology of *ens rationis ratiocinatae* and *ens rationis ratiocinantis* as a Thomist tenet. For the alternative between two kinds of distinctions of reason in early Formalism, see the contributions by Apaoan Machado and myself to this present volume.

⁹² Notably, as mentioned in Daniel Novotný's contribution to the present volume, Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz included a *distinctio moralis* in his discussion of distinctions.

sions of subjectivity vs. objectivity, an ubiquitous dichotomy in present-day intellectual life, one that, on a terminological level, has roots in the Scotist dichotomy, advocated with great precision by Petrus Thomae, between subjective and objective being. This latter pair is also at the origin of the same author's differentiation between subjective and objective distinctions. In Petrus Thomae, objective being is being in the mind, whereas subjective being implies actual existence.⁹³ When and how the pair 'subjective' and 'objective' swapped meaning to fit the scheme of 'opinion' vs. 'fact,' and in particular what role Formalism played in that process, remains to be studied.

The individual articles of the volume have already been introduced, albeit only briefly, and need not be further discussed here. The volume is organized strictly chronologically in order to enable insight into the evolution of the scholastic discourse on distinctions from early Scotism up until its reception in Leibniz's monadology. This book, then, tells the story of the development of one particular aspect of the history of metaphysics. By doing so, it provides an important case for a much-needed revision of the relationship between "Medieval" and "Early Modern" philosophy – these categories are too often used to signal some fundamental divide in intellectual history, where in fact there was continuity.

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⁹³ For subjective and objective being and / or distinctions, see the contributions by Vitaly Ivanov and myself to this present volume.

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I. The Fourteenth Century

Francis of Meyronnes and Petrus Thomae on the “Less Realist” Interpretation of the Formal Distinction

Garrett R. Smith

Introduction

The second decade of the fourteenth century saw an intensifying debate over the formal distinction. There was criticism emanating from thinkers outside the Franciscan order, and, due to Scotus’s own shifting terminology, competing interpretations of the formal distinction and the related notions of formalities, realities and modes proliferated among the Scotists within the Franciscan order. Scholars have identified two interpretations of the formal distinction, which Stephen Dumont described as the “less realist” and the “more realist.”¹ The less realist position denies that there is a plurality of formalities in God and that formal distinction is equivalent to formal non-identity. The more realist position is the opposite of this.

One of the most prominent defenders of the more realist interpretation was Francis of Meyronnes. He lectured on the *Sentences* at Paris in 1320–1321, during which time he engaged in debates with the Benedictine Thomist Pierre Roger (the future pope Clement VI) over the application of the formal distinction to the Trinity.² In these lectures on the *Sentences* Francis also examined the views of his fellow Scotists and subjected them to criticism. One of several positions he rejected has been an object of scholarly interest since the fifteenth century, and indeed it is the “less realist” interpretation of the formal distinction mentioned already. The position, whose adherents Francis identifies only as “aliqui” in his *Conflatus*, consists of two points: first, that there are not many formalities in one simple object, and sec-

I wish to thank Claus A. Andersen for his extensive comments on a prior draft, and Jacopo Lohs for comments as well.

1 Dumont, “Duns Scotus’s Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction,” 9–12; see also Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity*, 129–61, 166–72; Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine*, 185–86. Note that differing evaluations of Scotus’s doctrines are due in part to differing assumptions about the chronology of his works; on this point, see Dumont, “Duns Scotus’s Parisian Question,” 8, footnote 2.

2 François de Meyronnes – Pierre Roger, *Disputatio* (1320–1321), ed. Barbet. See Barbet, “Un témoin de la discussion”; Ruello, “La notion ‘thomiste’ de ‘ratio in divinis’ dans la Disputatio”; Roßmann, *Die Hierarchie der Welt*, 346–64; Roßmann, “Die Sentenzenkommentare des Franz von Meyronnes OFM,” 140–65; Möhle, *Formalitas und modus intrinsecus*, 63–66; Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine*, 52–53.

ond, that instead of using the term ‘distinct’ to refer to the distinction between the formalities or conceding that there are many formalities in God, one should describe the formalities as ‘not the same’ and refer the non-identity not to the extremes, that is, to the formalities, but to their composition.³ This second point is a reference to Scotus’s treatment of the formal distinction in the Oxonian *Ordinatio*, where he says that it is preferable to use the phrase ‘formally non-identical’ instead of ‘formally distinct.’⁴ We can summarize the two points that Francis of Meyronnes is reporting as (1) that there is only one formality in God, and (2) that formal distinction is not equivalent to formal non-identity.

The identity of the *aliqui* who hold the less realist interpretation of the formal distinction has inspired speculation ever since Francis’s *Conflatus* began to circulate. Some manuscripts ascribe the position to Duns Scotus,⁵ others to Petrus Thomae and Landolfus Caracciolus.⁶ The same names are mentioned in some anonymous commentaries on the *Conflatus*.⁷ The reason for the variety of attribu-

3 Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus*, prol., q. 1, ed. Möhle and Hofmeister Pich, 80: “Sed tamen aliqui dicunt quod propter hoc non debet poni quod sint plures formalitates, nec debet concedi distinctio, sed debet dici quod sunt non-idem, referendo istam non-identitatem non ad extrema sed magis ad compositionem extremorum.” My punctuation.

4 Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 2, pars 2, qq. 1–4, nn. 404–5, ed. Vat. 2, 357.

5 Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus*, prol., q. 1, in Cambridge, Peterhouse Library, Ms. 105, 2va, in marg.: “opinio Scoti”; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Cod. lat. 15871, 2rb, in marg.: “videtur esse opinio Scoti in Primo distinctione 2 quaestione 4.”

6 Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, Ms. 149, 2ra, in marg.: “ut fuit Petri Thome”; München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 8854, 3va, in marg.: “Petrus Thome et Landulfus qui fundant se super quoddam dictum Scoti qui dixit quod inter *a* et *b* non est distinctio sed non-identitas.”

7 Anonymus, *Commentarius 1 super Conflatum*, Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, I 148 inf., 56ra; Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 2143, 107rb: “Sed aliqui dicunt. Isti sunt aliqui Scotistae, sicut Landulfus et Petrus Thome, qui moti fuerunt ad hoc dicendum propter dictum Scoti distinctione 2^a quaestione ultima quando dicit ‘numquam[numquid M] debet concedi aliqua distinctio’ etc., isti dicunt in divinis unam formalitatem tantum et non plures distinctas, ita quod non admittunt aliqua[m] distinctionem ex natura rei in divinis, excepta personarum distinctione, sed bene ponunt non-identitatem, quae minus dicit quam distinctio. Vide Scotum ubi dictum est.” Anonymus, *Commentarius 2 super Conflatum*, Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, Ms. 295, 5v–6ra: “Sed tamen aliqui dicunt quod ibi non debent poni plures formalitates. Iste fuit Petrus Thomae, qui duo dixit. Primum quod in Deo est tantum una formalitas essentiae et relationis. Secundum quod non debet concedi ista ‘essentia est distincta a paternitate’, quia ad istas sequitur pluralitas formalitatum. Sed conceditur ista ‘essentia non est idem formaliter paternitati’. Fundavit autem se super dictum Scoti in secunda distinctione quaestione 3^a, dicentis quod melius est concedere non-identitatem quam distinctionem, nec sequitur ‘non sunt idem formaliter, ergo distinguuntur formaliter’. Ex hoc eliciebat ille quod ibi non erant plures formalitates, quia tunc essent distinctae sed tantum una, nec sequitur ‘essentia non est eadem formaliter paternitati, igitur est ab ea formaliter distincta.’” Anonymus, *Commentarius 3 super Conflatum*, Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, Ms. 555, 90r: “Ideo dixit doctor quod propter distinctionem ex natura rei non debet poni distinctio inter plures formalitates essentiales. Non oportet poni distinctio, sed

tion is that there were numerous adherents to the less realist position. To date I have found the basic position in the writings of William of Alnwick,⁸ Thomas Wylton,⁹ Henry of Harclay,¹⁰ John of Reading,¹¹ Peter of Navarre,¹² Landolfus

quod sunt non-idem, quia omnino sequitur ista 'sunt non-idem, ergo distinguuntur', quoniam in plus se habet non-identitas quam distinctio. Illud arguitur a communiori ad minus commune 2^a (?) distinctione. Antecedens probatur probatione doctoris subtilis et Landulphi primo Sententiarum [...]."

8 Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quodlibet*, q. 2, ed. Ledoux, 237–38: "[...] non igitur attributa in Deo distinguuntur formaliter, et hanc puto fuisse intentionem Iohannis Dons, L. I, d. 15 et q. 2, in *Lectura Parisiensis*, ubi dicit quod haec 'sapientia est formaliter bonitas' est distinguenda, prout ly 'formaliter' determinat compositionem, et sic est falsa, quia bonitas non est de formali ratione sapientiae, vel prout determinat extremum compositionis, et sic est vera, quia sapientia est formalitas bonitatis, ex quo patet quod sunt una formalitas. Dico igitur quantum ad istum articulum quod perfectiones simpliciter in Deo non distinguuntur formaliter." My punctuation. See also *ibid.*, 232, cited by Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine*, 191.

9 Nielsen, Noone, and Trifogli, "Thomas Wylton's Question," 374: "Concedo quod tantum una formalitas sit in Deo ex parte rei simpliciter et absolute loquendo, quia ex quo quaelibet formalitas est indivisa simpliciter loquendo ex parte rei ab alia, sequitur quod non sunt ibi multae formalitates ex parte rei loquendo de multitudine absolute dicta, quae divisionem dicit simpliciter in re in qua ponitur, et per consequens tantum est ibi una formalitas ex natura rei simpliciter loquendo." The position was also ascribed to Wylton later by Jacques de Pamiers; see Iacobus de Appamiis, *Quodlibet*, q. IIa1.VI, Bordeaux, Bibliothèque municipale, Ms. 167, 101rb ("Thomas Anglicus" in *marg.*): "Quantum ad vi articulum dicunt quidam expositores formalitatum quod distinctio formalis dicitur 'formalis ex natura rei' secundum quod li 'formaliter' est determinatio compositionis, non quia ponat duo extrema ex natura rei formaliter distincta sive aliam et aliam formalitatem habentia, sed quia secundum quod li 'formaliter' est determinatio compositionis et non extremorum, non ponit omnem modum identitatis, nec secundum hoc sit talis sensus 'essentia et relatio non sunt formaliter idem', id est non sint omnibus modis idem, quia se essent idem omnibus modis esse, ut idem definitive et in primo modo dicendi per se, et quod est falsum, quia unum non est de primo modo dicendi per se alterius, nec sicut tota definitio nec sicut pars definitionis."

10 Henricus de Harclay, *Quaestiones ordinariae*, q. 5, n. 43, ed. Henninger, 222: "Dico igitur breviter quod essentia et relatio sunt una res simplex et unus modus et una formalitas, non tamen sunt formaliter eadem, hoc est, non illo modo eadem quo modo essentia est eadem sibi ipsi; et hoc continget totum ex natura rei, non autem ex opere intellectus nostri."

11 Ioannes de Radingia, *Scriptum in I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 5, ed. Fiorentino, 259.

12 Dumont, "Duns Scotus's Parisian Question," 10, footnote 8 refers to Petrus de Navarra sive de Atarrabia, *Sent.* I, dist. 35, q. 1, n. 16, ed. Sagüés Azcona, vol. 2, 794–95, where Peter denies a plurality of formalities. See also *Sent.* I, dist. 33, q. 1, nn. 26–27, ed. Sagüés Azcona, vol. 2, 772: "[...] dico quod relatio non est idem formaliter essentiae, non ita quod ly 'formaliter' determinet subiectum et praedicatum, ut sit sensus quod essentia et relatio distinguuntur sicut formalitas et formalitas, sed ita quod ly 'formaliter' determinet compositionem praedicati et subiecti, quia non-idem formaliter est esse non-idem per se primo; modus autem 'per se' non est nisi in propositionibus. [...] Unde sic arguere: 'sunt non-idem formaliter, ergo sunt diversa formaliter', est facere fallaciam consequentis, procedendo ab eo quod habet plures causas veritatis ad unam illarum."

Caracciolus,¹³ Peter of Aquila,¹⁴ Nicholas Bonetus,¹⁵ and Walter Chatton.¹⁶ John Bassols, who may have known Scotus at Paris, described the less realist view as the common opinion, though he did not ultimately endorse it himself.¹⁷ Hugo de

The views of both Peter of Navarre and Petrus Thomae were reported by Matthias Döring in 1422. See Matthias Döring, *In Sent.* I, dist. 33, München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 8997, 60r: “Aliter respondent subtiles credentes se scotizare, scilicet Petrus Thomae et Petrus de Ravenna, dicentes quod illa non-identitas non denominat extrema sed compositionem, ut cum dicitur ‘relatio distingui formaliter ab essentia’, non denotatur quod alia sit formalitas relationis, alia essentiae, sed denotatur quod haec praedicatio non est de praedicato perseitatis ‘relatio est essentia’. Ideo per ‘non-idem’ vel ‘distinctum formaliter’ et ‘non praedicari in primo modo per se’ pro eodem sumunt. Et ratio illorum potest esse talis, quia primus modus perseitatis non est essendi sed distinguendi.” This text was previously noted by Meier, “Der Sentenzenkommentar des Matthias Doering,” 89. Meier also cites this text in “De Schola Franciscana Erfordiensis Saeculi XV,” 65, where he confessed himself unable to find previous mention of Peter of Ravenna and held him to be an unknown Scotist. But that he is Peter of Navarre is clear from the text quoted above. Petrus Thomae cited Peter of Navarre as “Petrus de Atarrabia” in *Quaestiones de modis distinctionum*, q. 2; unsurprisingly, the word ‘Atarrabia’ has many variant readings, including ‘Ravenna’ in Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, Ms. 659, 45v.

13 Caracciolus at least denies the inference from formal non-identity to formal distinction. Landulfus Caracciolus, *Sent.* I, dist. 2, pars 4, q. 4, Bologna, Biblioteca del Collegio di Spagna, Ms. 46, 42ra: “Quarta conclusio quod posito quod paternitas et essentia non sunt idem formaliter, non tamen sequitur quod sint distincta formaliter. Intellego enim quod paternitas et essentia non sunt quaedam extrema non-identitatis seu distinctionis formalis, sed tantum quod sit una et eadem res non omnibus modis idem. Unde paternitas est eadem res quod essentia sed non omnibus modis essendi idem. Numquid sequitur ‘paternitas et essentia sunt non-idem formaliter, ergo sunt distincta formaliter’, quod sequitur ex X *Metaphysicae*: omne ens comparatum ad aliud aut est idem aut diversum. Hic est enim locus a contrariis immediatis. Respondeo tripliciter: declaro quod non sequatur primo per responsionem Doctoris Subtilis dicentis quod non oportet sequi, quia ‘formalitas’ in antecedente negatur et in consequente affirmatur.”

14 Petrus de Aquila, *Sent.* I, dist. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ed. Venice 1501, 31ra: “Alia est opinio verior quam sequor quod inter attributa divina est aliqua non-idemptitas sive distinctio ex natura rei, circumscripto omni opere et actu intellectus, et potest ista distinctio vocari ‘modalis’ vel ‘formalis’. Non tamen intellego istam distinctionem per positionem, sed per abnegationem, in quantum hoc formaliter non est illud. Ideo Doctor noster dicit quod melius est uti illa negativa ‘non-idem’ quam ‘distinctum’.”

15 Nicolaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III (the Venice edition of 1505 has an error, see instead Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. lat. 6678, 46v): “Et si queras utrum sequatur ‘sunt non-idem formaliter, ergo distincta formaliter’, dicitur quod non, quia non-ydemptitas est in plus quam distinctio, quia distinctio requirit extrema positiva, non autem non-ydemptitas, quia homo est non-idem formaliter cum non-ente, non tamen distinctum, omne enim quod est ab altero distinctum est non-idem cum illo, non tamen e converso.”

16 Walter Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 2, q. 3, nn. 111–13, ed. Etzkorn-Wey, 311–12. Cited by Dumont, “Duns Scotus’s Parisian Question,” 11.

17 Ioannes de Bassolis, *Sent.* I, dist. 22, q. 4, ed. Paris 1517, 142ra: “[...] communiter omnes et theologi et philosophi ponunt in Deo unam formalitatem et unam actualitatem.” For his

Novocastro likewise held the more realist position.¹⁸ This essay shall focus on Francis of Meyronnes and Petrus Thomae. Petrus Thomae, I shall show, does maintain both points of the less realist position described by Francis of Meyronnes. Moreover, Peter had access to and criticized the earliest version of Francis's commentary on the *Sentences*. This leaves us with the beginning of a debate between the two most influential theorists of the formal distinction, Petrus Thomae and Francis of Meyronnes.¹⁹ In what follows, I will treat first the background of the issue in the works of John Duns Scotus, followed by a discussion of Francis's earliest commentary on the *Sentences*, turning to the critique by Petrus Thomae, and closing with an account of Francis's final commentary, the *Conflatus*.

1. Background in Duns Scotus

There are two issues at stake at present, whether there are a plurality of formalities in God, and whether formal non-identity and formal distinction are equivalent. Regarding the first, to my knowledge Scotus does not hold in his primary works that there is only one formality in God. There is a statement to this effect in the *Additiones* II, namely that there is one formality *a parte rei*, that is, apart

own view, see his *Sent.* I, dist. 33, q. 1, ad arg. 4, ed. Paris 1517, 182vb–83ra: "Nota quod quando dicitur in tota quaestione quod aliquorum formaliter distinctorum est una realitas, non est intelligendum sic quod realitas sit aliquid unum substitutum omnibus formalitatibus, sed pro tanto quia licet talis formaliter distinguuntur, non tamen realiter, eo modo quo expositum est supra. Et ideo dicitur una realitas, non tamen una formalitas, licet realitas cuiuslibet formalitatis sit penitus eadem illi, et sic recte numeretur realitas sicut et formalitas, et sint eadem realiter et distinguantur formaliter ab alia realitate, sicut formalitas a formalitate." For biographical details of Bassols, see Courtenay, "Early Scotists at Paris," 201.

¹⁸ But note that Hugo does not explicitly treat the inference we are discussing here. Cf. Hugo de Novocastro, *Sent.* I, dist. 22, q. 3, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. lat. 15864, 29va: "Vel satis potest concedi quod formaliter distinguuntur, et illud concordat dictis antiquorum dicentium quod illa quae sunt in Deo distinguuntur, sic quod unum non est formaliter alterum, licet convenient identitate, unde dicebant quod sunt idem per ydemptitatem non secundum formalitatem [...] dico quod 'reale' potest accipit dupliciter: uno modo pro omni eo quod est extra intellectum, et sic dico quod ista distinctio est realis, quia est rationis et rationis formaliter distinctarum extra intellectum, vel modi et modi vel formalitatis et formalitatis."

¹⁹ That they are the most important is evident from the surviving manuscript copies of their works, especially the adaptations into *Formalitates*-treatises. Regarding these adaptations, see Smith, "An Inventory of Unprinted Treatises on the Formalities from the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," (forthcoming). For manuscripts of Petrus Thomae's treatises on distinctions, see Smith, "Bibliotheca manuscripta Petri Thomae," 161–200. For works of Francis of Meyronnes, see Roßmann's articles "Die Sentenzenkommentare" and "Die *Quodlibeta* und verschiedene sonstige Schriften des Franz von Meyronnes OFM." For discussion of the philosophical reception of their views, see Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine*, 210–17; Schabel and Duba, "Ni chose, ni non-chose"; Andersen, "Introduction," 177–271.

from any consideration of the intellect, but the authors, Scotus and William of Alnwick, immediately go on to state that there are many formally distinct perfections in God.²⁰ So it is at least clear that Francis does not have Duns Scotus in mind when describing the position of the *Aliqui*, nor are the *Aliqui* following Scotus on this point.

On the second point, Scotus employed in the Oxonian *Lectura* the positive description “formal distinction” when speaking of the distinction of the divine attributes or of the personal properties of the Trinity and the divine essence.²¹ But in the *Ordinatio* he argued that it is better to use the negative description ‘not formally the same’ than to say that ‘such and such are distinct.’²² Considering the formal consequence ‘*a* and *b* are formally not the same, therefore they are formally distinct,’ where the variable ‘*a*’ signifies the divine essence and the variable ‘*b*’ the personal property of paternity, Scotus denies that the inference is valid. The reason for this denial, he says, is that a formality (*formalitas*) is denied in the antecedent but affirmed in the consequent. This does not make a whole lot of sense on the surface, for the consequence is not about formalities, but rather the adverb ‘formaliter’ is modifying the terms ‘non-idem’ and ‘distinctum.’ So it seems that the inference fails because the term ‘formaliter’ is denied in the antecedent but affirmed in the consequent. Also worthy of note

20 Duns Scotus-Guillemus de Alnwick, *Additiones* II, dist. 24, q. 1, nn. 27–28, ed. Goris-Smith-De Pascalis (forthcoming). On the joint authorship of this text, see the introduction to the forthcoming critical edition.

21 Duns Scotus, *Lect.* I, dist. 2, pars 2, qq. 1–4, n. 272, ed. Vat. 16, 215: “Unde est differentia virtualis, quia unum non est res alia ab alio, sed est in eo perfecte idem sibi, distinguitur tamen formalis ratio unius a formali ratione alterius.” Idem, *Lect.* I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 4, n. 176, ed. Vat. 17, 63: “Sunt igitur diversae rationes formaliter, et etiam ante actum intellectus, quia quaelibet [...] est ex natura rei, et tamen una non est formaliter alia; et hoc simul, sine compositione.” Contrast the sentiment in the following text with the text of the *Ordinatio* cited below: *Lect.* I, dist. 2, pars 2, qq. 1–4, n. 275, ed. Vat. 16, 217: “Et haec differentia potest dici virtualis quia deitas virtualiter continet paternitatem, et tamen ratio formalis unius non est ratio formalis alterius ante omnem operationem intellectus. Qui igitur potest capere, capiat, quia sic esse intellectus meus non dubitat.” For discussion of Scotus’s early theory of the formal distinction, see Wengert, “The Development of the Doctrine of the Formal Distinction in the ‘Lectura Prima’.”

22 Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 2, pars 2, qq. 1–4, nn. 404–5, ed. Vat. 2, 357: “Numquid igitur debet concedi aliqua distinctio? Melius est uti ista negativa ‘hoc non est formaliter idem’, quam ‘hoc est sic et sic distinctum’. Sed nonne sequitur, ‘*a* et *b* non sunt idem formaliter, ergo sunt formaliter distincta’? Respondeo quod non oportet sequi, quia ‘formaliter’ [formaliter = Dumont; formalitas = ed./codd.] in antecedente negatur, et in consequente affirmatur.” Stephen Dumont proposed the emendation from ‘formalitas’ in the text of the *Ordinatio* to ‘formaliter’, as can be seen in the immediately preceding footnote. See Dumont, “Duns Scotus’s Parisian Question,” 28. On this emendation, see also Smith, “Gerard of Bologna’s Critique of the Formal Distinction,” footnote 22.

about this passage in Scotus’s *Ordinatio* is that both variables are on the same side of the copula. This is the Oxonian position of Scotus.

At Paris, Scotus faced enough criticism over the formal distinction that he disputed a question on the topic, which we possess today under the names *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, *Quaestio logicalis*, or *Logica Scoti*.²³ This work contains Scotus’s answers to both of the issues now under consideration, namely, whether there is a plurality of formalities in God, and whether formal non-identity is equivalent to or convertible with formal distinction. A large section of this text is devoted to the analysis of six propositions:

- P1: *a non est formaliter b* (*a non est formaliter idem b*) (Scotus concedes)
- P2: *a et b non sunt formaliter eadem* (Scotus accepts it is convertible with P1, sane intellectum)
- P3: *deitas est formaliter distincta a paternitate* (Scotus concedes second interpretation)
- P4: *deitas et paternitas sunt formaliter distinctae* (Scotus concedes second interpretation)
- P5: *a habet distinctam formalitatem a formalitate b/formalitas a est distincta a formalitate b* (Scotus denies)
- P6: *a et b habent distinctas formalitates/formalitas a et formalitas b sunt duae, sive distinctae, formalitates* (Scotus denies, but concedes ‘*formalitas a est distincta formaliter a formalitate b*’)

In his analysis of propositions 3 and 4, Scotus revisits the inference he had denied in the *Ordinatio*. In the *Quaestio de formalitatibus* he says that these propositions admit of two meanings or interpretations. According to the first, the mode which is implied by the word ‘formaliter’ is affirmed of the word ‘distinctum’ which is a determinable. According to the second, the word ‘distinctum’ contains a negation which negates the mode implied by the word ‘formaliter’.²⁴ Scotus concedes that on the second interpretation, the propositions ‘*a* is not formally the same as *b*’ and ‘*a* is formally distinct from *b*’ are convertible. The propositions are not convertible, however, considered under the first interpreta-

23 For this text, see Emery, Jr. and Smith, “The *Quaestio de formalitatibus* by John Duns Scotus.” On Scotus’s Parisian critics, see Dumont, “Scotus’s Parisian Question,” 17–22; Smith, “Gerard of Bologna’s Critique of the Formal Distinction.”

24 Duns Scotus, *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, ed. Emery and Smith, 156: “Propositionum istarum utraque est minus determinata ad unum intellectum quam illae negativae, nam ista quae minus videtur posse habere diversos intellectus, scilicet ‘*deitas est formaliter distincta a paternitate*’, videtur posse habere duplicem intellectum: unum quod modus importatus per ly ‘*formaliter*’ affirmetur circa istud determinabile quod est ‘*distinctum*’, sicut affirmatur in ista ‘*hoc est formaliter idem isti*’ circa istud determinabile quod est ‘*idem*’; alius intellectus posset haberi quod negatio inclusa in hoc quod est ‘*distinctum*’ neget modum importatum per hoc quod est ‘*formaliter*’.” For commentary on this text, see Dumont, “Scotus’s Parisian Question,” 31–32.

tion. The reason for the denial is roughly the same as in the *Ordinatio*: the inference from formal non-identity to formal distinction is a fallacy of the consequent, since in the antecedent the predicate is denied, a predicate which is composed of a determination and a determinable, whereas in the consequent the determination is affirmed of a negated determinable.²⁵ The inference then is equivalent to saying ‘man is not necessarily risible, therefore man is necessarily non-risibile.’ Another explanation that Scotus offers in favor of the second interpretation is that the term ‘formaliter’ is a *determinatio distrahens*, which restricts or diminishes the meaning of the term ‘distinctum’ from the status of an absolute distinction to a qualified distinction.²⁶ In a summary of the section of the *Quaestio de formalitatibus* that analyzes these propositions, Scotus adds that he will concede the proposition ‘formality *a* is distinct from formality *b*’ only if one adds the modifier ‘formaliter,’ yielding the sentence ‘formality *a* is formally distinct from formality *b*.’²⁷

At Paris, then, at the end of his career, Scotus is willing to concede the inference from formal non-identity to formal distinction, as long as the notion of distinction is being qualified by the word ‘formaliter,’ which diminishes the distinction. Scotus is also willing to grant that there are multiple formalities in God, as long as these formalities are formally distinct. Scotus’s final position is thus contrary to both aspects of the less realist interpretation of the formal distinction.

What might account for the rise of the less realist position? Scotus’s *Quaestio de formalitatibus* enjoyed only a limited reception according to the current

25 Duns Scotus, *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, ed. Emery and Smith, 156: “Si autem tantum primus intellectus possit haberi, tunc non sequitur ‘non est idem formaliter, igitur est distinctum formaliter’, sed est fallacia consequentis, quia in antecedente negatur praedicatum compositum ex determinabili et determinatione, et verificatur ratione negationis illius determinationis. In consequente vero affirmatur ista determinatio circa determinabile negatum, sicut nec tenet ista consequentia ‘homo non est necessario albus, igitur est necessario non-albus’, et in multis aliis [...]”. See Dumont, “Scotus’s Parisian Question,” 32.

26 Duns Scotus, *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, ed. Emery and Smith, 159: “Isto modo intelligendo hoc totum quod est ‘formaliter distinctum’, ‘formaliter’ est determinatio diminuens a distinctione, sicut et hoc ‘non-idem formaliter’ diminuit a non-identitate, ita quod sicut formaliter non sequitur ‘sunt non eadem formaliter, igitur sunt non eadem’, sed est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, ita non sequitur ‘sunt distincta formaliter, igitur sunt distincta’, sed est consimilis defectus.” On absolute and qualified distinctions, see Duns Scotus, *Reportatio I-A*, dist. 33, q. 2, ed. Wolter and Bychkov, vol. 2, 327–32. For literature on these two kinds of distinctions, see Smith, “Gerard of Bologna’s Critique of the Formal Distinction,” footnote 33.

27 Duns Scotus, *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, ed. Emery and Smith, 166: “Recolligendo igitur a primo istius articuli, qui hucusque consistit in hoc quod est ponere vel distinctionem cum hoc quod est ‘formaliter’ vel ‘formalitas’ [...]. Tertia propositio, scilicet quod ‘formalitas *a* est distincta a formalitate *b*’, simpliciter est neganda et praecise concedenda cum ista determinatione ‘formalitas *a* est distincta formaliter a formalitate *b*’.”

state of research.²⁸ Interestingly, neither Francis of Meyronnes nor Petrus Thomae make explicit use of the *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, although, as we shall see, they discuss an inference that is found only in that work of Scotus. And as is clear, Scotus left a variety of texts about the formal distinction, so the problem arises of how to explain his conflicting accounts. One possibility, common in modern scholarship, is to discern a development in Scotus’s thought. Thus, if we assume the chronology among Scotus’s various treatments of the formal distinction (as applied to God) to be: *Lectura I* – *Ordinatio I* – *Reportatio I* – *Quaestio de formalitatibus* (with an editorial pass over *Ordinatio I* to update it with notes and “extra” annotations between *Reportatio I* and his death), then Scotus first posits a plurality of formalities in God (*Lectura*), then states that there are problems with inferring formal distinction from formal non-identity (*Ordinatio*), thoroughly revises his account by adding the language of the *distinctio simpliciter* and the four conditions it requires (*Reportatio*), before conceding finally that the inference from formal non-identity to formal distinction is valid under certain conditions (*Quaestio de formalitatibus*). But another possibility is that Scotus intended one of these texts to be the definitive one. This could be the *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, but the case could also be made for the *Ordinatio*: the text of the *Ordinatio* has been revised by various annotations and inserted material from Scotus’s Parisian lectures, and excerpts or summaries composed of the Parisian lectures for insertion into the *Ordinatio* (*Additiones I* and probably *Additiones II* as well).²⁹ Thus the early followers of Scotus might have been inclined to hold the *Ordinatio*-account as normative. As we will see below, Petrus Thomae, at least, had access to both the Oxonian and Parisian teachings of Scotus, but adopted the former as his own.

2. Francis of Meyronnes I: *Ab oriente*, I dist. 8

Francis of Meyronnes was one of the most influential theorists of identity and distinction. There are numerous manuscripts bearing texts with titles such as ‘Tractatus de formalitatibus’ ascribed to him. His reflections on the formal distinction are to be found primarily in his commentaries on the *Sentences*, of

²⁸ Cf. Dumont, “Scotus’s Parisian Question,” 17–22, 52–53, who notes references by Walter Chatton, Adam Wodeham, and William of Alnwick. There is also an anonymous question surviving in Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, Cod. 295, that links Scotus’s discussion of the inference in the *Ordinatio* to the text in the *Quaestio de formalitatibus* and relates Alnwick’s criticism of the latter text. On the anonymous defense in Padova 295, see Smith, “William of Alnwick’s Critique of the *Quaestio de formalitatibus*.”

²⁹ For book I, see Dumont, “John Duns Scotus’s *Reportatio Parisiensis Examinata*”; for book II, see the forthcoming critical edition of *Additiones II*.

which there are three: called *Ab oriente*, *Summa simplicitas*, and *Conflatus*.³⁰ According to their colophons, all three are somehow related to Francis's lectures at Paris around 1320–21; the *Summa simplicitas* is described as a *reportatio*, as is the *Conflatus*, but the *Conflatus* also incorporates text from the *Summa simplicitas* verbatim. The *Conflatus* was thus compiled later based on previously existing materials. Distinction 8 from the earliest commentary, *Ab oriente*, circulated separately as a treatise on formalities. Petrus Thomae responded to either the *Ab oriente* itself or the excerpted distinction 8.

The topic of the sole question in Francis's *Ab oriente* I distinction 8 is whether a plurality of formalities is compatible with divine simplicity.³¹ He begins with a series of articles defining the basic terms, namely *formalitas*, *forma*, and *formale*, among others. According to Francis, after rejecting several definitions of a formality, a *formalitas* is a "quiddity of whatever has a quiddity, whether it is definable or not definable."³² The qualification concerning definability is necessary if one wants the term to be applied to God: God does not admit of a definition, nor does anything in God, such as a perfection, admit of a definition. The reason for this is clear enough, for definitions entail the assignment of genus and difference, and hence they are contrary to divine simplicity. Now, a quiddity is "whatever is per se and primarily conceived by an intellect," in other words, the definition or what pertains to the definition.³³ Turning to the notion of form, after rejecting some possible definitions based on the notion of act and actualization, Francis settles on describing it as a perfection that is made to depend on something else in the genus of material cause. The notion of dependence here is that of inherence, to be in something else, to which Francis unclearly connects the notion that matter is defined through its opposite.³⁴ Now,

30 Roßmann, "Die Sentenzenkommentare"; Roth, *Franz von Mayronis O.F.M.*, 87–161; Fiorentino, *Francesco di Meyronnes*, 22–30; Hannes Möhle, *Formalitas und modus intrinsecus*, 29–41.

31 See Franciscus de Mayronis, *In Sent. I* ('ab oriente'), dist. 8, q. un. The text of this distinction is unedited and largely unstudied, save for what Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine*, 200–1, transcribed. In what follows I take the text from Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 896, and Tortosa, Archivo de la Catedral, Cod. 155.

32 Franciscus de Mayronis, *In Sent. I* ('ab oriente'), dist. 8, q. un., pars 1, art. 1, Vat. lat. 896, 59r; Tortosa 155, 7rb: "Ideo dico quod formalitas est quidditas cuiuslibet quidditatem habentis, sive definibilem sive non-definibilem."

33 Franciscus de Mayronis, *In Sent. I* ('ab oriente'), dist. 8, q. un., pars 1, art. 2, Vat. lat. 896, 59r; Tortosa 155, 67va: "Ideo dico quod quidditas est omne per se primo conceptibile ab intellectu, quia caetera, quae quidditatem non dicunt, per ipsam et non per se et ex consequenti aut secundario et non primo concipiuntur."

34 Franciscus de Mayronis, *In Sent. I* ('ab oriente'), dist. 8, q. un., pars 1, art. 3, Vat. lat. 896, 59r; Tortosa 155, 67va: "Ideo dico quod forma est perfectio quae est nata dependere ab aliquo in genere causae materialis, quae quidem dependentia dicitur inhaerentia, quia materia per oppositum definitur."

we might wonder what the difference is between a form and a formality. According to Francis there are two differences. The first difference is that there is a real distinction between a form and that of which it is the form, namely, the matter. The reason for this is that matter is the cause of form, and there is a real distinction between a cause and an effect. But this is not the case for a formality. The second difference is that a form can be corrupted, with that which it is the form of not being corrupted, a condition which does not apply to a formality. The reason for this is that in the case of matter and form, there is a real distinction and an essential order of prior and posterior; but again, such is not the case for a formality.³⁵

Francis defines the terms 'formale' and 'formaliter' together. The term 'formale' means whatever pertains to the formal and quidditative aspect of something.³⁶ Francis switches from the word 'formale' to 'formaliter', noting that we use the term for a variety of cases: the divine essence is formally every unqualified perfection, the attributes of being inhere formally in the *ratio* of being, and the intellect and will are said to be formally understanding and willing. Francis then abandons the initial definition, and leaves us with an equivocal use of 'formaliter.' According to Francis, the term is used in four ways: as it is defined against the term 'really,' such as when we say that the divine essence is really a relative property but not formally such, or, second, 'formally' can be distinguished against 'esse,' which is not part of the quiddity of something, or 'formally' can be distinguished against 'virtually,' or it can be distinguished against 'materially.'³⁷

35 Franciscus de Mayronis, *In Sent.* I ('ab oriente'), dist. 8, q. un., pars 1, art. 3, Vat. lat. 896, 59r; Tortosa 155, 67va-vb: "Ex quo sequitur prima differentia inter formalitatem et formam, quia omnis forma differt realiter ab eo cuius est forma, cum ab ipso causetur materialiter, et inter effectum semper sit realis distinctio; formalitas autem non differt realiter, quia non dependet ab eo cuius est formalitas. Secundo[ita V] quod omnis forma potest corrumpi, remanente eo cuius est forma, sed non formalitas, quia in essentialiter ordinatis prius potest fieri sine posteriori, ubi est realis distinctio, et non est ubi est realis identitas."

36 Franciscus de Mayronis, *In Sent.* I ('ab oriente'), dist. 8, q. un., pars 1, art. 4, Vat. lat. 896, 59r; Tortosa 155, 67vb: "Et dicitur quod formale est illud alicui quod pertinet ad rationem eius formalem et quidditativam."

37 Franciscus de Mayronis, *In Sent.* I ('ab oriente'), dist. 8, q. un., pars 1, art. 4, Vat. lat. 896, 59r; Tortosa 155, 67vb: "Ideo dico quod quattuor modis dicitur aliquid formaliter de alio: aut prout 'formaliter' distinguitur contra realiter, quo modo dicimus quod essentia divina est realiter proprietas relativa et non formaliter, et isto modo divina essentia est formaliter infinita, quia infinitas non distinguitur ab ipsa sicut formalitas alia quemadmodum proprietas. Aut prout 'formaliter' distinguitur contra esse, quod non est de quidditate alicuius, quo modo licet essentia sit infinita intrinsece, non tamen formaliter. Aut 'formaliter' prout distinguitur contra virtualiter, quo modo dicimus quod sol est formaliter lucidus, licet non sit virtualiter calidus. Aut prout 'formaliter' distinguitur contra materialiter, sicut dicimus quod homo est formaliter rationalis et materialiter corporalis. Unde patet formalis aequivocatio."

Having considered the basic meaning of these terms, we can examine Francis's understanding of formal distinction and formal identity. He begins his discussion of the formal distinction by positing the following definition: two things are formally distinct if one is not said of the other in the first mode of per se predication. The first mode of per se predication pertains to the quiddity, and, as we have seen, a formality is a quiddity. Francis does not, however, allow this definition to stand. One reason for this is that a negation is not said quidditatively of anything, and yet no one claims that a negation and that which it is negated of are formally distinct. Francis then proffers a revised definition, that a formal distinction is just the formalities themselves, since they are quiddities. This definition fails because formalities can be absolute, but a distinction is always a relation. Francis's final definition, and the one he endorses, is that a formal distinction is a relation of difference between two formalities, just as, he says, an essential distinction is that which is between two essences.³⁸ Unlike Scotus, Francis is not concerned with the logical form of propositions expressing the formal distinction; the kind of distinction simply depends on the kinds of metaphysical elements to be distinguished, whether formalities, essences, or modes. With Francis's definition of formal distinction in mind, it is not surprising to find that formal identity is just the lack of a formal distinction.³⁹ The basic notion of identity, like its correlative, distinction, contains the notion of relation. The absolute that grounds the relation are the two formalities. The formalities act as a subject for the distinction (or identity) between them, which is an attribute of the formalities.⁴⁰

There is a departure from the thought of Scotus contained in Francis's theory of distinction, namely, in the notion of 'ex natura rei'. For Scotus, the formal distinction obtains *ex natura rei*, which means that the distinction is present in an object before the intellect moves to have a cognition of it, which is to say, the distinction is independent of the activity of the intellect, even the divine intel-

38 Franciscus de Mayronis, *In Sent.* I ('ab oriente'), dist. 8, q. un., pars 1, art. 12, Vat. lat. 896, 60rb; Tortosa 155, 69rb: "Ideo dico quod formalis distinctio est respectus differentiae inter duas formalitates sicut essentialis est illa quae est inter duas essentias."

39 Franciscus de Mayronis, *In Sent.* I ('ab oriente'), dist. 8, q. un., pars 1, art. 13, Vat. lat. 896, 60rb; Tortosa 155, 69rb: "Ideo dico quod formalis identitas non est nisi carentia formalis distinctionis, sicut unitas est indivisio."

40 Franciscus de Mayronis, *In Sent.* I ('ab oriente'), dist. 8, q. un., pars 1, art. 29, Vat. lat. 896, 61va; Tortosa 155, 72ra: "[...] si ad multiplicationem distinctionum realium seu formalium sequitur multiplicatio realitatum et formalitatum. Et dicitur quod sic, quia ad multiplicationem passionis sequitur multiplicatio subiecti, quia si multa risibilia et multi homines. Sed contra, quia ad pluralitatem prioris sequitur pluralitas etiam posterioris et non e converso. Subiectum autem est prius passione; ergo. Ideo dico quod ad pluralitatem realitatum et formalitatum sequitur pluralitas distinctionum realium et formalium et non e converso."

lect.⁴¹ But for Francis, the formal distinction simply is a relation between formalities, which themselves are quiddities. Quiddities, however, can be thought, even produced, by the intellect. And there is a formal distinction between such quiddities, even when they are second intentions. Consequently, for Francis, the formal distinction does not exclusively obtain *ex natura rei*, since there can be formal distinctions between beings of reason in the intellect as well as in real beings outside the soul.⁴²

Francis briefly treats the inference from formal non-identity to formal distinction that Scotus had denied in the *Ordinatio*.⁴³ As we saw above, the problem in the *Ordinatio* was that a formality was denied in the antecedent and affirmed in the consequent, and so the inference was denied, whereas in the *Quaestio de formalitatibus* the term 'formaliter' was treated as a mode that conditioned the term 'distinctum,' diminishing the degree of distinction, and so the inference was accepted. Francis reports a reason someone (here no doubt he means Scotus) might hold that the consequence is not true: the advening mode corrupts the inference, yielding a contradiction. It is as if one were to affirm contradictory predicates of something, such as 'per se white' and 'per se not white.'⁴⁴ Francis's use of 'mode' here suggests he has the *Quaestio de formalitatibus* in mind, rather than the *Ordinatio*, unless we grant that there is a textual error in the *Ordinatio* ('formalitas' instead of 'formaliter'). Francis does not accept the argument, though his reason is cryptic. According to Francis, the terms 'identity' and 'distinction' are immediate as pertains to formalities, since they are disjunctive attributes of being, so one indeed can infer one from the other.⁴⁵

41 Francis does, however, assign the same meaning to 'ex natura rei' that Scotus does. See *In Sent.* I ('ab oriente'), dist. 8, q. un., pars 1, art. 19, Vat. lat. 896, 60vb; Tortosa 155, 70rb: "[...] ideo dico quod ex natura rei est omne illud quod ad suum esse non requirit aliquam intellectivam operationem, quia omne tale habet esse circumscripto omni opere rationis."

42 Franciscus de Mayronis, *In Sent.* I ('ab oriente'), dist. 8, q. un., pars 1, art. 27, Vat. lat. 896, 61rb–va; Tortosa 155, 71vb: "Viceimus septimus articulus est si omnis distinctio formalis est ex natura rei. Et dicitur quod sic, quia ponitur media inter distinctionem realem et rationis; omnis autem distinctio quae non est rationis est ex natura rei. Sed contra, quia secundae intentiones, quae ponuntur entia rationis, distinguuntur per rationes definitivas, quae est formalis distinctio. Ideo dico quod distinctio formalis, id est quidditativa, est tam in realibus quam in entibus rationis, quia utrobique sunt quidditates suo modo [...]. Ad rationem quod illa mediatio non est conveniens, quia omnis distinctio rationis aut est formalis, quando quidditates sunt non-idem, aut realis, quando unum sine altero concipi potest."

43 Franciscus de Mayronis, *In Sent.* I ('ab oriente'), dist. 8, q. un., pars 1, art. 31, diff. 7, Vat. lat. 896, 62ra; Tortosa 155, 72vb: "Septima quare non est bona ista consequentia 'ista non sunt idem formaliter, ergo distinguuntur formaliter?'"

44 *Ibid.*: "Et dicitur quod modus adveniens corrumpit illationem, sicut per se contradictio est [c. e.: contradictionem V], sicut quando dicitur 'per se album', 'per se non album'."

45 Franciscus de Mayronis, *In Sent.* I ('ab oriente'), dist. 8, q. un., pars 1, art. 31, diff. 6, Vat. lat. 896, 62ra; Tortosa 155, 72vb: "Sexta: si identitas formalis et distinctio formalis sunt opposi-

But ‘same and diverse’ pertain to all things, not just formalities, since they are transcendental attributes of being. Francis’s view then is that the inference as he formulates it, namely, ‘those are not the same formally, therefore they are distinguished formally,’ is not valid, but not for Scotus’s reason, rather it is invalid because one should argue from identity to distinction, not from sameness to distinction.⁴⁶ That is, Scotus is arguing from an improper disjunctive pair, where the correct pairs are same-diverse and identity-distinction. Scotus’s argument against the inference fails, because he is taking distinction as equivalent to non-identity, an equivalence Francis rejects. Scotus had considered a similar objection to his position in the *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, though without Francis’s distinction between the two disjunctive pairs. Incidentally, the objection also occurs in William of Alnwick’s quodlibetal dispute over the formal distinction, which seems to have been conducted with the *Quaestio de formalitatibus* in mind.⁴⁷ As Scotus reports the objection, the same and the diverse are immediately opposed over being, therefore, so also must ‘formally the same’ and ‘formally distinct’ be immediately opposed, and so it follows, if ‘*a* is not formally the same as *b*, therefore *a* is formally distinct from *b*’.⁴⁸ Scotus himself was not much concerned with the objection, and he was willing to concede the inference as long as the term ‘formaliter’ was interpreted as modifying and diminishing the term ‘distinctum.’⁴⁹

Francis of Meyronnes’s earliest account of the formal distinction is then that the formal distinction obtains between formalities, which are quiddities. It is not an *ex natura rei* distinction, since quiddities can be in the intellect as well as in reality. Furthermore, the notions of identity and distinction are parts of a disjunction, indeed, they are transcendental attributes of being, and as relations, they are ontologically subsequent to their foundations in formalities.

ta immediata circa formalitatem. Et dicitur quod sic, quia omnes passiones disiunctae sunt opposita immediata.”

⁴⁶ Franciscus de Mayronis, *In Sent.* I (‘ab oriente’), dist. 8, q. un., pars 1, art. 31, diff. 7, Vat. lat. 896, 62ra; Tortosa 155, 72vb: “Sed quid est impedimentum huius illationis secundum rem? Dico quod quia ista, identitas et distinctio, non sunt immediata nisi circa formalitates, et ideo in illis teneret; idem autem et diversum in communi se habent ad omnia. Ad rationem dicendum quod ibi accipitur ‘distinctio’ pro ‘non-identitate’.”

⁴⁷ See Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quodlibet*, q. 1, ed. Ledoux, 179–80.

⁴⁸ Duns Scotus, *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, ed. Emery and Smith, 156: “Contra hoc: idem et diversum sunt immediate opposita circa ens, ex X^o *Metaphysicae*; igitur pari ratione idem formaliter et distinctum formaliter erunt immediate opposita circa *a* respectu *b*, et per consequens sequitur ‘si *a* non est idem formaliter ipsi *b*, igitur est distinctum formaliter ab ipso *b*’.”

⁴⁹ Duns Scotus, *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, ed. Emery and Smith, 158.

3. Petrus Thomae

Two works of Petrus Thomae are relevant to our present reflections, namely the *Quaestiones de formis* and *Quaestiones de modis distinctionum*.⁵⁰ Chronologically, these works were written after the *Quaestiones de ente*, which means they date from the mid to late 1320's. The *De modis distinctionum*, at least, is based on disputes held by Petrus Thomae at the Franciscan *studium* in Barcelona; it is unknown where the *De formis* was disputed.

Petrus Thomae clearly had access to the *Ab oriente* version of book I of Francis of Meyronnes's commentary on the *Sentences*. Like Francis, Peter attempts in the *De formis* to define the notion of form, 'formale,' and 'formalitas,' and in the process rejects Francis's definition. Peter reduces Francis's discussion of form to three points: 1. that form is a perfection suited to depend on something in the genus of material cause; 2. dependence is inherence; 3. matter is defined through its opposite.⁵¹ Peter rejects all three points. Against the first, he argues that matter is not properly speaking the cause of form, thus form cannot be a perfection in the genus of material cause. The reason for this is that matter is only the cause of the material part of the composite. Against the second, Peter argues that dependence is the cause of inherence, thus they are not equivalent notions. Dependence is prior in nature to inherence, and there can be dependence relations without inherence relations, as is the case when a nature depends upon a supposit, for natures depend but do not inhere. Against the third part of Francis's description, Peter simply denies that matter can be defined properly through its opposite. Peter's own description of form, which is also repeated in the *De modis distinctionum*, is as follows: "form is an essential part of the composite, activating the other part of the same composite unqualifiedly, yet depending on it in becoming or in being, or in being only, or principally essentialitative or specificative of the composite."⁵² In the *De modis distinctionum*, he ascribes five properties to the definition of form: first, that by which matter is actualized, second by which the composite is specified, third, by which the com-

⁵⁰ Both works are unedited; for the manuscripts, see Smith, "Bibliotheca manuscripta Petri Thomae," 196–98. Peter's theory of distinctions has been previously studied by Bridges, *Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae, OFM*; Andersen, "Introduction," 93–177. In order to avoid confusion, note that the *Quaestiones de modis distinctionum* is a work comprised of 11 *quaestiones*, whereas the text edited by Bos under the title of *Quaestio de distinctione praedicatorum* and López Alcalde under the title *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum* is a single question subdivided into *articuli*.

⁵¹ Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de formis*, q. 1, art. 1, Vat. lat. 2190, 145v.

⁵² Petrus Thomae, *De formis*, q. 1, art. 2, Vat. lat. 2190, 145r: "[...] forma est pars essentialis compositi, alterius eiusdem partis actualiva simpliciter, ab eo tamen dependens in fieri et in esse, vel in esse tantum vel compositi, principaliter essentialiva vel specificativa." For the meaning of 'essentialitative,' see Petrus Thomae, *De ente*, q. 2, ed. Smith, 12 and 14.

posite operates, fourth, by which the composite is distinguished from other composites, and fifth, by which the composite is known.⁵³

According to Peter the term ‘formale’ is derived from ‘forma,’ and it is related to it as abstract to concrete. Taken generally, the word indicates anything pertaining to a form, and taken properly, it indicates anything pertaining to a quiddity. The term ‘formalitas’ is derived from ‘formale,’ and is related to it the same way it is related to ‘forma,’ namely, as abstract to concrete. Similar to the case of ‘formale,’ ‘formalitas’ is related to the notion of a quiddity or what pertains to a quiddity. It is not a definition or a definitive *ratio*, because there can be formalities of things that do not have definitions, such as God or the transcendentals. The proper meaning of formality, according to Petrus Thomae, is that of a quidditative *ratio*.⁵⁴ This meaning of formality meets several conditions that also apply to the notion of ‘formale,’ though Peter had neglected to supply these conditions in his discussion of the term ‘formale.’ These conditions are that a formality is that by which something is said to be formally something, by which it is distinguished from something, by which something is known, and by which something is produced, if it is produced. The term ‘formaliter’ according to Petrus Thomae is an adverb and so it is a mode of speech.⁵⁵ As a mode, it determines the verb in the sentence in which it is found. Recall here that for Scotus, the term ‘formaliter’ is a determination that is applied to the term ‘distinctum,’ not the verb. For Peter, the term ‘formaliter’ means the same as to say something is per se in the first mode, which applies to whatever pertains to a quiddity. Finally, Peter also explains what he means by a formal distinction. He writes, “I say these are formally distinguished which are such that, ultimately abstracted,

53 Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de modis distinctionum*, q. 7, art. 1, Vat. lat. 2190, 95v: “Invenio in ipsa rationem quintuplicis: quo ipsa enim forma est quo materia actuatur, quo compositum specificatur, tertio quo ipsum compositum operatur, quarto quo compositum distinguitur, quinto quo ipsum compositum cognoscitur.”

54 Petrus Thomae, *De mod. dist.*, q. 7, art. 1, Vat. lat. 2190, 95v: “Quantum est quod formalitas proprie loquendo est idem quod ratio quidditativa alicuius, nec aliud per ‘formalitem’ intelligo, licet ab aliis diversimode describatur, et isti rationi formalitatis sic acceptae vere conveniunt omnes condiciones formales. Ipsa enim est illud quo aliquid formalis tale dicitur et illud quo aliquid formaliter praecipue distingui dicitur, est tertio illud quo aliquid formaliter cognoscitur et hoc praecipue, est quarto quo aliquid si illud cuius est sit productum produci- tur.”

55 Petrus Thomae, *De mod. dist.*, q. 7, art. 1, Vat. lat. 2190, 95v: “De quarto, ‘formaliter’ est adverbium et per consequens dicit modum, omnia enim adverbia ex modo suo significandi significant quosdam modos. Secundum est quod ly ‘formaliter’ determinatur ipsa verbali copula qua quidem copulatur praedicatum subiecto. Tertium est quod nihil est quod intelligam per ipsum ‘formaliter’ nisi per se primo modo.”

neither one includes the other in the first mode of per se [predication]."⁵⁶ Ultimate abstraction is a mental act by which the mind focuses on a single quiddity or nature of something, prescinding from what might accompany it in reality or in less abstract forms of thought. It is a reduction to the bare essence of something.⁵⁷ Taken in such a degree of abstraction, if neither natures or essences include the other in their essence, then Peter considers them to be formally distinct. Even though ultimate abstraction is a mental act, the intellect finds the distinction between objects, it does not make the distinction itself.

With these definitions of the basic terms pertaining to the formal distinction in mind, we turn now to Peter's consideration of the inference from formal non-identity to formal distinction. Peter analyses the inference in question 5 of the *Quaestiones de modis distinctionum*. This question is devoted to defending Scotus's position on the inference from the criticism of Peter Auriol. The title of the question is "whether the negation of the mode of identity argues necessarily for a distinction of this and this." In the title, the phrase 'negation of the mode of identity' refers to the phrase "non-idem formaliter" in Scotus's inference. The adverb "formaliter" as we have seen, signifies a mode, which is negated in the antecedent and affirmed in the consequent. The phrase "distinction of this and this" refers to the consequent of the inference, the "distincta formaliter." To posit a 'this' and 'this' in God would be a violation of divine simplicity. Peter interprets Scotus's meaning as that the inference from formal non-identity to formal distinction is invalid, or, in Peter's terms, that the negation of a mode of identity does not bespeak necessarily a distinction of this and this.⁵⁸ In his defense of the views of Duns Scotus, Peter defends seven propositions that he describes as evident propositions, and five that are less evident:

⁵⁶ Petrus Thomae, *De mod. dist.*, q. 7, art. 1, Vat. lat. 2190, 95v–96r: "[...] voco hic illa 'distingui formaliter' quaecumque sic se habent quod ultimate abstracta neutrum praedicatur de altero primo modo per se."

⁵⁷ Petrus Thomae, *Quaestio de distinctione praedicamentorum*, art. 1, ed. Bos, 298; ed. López Alcalde, 294–96: "[...] abstractio dicitur ultimata secundum quam aliquid abstrahitur ab omni eo quod in eius ratione quidditativa seu definitiva proprie et simpliciter dicta nullo modo includitur." Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ord. I*, dist. 5, pars 1, q. un., n. 22, ed. Vat. 4, 20–21: "[...] apparet quae sit ultima abstractio, quia 'quiditatis absolutissimae, sumptae ab omni eo quod est quomodocumque extra rationem quiditatis' [...]." See also Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*, 34–35.

⁵⁸ Petrus Thomae, *De mod. dist.*, q. 5, art. 2, Vat. lat. 2190, 91r: "[...] Scotus in I, distinctione 2, quaestione 4, dicit quod haec consequentia non valet: 'a et b sunt non-idem formaliter, ergo sunt distincta formaliter', et per consequens negatio modi identitatis non arguit necessario distinctionem huius et huius[modi]." The manuscript here mistakenly gives the abbreviation for "huiusmodi" instead of "huius."

Evident propositions:⁵⁹

1. negatio identitatis aggregationis non arguit necessario huius et huius distinctionem.
2. negatio identitatis ordinis non arguit necessario distinctionem huius et huius.
3. negatio accidentalis identitatis non arguit necessario distinctionem huius et huius.
4. negatio identitatis compositi vere arguit distinctionem huius et huius.
5. negatio identitatis singularitatis arguit distinctionem huius et huius.
6. negatio identitatis suppositalis arguit necessario distinctionem huius et huius.
7. negatio identitatis simplicitatis arguit necessario distinctionem huius et huius.

Less evident propositions:⁶⁰

1. negatio identitatis formalis arguit necessario negationem identitatis aggregationis, ordinis, accidentalis et compositi.
2. negatio identitatis formalis non arguit necessario negationem identitatis singularitatis.
3. negatio identitatis formalis non arguit necessario negationem identitatis suppositalis.
4. negatio identitatis formalis non arguit necessario negationem identitatis simplicis.
5. negatio identitatis formalis non arguit distinctionem huius et huius.
6. negatio identitatis formalis non arguit necessario distingui formaliter.

Our concern is with propositions 5 and 6 from the list of less evident propositions. Before we treat them, however, we should note first what Petrus Thomae means by ‘identity’ in this question.

According to Peter, there are three ways to understand identity. One is according to the modes of per se predication that Aristotle outlined in the *Posterior analytics* I, ch. 4 (73a34–b5); especially relevant here are the first two modes. The second kind of identity is according to modes of unity, whether these modes are applied inside the intellect or outside the intellect in external reality; this is the kind of unity that Aristotle outlines in *Metaphysics* V, ch. 6 (1017a8–b27). The third kind of identity is that which is outside the intellect, and here Peter calls upon Duns Scotus. Scotus had outlined five such modes, which Peter expands to eight. The intensity of the degree of unity increases as one moves up the scale. The lowest is the unity of aggregation, followed by unity of order, accidental unity, composite unity, unity of singularity, unity of simplicity, unity of supposit, and last of all, unity of formal notion. Each of these grades of unity has a corresponding grade of identity.⁶¹ Since formal identity is the highest level, to

⁵⁹ Petrus Thomae, *De mod. dist.*, q. 5, art. 4, Vat. lat. 2190, 92r.

⁶⁰ Petrus Thomae, *De mod. dist.*, q. 5, art. 4, Vat. lat. 2190, 92v.

⁶¹ For the passage in Scotus, see *Ord.* I, dist. 2, pars 2, qq. 1–4, n. 403, ed. Vat. 2, 356–57. As noted by Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine*, 181, Scotus himself only described the degrees of unity and did not connect them with degrees of distinction. For further commentary on this passage, see Tweedale, *Scotus vs. Ockham*, 501–2.

negate it does not mean that the lower levels are necessarily also negated. Indeed, Peter holds that one can negate formal identity, and suppositional identity, and still retain the identity of simplicity, which of course, is what is required by divine simplicity. That is, in God the three supposits are not formally identical, nor are they suppositionally identical. Thus, to negate formal identity, does not necessarily lead to the positing of a this and a this in God, which is the fifth proposition on Peter's list of less evident propositions.

Peter treats Scotus's inference under the sixth of the less evident propositions. Peter's view is that the negation of formal identity does not necessarily infer formal distinction. He interprets Scotus's inference as equivalent to saying that the negation of formal identity does not necessarily argue a distinction of formalities. Peter provides a number of arguments for this proposition. One is an expanded form of Scotus's own argument for rejecting the consequence, namely that one cannot have a formal consequence in which something is denied in the antecedent but affirmed in the consequent, the reason being that what is in the antecedent and the consequent has to be taken uniformly. In the case at hand, it is the term 'formaliter' which is not taken uniformly. This term, we have seen, is a mode, and is denied in the antecedent but affirmed in the consequent.⁶²

Peter also argues that the inference commits a fallacy of a figure of speech.⁶³ But to show this, Peter rephrases it to 'non-idem formaliter, ergo diversum for-

62 Petrus Thomae, *De mod. dist.*, q. 5, art. 4, Vat. lat. 2190, 92v: "Sexta est quod negatio identitatis formalis non arguit necessario distingui formaliter. Unde non sequitur secundum Doctorem 'sunt non-idem formaliter, ergo sunt distincta formaliter', et ita per consequens negatio identitatis formalis non arguit necessario distinctionem formalitatis et formalitatis. Hoc probo primo per rationem Doctoris sic: quando negatum in antecedente affirmatur in consequente, illa consequentia non est formalis; sed sic est, cum infertur 'sunt non-idem formaliter, ergo et distincta formaliter'; ergo consequentia non est formalis nec per consequens necessaria. Maior patet, quia consequentia formalis exigit quod illa quae accipiuntur in antecedente et consequente uniformiter accipiantur. Minor probatur per ipsum, quia in antecedente negatur modus formalitatis, in consequente autem affirmatur."

63 Petrus Thomae, *De mod. dist.*, q. 5, art. 4, Vat. lat. 2190, 92v-93r: "Praeterea, potest colorari sic: illa consequentia non est formalis quae peccat per fallaciam figurae dictionis; sed ista, cum dicitur 'non-idem formaliter, ergo diversum formaliter' est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet. Minorem declaro, quoniam proceditur a negatione modi identitatis ad modum eiusdem negationis ut hic 'Sortes non est per se albus, ergo est per se distinctus ab albo'. Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum secundum istum Doctorem quod aliud est negatio perseitatis aliud perseitas negationis, quia ipsa negatio perseitatis vere potest attribui alicui positivo, non tamen perseitas negationis. Exemplum: 'homo non est per se albus'. Haec propositio est vera, quia albedo non competit homini per se primo modo, tamen ista 'homo est per se non albus' est falsa, quia importatur per eam quod ista negatio 'non-albus' sit de per se intellectu hominis, et haec est perseitas negationis. Referunt ergo perseitas negationis et negatio perseitatis propter quod si sic procedatur a negatione perseitatis ad perseitatem negationis semper peccat illatio."

maliter'; recall that originally, it read 'distinctum formaliter'. Here he identifies the problem as a process of moving from the negation of a mode of identity to a mode of negation, as in the proposition 'Socrates is not per se white, therefore he is per se distinct from white.' This is similar to Scotus's own discussion in the *Quaestio de formalitatibus*. Peter refers to Scotus, albeit without a precise reference, and argues that in the example of predication of whiteness of Socrates we have a distinction between the negation of perseity and the perseity of negation. The negation of perseity can be attributed to something positive, whereas the perseity of negation cannot. Thus we can say that a 'man is not per se white,' because in the first mode of per se predication whiteness is not said of a man, but we cannot say that a 'man is per se non white,' since this is to predicate a negation, 'non-white' as part of the human essence. Consequently, any inference that proceeds from the negation of a perseity to the perseity of negation will fail, as does the inference from formal non-identity to formal distinction. Petrus Thomae then, as is clear, follows Scotus on this point.

What is the consequence for the question under dispute with Francis of Meyronnes, namely whether there are a plurality of formalities in God? Peter answers this in question 6 of the *Quaestiones de modis distinctionum*, where, in his usual style, he provides a list of propositions that express his position. The relevant ones are that, speaking of the divine attributes, the 'formality of one is not distinct from the formality of another,' and that 'the formality of one is the formality of another,' and that 'all attributes are one formality.'⁶⁴ These propositions follow from the initial claim that the identity of formality is compatible with the negation of formal identity. Peter thinks that this proposition is true in turn, since it relies on his previous proof that the negation of formal identity does not result in a distinction of formalities.

Peter defends another relevant conclusion, namely that identity of formality does not require formal identity. That is to say, one can posit a single formality, for example for the divine attributes, without also saying that the divine attributes are formally identical or included in each other's formal aspects. Peter's argument in support is quite close to what Francis of Meyronnes will later reject. According to Peter, it is one thing to talk about the identity of the extreme, that is, of a formality, and another to talk about the identity of the mode of identity, that is the relation of identity between the formalities. Given that these are different, the identity of formality or identity of the extremes does not necessarily

⁶⁴ Petrus Thomae, *De mod. dist.*, q. 6, art. 2, Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 1494, 59va: "Tertia: formalitas unius non est distincta a formalitate alterius [...]. Quarta: formalitas unius est formalitas alterius ex praecedenti, alias esset inter ipsa distinctio huius et huius, quae non ponitur. Quinta: omnia attributa sunt una formalitas [...]": Vat. lat. 2190, 94r-v: "Sexta: formalitas unius non est formaliter formalitas alterius, non enim est sibi idem formaliter." Cf. Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*, 40–41.

imply formal identity.⁶⁵ Thus we are left with a perplexing metaphysics in which we have a single formality in God, but the mode of identity does not require that everything in God is formally the same. In a *dubium* that Peter raises, he asks how this is possible, but gives only the brief and unsatisfying reply that the single formality that is the divine essence and attributes does not remove the formal rationes of the individual attributes or the essence, which remain formally non-identical.⁶⁶

To conclude our discussion of Petrus Thomae, it is clear that he matches the description of the unnamed position assailed by Francis of Meyronnes exactly. He holds that there is one formality in God, and that despite this, there is a non-identity between the formal *rationes* of the attributes. Peter arrives at this position through his defense of Scotus's rejection of the inference from formal non-identity to formal distinction. He follows Scotus's Oxonian position from the *Ordinatio*, regardless of whether he disagrees with or was unaware of Scotus's later Parisian position that granted a similar inference in the *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, and Scotus's own claim regarding the equivalency of the formal distinction with *secundum quid* non-identity, in the Parisian *Reportatio*.⁶⁷

4. Franciscus de Mayronis II: *Conflatus*

We complete the circle by returning to the *Conflatus* of Francis of Meyronnes.⁶⁸ As I noted above, in the prologue Francis details four conclusions regarding which the school of the Minorites was assailed by their critics. The third conclusion, where we found the discussion of the *aliqui* among whom we can include Petrus Thomae, is that there can be a plurality of formalities in a single undivid-

⁶⁵ Petrus Thomae, *De mod. dist.*, q. 6, art. 1, Wien 1494, 59va: "Praeterea, identitas extremi non infert necessario identitatem modi, nam alia est identitas extremi, alia identitas modi identitatis extremi et extremi; sed identitas formalitatis est identitas extremi, identitas autem formalis est identitas modi identitatis ipsius; ergo etc."

⁶⁶ Petrus Thomae, *De mod. dist.*, q. 6, art. 3, Wien 1494, 59vb: "Secundum dubium est: si enim ponitur divinae essentiae et omnium attributorum eadem formalitas, unde ergo potest habere inter ipsa huiusmodi non formalis identitas? [...] Ad secundum dico quod huiusmodi non-identitas formalis habetur ex hoc quod ista unica et simplex formalitas non tollit rationes formales eorum quae sic dicuntur non-eadem." Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*, 39, thinks that Peter must mean that the attributes in God are not really distinct.

⁶⁷ Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A, dist. 33, q. 2, ed. Wolter and Bychkov, vol. 2, 330, 334–35.

⁶⁸ Given the numerous early printings of the *Conflatus*, it is the text that has received the most scholarly attention. See Roth, *Franz von Mayronis O.F.M.*, 319–28, 473–79; Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity*, 143–58; Möhle, *Formalitas und modus intrinsecus*, 88–101; Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine*, 188–210. According to Duba, *ibid.*, the problem of distinguishing between creatures in objective potency required Francis to refine his doctrine regarding distinctions through the course of composing his commentaries on the *Sentences*.

ed thing.⁶⁹ There is a parallel passage in the principal debate with Pierre Roger, albeit without mention of the position of Petrus Thomae.⁷⁰ At the current state of research it is difficult to determine whether or not Francis had read Petrus Thomae's criticisms in the *De formis* or *De modis distinctionum* on the present issue; certainly, as was noted above, Petrus Thomae was not alone in holding this position. But Francis does appear to have known of Peter's discussion of intrinsic modes – also in the *De modis distinctionum* – and to have responded to it.⁷¹

In the prologue to the *Conflatus*, Francis rejects the view I have attributed to Petrus Thomae. According to Francis, it is contradictory to say that there is a distinction or a non-identity, but that there are no extremes, that is, items such as formalities, that are distinct or are non-identical.⁷² Francis calls upon the authority of the one who “first spoke thus,” presumably Duns Scotus himself in the context of the inference from formal non-identity to formal distinction. Accord-

69 Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus*, prol., q. 1, ed. Möhle and Hofmeister Pich, 80: “Tertia conclusio est quod plures formalitates possunt esse in eadem re penitus indivisa, quia formalitas, secundum descriptionem eorum qui ponunt eas, est ratio definitiva uniuscuiuscumque. Hic autem, ut patuit, ponunt plures rationes definitivae.”

70 Franciscus de Mayronis, *principium in IV Sent.*, n. 98, in *Disputatio (1320–1321)*, ed. Barbet, 102: “Ex istis autem dictis sequuntur quatuor conclusiones in quibus consuevit nostra scola frequenter impugnari [...], tertia conclusio, quod in realitate una possunt inveniri plures rationes formales, quia ratio formalis et definitiva idem sunt, et hac parte, cum sit una tantum res, sint plures rationes formales vel definitive.” Francis later adapted this text into an independent treatise, found in Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 3026, 103va–106vb, 114ra–vb, 113ra–vb, where the text is labeled “tractatus de distinctione attributorum.” For the parallel to the *Conflatus*, see 103va–vb: “[...] quaeritur vero dudum cum inchoarem librum Sententiarum fuit facta concordia inter duas scholas quae diu disputaverant inter se de materia rationum formalium. Idcirco ad illius pacis processum occurrunt 12 puncta ordine congruo pertractanda [...]. et tunc ex dictis suis elicebam quattuor conclusiones in quibus solebat impugnari schola nostra. Quorum prima erat quod plures rationes formales sunt in una re, circumscripto omni opere rationis, quia quicumque ponit plures rationes definitivas ponit plures rationes formales, cum definiendo ‘rationem formalem’ dicamus quod est ratio definitiva, et ita tenet ista per locum a definitione. Iste autem ponit in una re plures rationes definitivas non fabricatas ab anima, ergo ponit plures formales. Minor patet per sua exempla.” For a description of Vat. lat. 3026, which contains several other treatises by Mayronis, see Etzkorn, *Iter Vaticanum Franciscanum*, 9–12.

71 Hannes Möhle has shown that Petrus Thomae criticized Francis of Meyronnes's conception of an intrinsic mode in q. 11 of the *Quaestiones de modis distinctionum*, and Francis appears to report and criticize Petrus Thomae's view in his *Conflatus*; see Möhle, *Formalitas und modus intrinsecus*, 309–13. Given that Peter quotes the *Ab oriente* commentary in the *De formis*, the chronology may be as follows: 1. Mayronis, *Ab oriente*, 2. Petrus Thomae attacks the *Ab oriente* in the *Quaestiones de modis distinctionum*, 3. Mayronis responds to Petrus Thomae in the *Conflatus*.

72 Cf. Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus*, prol., q. 1, ed. Möhle and Hofmeister Pich, 80–81.

ing to Francis, Scotus did not apply the term 'distinct' or 'distinction' to the terms of the distinction without qualification, but with the determination of a mode, namely, the mode 'formaliter' as we have seen. When the distinction is diminished, it means that the items to be distinguished are not the same quidditatively or in the first mode of per se predication.

Francis also treats the inference of Scotus in distinction 8 of the *Conflatus*, as was noted by one of the later commentators.⁷³ Here Francis is interested in the relation between non-identity and distinction.⁷⁴ These notions are not simply equivalent. Rather they accrue to quiddities in different instants of nature, with distinction always presupposing a prior non-identity. Francis holds that in creatures there are four instants of nature, and in God two instants. In quiddities of creatures, the first instant is the bare essence, which has whatever accrues to the quiddity in the first mode of per se predication. In the second instant various negations or negative predicates can be ascribed to the quiddity. In the third instant the positive attributes (*passiones*) are attached, from the second mode of per se predication. In the fourth instant accrue what is accidentally united to the quiddity, namely intrinsic modes such as necessity, contingency, or existence. Francis gives an example: we take two quiddities, those of blackness and whiteness. In the first instant, the two quiddities are neither the same nor not the same, they are simply taken as bare quiddities, much like Avicenna describes the quiddity of equinity as simply *equinitas*. In the second instant it can be seen that the formal notion of one quiddity is not that of the other, so in the second instant the two quiddities are not the same. In the third instant the two quiddities

⁷³ *Commentarius 1 super Conflatum*, Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana Milano, I 148 inf., 76va–b: "Utrum in Deo sit aliqua non-identitas. Postquam visum est quod in Deo est distinctio, hic doctor vult conari si aliqua non-identitas praecedat omnem distinctionem. Et hoc facit ad declarandum Scotum in distinctione 2^a, ubi dicit quod ista consequentia non valet: '*a et b non sunt idem formaliter, ergo distinguuntur formaliter*'. Et etiam dicitur ibi quod melius dicitur quod non sunt idem quam quod distinguuntur, ideo ponit doctor istam quaestionem et servat hunc modum in consuetum sibi et aliis."

⁷⁴ See Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus* I, dist. 8, q. 2. The 1520 edition by Mauritius here fails to provide rubrics distinguishing the first two questions. For the text I use Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 892. Note that Roßmann has raised the question of whether what circulates as books II–IV of the *Conflatus* has been revised or not. If only book I has been revised, and the term 'conflatus' indicates this revised state, then books II–IV, which in some manuscripts are described as *reputationes*, do not merit the title 'conflatus'. In what follows, however, I refer to "Conflatus I" to distinguish it from what circulates in the manuscripts as *Conflatus* II–IV as well as to indicate that it is a version of a commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*. For Roßmann's discussion of this problem, see "Die Sentenzenkommentare," 136–40.

are distinct, because distinction is a transcendental property of being, thus it accrues to an individual quiddity only in the third instant of nature.⁷⁵

Against this description of the signs of nature that accrue to a quiddity, according to which non-identity is not simply convertible with distinction, because they are found in different instants, Francis lodges an objection to the effect that the same and the diverse are said of the same essence and so also of the same formality. Consequently, just as one can say that something is not the same essentially as another, therefore it is essentially distinct from it, so also that something is not the same formally, therefore it is formally distinct.⁷⁶ Francis is willing to concede that the same and diverse are said of the same formality, but continues to insist that this occurs in different signs or instants of nature. According to Francis, there is nothing repugnant about positing a prior without a posterior, that is, non-identity without a posterior distinction. This is the case in God, where only the first two signs of nature are found. In God there is the divine essence, which is the underlying quiddity, and a second instant in which various negations such as non-identity are founded in the essence. But because the third and fourth instants are lacking, distinction is also lacking in God.⁷⁷ Now, this reply on its own is not quite satisfactory. The objection draws a paral-

75 For this uncharacteristically lengthy discussion, see Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus* I, dist. 8, q. 2, Vat. lat. 892, 85vb–86rb.

76 Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus* I, dist. 8, q. 2, Vat. lat. 892, 86rb: “Tertio sic: sicut se habet idem et diversum circa essentiam essentialiter, ita se habet idem et diversum formaliter circa formalitates; sed sequitur quod ‘non sunt idem essentialiter, ergo sunt distincta essentialiter’, ergo eodem modo sequitur ‘non sunt idem formaliter, ergo sunt distincta formaliter’, quod est propositum.”

77 Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus* I, dist. 8, q. 2, Vat. lat. 892, 86va–b: “Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod sicut dicebatur superius de istis quattuor signis quae conveniunt albedini et nigredini, scilicet quod in primo signo albedo et nigredo sunt tantum se ipsae, in secundo possunt intelligi non-idem, in tertio intelliguntur distincta quantum ad primum signum et secundum. Sed quia habet aliquid cui vel quod videtur repraesentare distinctioni quae deberet sibi competere pro tertio signo, scilicet infinitas, quae excludit omnem distinctionem et etiam repugnat eis aliqua evenire per accidens, hinc est quod quamvis simile modo procedatur ad primum et secundum, non tamen quantum ad tertium et quartum, qui eis non competunt. Primum ergo eis convenit ut natura eorum et quidditas salvetur. Secundum ut salvetur in eis veritas primi principii complexi. Cum ergo priori non repugnet intelligi sine posteriori et secundum signum in quo sunt non-idem sit prius tertio, in quo dicuntur distincta, nulla videtur repugnantia subtiliter intuenti quod dicantur aliquid non-idem et tamen non sunt distincta, nec repugnat universaliter non-identitatem esse sine distinctione propter prioritatem. Ex hoc patet ad argumentum. In creaturis autem inveniuntur non solum duo prima signa, sed etiam tertium et quartum, eo quod nihil in eis est quod repugnet distinctioni ex his quae conveniunt per accidens, et propter hoc bene tenet ‘sunt non-idem, ergo distinguuntur’ sed in divinis, quia non est tertium signum in eis pro quo eis deberet inesse distinctio, nec quartum pro quo deberet inesse ea quae sunt per accidens, non tenet.”

lel between a distinction between two essences or quiddities, which might be an essential distinction, and a formal distinction. Francis's reply, however only addresses an essential distinction, that is, the sort of robust transcendental distinction that accrues in the fourth instant of nature, not the quidditative distinction he does in fact allow.⁷⁸ Later in the same question, Francis notes that even though there is not a real distinction in God, the quidditative notions of the intellect and will are not the same quidditative notion.⁷⁹ And as we have already seen, the formal distinction obtains between quidditative notions, a claim that Francis repeats in the *Conflatus*.⁸⁰ Indeed, in other passages he argues that the quidditative or formal aspects of the divine attributes taken precisely as such are not the same, so it seems that there is at least formal non-identity that obtains between the formalities of the divine perfections, even if there is no formal distinction.⁸¹ Distinction itself is a relative notion, obtaining between what is distinguished, so even if Francis denies that distinction as a transcendental attribute is found in God, it does not mean he denies that there are divine perfections.⁸² The significance of this separation of non-identity and distinction into different instants of nature is that Francis arrives at one of the same results of Petrus Thomae, and indeed the Scotus of the *Ordinatio*, that there is a non-identity without distinction, or in other words that non-identity is not simply equivalent to distinction.

78 Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus*, prol., q. 1, ed. Möhle and Hofmeister Pich, 82: "Alio modo 'distinctio' accipitur ut est passio entis, et ut sic non requirit extrema realiter distincta sed tantum aliquo modo, et sic est in divinis [...], quarta conclusio est quod cum ista distinctione quidditativa stat summa simplicitas." My punctuation.

79 Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus* I, dist. 8, q. 2, Vat. lat. 892, 86vb: "Dico quod licet ibi non sit distinctio realis, quae est relatio realis, tamen bene est distinctio fundamentaliter inter ista attributa, scilicet voluntas non est fundamentaliter intellectus et fundamentaliter distinguitur, nec ratio quidditativa intellectus est ratio voluntatis."

80 Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus* I, dist. 8, q. 1, Vat. lat. 892, 83rb–va: "[...] dico quod sunt quattuor gradus distinctionis non fabricatae ab anima [...], tertia est distinctio formalis et illa est inter quidditatem et quidditate[m] sicut dicimus quod homo et asinus in potentia obiectiva distinguuntur et ista distinctio est proprie rationum definitivarum."

81 Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus* I, dist. 8, q. 7, Vat. lat. 892, 102rb: "[...] quattuor pono conclusiones. Prima est quod attributa nullam habent unitatem in suis rationibus formalibus ultimate praecisis, eorum enim rationes formales, cum sint simpliciter simplices, sunt primo diversae."

82 Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus* I, dist. 8, q. 1, Vat. lat. 892, 82va: "[...] sunt quattuor conclusiones. Prima quod distinctio non est aliquid absolutum sed respectivum. Et hoc probodupliciter. Primo sic: illud quod secundum suam rationem formalem dicitur ad aliquid est respectus; sed distinctio est huiusmodi, nam omne distinctum ab aliquo necessario est distinctum."

In his final commentary on the *Sentences*, namely the *Conflatus*, Francis is prepared to admit a plurality of formalities, which have their own unique quidditative notions. He is more sensitive to Scotus's rejection of the inference from non-identity to distinction than he was in his earlier *Ab oriente* commentary, and so he locates these two notions in different instants of nature. The quiddities of creatures can have four instants of nature, but the divine only two. The transcendental attribute of distinction is not found in the first two instants of nature, thus it cannot be applied to God. But there is a formal non-identity that obtains between the formalities of the divine attributes

Conclusion

We have studied here the two most prominent members of the "less realist" and the "more realist" interpretation of the formal distinction, Petrus Thomae and Francis of Meyronnes respectively. These two interpretations of the formal distinction take their inspiration from different texts in Duns Scotus, the first from the *Ordinatio*, written or at least begun at Oxford, and the second from the *Reportatio* and *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, from Paris. In the earlier text Scotus is hesitant to allow an inference from formal non-identity to formal distinction, whereas in the later texts he grants it, subject to qualification. Petrus Thomae, despite his knowledge of the *Reportatio Parisiensis*,⁸³ defends the position of the *Ordinatio*, developing a view not explicit in Scotus, though common among his early followers, such that there is a single formality in God and compatible with this single formality are non-identities obtaining between various formal aspects in God. Francis of Meyronnes also accepts that the inference in the *Ordinatio* is not valid, though for different reasons than did Petrus Thomae. Though he is critical of the less realist interpretation of the formal distinction, while permitting a plurality of formalities he banishes the transcendental notion of distinction entirely from God, even though the formalities of the divine attributes are non-identical.

83 Petrus Thomae cites the *Reportatio* I, dist. 32, q. 2 account of the distinction *secundum quid* and *simpliciter* in *Quaestiones de modis distinctionum*, q. 4, art. 3, Vat. lat. 2190, 88v–89r.

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Modus intrinsecus rei in Petrus Thomae's Quaestiones de modis distinctionum

Vitaly Ivanov

Introduction

Petrus Thomae (ca. 1280–1340),¹ a lecturer at the Franciscan *studium generale theologiae* in Barcelona (taught there from about 1316 to 1332), is one of the most interesting metaphysicians among the early followers of Duns Scotus. Petrus Thomae's mature doctrine of intrinsic modes, including the very concept 'intrinsic mode,' is contained in two large metaphysical treatises (written one after the other around 1325): *Quaestiones de ente* (the 14th question) and *Quaestiones de modis distinctionum* (the 11th question).² Unlike Scotus, Petrus Thomae was a very systematic author, which greatly facilitates analysis and interpretation. His *Quaestiones de ente* is certainly the first major *systematic* treatise on the transcendental concept of being, and one of the first independent (i.e., not in the form of a commentary on Aristotle) works on metaphysics³ from the emerging Scotist tradition, while the *Quaestiones de modis distinctionum* is one of the first *Formalist* treatises on distinctions and identities;⁴ only Francis of Mey-

This article is part of a larger study on the concept of 'intrinsic mode' in Scotus and the early Scotist tradition that is expected to be published in its entirety later.

1 For the life and works of Petrus Thomae, see Schabel and Smith, "The Franciscan *studium* in Barcelona," 381–86; Smith, "Bibliotheca manuscripta Petri Thomae," 161–68; Smith, "Introduction," in Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili*, XI–XIII; Ivanov, "Petrus Thomae – an Early Follower of Duns Scotus," 231–43.

2 On the *De ente*, see Dumont, "The Univocity of the Concept of Being [...] II," 196–217; "Transcendental Being," 145–46; Smith, "Introduction," in Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, XI–CCIV; on the *De modis distinctionum*, see Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*, 1–132; Hübener, "Robertus Anglicus," 334–53.

3 Let us recall that Scotus himself did not write a single completed large treatise on *metaphysics*. Although Nicholas Bonetus's *Metaphysica* is traditionally believed to have been composed in the late 1320s or even early 1330s, it is possible that Bonetus wrote his *Metaphysica* around the same time as Petrus Thomae wrote the *De ente*. However, at present, there is no basis for establishing a reliable relative chronology for the production of these two *main* systematic metaphysical works created by the early followers of Scotus.

4 On the "Formalist tradition" as a phenomenon in the history of philosophy, see Poppi, "Il contributo dei formalisti padovani"; Hübener, "Robertus Anglicus"; Bolliger, *Infiniti contemplatio*, 109–362; Andersen, "Introduction," 177–239; Vdovina, "Antonius Syrectus and the Tradition [...]"; Vdovina, "Laboratory of Ontological Concepts."

ronnes's so-called 'treatise on formalities' (*Tractatus formalitatum*), i.e., dist. 8 of the *Ab oriente* version of his *Commentary on the Sentences*⁵ – called the "Urtraktat" by Wolfgang Hübener⁶ – was apparently composed earlier.

The last, 11th, question of the second large metaphysical work by Petrus Thomae, his *De modis distinctionum*, is perhaps the most extensive and original treatise on the intrinsic mode from the early Scotist tradition. The subject of this question is: "Utrum modus intrinsecus rei distinguatur a re cuius est aliquo modo ex natura rei?"⁷

The issue of which *distinction* obtains between a mode and a thing is for Peter by no means some kind of random and external framework for considering the concept of 'intrinsic mode' but directly concerns the very *possibility* or consistency of this concept. Peter demonstrates this already in the initial arguments of the question, first the arguments 'contra' and then the one 'pro'.⁸ On the one hand, since what is distinct from something *ex natura rei* (i.e., not only through some reflexive operation of the intellect) apparently cannot be *intrinsic* to that thing from which it is so distinct, then if the intrinsic mode is distinct *ex natura rei* from the thing to which it belongs, it will not at all be a mode *intrinsic* to it. On the other hand, if there is no distinction *ex natura rei* at all between the intrinsic mode and the thing, then the mode would be a "mode of itself," which is impossible. In other words, without the distinction of the mode and the thing, there would be no *fundamentum in re* at all for a concept of *modus*. Consequently, the very concept of 'intrinsic mode' would not be a real concept but only a term signifying some *ens rationis*. However, metaphysics, according to Peter, is a *real science* that necessarily considers *real concepts*.⁹

Another initial counter-argument points to an additional important aspect of the consideration of modes: the possibility of a distinction *ex natura rei* is

5 Francis of Meyronnes, *Ab oriente*, dist. 8. This important text is contained in (among other codices): Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. Lat. 896, f. 59r–71rb; Padova, BU, Ms. 1258, f. 30ra–36va; Tortosa, Cathedral library, Ms. 155, f. 67ra–85ra.

6 Hübener, "Robertus Anglicus," 334.

7 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 109v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 63va; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 83vb). For a presentation and initial analysis of this question, see Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*, 117–32.

8 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, argumenta principalia (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 109v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 63va–b; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 83vb).

9 Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, q. 11, art. 1, ll. 50–51, 285: "[...] metaphysica enim considerat de entis conceptu [...]"; art. 2, ll. 181–84, 292: "[...] sed ens secundum proprium conceptum est proprium et adaequatum obiectum habitus realis, puta metaphysici [...]"; ergo conceptus proprius entis habet propriam realitatem"; art. 4, ll. 430–34, 304: "Potest [sc. univocatio entis] etiam vere dici metaphysica propter veram unitatem conceptus quidditativi, quem per se primo metaphysica speculatur."

associated with the *separate intelligibility* or cognoscibility of the mode and the thing in some perfect intellectual knowledge; therefore, the special topic of the question concerns not only the explication of a conceptual content but also the very *concept* itself, i.e., the way a *modus intrinsecus* can be conceived.¹⁰

The main possible aspects of the analysis of Petrus Thomae's doctrine of intrinsic modes in his *De modis distinctionum* q. 11 are the following: 1) a description of the meaning of the concept of 'intrinsic mode,' or the answer to the question, *what* an intrinsic mode as such is; 2) a demonstration of the possibility, or reality of this concept, i.e., the solution to the problem of *distinction* and *identity* of the mode and the thing (or quiddity) to which it belongs; 3) an explication of cognoscibility (or, *conceptibility*) of the intrinsic mode, i.e., the answer to the question, what the characteristics of its *concept* are; 4) a comparison between the intrinsic mode and several related concepts, primarily the 'degree of intension' of qualities and the 'quantity of perfection'; 5) a determination of the number and diversification of various intrinsic modes.

Structurally, the corpus of Peter's *quaestio* consists of three main articles, in the first article the dominant aspect of consideration is the first issue here mentioned (and partly the third and the fourth ones), whereas the second and third articles consider the intrinsic mode mostly under the second and the remaining aspects.

1. What is an Intrinsic Mode as such? – Petrus Thomae's Deduction of the Transcendental Concept of *modus intrinsecus*

In the first article, Peter undertakes a kind of 'deduction' of the transcendental concept of 'intrinsic mode' in twelve propositions.¹¹ This deduction begins with a certain fundamental statement about the *reality* of the mode, unfolds further in

¹⁰ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, arg. pr. (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 109v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 63va–b; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 83vb).

¹¹ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 109v–110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 63vb–64ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 83vb–84rb). It should be noted that at the beginning of the third article of this question, Petrus also prefaces his answer to the first doubt by dividing the general equivocal name 'modus' into different meanings, emphasizing that he does not intend to speak there about 'extrinsic modes,' which in the proper sense (i.e., in the sense of an *intrinsic* mode) are not modes at all, but things, that is, he will not speak about modes in the sense of accidents or modes expressed by modal propositions or through adverbs, but only about "the intrinsic and essential mode of a thing." Cf. Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 3, dub. 1 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 65ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85rb): "Primum est, quod hic non intendo loqui de illo modo qui facit propositionem modalem [modalem *om.*

the form of a consistent denial of everything that the intrinsic mode, according to Peter, formally *cannot* be, and ends with a clarification or description of the meaning of the concept of ‘intrinsic mode.’¹²

In the first proposition, Peter affirms the *reality* of the intrinsic mode (not in his own terminological sense of ‘reality,’¹³ but in the general sense according to which it is ‘something real’): “modus intrinsecus est in re ex natura rei.”¹⁴ The proof of this is an analytical explication of the concept: to be ‘intrinsic’ to something *ex natura rei* can only mean to be inherent in it *ex natura rei*; since the mode is intrinsic to the thing, it follows that it *really* exists in it. The only alternative to the inherence of the mode in the thing *ex natura rei* would be an *extrinsic* denomination from some operation of an intellect. However, the second proposition below is aimed at refuting this possibility. Moreover, the fourth corollary to this article below supplements this first proposition about reality with a proposition about actual existence: in actual existence, the intrinsic mode is *inseparable* from the thing to which it belongs.¹⁵

The second proposition reverses the first one. Since the mode is something real and existing in a thing, it formally (i.e., in its ‘quasi-quiddity’ and as such)

N], nec de *modo accidentali*, eo modo quo omnia accidentia dicuntur quidam [quidam *om.* N] modi; huiusmodi enim *non sunt praecise modi*, immo sunt *vere res*, nec sunt etiam *modi intrinseci*, sed *extrinseci*; nec etiam loquor hic de illis modis qui communiter per adverbia importantur, ut bene vel male [male N W, fortiter et cetera V], quia omnes tales [quia omnes tales V, tales enim W, relationes N] modi extrinseci sunt; tantummodo ergo hic loquor de *modo intrinseco et essentiali rei* [...]” My italics. Obviously, it is the meaning of such a concept of mode that is being discussed in the first article as well, since the attribute ‘intrinsic’ is constantly used in subsequent propositions and their proofs, and is also included in the final ‘description’ of the meaning of the concept.

12 It is manifest that Peter is aware of the impossibility of *defining* the transcendental concept, because he explicitly calls the outcome of this deduction a “description” (*descriptio*), not “definition” (*definitio*). See Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, prop. 12 (Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84rb): “Omnes istae condiciones in ista descriptione positae possunt elici ex praedictis.”

13 On Petrus Thomae’s own terminological meaning of “reality,” see Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 2, art. 1, in fine (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 77r–77v).

14 The same proposition is repeated by Peter in his late treatise *De distinctione praedicamentorum* too, and he actually refers there to this place in *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, cf. Petrus Thomae, *De distinctione praedicamentorum*, art. 2, concl. 1, in fine, 305: “[...] quia modi intrinseci sunt ex natura rei, ut apparet in ultima quaestione *De modis distinctionum*.”

15 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, corr. 4 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64rb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84va): “Quarto, quod modus intrinsecus est inseparabilis in actuali existentia a re cuius est.”

cannot be a “second intention,”¹⁶ i.e., something that has no immediate *fundamentum* in a thing, but only in our thinking about it. An additional argument in favor of this proposition is the impossibility of including ‘ens rationis’ in the quiddity of any real being. The intrinsic mode, as a *contractivum*, is included in the quiddity of any contracted or special being. If it were a second intention, then the essence of God and any created thing would contain something “made up” (*fictum*) by the intellect that is not real, which is completely impossible within the framework of Scotist ontology. In addition, as Peter stated already in his *De ente*,¹⁷ certain intrinsic modes are transcendental properties of being, and such properties cannot be second intentions at all.¹⁸ Otherwise, metaphysics would prove the inherence of second intentions in things, and thereby lose its status as the first of the *real* sciences.

According to the third proposition, a mode can neither be a *quiddity* nor its part.¹⁹ This is proved: an intrinsic mode is the mode of a *quiddity*, and therefore if the mode itself would be a quiddity, then either there will be no modes at all, or the quiddity itself will simply be a mode or consist of modes. In other words, if this non-identity is eliminated, the meaning of the concept of intrinsic mode will be lost.

The fourth proposition distinguishes the concept of mode from *reality* in a terminological sense.²⁰ Peter here affirms that there is at least some reality, such as the reality of the genus, of which it is evident that it is formally not an intrinsic mode. In addition, the identity of reality and mode would mean that reality, like a mode, could be intrinsic to another reality, which would make the distinction of realities (at least in a finite being) impossible.

16 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, prop. 2 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 109v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 63vb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84ra): “Secunda [propositio] est quod modus intrinsecus non est formaliter secunda intentio.”

17 Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, q. 12, art. 1, concl. 7, ll. 161–67, 315; q. 14, art. 3, ad 5, ll. 583–87, 413–14.

18 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, prop. 2 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 109v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 63vb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84ra): “Praeterea, passio entis non est secunda intentio; sed aliqui modi intrinseci sunt passionis disiunctae [disiunctivae V] entis, ergo et cetera.”

19 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, prop. 3 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 109v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 63vb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84ra): “Tertia propositio est quod modus intrinsecus formaliter non est [ipsa add. V] rei quidditas vel pars quidditatis.”

20 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, prop. 4 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 63vb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84ra): “Quarta propositio est quod modus intrinsecus non est formaliter ipsa realitas.”

The fifth proposition contrasts the *modus intrinsecus* with the *formality* of a thing.²¹ A thing cannot formally be *what* it is through an intrinsic mode, but through its formality or some quidditative content (*ratio quidditativa*), a thing formally is what it is.

In the sixth proposition, Peter denies the possibility of a mode being something *negative*.²² In contrast to *ens rationis*, Peter understands negation as “*nihil simpliciter*,” which cannot be something intrinsic to a thing or something positive at all, and therefore nothing negative can formally constitute an intrinsic mode. The opposite is also true: since a negation has no proper entity and formality, it cannot have any intrinsic mode of its own.²³ Probably, this refutation of the negativity of a mode is a reaction against some early followers or critics of Scotus among the Franciscans, who adhered to the position that being is contracted by *negative* modes (according to Stephen Dumont, William of Alnwick believed so).²⁴ A more detailed refutation of the thesis that the *contractivum* in general (and therefore the intrinsic mode) can be or include something purely negative is found already in the first article of question 14 of *De ente*.²⁵ Peter points out there that something purely negative cannot specify something positive; moreover, pure negation *ex se* is the most indefinite, and therefore it would be absurd to believe that it can be a *determinativum* or *contractivum*. Finally, the negativity of the mode would mean that anything formally constituted through it is ‘nothing,’ since everything that is specified (or determined) through pure negation is formally nothing. The falsity of these consequences, according to Peter, is obvious, and therefore any assumption of negativity of the contracting mode is impossible.

According to the seventh proposition, the intrinsic mode can formally be neither relative nor absolute,²⁶ because, as we shall see below, the intrinsic mode

21 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, prop. 5 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64ra): “Quinta propositio est quod modus intrinsecus non est proprie formalitas rei.”

22 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, prop. 6 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84ra): “Sexta propositio est quod modus intrinsecus non est formaliter aliquid negativum [negatio N].”

23 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 3, ad dub. 2 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111r–v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 65rb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85vb): “[...] dico quod sicut negatio non habet propriam entitatem, nec realitatem, nec formalitatem, [...] ita nec habet aliquem proprium [proprium om. W N] modum intrinsecum ei [...].”

24 Dumont, “The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: John Duns Scotus and William of Alnwick,” 15–16. See also William of Alnwick, “*Quaestiones in Primum Sententiarum*, q. 8,” in Dumont, *ibid.*, art. 2, ll. 737–51, 61; ad arg. pr. 1, ll. 1014–27, 71.

25 Cf. Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, q. 14, art. 1, ll. 83–101, 390–91.

26 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, prop. 7 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84ra): “Septima propositio est quod modus intrinsecus non est formaliter aliquid relativum [relativum N W respectivum V] nec aliquid absolutum.”

as *such* exceeds the division into absolute and relative categories and can inhere in a thing of *any* genus; therefore, its formal content as a *transcendental* concept cannot be reduced to only one genus or division of being.

The eighth proposition distinguishes the concept of intrinsic mode from the concept of a 'degree of intension or remission' of some accidental finite quality.²⁷ In contrast to the degree of intensification, which applies only to finite and accidental things, the concept of an intrinsic mode is *transcendentally common*. Since anything can have, and necessarily has, such a mode, these two concepts cannot be identical. Further on, Peter clarifies that although a degree of intensification may well be called some specific 'intrinsic mode,' the 'mode in general' cannot be reduced to a degree.²⁸ After all, many substantial things have essences that are in no way subject to increasing or decreasing, but at the same time are determined by their intrinsic modes, for example, the divine essence or angelic nature. In addition, Peter associates the 'degree of intensification' with a certain *accidental form* (the meaning of the concept 'gradus intentionis' is explained as "proportion of form"), whereas the intrinsic mode is neither the form nor the quiddity of a thing.²⁹ Moreover, the degree of intensification includes the form, while the intrinsic mode does *not* include even the content of the quidditative concept of being, but at the same time, it is included in a thing. Finally, a form is related differently to its degree of intensification than a thing to its intrinsic mode; a form is not connected with one or another of its degrees as necessarily as a thing is with its mode, because a form can individually subsist without this or that individual degree (although not without a degree at all), but a thing without its own intrinsic mode cannot. In the same way, the finite form of some quality acquires a degree of intensification as a kind of *additional* perfection through a secondary influence, already possessing a certain being as a form, while the intrinsic mode is produced through the same action by which the thing itself to which it belongs is produced into being.

In the ninth proposition, Peter opposes "some" scholars who claim that the intrinsic mode is formally a *magnitude of perfection* or *virtual quantity*.³⁰ As I have

27 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, prop. 8 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84rb): "Octava [propositio]: modus intrinsecus non est formaliter gradus intentionis vel remissionis."

28 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 3, ad dub. 1, in fine (Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 65rb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85va–b).

29 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 3, ad dub. 6 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 65va–b; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 86ra).

30 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, prop. 9 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84rb): "Nona [propositio]: modus intrinsecus non est formaliter quantitas seu magnitudo virtutis, ut quidam dicunt."

demonstrated elsewhere,³¹ behind these “quidam” is probably Scotus himself. Peter’s refutation is again aimed not at denying that the *magnitudo virtutis* is some kind of intrinsic mode (since he is quite willing to consider it a mode), but that the intrinsic mode as such can be *adequately* described by the concept of ‘virtual magnitude.’ Peter argues that since the concept of intrinsic mode is *more general* in comparison with the concept of virtual magnitude and includes many other modes, it is inappropriate and wrong (and “unskillful,” i.e., not befitting a scientist, too) to answer the question of what an intrinsic mode in general is, by indicating something as special as virtual magnitude.³² This is proven simply by listing the modes, which should be covered by the final general description of the concept of intrinsic mode, but do not in themselves mean any quantity of perfection. These are, for example, the modes of possibility, “through-itself-being” (*perseitas*, which is the intrinsic mode of substance), etc. Here, it is quite obvious that Peter no longer sees the *special* significance that the doctrine of the ‘transcendental magnitude of being’ or the ‘virtual quantity of perfection’ had for Scotus himself, nor the systematic coherence of it with the concept of *modus intrinsecus* in Scotus. This is why Peter so easily refutes this theory.

The tenth proposition explicitly expresses what the previous ones assumed: an intrinsic mode cannot formally be limited to a certain *genus*.³³ The proof for this reads: there are many modes that *transcend* any generic community, for example, finitude and possibility, which are common to all creatures. In addition, intrinsic modes immediately *contract* being as such and therefore also cannot formally belong to any determinate genus.

The eleventh proposition affirmatively states the conclusion that follows from the previous proposition: “modus intrinsecus formaliter est aliquid transcendens.”³⁴ It must be transcendent, since it is found in God and creatures, in substance and accidents.

31 See the first part of a larger forthcoming study I referred to in the initial note above concerning the conception of *modus intrinsecus* in Scotus.

32 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, prop. 9 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64ra): “Confirmatur, quoniam quaerenti quid est aliquod commune, incongrue et inartificialiter respondetur per aliquod inferius, sed modus intrinsecus est quid commune ad magnitudinem virtutis et ad multa alia, ut ad possibilitatem, perseitatem et plura alia, ut inferius ostendetur, ergo quaerenti quid est modus intrinsecus non convenienter [non convenienter V inconvenienter W] respondetur, quod est quantitas vel magnitudo virtutis.”

33 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, prop. 10 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64ra): “Decima propositio est quod modus intrinsecus non est formaliter aliquid determinatum [determinatum V terminatum W] ad certum genus.”

34 *Ibid.*, prop. 11.

Finally, in the last proposition, Peter puts together all the previous characteristics (*condiciones*) of this concept in one general description:

Duodecima propositio est quod modus intrinsecus rei est quaedam ratio positiva transcendens quae nec est quidditas nec pars quidditatis, quidditati tamen rei inexistens et ipsam intrinsece modificans.³⁵

In this deduction and the final description of the *meaning* of the concept of intrinsic mode in the 12th proposition, Peter mainly emphasizes the following characteristics: 1) The *reality* of the concept – the intrinsic mode is something *real* (or a *ratio positiva*), i.e., it is neither a being of reason (or second intention) nor something negative (against Peter of Navarre and William of Alnwick); 2) the opposition and correlation of the intrinsic mode and *quiddity* or formality; besides, in regard to reality (in the terminological sense) Peter states: “reality is formally not a mode” – a proposition clearly directed against Francis of Meyronnes; 3) the *transcendence* of *modus intrinsecus* (it transcends the absolute and the relative, it is not limited to any genus and occurs both in God and creatures).

In the last part of the description of the concept: “quidditati tamen rei inexistens et ipsam intrinsece modificans,” Peter, in fact, reaffirms the fundamental connection between the intrinsic mode and the quiddity. As for Francis of Meyronnes – and this is the *common* ground that remains the background for all the differences between the two ‘founding fathers’ of the Formalist tradition –, for Peter too, a mode is always the mode of a *quiddity* (or the thing). Besides, Peter affirms the peculiarity of this concept; the factual tautology in the description of *modus intrinsecus* (“intrinsically modifying”) indicates that this is a *sui generis* concept, which belongs to a fundamentally different order than any quidditative concept.

2. Properties of the Concept ‘Intrinsic Mode’

There are six corollaries to the first article additionally complementing the description and clarifying this concept itself as a *concept*.³⁶

First, and this fundamental proposition directly contradicts almost the whole subsequent Scotist tradition, Peter asserts that the intrinsic mode has its *own* or *proper* concept (*proprium conceptum*).³⁷ This means that a mode *can* be *abstractively* known in its proper concept *without* knowledge of the thing to

³⁵ *Ibid.*, prop. 12.

³⁶ This corresponds to the third aspect of consideration of an intrinsic mode in Peter’s question that I have distinguished above.

³⁷ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, corr. 1 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84rb): “Ex hoc concludo correlarie primo, quod modus intrinsecus rei habet *proprium* conceptum.” My italics.

which it belongs. This proposition was so important for the author (who, apparently, was also aware of how potentially controversial it was) that he repeated it in his *quaestio* – both as a subject of proof and as a premise for other arguments – at least seven times! In particular, in the fifth corollary to this article, he specifically emphasizes his disagreement with the “dictum quorundam dicentium, quod modus intrinsecus est quod non habet proprium conceptum praecisum ab illo cuius est.”³⁸ We cannot establish with complete certainty which of the early Scotists is meant here, but given that with a high probability in the next corollary the author opposes Francis of Meyronnes, we can assume that it is he who is meant here too. This is especially likely, because in *Conflatus*, dist. 42, q. 4, in his answer to the question concerning the *knowability* of the mode, Francis uses exactly the term with which Peter here characterizes his opponent’s position (namely, “praecise conceptibile / intelligibile”):

Dico quod omne per se conceptibile habet per se quidditatem, sed non est necesse quod id quod est cum alio praecise conceptibile quod de se habeat quidditatem. Modo in proposito dico, quod modus intrinsecus a nullo intellectu est conceptibilis per se, nisi cum ratione formali cuius est modus; licet enim bene sit intelligibilis, non tamen bene praescindendo a ratione formali quidditatis cuius est.³⁹

Petrus Thomae, however, argues the exact opposite. According to him, not only can a mode be understood abstractively in its own concept without the thing to which it belongs being understood; moreover, it is impossible for the thing to be abstractively comprehended in a proper act of understanding (*propria conceptione*) without its own intrinsic mode. In the second article of the question, the author provides several arguments to demonstrate these two points.⁴⁰

Regarding the *impossibility* of knowing a thing without its intrinsic mode, Peter specifically explains that in this assertion he means by ‘knowledge,’ firstly, an *abstractive conceptual* knowledge, and secondly, a *proper* understanding of a certain thing, in contrast to an understanding of it in some *general* or common concept, for example, the understanding of a human being according to its own or proper concept, i. e., as the quiddity ‘humanity’ and not according to the general concepts of ‘animal,’ ‘body,’ or ‘substance’ through which we also conceive some ‘formal contents’ in a human being. In other words, the *proper concept* of a certain thing is *distinctive* in relation to the formal concept of another thing and adequately expresses its quiddity in all its internal parts and with everything that

38 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, corr. 5 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64rb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84va).

39 Francis of Meyronnes, *Conflatus*, dist. 42, q. 4, n. 10, ed. Möhle and Hoffmeister Pich, 418.

40 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 2, prop. 2 and 3 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r–v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64rb–vb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84va–85ra).

intrinsically belongs to it. It is obvious that Peter here interprets⁴¹ Scotus's statements about some perfect or *adequate* concept of a thing in his famous explanation of the understanding of "*res cum vel sub suo modo intrinseco*" in *Ordinatio* I, dist. 8,⁴² as describing precisely such a *proper* quidditative concept. Peter asserts that the intrinsic mode *intrinsically* belongs to the *quiddity* of the thing whose mode it is.⁴³ This, in turn, follows from his theory of the contraction of being: according to Peter, the *ratio contrahendi* or *contractivum* intrinsically *constitutes* the quiddity of any contracted thing, i.e., in the case of contraction of being – the mode constitutes the quiddity of any particular being contained 'under' the concept of being as such.⁴⁴ On this background, Peter's main argument in favor of the impossibility of knowing a thing in its proper concept without knowing its intrinsic mode is very simple: A conceptual abstraction (*abstractio praecisiva*) prescinding a thing from what intrinsically belongs to its quiddity is impossible, because this would mean conceptually depriving the thing of its very *quiddity*, and not of something external to it; but the intrinsic mode does belong to the quiddity; therefore, a thing cannot be known in its proper concept without knowing its intrinsic mode as belonging to its quiddity.⁴⁵ In other words, any abstraction from the intrinsic mode in the comprehension of a thing means that we do not have a proper and adequate concept of it, but only some *general* or *common* and imperfect concept of some reality or objective content, for example, of being as such.

The second proposition about the *possibility* of cognition of an intrinsic mode in its proper concept without the proper cognition of a thing is demonstrat-

41 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, ad arg. pr., dicta Scoti (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 112v–13r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 67ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 87va).

42 Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 3, nn. 138–42, ed. Vat. 4, 222–24.

43 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 2, prop. 1 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64rb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84va): "Primum est quod modus intrinsecus pertinet ad quidditatem 'eius cuius est' intrinsece."

44 *Ibid.*: "[...] nam illud quod est ratio contrahendi pertinet intrinsece ad quidditatem 'eius cuius est,' quod est per se primus terminus contractionis; sed *modus intrinsecus est ratio contrahendi ens*, ut patuit in *Quaestionibus de ente*, ergo pertinet intrinsece [intrinsece om. N W] ad quidditatem cuiuslibet contenti sub ente." My italics. See also Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, q. 14, art. 1, ll. 111–13, 392; art. 2, ll. 185–86, 395; art. 2, concl. 5, ll. 333–64, 402–3.

45 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 2, prop. 2 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r–v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64rb–va; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84vb): "Hoc probo sic: abstractio praecisiva [praecisiva W praecisionis N om. V] rei ab eo quod ad eius quidditatem intrinsece pertinet est impossibilis [impossibilis W V incompossibilis N]; sed modus intrinsecus pertinet intrinsece ad quidditatem rei cuius est, ex praecedenti [dicto]; ergo huius abstractio est impossibilis [sed modus ... impossibilis om. V]. [...] Praeterea, si non concipis rem [rem om. N W] sub [sub V cum N W] aliquo modo, ergo non concipis eam propria conceptione, sed tantum [tantum V solum N solummodo W] in communi."

ed by the two following arguments.⁴⁶ First, in the order of distinct conceptual cognition, a certain constitutive element always precedes the whole constituted by it, therefore, the intrinsic mode as the contracting element conceptually *precedes* that term to which the contraction is carried out. The prior as such can always be understood without the posterior, hence, the intrinsic mode can be known in its own concept without the quiddity or thing constituted or contracted by it being known. In this regard, the intrinsic mode, according to Peter, is similar to a specific difference, which can be understood as such without the specific nature constituted by it, while the opposite, i.e., understanding a species without understanding its difference, is impossible. Second, Peter is here applying Scotus's famous argument⁴⁷ about the distinction between a certain and a doubtful concept from a demonstration of the univocity of the concept of being to this problem: If we have one certain concept and another doubtful concept about something, then we can know the first without knowing the second; but the certainty of the concept of the intrinsic mode can be compatible with the doubt regarding the proper concept of the thing to which it belongs, therefore, we can have the concept of an intrinsic mode without the proper concept of the thing (*res sub modo*). To explain the minor premise, Peter gives examples of finitude and infinity. It is possible to have a certain concept of the finitude of some being, but still be in doubt about its own quiddity or nature. In this way, Scotus already taught that a human intellect is capable of possessing a certain concept of infinity as a modifying *part* of the concept of 'infinite being' and yet is not capable of possessing the proper (i.e., simple and adequate) concept of the divine *essence* (insofar as it is "haec in se") to which this intrinsic mode belongs.⁴⁸

However, if the *modus* has its own, i.e., a *distinctly* knowable abstractive concept, this implies an unexpected conclusion, namely that an intrinsic mode has its *own formality*.⁴⁹ This conclusion is unacceptable for the subsequent For-

46 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 2, prop. 3 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64va; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84vb–85ra): "Tertium dictum est quod modus intrinsecus potest abstractive concipi non concepta re cuius est."

47 Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 3, pars 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 27–29, ed. Vat. 3, 18–19.

48 See Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1–2, n. 55, ed. Vat. 3, 37–38; cf. further *Ord.* I, dist. 2, pars 1, q. 3, n. 183, 164, ed. Vat. 2, 237–38, 225–26.

49 What difficult consequences this statement can lead to can be seen in a similar example from Peter's discussion of the scope of the concept "formality" in *De modis distinctionum*, q. 7, art. 3, ad dub. 4. Since not only *ens*, but all transcendental concepts have, according to Peter, their own *formality*, but all other transcendental concepts (he is here talking specifically about the *properties* of being) do not include the conceptual *ratio entis*, being "primo diversae" from *ens*, he is forced to divide 'formality as such' into two general types: the first *quidditative* formality of being and the *qualitative* formalities of transcendental properties. However, doubts then arise concerning the type of generality of such a concept of formality: 1) either it is necessary to

malist tradition that in this matter rather followed Francis of Meyronnes with his fundamental division of everything into ‘formality’ and ‘mode’ as *opposita*.⁵⁰ Indeed, Peter defines: “per formalitatem nihil aliud intelligo [...] quam aliquam formalem rationem cuiuscumque rei per se conceptibilem.”⁵¹ From this definition follows that everything that has its own concept also has its own formality. Thus, according to Peter, the intrinsic mode should have *its own formality*. Peter actually draws this conclusion in his answer to the last doubt in the third article of our *quaestio*.⁵²

accept that this general concept of formality can be abstracted from both types of transcendental formalities and predicated of them quidditatively, but from this, it would follow that formality as such is a more universal conceptual content than being itself, and therefore formality (as a kind of “super-transcendental” concept), and not being as such, should be considered as the *first* concept of human intellect and knowledge (inclusive as a subject of metaphysics), a conclusion that is clearly unacceptable to Peter; 2) or there cannot be anything *univocally* common predicable of both quidditative and qualitative formalities (i.e., about the two main types of transcendental conceptual contents), and therefore the universal and common concept of formality as such is only a purely *equivocal* name, and ‘formality’ in the proper sense is equal in the scope of predication to the *quidditative ratio* of being as such and depends on it. However, if we take into account the *connection* between univocity as the *unity of a concept* and the definition of a concept as such, which is crucial for the Scotist tradition, then there are valid reasons to doubt whether the universal term “formality” can be called a *concept* at all. Then formality in this general sense (as an equivocal name) cannot be an object of necessary knowledge. Therefore, such an ontological element as a certain *qualitative formality* needs a special explication, which, as far as I know, is absent in Petrus Thomae. Exactly the same order of argumentation can be applied to the *qualitative* concept of the formality of “intrinsic mode” compared to the *quidditative* formality of being as being. See Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 7, art. 3, ad dub. 4 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 95r–v).

⁵⁰ Francis of Meyronnes, *Ab oriente*, dist. 8, p. 1, art. 14 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. Lat. 896, f. 60va; Padova, BU, Ms. 1258, f. 30vb; Tortosa, Cathedral library, Ms. 155, f. 69va): “omne aliud a formalitate est modus intrinsecus.” Cf. *Conflatus*, dist. 8, q. 1, art. 2, 43vb: “omne quod distinguitur vel est quidditas, vel modus quidditatis.” Cf. the title of Möhle’s book: *Formalitas und modus intrinsecus*.

⁵¹ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 3, ad dub. 7 (Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 66ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 86va).

⁵² Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 3, ad dub. 7, dictum 1 and 2 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 112r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 66ra–b; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 86va): “Primum est quod modus intrinsecus potest considerari vel quantum ad *suam propriam formalitatem*, vel in comparatione ad rem [ad rem N eius V om. W] cuius est [...] Exemplum: infinitas quae est modus intrinsecus in divinis habet *formalitatem propriam*, quae est *sua propria ratio* qua est illud quod est. Potest ergo accipi [accipi W sumi V] secundum se et *suam propriam rationem* qua est illud quod est, vel per comparationem ad rem [rem N W illud V] cuius est, puta ad divinam essentiam. [...] Secundum est quod modus intrinsecus non distinguitur a *sua propria formalitate* seu formali ratione qua est illud quod est, tunc enim non esset illud quod est propria formalitate.” My italics. Of course, one can ask,

In the second corollary of the first article, Peter expresses the second main characteristic of the *concept* of intrinsic mode. The concept of intrinsic mode is not a quidditative, but a *qualitative* or *determining* concept.⁵³ This position is, on the one hand, fully consistent with the general theory of concepts of Scotus outlined in his *Theoremata* and with his characterization of the concept of *modus intrinsecus*, at least as it is set out in the key paragraph of *Ordinatio* I, dist. 8.⁵⁴ On the other hand, the texts of distinctions 19 and 31 of Scotus's *Sentences Commentary* (all three versions of it) include some substantive reasons for understanding the modes of finitude and infinity as two fundamental *types* of 'transcendental magnitude' of being. This could imply, among other things, the possibility of introducing a special class of 'quantifying' or 'quantitative' transcendental concepts (or 'modifying' as distinct from the 'formally differentiating' concepts of the 'specific' and 'ultimate differences'). The fact that Petrus Thomae, who is usually very ingenious and productive in completing the conceptual and theoretical constructions that Scotus left unfinished, did not take the chance to introduce such an additional division of transcendental concepts, may stem from Peter's failing to perceive the importance of the concept of 'magnitude of being as such' for Scotus, although he is obviously acquainted with the discussion itself in *Ordinatio* I, dist. 31.⁵⁵

Further, the concept of intrinsic mode is, according to Peter, *dividing* (*divisivus*) and itself *indivisible* (*irresolubilis*)⁵⁶ into any conceptual parts. In Scotist

whether this statement does not contradict the denial of the identity of intrinsic mode and formality in the 5th proposition of the first article above? Strictly speaking, what was denied there was that a mode is the formality of a thing and not its own *formality* as the *ratio* of the intrinsic mode conceived in itself. Nevertheless, in this rapprochement, one sees an echo of general efforts to maintain a fragile balance between thinking about the mode's own 'entity' and defending its status as necessarily *intrinsic* to a thing.

⁵³ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, corr. 2 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84rb): "Secundo, quod proprius conceptus modi intrinseci non est quidditativus, sed qualitativus [qualitativus W V modificans N]." Cf. Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 2, prop. 6 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64vb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85ra): "[...] propria ratio modi est qualitativa."

⁵⁴ On the division of concepts into *quidditative* and *qualitative* (predicable in *quid* / in *quale*) as the most universal for Scotus and the Scotist tradition, see Duns Scotus, *Theoremata*, pars 3, nn. 49–50, OPh II, 618; Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, q. 6, art. 1, ll. 105–7, 90; q. 12, art. 1, concl. 1, ll. 36–48, 308–9. On the *qualitative* character of the concept 'modus intrinsecus' in Scotus see Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 136, ed. Vat. 4, 221.

⁵⁵ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, ad arg. pr., dictum Scoti 5 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 113r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 67ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 87va).

⁵⁶ This particular characteristic is explicitly mentioned in only one manuscript, namely Ms. N, out of the seven manuscripts that I have reviewed and that contain the text of this question.

terminology, it is a ‘simpliciter simplex’ concept.⁵⁷ This can be confirmed by the fact that *ens* is *not* predicated of the intrinsic mode *quidditatively*, and the intrinsic mode does *not* include the *ratio* of the concept of being,⁵⁸ in other words, according to Peter, the intrinsic mode cannot be a being in a *quidditative* or formal way, but is a pure transcendental ‘quasi-quality.’ Since the concept of difference is also dividing and *qualitative*, Peter considers it necessary to specify⁵⁹ that the mode as such cannot be a *fundamentum in re* for any finite difference, because every specific difference necessarily enters into the quiddity as its *part*. In contrast, the intrinsic mode cannot be anything *quidditative* at all. In other words, Peter is here still elaborating on the fact that modes and differences constitute two fundamentally different types of concepts.

To summarize, Peter undertakes a rather radical expansion of Scotus’s epistemological theory, putting forward and proving the thesis about the knowability of the intrinsic mode in its *own proper* concept separately from the concept of a thing – a thesis that Scotus himself does not have in this form, and which, as it seems, was almost completely rejected in the subsequent Formalist tradition. Pe-

Nonetheless, it appears that this feature of the concept of intrinsic mode is fully consistent with Peter’s teaching about the intrinsic mode and its concept, both in general and in detail. Cf. Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, prop. 11 (Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84rb): “Praeterea, modus intrinsecus reperitur in Deo et in creaturis, et in substantia et accidente; ergo est transcendens *et habet proprium conceptum, qui est divisivus et irresolubilis*.” My italics, the last part is the reading present in N.

⁵⁷ In Scotus, such simply simple (*simpliciter simplices*) concepts, in addition to intrinsic modes, also include transcendental concepts of *being*, its simple or convertible *properties*, and the concepts of ‘ultimate differences’ of being, and perhaps also the concepts of ‘simple perfections.’ All of the listed concepts, except for the concept of being, are *qualitative*; the concept of being is the only *quidditative* ‘simply simple concept.’ As simply or absolutely simple concepts, all of the above-mentioned qualitative concepts are also ‘primarily diverse’ (*primo diversi*) from the first concept of being, since they do not include it within themselves; in other words, they do not include anything ‘in common’ with other concepts.

⁵⁸ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 2, prop. 6 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64vb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85ra–b): “Praeterea, illa quae sunt quidditative et omnibus modis idem, quidquid quidditative includit unum <includit> et reliquum; sed res includit quidditative ens [sed res includit quidditative ens W N sed res includit quidditative aliquid quod non includit modus, ergo et cetera. Maior patet. Minor etiam, quia res includit quidditative ens, non autem modus, ut patuit, etc. V]. Modus autem intrinsecus ipsum <sc. ens> non includit [Modus...non includit *om.* V], ut patuit in ista quaestione [De ente], “Utrum ens contrahatur per differentias vel per modos”. [...] ens non praedicatur in quid de modo [...]” All text in <...> is my emendation.

⁵⁹ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, corr. 3 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64ra–b; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84rb–va).

ter's answer to the question of what the *concept* of a mode is appears to be unique among the early followers of Scotus.

Let us return once more to the description of the meaning of the concept of intrinsic mode put forward by Peter. In the last corollary of the first article of the question, Peter refutes Francis of Meyronnes's famous 'description' of the intrinsic mode.⁶⁰ Again, Peter argues that since, according to the order and way of our cognition, the content of the *contracting* concept (*ratio contractivi*) always *precedes* the contracted quiddity or thing, and an intrinsic mode contracts being as such, then some intrinsic mode belongs to the quiddity of anything and, therefore, in the order of our understanding, *modus intrinsecus* always comes before (*praeveniens*) that thing (or quiddity). This directly contradicts the formula of Francis, in which the *defining* positive character of the mode is that it "arrives at something" (*advenit alicui*), i.e., is joined to an already always completely *constituted* quiddity.⁶¹ In addition, if Francis's description in terms of "advenientia" were correct, then, according to Peter, the mode would not be intrinsic, but only an accidental or extrinsic mode. Intrinsic modes, in Peter's *proper* sense, which expresses – in Peter's understanding – the doctrine of Scotus, would then not be possible at all.

Here, it is appropriate to make a few historical remarks. As was the custom of scholastic scholars of the fourteenth century, Peter nowhere (including in this corollary) *explicitly* identifies his opponent as Francis, therefore, until very recently, researchers made only very cautious assumptions about the relation between the two Franciscans – whether they knew of each other's works, directly polemized against each other, and reacted on each other's statements regarding certain key concepts in Scotus's teaching.⁶² This sixth corollary to the first article that I am analyzing provides very clear evidence of Peter's *direct* polemic

⁶⁰ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, corr. 6 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64rb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84va): "Sextum, quod non est verum dictum aliquorum dicentium, quod *modus intrinsecus est qui adveniens alicui non variat eius rationem formalem*; modus enim intrinsecus non est 'rei cuius est' adveniens, immo quod [quod N V quid W] *praeveniens*, saltem secundum [secundum W V per N] modum concipiendi, cum habeat rationem contractivi. Secundo, quia si sic, tunc iste modus non esset intrinsecus, sed accidentalis, et ita nullus modus esset intrinsecus, quod falsum est [Secundo ... falsum est. *om. V*]." My italics.

⁶¹ Francis of Meyronnes, *Ab oriente*, dist. 8, pars 1, art. 14 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. Lat. 896, f. 60va; Padova, BU, Ms. 1258, f. 30vb; Tortosa, Cathedral library, Ms. 155, f. 69va): "dico quod modus intrinsecus est ille qui adveniens alicui non variat rationem eius formalem." See also Francis of Meyronnes, *Conflatus*, dist. 8, q. 5, n. 19: "Ideo dico quod modus intrinsecus est qui adveniens alicui non variat rationem formalem eius vel recedens ab eo non variatur ratio."

⁶² Cf. Smith, "Bibliotheca manuscripta Petri Thomae," 162, and fn. 6; Möhle, *Formalitas und modus intrinsecus*, 309–15.

against Francis: Peter quotes here the very formula for describing the intrinsic mode, which belongs to Francis and is so important to him that he repeats it many times in his writings without any changes. In addition, in the margins of one of the fourteenth-century manuscripts⁶³ the scribe's hand made a note at this place: "dictum francisci de maironis" ("statement of Francis of Meyronnes"). Nevertheless, one occurrence of the formula and one indirect confirmation of the copyist still cannot serve as solid proof of Peter's acquaintance with Francis's theory of modes. However, let me present one more argument in favor of Peter's knowledge of Francis's theory, which, in my opinion, eliminates any reasonable doubt in this regard. Peter's earliest mention of the term 'intrinsic mode' is at the end of the first *quaestio* of his early theological *Reportatio*, dist. 1,⁶⁴ in the context of a discussion of the *divisions* of being. At that place, Peter not only lists and briefly characterizes the various intrinsic modes, but also cites some *ratio* of the intrinsic mode as the reason why he considers the division of being through, e.g., possibility and act, to be a "modal division" or division through intrinsic modes. He repeats this justification there several times, applying it to the modes of finite and infinite, potential and actual, necessary and contingent, and each time it sounds the same: "ista est ratio modi intrinseci" ("this is the content [of the concept] of intrinsic mode"). The *ratio* of each mode is thus described with the phrase "adveniens quidditati non variat quidditatem" – a mode does not change the "ratio formalis" of its quiddity. In other words, Peter in his early work not only knows the formula of Francis for describing the concept of the mode, but he obviously agrees with it and uses it as his *own* (without indication of authorship, as is typical for the period)! Additionally, and crucially, Peter, at this place, considers the division of being into real and non-real to be also *modal*, for "reality does not change the quiddity, since it is an intrinsic mode."⁶⁵ Now, the thesis that 'reality' is an *intrinsic mode of a quiddity*

⁶³ See Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, corr. 6 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r). This fact was already mentioned by Smith, "Bibliotheca manuscripta Petri Thomae," 162, fn. 6.

⁶⁴ See Petrus Thomae, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 1, (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 1106), f. 65r–v. I am grateful to Garrett R. Smith for sharing with me his working transcription of the only manuscript containing this important question concerning the univocity of being from Petrus Thomae's *Reportatio*. In his communications, Smith further confirmed to me the hypothesis that Peter undoubtedly knew the works and theories of Francis of Meyronnes already at the time of the composition of his early *Reportatio*, since Peter abundantly quotes and paraphrases him there, and probably relies on the early version of the *Sentences Commentary* by Francis referred to in recent studies as the *Ab oriente* version. See further Smith's own contribution to this present volume.

⁶⁵ See Petrus Thomae, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 5 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 1106, f. 65v): "Iuxta septimam divisionem accipio unam conclusionem, videlicet quod divisio entis per ens reale et non reale est divisio modalis et non quidditativa. Probatio: illa sunt modifi-

was unique to Francis of Meyronnes among the early followers of Scotus. There can thus be no doubt about Petrus Thomae's early acquaintance with Francis's theory of modes (as formulated already in his *Ab oriente*, dating most likely earlier than his Parisian *Sentences* lecture from 1320–21).

Moreover, it seems to me that the chronology of Peter's works as currently accepted by researchers perhaps needs some correction. It is currently believed that Peter read his theological course in the Barcelona *studium generale* of the Franciscans no earlier than 1322–1323,⁶⁶ and that the treatise *De modis distinctionum* dates back to the time immediately after 1325.⁶⁷ If this is correct, then no more than about three years passed between the composition of the texts here analyzed. However, it seems very unlikely that Peter in such a short time would have developed his own theory of intrinsic modes that in many essential respects is opposite to the theory he previously borrowed from Francis. Therefore, it seems reasonable either to date Peter's reading of the *Sentences* somewhat earlier, or to accept a later date for a final redaction of the metaphysical treatise. I believe the latter is more likely.

3. The Distinction between Intrinsic Mode and Thing

Petrus Thomae's own answer to the overall question of the whole discussion concerning the distinction between an intrinsic mode and the thing to which it belongs is contained in numerous and rather lengthy arguments in the second and third articles of the question.⁶⁸ It can be summarized as follows.

cantia quidditatem et non diversificantia quae non variant in suo adventu quidditatem; sed realitas non variat quidditatem cum sit modus intrinsecus; ergo." Additionally, in *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 1, propositio 2 (Vat. lat. 2190, f. 109v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 63vb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84ra), Petrus Thomae quotes a statement from Francis's *Ab oriente*, dist. 8. Peter there reports a certain "modus dicendi," according to which "[...] est unus modus ponens quod realitas est prima intentio, cuius secunda intentio est suus modus intrinsecus, unde *sicut entitas est prima intentio, cuius secunda intentio est formalitas, ita realitas est prima intentio, cuius secunda intentio est suus modus intrinsecus* [my italics]." This is an almost literal rendering of one of Francis's own statements regarding reality in *Ab oriente*, dist. 8, pars 1, art. 22 (BAV, Vat. lat. 896, f. 61ra): "Ideo dico quod realitas est prima intentio cuius secunda est modus intrinsecus, sicut entitas est prima intentio cuius secunda est formalitas."

⁶⁶ Cf. Schabel and Smith, "The Franciscan *studium* in Barcelona," 385; Smith, "Introduction," in Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, CLXXI.

⁶⁷ Cf. Smith, "Introduction," in Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili*, XIII.

⁶⁸ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 2, prop. 1, 4–6; art. 3, ad dub. 7, dicta 7–10 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r–111r; 112r–v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64rb, 64vb–65ra; 66rb–67ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84va, 85ra–b; 86vb–87rb). Cf. Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*, O. F. M., 123–31; Hübener, "Robertus Anglicus," 336–37.

First, the mode *intrinsically* belongs to the quiddity of the thing of which it is a mode.⁶⁹ In addition to the argument from *contractio entis*, this is proven by the reason that upon the abstraction of any property or perfection that does not internally belong to the quiddity of a thing, the remaining essence of the thing will still necessarily be *either finite or infinite*, therefore, it will intrinsically possess some intrinsic mode of its own.

Secondly, the intrinsic mode is *identically or essentially identical* with the thing to which it belongs.⁷⁰ This follows from the impossibility of a mode being separated from a thing (as well as a thing from a mode) in actual existence.

Thirdly, the intrinsic mode is *to some extent* (but not totally and adequately) *formally identical* with the thing.⁷¹ This follows from the fact that it belongs *intrinsically* to the quiddity of a thing, and therefore belongs to it by identity according to the first mode of per se predication (*praedicatio primo modo per se*), because it cannot be a property belonging to the quiddity by identity according to the second mode of per se predication (*praedicatio secundo modo per se*). But if something belongs to the quiddity of a thing by 'per se identity' of the *first* type, then it is *formally* identical to it, at least "to some extent" (*aliquaqualiter*). In addition, Peter uses as an argument the already proven impossibility of knowing a thing in its own quidditative concept without knowing its intrinsic mode: that which cannot be adequately understood without something else seems to be to some extent formally identical with it; a thing cannot be understood adequately without its own intrinsic mode, therefore, it is to some extent formally identical with it. Moreover, the intrinsic mode, as belonging to the quiddity of the thing, enters into the "first concept" of the thing and therefore is formally identical with it.⁷²

⁶⁹ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 2, prop. 1 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64rb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 84va). See the text cited in note 43 above.

⁷⁰ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 2, prop. 4 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64vb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85ra): "Quartum est quod modus intrinsecus est idem idemptice rei cuius est. Hoc ostendo sic: impossibile est enim rem ipsam in actuali existentia separari a modo suo intrinseco, ergo est idem essentialiter, et per consequens <idem> idemptice sibi."

⁷¹ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 2, prop. 5 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64vb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85ra): "Quintum est quod modus intrinsecus est idem aliquaqualiter formaliter [formaliter *om. N*] rei cuius est."

⁷² *Ibid.*: "Confirmatur, quia illud [quia illud *om. N*] quod est de primo conceptu seu [conceptu seu *om. W N*] intellectu rei est idem formaliter sibi; sed modus intrinsecus est de *primo intellectu rei*; ergo, etc." My italics.

Fourthly, the intrinsic mode is *not completely identical* (*idem penitus*) with the thing itself *ex natura rei*.⁷³ Peter proves this thesis in many ways,⁷⁴ but his main arguments boil down to the fact that complete identity *ex natura rei* means that the members of such an identity are not in any way distinct, in other words, that any non-identity of them – apart from a purely rational one – is simply excluded. However, the intrinsic mode and the thing still have different proper *rationes*: the *propria ratio* of the thing is quidditative, while that of the mode is qualitative. But the quidditative and qualitative *rationes* cannot be completely identical to each other *ex natura rei*, therefore, the thing itself cannot be completely identical to its mode *ex natura rei*.⁷⁵

Besides, a thing *quidditatively* includes being (i.e., the content of the concept of being as such), but the mode does not do so.⁷⁶ However, if something is completely identical with something else, then it must necessarily include within itself *all* the conceptual contents that are included in this other.

The total quidditative identity between *res* and *modus intrinsecus* would also mean that their quiddity is completely identical. From this, it follows that they must equally be a *subject* for the same quidditative predicates (i.e., more general or ‘higher’ conceptual contents that apply to them quidditatively), or – in Peter’s terminology – be a “subjective part” (*pars subiectiva*) of some universal predicates or concepts that are identical for both of them.⁷⁷ But, as mentioned

73 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 2, prop. 6 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 110v–111r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64vb–65ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85ra–b): “Sextum est quod modus intrinsecus non est idem penitus ex natura rei cum ipsa re.”

74 *Ibid.*

75 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 2, prop. 6 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64vb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85ra): “Praeterea, quorum rationes propriae non sunt idem penitus ex natura rei, illa non sunt [illa non sunt W N nec ipsa erunt V] idem penitus ex natura rei; sed propriae [propriae om. V] rationes rei et modi intrinseci eius non sunt idem penitus ex natura rei; ergo et cetera. Minor apparet, quia propria ratio modi est qualitativa. Ratio autem propria rei est quidditativa. Ratio autem quidditativa et ratio [ratio om. N V] qualitativa non videntur [videntur W V dicuntur N] penitus idem ex natura rei.”

76 This is implied by the status of the concept of intrinsic mode as a “simply simple” purely *qualitative* concept that is “primarily diverse” from the “simply simple” *quidditative* concept of being as such. See the text cited in note 58 above.

77 Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 2, prop. 6 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64vb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85ra–b): “Confirmatur, quia quae sunt idem quidditative totaliter, cuiuscumque unum est pars subiectiva, et alterum; sed res est pars subiectiva entis, modus autem non; ergo et cetera. Maior patet: quorum est enim eadem quidditas, omnia aequaliter subiciuntur eisdem superioribus. Minor etiam patet, quia ens non praedicatur in quid de modo, ut patet in illa quaestione.”

above,⁷⁸ *ens* as the first quidditative concept is not predicated quidditatively of the intrinsic mode,⁷⁹ although it is predicated quidditatively of any thing – finite or infinite; therefore, the thing is the ‘subject’ of the quidditative predication of *ens*, but the intrinsic mode as such is not. Consequently, the mode and the thing cannot be completely identical with each other *ex natura rei*.

Also, something that is neither a quiddity nor a part of a quiddity cannot be completely *quidditatively* identical with a thing, but precisely this applies to the intrinsic mode.⁸⁰

Finally, what is not identical with something in an *adequate* way cannot be completely and totally identical with it, since the meanings of ‘adequate’ and ‘total identity’ coincide. But the intrinsic mode is not adequately identical with the thing,⁸¹ since the *ratio contrahendi* or *contractivum* alone (i.e., the intrinsic mode) cannot be *adequately identical* with that which is constituted by and consists of the contractible and the contractive elements. Likewise, an element cannot be adequately identical with the whole it co-constitutes.⁸² It is worth recall-

⁷⁸ Cf. my discussion of the dividing character of the concept of *modus intrinsecus* in section 2 above.

⁷⁹ It is interesting that as in many other arguments in this question, Peter seems to refer here to question 14 of his treatise *De ente* (cf. “ut patet in illa [V adds: prius relata] quaestione”) in support of his thesis that being is not quidditatively predicated of the intrinsic mode. But while for references in other cases, one can find the corresponding places in the text of *De ente*, the thesis about the non-predicability of the quidditative concept of being of the intrinsic mode is absent there, at least, in explicit form.

⁸⁰ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 2, prop. 6 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64vb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85rb): “Praeterea, quod non est rei quidditas nec quidditatis pars, non est idem penitus quidditative cum re; sed modus intrinsecus non est rei quidditas nec eius pars, ut supra est ostensum, ergo et cetera.”

⁸¹ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 2, prop. 6 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 64vb–65ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85rb): “Praeterea, illud quod non est idem alicui adaequate, non est penitus et [penitus et add. V] totaliter idem sibi; haec est evidens, quia si totaliter, ergo adaequate; sed modus intrinsecus non est idem adaequate cum re [cum re W N rei V] cuius est, ergo non est totaliter [totaliter N essentialiter W] idem sibi [ergo non est ... sibi om. V]. Minor apparet, quia illud quod est ratio contrahendi non est adaequate idem cum eo quod ex contrahibili et contractivo resultat; sed modus intrinsecus est ratio contrahendi, ergo et cetera.”

⁸² In proof of an important proposition (*dictum*) 7 in his response to the last seventh *dubium* of the 3rd article, Peter gives some examples of a distinction that is less than the formal one accepted among the Scotists, but nonetheless, a distinction *ex natura rei*, namely, such a distinction, the members of which, being identical with each other by identity *primo modo per se*, i.e., *formally*, are nevertheless not identical *adequately ex natura rei*. The main example is the distinction between a metaphysical *totum* and its quidditative parts: this is how the reality or *ratio* of genus (part) and species (whole), or difference (part) and species (whole) are distinct. According to Peter, the distinction between an intrinsic mode and the thing to which it belongs

ing here the notion of ‘non-identity of adequacy’ introduced by Scotus in the *Reportatio* I-A, dist. 33, q. 2,⁸³ which he distinguishes there from formal distinction and non-identity in the strict sense.

Thus, although the intrinsic mode is identical with the thing *to some extent* even formally, because it belongs intrinsically (although not as a part) to its quiddity, however, this identity “per se primo modo” is not complete, not total, and not adequate. Consequently, the mode is nevertheless *simultaneously* distinguished from the thing by a certain ‘lesser formal distinction,’ which Peter himself prefers mostly to call here “*distinctio ex natura rei*.”⁸⁴ According to the later terminology of the Parisian *Reportatio* of Scotus, Peter could quite appropriately and correctly call such a distinction the ‘distinction of non-adequacy’ between the mode and the thing. In the *Summa simplicitate* version of his commentary on the *Sentences* and afterwards, Francis of Meyronnes calls it a “modal distinction” (*distinctio modalis*).⁸⁵ Exactly these two terms, *distinctio ex natura rei* and

pertains to the *same type* of distinction *ex natura rei* which is “lesser than formal.” At the same time, Peter asserts in proposition 8 that the distinction between an intrinsic mode and a thing is greater than the distinction between a whole quiddity and a part of the quiddity, although in both cases the common constitutive feature of distinction seems to be a non-identity of adequacy *ex natura rei*.

⁸³ Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A, dist. 33, q. 2, nn. 62–7, 329–32. The use of this concept by Peter in this argument once again proves that he was a very attentive reader and thoughtful connoisseur of all the works of his *Doctor*.

⁸⁴ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 3, ad dub. 7, dicta 7, 9–10 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 112r–v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 66rb–vb; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 86vb–87rb): “Septimum est quod aliqua distinctio ex natura rei est *minor* distinctione quae ponitur communiter formalis. [...] Nonum [Nonum V Contra *err.* N W] dictum est, quod distinctio modi intrinseci a ‘re cuius est’ est *minor* distinctione ista, quae ponitur communiter formalis. Hoc patet ex illa propositione praeassumpta, quod modus intrinsecus aliquo modo pertinet ad ‘perseitatem primi modi,’ sed ipse cum ‘re cuius est’ habet aliquam non-identitatem ex natura rei, ut ostensum est, ergo ista distinctio modi intrinseci a ‘re cuius est’ est [est W V erit N] *minor* illa, quae ponitur communiter formalis.” My italics. It is precisely because the distinction between a mode and a thing/quiddity is thought of as a distinction of non-adequacy between members, both of which to some extent belong to the *intrinsic* ‘area’ of quiddity, that Peter’s conclusion in the last proposition 10 seems, albeit to an extent unexpected (given his previous assertion of *formal* identity between them *aliqua*liter), but consistent and reasoned. See *ibid.*: “Decimum dictum est quod distinctio modi intrinseci a ‘re cuius est’ est *aliqua*liter distinctio formalis. Hoc ostendo sic: omnis distinctio ex natura rei est *aliqua*liter formalis, sed distinctio modi intrinseci a ‘re cuius est’ est ex natura rei, ut patet ex praecedenti, ergo et cetera [et cetera W N est *aliqua*liter formalis V]. Sequitur ergo, quod distinctio modi intrinseci a ‘re cuius est’ est aliquo modo formalis et aliquo modo [formalis et aliquo modo *om.* N] non formalis.”

⁸⁵ Francis of Meyronnes, *Reportatio in I Sententiarum (Summa simplicitate)*, d. 33, q. 1, art. 2 (Oxford, Balliol College Library, Ms. 67B, f. 81rb, Admont, Stiftsbibliothek, Cod. 91, f.

distinctio modalis, came to dominate discussions of the type of distinction between a thing and its intrinsic mode in the subsequent Formalist tradition for at least the next two centuries.

4. The Distinction between Intrinsic Mode and Being as Being

All the aforementioned arguments and explanations of Peter about the type of distinction and identity of the intrinsic mode in the last *quaestio* of the *De modis distinctionum* directly refer only to the distinction between a mode and a thing or reality of which it is a mode, but not to the distinction between a mode and *being as such*, which a certain mode – first of all, the mode of infinity or finitude – contracts and divides. I believe that the difficulty of interpreting the distinction between mode and being as such is not so much related to the concept of ‘intrinsic mode,’ but rather to the problematic status of being of the very concept of *ens inquantum ens*. Notably, in contrast to the question of the distinction between a mode and the thing constituted by it, Peter himself, as far as I know, left this issue without an explicit solution. It appears that, at least in part, this difficulty can be resolved based on the doctrine of the *reality* of the concept of being, which is contained in question 11 of the treatise *De ente*, as well as on the doctrine of the special type of the “totally objective distinction” (*distinctio se totis obiective*), which was added by Peter in his later treatise on distinctions (*De distinctione praedicamentorum*).

In his *De ente*, q. 11, Peter proves the reality of the concept of being as such (i.e., the fact that it is not a purely rational concept) and its unity (or, in terms of the Scotist tradition, ‘univocity’).⁸⁶ According to him, the proper reality of this concept as transcendental (i.e., most general) and the most abstract concept is not any *separate thing* subsistent outside of the mind, *in natura rerum*, but only the real *proper content* (*propria ratio*) of the very concept of *ens*, which has precisely *objective being* (*esse obiectivum*) in this concept. Peter, probably for the first time in the history of metaphysics, distinguishes here between two kinds of *realities*, objective and subjective reality:

Est autem advertendum quod cuilibet conceptui univoco reali correspondet realitas dupliciter: uno modo in se, alio modo in suis inferioribus. Prima realitas est obiectiva, secunda est subiectiva seu in effectu. Secundum primam abstrahit ab actuali existentia et ab illis quae actualem existentiam consequuntur. Secundum secundam concernit actualem

60vb): “Quarta est <distinctio> modalis, quae est inter modum intrinsecum et rationem formalem, sicut inter naturam specificam et suam finitatem.”

⁸⁶ Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, q. 11, art. 2, ll. 165–239, 291–4; art. 3, ll. 296–421, 297–303.

existentiam et quae ipsam consequuntur. Exemplum: conceptui specifico hominis correspondet uno modo realitas naturae rationalis non determinata ad hoc suppositum vel ad illud. Alio modo correspondet sibi eadem realitas ut determinata, divisa et particulata in diversis suppositis. Haec realitas primo modo non habet nisi esse obiectivum et unitatem propriam correspondentem illi realitati. Secundo modo habet esse subiectivum et in effectu, et sic non respondet sibi aliqua unitas sed potius pluralitas, cum sit in ipsis suppositis plurificata, ut dictum est, illa tamen plura possunt esse fundamentum remotum praedictae unitatis. Similiter, conceptui entis correspondet realitas dupliciter: uno modo ipsa entitas ut entitas non determinata ad hanc vel illam entitatem nec ad existere vel non-existere nec ad hunc modum essendi vel illum, et secundum hanc realitatem habet propriam unitatem et esse obiectivum praecise; secundum hanc etiam accidit sibi omnis signata entitas et omnis modus essendi determinatus. Alio modo correspondet sibi ipsa entitas ut est determinata et plurificata in diversis suppositis actu existentibus, et secundum hanc habet esse subiectivum, nec habet aliquam propriam unitatem, immo totalem diversitatem [...].⁸⁷

So, if we raise the question of the distinction between intrinsic mode and being and have in mind the *subjective reality* of the concept of being, then the object of our search becomes precisely the distinction between mode and *thing* or reality (since ‘being’ in the sense of *subjective reality* refers to all the variously existing things), that is, exactly what Peter explicates in question 11 of the *De modis distinctionum*, as I have demonstrated. However, if we mean by ‘being’ the content of the concept of *being as such*, then the question of distinction of the intrinsic mode from *being as such* can only be formulated in the sphere of the *objective reality* of the concept of being itself. Here, it should be recalled that in question 11 of the *De ente*, the main problem is how the univocal *real* concept of being can be abstracted from some beings that are *completely distinct* from each other in their *subjective reality* (primarily from God and creatures, but in truth – from any individually existing things). Peter answers that they are *completely distinct* in *subjective reality*, but they do really conform to each other in the *objective reality* of the concept of being as such.⁸⁸ At this place, Peter for the first time implicitly introduces the opposition of the characteristics “se totis subiective” and “se totis obiective” into the theory of *real* distinctions and identities, which is the background of the very peculiar terminology of the author’s later description of two distinctions, one of which seems key to understanding the distinction

⁸⁷ Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, q. 11, art. 3, concl. 4, ll. 380–99, 301–2. Consequently, Petrus Thomae is also the first to distinguish between a *distinctio se totis subiective* and a *distinctio se totis obiective*; see Andersen, “Introduction,” 147.

⁸⁸ Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, q. 11, art. 3, concl. 4, ll. 404–6, 302–3: “[...] praedicta <sc. Deus et creatura, substantia et accidens> distinguuntur se totis secundum realitatem subiective acceptam, et conveniunt realiter secundum realitatem obiectivam, vocando ‘realitatem obiectivam’ omnem conceptum primae intentionis [...].”

between *being as such* and other crucial ontological elements (inclusive *modi intrinseci*) of Scotist metaphysics.

In his late short treatise *De distinctione praedicamentorum*, Peter in addition to all the distinctions already discussed in the *De modis distinctionum* introduces two more special distinctions, the ‘totally subjective’ and the ‘totally objective distinction.’⁸⁹ In a sense, the *distinctio se totis obiective* is an even greater distinction than *distinctio se totis subiective*, since, for example, beings in the different highest genera (*praedicamenta*) can be totally subjectively distinct from each other, but at the same time totally objectively identical, because at least *one real* concept (the concept of being) can still be abstracted from them. This last,⁹⁰ extremely specific type of totally objective distinction is described by Peter as follows:

[I]lla distinguuntur se totis obiective quae non conveniunt in aliqua una realitate sive ratione quidditativa, vel a quibus non potest abstrahi aliquis conceptus unicus <sc. univocus – *my addition*> realis seu primae intentionis, sicut sunt differentiae formales seu individuales et illa quae habent conceptum quidditativum et qualitativum, sicut ‘ens’ et ‘bonum.’⁹¹

In contrast to the ‘totally subjective distinction’ that affects the ultimate *physical* reality, i.e., the actual existence of individual things and essences (which is designated as “subjective being” or “subjective reality”), this distinction is related to the extremely specific (and especially important for the subsequent Scotist tradition) *metaphysical-objective* reality of the conceptually cognized objective being (*esse obiectivum*) of quiddities and other transcendental *rationes*. Here, Peter himself points out the most important feature for establishing the totally objective distinction: the impossibility of abstracting *one real concept*, and the lack of commonality or conformity of items that are totally objectively distinct in *one* quidditative *ratio* or reality. This is exactly how, presumably, all *simpliciter* simple concepts (*conceptus simpliciter simplices*) are distinct from one another. Be-

⁸⁹ Cf. Petrus Thomae, *De distinctione praedicamentorum*, art. 1, divisio 2, 296; prop. 6–7, 302; art. 2, concl. 5–6, 309–12.

⁹⁰ It is not entirely clear how many types of distinctions exactly Peter allows in this treatise, since his “*distinctio ex natura rei*” is sometimes considered simply as a kind of generic term designating a common genus for all distinctions, except for the purely rational one, and sometimes seems to be a separate distinction, along with the others. Depending on this, the total number of distinctions will be equal to either six or seven, and the number *seven* became the canon in the later Formalist tradition: *distinctio rationis*, *distinctio ex natura rei*, *distinctio formalis*, *distinctio realis*, *distinctio essentialis*, *distinctio se totis subiective/subiectiva*, *distinctio se totis obiective/obiectiva*. See Antonius Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, principium. For the tradition of the seven distinctions, see also the contributions to this present volume by Apaoan Machado, Claus A. Andersen, and Rafael Ramis Barceló.

⁹¹ Petrus Thomae, *De distinctione praedicamentorum*, art. 1, prop. 7, 302.

fore everything else, this applies to the first *quidditative* concept of being as such and the *qualitative* transcendental concepts.

Since the concept of intrinsic mode, as shown above, is transcendental *qualitative* and ‘*primo diversus*’ from the first *quidditative* concept of being as such, and since it does not include the concept of being, which, accordingly, cannot be *quidditatively* predicated of intrinsic mode, then from intrinsic mode and being as such no real concept univocally common to them can be abstracted. Therefore, the distinction between being as being, i.e., the contractible *ratio* of the concept of being, and the intrinsic mode that contracts and modifies it, is a distinction revealed precisely in consideration of the objective *esse* of the very concept of being, i.e., in its *objective reality*. In other words, it is most likely that being as such and its intrinsic mode can be distinct from each other only by a *distinctio se totis obiective*. It is especially worth noting here that this distinction, despite its connection to the transcendental-objective field of conceptual contents, is certainly understood as a *real distinction* (or a distinction *ex natura rei*) in the broadest sense of a distinction that is *independent* from any comparative operation of the intellect (or the will) that produces *entia rationis*.

This interpretation does not by any means eliminate all the difficulties associated with Peter’s later theory of distinctions. The most obvious one is the following: Duns Scotus believed, and Peter explicitly accepts this position, that there is a *formal* distinction between being and its transcendental properties (at least, the simple and convertible ones, i.e., one, true, and good). However, transcendental properties as qualitative, simply simple concepts do not have a univocally common real concept with the *quidditative* concept of being as such. Therefore, they fully satisfy the criterion of being distinct precisely by a *totally objective distinction*, which Peter also directly states in the description quoted above; he even mentions there the example of ‘being’ and ‘good.’ How can the characteristics of being ‘totally objectively distinct’ and ‘formally distinct’ be compatible with each other regarding the same ontological concepts? Furthermore, the most difficult problem concerns Peter’s assertion that a totally objective distinction is the *greatest* distinction, which is a legitimate reason for concluding that all the other types of distinctions are present in this one.⁹² First, if this inference is valid: “*quaecumque distinguuntur se totis obiective, distinguuntur omnibus modis aliis,*”⁹³ then being as such would have to be distinguished from its property or intrinsic mode also by a totally subjective distinction, i.e., in actual existence as two individual things, but this seems impossible and absurd, because, as stated above, being as such is not any existing thing, but only the objective content of the concept (*ratio entis* as a cognized object). Second, if ‘totally objectively distinct’ extremes are supposedly distinct to the *highest* possi-

92 Petrus Thomae, *De distinctione praedicamentorum*, art. 1, corr. 2, 302–3.

93 *Ibid.*

ble degree, then what type of *identity* can be inherent in them at all? Suppose this distinction fundamentally excludes identity as such, then how can it be argued that ‘denominatively taken beings,’ i.e., transcendental properties and, probably, intrinsic modes, can still be understood as ‘being,’ given that the main condition for the *real* status of their entity in Peter’s metaphysics is the *essential* or *identical identity* of such transcendental conceptual contents with *ens inquantum ens*? Of course, one cannot definitely say that these difficulties are in no way resolvable. However, in all texts by Petrus Thomae known to me, one does not find any *explicit* solution to them.

5. The Number and Variety of Intrinsic Modes in Petrus Thomae

Finally, regarding the number and variety of intrinsic modes that Petrus Thomae mentions and discusses in his treatise, it should be noted, firstly, that he distinguishes various intrinsic modes in accordance with the things to which they belong and which they contract.⁹⁴ Since some modes contract being as such, such modes as ‘infinity’ and ‘necessity’ are intrinsic only to an infinite being, i.e., God, whereas the modes of ‘finitude,’ ‘limitation’ (*limitatio*), and ‘possibility’ are intrinsic only to finite being or creatures.⁹⁵ The intrinsic mode called ‘perseitas’ constitutes the divine essence and all things belonging to one finite category of ‘substance,’ while the mode ‘inesseitas’ constitutes things belonging to the nine finite categories of accidents.⁹⁶ The mode ‘adseitas’ is intrinsic to the uncreated being and any created absolute being⁹⁷ (that is, belonging to the three ‘absolute’

⁹⁴ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 3, ad dub. 1, 3, 5 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111r–v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 65ra–65va; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85rb–85vb, 86ra).

⁹⁵ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 3, ad dub. 1 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 65ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85rb): “Alius est modus intrinsecus enti increato [increato *om. N V*] et nullo modo alicui creato, ut infinitas, necessitas. Alius est intrinsecus omni enti creato et nullo modo enti increato, ut finitas et limitatio et possibilitas.”

⁹⁶ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 3, ad dub. 1 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 65ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85rb–va): “Alius [Alius *om. N*] <sc. modus> est intrinsecus enti increato et uni creato tantum, sicut substantiae, et ille modus est perseitas. Hic [modus] enim est intrinsecus et divinae essentiae et etiam omni creatae substantiae. [...] Alius est intrinsecus omni accidenti et nullo modo substantiae, sicut inesseitas, ut puto sicut enim perseitas est intrinseca [intrinseca *N W* modus intrinsecus *V*] substantiae, ita videtur quod inesseitas sit cuilibet accidenti intrinseca.”

⁹⁷ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 3, ad dub. 1 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 65ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f.

categories: substance, quantity, and quality), while finite things belonging under the seven ‘relative’ genera have the mode of ‘adalienitas,’ which does not yet have its own term in the *De modis distinctionum* but is called so in the late treatise *De distinctione praedicamentorum*.⁹⁸ In addition, Peter mentions ‘singularitas’ as a special intrinsic mode of individuals,⁹⁹ although it is not at all clear how it differs from Scotus’s ‘haecceitas,’ which, according to Scotus, is not an intrinsic mode, but an ‘individual difference,’ or from the traditional second intention of ‘singular.’ The individual degrees of increasing and decreasing (*gradus intentionis*) of qualities as accidental forms and ‘quantitas virtutis’ are also allowed as possible intrinsic modes.

Secondly, since intrinsic modes as transcendental contractive *rationes* contract not only being as such but also finite being to its ten categories, then, in addition to the above-mentioned modes common to all categories, as well as modes common to several categories at once, there must also be modes that are intrinsic and proper to each finite genus or category, immediately constituting it.¹⁰⁰ The intrinsic mode of substance has its own proper name, namely ‘perseitas.’ Insofar as I know, Peter never mentions the specific names of the proper modes of the other categories.

Thirdly, Peter argues that *one* essence can have *many* different intrinsic modes, for example, the divine essence has ‘necessity,’ ‘infinity,’ ‘perseitas,’ and ‘adseitas.’¹⁰¹

85rb): “Aliquis enim modus est intrinsecus enti increato et omni enti absoluto creato, sicut adseitas [adseitas W V perseitas err. N].”

⁹⁸ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 3, ad dub. 3 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 65va; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85vb); Petrus Thomae, *De distinctione praedicamentorum*, art. 2, concl. 1, in fine, 305: “<praedicamenta constituuntur et distinguuntur per modos intrinsecos, sc.> per perseitatem, inesseitatem et adalienitatem.”

⁹⁹ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 3, ad dub. 1 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111r; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 65ra; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85va): “Alius modus est intrinsecus soli individuo, ita quod non convenit alicui superiorum suorum [ita quod ... suorum N W ita quod nec speciei nec generi V], ut singularitas [...].”

¹⁰⁰ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 3, ad dub. 3 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 65rb–va; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 85vb): “Secundum [dictum] est quodlibet praedicamentum habet modum proprium sibi intrinsecum, ut substantia habet perseitatem, quantitas etiam aliquem proprium [aliquem proprium om. N W] modum intrinsecum [intrinsecum om. W V] a modo substantiae distinctum habet [habet om. W], et qualitas similiter, et similiter omnia praedicamenta respectiva [similiter omnia praedicamenta respectiva V omnia relativa N omnia talia W].”

¹⁰¹ Petrus Thomae, *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11, art. 3, ad dub. 5 (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 2190, f. 111v; Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 1494, f. 65va; Napoli, BN, Cod. VIII, F. 17, f. 86ra): “[...] dico primo, quod unius essentiae possunt esse plures modi intrinseci.”

Fourthly, Peter also remarks that one thing's many realities may correspond with as many intrinsic modes, for "every reality has its own proper intrinsic mode."¹⁰²

Fifthly, in the special case of divine being, a plurality of supposita (*supposita*) can also have one intrinsic mode, because the three Persons in God have one and the same necessity and the same infinity, for there are not three infinities in three Persons, just as there are not three necessities of being.¹⁰³

In sum, it can be observed that in contrast to the situation with only two intrinsic modes in Scotus's theology and metaphysics,¹⁰⁴ in Petrus Thomae's treatise there is a multitude and large variety of intrinsic modes that function as special ontological conceptual elements that serve to explicate the constitution of things and the distinctions between them. Specifically, a common characteristic of most of Peter's intrinsic modes is the fact that they act in the sphere of transcendental *rationes* as a kind of equivalents to *difference* in the categorical field, since they do divide and contract any transcendental concept, i.e., a concept that surpasses the generality of some genus; the first such concept is that of being as such.

Conclusion: Petrus Thomae's Metaphysical Explication of the Transcendental Concept '*modus intrinsecus rei*'

In this study, I have analyzed the doctrine of intrinsic mode of being contained in Petrus Thomae's treatise *De modis distinctionum*, q. 11. This question is possibly the most extensive and original treatise on the intrinsic modes in the early Scotist tradition. Peter relies on his interpretation of Scotus's teaching on the intrinsic mode, at least the metaphysically most relevant part of it, as contained in *Ordinatio* I, dist. 8; he uses the terminology and examples of Scotus and also accepts and supports Scotus's position on the *primacy* of the intrinsic modes of infinity and finitude in the contraction of the concept of being. Despite the obvious and quite conscious adherence to some of the fundamental positions of Scotus concerning intrinsic mode, it is impossible not to notice Peter's *additions* to Scotus's conceptual constructions as well as a general intention to *systematize* the whole theory.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*: "Secundo dico, quod quot sunt in aliqua re [aliqua re N V creatura W] realitates, tot possunt in ipsa poni modi intrinseci; quaelibet enim realitas habet proprium modum intrinsecum [...]."

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*: "Tertio, quod unus modus intrinsecus potest esse plurium suppositorum, nam eadem necessitas et infinitas est trium personarum in divinis [est trium personarum in divinis N W potest esse plurium personarum et est in personis divinis V], non sunt enim in tribus personis tres infinitates, nec [nec N W vel V] tres essendi necessitates."

¹⁰⁴ For a demonstration of this assessment, see the last section of the first part of a larger forthcoming study I referred to in the initial note above.

Unlike Scotus, Peter primarily discusses the concept of *modus intrinsecus* in the context of the general Formalist doctrine of distinctions and identities in being. Since the subsequent Scotist tradition was to a large extent developed within the boundaries of the genre of 'treatises on formalities' or distinctions and identities, the later Scotist discussions of intrinsic modes precisely within the framework of the doctrine of distinctions is also evidence of the doctrinal influence and merit of Petrus Thomae, perhaps even more than of the second 'founding father' of Scotist Formalism, Francis of Meyronnes.

In contrast to Scotus, Peter gives a detailed deduction and description of the concept of 'intrinsic mode' as such and also attempts to explain the peculiar cognoscibility of this concept, essentially complementing and changing the metaphysical epistemology in regard to the *concept* of intrinsic mode and its formality. In his metaphysical description of the *meaning* of the concept of intrinsic mode, Peter mainly emphasizes the following characteristics: 1) the *reality* of the concept, 2) the *transcendence* of the intrinsic mode, and 3) the opposition and correlation of the intrinsic mode and *quiddity*. Further, Peter undertakes a rather radical expansion of the epistemological theory of Scotus, putting forward and proving the thesis of the knowability of the intrinsic mode in its *own proper* concept separately from the concept of thing – a thesis that Scotus himself does not have in this form, and which secures Peter a unique status among the early followers of Scotus.

According to Peter's profound and extensive discussion of the problem of distinction and identity between intrinsic mode and thing, although the intrinsic mode is identical to a thing not only essentially and really, but *to some extent* even formally, mode is nevertheless *simultaneously* distinguished from the thing by a certain "lesser formal distinction," which Peter himself prefers mostly to call "*distinctio ex natura rei*." According to the later terminology of the Parisian *Reportatio* of Scotus, Peter could quite appropriately and correctly call such a distinction a 'distinction of non-adequacy' between the mode and the thing. This term, i.e., *distinctio ex natura rei*, along with the term *distinctio modalis* introduced by Francis of Meyronnes, would go on to dominate the discourse on the distinction between a thing and its intrinsic mode in the subsequent Formalist tradition.

Further, Peter tries to clarify the connection indicated, though not explicated, by Scotus between the metaphysical concept of intrinsic mode and the 'disjunctive property' of being. Peter also discusses a high number of different intrinsic modes and attempts to systematically diversify them.

Finally, I have attempted to resolve the difficulty which, in contrast to the question of the distinction of mode and the thing constituted by it, Peter himself, as far as I know, left without an explicit solution, namely the difficulty regarding the type of distinction between intrinsic mode and *ens inquantum ens*. A viable solution may be based on two elements of Peter's teaching: the doctrine of the

twofold reality of the concept of being, contained in the *De ente*, q. 11, and the doctrine of the special “totally objective distinction” (*distinctio se totis obiective*), which Peter added to the other distinctions in his later treatise on distinctions (*De distinctione praedicamentorum*). From my analysis, I conclude that the distinction between being as being, i.e., the contractible *ratio* of the concept of being, and the intrinsic mode that contracts and modifies it, emerges only through consideration of the objective *esse* or reality of the very concept of being. This means that being as such and its intrinsic mode can most likely be distinct from each other only due to a *distinctio se totis obiective*, which is certainly understood by Peter as a *real distinction*, or a distinction *ex natura rei*, in the broadest sense of the term.

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Nicolas Bonet's White-Tie Formalism

William Duba

Introduction

As the other contributions to this volume show, Formalism has held pride of place in the history of Scotism, from John Duns Scotus's earliest presentations of a formal non-identity grounded in reality to the Baroque Scholastics' reformulations and innovations. Indeed, shortly after Duns Scotus died in 1308, numerous scholastics were taking the doctrine of formal distinction in different directions. The more formal of the group, the *formalizantes*, posited the existence of *formalitates*, that is, of parts of essences (corresponding to parts of the definition of a thing) that have a basis in external reality (*ex natura rei*), that belong to the same thing, and that can be distinguished (formally) from each other. Perhaps the most radical of these *positoires formalitatum* was Nicolas Bonet, who took upon himself to create a complete series of philosophical manuals based around an ontology so radical that it formalized prime matter itself.

1. The *Philosophiae*

Nicolas Bonet (Nicholaus Bonetus) was a Franciscan theologian who lectured on the *Sentences* at Paris in the early 1330s, and became Master of Theology in 1333. The pope sent him on a mission to the Khan in 1338; after debating the Greeks in Constantinople, he returned west. In 1342, he received the bishopric of Malta, and he died in 1343.¹ At some point during his career, Nicolas Bonet produced a work that, in its scope and coherence, outmatches the names given to it.² A conclusion to the whole work extant in a single fourteenth-century witness (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 16132) names the parts:

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1 Duba, "Three Franciscan Metaphysicians After Scotus," 466–69.

2 When Nicolas produced this work is an open question. The most recent work has suggested that, owing to a textual relationship with Gerald Odonis, it "must have been composed in the early 1330s," cf. Duba, "Three Franciscan Metaphysicians", 466. Nevertheless, no solid evidence has been proposed, and this statement must be left as hypothetical, like that of Grellard, "Les présupposés méthodologiques de l'atomisme", 182, who claims that, since these four texts appear as a reworking of his university teaching, "on peut estimer qu'ils ont été composés avant son doctorat, donc avant 1334." Given that this work reveals an author who is conscious both of being a Latin Christian and a participant in a philosophical dialogue that

Let us therefore put an end to the sayings in this volume, whose books are: first, the *Metaphysics*, which treats being *qua* being and its *per se* passions. And that art is very universal and applicable to any situation and is prior to the others in the order of writing and teaching.

The second book is the book of nature, namely the book of *Physics*, whose subject is set as the nature common to the first ten genera, and in this common physics the investigation concerns the *per se* passions of a nature that is limited.

Then thirdly follows the book of *Categories*, which contains ten partial books, because there is one partial booklet for each of the categorical genera.

Lastly in this volume is the book of *Natural theology*, whose subject is the first unmoved mover, and concerning its negative and positive passions and things associated with them.

I assert nothing pertinaciously to you in the aforesaid books, but set them out to you as a likely account, because nothing should be boldly asserted concerning such secrets of nature, and especially concerning ineffable celestial secrets, but rather one should treat with all reverence such matters as likely (*probabiliter*).

In all these things I do not want to have just a pious reader, but also one who corrects freely. And would that it have as many discoverers and pious expositors as it will have opponents. Farewell, my sweet, and pray to the First Mover for me.³

While, to my knowledge, this passage only occurs in a single manuscript witness, it is highly likely that it is genuine; the manuscript was copied in the fourteenth century at Paris using *pecia*, and, while passages may have been added to some texts, there is no reason to add a *protestatio* written in the name of the author,

spans epochs and religions, one could also consider the hypothesis that Bonetus produced it as part of his preparation for the 1338 mission. Equally likely, however, is that Bonetus intended this work to be a textbook for the Franciscan philosophical *studia*, as indeed it was. In that case, just as Francis Meyronnes appears to have produced textbooks (including the *Conflatus*) after becoming Master of Theology, so too Bonetus could have written this work at any point late in his life.

3 Nicholas Bonetus, *Philosophiae*, Paris, BnF, latin 16132 (=Paris), f. 302ra–b: “Inponamus igitur finem dictis in hoc [verum] volumine, quorum libri sunt: primus *Metaphysica*, que tractat de ente in quantum ens et eius per se passionibus. Et est ars illa multum universalis et applicabilis ad omne propositum et prior aliis in ordine scripture et doctrine. – Secundus liber est liber de natura, scilicet liber *Physicorum*, cuius subiectum ponitur natura communis ad decem prima genera, et de per se passionibus nature limitate in communi* physica* inquiritur. – Deinde tertius sequitur liber *Predicamentorum*, qui continet decem libros partiales, quia de quolibet genere predicamentali est unus partialis libellus. – Ultimo autem in hoc volumine est liber *Theologie naturalis*, cuius subiectum est primus motor immobilis, et de eius passionibus negativis et affirmativis et de annexis eisdem. – Nichil autem in libris predictis pertinaciter tibi assero, set pro sermone probabili tibi ostendo, quia nichil in talibus secretis nature et specialiter de ineffabilibus secretis celestibus est temerarie asserendum, set cum omni reverentia probabiliter pertractandum. – In omnibus hiis non tantum volo habere pium lectorem, set et liberum correctorem. Et utinam haberet tot inventores et pios expositores quot habebit contradictores. – Vale dulcissime michi et pro me orabis primum motorem.”

and both precedent and grounds for a copyist to omit it.⁴ This explicit statement matches numerous internal references to the work. Therefore, we can be confident that Bonet gave to the sections the names *Metaphysica*, *Physica*, *Predicamenta*, and *Theologia naturalis*, and that he was the first author to name his own works *Metaphysica* and *Theologia naturalis*.⁵ He clearly assigned an order and a structure to the aggregate, but I have not found a name, hence the generic title *Philosophiae*.

Bonet numbered the sciences or philosophies of the *Philosophiae*. His *Metaphysica* treats the first science, that of being *qua* being, the *Theologia naturalis* the second science, that of infinite being, the *Physica*, concerns itself with the third science, that of finite being, and the *Predicamenta* concern *scientia quarta* (substance) to *scientia tertiadecima* (*habitus*).⁶ From a recent survey of Bonet's works, the *Metaphysica* exists in full, derivative, or fragmentary form in over 40 manuscript witnesses, and two printings (Barcelona 1493 and Venice

4 On the other hand, the Leonine-verse division that follows does not have the same claim to authorial origin (Paris f. 302rb): "Quadruplicis \lumen/ artis dans ecce volumen | Bis duo subiecta quo sunt distincta que lecta | Nam liber est primus *methaphisica* sic reperimus | Ens ens in quantum subiectum des sibi tantum | *Phisica* succedit huic stare secunda que credit | Cui fore naturam subiectum dico futuram | Distinctus sequitur liber in quinos reperitur | Prima decem genera subiecta quibus dato vera | Illis assotia librum de theologia | Subiectum detur primus motor que locetur."

5 For the internal naming of the *Metaphysica*, see Duba, "Three Franciscan Metaphysicians After Scotus," 472–73; for the *Theologia naturalis*, see Smith, "The Natural Theology of Nicholas Bonetus," 648–49.

6 Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* 2, cap. 5 (Erfurt, CA 2o 314 (=Erfurt) 18va; Paris 25va; Venice ed. 17rb): "Amplius autem manifestum est quod de ente inquantum ens erit una scientia que habebit ens pro subiecto. Secundo, quia ens dividitur sic primo ut fertur ens aliud finitum, aliud infinitum. De ente inquantum ens erit prima scientia, de ente infinito secunda, de ente finito tertia. Item, quia ens finitum et limitatum dividitur eque immediate, ut fertur, in decem prima genera, de quibus sunt decem scientie, quia quelibet quiditas predicamentalis habet suas proprias passiones cum ea convertibiles et de ipsa demonstrabiles. Et sic quarta scientia erit de substantia, quinta de quantitate, sexta de qualitate, septima de relatione, octava de actione, nona de passione, decima de situ, undecima de quando, duodecima de ubi, tertiadecima de habitu." Bonetus did not apparently stop with thirteen sciences. In only a few early witnesses (Paris 25va–26ra; Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut.83.23, 34r–v), the list continues, with the science of incorporeal substance (14), the first mover (15), Saturn (16), Jupiter (17), Mars (18), the Sun (19), Venus (20), Mercury (21), the Moon (22), corporeal substance (23), incorruptible corporeal substance (24), corruptible corporeal substance (25), simple corporeal substance (26), the four elements (27–30), compound substance (31), animated corporeal substance (32), the rational soul (33), beasts of burden, oxen, birds, fish, the near-infinite species of animals, inanimate compounds, gold, silver, lead and various kinds of metals (34–42).

1505).⁷ Many manuscripts, especially those from the fifteenth century, appear to have been produced as part of a teaching curriculum; for example, the two copies in Fribourg were made by friars undergoing a course in philosophy at the Franciscan *studium* in Strasbourg; numerous copies and *excerpta* from the *Metaphysics* in Prague also seem to attest to teaching activity.⁸ In what follows, the Venice 1505 printing will be the reference for books and chapters, and the text is checked against the fourteenth-century witnesses in Erfurt, Bibl. Amplo-niana, CA 2° 314, and Paris, BnF, latin 16132.

Bonet's work is part speculative treatise, part didactic manual. Bonet enters into dialogue with *predecessores nostri*, "our predecessors," namely the ancient philosophers, and avoids any religious authority. He is very systematic, builds his arguments on prior distinctions, and extensively cross-references his work. Among the Franciscans influenced by Scotus, his Formalism is perhaps the most extreme.

Nicolas Bonet discusses distinctions and identity in book III of his *Metaphysics*, immediately after explaining in what sense *Metaphysics* is the study of being qua being (book I), and how it is not properly a science, but a habit of a first proposition (book II). His language is that of the Scotists, and the scholastics more generally, but the ideas behind it are unique. In fact, when the language of Aristotle is stripped away, what remains of Bonet's doctrine of identity and distinction, or rather, of the construction of reality, is being qua being, which is constricted to species by a series of *formalitates*, and then individuated, actualized, and adorned with accidents through a cluster of intrinsic modes. The aggregate of these formalities and modes is fundamentally one.

7 The most recent manuscript list is Buffenoir, *Une science naturelle de Dieu?*, 21–23, largely based on Martin de Barcelona, "Nicola Bonet," 644–47 and Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries," 286. To Buffenoir's list can be added Città del Vaticano, Vat. lat. 946 (includes a ca. 1338-epitome of the *Physica* (23r–29r), *Metaphysica* (29v–37v) and *Theologia naturalis* (38r–41r); see Smith, "Natural Theology," 662) Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut.83.23 (late XIV/early XV); Fribourg, Bibliothèque des Cordeliers 39, 10r–21r (Excerpts from *Metaphysica* copied by Johannes Joly, mid-XV, see Mosberger, *Katalog*, 27); 43, 65r–140v (*Metaphysica* copied by Conrad Grütisch in Strasbourg, 1425, see Murith, *Jean et Conrad Grütisch de Bâle*, 22), and 73 (*Metaphysica* copy finished by Johannes Joly *studens tunc temporis* in Strasbourg, 11 July 1456); Weimar, Herzogin Anna Amalia Bibliothek, Hs. Fol. 63c (*Metaphysica*, *Physica*, *Predicamenta*, *Theologia*, ca. 1450, Bound by 'Adam' in Erfurt, previously in the convent of Peter and Paul, Erfurt; see Smith, "Natural Theology," 663).

8 Duba, "Three Franciscan Metaphysicians," 486.

2. Matter as the First *differentia* of Being

Bonet's *Metaphysics* concludes with a division of being *qua* being into two classes:

Such a division of being *qua* being therefore shall be one type of being that is limited, and the other unlimited. By 'limited and unlimited' I do not mean 'finite and infinite,' but rather in a roundabout manner I state the two differentiae that by themselves divide being, such that by adding the differentia 'limited being' to the quiddity of being, there is brought about a single *per se* limited quiddity that is common to the ten primary genera and is univocally predicable of these and of all their contents. By 'unlimited being,' however, I mean a certain differentia that, when added to the quiddity of being, constitutes a single *per se* quiddity, which is the quiddity of the first intelligence. Thus, I have used the words 'limited' and 'unlimited,' for the proper names of these differentiae are not known to me.⁹

The study of unlimited being is Second Philosophy, *Theologia naturalis*, and the study of limited being is Third Philosophy, *physica* or *philosophia naturalis*. But by referring to 'limited being' that is *per se* univocally predicable of all the categories, Nicolas points to how he thinks nature is the subject of the science of physics.

He hints at his conclusion in the first book of the *Physica* with the words taken from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Z3:

It is clear therefore that the subject of natural philosophy is not a what nor a how nor anything of any category, but is each and every one of them in potency, since it is a quiddity common to the ten first genera, possible and contractable by differentiae and by acts to the ten first genera. For it is contracted by one differentia to the genus of substance, and by another to the genus of quantity, and so on for the other genera. Therefore, it is each one in potency, just as something above is in potency to those things below.¹⁰

⁹ Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* IX, cap. 1 (Text and translation from Duba, "Three Franciscan Metaphysicians," p. 485; Paris 77va; Erfurt 73va, Venice ed. 43va): "Sit igitur talis divisio entis in quantum ens aliud limitatum et aliud illimitatum. Nec intelligo per 'limitatum et illimitatum' finitatem et infinitatem, sed circumloquor duas differentias per se divisivas entis, sic quod per hanc differentiam 'esse limitatum' additam quidditati entis constituitur una per se quidditas limitata communis ad decem prima genera et predicabilis de ipsis univoce et de omnibus per se contentis in illis; per 'esse' autem 'illimitatum' intelligo quandam differentiam que, addita quidditati entis, constituit unam per se quidditatem, que est quidditas prime intelligentie. Propter hoc enim usus sum istis nominibus 'limitatum' et 'illimitatum,' quia non sunt nomina propria illarum differentiarum mihi nota."

¹⁰ Nicholaus Bonetus, *Physica* I, cap. 2 (Paris 81ra; Venice ed. 45va): "Palam igitur quod subiectum naturalis philosophie nec est quid nec quale nec aliquid alicuius categorice, sed potentia unumquodque, cum sit quidditas communis decem primis generibus, potentialis et contrahibilis per differentias et per actus ad decem prima genera. Contrahitur enim per unam dif-

Indeed, Bonet uses Aristotle's famous thought-experiment for matter ("Matter is not a what, nor a how...") to define the subject of natural philosophy. Physics, of course, involves change, and Aristotle's *Physics* posits three principles of change: something (the form), its privation, and a substrate (in the case of substantial generation, matter). Change happens when something goes from one opposite to another, while the substrate persists. So too Bonet has three principles:

There is therefore in Sortes and in a rose and in everything that comes to be, in addition to two opposite principles, some third substrate, namely, quiddity, which passes from one of the opposites to the other. For we rightly concede that Sortes is produced from nothing as if from nothing existing at all, such that neither his matter nor his form existed before his production. But the quiddity of his matter and his form, and of man, and animal, and of all the predicates above passes from the non-existence of Sortes to his actual existence.

And if you ask if this quiddity that so passes from non-existence to existence suffices for a substrate that passes from one opposite to the other, and whether it can be called the matter of which the Philosophers spoke, saying that matter is necessary in every production as a third principle, I reply to you that this quiddity of any producible thing seems to suffice for all matter. Nor should any other matter be posited nor found, since more things should not be posited without necessity, and fewer principles should be posited rather than more.¹¹

Thus, proximate matter is the quiddity of the species, and prime matter is limited being, and Nicolas Bonet backs this up with an example:

The proximate matter of Sortes is humanity, the less-proximate matter is animality, and thus keep climbing until limited nature, which is the quiddity that is in itself common to the ten categories and is in itself included in them, which limited quiddity is indeed prime matter, entirely firstly first.¹²

ferentiam ad genus substantie et per aliam ad genus quantitatis, et sic de aliis generibus; ergo est potentia unumquodque, sicut superius est in potentia ad sua inferiora."

11 Nicholaus Bonetus, *Physica* I, cap. 3[bis] (Paris 83rb; Venice ed. 46vb): "Est igitur in Sor et in rosa et in omni eo quod fit preter dua principia opposita, aliquod tertium substratum, scilicet quiditas, que transit de uno opposito ad aliud. Concedimus enim bene quod Sor producitur de nihilo, quasi de nullo penitus existente, sic quod nec eius materia nec eius forma ante eius productionem existunt. Quiditas tamen materie eius et forme et hominis et animalis et omnium predicatorum superiorum transit de non-existentia Sortis ad eius actualem existentiam. – Et si queras an ista quiditas, que sic transit de non-existentia ad existentiam, sufficiat pro substrato quod transit de uno opposito ad aliud, et an possit dici materia de qua locuti sunt philosophi dicentes materiam esse necessariam in omni productione tanquam tertium principium, respondeo tibi quod ista quiditas cuiuslibet rei producibilis videtur sufficere pro omni materia. Nec est alia ponenda nec invenienda, quoniam non sunt ponenda plura sine necessitate, et sunt ponenda pauciora principia quam plura."

12 Nicholaus Bonetus, *Physica* I, cap. 3[bis] (Paris 83rb–va; Venice ed. 46vb): "Et pono tibi exemplum: materia proxima Sortis est humanitas, materia minus proxima est animalitas, et sic

This is how Bonet understands Aristotle's statement in *Metaphysics* Z3 about how matter is not what or a how or a how much: it is the difference prior to this difference, and in this sense it is "purely potential."¹³ In effect, Bonet's inspiration for his hylomorphic theory seems to come from later in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Z, specifically, Z12, on definition. In a definition, Aristotle seems to argue, the genus acts as matter and the differentia as form.¹⁴ For Bonet, this equivalency has ontological force: the genus could be called matter and each of the differentiae that successively contract it could be called form, yet, strictly speaking, the process boils down to successive quiddities contracting being.

Bonet takes Formalism to its most formal: white-tie Formalism. Matter is entirely superfluous, just a name we give to the first determination of being. That determination, like every other one thereafter, is just a quiddity. Further, in book III of his *Metaphysics*, Bonet states that quiddities can also be called *formalitates*.

3. Book III of Bonet's *Metaphysics*

After discussing the subject of *Metaphysics* and what kind of a cognitive habit one has of it in the first two books, Nicolas Bonet opens Book III of his *Metaphysics* by appearing to present it as a philosophical dictionary, similar to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Δ:

Being *qua* being is obvious, since it is the first that-which-is (*quod quid est*) that does not have a that-which-is. Therefore, one must examine the identity and distinction of the first that-which-is with respect to every other that-which-is. And because in these discussions we often use some words that are not known to everyone who listens to this *Metaphysics*, I will set forth in how many ways these words are said and what they mean.

semper ascendendo usque ad naturam limitatam, que est quiditas per se communis ad decem predicamenta et per se inclusa in illis, que quidem quiditas limitata est prima materia omnino primo prima."

¹³ Nicholaus Bonetus, *Physica* I, cap. 3[bis] (Paris 83va; Venice ed. 46vb): "Secunda proprietas quam attribuunt philosophi materie prime est ista: quod materia prima non est quid, nec quale, nec quantum, nec aliquid alicuius alterius predicamenti, sed est potentia unumquodque. Istā proprietatem convenit proprie quiditati limitate predicabili de decem primis generibus, quia nec est quid, nec quale, nec quantum, sed abstrahit ab illis quantum est ex se, sicut superius abstrahit ab inferiori. Sed est in potentia ad quodlibet predicamentum, cum sit trahibilis et actuabilis et contrahibilis per diversas differentias ad decem prima genera."

¹⁴ The crucial and disputed passage is Aristoteles Latinus, *Metaphysica* (rec. Moerbeke; AL 25.3.2, p. 157): "Si ergo genus simpliciter non est preter eas que ut generis species aut, si est quidem, ut materia autem est (vox enim genus est et materia, differentie autem species et elementa ex hac faciunt), palam quia diffinitio est ex differentiis ratio." For how Scotists work this sense into their doctrine of matter, see Duba, "Three Franciscan Metaphysicians," 428–39.

And the first investigation shall concern the term ‘thing’ (*res*): what is a thing and what you call a ‘thing,’ what is being the same really, what is to be distinguished really, what is a real distinction, what is a formality (*formalitas*), what you mean by ‘formally being the same,’ what by ‘being formally distinct,’ what is the formal distinction, what is being the same in the first mode of *per se* predication, what it is in the second mode of *per se* predication, what in the third mode, what in the fourth mode, what is a quiddity, what is an intrinsic mode of a quiddity, what is identical predication, what is denominative predication, what is absolute division, what is relative indivision, what is being the same by absolute indivision and what by relative indivision. For we often use these terms in this metaphysics; therefore, it is absolutely necessary that you not be ignorant of in how many ways each term is said. For ignorance of the meaning of terms fools many and leads many to make mistakes and to condemn this metaphysics, which clearly aims to show that it is possible, rather that it is necessary that there exist a distinction on the part of reality (*ex natura rei*), not made by the intellect and without also a real distinction.¹⁵

That is, like Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Δ, Nicolas Bonet’s *Metaphysics* III sets out a philosophical vocabulary. Bonet’s masterful piece of horismotic philosophy has a specific point: to make the case for and to defend a *distinctio ex natura rei*, that is, a distinction that is neither real nor made by the intellect. As an additional consequence of his radical simplification of ontology, Bonet provides a relatively short list of distinctions: namely, a real distinction and a formal distinction, with an implied distinction of reason.

Bonet’s book III had an impact broader than that of the *Metaphysica*. It circulated independently as his *Formalitates*, in at least one manuscript, and in

15 Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 1 (also cited and translated in Duba, “Three Franciscan Metaphysicians,” 474; Erfurt 22rb–22va; Paris 30ra; Venice ed. 19rb): “Ens in quantum ens manifestum est, quoniam est primum quod quid est non habens quod quid est, sed principium cuiuslibet habentis quod quid est. Est igitur de identitate et distinctione primi quod quid est ab omni alio quod quid est ex natura rei perscrutandum. Et quia in istis frequenter utimur verbis aliquibus non notis, cuilibet hanc metaphysicam audienti, quotiens hec nomina dicantur et quid significant premittendam. Et sit igitur prima inquisitio que occurrit circa hunc terminum ‘res’: quid sit res, et quid tu vocas rem, quid sit esse idem realiter, quid distingui realiter, quid distinctio realis, quid formalitas, quid intelligi per esse idem formaliter, quid per esse distincta formaliter, quid distinctio formalis, quid est esse idem primo modo dicendi per se, quid secundo modo dicendi per se, quid tertio modo, quid quarto modo, quid sit quidditas, quid modus intrinsecus quidditatis, quid predicatio idemptica, quid predicatio denominativa, quid divisio absoluta, quid indivisio relativa, quid (tertio modo...quid *om. per hom.* Erfurt) est esse idem indivisione absoluta, quid indivisione relativa. Istis namque terminis frequenter utimur in hac metaphysica, ergo omnino est tibi necessarium quod in isto libro, quotiens quilibet terminus dicitur (quotiens...dicitur]de quotiens quodlibet terminorum dicitur Paris in quo nos istis terminis utimur Venice), significationem eorum non ignores. Ignorantia namque de significato terminorum multos decipit, et multos errare permittit, et hanc metaphysicam condemnare, que distinctionem ex natura rei et non per intellectum esse possibilem, immo necessariam absque reali divisione clare vult ostendere.”

two printings.¹⁶ Recent scholarship has also highlighted the importance of book III, bringing to light the underlying textual history.¹⁷ As witness to its continuing appeal, another contributor to this volume, Vitaly Ivanov, has recently published a Russian translation of book III, chapters 1–7.¹⁸

Bonet's definition-oriented presentation, particularly in chapters 1–7, allows for the extraction of an outline, using Nicolas' own words to reveal the structure and direction of the argumentation:

Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, Outline

1. Res
 - 1.1 per modum substrati
 - 1.2 per modum predicati
 - 1.3 per modum constituti et resultantis
2. Distinctio realis: tres regulae. Singularia:
 - 2.1 et individua que sunt adinvicem separabilia et mutuo: quodlibet eorum est res.
 - 2.2. quorum unum potest existere per se perseitate tertio modo, sed non econtra: quodlibet illorum est res et non aliquid rei.
 - 2.3 et individua quorum unum non potest per se existere tertii modi sine alio, nec econtra, quodlibet eorum est aliquid rei et non res.
3. Formalitas, identitas formalis et distinctio formalis
 - 3.1 formalitas vel quiditas
 - 3.1.1 Omne illud est formalitas vel quiditas (quod idem est) quod additum alteri variat rationem formalem ipsius, scilicet constituti ex illo et altero cui additur.
 - 3.1.2 vel per se est inclusum in ratione formali alicuius.
 - 3.2 esse idem formaliter
 - 3.2.1 quando unum per se primo modo includitur in alio, ita quod si unum illorum definiretur, aliud esse definitio sua vel pars definitionis eius.
 - 3.2.2 Sor et Plato sunt idem formaliter.
 - 3.3 formalis distinctio seu non-identitas
 - 3.3.1 Omnis quiditas per se et prima non includens aliam quiditatem nec in ipsa inclusa necessario formaliter distinguitur ab illa.
 - 3.3.2 Omnis quiditas que non est compossibilis alteri quiditati in eadem re necessario distinguitur formaliter ab illa.

¹⁶ Ps.-Antonius Andreae [=Nicholaus Bonetus], *Formalitates secundum viam doctoris subtilis*, Padua 1475; Nicholaus Bonetus, *Formalitates Boneti secundum viam doctoris subtilis*, Venice 1489. On the identification and discussion of these texts, see the next note.

¹⁷ Bolliger, *Infiniti contemplatio*, 281–90; Mandrella, “Metaphysik als Supertranszendentalwissenschaft?,” 167–69; Goris, *Scientia propter quid nobis*, 141–50.

¹⁸ See Ivanov's translation in *Платоновские исследования / Platonic Investigations* 17/2 (2022), 260–90.

4. Predicatio
 - 4.1 per se
 - 4.1.1 primo modo (non 'hoc est hoc' sed 'hoc est ex his'). Predicatio in qua:
 - 4.1.1.1 idem predicatur de seipso.
 - 4.1.1.2 pars definitionis predicatur de definito.
 - 4.1.1.3 tota definitio predicatur de definito.
 - 4.1.2 secundo modo: predicatio in qua predicatur propria passio de subiecto
 - 4.1.3 tertio modo (est modus essendi: esse solitarium et ab alio precisum)
 - 4.1.4 quarto modo: actus profluens a causa formali de effectu formali
 - 4.2 denominativa: in qua predicatum dicitur inesse subiecto in quadam adiacentia
 - 4.3 identica
 - 4.3.1 identitate absoluta: idem omnibus modis idem predicatur de seipso
 - 4.3.2 identitate relativa: predicatum et subiectum sunt aliquid non idem, et cum hoc aliquid aliquid.
 - 4.4 identice identica: presupponit aliam identitatem extremorum cum aliquo tertio.
5. De modis intrinsicis: Modus intrinsecus additus alicui quiditati contrahibili non variat rationem constituti ex illo modo et ex illa quiditate contrahibili.
6. Simul totum (ipsum simul totum vocatur res). Sunt in simul toto alique que dicunt:
 - 6.1 pure quid = ens inquantum ens
 - 6.2 mere quale = omnes differentie medie et extreme contrahentes ens inquantum ens
 - 6.3 quale quid = omnia predicata ab ente et descendendo usque ad simul totum
 - 6.4 mere hoc = omnes differentie individuales
 - 6.5 hoc aliquid = omnia simul tota et singularia. Sunt etiam in simul toto multi modi intrinseci.
7. Indivisio absoluta et indivisio respective
 - 7.1 indivisio absoluta: illa que est respectu sui et ad se sic quod non est plura
 - 7.2 indivisio relativa: illa qua aliquid est ab alio indivisum
 - 7.2.1 aliqua sunt actu indivisa, possibilia tamen dividi ex parte utriusque extremi
 - 7.2.2 alia sunt actu indivisa, possibilia tamen dividi tantum ex parte unius extremi
 - 7.2.3 alia sunt actu indivisa et impossibilia dividi ex parte utriusque extremi
8. Distinctio ex natura rei
 - 8.1 si est possibilis
 - 8.2 si est necessaria

Ex quibus patet manifeste quod intentio eorum est quod in individuo sunt multe quiditates, quarum una includit aliam et constituitur ex illis, et finaliter fit resolutio istarum ad primam quiditatem, que est quiditas entis inquantum ens, que omnino est irresolubilis. Dubitatio [1]: si tales quiditates precise reperiuntur in sensibilibus et si totaliter annihilentur et corrumpantur illis corruptis, vel forte remaneant in suo esse quiditativo separate corruptis omnibus singularibus in existentia actuali.

Dubitatio magna [2]: ponendo distinctionem formalem ex natura rei [...] inter genus et differentiam [...], a quo sumatur quiditas differentie? Et hoc specialem dubitationem habet in omni composito animato.

Dubitatio [3]: an magis proprie dicatur esse in aliquo plures formalitates distincte an una.

Nicolas's definitions (1–7) set the stage for the claim that a formal distinction is not only possible, but necessary. The key terms '*res*,' '*formalitas*,' 'formal identity,' 'intrinsic mode,' and 'indivision' establish the conditions for a reality in which a *distinctio ex natura re* must exist.

3.1 *Res*

Bonet gives three definitions of '*res*.' The first sense is *res* as substrate and subject:

Just as matter and form and all accidents are quantified by a single quantity corresponding to them, and all accidents that are subjectively in a quantity are quantified and extended by a single quantity corresponding to them in the manner of a substrate and a subject, so in Sorte there is, as if in the manner of substrate and subject, a certain intrinsic mode that is called *res* or *realitas*, by which thing or reality are reified all that is in Sortes, namely *Sorteitas*, humanity, animality, and substance and being, and all differentiae and the passions of everything included in Sortes.¹⁹

This first definition is *res* (R1) as a substrate to an aggregate. Bonet gives two analogies: first, a bundle of matter, form, and accidents is said to have a discrete quantity; second, accidents that inhere in a quantity, such as a color in a surface, are said to have that quantity; for example, whiteness can be said to have the quantity of two square meters by virtue of the surface that it inheres in. Likewise, the whole bundle of matter, form, properties, accidents of a given person ('Sortes') can be said to be a thing because of the intrinsic mode of reality that the thing possesses.

Second (R2), a *res* in the manner of predicate is such that it corresponds to every positive thing, so that *res* has a greater extension than being *qua* being, as *res* includes differentiae, passions, and quiddities other than the quiddity of being. "And all those who argue against the formal distinction share in taking *res* according to this signification." And, Bonet continues, in so doing they are deceived.²⁰

19 Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 1 (Erfurt 22va; Paris 30ra–b; Venice ed. 19va): "Per modum substrati, Sic intelligo quod, sicut materia et forma et omnia accidentia (et omnia accidentia *om.* Venice) sunt quanta unica quantitate correspondente illis, et accidentia omnia que existunt subiective (*om.* Venice) in quantitate sunt quanta et extensa una quantitate correspondente illis per modum substrati et subiecti, sic in Sorte est quasi per modum substrati et subiecti quidam modus intrinsecus qui dicitur *res* vel *realitas*, a qua *re* vel *realitate* reantur omnia que sunt in Sorte, et *sorteitas* et *humanitas* et *animalitas* et *substantia* et *ens* et omnes differentie et omnes per se passionis omnium inclusorum in Sorte."

20 Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 1 (Erfurt 22va–b; Paris 30rb–va; Venice ed. 19va): "Amplius alii vocant *rem* per modum predicati, scilicet quod omne positivum predi-

Third (R3), a *res* is the thing that comes about and has independent existence (which Bonet identifies as the third mode of perseity), as something constituted into being from others, coming about as a result.²¹

Bonet then concludes:

And if you ask which of these ways of taking '*res*' is more proper, I will reply to you: any of them is possible and can be true, because words signify according to convention (*ad placitum*). Also, someone could impose this word '*res*' to signify something in the manner of a substrate and a subject, and someone else could impose it to signify in the manner of a predicate, such that it is convertible with every positive being, and a third could impose it to signify in the manner of something constituted and resulting.

But the second way, as was said, is entirely discarded by modern philosophers, and even by ancient ones, who posit a distinction *ex natura rei* without a real distinction. But it is possible for them to use '*res*' in the first and third signification. But which is more proper, the first or the third signification? It is held that the third one is. And we want to use this word according to this signification for the most part in this metaphysics. Although the first meaning shall not be entirely cast aside from the consideration of this metaphysics, the third is more intelligible.²²

catum dictum de alio dicitur *res*, et sic accipiendo *rem* *res* non convertitur cum ente inquantum ens, quod est subiectum huius metaphysice. Quia quiditas entis sic intelligendo *rem* non est tantum *res*, sed differentie et passiones et alie quiditates a quiditate entis, immo omne positivum est essentialiter *res*, et sic *res* et positivum convertuntur. Et *res* in ista significatione est nomen equivocum, cum equaliter significet omne positivum. Et sic accipiendo *rem* quicumque habent aliquam distinctionem extra intellectum in natura rei distinguuntur realiter. Et in ista significatione capiunt *rem* communiter omnes arguentes contra distinctionem formalem, et decipiuntur, ut infra videbitur, quia accipiunt *rem* pro omni positivo quod est extra nihil, et per consequens formali consequentia concludunt, quod ubicumque est aliqua non-identitas vel distinctio *ex natura rei*, quod ibi est distinctio realis. [...] Sed in ista significatione inventores formalitatum et distinctionum *ex natura rei*, et antiqui philosophi et moderni non intelligunt, nec in ista metaphysica sic accipitur '*res*,' immo ista significatio nominis huius quod est '*res*' omnino abiicitur a consideratione nostra, nec volumus uti in aliquo hoc nomine '*res*' pro tali significatione."

21 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 1 (Erfurt 22vb; Paris 30va; Venice ed. 19va): "Amplius autem tertio accipitur *res* per modum constituti et resultantis, sicut persona et suppositum accipitur per modum totius per se entis et existentis perseitate tertii modi."

22 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 1 (Erfurt 22vb; Paris 30va; Venice ed. 19va–b): "Et si queras quis istorum modorum accipiendi *rem* sit magis proprius, respondeo tibi: quilibet istorum est possibilis et potest esse verus, quia nomina significant ad placitum. Et etiam unus potest imponere hoc nomen '*res*' ad significandum aliquid per modum substrati et subiecti, et alius per modum predicati et ut convertitur cum omni positivo, et tertius per modum constituti et resultantis. Secundus autem modus, ut dictum est, omnino abiicitur a modernis philosophis et etiam ab antiquis, qui ponunt distinctionem *ex natura rei* absque distinctione reali. Possibile autem est ipsis uti re in prima et tertia significatione. Sed que sit magis propria, vel prima vel tertia significatio? Fertur quod tertia. Et in ista significatione hoc nomine '*res*' volu-

Bonet therefore rejects the idea of ascribing to reality everything that has positive existence and specifically points to reality as the result of what comes into being by complex elements. In other words, *res* is the ordered aggregate that comes into being. Yet Bonet cannot quite abandon the notion of *res* being simply the substrate of the aggregate, possibly made *res* by an intrinsic mode; he will return to this tension in the discussion on the *simul totum*, below (see section 3.5).

3.2 *Formalitas*

In defining *formalitas*, Bonet states that a *formalitas* is the same as a *quiditas*, saying that it is what, when added to something else, changes the formal description (*ratio formalis*) of that thing. A *formalitas* is everything that is in itself included in the formal description of something.²³ Thus, being *qua* being is the absolutely first quiddity-formality, then the categories, intermediate and specific differentiae are quiddities-formalities, but individuating characteristics are not. In other words, a *formalitas* is an element of the essence of something: for a human being, all the formal components of humanity, such as being a substance, being an animal, and being rational, are *formalitates*; likewise, for an accident, being a quality, a color, and whiteness are all *formalitates*. On the other hand, *formalitates* are not what makes this person be this instance of a human being, or what makes these accidents inhere in this particular substance. A formality is simply any part of a being corresponding to the question ‘what is it?’

3.3 Formal Identity

Two comparanda are formally identical when they are related in the same line going from the most specific species to being *qua* being. Formal identity also occurs when two individuals have the same quiddity, although Bonet says that philosophers do not use ‘Formally identical’ in this sense. In the first sense, however, things are the same, but they also have a certain non-identity, as, for exam-

mus uti ut in pluribus in ista metaphysica. Licet prima non omnino abiiciatur a consideratione huius metaphysice, tertia tamen est intelligibilis magis.”

²³ Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 3 (Erfurt 23va; Paris 31ra; Venice ed. 19vb–20ra): “Amplius autem circa hunc terminum ‘formalitas’ vel ‘quiditas’ quid sit et quid non, et quotiens dicuntur est insistendum. Omne illud est formalitas vel quiditas (quod idem est) quod additum alteri variat rationem formalem eius, scilicet constituti ex illo et altero cui additur vel per se est inclusum in ratione formali alicuius.”

ple, a human being is formally the same as an animal, but there is some way in which they are not the same.²⁴

3.4 Intrinsic Modes

Bonet defines *formalitates* as what, when added, change the formal description of something. On the contrary, those things that do not change the formal description of something are intrinsic modes.

From this it follows that individual differentiae are intrinsic modes, because those things constituted by them do not change their formal description, rather they are not distinguished according to their formal descriptions, but have the same description. Finite and infinite do not differ in formal description, because a finite and an infinite line have the same description; so too actuality and potency, necessity and contingency, in the soul and outside the soul. Intrinsic modes do not change the formal description in the same way as accidental differentiae or passions, just as male and female, pale and dark man belong to the same essential thing.²⁵

24 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 3 (Erfurt 23vb; Paris 31rb; Venice ed. 20ra): “Adhuc autem quid sit esse idem formaliter alicui et quid non? Dicitur quod tunc aliquid est idem formaliter alicui quando unum per se primo modo includitur in alio, ita quod si unum illorum definiretur, aliud esse definitio sua vel pars definitionis eius. Vel quando plura includunt unum, ita quod si illa plura definirentur illud unum esset definitio eorum, nullo quiditative supple addito. Hec sit descriptio eius quod est esse idem formaliter. – Exemplum primi: homo est idem animali et rationali formaliter, quia per se illa sunt inclusa in eo tanquam principia definitiva hominis. – Exemplum secundi: Sor et Plato sunt idem formaliter, quia eadem definitio et quiditas per se est inclusa in eis, et si definirentur, haberent eandem definitionem. – Palam autem quod primus modus identitatis formalis differt a secundo in duobus, primum quia illa que sunt idem formaliter secundum primum modum necessario sunt idem realiter, sicut includens et inclusum, ut homo et animal et rationale; que igitur sunt sic idem formaliter sunt etiam idem realiter. Que autem sic sunt idem formaliter quod ambo includunt eandem formalitatem et quiditatem non oportet quod, si sunt idem, sic formaliter, quod propter hoc sint idem realiter, sicut Sor et Plato. Sed quandoque sunt idem formaliter et realiter, quandoque non. Differunt etiam secundo in alio, quia que sic sunt idem formaliter secundum primum modum, unum est pars potentialis vel contrahibilis, et aliud actuale vel contrahens; tertium quod resultat ex illis est illud sic includens illa. – Philosophi tamen moderni per esse idem formaliter intelligunt primo modo, non secundo modo. Et isto modo uti intendimus.”

25 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 5 (Erfurt 25va; Paris 32vb; Venice ed. 20vb): “Ex hoc sequitur quod differentie individuales sunt modi intrinseci, quia constituta per illa non variant rationem formalem, immo talia constituta per illa non distinguuntur secundum rationes formales, sed sunt eiusdem rationis. Finitum et infinitum non variant rationem formalem, quia linea finita et infinita sunt eiusdem rationis; actus et potentia; necessitas et contingentia; in anima et extra animam; sicut nec modi intrinseci variant rationem formalem sicut sunt differentie accidentales vel passionis, sicut masculus et femella, homo albus et niger sunt eiusdem rationis.”

Bonet concludes, however, that all intrinsic modes are *primo diversi*, because if they had anything in common, they would be quiddities, and as such they would change the description.²⁶ Likewise, an essential differentia cannot specify an intrinsic mode, but these intrinsic modes arise in the manner of properties.²⁷

Bonet's discussion of intrinsic modes is one of the clearest cases where he reveals his debt to his predecessor Francis Meyronnes. Meyronnes, for his part, inverted a position of John Duns Scotus on how to conceive of the notion of an infinite being. Scotus, explaining how we can have a concept proper of an infinite being, gives the example of how we can have the same concept of being, but to different degrees; thus, being to the most perfect degree is the intrinsic mode of infinite being. While Meyronnes inherits the discussion of *gradus intrinsecus* from his predecessors, his inversion lies in giving priority to *modus intrinsecus*, and using such intrinsic modes to explain degrees of perfection.²⁸

Bonet takes his definition of intrinsic modes from Meyronnes and posits them as being the individual difference, that is, what makes something a particular, as well as the disjunctives finite and infinite, actuality and potency, necessity and contingency, intramental and extramental.²⁹ Yet Meyronnes posits a modal distinction between a thing's quiddity and one of its intrinsic modes, and this type of distinction is unique in Meyronnes' hierarchy since it distinguishes two aspects without a common basis (for the quiddity of a thing is not a quiddity without an intrinsic mode, and vice versa). To call the modal distinction a 'distinction,' Meyronnes relies on a definition of distinction as a "respect of dislikening". Bonet calls intrinsic modes *primo diversi*, radically other, but he refuses to claim that any distinction can single them out; to the contrary, as we shall see below (section 3.6), quiddities are entirely undivided from their intrinsic modes. Moreover, his definition of the formal distinction *stricte loquendo* explic-

26 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 5 (Erfurt 25va; Paris 32vb–33ra; Venice ed. 20vb): "Omnes modi intrinseci sunt primo diversi quantum ad primum modum. Hoc probatur, quia si includerent aliquid commune quidditative, tunc non essent puri modi intrinseci, sed essent quedam quiditates, et addite alicui variarent rationem formalem eius. Omne namque includens quiditatem est quidam quiditas in se."

27 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 5 (Erfurt 25vb; Paris 33ra; Venice ed. 21ra): "Nullus modus intrinsecus est per se contrahibilis per differentiam essentialem; hoc probatur: quia omne quod per se contrahitur per differentiam quidditativam per se est inclusum in quiditate constituta ex contrahibili et contrahente; sed omne per se inclusum in quiditate est quiditas; ergo modi illi qui ponebantur intrinseci essent quedam quiditates, cuius oppositum est dictum."

28 Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine*, 196–200.

29 Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 426–47. Not surprisingly, Bonet's list of intrinsic modes corresponds to the list of four found in the *Conflatus*. Meyronnes' earlier *Reportatio* provides a different four-fold list: *quantitas virtutis*, *actualis existentia*, *realitas*, and *haecceitas*; see Duba and Schabel, "Ni chose, ni non-chose," 163.

itly excludes intrinsic modes, a position that Bartolomeo Mastri would later signal.³⁰

3.5 *Simul totum* (Synolon)

On Bonet's metaphysics, being *qua* being signifies merely *quid* (what); it combines with the successive determinations along the categorial line, signifying *quale* (what sort). These can be combined to state what sort of thing something is (*quale quid*). Individual differentiae of these genera state that an instantiation is a *this* (*hoc*): this animal, this body. Individuals of the species signify a *hoc aliquid* (or, curiously and recursively, a *simul totum*). Finally, there are the intrinsic modes (or rather, the intrinsic modes other than the individual differentiae), such as being finite or actual existence.

And this individual (*singulare*) includes all these things, and therefore has been rightly called the *simul totum* by ancient and modern philosophers, and it is the very *res* that we spoke about above. Therefore predicates that state merely what (*quid*) are not the *res* itself, nor are those that state what sort or what sort of thing, nor this, nor this something, but they are something of this *res*. But this *simul totum* is called '*res*'; all those things that are in the *simul totum* exist in a certain essential order, and from all of those things the *simul totum*, or even the aggregate, comes about and is constituted.³¹

30 See Andersen, *Metaphysik in Barockscotismus*, 751, note 56.

31 Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 6 (Erfurt 26ra–b; Paris 33rb; Venice ed. 21ra–b): “Palam igitur quod in simul toto et singulari plura ac diversa positiva, et non eiusdem ordinis, ibi existunt. In simul toto enim quod est Sortes, non sicut in acervo, sed in quodam ordine essentiali immutabili existunt alique que dicunt pure quid, alique que dicunt quale quid, alia que dicunt mere hoc, alique que dicunt hoc aliquid. Subiectum huius metaphysice quod in Sorte et in quolibet includitur dicit mere quid, cum non sit nisi mera quiditas simpliciter simplex, primo diversa ab omni quali et ab omnibus quia et quale et hec sunt extra ratione eius. Mere quale sunt differentie contrahentes ens inquantum ens, immo omnes differentie medie et extrema, cum sint primo diverse ab omni quid. Sunt etiam in simul toto alique que dicunt quale quid, sicut sunt omnia predicata secundum rectam lineam incipiendo ab ente exclusive et descendendo usque ad simul totum, que sunt constituta ex contrahibili et contrahente. Alia sunt in toto que dicunt mere hoc, sicut omnes differentie individuales omnium individuorum predicatorum superiorum. Est enim ibi individuum entis, substantie, corporis, animalis, hominis, et sic de aliis. Alia sunt in simul toto que dicunt hoc aliquid, sicut sunt omnia simul tota et singularia. Sunt etiam in simul toto multi modi intrinseci sicut finitas, existentia actualis et sic de aliis. Ipsum autem singulare includit omnia ista, et ideo a philosophis antiquis et modernis nominatur non immerito simul totum, et est ipsa res de qua loquuti sumus supra. Predicata igitur que dicunt mere quid non sunt ipsa res, nec que dicunt quale, nec quale quid, nec hoc, nec hoc aliquid, sed sunt aliquid illius rei. Ipsum autem simul totum vocatur res; omnia illa que sunt in simul toto sunt in eo quodam ordine essentiali, ex quibus omnibus resultat et constituitur simul totum vel etiam aggregatum.”

Bonet is clear that the *simul totum* is a *res* for him in sense R3 and that it is an aggregate; it is not, however, a heap (*acervum*), since there is some immutable order that runs *quid, quale, quale quid, hoc, hoc aliquid*. Later, in the first *dubitatio*, Bonet, in explaining the third position (which he judges *congruus*, as opposed to the others, which he labels *non verus* and *dubius*, respectively) that holds that “everything that is posited in the categorial line, descending from the most general genera to individuals, inclusively such that it excludes actual existence” can be in objective potency, he specifies that there are “two worlds, or rather one world under two beings, namely, under physical and natural being, both in real and actual existence, and under metaphysical and quidditative being.”³² A *res*, understood according to R3, that is, as a *simul totum*, cannot exist in this second, immutable world of quidditative being, but requires (the intrinsic mode of) actual existence.³³

3.6 Indivision

Bonet declares “that which we call indivision others call unity,” as indivision for him is the lack of being divided.³⁴ Indivision for Bonet can be absolute or relative. Every *res* is absolutely undivided in itself, and each *res* has a single such

32 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, dubitatio [1] (Erfurt 30ra; Paris 37ra; Venice ed. 25ra): “Fertur autem ab istis quod omnia que ponuntur in linea predicamentali incipiendo a primis generibus et descendendo usque ad individua inclusive, ut prescendit ab existentia actuali, quod possibile est quod sint in potentia obiectiva in esse quidditativo ab eterno. Totum enim predicamentum substantie et omnia que continentur in illo sunt priora ipsa existentia et abstrahunt ab illa, et eodem modo de omnibus aliis predicamentis. Manifestum autem est quod positores istius opinionis distinguunt duplicem mundum, vel melius eundem sub duplici esse, scilicet sub esse physico et naturali, et in existentia reali et actuali, et sub esse metaphysico et quidditativo.”

33 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, dubitatio [1] (Erfurt 30va; Paris 37va; Venice ed. 25rb): “Et si queras ‘numquid ibi in tali esse quidditativo ponatur res?’, respondeo accipiendo rem in secunda significatione de qua dictum est per modum predicati ibi ponitur. Accipiendo autem rem in prima significatione per modum substrati et subiecti, ibi non ponitur. Accipiendo autem rem in tertia significatione per modum aggregati et constituti et resultantis quod appellatur simul totum, ibi non ponitur, nam simul totum quod dicitur res, sicut Sortes, non tantum resultat ex illis que sunt per se in linea predicamentali, sed ex illis et ex existentia actuali resultat simul totum quod est Sortes. Et ideo simul totum non ponitur in potentia obiectiva.”

34 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 7 (Erfurt 26vb; Paris 33vb–34ra; Venice ed. 21va): “Et ut plane intelligas, debes scire quod illud quod nos vocamus indivisionem vocant alii unionem. Indivisio namque non est aliud nisi carentia divisionis, que est relatio cui opponitur relative; unio autem secundum alios opponitur contrarie divisioni et separationi, que est relatio.”

indivision.³⁵ On the other hand, all the components of the aggregate that is a *simul totum* have relative indivision to each other.³⁶ Bonet presents three kinds of relative indivision, according whether both extremes, only one extreme, or neither extreme can exist in separation. In this last sense, in the *simul totum*, a quiddity is entirely undivided from its intrinsic mode, and a proper passion from its subject, but in neither case can one exist without the other.³⁷

4. The Need for the Formal Distinction

Bonet concludes the third book of his *Metaphysics* with a lengthy discussion of the *distinctio ex natura rei*, its possibility and necessity. That it is possible depends on how one takes the term ‘res.’ If ‘res’ is taken in sense R2, as applied to all that is not nothing (*extra nihil*), then a contradiction arises in positing a *distinctio ex natura rei*, “and in this sense all the enemies of formalities are deceived, believing that those who posit *formalitates* use ‘res’ like they do in this sense, which is false.”³⁸ On the other hand, in sense R1, where ‘res’ is taken in

35 Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 7 (Erfurt 26va; Paris 33vb; Venice ed. 21rb): “Indivisio autem absoluta prior est indivisione relativa, quia quecumque sunt indivisa indivisione relativa sunt indivisa indivisione absoluta. Nulla res potest habere indivisione absolutam nisi unam, quia quodlibet quod est in se indivisum unica indivisione est a seipso indivisum.

36 Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 7 (Erfurt 26rb–va; Paris 33va–b; Venice ed. 21rb): “Indivisio autem relativa dicitur esse illa qua aliquid est ab alio indivisum, sicut una pars continui est ab alia indivisa in continuo, et accidens a subiecto, et forma a materia in composito est indivisa. Ista enim sunt idem per indistinctionem et indivisionem unius ab altero. Isto etiam modo dicuntur esse omnia indivisa indivisione et indistinctione relativa quecumque sunt in aggregato et simul toto quod appellatur res. Quodlibet autem illorum, sive dicat quid, sive quale, sive modum intrinsecum, est in se indivisum indivisione absoluta, ut prescindit ab alio, et est indivisum indivisione relativa cum alio. Animalitas enim est in se indivisa indivisione absoluta; similiter rationalitas est in se indivisa indivisione absoluta. Rationalitas tamen et humanitas sunt idem adinvicem indivisione relativa.”

37 Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 6 (Erfurt 26va; Paris 33vb; Venice ed. 21rb): “Indivisio autem relativa in triplici genere reperitur. Aliqua enim sunt actu indivisa, possibilia tamen dividi ex parte utriusque extremi, ut partes in continuo sunt actu indivise, possibiles tamen dividi ex parte utriusque extremi. Alia sunt actu indivisa, possibilia tamen dividi tantum ex parte unius extremi et non ex parte alterius, sicut simitas et nasus. Nasus enim potest separari a simitate et non e converso. Tertium genus indivisionis est quod aliqua sunt actu indivisa et impossibilia dividi ex parte utriusque extremi, sicut dicerent Philosophi de animali celesti, quia intelligentia et celum sic sunt indivisa adinvicem quod sunt impossibilia abinvicem dividi quantum est ex parte cuiuslibet extremi. Exemplum etiam in simul toto: quidditas est omnino indivisa a suo modo intrinseco, et e converso, et propria passio a subiecto.”

38 Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 8 (Erfurt 27ra; Paris 34ra–b; Venice ed. 21va): “Apparet autem manifestum quod accipiendo rem per modum predicati, ut hoc nomen ‘res’ est nomen impositum ad significandum omne positivum quod est extra nihil, talis distinctio et

the sense of a substrate and subject Bonet claims that a *distinctio ex natura rei* is certainly possible. For just as matter, form, and accidents can be said to be the same thing by denomination from the one composite in which they all inhere, so too can the individual differentiae, other intrinsic modes, and the whole categorical line, be said to be a 'res' by denomination from the substrate or subject by which they are all said to be one and the same thing.³⁹

In the sense in which Bonet understands *res*, however (R3), the possibility of the formal distinction is evident:

But further, taking 'res' in the third meaning, in the manner of what comes about and is constituted in existence, namely for the concrete whole (*simul totum*) and the aggregate, it is evident to anyone having a shred of intellect that this positing of *formalitates* and the distinction *ex natura rei* is possible. For in such a concrete whole and aggregate, which alone is called a 'res,' there are many things distinct *ex natura rei* that are not adequately *res*, nor are they that concrete whole and aggregate, just as a part is not its whole, but they are something of it and something of the *res*, just as matter is something of the composite and not the composite itself. It is therefore clear that it is possible for there to be, along with the unity of the *res*, a distinction *ex natura rei* and a plurality of *formalitates*. Likewise, with Sortes, who is a single thing and one concrete whole and one aggregate, it is possible that there be a quiddity of being and a quiddity of differentiae and of all quiddities that are in a direct categorical line, as well as that the [quiddities] of intrinsic modes and *per se* passions remain distinct *ex natura rei*. From all these comes to be Sortes, which is one *res* and one concrete whole, and one aggregate from all these.⁴⁰

positio formalitatum ex natura rei stare cum una re est omnino impossibile et contradictionem includens, quia quecumque sic distinguuntur ex natura rei distinguuntur realiter, ut supra patuit in primo capitulo huius tertii libri. Et in ista significatione rei decipiuntur omnes emuli formalitatum, credentes quod positores formalitatum utantur re in ista significatione sicut ipsi, quod est falsum.

³⁹ Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 8 (Erfurt 27ra; Paris 34rb; Venice ed. 21va): "Accipiendo autem rem in prima significatione sua, prout accipitur per modum substrati et subiecti, distinctio quiditativa et formalis ex natura rei videtur esse possibilis. Hoc probatur, quia sicut plura realiter distincta possunt esse quanta unica quantitate denominative, ut materia et forma et omnia accidentia, sic unica realitate per modum substrati et subiecti possibile est quod plures quiditates et formalitates reentur et denominative dicantur res, nam sicut Sortes et omnia que sunt in Sorte, sive differentie sive modi intrinseci, dicuntur ens unica quiditate entis a priori, sic omnia que sunt in Sorte, sicut entitas, substantia, corpus, animal, homo, et sic de aliis, possunt dici res a posteriori unica realitate qua reantur."

⁴⁰ Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 8 (Erfurt 27ra–b; Paris 34rb; Venice ed. 21va–b): "Amplius autem accipiendo rem in tertia significatione per modum resultantis et constituti, scilicet pro simul toto et aggregato, manifestum est cuilibet habenti granum de intellectu, quod hec positio formalitatum et distinctio ex natura rei est possibilis. Nam in tali simul toto et aggregato, quod solummodo vocatur res, sunt plura distincta ex natura rei (sunt...rei *om.* Paris, Venice), que non sunt res adequate, nec sunt illud simul totum et aggregatum, sicut nec pars est ipsum totum, sed sunt aliquid illius et aliquid rei, sicut materia est aliquid compositi et

That is, if a 'res' is taken to mean an ordered aggregate, then the parts of that aggregate, namely the intrinsic modes, *formalitates*, and so on, all fall short of being a *res* in themselves, but are also a part of them.

Therefore, not only does positing *formalitates* seem possible, but even quite easy to understand, since here 'res' is understood in the way of an integral whole, because it has been built up from all the prior predicates, all the differentiae, and intrinsic modes, like a house is a certain concrete whole and aggregate, resulting from many parts, such as stones, wood, and so on, none of which is a house, but <each> is something of this house. Thus Sortes is some concrete whole resulting from many things that are distinct *ex natura rei*, none of which is Sortes, but <each> is something of Sortes.⁴¹

As discussed earlier, Bonet provides a deflationary reading of matter, making it the quiddity of limited being. Thus, for him, the concrete whole (*simul totum*, the Latin translation of *σύνολον*), is not the composite of matter and form, but rather is an ordered aggregate of *formalitates*, properties and intrinsic modes (which act like properties, and one of which, named here *haecceitas*, and presumably identical to the individual differentia, makes the thing an individual). Bonet appeals to Aristotle's analogy to definitions to defend his view as Aristotelian:

This appears to be the express intention of Aristotle in book Z of his *Metaphysics*, in the chapter on definition, where he calls the particular and the singular a concrete whole; but the parts of a definition, such as genus and differentia, he calls the parts of a thing and not a thing. Whence there he compares the parts of a definition to the parts of an integral whole, just as he applied the whole definition to the whole thing, so the parts of the definition to the parts of thing.⁴²

non ipsum compositum. Palam igitur quod cum unitate rei possibilis est distinctio ex natura rei et pluralitas formalitatum, sicut cum Sorte, quod est unica res et unum simul totum et unum aggregatum, possibile est quod stet quidditas entis, et quidditas differentiarum et omnium quidditatum que sunt in recta linea predicamentali, necnon et modorum intrinsecorum et per se passionum stant distincte ex natura rei. Ex quibus omnibus resultat Sortes, quod est una res et unum simul totum et unum ex omnibus aggregatum."

41 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 8 (Erfurt 27rb; Paris 34rb–va; Venice ed. 21vb): "Non tantum igitur videtur possibilis positio formalitatum, sed etiam valde facilis ad intelligendum, cum hic accipiat res per modum totius integralis, quia ex omnibus predicatis prioribus et omnibus differentiis et modis intrinsecis integratur, sicut domus est quoddam simul totum et aggregatum resultans ex pluribus partibus, ut lapidibus, lignis et sic de aliis, quorum neutrum est domus, sed aliquid ipsius domus, sicut Sortes est quoddam simul totum resultans ex pluribus distinctis ex natura rei, quorum neutrum est ipse Sortes, sed aliquid Sortis."

42 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 8 (Erfurt 27rb; Paris 34va; Venice ed. 21vb): "Hec videtur fuisse expressa intentio Philosophi, Aristotelis, 7 sue *Metaphysice*, capitulo de diffinitione, ubi vocat particulare et singulare simul totum; partes autem diffinitionis, sicut genus et differentiam, vocat partes rei et non rem. Unde comparat ibi partes diffinitionis part-

Here Bonet refers to *Metaphysics* Z, cap. 10, where Aristotle discusses how parts relate to a thing.⁴³ There are two senses of parts relevant here: those that are constitutive of the particular (the “concrete whole,” *simul totum*), and material parts of a thing (the parts of the “integral whole”); for this latter case, Aristotle uses the example of a finger. A finger is not a separate entity from a human being, but is rather part of a human being. Moreover, something in reality corresponds to that finger, something that is not the same as what corresponds to another finger of the same person. But a finger presupposes the existence of the human being, and thus is posterior to it. By contrast, for Aristotle, the constitutive parts are what go together to make the human being and thus are prior to it. In citing this passage, Bonet claims that Aristotle intends to make an analogy between these distinct (posterior) parts of an integral whole, and the prior parts of a concrete whole, which he reads as the succession of *formalitates* that constitute the species, and the intrinsic modes that make it a particular thing.

Having established the possibility of the formal distinction, Nicolas Bonet then argues that it is necessary, given that one supposes the univocity of being. After all, nothing contracts or determines itself, and the univocal concept of being needs contraction and determination, therefore, some differentiae that are really distinct from being contract being. And these differentiae need to be formally distinct.

Nicolas Bonet claims that “ancient and modern philosophers” conclude the existence of *formalitates* and the formal distinction in the following way: they start from the investigation of sensory reality, which takes them to being *qua* being, which is common univocally to the first intelligence and to all things. While this first being shares this notion of being with everything else, nevertheless it has a proper concept that is distinct from everything else, and from this follows a distinction rooted in reality, a *distinctio ex natura rei*.⁴⁴ This leads to

ibus totius integralis, sicut inquit tota definitio ad totam rem, ita partes definitionis ad partes rei.”

⁴³ The Venice edition here replaces “capitulum de diffinitione” with “tex. 43,” which refers to Z12 (1037b27–38a35).

⁴⁴ Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 8 (Erfurt 27va; Paris 34va–b; Venice ed. 21vb): “Et si queras ‘ad concludendum formalitatem et distinctionem ex natura rei, a quo est omnino primo incipiendum?’ Respondeo tibi: antiqui philosophi et moderni inquirentes eam ab isto principio inceperunt, videlicet quod de prima intelligentia habemus aliquem conceptum ab istis sensibilibus, et hec est communis animi acceptio omnium philosophorum. Ex hoc processerunt ulterius quod ista sensibilia non possunt causare conceptum alicuius nisi contineant ipsum virtualiter vel formaliter, quia quod non continet aliud quantum ad entitatem, nec quantum ad intelligibilitatem. Palam autem quod ista sensibilia non continent aliquid quin sit in prima intelligentia virtualiter. Sequitur ergo quod continet aliquid quod est in ipsa formaliter, et hoc est conceptus entis contentus formaliter in utroque. Ex hoc sequebatur univocatio prime intelligentie ad ista sensibilia, ymmo ad omnia in isto conceptu communi entis inquantum ens.

what Bonet calls the “Achilles of all those who philosophize,” namely to conclude a distinction *ex natura rei* by appealing to the “first principle,” a combination of the principle of non-contradiction and that of the excluded middle. That is, for any proposition, either the affirmation or the negation of a proposition is true, but not both. Bonet’s example is that of being *qua* being and substance. Being is common to the ten categories; as substance is one of the ten categories, it is being in some way. But substance is not common to the ten categories. By the first principle, substance and being cannot both be the same and not be the same in the same way. Therefore, there must be some kind of non-identity in reality (*ex natura rei*) to support that predication.⁴⁵

Indeed, Bonet argues, there are different levels of distinction, and even those who refuse the formal distinction distinguish between a real distinction and a distinction of reason:

Even the enemies and maligners of *formalitates* have to concede that all contradictories do not lead to the same distinction, but according to them and rightly, <some> lead to only *rationes* and concepts, and <some> necessarily to a real distinction, as being and non-being, and many others. Every school also concedes that some contradiction does not necessarily lead to a real distinction and one in external reality.

And Aristotle argues in *Metaphysics* IV against those who deny this and he concludes against them that they lack sense and should be whipped until they concede that at the same time there cannot be both whipping and non-whipping.⁴⁶

Ulterius autem procedendo sequebatur distinctio ex natura rei, quia ex quo prima intelligentia convenit cum omnibus in conceptu quidditativo entis et distinguitur in conceptu proprio, accipiendo conceptum pro obiecto conceptu, necessario sequitur distinctio formalis et ex natura rei entis et cuiuslibet univoci ad sua univocata, quia non videtur quod omnino eodem convenient aliqua et differant.”

⁴⁵ Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 8 (Erfurt 27va–b; Paris 34va–b; Venice ed. 21vb–22ra): “Achilles autem omnium philosophantium semper fuit ad concludendum distinctionem ex natura rei per primum principium, scilicet ‘de quolibet affirmatio et negatio vera sub disiunctione et de nullo simul,’ applicando extrema contradictionis de predicatis ex natura rei non fabricatis per actum intellectus ad aliquam. Quia, si affirmatio vere applicatur uni et vere negatur alteri, necessario concluditur aliqua non-ydemptitas ex natura rei in illis quibus applicantur. Sola enim non-ydemptitas tollit apparentem contradictionem, sicut ydemptitas est causa contradictionis vere, quia vera contradictio et verus elenchus est affirmatio et negatio unius et eiusdem, non nominis tantum, sed rei et nominis, et ad idem et secundum idem. Formetur ergo sic elenchus: ens in quantum ens est contrahibile et communicabile omnibus decem generibus; substantia non est communicabilis decem generibus; ergo necessario est aliqua non-ydemptitas ex natura rei inter illa. Et sic poteris formare multos veros elenchos de multis predicatis ex natura rei, ex quibus necessario concludes distinctionem ex natura rei.”

⁴⁶ Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 8 (Erfurt 28ra; Paris 35ra; Venice ed. 22ra): “Hoc etiam emuli et impugnatores formalitatum habent concedere: quod omnia contradictoria equalem distinctionem non concludunt, sed secundum eos aliqua concludunt solum distinctionem rationis et conceptus, et alia necessario distinctionem realem, ut esse et non-esse et

As for why some contradictories lead to a real distinction and others do not, Bonet first says, "everyone has this problem." Thus, "let them solve it."⁴⁷ He also suggests differences on the parts of the predicate and subject. Finally he says:

Otherwise it is said that there is no other cause but that this is this. For it is foolish to seek the cause of all things, since there is not an infinite regress in causes.⁴⁸

In a masterstroke, Bonet ontologizes the foundation of Aristotelian Philosophy, the principle of non-contradiction, and claims it to prove the formal distinction, which then becomes the shared patrimony of philosophers. Where Aristotle in *Metaphysics* I presents strategies for confuting those who claim that contradictory statements are simultaneously true, Bonet uses the impossibility of contradictories being simultaneously true to assert the existence of contradictories in the same reality, while being formally distinct. Aristotle mentions that those who deny the first principle should either be persuaded or compelled to admit it.⁴⁹ Bonet takes this dialectical guidance into the physical plane, creatively making Aristotle propose the flagellation of those who deny him, applying a punishing ontology to correct a sloppy epistemology.⁵⁰ Further, just as the first principle cannot be demonstrated, for that would lead to an infinite regress,⁵¹ so Bonet

plurima alia. Hoc etiam concedit omnis scola quod aliqua contradictoria aliquam distinctionem in re extra et realem necessario concludunt. Et contra negantes hoc arguit Aristoteles in IV *Metaphysice* sue, et concludit contra tales quod ipsi indigent sensu et pena et debent flagellari (fātigari Erfurt, Paris) donec ipsi concedant quod de eodem simul non verificantur flagellari et non flagellari."

⁴⁷ Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 8 (Erfurt 28ra; Paris 35ra; Venice ed. 22ra): "Et si queras que est ratio quare aliqua contradictoria concludunt distinctionem realem et aliqua(alia) non, cum omnia contradictoria circa idem equaliter repugnent, respondeo omnes habent solvere istam difficultatem, quia omnes ponunt quod equaliter repugnant et quod non equalem distinctionem concludunt. Solvant ergo illi istam difficultatem."

⁴⁸ Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 8 (Erfurt 28rb; Paris 35rb; Venice ed. 22ra–b): "Aliter dicitur quod non est alia causa nisi quia hoc est hoc. Insipientis enim est querere causam omnium cum non sit processus in infinitum in causis."

⁴⁹ Aristoteles, *Met.* Γ5, 1009a17–19; Aristoteles Latinus, *Metaphysica* (rec. Moerbeke; AL 25.3.2, pp. 81–82): "Est autem non idem modus <intercessionis> ad omnes; his namque persuasione egent illi vi".

⁵⁰ Bonet likely took the idea from Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, c. 8 (ed. van Riet, 62). Elsewhere, Bonet takes even greater liberties with his sources, for example, adapting a passage from Averroes to make it favorable to Bonet's own doctrine of a distinction between mathematical and natural place, and then presenting that teaching as specifically that of Aristotle and Averroes: Duba, "Mathematical and Metaphysical Space in the Early Fourteenth Century", 101–3.

⁵¹ Aristoteles, *Met.* Γ4, 1006a7–9; Aristoteles Latinus, *Metaphysica* (rec. Moerbeke; AL 25.3.2, p. 74): "est enim ineruditio non cognoscere quorum oportet querere demonstrationem et quorum non oportet. Totaliter quidem enim omnium esse demonstrationem est impossibile;

claims that the relationship between contradictories and formal or real distinctions cannot be demonstrated.

To explain the persistent presence of contradictories in reality, Bonet re-asserts his “Achilles,” that there has to be a way for contradictory predicates to be simultaneously present, leading to a formal non-identity *ex natura rei*. He concludes:

But it further appears that this position on formalities had its origins not in Scotland, nor in France, but rather in Greece, at Athens, in the schools of Aristotle, who with word and writing taught it, as is clear to anyone who looks at his philosophy. For he said that scientific knowledge is not of particulars, but of universals; therefore universals are not entirely the same as particulars. I ask, ‘what did he mean by universals and universal quiddity?’ Not the act of conceiving, because that is particular and, moreover, there is not scientific knowledge of it. But he meant the extramental universal object. He also said that universals are incorruptible; but singulars are corruptible; therefore of singulars there is neither scientific knowledge nor definition. Therefore, the distinction is among those universals. Moreover, the whole *Metaphysics* VII concerns these quiddities and their non-identity.⁵²

Bonet famously claims the formal distinction has its roots in Aristotle, properly understood. Later thinkers, such as Belluto and Mastri, gladly incorporated Bonet’s statement into their own defenses of the antiquity of the formal distinction.⁵³

Bonet finishes with a *dubitatio magna*: Where does the quiddity of genus and the quiddity of differentia come from, and how is this related to matter and form?⁵⁴ For humans this is even more complicated: is humanity from the body,

nam in infinitum procederet, ut nec ita foret demonstratio.” Cf. Nicholaus Bonetus, *supra*, n. 46.

⁵² Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, cap. 8 (Erfurt 28va; Paris 35va; Venice ed. 22rb): “Amplius autem videtur ista positio formalitatum ortum habuit non in Scotia nec in Francia, sed magis in Grecia apud Athenas in scholis Aristotelis, qui verbo et scripto eam docuit, ut patet omni intuenti philosophiam suam. Ait enim quod scientia non est de particularis, sed tantum de universalibus; ergo universalia non sunt idem omnino cum particularibus. Quero quid intelligit per universalia et quidditatem universalem? Non actum concipiendi, quia ille particularis est, et etiam de illo non est scientia. Sed de obiecto universali extra. Ait etiam quod universalia sunt incorruptibilia, singularia autem sunt corruptibilia; ergo ipsorum non est scientia nec definitio; ergo distinctio inter illa. Totus etiam septimus *Metaphysice* plenus est de istis quidditatibus et earum non-identitate.” This passage and translation are also in Duba, “Three Franciscan Metaphysicians,” 476.

⁵³ Andersen, *Metaphysik in Barockscotismus*, 660–61, n. 3.

⁵⁴ Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, *dubitatio magna* (Erfurt 30va; Paris 37va; Venice ed. 23ra): “Amplius autem habet dubitationem magnam ponendo distinctionem formalem ex natura rei quam tu ponis inter genus et differentiam et in esse quidditativo et in actuali existentia: a quo sumatur quidditas generis, et a quo sumatur quidditas differentie?”

the soul, or both?⁵⁵ Bonet's answer is quite complicated, beginning with the answer given by two positions that he does not hold, namely, that (A) the compound is something added to matter and form, not something that results from their union,⁵⁶ and (B) the compound is something that results from the union of matter and form, but matter and form are two different things (*res*).⁵⁷ In the latter case, Bonet claims, a compound is made of matter and form, where matter is just the quiddity of matter and is either relatively or absolutely identical to the quiddity of the compound and form is what contains all the differentiae that restrict being from the first division all the way to the individual differentia. But all the subalternate genera and species will be partially from matter and partially from form.

As a further refinement of these two positions, which may be inspired by John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol,⁵⁸ Bonet proposes the identification of matter with 'limited being' discussed at the beginning:

But if prime matter is posited as limited being, which is common to the ten categories, there is the same way of establishing the categorial line, except that the subalternate gen-

55 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, dubitatio magna (Erfurt 30vb; Paris 38ra; Venice ed. 23rb): "Et maior difficultas adhuc oritur in homine, utpote in Sorte: a quo sumatur humanitas, vel a corpore, vel ab anima, vel ab utroque? Non potest dici quod sumatur a corpore, quia tunc corpus Sortis esset homo; nec ab anima, quia tunc anima esset homo; nec ab utroque, quia tunc humanitas esset plures res. Idem potest argui de differentia."

56 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, dubitatio (Erfurt 30vb; Paris 37vb; Venice ed. 23rb): "Dissolutio autem istius dubitationis, licet sit difficilis, potest tamen sic responderi, ponendo tertiam entitatem in composito tanquam tertiam rem additam, non resultantem. Et tunc dicitur quod illa tertia entitas includet omnia predicata priora, scilicet genera et differentias; omnia igitur illa predicata superiora que per se sunt inclusa in illa tertia entitate erunt res realitate illius tertiae entitatis. Animalitas ergo non sumetur a corpore, nec ab anima, nec ab utroque; nec similiter rationalitas; sed tam animalitas quam rationalitas sumentur ab illa tertia entitate. Nam illa tertia entitas includit ens et substantiam, et omnia predicata priora, et omnes differentias, et est resolubilis in illa."

57 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, dubitatio magna (Erfurt 31rb; Paris 37vb; Venice ed. 23va): "Apparet etiam ulterius quod, si in composito non sit tertia entitas nisi resultans, quod ex genere et differentia non constituetur tertia quidditas nisi resultans, quia illa tertia quidditas, si poneretur, oporteret quod esset res duplici realitate: forme scilicet et materie. Iste est modus dividendi et contrahendi et constituendi lineam predicamentalem in genere substantie, et hoc in composito in quo non est nisi una forma, sicut in inanimatis. Hec omnia sunt vera ut fertur, supposito quod materia sit res alia a forma."

58 One could make a case that (A) is the position of John Duns Scotus, which Peter Auriol criticizes on the basis of *Met.* H6, especially in the Arabic-Latin translation. Against Scotus's opinion, Auriol objects that the composite is not anything added, but rather is fundamentally the same thing that was in potency and now is in actuality. Since he thus holds that matter is pure potentiality, he might be the inspiration for (B); see Duba, "Aristotelian Traditions in Franciscan Thought"; Friedman, "Is Matter the Same as Its Potency?"

era and the species will not be founded on the coming together of two things, but of two formalities of the same thing.⁵⁹

Thus Nicolas Bonet, to guarantee the unity of the composite, portrays matter as a formality. This model naturally raises questions concerning human beings, who have an intellective soul that can exist in separation from the body. Bonet argues that body and soul are distinct species of substance, but imperfect, as they can combine to form a perfect one.⁶⁰

At least in book III of his *Metaphysics*, Bonet provides two explanations for how the intellective soul expresses the vegetative, sensory, and intellective aspects. The first explanation is that the intellective soul contains a further three differentiae, by the first of which the organized and disposed body is contracted and the vegetative life is brought into being; the second differentia applies to the vegetative and constitutes the sensory aspect, which in turn is further refined by the third differentia into the intellective. Alternatively, the fusion of the soul and body, as perfection to what can be perfected, brings into being all three aspects at once.⁶¹

Conclusion

Nicolas Bonet never explicitly states a hierarchy of types of distinctions, but in *Metaphysics* III, the list is relatively short. Even his enemies, he claims, admit of distinctions of reason and real distinctions. A thing, a *res*, is a concrete whole (*simul totum*), which is an organized series of *formalitates* running from limited being (matter) down to the specific difference, which contracts the thing to its

59 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, dubitatio magna (Erfurt 31rb; Paris 37vb; Venice ed. 23va–b): “Si autem ponatur materia prima esse ens limitatum quod est commune ad decem predicamenta, idem modus est constituendi lineam predicamentalem nisi quod genera subalterna et species non fundabuntur super concursum duarum rerum, sed duarum formalitatum unius rei.”

60 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, dubitatio magna [2] (Erfurt 31rb; Paris 37vb; Venice ed. 23vb): “Licet anima et corpus quodlibet sit species generis substantie, sunt tamen imperfecte, quia possunt esse partes unius quiditatis specificice perfecte.”

61 Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* III, dubitatio magna [2] (Erfurt 31rb–va; Paris 37vb; Venice ed. 23vb): “In ipsa autem anima intellectiva continentur tres differentie alie forte ab illis. [...] Prima differentia anime et superior in isto ordine contrahit tale corpus sic organizatum et constituit vivum vita vegetativa. Secunda differentia contrahit vegetativum et constituit sensitivum et animal. Tertia differentia contrahit sensitivum et animal et cum eo constituit ratiocinativum, scilicet hominem. Vel potest dici quod ipsa anima tota addita corpori sicut perfectio perfectibili contrahit corpus organizatum et cum eo constituit vegetativum, sensitivum, et intellectivum, et sic tota anima habet rationem differentie. Similis modus contrahendi et dividendi et constituendi est in celo.”

proximate matter; it also contains intrinsic modes, such as *haecceitas*, which gives the thing its "individual differentia." All these elements in the *simul totum* are identical by relative identity, and the *formalitates* have a formal non-identity *ex natura rei* between them.

The foundations of this metaphysics, Bonet assures us, are Aristotelian. Logic plays an explanatory role in Bonet's metaphysics from the very beginning of the *Metaphysica*, that is, of the whole *Philosophiae*, where Bonet forges his incipit as a syllogism, fusing the incipits to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (major premise) and the *Posterior Analytics* (minor premise).⁶² Bonet takes the thought-experiment of stripping being in *Metaphysics* Z3 and applies to it the doctrine of definition in Z12: in our mind we remove from being its determinations, that is, its differentiae, which are its *formalitates*, until we arrive at the first determination applied to being, which makes it prime matter.

In a stunning development of Formalist doctrine, Nicolas Bonet radically revises matter. Prime matter no longer serves as the individuating principle; the intrinsic mode of *haecceitas* handles that. Prime matter is only potential in the sense of being the first restriction of being, separating God from Creation; it does not even distinguish spiritual and sensible substances: on Bonet's ontology, prime matter involves limited being, common to the ten categories, and thus every instantiation has prime matter. For Bonet, this model greatly simplifies the problem posed by the formal distinction: rather than balance *formalitates* against a hylomorphic composite, he can present a reality where there are only *formalitates*, and the individual is an ordered aggregate. In doing so, however, he reduces matter to a mere formality. The argument for the necessity of the formal distinction likewise uses Aristotle's logic to dictate reality. Aristotle, in *Met.* Γ, presents the principle of non-contradiction (and excluded middle) as the foundations of knowledge. Bonet applies an ontological reading: corresponding to these rules of knowing are rules about the world, which means that external beings have these characteristics that appear contradictory. Moreover, since Aristotle holds that one cannot have knowledge of singulars, we only know quidditative being, which points to the existence of eternal, quidditative entities (which, however, are singular, and there can be several singular instantiations of the same set of quiddities) in a "world" distinct from that of contingent, physical, actually-existing entities. The doctrine in Bonet's *Metaphysics* III documents these beings, relates them to the worlds in which they are known to exist, and claims that the philosophy that explains this reality goes back to Aristotle himself. Indeed, Bonet uses ideas, constructions, implicit and explicit citations from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Yet his reading is highly selective, to the point of distorting Peripatetic thought, rebuilding Athens in Caledonia.

62 Duba, "Three Franciscan Metaphysicians," 464–65.

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Vienna Formalism

Mental, *ex natura rei*, and Formal Distinctions in Johannes Meyger's *Tractatus distinctionum*

Apaoan Ramos Machado

Introduction

Johannes Meyger's theory of distinctions, contained in his *Tractatus distinctionum* (posthumously published in 1482, but written almost a whole century earlier), merges various traditions within the broad Formalist tradition. His treatise is a perfect example of how the Formalist tradition, not only being cultivated in the Franciscan convents, pervaded major European educational institutions, in this case the University of Vienna. Meyger's work, explicitly conceived as a handbook for students, thus helps us understand the importance of the theory of distinctions in medieval university education. In this present article, I shall introduce Johannes Meyger (section 1), highlight the circumstances of the printing of his treatise (section 2), explain the treatise's pedagogical merits (section 3), discuss Meyger's sources (section 4), and finally analyze his presentation of the mental, *ex natura rei*, and formal distinctions (sections 5–7); when discussing the formal distinction, I shall pay particular attention to Meyger's notion of 'formality.'

1. Johannes Meyger († 1402?) and the Vienna Circle of the Late Middle Ages

During the Late Middle Ages, with the emergence of the new universities in Central Europe, a journey eastward was undertaken by many Theology and Philosophy professors. The Formalist tradition was a part of this development or, as one may say, "transfer of learning" (*translatio studii*).¹ It soon gained adherents in this part of Europe. Johannes Meyger and his treatise on distinctions exempli-

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¹ For the historical background, see Shank, *Unless You Believe*, 3–25; for the notion of *translatio studii*, see especially *ibid.*, 6.

fy this development. Only little is known about Meyger.² He appears to have been a parish priest in the small town of Maigen in Lower Austria, where he exercised his priesthood associated with an income from his rural property, besides being canon in Passau and Vienna. He does not seem to have been a member of any religious order, and was thus not a Scotist Franciscan like many others in the Formalist tradition. What we know for sure is that his life and his unique extant work, his *Tractatus distinctionum*, are closely related with the origins of the University of Vienna.

The University of Vienna was founded by Duke Rudolph IV in 1365. However, this ambitious project was not carried out due to the duke's premature death. It was only in 1384 that the university, owing to a new privilege granted by his brother, Duke Albert III, was provided with its material basis.³ The first step taken by Duke Albert was the construction of the university building, the Collegium Ducale. Prominent figures were recruited to serve as teaching staff. The Paris-trained theologians Henry of Langenstein and Henry Totting of Oyta deserve special mention. These authors formulated the nascent university curriculum and attracted students to this corner of Europe. In addition to them, the much less well-known local theologian Johannes Meyger was appointed. And not only that, in 1385 Meyger even served as rector of the *studium generale*, a position that he held only during that one year. From 1387 to 1391, Meyger held the position of vice chancellor. Together, Henry of Langenstein, Henry Totting of Oyta, Johannes Meyger, and other professors constituted what we could call the Vienna Circle of the Late Middle Ages.

Like in other universities, every advanced Theology student was expected to lecture on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*.⁴ However, before starting to write his commentary on the *Sentences*, the candidate was required "to principiate" (*principiare*), i.e., to debate theological issues from the *Sentences*, responding to criticism from the other students and the professor.⁵ One fragment of a manuscript notebook written by one of the first Theology students in Vienna, Johannes Bremis, has survived; in it, we find mention of his co-students Hermann Lurtz of Nürnberg and Lambert of Gelderen. This generation of scholars not only pro-

2 For some biographical information, see Shank, *Unless You Believe*, 38, 116–17; see further Aschbach, *Geschichte der Wiener Universität*, 410–11.

3 For a detailed account of the foundation of the University of Vienna, see Mühlberger, "Alma Mater Rudolphina Vindobonensis." Mühlberger mentions the most important figures, the founding documents and the internal structure of the nascent institution. On the foundation of the University of Vienna, see also Shank, *Unless You Believe*, 3–56. For an overview of the philosophical and theological ideas that circulated there, see the collective volume edited by Brinzei, *The Rise of an Academic Elite*.

4 Shank, *Unless You Believe*, 35–36.

5 Regarding Johannes Bremis's *Principium*, see Shank's appendix in *Unless You Believe*, 205–19.

duced new works of their own, but were in their turn influential in other European emerging institutions of higher education. Johannes Bremis's notebook further documents the role of Johannes Meyger as a theology professor at the new university.

2. A *Tractatus distinctionum* among the Earliest Printed Books in Vienna

The *Tractatus distinctionum* attributed to Johannes Meyger, which survived in two manuscripts and in a posthumously printed *incunabulum* edition of 1482, was one of the first books to be printed in Vienna (notably, one of the manuscripts was based on this printed edition, while the other dates from shortly before the book was printed).⁶ Stephan Koblinger, its most probable printer – and the first printer in the city – had, earlier in 1482, arrived from Vicenza in Northern Italy. He stayed in Vienna until at least 1486.⁷ In Italy, Koblinger had already printed a few books, for example, the Italian humanist Giovanni Tortelli's *De orthographia* and the Dominican Leonardo da Utino's *Sermones aurei*, both printed in 1479. By virtue of his *séjour* in Italy and his knowledge of the Italian language, a short Italian-German dictionary published in Vienna in the same year of Meyger's treatise has been ascribed to Koblinger both as author and editor (*Vocabularius italico-teutonicus*, also known as *Vocabulista*). Besides Meyger's treatise and the *Vocabulista*, other *incunabula* were printed by Koblinger in the very year of 1482. His printing activity had a further focus on religious literature, such as Guido de Monte Rochen's famous manual for parish priests, *Manipulus curatorum* (still not obsolete in those times before the Council of Trent), and the French theologian Jean Gerson's brief treatise on the sacrament of penance, *Doctrina de confessione et absolutione*, not to mention *Dy history von Sand Roccus* (in German language), a hagiographic by the Venetian humanist Fran-

⁶ The manuscripts are the codices 4963 (119r–27r, copied in 1481) and 4951 (154r–63r, the one that was copied from the *incunabulum*) held in the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek. According to the Incunabula Short Title Catalogue (ISTC) of the British Library, four copies of the *incunabulum* are known to exist, one in Spain, one in the Czech Republic, and two in Austria; cf. <<https://data.cerl.org/istc/im00531030>>. As for the question of authorship, while both of the manuscripts and the incunable mention Meyger as the author of the text, we have no external evidence to support this attribution. On the other hand, we do not at the present moment have any reason to doubt the accuracy of the attribution. I am currently preparing a critical edition of the treatise. In this present paper, all quotes from Meyger are from my preliminary edition; the folio numbers refer to the incunable text.

⁷ For a detailed account of the publishing activities of Stephan Koblinger, see Starck, "Zur Frage der Wiener Erstdrucker," especially 64–66. Concerning the history of book printing in Vienna, see Flood, "The History of the Book in Austria," 447–48.

cesco Diedo. Koblinger also printed Giles of Rome's *Errores philosophorum*. The works printed by Koblinger represent different genres, and they targeted various audiences. Meyger's treatise seems to be among this collection of printed books simply because it met the demands of the time. In Vienna, there must have been a market for Formalist literature.

3. Meyger's Pedagogical Vocation: *manipulus distinctionum*

In the prologue to his treatise, Meyger tells us that he was impelled to write it "by filial requests" (*voitis filialibus*) from someone he does not identify; in all probability, it was one of his students. It could in fact have been one of the students mentioned above. In any case, the request reveals the keen interest of the Viennese students in theory of distinctions. Meyger's brief introduction testifies to the high popularity of this topic in the nascent university *milieu* of Vienna. Meyger regards the subject of his treatise as the "most difficult" (*difficillima*) of all metaphysical issues, but also as the "most useful" (*utilissima*) one.⁸ Meyger's pedagogical concern is interesting in itself, since it helps us understand the importance of the theory of distinctions not only in medieval written output, but in the context of university education. He repeatedly calls his treatise a "handbook on distinctions" (*manipulus distinctionum*). At one place, after facing one difficult question on the nature of formalities, he explicitly says that his intention is "merely to compile a useful handbook." To write such a handbook is his aim, not to implant any "grain of knowledge" (*frumentum sciendi*), as he curiously says, seemingly playing on the commonplace syntagma "instrument of knowledge" (*instrumentum sciendi*) found in many handbooks of logic.⁹

At any rate, Meyger's handbook is conceived exactly as a *tool* for helping students solve philosophical and theological problems. Meyger did not forget to include a list of problems that could be tackled by students armed with his treatise. His book thus enables investigation into the difference between being and its properties, between these passions among each other, between what is superi-

8 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 1r: "[Q]uia rerum quiditates volentes investigare necesse est ut earum identitatem et diversitatem iugiter meditentur, tibi ergo, carissime, utile fore existimavi modos distinctionum habere sub compendio maxime propter rerum creaturarum sinceram intuitionem ac diversorum praedicamentorum debitam distinctionem, unde votis flagitabas filialibus ut modos distinctionum uno tibi sub manipulo ego, Villicus, recolligerem. Haec res, quamvis inter omnes metaphysicales difficultates sit difficillima, tamen quia utilissima est, tibi condescendere honeste fore indicavi."

9 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 10r: "[...] ideo nunc pertranseo nec etiam intendo horreum intellectus implere frumento sciendi, sed tantummodo manipulum per usum colligere."

or and what is inferior, between genus and species, between parts and the whole, between action and passion, in fact between any of the ten Aristotelian categories; it further enables focus on one thing in abstraction from other things; it also elucidates the distinction between the divine attributes and the properties of the persons in the “most high and simple” Trinity.¹⁰ In sum, the doctrine of distinctions, as presented in Meyger’s treatise, is a true panacea for the philosophical and theological problems of his time.

The treatise is divided into three parts. The first part presents various kinds of distinctions and identities, elucidates the hierarchical rules governing the relationship between them, and explains each distinction in particular. In the second part, Meyger lists various “ways of investigating” (*viae investigandi*) each kind of distinction. The third (and longest) part discusses six issues (*dubia*), concerning distinctions; the formal distinctions receives by far the most attention (questions 2–5).¹¹ The table of contents of Meyger’s *Tractatus distinctionum* is as follows:

Overall division of the text into three parts:

1. Modes of distinctions and identities (*Modi distinctionum et identitatum*); 1r–2v
2. Ways of investigating distinctions (*Viae investigandi distinctiones*); 2v–4r
3. Some doubts on distinctions (*Dubia aliquae circa distinctiones*); 4r–11v

The six issues discussed in the third part:

1. Whether the distinction *ex natura rei* should be posited? (*Primum dubium tangit distinctionem ex natura rei, scilicet an sit ponenda talis distinctio*); 4r–4v
2. Whether those things that are formally distinguished are really distinguished? (*Quaeritur utrum illa quae distinguuntur formaliter distinguuntur realiter*); 4v–8v
3. Whether formality and reality in the same simple thing are distinguished? (*Quaero utrum formalitas et realitas in eadem re simplici distinguebantur*); 8v–10r
4. Whether formality comes from form? (*Quaeret aliquis utrum formalitas veniat a forma*); 10r (the issue is dealt with on just one page)

¹⁰ Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 11v: “Ex istis declaratis in hoc libello poteris investigare differentiam inter ens et suas passiones, et passionum inter se, similiter differentiam inter superius et inferius, inter genus et differentiam et speciem, inter partes et totum, inter actionem et passionem, et generaliter distinctionem et identitatem omnium praedicamentorum, et videre quamlibet rem seorsum ab alia re, etiam distinctionem divinorum attributorum ac proprietatum personalium in summa ac simplicissima trinitate.”

¹¹ Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 1r: “Suscipe ergo manipulum distinctionum: in quo primo modos distinctionum et identitatum adunabo, secundo vias investigandi distinctiones ordinabo, tertio dubia aliquae circa distinctiones disputabo, et sic finaliter, deo grates referendo, manipulum distinctionum alligabo.”

5. Whether singulars under the same species are formally distinguished? (*Quaeritur utrum singularia sub eadem specie distinguuntur formaliter*); 10r–10v
6. Whether one of two essentially distinguished items can exist one without the other? (*Ultimo propter quoddam dictum de distinctione essentiali, scilicet quod illa quae essentialiter distinguuntur unum potest sine altero existere*); 10v–11v

4. Meyger's Formalist Sources

Meyger's handbook embraces different approaches from the Formalist tradition. We thus find influence from various Formalist authors, not to mention Duns Scotus himself. Francis of Meyronnes (1285–1328) is explicitly mentioned, along with 'his followers' (*sui sequentes*). Though not mentioned by name, influence from Petrus Thomae († 1340) and Antonius Andreae (ca. 1280–ca. 1320) is manifest. Meyger also mentions, several times, some anonymous *formalizantes*, with whom he invariably tries to be in accordance. Meyger synthesizes crucial concepts from contrasting philosophers, without worrying much about the consequences of this synthesis or the internal coherence of his *manipulus*. Let us not forget that his primary aim is pedagogical. He may thus consciously have chosen simply to introduce his students to different approaches and perspectives. A handbook fulfills its pedagogical purpose when it places on the table different currents of thought, even though in dissonance with each other.

Petrus Thomae seems to be the most important source. The typology of distinctions and identities presented by Meyger is taken over from Peter.¹² As far as we know, this Franciscan master, active in the *studium* of his order in Barcelona, was the first to establish a list of seven types of distinctions and identities, including the *se totis subiective* distinction and the *se totis obiective* distinction (or, in short, subjective distinction and objective distinction). The latter two are absent from Francis of Meyronnes's catalogue of four distinctions (essential, re-

12 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 1r: "Modi ergo distinctionum sunt septem, quoniam aliquae distinguuntur ratione, aliquae ex natura rei, aliquae formaliter, aliquae realiter, aliquae essentialiter, aliquae se totis subiective, aliquae se totis obiective. [...] Sunt autem aliquae idem: aliquae ratione, aliquae ex natura rei, aliquae essentialiter, aliquae realiter, aliquae formaliter, aliquae se totis subiective, aliquae se totis obiective." Meyger does not pay too much attention to the list of identities, but rather focuses on the corresponding list of distinctions. The seven distinctions and identities were introduced by Petrus Thomae in his *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*, 286–310. Peter also discussed the topic in other works; see Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*, especially 57. For a survey over Petrus Thomae's works, see Smith, "Bibliotheca manuscripta." For a detailed discussion of each of the seven distinctions, see Andersen, "Introduction," 110–76, and Andersen's article in this present volume.

al, formal, and modal).¹³ Though the inspiration from the sevenfold division comes from Peter, Meyger does not blindly follow him, as we shall see.

As for the relationship between the kinds of distinctions, Meyger fully supports Petrus Thomae's idea of an intrinsic hierarchy between them (and also between the kinds of identities). This hierarchy is governed by the rule that the greater distinction entails the lesser one, but not vice versa. Thus, the objective distinction – which is the greater distinction – entails the other six distinctions, for instance. The subjective distinction entails the essential, real, formal, *ex natura rei*, and mental distinctions. And the essential distinction entails the real, formal, *ex natura rei*, and mental distinctions, and so on.¹⁴ Because a greater distinction may coincide with a lesser one, this rule has been called, by Geoffrey G. Bridges, the “rule of coincidence of distinctions” – to which corresponds, on the identity side, a “rule of coincidence of identities.”¹⁵ Mental identity, or identity of reason (*identitas rationis*), entails all the other six kinds of identities, but not vice versa.

As for the relationship between the distinctions and the identities, Meyger further explains that the ‘mental distinction’ (*distinctio rationis*) presupposes formal and *ex natura rei* identity, whereas the objective distinction excludes any kind of identity. Here again, Meyger is following Peter's rule, though not indiscriminately. Meyger thus points out that every real distinction is essential too, but only in the case of creatures; the same rule cannot be applied to the persons of the Trinity (being three really distinct divine persons, despite sharing only one essence).¹⁶ Also, the specific distinction is greater than the numerical distinction (notably, these two distinctions are not included under the seven distinctions taken over from Petrus Thomae); according to the rule of coincidence of distinctions, the greater distinction entails the lesser one; therefore, the specif-

¹³ See Mayronis, *Conflatus*, dist. 8, q. 1, 43vbO.

¹⁴ Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 1r: “Et quibus tria infero corollaria. Primum: quod maior identitas quae sit est identitas rationis. Et minor identitatum est identitas se totis obiective. Ratio primi dicti est: quia identitas rationis infert omnes alias sex. Ratio secundi: quia identitas se totis obiective nullam aliam infert. Secundum corollarium: maior distinctio quae sit est distinctio se totis obiective, sed minor distinctio est distinctio rationis. Ratio primi dicti: quia distinctio se totis obiective infert omnes alias, quia maior distinctio arguit minorem. Ratio secundi: quia distinctio rationis nullam aliam infert, cum minor distinctio non arguat maiorem. Tertium corollarium: quod cum distinctione rationis stat identitas ex natura rei et formalis. Et sic ascendendo usque ad ultimam. Sed cum distinctione se totis obiective nulla stat identitas.” Cf. Petrus Thomae, *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*, 310–14.

¹⁵ Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*, 143 and 146.

¹⁶ Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 2r: “Circa praemissa notatur quod distinctio essentialis comparatur ad distinctionem realem, sicut inferius ad suum superius, quia omnis distinctio essentialis est realis, sed non e converso. Et non reperitur distinctio realis sine essentiali nisi inter supposita divina, quia in creaturis omnis distinctio realis est essentialis.”

ic distinction should entail the numerical one; however, this only holds true so long as we speak of things *in recto*, such as in the classical example of man and donkey (they are specifically and numerically distinct), but not of things *in obliquo*, like formalities (specifically distinct formalities may be found in one individual, seems to Meyger's point).¹⁷

From Meyronnes, Meyger inherited some of his criteria for investigating the distinctions. The Austrian Formalist thus reproduced quite faithfully Meyronnes's criteria for a real distinction.¹⁸ He also took over Meyronnes's definition of formality in terms of quiddity. On the other hand, Meyger does not devote any special portion of his treatise to discussing the concept of "intrinsic mode" (*modus intrinsecus*), which plays an important role in the metaphysics of Meyronnes. In Meyger's treatise, modes (unspecified if intrinsic, or not) are only mentioned in passing; we thus learn that formality is a "mode of reality" (*modus realitatis*), while reality is a "mode of formality" (*modus formalitatis*).¹⁹ Unfortunately, Meyger does not explain in any detail what he means by this. Notably, and corresponding to his disinterest in modes, Meyger does not sup-

17 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 8r: "Sed cum dicitur quod 'distincta specie sunt distincta numero,' hoc negat Scotus. Ideo non procedit ratio. Contra: distinctio specifica est maior numerali, sed distinctio maior arguit minorem; ergo illa quae distinguuntur specie distinguuntur numero, sicut patet de homine et asino distinguuntur specie et numero. Respondeo et dico quod habet veritatem de rebus in recto, sicut est homo et asinus, non autem de rebus in obliquo, sicut sunt formalitates."

18 Mayronis, *Conflatus*, dist. 8, q. 1, 44rbE–F: "Secundo videndum est quomodo possit realis distinctio investigari, et dico hoc similiter quod quatuor investigatur. Primo per viam originis, et hoc modo investigat Augustinus I *De Trinitate* distinctionem personarum, per hoc quod nihil gignit se, oportet ergo quod gignens sit realiter distinctum a genito. Ubicumque enim est hoc ab hoc, ibi est realis distinctio. Secunda via est via generationis. Quandocumque aliqua res potest generari, alia non genita, illa necessario distinguuntur realiter. Isto modo probatur quod materia et forma distinguuntur realiter, quia formatur generatio materia existente ingenerabili et incorruptibili. Tertio per viam corruptionis, quia quandocumque unum non corrumpitur alio corrupto inter illa est realis distinctio. Isto modo investigatur quod relatio distinguuntur a fundamento, quia fundamentum manet relatione corrupta. Quarto per viam separationis, quia quaecumque separata possunt manere, illa distinguuntur realiter. Isto enim modo probantur accidentia distingui in altari a substrato et anima a corpore, quia unum ab alio separatur." Compare this passage with Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 3v: "Distinctio realis etiam investigatur quatuor modis. Primo via originis. Secundo via generationis. Tertio via corruptionis. Quarto via separationis. Exemplum primi: ut in suppositis divinis, ubi pater realiter distinguitur a filio quia origine. Exemplum secundi: quando unum sine alio generatur, sicut Sortes et Plato. Exemplum tertii: quando unum sine alio corrumpitur sicut Sortes sine Platone. Exemplum quarti: quando unum potest separari ab alio, ut Petrus a Paulo."

19 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 4r–v: "Et ego respondeo. Pro quo notandum quod formalitas in pluribus se habet quam realitas, quia formalitas est modus realitatis, modo naturae tam salvatur in formalitate quam [in] realitate, quandoquidem realitas est modus formalitatis."

port the assumption of a modal distinction, by which a quiddity and its intrinsic mode may be distinguished. When discussing the fifth question, “whether singulars under the same species are formally distinguished,” Meyger explicitly and immediately rejects the opinion according to which singulars having the same species are modally distinguished from each other.²⁰ He does not mention any particular author who might have defended this thesis; however, we do know that a shared opinion among some Formalists was that the individuating principle, called “haecceity” (*haecceitas*), belongs under the intrinsic modes. In one anonymous Formalist treatise (printed thrice), we learn that “haecceity is nothing but a certain intrinsic mode” (*haecceitas nihil aliud est nisi quidam modus intrinsecus*).²¹ The French Franciscan Nicolas Bonet († 1343) likewise understands “individual differences” (*differentiae individuales*) as intrinsic modes.²² Curiously enough, the term *haecceitas* is absent from Meyger’s treatise.

Returning to the aforementioned fifth question, Meyger’s position is that an individual, e.g., Socrates, has a “singular essence” or “singular quiddity” (*essentia singularis, quiditas singularis*), and that there is an essential distinction between Socrates and Plato; applying the rule of coincidence of distinctions, it is imperative to conclude that they are also formally distinct.²³ Moreover, despite Meyger generally being laconic about the *se totis* distinctions, he understood the distinction between individual differences as belonging under both of these (objective

20 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 10r: “[Q]uaeritur utrum singularia sub eadem specie distinguuntur formaliter. Videtur quod non, quia illa quae distinguuntur formaliter habent diversas, seu distinctas, quiditates et definitiones; sed individua eiusdem speciei non sunt huiusmodi; igitur non distinguuntur formaliter. Patet consequentia et maior ex hoc, quia distincta formaliter distinguuntur per distinctas formalitates, sed formalitates pertinent ad primum modum dicendi per se; et per consequens est quiditas. Minor patet ex hoc quod quiditas singularium sub eadem specie est universalis formalitas seu realitas; ergo non est particularis; per consequens non possunt realiter distingui. Propter hanc rationem dicunt quidam quod distinctio singularium sub eadem specie non est formalis, sed modalis tantum, quia per differentiam individuaalem, quae non pertinent ad quiditatem. Contra: Sortes secundum quod iste non habet humanitatem, sed non communem, ergo singularem, per consequens essentiam singularem; ergo Sortes essentialiter distinguitur a Platone; sed quaecumque essentialiter distinguuntur distinguuntur formaliter, quia maior distinctio arguit minorem; ergo Sortes et Plato distinguuntur formaliter.”

21 Anonymous, *Tractatus formalitatum secundum doctrinam Francisci Mayronis*, art. 1, 264rbG. Regarding the authorship of this treatise, included in the 1520 edition of some of Francis of Meyronnes’s works, see the contribution by Claus A. Andersen in this present volume.

22 Bonetus, *Metaphysica*, III, cap. 5, 20vb.

23 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 10v: “Secundo Sortes distinguitur essentialiter et numeraliter a Platone; ergo habet aliquam essentiam singularem, et per consequens quiditatem singularem; ergo formaliter distinguitur a Platone, quia distinctio formalis est quiditativa.”

and subjective) distinctions, clearly following Petrus Thomae.²⁴ According to Meyger, though all individuals under the same species essentially belong to the same species, their *distinctiva* (or rather their individual differences) do not belong under the same truly univocal concept. Thus, Socraticity and Platonicity are totally objective distinct items, in spite of Socrates and Plato being humans. As interesting as this is, Meyger has much more to say about the first three distinctions in the list of distinctions he took over from Petrus Thomae, and in the remainder of this article I shall focus on them.

5. Mental Distinction (*distinctio rationis*)

Tacitly following Petrus Thomae, Meyger distinguishes between two kinds of acts of the intellect: 1) the “collative act” (*actus collativus*)²⁵ and 2) and the “simple and absolute apprehension” (*simplex et absoluta apprehensio*). Since the simple and absolute apprehension conceives the object without drawing any difference, the mental distinction only arises from a collative act. Accordingly, the mental distinction does not persist but under this collative act; when the collative act ceases to perform, the distinction simply disappears. There are as many mental distinctions as there are collative acts (an interesting implication being that a collative act in fact always produces a mental distinction).²⁶ Furthermore, the collative act produces a “relation of distinction” (*respectus distinctionis*), which is the same as a mental distinction. Meyger evokes the axiom according to

²⁴ Petrus Thomae, *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*, 308, 310.

²⁵ Other similar syntagmas are used by Meyger for referring to the collative act, such as ‘actus collativus seu negociativum potentiae negociantis,’ ‘apprehensio collativa,’ ‘comparatio seu collatio,’ and ‘actus comparativus seu negociativum.’ Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 3r. See further Petrus Thomae, *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*, n. 6, 288.

²⁶ Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 3r: “Dico igitur quod distinctio rationis pure consequitur actum collativum seu negociativum potentiae negociantis, quaecumque sit illa; et non competit talis distinctio obiecto nisi ut stat sub apprehensione collativa. Unde si obiectum simplici et absoluta apprehensione apprehenditur, nunquam originatur circa ipsum distinctio rationis, quia alias nunquam posset concipi idem obiectum simplici apprehensione sine differentia rationis, quod falsum est, cum saltem prima apprehensione posset sine tali differentia concipi. Cum ergo intellectus vel alia potentia collativa exercet circa idem obiectum penitus indistinctum actum comparativum vel negociativum, consequitur illum actum comparativum respectus distinctionis ad actum primum, per habitudinem tamen ad obiectum quod idem est utriusque actus; et hunc respectum voco ‘distinctionem rationis.’ Et quandocumque et quotiescumque sit talis comparatio seu collatio circa idem penitus indistinctum, tunc consurgit talis distinctio rationis; et tot distinctiones rationis quot erunt actus collativi, quia multiplicatis terminis vel obiectis alicuius respectus necesse est respectus illos multiplicari. Omnis autem distinctio est distinctorum relatio; ergo etc. Taliter distinguuntur definitio et definitum, et secundum quosdam ‘quod quid est’ et ‘cuius est quod quid est,’ et tu potes inducere in omnibus.”

which “every distinction is a relation of distinct items” (*omnis [...] distinctio est distinctorum relatio*). The ontological status of this mental relation is reduced to a pure “figment of the intellect” (*ficticium intellectus*), to which nothing corresponds in reality outside of the intellect.²⁷

Meyger refers to some unnamed authors (probably Scotus and Petrus Thomae) for holding that the mental distinction may be based either “on one circumstance” (*ab uno diversimode circumstante*) or “on diverse circumstances” (*ex diversis diversimode circumstantibus*).²⁸ As an example of a mental distinction based on one such “circumstance,” the distinction between the transcendentals ‘good’ (*bonum*) and ‘true’ (*verum*) is adduced; they are one and the same object, but when seen in relation to an intellect this one object is true, while in relation to the will it is good.²⁹ Examples of mental distinction based on “diverse circumstances” are the distinction between the right and left side of a column, where the distinction between left and right of course are imported from the structure of an animal body, and a point considered at one time as the beginning of a line and, at another time, as the end of the line.³⁰

Historically, one important aspect of the discussion of mental distinctions was whether they depend on real distinctions. In a letter (presumably to the Jesuit Denis Mesland), René Descartes, rejecting the existence of a purely mental distinction, the so-called *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*, insists that “we cannot think of anything without foundation [in reality]” (*neque [...] quicquam possumus cogitare absque fundamento*).³¹ Similarly, over three hundred years before Descartes, Godfrey of Fontaines had already suggested that mental distinction always requires a foundation in reality.³² Petrus Thomae, by contrast, advocated both a pure (*per actum intellectus possibilis*) and a non-pure mental distinction

²⁷ Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 1v.

²⁸ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 4, nn. 160 and 172, ed. Vat. 4, 231 and 243. Concerning Petrus Thomae, see Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*, 64–65.

²⁹ Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 2v: “Exemplum secundi: de bono et vero. Unum enim et idem obiectum per comparisonem ad voluntatem dicitur bonum, et per comparisonem ad intellectum dicitur verum. Et concordant cum illis omnes isti qui ponunt quod illa quae distinguuntur ratione habent habitudinem ad aliquae realiter distincta.”

³⁰ Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 2v: “Et dixerunt quidam quod distinctio rationis aliquando potest accipi ex diversis diversimode circumstantibus et aliquando ab uno diversimode circumstante. Exemplum primi: in columna quantum ad differentiam dextri et sinistri, quae differentia quidem accipitur in columna ex diversis partibus animalis diversimode ad invicem se habentibus. Idem patet de puncto et linea. Punctus enim in linea est principium et finis quae non differunt in puncto nisi ratione, quia per comparisonem ad diversas partes lineae.”

³¹ Descartes, undated letter (from 1645 or 1646), *Correspondance*, AT IV, 349.

³² Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodlibet VII*, q. 1, 273; for other scholastic philosophers who hold the same position about mental distinction, see Knebel, “Aureol and the Ambiguities,” 333, especially note 21.

(*per actum potentiae collativae*). In the pure mental distinction, there is no trace of any real distinction, whereas the non-pure variant has some admixture of the real distinction.³³ The aforementioned example with the column might serve as an example of a mental distinction based on something real; here, the real basis would consist in the real parts (right or left) of an animal standing next to or in front of the column. Meyger has a different solution. According to him, mental distinctions do not presuppose “something real” (*aliquid reale*) or any real relation (*habitus*) between mentally distinct items.³⁴ Meyger is perfectly clear and very strict: if we could detect anything real or *ex natura rei* in a mental distinction, then it would not be a mental distinction at all, but rather indeed a distinction *ex natura rei*.

Yet, it’s worthwhile returning to the aforementioned transcendentals (being, one, true, good). It is not so clear if Meyger endorses universal application of the mental distinction to them. In fact, in the course of his handbook, he seems to challenge the consistency of his own opinion about transcendentals. At the outset, Meyger seems to have catalogued the distinction between being and its attributes under the objective distinction, exactly like Petrus Thomae did, for whom the distinction of “being and good” (*sicut ens et bonum*) is an example of an objective distinction.³⁵ Following his own rule of coincidence of distinctions, the objective distinction (which is the greatest distinction) should then entail all the other six distinctions (including the real distinction). But in contradiction with what was said, in his discussions on formal distinction, Meyger stated that ‘being and its passions’ (*ens et eius passiones*) would be a case of formal distinction and not of real distinction, since being and its passions (the other transcendentals) are ‘really the same’ (*idem realiter*).³⁶ This position, however, seems to be the same as that of Meyronnes. Meyger’s handbook reveals to us that to com-

33 Petrus Thomae, *De distinctione praedicamentorum*, 296–97; and Petrus Thomae, *Quodlibet*, 106; regarding the pure and non-pure mental distinction in Petrus’s work, see Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*, 57–58.

34 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 2v: “Sed contra: hoc in quo conveniunt, scilicet quod distinctio rationis sit sumenda per habitudinem ad aliquae realiter vel ex natura rei distincta, arguo sic: illud quod necessario ad suum esse praeexigit aliquid reale, id non dependet pure ab opere intellectus. Sed distinctio rationis dependet pure ab intellectu, quia alias non esset distinctio rationis. Ergo distinctio rationis non de necessitate praeexigit aliquae distincta ex natura rei ad quorum habitudinem formetur. Ad hoc idem est unum argumentum prius factum, cum descripsi distinctionem rationis.”

35 Petrus Thomae, *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*, 310.

36 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 7r. A similar formulation is also found in Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 6r: “Idem in *Metaphysica* dicit quod ens et unum convertuntur et non sunt realiter distincta sed formaliter. Item essentia divina est eadem res cum patre, et tamen distinguitur formaliter ab eo; ergo distincta formaliter non sunt distincta realiter.”

bine different Formalist traditions is sometimes to renounce internal coherence and even to run the risk of falling into philosophical imbroglíos.

6. Distinction *ex natura rei*

Meyger describes the distinction *ex natura rei* as holding between extremes with contradictory predicates, which can be verified, or not, by the intellect. Thus, the distinction *ex natura rei* is “beyond our intellectual efforts” (*praeter opus intellectus*). Unlike the mental distinction, in which “the extremes are distinguished only by the intellect” (*distincta solum distinguuntur per intellectum*), in the distinction *ex natura rei* the role of the intellect is limited to “verification” (*verificatio*) of contradictory predicates. To illustrate the distinction *ex natura rei*, Meyger provides a list of examples: the whole and its parts, superior concepts and their inferiors, a formal cause and its effect. In the first example, the whole is “joined together” (*constitutum*), while its parts, even when taken at the same time, are “not joined together” (*non constitutum*). In the second example, the superior concept is “communicable” to many (*multiplicabile*), while its inferiors are not (*non multiplicabile*). In the third example, a formal cause has “power to cause” (*habet causare*) whereas its effect does not have such “power to cause” (*non habet causare*).³⁷ In all three cases, a distinction holds between contradictory predicates.

In the first question of the third part of his treatise, Meyger discusses whether the distinction *ex natura rei* should at all be assumed. The anti-Formalist criticism, as Meyger represents it, consists simply in asking whether this distinction corresponds to something in reality, or not. If the distinction *ex natura rei* corresponds to something, then it is the same as the real distinction; if it does not, then it is the same as the purely mental distinction. In both cases, it seems that we would have no reason for admitting a separate distinction *ex natura rei*. Meyger, however, recognizes two kinds of distinctions that may be said to be *ex natura rei*: one “properly speaking” (*proprie dicta*) and another only “improperly speaking” (*improprie dicta*). In the first case, we are dealing with a proper real distinction, which holds between things (*sicut res et res*). In the second case, we

37 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 4v: “Distinctio ex natura rei est cuius distincta sunt praeter opus intellectus, quia sunt praedicata quorum contradictoria possunt verificari et non verificantur, quia talis verificatio sit per intellectum. Et hoc modo distinguuntur partes simul sumptae et suum totum, quia totum est constitutum et partes simul sumptae non sunt constitutae, et quia constitutum et non constitutum contradicunt; ergo etc. Similiter superius et inferius distinguuntur ex natura rei, quia superius est multiplicabile, inferius vero non est multiplicabile. Sed quia multiplicabile et non multiplicabile contradicunt, igitur. Similiter causa formalis et eius effectus distinguuntur ex natura rei, quia causa formalis habet causare; sed eius effectus non habet causare; igitur.”

are dealing with real items, like formalities and realities, which are not exactly things, but rather belong to things – and the distinction then holds between these items (*sicut rei et rei*).³⁸ Meyger explains that “the nature of being is preserved in formality and reality” (*natura entis tam salvatur in formalitate quam realitate*).³⁹ Formalities and realities are not *aliquid* or *ens in recto*, but rather only *alicuius* or *ens in obliquo*; they are real, but they do not have any existence independently from the things they pertain to.

One may wonder, how Meyger would explain the distinction between formalities and realities, a sort of meta-question of importance for his Formalist terminology. The distinction clearly cannot be expressed in terms of a real distinction (properly speaking). Meyger states that “formality is multiple, while reality is not” (*formalitas multiplicatur, realitas autem non*).⁴⁰ Consequently, since they have contradictory predicates, they would seem to be distinct from one another *ex natura rei*. In fact, the best way to understand the difference between formality and reality, in Meyger’s treatise, is to take the example of God’s essence and his attributes. The divine essence is one unique reality, whereas God’s attributes, being formalities, are multiple, like goodness, holiness, and others.⁴¹

7. The Formal Distinction and the Concept of *formalitas*

The formal distinction, according to Meyger, holds between extremes which can be expressed in different definitions.⁴² Formal identity, contrariwise, takes place when the extremes can be predicated of each other “according to the first mode of *per se* predication” (*in primo modo dicendi per se*) – in which, the predicate is not only a part of the subject’s definition, but is rather convertible with the subject – or are posited in the *definitio potissima*, i.e., the definition that expresses all quiddity of the *definitum*.⁴³

38 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 3r: “Et diligenter adverte quod distinctio ex natura rei duplex est. Quaedam est proprie dicta. Et hoc modo distinguuntur ea quae distinguuntur sicut res et res, ut Sortes et Plato. Alia est improprie dicta. Et hoc modo distinguuntur substantia et accidens, materia et forma, et supposita in divinis. Et sic distinctio ex natura rei impropria est illorum quae distinguuntur sicut rei et rei.”

39 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 4r.

40 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 6r.

41 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 6v: “Patet in suppositis divinis, ubi est eadem realitas et distincta formalitas, quia essentia divina non est multiplicata, sed formalitas est multiplicata, ut benignitas etc.”

42 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 1v: “Distinctio formalis est cuius distincta ponuntur in diversis definitionibus. Et illo modo distinguuntur subiectum et sua propria passio, anima et suae potentiae, inferius et superius.”

43 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 1v–2r.

Unsurprisingly, the concept of ‘formality’ holds central place in Meyger’s discussion of the formal distinction; the formal distinction is a distinction between formalities.⁴⁴ In terms of originality, Meyger’s dealing with this concept may be disappointing. However, what in fact is interesting is how he draws on to different Formalist sources and their divergent definitions of ‘formality.’ The first definition of ‘formality’ introduced by him is that of Antonius Andreae, given in his *Quaestiones* on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, the second is that of Meyronnes, in his *Conflatus*. The definitions under consideration, and Meyger’s summary of them, are displayed in Table 1.

Johannes Meyger, <i>Tractatus distinctionum</i> , 3r–v	Antonius Andreae, <i>Super Met.</i> IV, q. 2, a.1, 37ra	Franciscus de Mayronis, <i>Conflatus</i> , dist. 8, q. 5, 48vb
Diceret: quid est ipsa formalitas? Dico quod formalitas est quaedam ratio obiectalis reperta in re per intellectum, quam non oportet semper intellectum movere, dummodo actus intellectus potest in ipsam terminari. Dico notanter “quam non oportet intellectum movere,” quia sufficit quod actus intellectus in ipsa terminetur, quia non semper movetur intellectus a re quam intelligit. Sed sufficit quod non sit modus repugnandi ex parte rei. Vel potest dici: formalitas est quidditas cuiuslibet quidditati habentis diffinitionem sive non.	Quantum ad primum, primo praemittam rationem ‘formalitati,’ quam describo sic: formalitas est ratio obiectalis in re apprehensa ab intellectu ex natura rei, quam non oportet semper movere intellectum, dummodo actum intellectus possit terminare.	Dico ergo quod formalitas est quidditas uniuscuiusque habentis quidditatem, sive definibile sit sive non, quia ratio formalis uniuscuiusque est illud quod inest sibi in primo modo dicendi per se, talia autem sunt omnia quidditativa.

Table 1. Divergent definitions of *formalitas*.

⁴⁴ Let me mention, without at this place going into details, that the concept of ‘reality’ also plays a role in Meyger’s discussion. His definition of ‘reality’ (*realitas*) can be traced back to Petrus Thomae’s *Formalitates seu quaestiones de modis distinctionis*, q. 2, art.1, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. 3433, 9v. See Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 9r: “Et ideo si quaeris: quid igitur sit realitas? Respondeo et dico quod est aliquid positivum in re ex natura rei non contentum in aliquo alio ut in potentia passiva pura vel activa vel sicut inferius in superiori, sed actualiter inexistens, ita quod [est] ultimate abstractum [et] nullum illorum a quo formaliter distinguitur includit identice, impossibile est tamen in actuali existentia ab illis separari per aliquam potentiam.”

In order to answer the question, “Whether the negation has a distinct formality in relation to its opposite affirmation” (*Utrum negatio habeat distinctam formalitatem ab affirmatione cui opponitur*), Antonius Andreae provided a rather broad definition of ‘formality’ in terms of a *ratio obiectalis* (see the quote in Table 1). This definition follows upon his rejection of a definition of formality as “something positive” (*aliquid positivum*) – a negation cannot be understood as something positive.⁴⁵

In his definition, Antonius draws an important distinction between “to move the intellect” (*movere intellectum*) and “to terminate an act of the intellect” (*actum intellectus terminare*). “Relations” (*relationes*), “individual properties” (*proprietates individuales*), and “negations” (*negationes*) cannot move the intellect and would therefore, at first sight, seem not to be included among the formalities. Antonius makes out three essential characteristics for a thing to be considered capable of moving the intellect: it must be a “being” (*ens*), be “absolute” (*absolutum*), and “have a definition or quiddity” (*quod habeat rationem quid vel essentiae*).⁴⁶ Formalities are not absolute beings, obviously. Hence, Antonius insists that formalities do not need to move the intellect, but only to terminate it. In other words, the definition of formality is loosened in order to embrace the notion of negation; this solves the question under discussion in Antonius’s text. Conceivability is what matters, according to Antonius. That becomes clear in a corollary he adds to his explanation of what a formality is. We there learn that “everything that can be distinctly conceived by the intellect has

45 Antonius Andreae, *Super Met.* IV, q. 2, 37ra: “Praeterea, omnis formalitas est aliquid positivum, quia actus intellectus, cum sit positivum, non videtur posse terminari ad obiectum quod non est positivum, sed negatio non est aliquid positivum. Ergo non habet propriam formalitatem.” Concerning the concept of formality in Antonius Andreae and the novelty of his definition, see Goris, *Transzendente Einheit*, 51–60. For its influence in the later tradition, long after Meyger, see also Andersen, “*Scientia formalitatum*,” 224–25. Sven K. Knebel recently emphasized the influence of Peter Auriol’s *ratio conceptibilis* on the later Formalist tradition and its notion of conceivability as a key characteristic of formality, see Knebel’s review, “www.formalitas.eu.”

46 Antonius Andreae, *Super Met.* IV, q. 2, 37ra–b: “Quod dico pro tanto, quia, licet aliquid possit terminare actum intellectus, non tamen semper potest intellectum ad sui intellectionem movere. Sicut communiter dicitur quod relationes non movent intellectum ratione dependentiae, et quia non sunt aliquid absolutum, et tamen terminant actum intellectus. Similiter proprietates individuales ex eo quod non habent rationem quid, ideo non movent intellectum, et tamen terminant actum eius. Similiter negationes terminant, licet non moveant intellectum, quatenus non sunt entia, ita quod tria requiruntur ad hoc quod aliquid moveat intellectum: primum quod sit ens, secundum quod sit absolutum, tertium quod habeat rationem quid vel essentiae. Propter primum remouentur negationes, propter secundum relationes, propter tertium omnis proprietas hypostatica vel proprietas personalis in divinis et proprietates individuales, quae omnia, licet actum intellectus terminent, non tamen movent intellectum.”

distinct formalities *ex natura rei*” (*quaecumque possunt distincte concipi per intellectum habent distinctas formalitates ex natura rei*).⁴⁷

Meyger does not particularly stress the importance of the definition given by Antonius Andreae or its philosophical consequences. As if that definition were not enough, Meyger evokes another definition that was widely known among the Formalists and that goes back to Meyronnes. According to this second definition (also quoted in Table 1), a ‘formality’ is a “ratio formalis.” The French Franciscan identified formality and quiddity and, accordingly, called the formal distinction a “quidditative distinction” (*distinctio quidditativa vel formalis*).⁴⁸ Remarkable in his definition of formality is his concern to include such quiddities that have no definition (non-definable quiddities), which applies to the case of the transcendentals. Puzzlingly, Meyger quotes both of these definitions of ‘formality,’ but does not comment on the difference between them and does not even mention their theoretical implications.

Meyger adds a comment on the notion of formality. He asks whence this very notion is derived (*a quo provenit talis formalitas*).⁴⁹ This question was frequently debated in the Formalist tradition. Meyronnes ruled out the possibility that ‘formality’ is derived from ‘form,’ something he thought would be “a stupid imagination” (*grossa et asinina imaginatio*).⁵⁰ Meyger does not share this opinion. He brings up various meanings of ‘form.’ One may thus distinguish between form as accidental (*forma accidentalis*), as essential or pertaining to being (*forma essentialis* or *forma in essendo*), and as quidditative or pertaining to being (*forma quidditativa* or *forma in cognoscendo*); ‘formality’ is derived from ‘form’ in this latter sense, i.e., from *forma in cognoscendo*.⁵¹ It is worth mentioning the similarity in this regard between Meyger’s text and the aforementioned anonymous Formalist treatise, which presents a similar list of meanings of ‘form’ and concludes that ‘formality’ is derived from *forma in cognoscendo*. Just how close the two texts are to one another may be gathered from the textual comparison in

⁴⁷ Antonius Andreae, *Super Met.* IV, q. 2, 37rb.

⁴⁸ Franciscus de Mayronnis, *Conflatus*, dist. 8, q. 1, 43vbP: “Post illam est tertia, scilicet quidditativa vel formalis.” Regarding Meyronnes’s and Andreae’s definitions of formality as *ratio formalis* and *ratio obiectalis*, see also Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 725–26.

⁴⁹ Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 3v.

⁵⁰ Franciscus de Mayronnis, *Conflatus*, dist. 8, q. 5, 48vbO: “Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum. Primo quid sit formalitas. Secundo quid sit modus intrinsecus. Et tertio quid sit realitas. Quantum ad primum: quid sit formalitas, dicunt aliqui quod formalitas dicitur a forma sicut materialitas a materia. Et ideo dicunt aliqui quod plures formalitates sine pluribus formis esse non possunt, sicut nec plures materialitates sine pluribus materiis. Contra: ista est nimis grossa et asinina imaginatio, quod patet ex duobus.”

⁵¹ Regarding the different meanings of ‘form’ and ‘form’ as deriving from *forma in cognoscendo* by other Formalist authors, see Hübener, “Robertus Anglicus,” 340.

Table 2. Clearly, either Meyger and the anonymous Formalist are drawing on the same source, or else the latter is dependent on Meyger.

Johannes Meyger, <i>Tractatus distinctionum</i> , 3v	Anonymous, <i>Tractatus formalitatum</i> , 165vbQ
Diceret: a quo provenit talis formalitas? Dico quod cum forma sit triplex, scilicet accidentalis, ut albedo, essentialis, quae est forma in essendo, ut forma quae est altera pars compositi, et forma quiditativa, quae est forma in cognoscendo, omne enim superius est forma in cognoscendo sui inferioris, et pro tanto convenimus universalia appellare formas singularium. A sola autem forma in cognoscendo dicta est formalitas.	Tertio notandum est quod formalitas venit de forma, et formale dicitur de forma, et forma est duplex. Nam quaedam est essentialis et quaedam accidentalis. Forma autem essentialis est duplex, nam quaedam est in essendo, ut altera pars compositi, scilicet forma partis; alia est in cognoscendo, et sic superiora sunt formae, II <i>Physicorum</i> et V <i>Metaphysicorum</i>; omnes partes definitionis sunt formae inferiorum. Et tunc pono tria corollaria consequenti ad praedicta. Quorum primum est istud quod a forma accidentalis non venit formalitas. Secundum est quod a forma quae est altera pars compositi non venit formalitas. Tertium est quod formalitas venit a forma in cognoscendo.

Table 2. *Formalitas* and *forma*.

Whether ‘formality’ derives from ‘form,’ or not, could seem to be a trivial question. It turns out to be anything than that. In the first round of his discussion, Meyger, here again following Petrus Thomae, observes that “‘formality’ is taken from ‘form,’ and ‘formal’ from ‘form’” (*formalitas accipitur a forma, et formale de forma*); this is indeed the first in a list of necessary propositions concerning formalities.⁵² At the end of his treatise, Meyger resumes the discussion, “whether

52 See first Petrus Thomae, *Formalitates seu quaestiones de modis distinctionum*, q. 7, art. 1, 37r: “De tertio dico ista: primum quod ‘formalitas’ accipitur a ‘formali’, sicut enim a ‘forma’ dicitur ‘formale’, ita a ‘formali’ ‘formalitas’.” This is echoed in the first of Meyger’s propositions on formalities. The whole list merits full citation as documentation of Meyger’s overall approach to the formalities – Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 6r–v: “Primum quod praemitto est: quod formalitas accipitur a forma, et formale de forma. Secundum dictum est: quod hoc adverbium ‘formaliter’ habet distinctum modum, sicut quodlibet adverbium habet distinctum modum; et ideo, dicendo sic ‘formaliter est,’ ly ‘formaliter’ est determinatio copulae verbalis, scilicet praedicati cum subiecto. Tertium dictum: formalitas est aliqua res essentialis. ‘Res’ dico large accepta, non proprie secundum quiditatem vere rei; et ideo dixit beatus Augustinus in *De Doctrina Christiana* quod illud quando “nulla est res, omnino nihil est”. Quartum dictum: quia formalitas est vera res, large tamen dicta, ideo cum unitate rei stat pluralitas formalitatum. Exemplum de actione et passione III *Physicae*. Quintum dictum: formalitas et realitas sunt aliquomodo idem; et aliquomodo distinguuntur, quia formalitas multiplicatur, realitas autem non; sed multiplicatum et non multiplicatum distinguuntur, ut dictum est; igitur. Sextum dictum est quod entitas et quiditas distinguuntur, quia entitas abstrahitur ab esse, quiditas vero ab

formality comes from form,” in order to address the issue at length and more effectively. His discussion leads him to consideration a causality that may strike most modern readers as rather odd. Nevertheless, this is how it goes. His opponent holds that ‘formality’ does not derive from ‘form,’ because a cause does not derive from its effect; a formality, however, is the cause of the form, and hence it cannot be concluded that ‘formality’ derives from ‘form.’ The abstract *ratio humanitatis* is thus seen as the cause of the real man. According to Meyger, some (unnamed) philosophers argue against this position, claiming that the concepts of formality, reality and even others like *reale*, *formale*, *entale* (i.e., derivations from *res*, *forma*, *ens*) are, in fact, concrete concepts and not abstract ones. Meyger disagrees. For him, these concepts are abstracts. A concrete concept can be related either to the subject, like in the case of accidents, or else to the supposit, as in the case of the universals. However, formality, reality and other derived concepts are neither accidents nor universals. Thus, in order to prove that formality is an abstract concept and that it can be understood as the cause of a concrete one, Meyger argues that the notion of ‘concrete’ can be interpreted in two different ways, according to the “way of resolution” (*via resolutionis*), and according to the “the way of composition or constitution” (*via compositionis seu constitutionis*). On the first approach, that of “resolution,” the concrete is the cause of the abstract and the abstract is its effect, because the concrete is resolved into abstracts. Contrariwise, on the second approach, that of “composition or constitution,” the concrete is the effect, because the concrete is constituted “of

substantia, modo sicut sunt plures entitates cum esse, sic sunt plures quiditates cum substantia. Septimum dictum: formalitas comparatur ad rem cuius est sub duplici habitudine. Uno modo ‘sub habitudine cuius,’ quia ipsa est rei. Alio modo ‘sub habitudine quo,’ quia res quae est forma est ipsa formalitate. Octavum dictum: formalitas semper est quo et nunquam quod, quia quo et quod distinguuntur. Nonum dictum est: quia formalitates se ipsis distinguuntur, et non alia formalitate, sicut si una res large accepta, vel una formalitas ab alia distinguitur per primam formalitatem et non per aliam. Decimum dictum: provenit de reali, unde reale potest dici quodcumque consequens rem et hoc large accipiendo reale. Undecimum dictum: cuicumque inest eadem formalitas formaliter eidem inest eadem realitas realiter. Duodecimum dictum: cuicumque inest eadem realitas realiter eidem inest eadem formalitas formaliter. Tredecimum dictum: a quocumque distinguitur eadem formalitas ab eodem distinguitur eadem realitas realiter. Decimum quartum dictum est: ipsa formalitas et realitas in eadem re non habent se sicut duo, ita quod ipsa res per realitatem sit una et per formalitatem sit distincta. Decimum quintum dictum: ponentes pluralitatem formalitatum non negant simplicitatem in prima causa. Decimum sextum dictum: quod sicut esse consequens rem est reale, ita esse consequens ens est entale, quia sicut de re habemus ‘reale,’ ita de ente habemus ‘entale,’ quamvis hoc vocabulum ‘entale’ non sit in usu. Decimum septimum dictum est: quod universalitatibus non debetur formalitas nisi ficto modo. Decimum octavum dictum: quod formalitates consequentes rem et ens possunt dici ‘entitates’ vel ‘entalitates’ sine communi nomine ‘formalitates.’ Decimum nonum dictum: distinctio ex natura rei non est distinctio realis. Vicesimum dictum est: quod illa quae sunt distincta realiter non sunt distincta essentialiter, sicut patet in suppositis divinis.”

matter and form or their abstracts” (*ex materia et forma seu ex suis abstractis*). The abstracts or thus first, before the concrete. This applies to the formalities. ‘Formality’ is certainly an abstract term and it may be understood as a “cause” of a certain concept of ‘form,’ namely by the way of composition.⁵³

If we are attentive to Meyger’s argumentation, it seems that he implicitly admits that by way of resolution the form of the concrete (or better, the form of the concrete composite thing) can be understood as the form which the concept of formality is derived from. He seems to mean that in this case the concept of formality would have derived not from *forma in cognoscendo*, but rather from *forma in essendo*, which is the form that together with matter constitutes the composite thing. Which is contrary to his previous decision in favor of *forma in cognoscendo*. We might then ask whether ‘formality’ derives from *forma in cognoscendo* or from *forma in essendo*? Meyger himself indeed admits that his position could raise “certain doubts” (*specialia dubia*) concerning the real and essential distinctions. The essential dependence involved in the relation between cause and effect – evoked here to solve the confusing relation between form and formality – is one of the “ways of investigating” essential distinctions (essentially dependent extremes can be separated by an essential distinction). Meyger may here have found himself trapped in a difficulty, and not being able to find the way out he acknowledges that he is just “passing by” (*pertranseo*).⁵⁴ This is indeed the place, cited at the beginning of this article, where Meyger tells his reader that he is content with writing a mere handbook. That is his aim, rather than

53 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 10r: “[Q]uia dictum est supra quod ‘formalitas venit a formali et formale a forma,’ ubi gratia ista se habent per ordinem: ‘humanitas ut humanus’ [et] ‘humanus ut homo’ secundum formalizantes, in quo ordine iuxta quosdam humanitas se habet ut formalitas, et humanitas idem est quod formale sive habens formalitatem et homo ut forma respectu istorum, merito quaeret aliquis: utrum formalitas veniat a forma? Arguo quod non, nam numquam causa venit ab effectu, immo e converso ordine naturae. Sed formalitas est causa formae. Patet, quia humanitas sive ratio humanitatis, ut verius loquar, est abstractum et ipsa est formalitas et causa concreti, sicut albedo est abstractum et causa albi, quod est concretum; ergo etc. Responsio est quorundam quod formalitas, realitas reale, formale et entale et similia sunt concreta et non abstracta. Contra hos, arguo sic: omne concretum dicitur ad concernendum subiectum ut sunt accidentia aut ad concernendum supposita ut sunt universalis; sed realitas, formalitas, reale et similia non concernunt substantiam, quia non sunt accidentia; nec suppositum, quia sunt singularia; et singulare nullum suppositum concernit, cum nullum habeat sub se; ergo talia non sunt concreta. Dico igitur aliter quod concretum potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo via resolutionis, et sic concretum est causa abstracti et abstractum est effectus, est enim concretum quoddam totum et resolvitur in abstracta tamquam in eius partes. Alio modo est via compositionis, seu constitutionis, et isto modo concretum est effectus, quia est quoddam concretum ex materia et forma seu ex suis abstractis, et sic patet responsio ad argumentum et similiter formalitas quae est quoddam abstractum est causa.”

54 Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, 10r, as quoted in note 9.

coming up with any original solutions to the highly abstract problems discussed in Formalist literature.

Conclusion

From what I have presented above, Johannes Meyger, in his *Tractatus distinctionum*, emerges as an independent Formalist author, one who was not affiliated with the Franciscan order and who was neither a direct nor an indirect student of Duns Scotus. Meyger views the theory of distinctions as an indispensable and useful tool for solving philosophical and theological problems. His aim was, above all, to write a useful handbook for the Theology students of the young University of Vienna, presenting various Formalist approaches to his students. His treatise testifies to the immense popularity of the theory of distinctions in Meyger's own times and, in fact, also almost an entire century later, when the treatise was picked up again and became one of the earliest printed books in Vienna. Though Meyger was in a certain sense an outsider, he was far from unconscious of the issues discussed by the Formalists. As I have argued, his treatise indeed amalgamated ideas of different Formalist schools, in particular, the seven kinds of distinctions as well as the rule of coincidence (taken over from Petrus Thomae), some criteria for investigating distinctions (borrowed from Francis of Meyronnes), and the competing definitions of 'formality' (going back to Antonius Andreae and, again, Meyronnes). Meyger does not appear to be much bothered with the mutual inconsistency of the ideas borrowed. The doctrine of transcendentals is a case in point, since Meyger does not clarify whether the distinction between the transcendentals is a kind of objective distinction or of formal (certainly, not real) distinction. And as for the definitions of formality, he does not seem to be aware of all the implications of Meyronnes's and Andreae's divergent definitions of this concept.

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II. The Fifteenth Century

Parisian Formalism

Brulefer and Sirect on Petrus Thomae's Seven Distinctions

Claus A. Andersen

Introduction

The single most important motif in Formalist literature, from the beginnings of the Formalist tradition in the early fourteenth century until the adoption of Formalist discussions into the *Cursus philosophici* of Early Modern Scholasticism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was the assumption of a plurality of different kinds of distinctions. John Duns Scotus's formal distinction, of course, plays a crucial role in, and indeed lends name to, this whole literature.¹ Some early Scotists, however, were not content with discussing this peculiar metaphysico-theological invention of Scotus, but rather felt motivated to ask themselves whether there may not in fact be still other ways to distinguish among various aspects of reality. From the very outset, two models competed for acceptance: the model of Francis of Meyronnes (1285–1328) with four kinds of distinctions, and the elaborate doctrine of Petrus Thomae († 1340) with no less than seven different kinds.² Though Meyronnes had his followers (known as *Maronistae*) in the fifteenth century, in the long run Peter's model was more successful: It remained a topic of critical discussion until as late as the eighteenth century, long after its inventor's name was forgotten. Even authors critical of the idea that we do indeed need seven different kinds of distinctions in order to

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1 As explicitly reflected in some Formalist literature; see Dagui, *Tractatus formalitatum brevis*, n. 10, 80–82: “Et quia [distinctio formalis] difficilior est omnium, quia formalitas, ideo ab ista tractatus sumit nomen formalitatum.” Further examples in Andersen, “A Lullist Contribution,” 230, and Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 662.

2 See Andersen, “Introduction,” 81–93, Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*, 132–36, Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine*, 185 and 195. For the relationship between Petrus Thomae and Francis of Meyronnes, see Garrett R. Smith's contribution to this present volume.

grasp reality continued to discuss Petrus Thomae's distinctions, albeit often with Meyronnes's modal distinction added on top of them.³

If Petrus Thomae was forgotten – as most medieval scholastics were, whose works were never or rarely printed – and thus was no longer read in the Post-Medieval Scotist tradition, one may wonder how his doctrine could have survived so long.⁴ At least one part of the answer to this riddle may be found in the fourteen-eighties, when two Scotists, Étienne Brulefer (1450/55–1496/99) and Antoine Sirect († ca. 1510), drafted their respective treatises on formalities. Brulefer in fact composed two, the shorter of which – primarily of consideration in this present article – became widely diffused; the longer, and later, treatise was conceived as a detailed commentary, or self-commentary, on the shorter one. Both authors were active in Paris, Brulefer though only early in his career, when he studied and taught at the University of Paris,⁵ whereas Sirect remained attached to the Franciscan Convent in Paris for decades.⁶ Several Formalist trea-

3 See Andersen, "Introduction," 203–67.

4 Note that Petrus Thomae's short treatise on distinctions (on which see below) was printed in Venice in 1517; cf., again, Andersen, "Introduction," 253. However, this print does not seem have had much impact, probably due to the availability at this time of a large body of printed treatises on the formalities.

5 The fairly well-known Breton Franciscan Étienne Brulefer (family name Pillet, frequently called Burlifer in Latin sources) received his doctorate at the University of Paris in 1482. Subsequently, he lectured on the *Sentences*, first in Paris, then in Mainz, and finally in Metz. He died in his native region of Brittany. The most recent account of Brulefer's life and works is Zahnd, "Easy-Going Scholars," 300–2. Zahnd, *ibid.*, 301, counts 18 editions between 1480 and 1591 of Brulefer's short treatise on distinctions. Since the work in fact continued to be printed beyond 1591, the true number of editions must be somewhat higher. Unnoticed in previous scholarship is the fact that Brulefer revised his short treatise; additional to the seven principal arguments against the Formalist doctrine found in the earliest prints, prints from the mid-1490s onwards present three further arguments (as seen in the Basel edition of 1501, 4v–5r). Since these additional arguments are not crucial to this present article, I shall refer to the earliest complete printed edition I have been able to retrieve (Paris, ca. 1485–1490). Two of the extant manuscripts of this treatise are both dependent on one of the early Parisian prints; Ms. Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen Mc73, 10r, even copies the explicit of a Parisian print: "Magistri Stephani Brulifer formalitates Ordinis minorum impresse Parisius finiunt foeliciter"; Ms. Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig 1600, 5ra, has the same explicit, only omitting the information that this text was *printed* at Paris). A third manuscript, Ms. Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Msc. Class. 58/1, 317r, has a deviating colophon: "Magistri Stephani Brulifer legentis sententias doctoris subtilis, in monasterio minorum, Parisiis formalitates finiunt feliciter"; its relationship to the printed editions still needs to be clarified. The long treatise was published posthumously in 1501; I take one example of a cow drinking water from the River Rhine ("vacca bibet in Rheno"), rather than the Seine or the Moselle, as evidence that this treatise was written during Brulefer's time in Mainz; see Brulefer, *Formalitatatum textus*, comm., pars 4, 41rb.

6 Sirect's biography is far less known than Brulefer's. The *titulus* of the first edition of his *Formalitates moderniores* (1484) informs the reader that he was a Franciscan from the Pro-

tises from the fifteenth century have survived, some in manuscript, others in print. None, however, were printed as often as those of Brulefer or Sirect, which throughout the next century often appeared together in one volume (with additional material). Even in 1605, and again in 1607, their treatises were incorporated into a printed syllabus of Franciscan teaching materials, called *Gymnasium speculativum*, and published in Paris. This syllabus, compiled by the Observant Franciscan Augustinus Gothutius, was organized into five classes, with Formalist matters constituting a class of their own in addition to logic, physics, metaphysics, and theology; Brulefer's and Sirect's treatises figure among the teaching materials for the Formalist class, along with Maurice of Port's opusculum on distinctions, a *Grammatica speculativa* (known today to be a work by Thomas of Erfurt, but here still ascribed to Duns Scotus), and Cardinal Constanzo Sarnano's treatise *De primis ac secundis intentionibus*.⁷ Sirect, known to posterity as the *Magister formalitatum* (occasionally *Inventor formalitatum*), even had the honor of his treatise becoming an object of a noteworthy commentary tradition that lasted well into the seventeenth century; there exist commentaries on Brulefer's short treatise as well.⁸ In brief, Brulefer and Sirect set the tone for a long

vince of Touraine and a professor of theology in the Parisian *Gymnasium* of the Franciscans; this information is reiterated in most of the subsequent editions of this work. He is assumed, in contemporary sources, to have been a student of Nicolaus de Orbellis (see printed marginal note in Brulefer, *Epithomata*, ed. 1501, 25v). Sirect received the privileges of a "Most Reverend Father" in 1488 and was certainly active as a *lector ordinarius theologiae* in the Franciscan Grand Couvent in Paris in 1504; see *Regesta Ordinis* 1, 186, and *Regesta Ordinis* 2, 8. He served as *visitator* at the same place, when the Convent received its first reformed statutes in 1502 (or 1504); see Piana, *Gli Statuti*, 69 and 118. Sirect is said to have read and approved of Huet, *Serpens antiquus* (1v–2r in the edition of 1518); this work appears to have been first published ca. 1510, which then may be regarded the latest recorded date of any activity of Sirect. Sbaraglia, *Supplementum*, 92–93, mentions other Franciscan works "corrected" by Sirect (including one printed in 1519, which does not however mention Sirect by name, but only refers to one unnamed Franciscan professor). I have so far counted 28 printed editions of Sirect's treatise, but my list is likely incomplete and shall not be published here. In this article, I refer to the Venetian edition of 1484. There exists also a Bolognese print, presumably also from 1484 (not stated in the print); these two editions differ only insignificantly.

⁷ Apart from the year of printing indicated on the title page, the editions of 1605 and 1607 are identical. An earlier edition of 1604 differs considerably from the later ones; instead of those by Sirect and Brulefer, it includes the Paduan Scotist Filippo Fabri's treatise on distinctions (called "*De formalitatibus, in Scoti formalitates*" on the title page). The later editions' division of classes, with the texts allocated to each class, is reproduced in Andersen, "*Scientia formalitatum*," 244.

⁸ Commentaries on Sirect's treatise include Alessandro Palazzo, *Super Antonii Sirecti formalitatibus* (Ms. Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria, Aldini 254, dated 1488; a literal commentary on all of Sirect's treatise); Antonio Trombetta, *In tractatum formalitatum scoticarum sententia* (first edition: Venice 1493, numerous later editions); Giovanni Vallone, *Lectura resolutissima*

stretch of the Formalist tradition. However, as regards Petrus Thomae's septenary of distinctions these two authors, who do not appear to have ever referred to one another in their writings,⁹ held completely divergent views. Whereas Brulefer opted for a much slimmer economy of distinctions, in fact a return to the Subtle Doctor's original teaching, Sirect defended Peter's septenary, or at least one version of it.

super formalitatibus Scoti (first edition: Naples 1533, numerous later editions); Francesco Pitigiani d'Arezzo (also called Arretino), *Expositio exactissima, atque absolutissima identitatum et distinctionum (quas Formalitates vocant) M. Antonii Sirecti Doct. Paris. secundum doctrinam Doct. Subtilis Scoti, subtilium omnium Principis* (Venice 1606). Brulefer's treatise was commented upon in Samuel Cassinensis, *Magistri Stephani Burlifer doctoris Parisiensis formalitates cum argumentationibus ad eas* (Milano 1496) and Guillaume Bernard, *Identitatum et distinctionum, ab eximio Theologiae quondam professore Stephano Brulifero Franciscano, traditatum, compendiosa contractio* (Paris 1541, some further editions; the author claims to be a *discipulus* of Brulefer, see *ibid.*, 1v). Both of the latter works include the full text of Brulefer's short treatise. A consideration of Sirect, Brulefer, and Trombetta, along with Scotus and still other authors, is found in Jean Du Douet, *Formalitarum Doctoris Subtilis Scoti, Antonii Sirecti, Antonii Trombettae, et Stephani Bruleferi, eximiorum Theologorum, ordinis Minorum, Monotessera in philosophiae Aristotelis et Theologiae theoricarum studiosorum gratiam adunata, ac in tres libros capitibus sectos ordine perfacili digesta* (first edition: Paris 1579, second edition: Venice 1587). A similar synthesis is found in François Leroy, *Formalitarum seu plurium scientiarum metaphysico coeuntium ordine scita commistio* (Paris 1603). The Jesuit Bartolomeo Amico, *Tractatio de variis formalitarum et distinctionum generibus dilucida et exacta ex Thomist. Scot. Aegid. Nominalium, at Recentiorum mente, omnibus scientiis perutilis et necessaria* (Naples 1638), considerably broadens the perspective to include developments outside the Scotist tradition; he calls Sirect 'Inventor formalitarum,' see *ibid.*, 185. Some of this material has been considered in scholarship; see Poppi "Il contributo dei formalisti padovani," 682–702 (Trombetta), Perrone, "Il formalismo di fra Giovanni Vallone," 35–42 (Vallone), Schmutz, "Le petit scotisme," 395 and 467 (Du Douet and Leroy), Marrone, *Res e realitas*, 20–124, 248–61, and "Ens reale / Ens rationis" (Trombetta, Du Douet, and Pitigiani), and Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 664–65, (Du Douet, Leroy, and Pitigiani); general considerations in Andersen, "Scientia formalitarum" (with special focus on Du Douet's concept of a special "science of formalities" and its critical reception in Leroy and Pitigiani).

⁹ Some of the material I present has already been discussed in Bolliger, *Infiniti contemplatio*, 310–58. Bolliger, however, presents Brulefer as reacting to Sirect. This approach does not harmonize with the chronology of their publications; whereas Sirect's treatise appeared in print in 1484, Brulefer's short treatise is assumed to have been printed already in 1480 (the earliest prints, however, are undated). Bolliger only considers the posthumous 1507 Basel edition of Brulefer's works (it contains his *Reportata* on the *Sentences* and the two Formalist treatises). It is possible that Brulefer considered Sirect's treatise when writing his *longer* treatise; however, I have not seen any hard evidence of this. Instead, it seems to me that both authors are drawing on a vast, for a large part anonymous, Formalist literature (see Garrett R. Smith's inventory of such material at www.formalitas.eu).

In this present contribution, I shall briefly outline Petrus Thomae's original doctrine, articulated in his *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum* (section 1); I shall then investigate how the two Renaissance Scotists responded to the individual parts of the doctrine, i.e., the seven kinds of distinctions (section 2 and its seven subsections); finally, by way of conclusion, the consequences drawn by Brulefer and Sirect from their concern with the seven distinctions, and some later reactions, are considered. I shall limit myself to discussing the reception of the seven kinds of distinctions. Whereas Brulefer's two treatises are structured as critical discussions precisely of the seven distinctions (neutrally presented at the beginning of the short treatise), Sirect's treatise includes a long introductory section with discussions of a number of key concepts from Scotist metaphysics; needless to say, these discussions, as well as the far-reaching metaphysical and theological implications of the diverging approaches considered in this study, would merit further scholarly attention.¹⁰

1. Petrus Thomae's System of Distinctions in His *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*

Petrus Thomae's *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum* has come down to us in two slightly different versions, both of which are available in modern editions.¹¹ In both versions, the text is divided into a general presentation of various kinds of distinctions and a special consideration of how these distinctions apply to Aristotle's ten categories. In both versions of the text, the following seven distinctions are presented and explained:¹²

- 1) *Distinctio rationis*
- 2) *Distinctio ex natura rei*
- 3) *Distinctio formalis*
- 4) *Distinctio realis*
- 5) *Distinctio essentialis*
- 6) *Distinctio se totis subjective*
- 7) *Distinctio se totis obiective*

¹⁰ For Sirect's discussion of modes, see Sylvain Roudaut's contribution to this present volume.

¹¹ Egbert P. Bos edited one version under the title *De distinctione predicamentorum*. Celia López Alcalde edited another version under the title *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*. I generally refer to the latter version; only on rare occasions do I mention differences between the two versions. Regarding the intricate problem of the relationship between the two versions, see Andersen, "Introduction," 47–81. For a more general treatment of Peter's doctrine of distinctions, see Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*.

¹² Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, nn. 2–4, 286. For the following, see further the introduction to this present volume.

Let me here concentrate on the order among these distinctions. The order is anything but random, as becomes clear from two *corollaria* added by Petrus Thomae to his presentation of the individual distinctions. In the first corollary, Peter cites Aristotle's view (expressed in *Topics* I) that in opposites there are as many kinds on one side as there are on the other; from this, Peter infers that there are as many kinds of identity as there are kinds of distinction, or diversity. The seven distinctions thus only make up one half of Peter's doctrine; each kind of distinction has a corresponding kind of identity, and the kinds of identity may be described simply by negating the description of their counterparts.¹³ That in itself does not reveal much about the order of the distinctions and their corresponding identities. The second corollary clarifies that the order of inference of the distinctions is the reverse in comparison to that of the identities. In the order of distinctions, the objective distinction (or 'totally objective distinction') embraces all the others in the sense that if two items are objectively distinct from one another, then they are also distinct from one another in all other ways; the subjective distinction (or 'totally subjective distinction') has the second largest scope and thus embraces all prior distinctions in the above list, but not the objective one.¹⁴ One could go on in the same way until the least broad distinction is reached, the distinction of reason, which does not imply any other distinction. In the order of identities, it is the other way around. Whichever items are rationally identical with one another are also identical in all other ways (the meaning is that when an intellect does not impose any distinction upon a real item, then neither is there any kind of mind-independent distinction in the object, hence factual identity). Objective identity, on the contrary, does not imply any other kind of identity (that is, objective identity comprises such items that are so diverse that they are not identical in any other way).¹⁵

13 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, nn. 35–36, 310: “[P]rimum corollarium quod quotiens dicitur distinctio totiens et identitas; primo *Topicorum* ‘quot modis dicitur unum oppositorum tot et reliquum’; sicut enim idem et diversum sunt opposita, ita distinctio et diversitas et identitas. Quaedam ergo sunt idem ratione, quaedam ex natura rei, quaedam formaliter, quaedam realiter, quaedam essentialiter, quaedam se totis subiective, quaedam se totis obiective; ita quod descriptiones istorum modorum identitatis sunt accipiendae per oppositum ad descriptiones superius dictas de modis distinctionum.”

14 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, nn. 37–38, 312: “Secundum corollarium est quod praedicti aliter se inferunt affirmative, aliter negative, aliter quando accipiuntur cum distinctione, et aliter quando cum identitate. Circa quod est sciendum primo, quod primo, quando determinant distinctionem, sic se habent, quod quaecumque se totis obiective distinguuntur, omnibus modis aliis distinguuntur et sic de omnibus aliis modis distinctionum respectu aliorum praecedunt. Quaecumque enim distinguuntur subiective, distinguuntur essentialiter, realiter, formaliter et ratione et sic de aliis, non autem e contrario.”

15 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 39, 314; “Secundo est notandum quod per oppositum se habent praedicti modi quando accipiuntur cum identitate, quia quaecumque sunt idem ratione,

The relationships among the distinctions become much clearer when considering them one by one. Here, I should like to emphasize the systematicity of Petrus Thomae's doctrine. Duns Scotus himself only incidentally mentioned a hierarchy of distinctions.¹⁶ Francis of Meyronnes remarked that there is a hierarchical order in his own four distinctions.¹⁷ Petrus Thomae too, in an earlier work, had experimented with a hierarchy of distinctions prior to writing his short treatise on distinctions.¹⁸ It is only in the latter work that the idea of a genuine system of distinctions and their corresponding identities emerges as a complete and polished doctrine. It was this doctrine that most of the Formalist literature centered on and that both Brulefer and Sirect commented upon. It should be mentioned that both of them already build on an established tradition. They thus rather refer to the *formalistae*, or *formalisantes*, as a group than to Petrus Thomae himself, who is only mentioned once in Sirect's treatise,¹⁹ and not at all in Brulefer's treatises. With this earlier – for a large part anonymous – literature, Sirect and Brulefer share an exclusive interest in the first part of Petrus Thomae's treatise, i.e., his doctrine of distinctions, rather than his discussion in the second part of their application to the Aristotelian categories.

2. The Septenary of Distinctions and Its Reception

2.1 The Distinction of Reason: A Product of a Collative Act

In his *Tractatus brevis*, Petrus Thomae describes the distinction of reason (*distinctio rationis*) as a product of a collative, or comparative, power of the soul. It is called 'of reason,' not due to any *ratio* found in reality, but rather due to the power that produces it. That power is normally the possible intellect, but can also be the will or imagination. How the production of a distinction works in these latter cases is not explained. Peter does emphasize that the act involved is not one that is immediately directed toward its object, but rather a reflexive act. His example is the distinction between something that is defined and the definition itself – in which case, an intellect is reflecting upon its own product and

sunt idem in omnibus aliis modis et sic de singulis respectu sequentium, non tamen e contrario, quia non omnia, quae sunt idem se totis obiective, sunt idem in omnibus aliis modis, ut apparet ex praedictis et sic de omnibus modis aliis praecedentibus."

¹⁶ Duns Scotus, *Quaest. super libr. Metaph. Aristotelis*, VII, q. 19, n. 44 (OPh 4, 370). For a quote from this text, along with further references, see the introduction to this present volume.

¹⁷ Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus*, dist. 8, q. 1, 43vbO; quoted in Andersen, "Introduction," 91.

¹⁸ Petrus Thomae, *Quodl.* 7, 119–22; see Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*, 53–132; Andersen, "Introduction," 95–99.

¹⁹ Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 3, 11r.

compares it with something real.²⁰ From Peter's discussion in the second part of his treatise, it appears that whatever is distinguished due to reason must itself be a being of reason, and therefore this kind of distinction does not apply to the ten categories; they would not be the first principles of things, were they not real.²¹ To sum up, there is no distinction of reason within the ten highest categories, and the distinction between something defined and its definition is itself a being of reason.

Brulefer completely accepts Petrus Thomae's description of the distinction of reason and correctly identifies it as the common view among the Formalists.²² His own example is the grammatical distinction between 'Socrates' as a subject and 'Socrates' as a predicate.²³ Sirect similarly uses the example of a subject and its predicate in propositions in which something is predicated of itself. Nevertheless, a proposition like 'homo est idem sibi ipsi' does not exemplify a distinction of reason, but rather its counterpart, an identity of reason; such a proposition expresses a concept that is completely non-distinct both in reality and due to reason.²⁴ Sirect agrees with Petrus Thomae regarding the dependency of a distinction of reason upon a collative act. There obtains a distinction of reason both between a real being and a being of reason and among beings of reasons among themselves, because a distinction in these cases occurs due to a "collatio intellectus." In order to make the point that a distinction of this kind is not due to anything in the object, but rather only to a collative power, Sirect employs the

20 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, nn. 5–7, 286–88: "[I]lla distinguuntur ratione, non quidem ratione reali reperta in re distinguibili vel distincta, sed ratione, id est, intellectus fabricatione, quaecumque distinguuntur per actum collativum seu comparativum intellectus possibilis vel alterius potentiae collativae, sicut definitio et definitum, logice loquendo. Dico autem actum collativum, quia duplex est actus intellectus possibilis, scilicet primarius sive rectus et secundarius sive reflexus sive comparativus. [...] Non solum autem intellectus possibilis est potentia collativa, sed etiam voluntas et imaginatio, quia quaelibet istarum potentiarum potest unum alteri conferre vel comparare." Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 2, pars 2, qq. 1–4, n. 401, ed. Vat. 2, 355, already commented on the two kinds of rational distinction.

21 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 42, 314: "[S]i praedicamenta distinguantur mediante actu collativo alicuius potentiae, ergo ipsa non erunt decem rerum prima principia [...]. Consequentia est evidens, quia tunc praedicamenta essent entia rationis." Similarly *ibid.*, n. 44, 318.

22 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 7r–v: "[P]raeter distinctionem rationis quae fit per actum collativum intellectus seu voluntatis quam etiam suppono cum praedictis formalisantibus [...]."

23 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 1r.

24 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 1, 6v: "[P]ono duas conclusiones. Prima est quod illa sunt idem et eadem ratione quae habent eundem conceptum omnino indistinctum a parte rei, et etiam indistinctum ex parte intellectus, ut homo est idem sibi ipsi [...]. Secunda conclusio illa distinguuntur ratione quae distinguuntur per actum collativum intellectus praecise, ut in omni propositione mundi in qua praedicatur idem de se ipso, ut subiectum et praedicatum distinguuntur ratione."

terminology of a “rationable nature” (*natura ratiocinabilis*) and a “ratiocinizing power” (*potentia ratiocinans*).²⁵ This terminology reminds us of the widespread division of the rational distinction into one “rationis ratiocinatae” (with a foundation in reality) and another “rationis ratiocinantis” (without such a foundation), to use the standard nomenclature of the later tradition. This division is widely seen, also by later Scotists, as a motif peculiar to the Thomist tradition.²⁶ In his long treatise, Brulefer, without using Sirect’s terminology, likewise differentiates between two different kinds of distinction “in the intellect” (*in intellectu*): whereas the weaker one does not correspond to any distinction *ex natura rei*, the stronger one does.²⁷ The rational distinction of the Formalists, from Petrus Thomae onwards, is described as one that is a product only of a reasoning intellect, has no foundation in reality, and does not correspond to any distinction *ex natura rei*.

2.2 The Distinction *ex natura rei*: A Separate Kind of Distinction?

Petrus Thomae does not say much about the *distinctio ex natura rei* as such. He simply defines it through its contrast to the distinction of reason: It depends on the *rationes* of the terms that stand for real things, and not on any collative power. It is similar to the rational distinction with a foundation in reality, though it clearly falls on the side of reality and is not conceived as any kind of rational distinction. Man and donkey, or rather their species (as Peter seems to be meaning), are distinct in this way.²⁸ The example represents real items that are not the same. All real beings (*entia realia*) and everything that falls “under the consideration of a real science” (*sub consideratione scientiae realis*) thus counts as distinguished *ex natura rei* – and with them Aristotle’s ten categories, but also the transcendentals, first intentions, intelligible things, and everything that is consti-

25 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 1, 6v: “[I]nter entia realia et rationis ut inter animal et genus, similiter inter entia rationis inter se ut inter genus et speciem est distinctio rationis, quia non fit nisi ex sola collatione intellectus, et accipio distinctionem rationis quae est a potentia ratiocinante et non pro distinctione rationis quae est a natura ratiocinabili. Ex hoc patet quod distinctio rationis est respectus rationis per actum collativum a potentia ratiocinante causatus.”

26 See Knebel, “*Distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*”; Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 781–99, with references to further literature.

27 Brulefer, *Formalitatum textus*, comm., pars 3, 30vb: “In intellectu est duplex distinctio, una maior alia minor.” *Ibid.*, 31ra: “Licet distinctioni minori intellectu non correspondeat aliqua distinctio ex natura rei tamen distinctioni maiori semper correspondet aliqua distinctio ex natura rei.”

28 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 8, 290: “[I]lla distinguuntur ex natura rei praecise, quorum distinctio praecise dependet ex rationibus propriis terminorum et non ab actu alicuius potentiae collativae, qualis est distinctio hominis ab asino.”

tuted by intrinsic modes.²⁹ Without doubt, Petrus Thomae understands the *distinctio ex natura rei* simply as a general concept that embraces all distinctions that are not due to the workings of an intellect.

Brulefer describes the Formalist *distinctio ex natura rei* as applying to items about which contradictory predicates can be verified without any intellectual intervention. A whole (*totum*) and its parts (*partes*) is a case in point, because a whole has constituted (or composed) being whereas the parts (or components) don't; having constituted being and not having constituted being are contradictory predicates, and they do not need any operation of an intellect in order to be contradictory.³⁰ Sirect begins on the side of identity: Such items are identical *ex natura rei* about which two opposite predicates cannot be verified without the work of an intellect. His example is identical propositions ('man is man,' 'Socrates is Socrates'); we just learned that there obtains a rational distinction between subject and predicate in such sentences, and that is in fact the point here. Before an intellect intervenes, by separating the subject from the predicate, Socrates is just Socrates. As for the distinction *ex natura rei*, Sirect confirms Brulefer's description. He adds the example of a definition and the thing defined: The definition (e.g., rational animal) has a constituting function (*est [...] constitutiva*), which the thing defined (man) does not have.³¹

There would thus seem to be agreement among the Formalists. Brulefer, however, does not himself subscribe to the Formalist understanding of the *distinctio ex natura rei*. He vehemently rejects that there can be any distinction *ex natura rei* that is "smaller than the formal distinction." This is the first point in his criticism of the (self-proclaimed) Scotists and Formalists whose opinions, as he says, are widespread, and yet contain many falsehoods and also depart from

29 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, nn. 44–46, 316–20. First intentions are not beings of reason; see *ibid.*, n. 51, 324.

30 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 1r–v: "Distinctio autem ex natura rei secundum eos est illa quae est inter aliqua extrema de quibus praedicata contradictoris possunt verificari praeter opus intellectus, ut se habent totum et partes, superius et inferius, abstractum et concretum. Totum enim habet esse constitutivum, partes autem non constitutum; constitutum autem et non constitutum contradicunt. Similiter superius est praeter opus intellectus multiplicabile in plura, inferius autem non multiplicabile; multiplicabile vero et non multiplicabile sunt contradictoria."

31 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 2, 8r: "[P]ono duas conclusiones. Prima est ista: illa sunt idem ex natura rei de quibus duo praedicata opposita secluso opere intellectus collativo verificari non possunt, ut homo est homo, Sortes est Sortes. Secunda conclusio: illa distinguuntur ex natura rei sive medialiter de quibus seu inter quorum extrema duo contradictoria secluso opere intellectus verificari possunt; sic se habent diffinitio et diffinitum quia seclusa opere intellectus diffinitio est saltem constitutiva, diffinitum vero non." The earliest editions have 'decem' for 'duas'; the error is corrected in later editions. Sirect subsequently recounts the example of the whole and its parts.

Scotus's doctrine. It is thus wrong to say that a distinction *ex natura rei* can consist along with a formal identity or where there is not also a formal distinction. Rather, whatever is distinguished *ex natura rei* is also distinguished formally, and vice versa.³² A consequence of this position is that it does not make sense to formulate a separate description of this kind of distinction at all. For Brulefer, it is important to adhere to Duns Scotus. However, his criticism is not at odds with Petrus Thomae either, who did not conceive of the *distinctio ex natura rei* as a separate kind of distinction with its own field of application.

Sirect, in contrast, stands by the Formalist description of the *distinctio ex natura rei*. At the end of his long discussion of this distinction, he concludes that this distinction distinguishes between quiddities and their intrinsic modes, between intrinsic modes and other intrinsic modes, between categories, between being and God or creature, and between something constituted and that which constitutes it. All of these are neither distinguished due to reason nor are they distinguished by a full-blown real distinction. Therefore, argues Sirect, it is necessary to assume a "middle distinction" (*distinctio media*) between the rational ones and the real ones.³³ Sirect prefers to talk of a *distinctio ex natura rei*, but he is aware that Meyronnes called the distinction between a quiddity and its mode a 'modal distinction'.³⁴ It would thus seem that Sirect thinks intrinsic modes belong to the proper field of application of the distinction *ex natura rei*. However, his terminology is flawed: A few lines later he concludes his section on this distinction by calling it a '*distinctio ex natura rei media et formalis*' and states that it distinguishes between formal *rationes* of the terms that stand for real things.³⁵

32 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 2v: "[I]sta opinio licet sit multum communis et famosa apud multos scotistas, videtur tamen continere multa falsa nec sequitur doctorem subtilem; immo manifeste asserit aliqua contra ipsum. Ideo hoc secundo loco arguo contra eam, probando primo quod nulla sit distinctio ex natura rei minor distinctione formali, et quod distinctio ex natura rei non potest stare cum idemptitate formali, quia quaecumque distinguuntur ex natura rei distinguuntur formaliter, et e converso. Ergo distinctio ex natura rei non stat cum idemptitate formali, nec est minor ipsa." Cf. similarly *ibid.*, 4v.

33 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 2, 10r: "Ex praedictis infero quod quidditas et eius modus intrinsecus, et modi intrinseci adinvicem et omnia quae sunt in recta linea praedicamentali distinguuntur ex natura rei abinvicem. Et similiter ens a deo et creatura, et breviter quodlibet constitutum a suo constitutivo; omnia enim ista distinguuntur secluso opere intellectus et non distinctione reali proprie capiendo distinctionem realem, ergo aliqua distinctione media inter distinctionem rationis et realem isto modo sumptam."

34 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 2, 10r: "Hanc distinctionem mediam voco ex natura rei, quae ut patet ex vi vocabuli nisi a protervo negari non potest, licet distinctionem inter modum et quidditatem Franciscus modalem appellaverit tamquam a denominatione imperfectiori et ignobiliori." See Mayronis, *Conflatus*, dist. 42, q. 5, 122vbN.

35 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 2, 10v: "[D]ico quod inter distinctionem realem et distinctionem rationis est distinctio ex natura rei media et formalis. Ex hoc

That, of course, completely blurs the relationship between the formal distinction and the distinction *ex natura rei*. It is unclear, at this point, whether Siret thinks they are identical, as does Brulefer, or whether there is indeed the need for a separate distinction that is “lesser” than the formal distinction.

2.3 The Formal Distinction: One or Two Kinds of Distinction?

Petrus Thomae defines the formal distinction as holding between items related to one another such that one of them, due to an ultimate abstraction, does not include the other quidditatively. In things divine, an example is the distinction among the divine attributes of goodness, truth, and wisdom. They may be ultimately abstracted from one another, even though they are really or essentially identical (*includant se identice sive essentialiter*); the ultimate abstraction, through which the formal distinction occurs, does not exclude this kind of identity, but only formal identity. It works in the same way for transcendental concepts and, within creation, for the faculties of the soul.³⁶ Peter’s reasoning is based on a differentiation between real or essential and formal inclusion and on the notion of ultimate abstraction, motifs well known from Duns Scotus’s discussions of the formal distinction.³⁷

As for the *modes of inclusion*, Peter explains that in God, the divine essence essentially includes all its attributes and vice versa, and all attributes are essentially included in one another. In created things, various properties may be essentially included in a subject, though not in one another (exemplified, again, by the soul and its faculties). Formal inclusion is when one item is included in the formal *ratio* of something else and is correspondingly predicated of it, i.e., according to the first mode of *per se* predication (*primo modo dicendi per se*); recall that according to Aristotle, this kind of predication pertains to the defining

patet quod distinctio ex natura rei est respectus qui oritur ex propriis rationibus formalibus terminorum secluso quocumque actu potentiae collativae.”

36 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, nn. 9–10, 292: “[I]lla distinguuntur formaliter, quaecumque ita se habent, quod unum ab alio ultimate abstractum non includit quidditative reliquum, sicut in divinis bonitas a veritate et sapientia ultimate abstracta non includunt se quidditative sive in suis rationibus quidditativis, licet includant se identice sive essentialiter. Nam ultima abstractio in divinis vel in transcendentibus simpliciter non tollit identitatem identicam, licet tollat identitatem formalem. Secundo patet in creaturis, quia intellectus a voluntate ultimate abstractus non includit quidditative voluntatem, et sic de aliis potentiis animae.”

37 For the following, regarding both the formal and real distinctions, see Andersen, “Introduction,” 121–45.

features of an object.³⁸ Peter explains that form and matter are formally included in a composition, and the same goes for genus and difference in a species.³⁹

An *ultimate abstraction* is one that abstracts an item from everything that is not included in its quidditative *ratio*. It is called ultimate, because beyond that no further abstraction is possible; nothing can be abstracted from an item that belongs to its own quiddity. It only works the other way around; ‘animal’ may thus be conceived in abstraction from ‘human,’ but ‘human’ cannot be conceived in abstraction from ‘animal’ (a defining element of the quiddity of ‘man’).⁴⁰ In his discussion of the ten categories, Peter affirms that these are all formally distinct from one another, since they do not include one another in their respective quidditative concepts and hence may be ultimately abstracted from one another.⁴¹

The Formalist understanding, according to Brulefer, is that a formal distinction distinguishes between two items, of which one is not included in the other in the way that something is when it is predicated of it according to the first mode of *per se* predication; his example is the distinction between a subject and its property.⁴² Sirect subscribes to this definition and uses the same example.⁴³ The example given, of course, is in accordance with Aristotle’s understand-

38 Aristotle, *Post. Anal.* I, cap. 4, 73a34–b5.

39 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, nn. 10–12, 292–94: “[D]uplex est inclusio quoad praesens: quaedam identica vel essentialis et quaedam formalis. Identica, quando aliqua sic se habent, quod unum includit aliud essentialiter et e contrario, sicut patet in divinis, ubi essentia divina includit essentialiter quodcumque attributum et e contrario, et quodlibet attributum includit essentialiter aliud et e contrario; vel quando aliqua duo essentialiter includuntur in aliquo tertio, sicut propriae passionis in subiecto et omnes potentiae animae in ipsa anima, licet enim potentiae animae essentialiter in ipsa anima includantur, non tamen una includit aliam. Sed illa inclusio dicitur formalis, quando unum includit aliud in sua ratione formali seu definitione propriae et simpliciter dicta, vel quando unum inest alteri in primo modo dicendi per se, quemadmodum materia et forma includuntur in composito, et genus et differentia in specie.”

40 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, nn. 13–14, 294–96: “[I]lla abstractio est ultimata, secundum quam aliquid abstrahitur ab omni eo, quod in eius ratione quidditativa seu definitiva, propriae et simpliciter dicta, nullo modo includitur. [...] Et dicitur praedicta abstractio ultimata, quia ulterius non potest fieri aliqua alia abstractio respectu illius, a quo tale quid abstrahitur. Ideo omnis alia est simpliciter impossibilis et contradictionem includit, nam nihil potest vere abstrahi ab aliquo, quod est de eius quidditate, licet possit fieri e contrario: animal enim potest abstrahi ab homine sive concipi propter hominem, e contrario autem non.”

41 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, 47–48, 322.

42 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 1v: “Distinctio autem formalis est illa quae est inter aliqua duo quorum unum non includit aliud in primo modo dicendi per se, ut inter subiectum et suam propriam passionem.”

43 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 3, 14v: “[I]lla distinguuntur formaliter quae habent aliam et aliam formalitatem quarum neutra alteram includit in ratione sua

ing of the *proprium* as predicable only in the second mode of *per se* predication.⁴⁴ As regards formal identity, both Brulefer and Sirect quote Duns Scotus's definition in *Ord.* I dist. 2: "I speak of formal identity, where that which is said to be thusly identical includes that with which it is thusly identical in its formal quidditative *ratio* and according to the first mode of *per se* [predication]."⁴⁵ To arrive at a proper definition of a formal distinction, Brulefer simply turns around this definition of formal identity and says that a formal distinction obtains where this kind of inclusion does not occur.⁴⁶ This position would seem to amount to a confirmation of the "Formalist" description he had earlier reported. However, from Scotus's definition of formal identity, Brulefer derives a more nuanced view of the formal distinction than the one he finds among the Formalists.

According to Brulefer, there are two kinds of formal distinction. The first one squares with the Formalist conception and indeed distinguishes between a subject and its property, whose *rationes* are not quidditatively included in one another (he cites the classical example of humanity and risibility).⁴⁷ The second kind of formal distinction rather distinguishes between items whose *rationes* are not precisely and adequately (*praecise, adaequate*) the same; 'animalitas' and 'humanitas' (like all other superior and inferior concepts) are examples of such incongruence (or non-identity of formal quidditative *rationes*; recall Scotus's definition of formal identity).⁴⁸ In their ultimately-abstract state, these are not predicated of one another. Only if their *rationes* were formally infinite would they be congruent. This is indeed the case with the divine essence and divine

formali et per se primo modo sicut dicimus quod subiectum et propria passio distinguuntur formaliter."

⁴⁴ See, again, Aristotle, *Post. Anal.* I, cap. 4, 73a34–b5.

⁴⁵ Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 2, pars 2, qq. 1–4, n. 403, ed. Vat. 2, 356–57: "Voco autem identitatem formalem, ubi illud quod dicitur sic idem, includit illud cui sic est idem, in ratione sua formali quidditativa et per se primo modo." Quoted by Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 7v, and Sirect, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 3, 14r.

⁴⁶ Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 7v: "Voco autem distinctionem formalem ubi illud quod dicitur sic distinctum non includit illud a quo sic est distinctum in ratione sua formali et per se primo modo."

⁴⁷ Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 8r–v: "[D]istinctio formalis est duplex. Una est quae est inter duas aliquas quidditates vel realitates seu formalitates quarum una non cadit in ratione quidditativa alterius, nec econtra, et isto modo subiectum et propria passio puta risibilitas et humanitas distinguuntur formaliter, quia in quidditativa ratione humanitatis non accipitur vel includitur risibilitas, nec econtra."

⁴⁸ Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 8v: "Alia est distinctio formalis quae est inter aliqua duo extrema quorum unus non est praecise neque adaequate ratio alterius seu adaequativa alterius; verbi gratia ratio animalitatis et ratio humanitatis dicuntur distingui formaliter."

goodness – they are formally distinct and yet they are predicated of one another, even in their abstract state, due to their infinity. Brulefer underscores that this enhanced view of the formal distinction is in accordance with Scotus's original teaching.⁴⁹ The Formalists only speak of the first kind of formal distinction, and hence misconstrue Scotus's teaching.⁵⁰

Brulefer's criticism implies that the Formalists have missed the theological relevance of the formal distinction. In his *long* treatise on distinctions, he strongly emphasizes that divine simplicity is in no way compromised by the assumption of a formal distinction.⁵¹ Sirect would not disagree regarding this latter point, emphasizing as he does that the application of the formal distinction *in divinis* is neither heretical nor at odds with faith.⁵² Sirect, though, does not discuss the significance of infinity for the predication of divine attributes about one another. Instead, he makes the point, absent in Brulefer's short treatise, that all divine attributes common to the Trinitarian persons possess their own infinity that is formally distinct from the divine essence, even though they all *radicaliter* (not *formaliter*) have their infinity from that essence.⁵³

Another aspect of the divergent approaches of the two Scotists concerns the relationship between superior and inferior concepts. Brulefer, drawing on the second kind of formal distinction, rejects the view endorsed by Petrus Thomae

49 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 8v: "Isto modo etiam secundum viam doctoris subtilis, quia ratio humanitatis non adaequat rationem animalitatis, qua propter unum non praedicatur de alio in abstracto loquendo de ultimata abstractione, quia humanitas non est animalitas, et hoc est quia una non est praecise et adaequate altera, et hoc nisi altera illarum esset formaliter infinita, vel ambae illae rationes essent formaliter infinitae, ut essentia divina et bonitas, licet enim distinguantur formaliter et una non sit praecise alia, praedicantur tamen de se invicem in abstracto loquendo etiam de ultima abstractione, sed hoc est propter infinitatem formalem inclusam in ipsis."

50 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 9r: "[I]sti formalisantes semper capiunt uno modo distinctionem formalem, scilicet primo modo, et ideo non habent mentem doctoris subtilis." Brulefer adds, but fails to substantiate, that his differentiation between two kinds of formal distinction solves all seven objections against the formal distinction presented by Gregory of Rimini; cf. Ariminensis, *Super primum*, dist. 8, q. 1, art. 2, 32–37.

51 Brulefer, *Formalitarum textus*, comm., pars 4, 42rb: "Distinctio formalis nullo modo variat, nullo modo violat, nullo modo obviat, nullo modo impedit simplicitatem divinam."

52 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 3, 14v–15r, in reaction to an objection that since 'formalitas' derives from 'forma,' a multiplicity of formalities in God would imply the theologically scandalous view of a multiplicity of forms in God. This same motif is also discussed in Brulefer, *Formalitarum textus*, comm., pars 3, 25rb. Johannes Meyer discussed it too; see Apaoan Machado's contribution to this present volume.

53 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 3, 15v: "[O]mnia absoluta communia tribus personis habent propriam infinitatem formaliter distinctam ab infinitate divinae essentiae, verum est tamen quod omnia sunt infinita radicaliter ab essentia divina, licet non formaliter."

(who is not mentioned) that ‘human’ cannot be conceived in abstraction from ‘animal.’ Inferior concepts are indeed formally distinct from their superiors, says Brulefer, since they are not precisely and adequately the same. Something defined is likewise formally distinct from its definition; the defined has a quiddity that is constituted by the parts of the definition.⁵⁴ However, if one maintains the first kind of formal distinction, Brulefer does concede that then one would have to say that there is no formal distinction in any of the cases just mentioned; it is true that the quiddities of the items in question are formally included in, and thus not distinguished from, one another.⁵⁵ Recall here that Sirect mentioned the example of something defined and its definition in connection with the *distinctio ex natura rei*. More significantly, though, Sirect explicitly subscribes to the view that superior concepts can be conceived in abstraction from their inferiors, but the inferiors not in abstraction from their superiors; he makes the same point regarding essential differences and intrinsic modes that are not formally identical with what they constitute, whereas the constituted items are formally identical with them.⁵⁶ Sirect’s position confirms Brulefer’s observation that the Formalists only know of the first kind of formal distinction (based on non-inclusion), not of the latter (based on incongruence). The two Scotists have divergent conceptions of the formal distinction, and they disagree about its application both *in divinis* and *in creaturis*.

2.4 The Real Distinction:

A Distinction for Trinitarian Persons and Other Things

According to Petrus Thomae, a real distinction distinguishes between items which are formally something positive, which do not – when ultimately abstracted – in any way include one another, and which are neither identically nor

⁵⁴ Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 8v–9r: “[O]mne inferius distinguitur formaliter a suo superiori. Ratio enim inferioris non est praecise et adaequate ratio superiorum, nec inferius est idem suo superiori idemptitate adaequata, ita quod inferius sit tantum suum superius formaliter, similiter diffinitum isto modo distinguitur formaliter a diffinitione, quia non est praecise et idemptitate adaequata sua diffinitio, cum dicat quiditatem aliam a diffinitione constitutam ex partibus diffinitionis.”

⁵⁵ Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 8v (speaking of the first kind of formal distinction): “Et isto modo non dicuntur distingui formaliter diffinitum et diffinitio, superius et inferius, quia semper alterum illorum cadit in ratione quiditativa alterius, seu includitur quiditative in alio.”

⁵⁶ Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 3, 14v: “Clarum est quod superius non includit inferius in ratione sua formali et per se primo modo sed potius econtra. [...] [O]mnia praedicata quiditativa superiora et omnes differentiae essentiales et modi intrinseci non sunt idem formaliter suis constitutis, sive inferioribus, bene econtra.”

formally (*nec [...] identice nec formaliter*) predicated of one another.⁵⁷ The requirement of formal positivity excludes negations and privations from this kind of distinction.⁵⁸ The most interesting feature of Peter's presentation of the real distinction is that it includes a discussion of kinds of predication that one might have expected to find already in the presentation of the formal distinction. Brulefer certainly would have preferred that.

Peter explains that there are two kinds of predication, one essential and another accidental, and that essential predication is subdivided into identical and formal predication.⁵⁹ *Identical* predication, which is one kind of essential predication, requires *essential* identity of the subject and its predicate. For identical predication to work, both the subject and the predicate must be infinite, either formally, which is the case with things divine, or else just permissively (*permissive*), which is the case with the transcendentals (they may apply to either divine, hence infinite, or created things and therefore are only permissively infinite).⁶⁰ We learn that only in such cases is there a proper ground (*ratio praecisa*) for identical predication, and that this ground consists in an "unlimited essential intimacy" (*illimitatio essentialis intimitatis*), a notion we may understand as standing for an essential congruency of all things infinite.⁶¹

57 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 24, 302: "[I]lla distinguuntur realiter, quaecumque ita se habent quod quodlibet formaliter est positivum, et unum ab alio ultimate abstractum nullo modo includit aliud, nec potest de illo identice nec formaliter praedicari."

58 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 25, 302: "[N]egationes et privationes intra se nec ab aliquo alio realiter distinguuntur, quia non dicunt formaliter aliquid positivum." Peter further explains that privations do connote something positive, though they are not formally such.

59 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 26, 302. Peter references the use of this subdivision in Duns Scotus, *Quaest. quodl.*, q. 5, n. 5, ed. Wadding 12, 120. For Scotus on predication, see Knuuttila, "*Praedicatio identica*"; Knuuttila's reference to Antonius Andreae (*ibid.*, 274) is actually to Petrus Thomae, whose *Tract. brevis* was in some manuscripts ascribed to Antonius.

60 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 27, 304: "Ad praedicationem autem identicam duo necessario requiruntur. Primum est quod praedicatum et subiectum sunt idem essentialiter, nam omnis praedicatio identica est essentialis, licet non e contrario. [...] Secundum est quod utrumque extremum, scilicet subiectum et praedicatum vel eorum alterum, sit infinitum vel formaliter, sicut in divinis, vel permissive, sicut in transcendentibus simpliciter."

61 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 30, 306: "[S]olum in divinis et in transcendentibus simpliciter reperitur praedicatio identica absque formali, verbi gratia deitas est bonitas, bonitas est sapientia et e contrario. Ratio huius est, quod solum in praedictis reperitur ratio praecisa praedicationis identicae, quod est illimitatio essentialis intimitatis, de quo tractatur in paenultima quaestione *De modis distinctionum* in principio." The *quaestio* from *De modis distinctionum* referred to is identical with Petrus Thomae, *Quodl.* 6; see there in particular 89. The unusual terminology of "unlimited essential intimacy" is found both in the passage in *Quodl.* 6 and in Petrus Thomae, *De distinctione predicamentorum*, ed. Bos, 301. For discussion, see Andersen, "Introduction," 43–45 and 127–29.

Formal predication requires that a predicate belong intrinsically to the quiddity of its subject or is predicated of it according to the first mode of *per se* predication (as in ‘a human is a rational animal’).⁶² Referring to Scotus, Peter says that “in all creatures, identical predication is formal.”⁶³ This clearly does not mean that formal predication is genuinely identical predication, but rather only that, in the finite world which lacks “unlimited essential intimacy”, formal predication amounts to a creaturely quasi-equivalence to identical predication.⁶⁴ Peter, in the second part of his treatise, infers that the real distinction applies to the ten categories, since these are positive and are not predicated formally or identically of one another.⁶⁵

Somewhat paradoxically, Brulefer’s view of the formal distinction is thus confirmed by what Petrus Thomae says about the real distinction. According to Brulefer, one kind of formal distinction does distinguish between infinite attributes that are predicated of one another due to their infinity (Peter’s identical predication) and between superior concepts and the inferior ones that they, together with a differential concept, constitute (Peter’s formal predication). Whereas Peter says there is no real distinction in these cases, Brulefer says there is a formal one. They partially agree, even though their views of the abstractability of inferior concepts from their constituent items remain at odds.

Petrus Thomae adds the consideration that the categories are distinguished from one another in the same way in which one thing is distinguished from another thing (*res et res*), and since a major distinction implies a minor one, the categories are likewise distinguished in the same way in which one reality is distinguished from another reality (*realitas et realitas*); the categories are further distinguished in the same way as beings (*ens et ens*), because *res* and *ens* are convertible.⁶⁶ Peter, at this place, offers no definitions of the terms ‘realitas,’ ‘res,’

62 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 28, 304: “Illa autem praedicatio est formalis, in qua praedicatum pertinet intrinsece ad rationem quidditativam subiecti, sive quando praedicatum inest subiecto primo modo dicendi per se, ut homo animal rationale.”

63 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 31, 306: “[I]n creaturis non reperitur proprie et stricte praedicatio identica nisi formalis. [...] [S]ecundum ipsum non potest fieri praedicatio aliqua identica praecise nisi sit formalis.” Petrus Thomae is referring to Duns Scotus, *Tractatus de primo principio*, cap. 4, n. 77, 100.

64 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 31, 306, states there is no “illimitatio essentialis intimatis” in creatures.

65 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, nn. 53–55, 326–28.

66 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 56, 328–30: “[Q]uacumque distinguuntur sicut res et res, distinguuntur sicut realitas et realitas. Sed omnia praedicamenta distinguuntur sicut res et res. Ergo, etc. Maior patet, quia maior distinctio arguit minorem. Sed distinctio rei et rei, id est essentialis et essentialis, est maior quam realitatis et realitatis. Ergo, etc. [...] [Q]uacumque distinguuntur sicut ens et ens, distinguuntur sicut res et res. Sed omnia praedicamenta distinguuntur sicut ens et ens. Ergo, etc. Maior apparet, quia ens et res convertuntur [...]”

or ‘ens.’ His consideration simply signals that he associates the real distinction with a distinction among *things*. This latter fact, however, is noteworthy, because Brulefer reports that the Formalists understand the real distinction as distinguishing between two things (*res et res*). ‘Things’ thusly distinguished are such that one of them may perish, while the other remains, or *vice versa* (this is the case with two individuals of one and the same species); or, one of them is able, by divine intervention, to exist without the other (as when through divine power accidents are preserved without their subject); or, one of them is an extrinsic (efficient or final) cause and the other its effect. For this final point, Brulefer refers to Augustine’s *dictum* in his *De Trinitate* that no thing can produce itself; although Augustine expresses himself in general terms, the ‘things’ which he intends are the Trinitarian persons.⁶⁷

Sirect affirms that the real distinction distinguishes between things that are ontologically independent of one another, or are related to one another like producer and product, or exist in other things that are really distinct.⁶⁸ The flip side of real distinction, the corresponding kind of identity, is accordingly described as identity between things, where one thing cannot be without the other (in other words, their separation is impossible), where one is not the origin (*originans*) of the other (*originatum*), and where none of them are included in other things that are really distinct.⁶⁹ Sirect’s examples of really distinct things more or less square with those given by Brulefer. Most notably, he too includes the Trinitarian persons among the ‘things’ that are really distinguished from one another; the divine persons are not really identical, even though one of them cannot be without the others since then they would not be all essentially united.⁷⁰ The di-

67 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 1v: “Distinctio vero realis est illa quae est inter aliqua duo quae sunt res et res. Illa vero sunt res et res quorum unum potest corrumpi alio remanente, et e converso, ut Sortes et Plato, vel quorum unum potest per divinam potentiam esse sine alio, ut paries et color existens in eo, et omne accidens per accidens respectu sui subiecti. Illa etiam sunt res et res quorum unum est per se causa efficiens vel finalis, et aliud per se effectus quia idem realiter non potest causare seipsum. Illa etiam quorum unum est generans et aliud genitum, quia nulla res seipsum gignit, secundum Augustinum libro primo *De Trinitate*, ut in divinis pater et filius.” See Augustinus, *De Trinitate libri XV*, I, n. 1, ll. 35–36, CCSL vol. 50, 28.

68 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 4, 17r: “[I]lla sunt distincta realiter quae sic se habent disiunctive quod unum potest esse sine alio vel quod unum est produciens et aliud productum vel quae sunt in pluribus rebus realiter distinctis.”

69 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 4, 16v: “[I]lla sunt idem realiter quae sic se habent quod unum non potest esse sine alio, seu unum impossibile est separari ab alio absque contradictione, et cum hoc quod impossibilitas separationis non proveniat a causa extrinseca, et quod unum respectu alterius non sit originans et aliud originatum, et quod non sint in pluribus rebus realiter distinctis.”

70 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 4, 17r: “[T]res personae divinae distinguuntur realiter a se invicem et non sunt idem realiter non obstante quod una non possit

vine persons are not mutually really identical, but they are really identical with the divine essence, and all divine attributes are really identical not only with each other and with the divine essence, but also with each of the divine persons.⁷¹ As for the requirement of positivity, Sirect is a bit more accurate than Petrus Thomae; he says in order to be really distinguished, things must possess their own “positive reality of existence or at least of subsistence.”⁷²

Sirect’s understanding of the real distinction nicely corresponds to Brulefer’s brief account of the Formalist view of the matter. Brulefer’s own position, again, deviates considerably from that standard view. He divides the distinction between things (*res et res*) into two: one that distinguishes between suppositis and another that distinguishes between natures. The suppositis he has in mind are the Trinitarian persons that have a shared nature despite being different *res*. The natures he has in mind are all other real things that are different from other things (“*omnes alias res quarum una non est alia*”). This latter real distinction, says Brulefer, is usually called an ‘essential distinction’ due to the equivalent meaning of ‘nature’ and ‘essence.’⁷³ Obviously, Brulefer sees no need to operate with a separate essential distinction and thus includes the essential distinction under the real one. This step is remarkable, because Brulefer had previously discarded any separate *distinctio ex natura rei*, which for Petrus Thomae served as a genus of all mind-independent distinctions. In Brulefer’s reformed Formalist system, the second kind of real distinction *de facto* takes over this function, with the important difference that whereas the formal distinction was included under Petrus Thomae’s *distinctio ex natura rei*, it is excluded from Brulefer’s *distinctio realis*.

esse sine alia, quia haec non est nisi propter unitatem essentiae.” The other examples he presents are: an essential whole and its parts, individuals of one and the same species or of different species in the same category, and matter and form.

71 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 4, 16v: “[O]mnia essentialia et notionalia essentiae divinae unica realitate reantur; similiter omnia attributa sunt eadem realiter et cum essentia et cum se invicem et cum personis divinis et personae divinae cum essentia divina.”

72 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 4, 17r: “[D]istinctio realis est illa cuius extrema habent aliam et aliam realitatem formaliter positivam existentiae vel saltem subsistentiae.”

73 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 9r: “[D]istinctio realis est duplex, quia quaedam est suppositorum, et alia est naturarum. Prima est inter personas divinas quae sunt tria supposita realiter distincta habentia tamen eandem naturam numero indivisibilem et indivisibiliter. Distinctio autem naturarum est inter omnes alias res quarum una non est alia, et ista vocatur distinctio essentialis, quaecunque enim habent aliam et aliam naturam habent aliam et aliam essentiam, cum natura et essentia sint idem.” Brulefer, *Rep.* I, dist. 2, q. 2, 24rb, likewise differentiates between two kinds of real distinction, a “distinctio suppositorum” and a “distinctio essentialium.”

2.5 The Essential Distinction: One More Real Distinction, or the Negation of Essential Order?

Once again, Petrus Thomae delivers an explanation that later writers probably would have preferred to see at an earlier place in his system. His essential distinction distinguishes between items that are such related that one could exist without the other, either because one is earlier in nature than the other, or because one can perish while the other persists, or because the distinguished items, independently of one another, can be brought into existence by some power.⁷⁴ In his discussion of the distinction between categories, Peter asserts that the essential distinction does apply to the categories, simply because something belonging under one category can, by divine intervention (presumably since this does not happen naturally), be brought into existence independently of whatever belongs under some other category.⁷⁵

Petrus Thomae's description of the essential distinction fits both Brulefer's and Sirect's understanding of the *real* distinction, if one exempts their application of that distinction to the Trinity. Reporting the standard Formalist view, Brulefer explains that the essential distinction distinguishes between items that, due to some power, can be separated from one another (if they are not already separate from one another, one should add, for his examples are two human beings, and a wall and its whiteness; obviously, an external power is needed only in the latter example). In the realm of creatures, there is no difference between the real and the essential distinctions, since they have the exact same field of application. Only regarding divine things do they differ from one another, because there one finds a real distinction between the Trinitarian persons, but not an essential distinction. The real distinction thus has a broader field of application than the essential distinction.⁷⁶ As we already know, Brulefer himself rejects

74 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 32, 308: "[I]lla distinguuntur essentialiter, quaecumque ita se habent quod uno existente aliud non existit vel non oportet existere, ut quando unum est natura prius alio, vel quando uno corrupto vel destructo non oportet aliud corrumpi, vel quando unum potest poni sine alio per potentiam aliquam in actuali existentia, sicut homo et angelus, et cetera."

75 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, nn. 57–58, 330: "[O]mnia praedicamenta distinguuntur essentialiter. Hanc probō sic: res unius praedicamenti per potentiam divinam potest poni in actuali existentia absque re alterius praedicamenti, ergo unum praedicamentum conceditur esse distinctum essentialiter ab alio." Peter adds a lengthy argument to prove that the essential distinction not only applies to the four first (absolute) categories, but also to the six last (relative) categories; see the discussion in Andersen, "Introduction," 151–57.

76 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 1v: "Distinctio essentialis est illa quae est inter aliqua quae per aliquam potentiam possunt separari a se invicem, ut Sortes et Plato, paries et albedo sua. Et sic <non> differunt distinctio realis et distinctio essentialis secundum istos in creaturis, quia quaecumque quod distinguuntur essentialiter in creaturis distinguuntur realiter,

the assumption of a separate essential distinction and rather prefers to speak of two different real distinctions, one that distinguishes between supposita, and another that distinguishes between natures.⁷⁷

Sirect's understanding of the essential distinction deviates from what Brulefer takes to be the standard Formalist view. According to Sirect, there is an essential distinction between natures or essences that are really distinct (so far he agrees with Brulefer), or that do not "concur" (*concurrunt*) with an intrinsic and essential *ratio* of something else.⁷⁸ The latter point is motivated by a consideration of the notion of 'essential order.' It comes in two versions. A *secundum quid* essential order unites things that are thus related so that one is dependent on the other, and cannot by any natural power be separated from it, even though it can by divine power. An accident may in this way be separated from its substance, or a substance from its extrinsic causes.⁷⁹ A *simpliciter* essential order is one where separation through divine power is excluded, since any separation would imply a contradiction. In such cases, says Sirect, whatever is dependent is *realiter* identical with its independent counterpart. He mentions two examples: the creaturely dependence upon God, and the dependence of the whole upon its parts.⁸⁰

et e converso: quaecumque distinguuntur realiter etiam distinguuntur essentialiter in creaturis. Reperitur tamen in divinis distinctio realis personarum sine distinctione essentiali ipsarum, cum habeant eandem essentiam. Sic ergo secundum eos distinctio realis in plus se habet quam distinctio essentialis." In the second sentence, a missing 'non' has been supplied from the 1501 edition. That the only difference between the real and the essential distinctions consists in the former's applicability to the Trinitarian persons is a motif also found in Meyronnes; see Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine*, 196.

⁷⁷ Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 9r-v: "[D]istinctio essentialis non condistinguitur contra distinctionem realem, sed est ipsa distinctio realis, licet non praecise suppositorum, sed etiam naturarum. Et quoad hoc bene dicit praecedens opinio quod in divinis invenitur distinctio realis et non distinctio essentialis, quia ibi invenitur distinctio suppositorum, et non distinctio naturarum."

⁷⁸ Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 5, 17v: "[I]lla distinguuntur essentialiter quae habent diversas naturas sive essentias realiter distinctas, vel quae non concurrunt ad rationem intrinsecam et essentialem alicuius."

⁷⁹ Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 5, 17v: "[D]uplex est ordo essentialis ut ad praesens sufficit. Unus est secundum quid et est quando posterius dependet sic a priori quod licet non possit esse sine illo per potentiam naturalem potest tamen per potentiam divinam, sicut est de accidente respectu substantiae saltem de aliquo et de substantia respectu causarum secundarum extrinsecarum." 'Unus' replaces 'unum' in the original.

⁸⁰ Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 5, 17v: "Alius est ordo essentialis simpliciter et est inter illa quae sic se habent quod implicant contradictionem etiam per quamcumque potentiam posterius esse sine priori, et accipio ibi ordinem essentialem pro dependentia essentiali, et sic dico quod quodcumque aliquid habet ordinem essentialem isto secundo modo ad aliud in ratione dependentis ad independens tali dependentia idem significatur realiter

In addition to the essential identity of Trinitarian persons (the only instance where essential identity adds anything to real identity), Sirect knows of a second kind of essential identity, one that consists in something's intrinsic concurrence with the essence of something else.⁸¹ This, then, results in Sirect's enhanced definition of the essential distinction, cited above. He explicitly admits that the addition of a distinction between items that have no essential concurrence results in a new division of the essential distinction.⁸² Brulefer was not unfamiliar with this variant of the Formalist understanding of the essential distinction. He reports that the Scotist known to the late scholastics as John the Canon (an alias for Francis of Marbres, as recent scholarship has shown) held this position. In contrast to Sirect, Brulefer spells out the obvious implication of this position, namely that "no creature would be essentially distinct from God," an implication that Brulefer dismisses as simply absurd.⁸³

2.6 The Totally Subjective Distinction: What is Subjective Being?

A totally subjective distinction, in Petrus Thomae's system, distinguishes between items whose realities are distinct "numerically or individually or in actual existence or when the reality of the one is particularized and different from that of the other," individuals within one and the same species being a case in point.⁸⁴ The terminology of a total ('se totis') distinction is already found in Scotus, who employs it to signal the total exclusion of anything shared in primarily diverse

cum sua dependentia, sicut dico de creatura et sua dependentia quam habet ad deum et de toto respectu suarum partium."

⁸¹ Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 5, 17v: "[I]demptitas essentialis capitur dupliciter. Uno modo pro illa idemptitate qua aliqua idemptificantur uni essentiae singulari [...]. Secundo modo capitur idemptitas essentialis pro illa idemptitate qua aliqua dicuntur esse de essentia alicuius sive concurrant intrinsece ad essentiam alicuius." 'Dicuntur' replaces 'dicunt' in the original.

⁸² Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 5, 17v: "[A]d quam conformiter posset dari una alia divisio de distinctione essentiali."

⁸³ Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 9v: "[S]ecundum istum modum nulla creatura distingueretur essentialiter a deo; patet, quia nulla creatura potest essentialiter esse sine deo, sed omnia ista sunt absurda." See Joannes Canonicus, *Quaest. super octo libros Physicae Aristotelis*, I, q. 5, Venice 1520, 15vb. Concerning the true identity of this author, see Schabel, "Francesc Marbres."

⁸⁴ Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 33, 308: "[I]lla distinguuntur se totis subjective, quaecumque ita se habent quod realitates eorum sunt distinctae numero vel individualiter vel in actuali existentia vel quando realitas unius est particulata et divisa a realitate alterius, sicut Petrus et Andreas et quaelibet individua eiusdem speciei." See also Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, q. 11, art. 3, 297–98.

items (*primo diversa*).⁸⁵ Peter's totally subjective distinction thus distinguishes between realities that do not share any *subjective* being, a kind of being that he in his *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili* carefully distinguishes from *objective* being. Subjective being is had by items that subsist in themselves, which include (despite varying degrees of independence) God, substance, and absolute as well as relative accidental categories.⁸⁶

When discussing the application of the *distinctio se totis subiective* to Aristotle's ten categories, Peter confirms that these are distinct "in regard to subjective being." As highest genera they per definition are unmixed, so that something belonging under one category does not belong under another.⁸⁷ Here, being and the transcendentals pose a problem, because they transcend the division of being into categories; they are, however, contracted to each category and therefore always receive a different subjective being, depending on which category they enter.⁸⁸ Everything that is distinguished according to genus, species, and number is distinguished subjectively, which again applies to the categories.⁸⁹ Items that may actually exist (*actualiter existere*) independently of one another are distinguished subjectively, one more example of why the categories are subjectively distinguished.⁹⁰

Brulefer reports that the Formalists understand the totally subjective distinction to be distinguishing between items whose realities are separate and independent from one another in regard to actual existence or subjective reality. As an example, he mentions two individuals in one and the same species.⁹¹ This

85 Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 26, q. unica, n. 9, ed. Vat. 6, 3: "[Q]uae se totis distinguuntur sunt primo diversa." For further examples from Scotus, see Andersen, "Introduction," 147.

86 Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili*, q. 7, art. 3, 143.

87 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, nn. 68–69, 338: "[O]mnia praedicamenta distinguuntur se totis subiective. [...] [I]lla distinguuntur se totis subiective sive secundum esse subiectivum, quando illud quod realiter reperitur in uno non reperitur in alio. Sed omnia praedicamenta sunt huiusmodi. [...] Minor probatur, quia coordinationes praedicamentorum sunt impermixtae." The notion that categories per definition are unmixed is a commonly held view; see Hamesse, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*, n. 68, 317; I owe this reference to Robert Andrews.

88 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 71, 340: "[L]icet transcendentia aliqua reperiantur in quolibet praedicamento, tamen quodlibet illorum contrahitur ad proprium esse cuiuslibet talis praedicamenti, et per consequens habent aliud et aliud esse subiectivum in alio et alio praedicamento."

89 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 76, 342: "[Q]uacumque distinguuntur genere, specie et numero, distinguuntur se totis subiective. Sed praedicamenta sunt huiusmodi."

90 Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 78, 344: "[Q]uacumque possunt sine invicem actualiter existere, distinguuntur se totis subiective. Sed res omnium praedicamentorum sic se habent."

91 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 1v: "Distinctio se totis subiective secundum eos est illa quae inter aliqua duo extrema quorum realitates sunt distinctae et ab invicem separatae in actuali existentia, ita quod non conveniunt in aliqua realitate subiectiva seu actu existendi, ut duo individua eiusdem speciei."

kind of distinction differs from the real distinction in that the latter applies to parts of wholes (such as the unity of body and soul) that *may* dissolve into separate realities, but otherwise convene in one subjective reality, whereas items that are subjectively distinguished must be separate realities from the outset.⁹² Brulefer's own understanding of the totally subjective distinction is that it is superfluous. It simply represents either a formal distinction or one of the two kinds of real distinction (between natures or between supposits).⁹³ His reductionist approach rests on an understanding of "subjective being" as a kind of potential common reality that can be determined, or contracted, into specific realities. He argues that the subjective distinction may coincide with the real distinction between *natures*, because God and creatures (*deus et creatura*, two distinct natures) cannot convene in any contractible being due to God's highest simplicity, which prevents Him from entering the order of contractible, hence composite, being.⁹⁴ To the same effect, Brulefer argues that the Aristotelian categories do not convene in any potential reality that would be contractible through other realities, i.e., formal differences. Being is not such a potential reality and it only descends into the categories through intrinsic modes, which do not themselves represent any contracting realities.⁹⁵ The subjective distinction may also coincide with the real distinction between *supposits*, because the Trinitarian persons, otherwise known to be really distinct, do not convene in any contractible being in God and thus additionally may be said to be subjectively distinct.⁹⁶ The same pattern is true of the formal distinction: divine wisdom and the divine essence do not convene in any contractible being, since there is no such potential being

92 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 1v–2r: "Nec enim coincidit ista distinctio cum distinctione reali, quia ibi non requiritur de necessitate separatio actualis; hic autem requiritur. Unde corpus et anima unita distinguuntur realiter, quia licet non sint separata actu, possunt tamen separari, et unum potest corrumpi alio remanente, et tamen non distinguuntur se totis subiective, conveniunt enim in realitate subiectiva, cum ex his constituatur unum ens per se."

93 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 9v: "[D]ico quod distinctio se totis subiective aut est distinctio formalis, aut etiam aliquando est distinctio realis naturarum seu suppositorum."

94 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 9v: "[I]lla dicuntur distingui se totis subiective quae non conveniunt in aliqua realitate potenciali contrahibili ad ipsa per alias realitates contrahentes, ut deus et creatura, cum enim deus sit simplex simpliciter summe non est in eo ordo realitatum quarum una contrahat aliam."

95 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 9v–10r: "Isto modo etiam distinguuntur decem praedicamenta, quia in nulla realitate contrahibili potenciali ad ipsa per alias realitates conveniunt, supposito quod ens non descendit in ipsa per differentias formales, sed solum per modos intrinsecos, qui non dicunt aliquas realitates."

96 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 10r: "[S]tat distinctio se totis subiective cum distinctione reali suppositorum, sicut pater et filius et spiritus sanctus in divinis distinguuntur se totis subiective, cum in nulla realitate contrahibili conveniant, et tamen distinguuntur distinctione reali suppositorum."

in God; divine wisdom and the divine essence, however, clearly are formally distinct.⁹⁷ As Brulefer sees it, any distinction applied to God falls outside of the realm of contractible being and thus may be said to be a subjective distinction. Beyond reiterating other distinctions, the latter has no separate function. Brulefer sees no need to maintain such a distinction.⁹⁸

Sirect reports two different views (*modi dicendi*) on the totally subjective distinction. The first corresponds to Brulefer's understanding of this distinction as distinguishing between items that have no potential contractible being in common; contrary to Brulefer, though, he does not make the point that this kind of distinction is entirely reducible to others.⁹⁹ The alternative view is that such items are subjectively identical whose realities can simultaneously be in one and the same thing, due either to real identity or to a relationship between items of which one informs and the other is informed; correspondingly, those items are subjectively distinguished which cannot simultaneously be thus included in one and the same thing.¹⁰⁰ Sirect provides a couple of examples, the most interesting of which is that "whatever items are in things divine are subjectively identical."¹⁰¹ This example would seem to exclude any understanding of subjective being as a potential and contractible reality. One is therefore surprised to see Sirect con-

⁹⁷ Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 10r: "[A]liquando stat [...] distinctio se totis subiective cum distinctione formali duntaxat, sicut sapientia et essentia divina distinguuntur se totis subiective, cum in nulla realitate contrahibili convenient, quia in deo nulla ponitur realitas contrahibilis et contrahens, ideo nulla est ibi realitas subiectiva, et tamen manifestum est quod sapientia divina et essentia divina solum formaliter distinguuntur."

⁹⁸ Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 10r: "Ex omnibus igitur his evidens est quod distinctio se totis subiective non condistinguitur contra distinctionem realem seu contra distinctionem formalem, sed aliquando stat cum distinctione reali naturarum, aliquando cum distinctione reali suppositorum, aliquando cum distinctione formali solum."

⁹⁹ Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 6, 18r: "Primus [modus dicendi] quod illa dicuntur esse idem se totis subiective quae quiditative conveniunt in aliqua realitate potentiali et contrahibili per realitatem differentiae. Et per oppositum illa distinguuntur se totis subiective quae in nulla tali realitate quiditative conveniunt." Sirect then gives a series of examples that largely correspond with those given by Brulefer.

¹⁰⁰ Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 6, 18r: "Alius modus dicendi est quod illa dicuntur idem subiective quorum realitates possunt simul esse in eadem re vel per idemtitatem realem vel per modum informantis vel informabilis. Et per oppositum illa distinguuntur se totis subiective quorum realitates non possunt simul esse in eodem numero altero praedictorum modorum, videlicet vel per modum informantis vel per modum informabilis vel per idemtitatem realem." The second 'quorum' has been corrected from 'quarum' in the original.

¹⁰¹ Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 6, 17v: "[O]mnia quae sunt in divinis sunt idem subiective."

clude this section by remarking that the two views are not only equally probable, but in fact are only different ways of speaking.¹⁰²

Notably, Sirect's entire section on this distinction was quoted verbatim, but without any attribution to Sirect, in a *Tractatus formalitatum* supposedly composed by Francis of Meyronnes, printed thrice in the decades following the publication of Sirect's treatise, once even in a volume exclusively with texts by Meyronnes.¹⁰³ The totally subjective distinction, however, was Petrus Thomae's invention, not Meyronnes's, and it is remarkable that Peter's understanding of this distinction as distinguishing between individual things, each with their own *actual existence*, had so little resonance among the Formalists, who rather discussed *potential and contractible reality* under this heading.

2.7 The Totally Objective Distinction: Objective Being, Univocity, and Modes

The last kind of distinction in Petrus Thomae's system is the totally objective distinction. It is akin to the totally subjective distinction in that it too excludes agreement in one particular kind of being. This time, it is objective being that the distinguished items do not have in common. Peter does not explicitly talk of objective being here, but he is clearly drawing on his discussion of objective being in his *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili*, where objective being (in the relevant sense of the term) is described as a kind of *esse repraesentatum*¹⁰⁴ that – as unproduced and real – holds “the middle between subjective being and fictive being.”¹⁰⁵ In the *Tractatus brevis*, we learn that items are distinguished totally ob-

¹⁰² Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 6, 18r: “Et si quaeras quis istorum modorum est probabilior, dico quod uterque est probabilis nec est differentia inter eos nisi in modo utendi vocabulo, et ideo qui voluerit tenere alterum illorum dicat consequenter.”

¹⁰³ Anonymous, *Formalitates secundum doctrinam Francisci Maironis*, art. 2, 105ra–b. This first edition was printed in Ferrara in 1490 as a part of a volume with texts by Antonius Andree and Francis of Meyronnes. A second edition was adopted in a collection of philosophical treatises by various authors printed in Venice in 1517. A third edition appeared among works by Francis of Meyronnes printed in Venice in 1520. Whereas Poppi, “Il contributo dei formalisti,” 634, saw this treatise as a “prototype” of the later Formalist literature, Hübener, “Robertus Anglicus OFM,” 332, correctly observed its dependency upon Sirect's treatise, in particular his discussion of the subjective distinction. The anonymous treatise in fact is a patchwork of quotes from the earlier tradition and was likely composed for the 1490 print. See further Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 662–63.

¹⁰⁴ Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili*, q. 7, art. 3, 144.

¹⁰⁵ Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili*, q. 7, art. 3, 152: “[E]sse obiectivum tenet medium inter esse subiectivum et esse pure fictum.” *Ibid.*: “[L]icet esse obiectivum teneat medium praedicta, et non sit aliquod esse productum sicut est illud quod est esse subiective, tamen ex hoc non sequitur quin vere habeat esse reale.”

jectively when they do not agree in any quidditative *ratio*, or when “one real univocal concept or one of a proper *ratio*” cannot be abstracted from them. Peter’s examples are “individual and formal differences” as well as concepts that are related to one another as something quidditative and its qualification, such as ‘being’ and ‘goodness.’¹⁰⁶ Differentiating and qualifying concepts lie outside of objective being and hence are objectively distinct from the concepts they differentiate or qualify. This distinction has the largest possible scope, because it distinguishes between what lies within quidditative being and what does not. This last distinction, finally, does *not* apply to Aristotle’s ten categories, because these are all found within objective being and hence “some real univocal concept or one of first intention” can be abstracted from them.¹⁰⁷

The Formalist understanding of this distinction, according to Brulefer’s very short description, is that it distinguishes between items that do not agree in any real quidditative concept, two ultimate differences being a case in point.¹⁰⁸ In his critical evaluation, he states that the objective distinction overlaps with the formal distinction and the real one between natures; he only grants that the objective distinction has a “connotation” (*addit seu connotat*) of its own in that it distinguishes between items that do not agree in any real quidditative concept. Beyond this connotation, however, the objective distinction has no particular function. Since the ultimate differences are already *realiter* distinct, and transcendental concepts likewise are *formaliter* distinct, Brulefer sees no need to maintain a separate objective distinction.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, n. 34, 310: “[I]lla distinguuntur se totis obiective, quae non conveniunt in aliqua una realitate seu ratione quidditativa vel a quibus non potest abstrahi aliquis conceptus univocus realis seu propriae rationis, sicut sunt differentiae formales et individuales et illa quae habent conceptum quidditativum et qualitativum, sicut ens et bonum.” Ultimate differences and transcendentals are also the examples, of items not quidditatively included in being, presented in Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, nn. 132–36, ed. Vat. 3, 81–85.

¹⁰⁷ Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, nn. 79–80, 344–46: “[P]raedicamenta non distinguuntur se totis obiective. Probatur quia illa distinguuntur se totis obiective, a quibus non potest abstrahi aliquis conceptus unus realis sive primae intentionis. Sed praedicamenta sic se habent, quod ab eis potest abstrahi aliquis conceptus univocus realis sive primae intentionis.”

¹⁰⁸ Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 2r: “Distinctio se totis obiective est illa quae est inter aliqua duo extrema quae in nullo conceptu reali communi conveniunt quidditative, ut sunt duae ultimae differentiae.”

¹⁰⁹ Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 10v: “[D]istinctio se totis obiective aliquando est distinctio realis naturarum, aliquando distinctio formalis solum. Addit [...] seu connotat ultra illas distinctiones, quod illa quae sic distinguuntur in nullo conceptu quidditativo reali conveniunt. Unde ultimae duae differentiae duarum diversarum specierum distinguuntur realiter, et similiter se totis obiective cum in nullo conceptu quidditativo communi conveniant, similiter unitas et bonitas [...], et sic de multis aliis distinguuntur se totis obiective, et tamen solum distinguuntur formaliter; stat ergo distinctio se totis obiective cum distinctione formali et cum distinctione reali.”

Sirect phrases this distinction and its corresponding identity in terms of predication. Objective identity thus holds between items about which we may predicate “some quidditative predicate,” regardless of whether this predicate is limited (i.e., categorical) or transcendent and whether it signifies a potential reality or not; items about which such predication is not possible are objectively distinguished.¹¹⁰ From this, Sirect infers three corollaries: 1) God and creatures are objectively identical, and so are the ten categories. 2) The properties of being are objectively distinguished among themselves and from being. 3) Ultimate differences and all things that are *primo diversa* are objectively distinguished.¹¹¹

Even though the descriptions of the totally objective distinction offered by Brulefer and Sirect do capture important aspects of Petrus Thomae’s explanation of this kind of distinction, neither of them seem to be quite aware of its crucial metaphysical significance. Both of them thus omit any mention of univocity in their discussions of this distinction (Sirect, though, in the first article of his treatise, does include a remark that transcendent ‘being’ is not predicated univocally of ultimate difference and the properties of being, but only of God, the ten categories, and matter and form).¹¹² Though this does correspond with one line of the manuscript tradition of Petrus Thomae’s *Tractatus brevis*, it is nevertheless surprising that the two Scotists do not themselves establish any connection to this important aspect of Scotist metaphysics.¹¹³ For Petrus Thomae’s own

110 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 7, 18r-v: “[I]lla sunt idem obiective de quibus potest praedicari aliquod praedicatum quidditative sive illud sit limitatum sive transcendens sive dicat realitatem potentialem sive non, et illa distinguuntur se totis obiective de quibus non potest praedicari tale praedicatum quidditative.” The anonymous author of *Formalitates secundum doctrinam Francisci Maironis*, art. 2, 105rb, has borrowed this description of the objective distinction from Sirect; this time, however, he does not quote Sirect’s discussion in full.

111 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 7, 18v: “Ex hoc inferuntur aliqua corollaria: Primum quod deus et creatura sunt idem se totis obiective et etiam decem praedicamenta. Secundum quod passiones entis a se invicem et ab ente distinguuntur se totis obiective. Tertium corollarium quod differentiae ultimae et breviter omnia illa quae sunt primo diversa distinguuntur se totis obiective.” Sirect further quotes Scotus’s argument that all differences of differences must be reducible to items that are *primo diversa*, since there would otherwise be no halt in the series of differences; see Duns Scotus, *Ord.* II, dist. 3, pars 1, qq. 5–6, n. 170, ed. Vat. 7, 475.

112 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 1, 4v.

113 At the relevant places, Bos’s edition of Peter’s treatise omits any talk of univocity (the term, though, is recorded in the *apparatus criticus*); see Thomae, *De distinctione predicamentorum*, 302 and 312. By contrast, approaching the Scotist system of distinctions from a Thomist perspective, Chrysostomo Javelli is well aware of the connection between the objective distinction and Scotus’s doctrine of univocity; see Andersen, “Javelli and the Reception,” 133–34. In Formalist literature, Johannes Meyger, *Tractatus distinctionum*, cap. 1, 2v, explicitly phrases the difference between the subjective and the objective distinction in terms of univocity: “Dif-

thought the difference between the subjective and objective distinctions is of utmost importance. It illustrates the discrepancy between subjective and objective being. This is nicely expressed in his *Quaestiones de ente*, q. 11, where we learn that God and creatures are totally distinct in regard to subjective reality, but not so in regard to objective reality (which may stand for any first intention concept).¹¹⁴ It would indeed seem legitimate to interpret the *Tractatus brevis* as a systematic summary of the salient features of Peter's ontology as formulated in various other works. One important challenge to this reading, though, is the lack in this treatise of any explicit discussion of the place of intrinsic modes within the system of distinctions. As seen in section 2.2, Peter did explain that everything constituted by modes is distinguished *ex natura rei*, but he does not discuss the kind of distinction that obtains between intrinsic modes and the realities they modify. A fair guess is that Peter would subsume the intrinsic modes under such qualifying concepts that differ totally objectively from what they constitute, but strangely his presentation of this distinction leaves them unmentioned.¹¹⁵

At any rate, our Parisian Formalists do not move in this direction. Brulefer reports that the Formalists hold that being is contracted to the ten Aristotelian categories through intrinsic modes.¹¹⁶ Whereas in the short treatise Brulefer does not spend much energy on this topic, his longer treatise has a substantial and critical digression on the Formalist understanding of intrinsic modes. In brief, since intrinsic modes are not predicated of what they modify according to the first mode of *per se* predication, the Formalists, according to Brulefer, must here accept a formal distinction.¹¹⁷ Brulefer's own solution is to negate the premise;

fert autem ille ultimus modus a paenultimo, quia quae distinguuntur se totis subiective possunt aliquo modo univocari. Sed quae distinguuntur se totis obiective in nullo univoco univocantur, quia in ultimo modo tanta est distinctio distinctionum quanta est ipsorum distinguentium." In Francis of Pertusa, *Formalitates*, Tortosa Archivo del Catedral codex 153, 9r (manuscript dated 1440), we find a statement to the contrary: "[I]lla distinguuntur se totis subiective quod non conveniunt in aliquo communi univoco, scilicet in aliquo uno subiecto." Clearly, a unified Formalist doctrine on this subject did not exist. I thank Apaoan Machado and Robert Andrews for showing me their preliminary editions of the texts by Meyger and Pertusa respectively.

¹¹⁴ Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, q. 11, art. 3, 302: "[P]raedicta [Deus et creatura] distinguuntur se totis secundum realitatem subiective acceptam, et conveniunt realiter secundum realitatem obiectivam, vocando 'realitatem obiectivam' omnem conceptum primae intentionis."

¹¹⁵ I have presented this reading in Andersen, "Introduction," 171–77; for a discussion of this problem, and more generally Petrus Thomae's approach to intrinsic modes, see the contribution by Vitaly Ivanov in this present volume.

¹¹⁶ Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 9v.

¹¹⁷ See the detailed discussion in Brulefer, *Formalitatatum textus*, comm., pars 3, 28rb–va; Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 2v–3r, only has a brief discussion of this topic.

intrinsic modes do indeed *per se* pertain to the concept of whatever item they modify, and because they do so they do not add any new reality to the thing modified.¹¹⁸ From Brulefer's discussion, however, it does not become clear what kind of distinction he would apply here (it does seem, though, that only a distinction of reason would come into consideration). As for Sirect, I already mentioned, again in section 2.2, that he discusses intrinsic modes in connection with the *distinctio ex natura rei*. Curiously, Sirect's "*distinctio medialiter*," used as a synonym for the "*distinctio ex natura rei*" in the *editio princeps* of his treatise, has in later editions been changed to "*distinctio modaliter*."¹¹⁹

Conclusion: Some Aftermath to the Seven Distinctions

Brulefer concludes his critical discussion of the Formalist system of distinctions with a statement of Ockham's razor that, "since a plurality should not be posed without necessity," it suffices to assume a real and a formal distinction beyond the rational distinction; all other distinctions, if not due to the workings of an intellect, may be reduced to these two.¹²⁰ This conclusion would seem to result in a trio consisting simply of the rational, the real, and the formal distinctions. At one place in his commentary on the *Sentences*, Brulefer without further ado does state there are just these three distinctions.¹²¹ However, as we have seen, Brulefer's position is rather more complex due to his doubling of both the formal and

118 Brulefer, *Formalitatum textus*, comm., pars 3, 28vb: "Modus intrinsecus est ille qui est de per se conceptu alicuius rei non addens aliam realitatem qualitercunque distinctam a realitate eius cuius est modus." As becomes clear at 29rb, Brulefer is in particular targeting Meyronnes's definition of intrinsic modes; for this latter, see Möhle, *Formalitas und modus intrinsecus*, 296; Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 726.

119 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. partial. 2, 8r; cf. the edition of 1588, 53, and the edition included in the 1605 edition of Gothusius, *Gymnasium speculativum*, 804. Most likely, the *ex natura rei* distinction is called "*medialiter*" due to its overlap with the formal distinction that is seen as occupying the middle between the rational and the real distinctions. Let me at this place again refer to the discussion of Sirect's view of intrinsic modes in Sylvain Roudaut's contribution to this present volume.

120 Brulefer, *Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, 10v: "Ex istis omnibus evidenter notum est quod cum pluralitas non sit ponenda sine necessitate, et non appareat aliqua necessitas multiplicandi distinctiones quae sunt praecedentes intellectum nisi in distinctionem formalem et distinctionem realem sequitur quod non sunt necessario ponendae aliae distinctiones condistinctae proprie et per se et aliae ab istis duabus, patet enim manifeste quomodo aliae continentur sub istis, et ad eas reducuntur etc."

121 Brulefer, *Rep. I*, dist. 3, q. 3, 36vb: "[T]riplex est distinctio scilicet rationis, formalis et realis." Brulefer, *Rep. I*, dist. 26, q. 1, 113rb, additionally discusses a "*distinctio personalis*" and a "*distinctio notionalis*" taken over from Bonaventure, albeit without adopting them into his economy of distinctions. I thank Apaoan Machado for referring me to the latter place.

the real distinctions in his short treatise, and his additional acceptance of a double rational distinction in his long treatise (albeit only one of these counts as a genuine rational distinction). In the latter work, Brulefer accordingly summarizes his doctrine of distinctions as comprising three pairs of distinctions.¹²² That makes six.

Whereas for Brulefer the Formalists are a source for irritation, for Sirect they are mostly a source for inspiration. Nevertheless, he too concludes his treatise on a critical note, in particular regarding the double order of inference, the one feature that rendered Petrus Thomae's doctrine of distinctions and identities into a systematic whole. Sirect, being a faithful Formalist, reports that objective identity is the least of all kinds of identity, whereas rational identity is the greatest; the latter implies all the other kinds, but they do not imply it.¹²³ However, just a few lines later, he confesses not being able to see just how one kind of identity implies all the others, even though it is clear to him that some kinds do imply others.¹²⁴ Similarly in an opposite direction: Sirect reports that a greater distinction implies a lesser one; but, again, he does not himself see how one kind of distinction may imply all the others, even though some of them do imply others.¹²⁵ None of the examples Sirect gives of why the order of inference is deficient in both directions are particularly illuminating (just to give one example: two powers of the soul are objectively distinct, because they, or at least the differences by which they differ, are *primo diversa*, but they are not subjectively distinct, on the second account of that distinction, because they are united in one and the same thing by real identity). He is well aware that "many Formalists say the opposite" (*multi formalizantes dicunt oppositum*) and have solutions ready for his counterexamples.¹²⁶ That Sirect nevertheless insists that the idea of a double order of inference does not work is significant; it amounts to a renunciation

122 Brulefer, *Formalitatum textus*, comm., pars 4, 53va: "In genere tantum triplex est distinctio scilicet rationis, formalis, et realis. Distinctio autem rationis est duplex, similiter et distinctio formalis sicut in praecedentibus sufficienter declaratum est. [...] Distinctio realis est duplex, quia quaedam est realis, id est ex natura rei praecedens omnem actum intellectus hoc modo capitur generaliter." At this place, Brulefer has in mind a division of the real distinction into an *ex natura rei* distinction and a distinction between two *res*; a few columns later, at 54va, he reiterates the division, known from the short treatise, of the real distinction into one that holds between suppositis and one that holds between natures or essences.

123 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 3, pars 2, 19r.

124 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 3, pars 2, 19v: "[B]reviter non possum videre quomodo una idemplitas per bonam consequentiam posset inferre omnes alias idemplitates, licet aliquae aliquas inferant."

125 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 3, pars 2, 19v: "[M]aior distinctio infert minorem, tamen non video iudicio meo qualiter una distinctio per bonam consequentiam posset inferre omnes alias distinctiones inferre, licet aliquae aliquas inferat."

126 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 3, pars 2, 19v.

of the systematic character of the Formalist doctrine of distinctions. Sirect's last word on this subject is that "Scotus never established these consequences or inferences."¹²⁷ Brulefer might have said that as well.

Sirect and Brulefer did not work in a void. Considering only Paris, the University Chancellor and influential theologian Jean Gerson (1363–1429) had already recommended reducing the Formalist septenary to just three distinctions (the rational, the formal, and the real), and Brulefer may have been aware of that.¹²⁸ At any rate, his own critical reception of Formalism was well received in its turn by the Parisian Scotist Pierre Tartaret († 1522), who in his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* gives a summary of Brulefer's teaching from the short treatise.¹²⁹ Sirect too had a Parisian ally. Nicolas D'Orbelles (Lat. Orbellis, † between 1472 and 1475), a Franciscan from Sirect's own province (Touraine), and possibly his teacher at some point, received his doctorate in Paris in ca. 1435. In the first book of his *Compendium of Natural Philosophy*, Nicolas incorporated a long section on the seven kinds of distinctions and identities, including a discussion of their double order of inference. D'Orbelles is uncritical toward the Formalist doctrine and may have been a source of inspiration for Sirect.¹³⁰

As mentioned in the introduction to this study, both Sirect and Brulefer were widely received throughout the sixteenth century and clearly were still of importance for Franciscan teaching at Paris at the beginning of the seventeenth

127 Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 3, pars 2, 19v: "Nec unquam Scotus ordinavit illas consequentias sive illationes nec etiam aliquam rationem convenientem."

128 See Bolliger, *Infiniti contemplatio*, 329 (regarding the reduction to three distinctions) and 338–52 (further parallels between Gerson and Brulefer). Bolliger makes a strong case for Gerson's influence on Brulefer, especially on his critical approach to Formalism. Gerson is known for his criticism of contemporary realist metaphysics; see Hoenen, "Modus loquendi platonico-rum." It is still debatable just what Brulefer adopted from Gerson. One of Bolliger's examples is the notion of *ratio obiectalis*, which goes back to Antonius Andreae and certainly was widespread in contemporary sources; see Apaoan Machado's contribution to this present volume. Brulefer did not need to read Gerson to learn this.

129 See Andersen, "Introduction," 205; Tartaret's summary is contained in the appendix to Petrus Thomae, *Tract. brevis*, 384–85.

130 D'Orbelles's section on distinctions is discussed in Andersen, "Introduction," 217–23. D'Orbelles's presentation of the distinctions was in its turn inserted into a Formalist treatise that also included elements from other sources; this treatise has been edited in Sousedik, "Nicolai de Orbellis *Tractatus de distinctionibus*," 122–37. The latest account of D'Orbelles's life and works is in Zahnd, "Easy-Going Scholars," 290–99. For the possibility that Sirect was a student of D'Orbelles, see footnote 6 above; Sirect may have profited from the latter's discussion of the distinctions, regardless of whether or not he studied with him. Another possible source is an anonymous text called *Distinctiones communes usitatae Parisiis*, preserved in a manuscript dated 1449 (Ms. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 4007, ff. 48v–59r); the relationship of this text to Sirect's and D'Orbelles's accounts of the distinctions needs closer investigation. I thank Apaoan Machado for referring me to this manuscript.

century.¹³¹ In the Franciscan *Cursus philosophicus* literature of that century, and later, the seven distinctions were still being discussed, occasionally even extremely critically. In their jointly written *Disputations on Logic* from 1639, which included a section on distinctions, the influential Italian Conventual Franciscans Mastri and Belluto were thus overtly dismissive of the whole Formalist literature, known to them basically as Sirect and his commentary tradition. They characterized this literature, which at the time de facto had taken on the form of a discipline in its own right, as “some particular French dish” (*more Gallico pulmentum quoddam*) that did no good for the students or teachers of their Order.¹³² Much like Brulefer, though under influence from other currents in contemporaneous scholasticism, Mastri and Belluto sought to reduce the number of distinctions. Ironically, the model Mastri ends up with in his own *Disputations on Metaphysics*, where he pays tribute to recent developments in scholasticism of his day, especially a widespread interest in the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* and a tendency to discuss distinctions under the heading of *praecisiones*, is hardly less complex than the doctrine of the old Formalists.¹³³ If there is a morale to this story, it may be that a plurality of distinctions is in fact a good working tool when doing metaphysics (Scotist or otherwise). Whether there must be *seven* kinds of them remains debatable.

131 Beyond Augustinus Gothutius's *Gymnasium speculativum*, see also the Formalist works by Jean Du Douet and François Leroy mentioned in footnote 8 above. Important in this context is further the *Nucleus disputationum in universam philosophiam* (Paris 1625) by the French Recollect Franciscan Charles Rapine. This latter work differs from most Franciscan *Cursus philosophicus* literature by its conservative adherence to the older Scotist tradition, something clearly seen especially in the metaphysical part's section on distinctions; Rapine approves of all seven distinctions from Petrus Thomae's list (and their corresponding kinds of identity) as well as the modal distinction (which he says falls under the *ex natura rei* distinction). See Rapine, *Nucleus disputationum in metaphysicam*, disp. 6, 77–116; see further Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 867–69 and *passim*.

132 For this polemic and its background, see Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 659–68, in particular 667.

133 See Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 820 and 847. See further section 2 in my introduction to this present volume.

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Diverging Views on Modes in Fifteenth-Century Scotism

Sirect vs. Trombetta on the Modal Distinction

Sylvain Roudaut

Introduction

In his disputations *ad mentem Scoti* on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673) – celebrated in his time as the “prince of Scotists” – writes:

An intrinsic mode is said to lack its own formality, and is only formally distinct from an essence in a negative sense, because an essence can be conceived in some way without a mode, though not entirely perfectly and adequately, whereas a mode cannot be conceived in any way without the thing of which it is a mode. Although the Scotists acknowledge such a nature of intrinsic modes, they nonetheless fight no less about its definition than the Moderns about the definition of the extrinsic ones.¹

The concept of ‘mode’ emerged as a central theme in the landscape of early modern philosophy, gradually taking shape as a technical philosophical concept within the Latin tradition from the late thirteenth century to the seventeenth century. Although Mastri himself probably did not know much about modes as they were discussed outside of scholasticism, by the time he was writing, modes had gained enough popularity to be discussed across various philosophical circles, spanning from scholastic traditions to Cartesian circles, among other currents of Early Modern philosophy.² Mastri points out that the concept of mode,

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1 Bartholomaeus Mastrius, *Disputationes ad mentem Scoti in duodecim Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros Metaphysicorum*, disp. 2, q. 6, art. 1, nn. 151–52, in *Cursus philosophicus* vol. 4, ed. 1708, 69a: “Modus intrinsecus ea ratione dicitur propria carere formalitate, et solum formaliter negative ab essentia distingui, quia essentia sine modo potest aliquo pacto quidditative concipi, licet non omnino perfecte et adaequate, sed modus nullo modo concipi potest quidditative sine re, cuius est modus. Quamvis autem fateantur Scotistae talem esse naturam modi intrinseci, attamen circa definitionem, eius non minus rixantur, quam Recentiores circa definitionem extrinseci.”

2 For Mastri's view on modes vis-à-vis other philosophical traditions, see Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 441–47.

long before enjoying this fame in the modern era, where it became subject to sophisticated distinctions such as extrinsic versus intrinsic modes, was already a subject of intense debate within the earlier Scotist tradition, dating back to the time of Scotus himself, who was active at the turn of the fourteenth century. This tradition played a pivotal role in promoting the concept of mode as a central facet of metaphysics, contributing significantly to its evolution during the three-century period (ca. 1300–1600).

This paper aims to scrutinize the contributions of two influential figures within the Scotist tradition: Antoine Sirect and Antonio Trombetta. These scholars played crucial roles in shaping Early Modern Scotism. Antoine Sirect, a French Franciscan affiliated with the province of Tours, was active in the late fifteenth century. Although traditionally believed to have passed away around 1490, recent research suggests that he lived into the first decade of the sixteenth century.³ As a Master of Theology at the University of Paris, Sirect gained prominence for his *Formalitates moderniores*, published in 1484 and then multiple times in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. His significance is further underscored by the multitude of scholars who commented on his *Formalitates*, most notably Antonio Trombetta.

The Italian Franciscan Antonio Trombetta (1436–1517) taught both metaphysics and theology in Padua (first at the Franciscan *Studium*, then at the University) and further served his order as Provincial minister of the Province of S. Antonio; late in his life, he was made Bishop of Urbino and titular Archbishop of Athens.⁴ Trombetta wrote a commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and was active in the controversies of his time over the Averroistic theories of the soul.⁵ We are here concerned with his influential and widely printed treatise on formalities, first published in 1493 under the title *In tractatum formalitatum Scotticarum sententia*. Trombetta's treatise structurally mirrors Sirect's treatise and is

3 Only little is known about Sirect's life. His only extant work, the *Formalitates moderniores*, has not received the full scholarly attention it deserves. See, however, Bolliger, *Infiniti contemplatio*, 310–21. The present article, along with Claus A. Andersen's study in this volume, aims to contribute to a better appreciation of this work. For more details on Sirect's biography, see Andersen's article.

4 To date, one of the most complete studies on Trombetta is Marrone, *Realitas obiectiva*. Other general presentations can be found in Scapin, "La metafisica scotista a Padova dal XV al XVII secolo," 501–9; Poppi, "Lo scotista patavino Antonio Trombetta"; Mahoney, "Duns Scotus and the School of Padua around 1500." Other studies focusing on the Scotist themes of Trombetta's thought include Forlivesi, "Quae in hac quaestione tradit Doctor videntur humanum ingenium superare"; Forlivesi, "In Search of the Roots of Suárez's Conception of Metaphysics"; Poppi, "Una scheda sulla docenza pubblica di metafisica 'in via Scoti'."

5 See D'Angelo, "Obiezioni scotiste contro l'unicità dell'intelletto"; Poppi, "L'antiavverroismo nella scolastica padovana"; Mahoney, "Antonio Trombetta and Agostino Nifo on Averroes."

indeed, to a large extent, a critical commentary on this work and seems to have initiated a tradition of commentaries specifically focused on Sirect. At any rate, Trombetta's *Formalitates* represent the early stage of a tradition of cumulative commentaries, comprising a multilayered series of interpretations, where commentators reference Sirect through critical comments on other commentaries on the same text. The treatises on formalities by Sirect and Trombetta became essential readings and evolved into textbooks for those trained in the *via Scoti* during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Their influence, however, went beyond the Scotist tradition; their works were quoted by figures from the Jesuit school, who did not belong to the Formalist tradition.⁶

An important chapter of Sirect's and Trombetta's treatises on formalities was the notion of 'mode.' The concept of mode pertains to the elements that Sirect and Trombetta directly inherited from John Duns Scotus. Modes were a pivotal conceptual device of Scotus's metaphysics and theology, where they serve to harmonize the theory of the univocity of being with the qualification of God as infinite (*ens infinitum*).⁷ In the framework established by Scotus, infinity is not construed as a distinct entity added to the divine essence but rather as a *mode* of it. This perspective enabled Scotus to reject the idea of a real composition of essences when referring to attributes such as 'infinite being,' 'infinite wisdom,' or 'infinite love.' Scotus employed a compelling analogy involving the degree of color (whiteness) to elucidate the relationship between a mode and the thing of which it is a mode. According to Scotus, the degree of intensity of a shade of whiteness is not distinct from whiteness itself; instead, it is a mere 'mode' of whiteness, just like infinity is a mode of being in the case of God.⁸

Modes in Scotus's philosophy extend beyond considerations of finite or infinite being; they encompass various properties such as actuality, necessity, or possibility.⁹ Additionally, Scotus appeals to modes when discussing the way cate-

⁶ In particular, Pedro da Fonseca (1528–1599) and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) refer to Trombetta; see, e.g., Fonseca, *Commentaria in metaphysicorum Aristotelis libros*, V, cap. 6, q. 3, vol. 2, 365B; Francisco Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 6, sect. 6, n. 5, Opera omnia XXIV, 226a; disp. 7, sect. 2, n. 2, 262a; disp. 7, sect. 2, n. 15, 266b; disp. 32, sect. 2, n. 7, Opera omnia XXV, 321a. Both Sirect and Trombetta are referenced in the long discussion of the distinction between the divine attributes in Giulio Cesare Recupito, *Theologia, tractatus primus de Deo uno*, III, q. 4, 165–247. I thank Claus Andersen for the latter reference. For some later Jesuits interested in Formalist literature, see further Andersen, "Scientia formalitatum," 213–14.

⁷ Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 108, ed. Vat. 4, 202–3; n. 136, 221; n. 149, 227.

⁸ Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 138, ed. Vat. 4, 222.

⁹ Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 138, ed. Vat. 4, 222.

gories or species of one category (like quality) are distinct,¹⁰ and seems to be relying on the same idea when analyzing individuation, as seen in his discussions of 'gradus individualis' in the *Questions on the Metaphysics*.¹¹

However, the exact nature of the relationship between modes and what Scotus terms the 'formal distinction' remains enigmatic, partially due to the difficulties of interpretation raised by this formal distinction and the evolution of Scotus's own understanding of it.¹² While the modal distinction seems akin to the formal distinction, the precise interplay between the two is not entirely clear. Scotus never defines precisely what later came to be named the 'modal distinction,' nor does he ever use this terminology himself. For Scotus's followers, questions arose: Is the modal distinction encompassed within the formal distinction, constituting a subtype of it? Or does it represent a separate form of distinction, and if so, what are the exact relations between them?

These important questions prompted early Scotists in the first half of the fourteenth century to undertake the task of specifying the relations between these two types of distinctions – formal and modal – and between formalities and modes. In this paper, we will explore how Sirect and Trombetta engaged with and contributed to the understanding of modes within the Scotist tradition, inheriting and developing Scotus's complex framework, an aspect of their thought that has not received much scholarly attention.¹³

In examining the intricacies of Sirect's and Trombetta's treatments of modes, this study will follow a comparative approach. Instead of presenting successive accounts of each philosopher's views, we will undertake a simultaneous exploration of their responses to specific questions raised by modes. This approach of setting up their views face to face will foster a more precise understanding of the lively debates within the Scotist tradition in the late fifteenth century.

The following sections will analyze how Sirect and Trombetta addressed specific problems associated with modes. Section 1 focuses on our authors' respective responses to the fundamental question of how to define them, probing

10 Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q. 36, nn. 35–36, *Opera philosophica* 1, 482–83; n. 49, 486.

11 Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, VII, q. 13 nn. 133–38, *Opera philosophica* 4, 264–66.

12 See Wolter, "The Formal Distinction;" Grajewski, *The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus*. For more recent studies, see Cross, "Duns Scotus on Essence and Existence;" Thornton, "From Theology through Metaphysics to Logic;" Dumont, "Duns Scotus's Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction."

13 Some aspects of Trombetta's views on modes are discussed in Marrone, *Realitas obiectiva*, 35–86. A systematic comparison between Sirect and Trombetta has never been undertaken but a few comments on Trombetta's critical discussion of Sirect's views on modes can be found in Poppi, "Il contributo dei formalisti padovani," 690–93.

into their ontological status and the methods employed to characterize them. Section 2 treats the typology of modes and distinctions put forward by Sirect and Trombetta, before we look at the place of modes in their general typologies of distinctions in section 3. Section 4 explores the divergent perspectives of Sirect and Trombetta on the relations between modes and the hierarchical order among them. This dual examination of Sirect and Trombetta shall finally enable us to draw some conclusions regarding the lively debates within the shared general framework of the late fifteenth-century Formalist tradition.

1. Definitional Problems

Sirect and Trombetta, both immersed in the Scotist tradition that had been flourishing since the fourteenth century, share a common ground in their general definition of ‘mode.’ The foundation of their definition draws from a few remarks left by Scotus on intrinsic modes in *Ordinatio* I, dist. 8, where the Subtle Doctor emphasized that a mode does not add any quidditative content on top of the thing it modifies, or more precisely, does not ‘destroy’ the nature of what it affects.¹⁴ On the basis of these scarce elements found in Scotus, seeking to explain his view and to clarify this ‘non-destructive’ character of modes, the early Scotists of the fourteenth century like Francis of Meyronnes, who seems to have initially formulated it, or Nicolas Bonet, had proposed the following definition: a mode is “that which, being added to something, does not change its formal *ratio*” (*qui additus alteri non variat rationem formalem*).¹⁵

Sirect and Trombetta both accept this definition.¹⁶ This shared understanding, however, is nuanced by their recognition of the need to rectify potential misinterpretations of this definition. Indeed, despite its historical precedence and

¹⁴ Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 4, n. 192, ed. Vat. 4, 261: “Infinitas enim non destruit formalem rationem illius cui additur, quia in quocumque gradu intelligatur esse aliqua perfectio (qui tamen ‘gradus’ est gradus illius perfectionis), non tollitur formalis ratio illius perfectionis propter istum gradum, et ita si non includit formaliter ‘ut in communi, in communi’, nec ‘ut infinitum, infinitum.’” The term ‘variat’ appears in the parallel passage of Scotus’s *Lectura* (I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 4, n. 175, ed. Vat. 17, 63).

¹⁵ Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus*, dist. 8, q. 5, 49rbE: “Ideo dico quod modus intrinsecus est qui adveniens alicui non variat rationem formalem eius vel recedens ab eo non variatur ratio, sicut patet in albedine et eius gradibus.” I thank Claus A. Andersen for pointing out to me that Francis of Meyronnes is probably the first to use this definition later taken up by other Scotists. On this, see Möhle, *Formalitas und modus intrinsecus*, 316–17, where a list of other Scotists accepting this definition can be found. See also Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 435–41, and the references therein. For Bonetus, see William Duba’s contribution to this present volume.

¹⁶ Antonius Sirectus, *Formalitates moderniores*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 24v; Antonius Trombetta, *In tractatum formalitatum Scoti sententia*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 9vb.

widespread adoption, this definition is not without its inherent ambiguities. The challenge lies in the lack of clarity regarding the scope and sense of the non-varying character of modes.

1.1 Sirect

Sirect deals with this point in the second article of his *Formalitates*, dedicated to elucidating the type of distinction he calls “in the nature of things” (*ex natura rei*).¹⁷ We will return to this shortly. Sirect adds an important precision to the definition according to which a mode is something that does not change the formal *ratio* of the thing to which it is added. He writes:

However, an intrinsic mode according to Scotus, in distinction 8 of the first [book of the *Sentences*], question 4, is what, added to a thing or removed from it, does not change the formal *ratio* of the [thing] constituted by it (*constituti per ipsum*), that is, what by itself (*de se*) does not have a formal *ratio*. An intrinsic mode, indeed, cannot be conceived in itself (*per se*), because it is only conceived together with the thing of which it is a mode.¹⁸

Like most thinkers pertaining to the Scotist tradition who reflected on modes (with notable exceptions like Petrus Thomae), Sirect believes that a mode cannot be conceived independently of the thing of which it is a mode.¹⁹ A mode is not only conceived with respect to another thing but what defines a mode is its particular way of doing so: a mode is added to a thing with which it is conceived, but it does not affect its formal nature.

However, it is important to specify that what remains unchanged in its formal nature is not the entity possessing or receiving a mode, but the entity insofar as it possesses this mode. In clearer terms, it refers to the *sum* of the entity and

17 On Sirect's typology of distinctions, cf. Claus A. Andersen's contribution in this volume.

18 Sirectus, *Formalitates*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 24v: “Est autem modus intrinsecus secundum Scotum 8 d., prima, q. 4 *Sententiarum*, qui additus alteri non variat rationem formalem constituti per ipsum vel remotus ab illo, id est, qui de se nullam rationem formalem dicit. Modus enim intrinsecus est inconceptibilis per se, quia non concipitur nisi cum illo cuius est modus.”

19 Petrus Thomae seems to have been one of the few exceptions to this consensual rule. In a question he devotes to intrinsic modes, he argues that a mode possesses its own concept through which it can be conceived independently of the thing of which it is a mode. See Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de modis distinctionis sive distinctionum*, q. 11, Città del Vaticano, BAV, Ms. Latin 2190, 110r: “Quinto quod non videtur verum dictum quorundam quod modus intrinsecus est qui non habet proprium conceptum praecisibilem ab illo cuius est <modus>, quia immo habet proprium conceptum secundum quem potest concipi non concepta re cuius est <modus>.” On Petrus Thomae's theory of modes, see Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*, 118–24; Ivanov, “Petrus Thomae: An Early Follower of Duns Scotus”; Ivanov, “Metaphysics of a Forgotten Tradition”; Smith, “Introduction,” cii–ciii. See further Vitaly Ivanov's contribution to this present volume.

its mode. Sirect emphasizes this by stating that what remains unchanged in its formal nature is the *constitutum*, i. e., what is constituted by the entity along with its mode.

The significance of this precision lies in Sirect's insistence on the distinction between two types of properties that both determine an essence: modes and specific differences. Both types of properties are added to an essence, but they do so in different ways. The key difference lies in whether they modify what they constitute. According to Sirect, a specific difference alters the quidditative content of the genus it determines, changing what the genus is by introducing an additional specification. For instance, when the genus 'animality' is complemented by a specific difference like rationality, it gains more quidditative determination and undergoes a change in its quidditative *ratio*. Modes also modify the quidditative *ratio* of the entity to which they are added. For example, the mode of infinity in an infinite being changes the pure quiddity of that being which it determines. But while modes change the 'quidditative' *ratio* of what they constitute, they do not change its 'formal' *ratio*:

Secondly, a mode differs from a difference because an intrinsic mode only changes the quidditative *ratio*, understanding by 'quidditative *ratio*' the quidditative concept of the thing to which [the mode] is added or by which it is conceived. A difference, however, changes the quidditative and formal *ratio*, and this is the meaning of Scotus's saying that an intrinsic mode is that which, when added to something else, does not change the formal *ratio*. For he does not say that [a mode] does not change the quidditative *ratio*, but that it does not change the formal *ratio*, since it can certainly change the quidditative [*ratio*], as is obvious with infinity or finitude, which do change the quidditative *ratio* or concept of being itself.²⁰

Readers familiar with Scotist literature on essences, quiddities, and formalities might find this perspective surprising. While Scotus's brief remarks on modes made it clear that modes do not alter the nature of what they affect (e. g., a particular intensity of whiteness does not change the intrinsic nature of whiteness), Sirect contends that both modes and specific differences modify the formal *rationes* of the entities they affect. The central distinction, necessitating the defini-

²⁰ Sirectus, *Formalitates*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 25r: "Secundo differunt modus intrinsecus et differentia, quia modus intrinsecus variat solum rationem quidditativam, accipiendo rationem quidditativam pro conceptu quidditativo illius cui additur sive contracti per ipsum. Differentia vero variat rationem quidditativam et formalem, et sic intelligitur dictum Scoti, quod modus intrinsecus est qui additus alteri non variat rationem formalem. Non enim dicit quod non variat rationem quidditativam sed formalem, quia quidditativa bene potest variare, ut patet de finitate et infinitate quae variant rationem seu conceptu quidditativum ipsius entis." Similar remarks at 29v. Note that Sirect, like many other authors, attributes Meyronnes's definition of 'intrinsic mode' to Scotus; see the references in footnote 15 (in particular, Andersen, *Meta-physik im Barockscotismus*, 435–36).

tional precision about modes, is that modes do not alter the entire entity that they constitute (the sum of the entity *with* its mode). This difference is grounded, conceptually speaking, on a distinction between quidditative and formal *rationes*.

To take an example, following what Sirect seems to have in mind, in a whiteness of degree 6, the intensity of 6 degrees affects and changes whiteness as such and, so, changes its 'quidditative *ratio*.' However, this degree of intensity does *not* change the formal definition of what is composed of whiteness and this intensity, since this particular shade of whiteness remains whiteness. For Sirect, the main difference between modes and specific differences lies in the fact that a genus is a potential reality actualized by an actual one (the specific difference), and that these two realities come to compose a third one possessing a formal *ratio* distinct from them. This is so, because in the case of a composition of genus and specific difference, both realities bring a formal *ratio* in the constitution of the compound essence. This is not the type of relation existing between a mode and its thing which, while being a type of composition, is not a composition between two realities.

1.2 Trombetta

In his treatise, Trombetta adopts the structure of Sirect's *Formalitates*, meticulously examining each issue and argument presented by Sirect. Trombetta dedicates considerable attention to the discussion of modes, surpassing the length of Sirect's treatment. He elaborates on and critically evaluates the various properties ascribed to modes by Sirect, offering a more extensive and in-depth analysis of this aspect. Like Sirect, Trombetta believes that a mode cannot be conceived independently of the thing of which it is a mode.²¹

According to Trombetta, we can say in a sense that a mode is formally identical with the thing of which it is a mode, insofar as it does not have any other formal nature; however, in another sense, a mode is not formally identical with it because, strictly speaking, it does not have any formal nature at all. This subtle point can be summarized by saying that a mode is formally identical with the thing of which it is a mode, although *negatively* and not positively – a distinction which Mastri later takes up, as seen in the citation opening this study.²² Trombetta also feels the need to bring precisions to the traditional definition of

21 Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 10rb. Let me note that Giovanni Battista Chiodini, who authored a treatise on intrinsic modes in the early seventeenth century, attributes to Trombetta the view that a mode can be defined independently of its 'modatum.' I have failed to notice anything in Trombetta's treatise in support of this reading; see Ioannes Baptista Chiodinus, *Lumen doctrinae Scoti fulgentissimum, De modis intrinsecis*, q. 8, 33a.

22 Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 10ra.

modes relying on the non-variation criterion. At first glance, he seems to fully agree with Sirect, as suggested by the almost identical formulation he provides in the second article of his treatise:

It must be noted that when an intrinsic mode is defined as that which, being added to or leaving a thing, does not change its formal *ratio*, it should not be understood that it does not change the formal *ratio* of the thing it is added to, but of what is composed by this degree and the thing it is added to. This can be proved because, if it were interpreted as the formal *ratio* of the thing to which [the mode] is added, it would follow that there would be no difference between an intrinsic mode and an essential difference, since it is certain that the essential difference that is added to a genus does not change its formal *ratio*, just as rationality does not change the formal *ratio* of animality.²³

As can be seen from this excerpt, this proviso is also meant here to differentiate modes and specific differences, just like in Sirect's analysis.²⁴ But there the resemblance ends. For Trombetta, this proviso is not necessary because modes and specific differences equally change the quidditative *ratio* of the thing they affect. Quite on the contrary, it is precisely meant to differentiate modes and specific differences because, while they do not change the quidditative *ratio* of what they determine, specific differences do modify the quidditative *ratio* of the thing they constitute:

From this distinction, a few Scotists say that an intrinsic mode changes the quidditative *ratio* alone, and not the quidditative and formal *ratio*, which is indeed constituted, as it is said, by a 'what' and a 'how' (*ex quid et quale*). I do not hold this opinion, for I say that a mode does not change any quidditative *ratio*.²⁵

By 'this distinction,' Trombetta refers to the distinction between the quidditative *ratio* alone (*ratio quidditativa tantum*) and the quidditative and formal *ratio*. The quidditative *ratio* only contains what is predicated *in quid*, that is, 'what' is included in the essential definition of the thing. By contrast, the formal *ratio* contains a concept predicated *in quale*, i.e., expressing 'how' a thing is, without de-

²³ Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 9vb: "Tertio est notandum quod, quando diffinitur gradus intrinsecus quod est ille qui, adveniens vel descendens a re, non variat rationem eius formalem, non habet intelligi quod non variat rationem formalem illius cui advenit, sed constituti per ipsum gradum, et per illud cui advenit. Quod probatur, quia si intelligeret tantum de ratione formali illius cui advenit, sequeretur quod gradus intrinsecus et differentia essentialis non different, quia certum est quod differentia essentialis adveniens generi non variat rationem formalem eius, sicut rationalitas non variat rationem formalem animalis."

²⁴ Sirectus, *Formalitates*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 24v–25r.

²⁵ Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 12rb: "Ex qua distinctione nonnulli Scotistae dicunt quod modus intrinsecus variat rationem formalem, quae videlicet est constituta, ut dictum est, ex quid et quale, quam opinionem, ut dictum est, ego non teneo, quia dico modum nullam rationem quidditativam variare."

noting a separate quiddity. Specific differences, such as ‘rational’ (i.e., when predicated *in concreto*), are predicated *in quale*, expressing ‘how’ a genus is determined.

It follows from this distinction, drawing on a difference between *in quid* and *in quale* predicates central to the Scotist theory of the univocity of being, that a specific difference changes the quidditative difference of the thing it constitutes since it is an essential component of this thing. For instance, humanity cannot remain humanity without rationality. That Trombetta thinks here of specific differences rather than individual differences (or haecceities) seems clear as the example he provides is an example of a specific difference.

In summary, Antoine Sirect and Antonio Trombetta exhibit differences in the way to explain the definition of modes, despite sharing the same formulation of it. Sirect grants to modes a greater ontological weight by claiming their modifying effect on the quiddity of their subject. On the contrary, Trombetta asserts that a mode never alters the essence of what it determines, be it defined as a ‘formal’ or ‘quidditative’ *ratio*. The reasons underlying these divergences as to the effect of modes will become clearer as we delve deeper into the nature of modes and their types.

2. Typology of Modes and Distinctions

Sirect’s and Trombetta’s treatises bear important similarities to the Pseudo-Mayronian *Treatise on Formalities* (*Tractatus formalitatum secundum doctrinam Francisci Mayronis*), although the exact relations between the Pseudo-Mayronian treatise, whose exact context of redaction is still unknown, and those of Sirect and Trombetta are difficult to assess with precision.²⁶ This treatise presents a classification of nine distinct *genera* of modes: 1) finitude, 2) infinity, 3) act, 4) potency, 5) necessary, 6) contingent, 7) existence, 8) reality, 9) haecceity.

The attempt to provide a list of types or ‘genera’ of modes was not uncommon in the Scotist tradition, as Francis of Meyronnes, who probably inspired the author behind the Pseudo-Mayronian treatise regarding these genera of modes, proposed such a list in his *Conflatus*, for instance.²⁷ Both Sirect and Trombetta refrain from offering such a classification. Sirect, in particular, contents himself with giving a few examples, namely ‘infinity,’ ‘necessity,’ ‘eternity,’ and ‘existence’ in the case of God, and ‘act and potency,’ ‘contingence,’ ‘intension and remission’ and ‘others’ in the case of creatures.²⁸

²⁶ See though the remarks on this treatise in Claus A. Andersen’s contribution to this present volume.

²⁷ Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus*, dist. 8, q. 5, 49rb–va.

²⁸ Sirectus, *Formalitates*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 24v. For the difference between Sirect, Francis of Meyronnes and the Pseudo-Meyronnes, see Bolliger, *Infiniti contemplatio*, 310. See also An-

The approach prompts speculation as to the reasons behind Sirect and Trombetta's avoidance to organize modes in a more systematic way. One observation may help explain this fact. Both Sirect and Trombetta emphasize the fundamental characteristic of a mode as lacking quiddity or formal *ratio*.²⁹ They firmly reject the idea that a mode inherits the formality of the thing it affects and possess a positive formal nature. It may be conjectured that this emphasis on the absence of formal content proper to modes led them to set aside a type of classification into what the Pseudo-Mayronian *Formalities* calls 'genera,' since modes cannot be conceived as genera subdivided by differences, strictly speaking.

We can nevertheless note that, although they agree on the lack of formal content proper to modes, in line with the most prevalent conception of modes in the Scotist tradition, Sirect and Trombetta do not propose the same interpretations of earlier authors of this tradition. Sirect attributes to Landulph Caracciolo (ca. 1275–1351) the view according to which a mode like 'infinity' is (positively) formally identical with the thing of which it is a mode, in the sense that it is formally included in its essence. This interpretation of Landulph, which could have significant implications on the typology of modes, is rejected by Trombetta.³⁰ A close reading of Caracciolo reveals that Trombetta's interpretation is more faithful to what the fourteenth-century Franciscan said. Despite a terminology slightly different from that of Sirect and Trombetta, Caracciolo claimed indeed that infinity, in the case of God, is distinct from the divine essence as its degree.³¹ At any rate, Sirect's and Trombetta's views do not significantly depart

dersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 444–45, who compares this list with others found in earlier and later Scotists.

²⁹ Sirectus, *Formalitates*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 24v–25r; Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 9vb–10ra.

³⁰ Sirectus, *Formalitates*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 24v; Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 11ra. On Sirect and Trombetta's disagreements concerning Landulphus, see Poppi, "Il contributo dei formalisti padovani," 691.

³¹ Cf. Landulphus Caracciolus, *Commentarium in quattuor libros Sententiarum*, prol., q. 1, art. 3 (Dole, Médiathèque du Grand Dole, Ms. 14MS/G/3 (80)), 4rb–va: "Secunda conclusio, quod infinitas et essentia non sunt idem ex natura rei. Primo, quandocumque aliquae duae rationes adaequant totaliter sua fundamenta, si relationes non sunt idem ex natura rei, et per consequens nec fundamenta sunt idem totaliter ex natura rei. Sed identitas et aequalitas adaequant totaliter rationem suorum fundamentorum, videlicet essentialium infinitarum cum ergo identitas non sit aequalitas ex natura rei in divinis, sequitur quod aliquo modo non infinitas ex natura rei. [...] Si obiciatur quod infinitas est gradus intrinsecus ipsius essentiae et per consequens de eius intrinseca et quiditativa ratione dico quod verum est quia volo quod infinitas sit non idem essentiae quiditativa sed dico quod est non idem sicut gradus intrinsecus est non idem ei cuius est gradus intrinsecus et hoc est ex natura rei." Francisco Pitigiani d'Arezzo, in his own exposition of Sirect's *Formalitates*, also notes that Trombetta's reading is fairer to Landulph than Sirect's; cf. Franciscus Arretinus, *Expositio*, a. 2, art. par. 2, com. 19, 188r. On Lan-

from the teachings on the intrinsic nature of modes that were dominant in the Scotist tradition. That being said, their perspectives exhibit greater originality in their integration of modes into the broader typology of distinctions they recognize, as well as in their utilization of key distinctions to address the challenges posed by modes, as we shall see in the next section.

2.1 Specific vs. Individual Modes

Despite not offering a classification of modes strictly speaking, a key distinction between distinct types of modes can be found in Trombetta's treatise. Trombetta makes a distinction between two main types of modes:

To understand how an intrinsic mode cannot be conceived independently from a thing, it must be noted that some modes stem from the specific nature and quiddity, while others stem from individual being. An example of the first type is the quantity of perfection that stems from the specific nature of whiteness, insofar as it is whiteness, which can be demonstrated of this very nature of whiteness, abstracted from all individual being. Other modes stem from individual and singular being, and in this way we say that the intension and attenuation of forms capable of being intensified or attenuated are their intrinsic modes and degrees, with respect to individual being. Therefore, some blackness of degree 4 according to its individual degree is more perfect and more intense than some whiteness at degree 2, although the whiteness at degree 2 is said to be more perfect and more intense by its essential intrinsic degree.³²

According to Trombetta, there are two types of modes. First, there are modes stemming from specific natures. These modes include for example the quantity of perfection proper to an essence, such as whiteness *qua* species. Secondly, there are modes stemming from particular individuals. These modes include for ins-

dulph's reception of Scotus's theory of modes and degrees, see Suarez-Nani, "Nature spécifique, degrés et modes intrinsèques."

³² Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 10rb: "Pro intelligentia quomodo modus intrinsecus non sit per conceptibilis sine re, cuius est modus, advertendum quod quidam modus insequitur naturam specificam et quiditatem, quidam vero insequitur esse individuale. Exemplum primi, quantitas perfectionalis, que insequitur naturam specificam albedinis ut albedo est, est modus intrinsecus eius demonstrabilis de ipsa natura albedinis, ut abstrahit ab omni esse individuali, quia considerando naturam albedinis secundum se et in esse quiditativo, albedo est perfectior nigredine. Est et alius, qui insequitur esse individuale et singulare, et isto modo nos dicimus, quia intensio et remissio in forma intensibili et remissibili est modus et gradus intrinsecus eius quantum ad esse individuale. Unde nigredo, ut 4 secundum gradum individuale (hoc est, qui insequitur ipsam in esse individuali) est perfectior et intensior albedine ut duo, licet albedo ut duo dicatur esse perfectior et intensior gradu intrinseco essentiali insequente naturam albedinis ut albedo est."

tance the particular degree of intensity characteristic of an individual instance, such as the unique shade of whiteness exhibited by a specific object.

This distinction serves to illustrate the fact that one and the same entity may possess seemingly contradictory properties when viewed through the lens of individual or specific modes. Whiteness under a particular individual degree may be less intense than blackness under a particular individual degree; however, whiteness as a species remains more perfect or intense as a species than blackness. The two types of modes – specific and individual – cannot exist independently from the common substrate of the entity itself.

Trombetta introduces this distinction to explain why a mode as such cannot be conceived independently from that of which it is a mode. He does not posit any difference between the two types of modes in this respect. Both specific and individual modes are unconceivable without their subject. However, this distinction was not unique to Trombetta, as can be gleaned from later commentaries on Sirect and Trombetta, like that of Francesco Pitigiani d'Arezzo (ca. 1533–1616), which is one of the longest samples of this 'Formalist' literature. We learn from this work that other Scotists active in this period employed the same distinction to differentiate further the different natures and effects of modes.³³

It becomes clear from these other testimonies what this distinction is supposed to explain with respect to the conceivability of modes. For instance, Paul Scriptor, whose *Lectura super quaestiones Scoti in primum et secundum librum Sententiarum* was first printed in 1498, underlines that this distinction enables an understanding of how a thing can be conceived without its mode, rather than the other way around. Some whiteness can be conceived without a particular degree but it cannot be conceived without its specific degree. According to Scriptor, when a particular whiteness is conceived together with its particular degree, *this* whiteness is conceived confusedly, whereas whiteness as a property common to all white things is conceived distinctly.³⁴ Without appealing to any difference between specific and individual modes, Sirect holds the same view in his *Formalitates* but he mainly underlines the 'loss of information' happening when a par-

33 Franciscus Arretinus, *Expositio*, a. 2, art. par. 2, com. 17 (two sections are numbered as 'Comment. XVII,' this is the first one), 176v. See similarly Iacobinus Malafossus, *Super primum Sententiarum*, dist. 8, q. 3, 186va–b.

34 Paulus Scriptor, *Lectura I*, dist. 8, q. 2, ed. 1505, 97rb: "Secundo notandum quod modus intrinsecus est duplex, scilicet proprius speciei, et proprius individui, ut cum video hanc albedinem possum intelligere albedinem sine proprio gradu huius albedinis, sed non possum intelligere sine gradu specifico, nam secundum Scotum omnis species in universo habet proprium gradum perfectionis inter species. Tertio notandum impossibile est rem talem concipi sine suo modo, licet possit concipi sine modo quem habet in inferiori ut albedo potest concipi sine modo huius albedinis et tunc hec albedo concipitur confuse, licet albedo in communi concipiat distincte."

ticular whiteness is conceived without its individual degree, in which case it is conceived imperfectly.³⁵

Interestingly, we can also learn from these later testimonies that the distinction between individual and specific modes served to bring further nuances to the debate already mentioned around the non-variation clause essential to the definition of modes.³⁶ Francesco Licheto (ca. 1450–1520), in particular, asserts that while individual modes do not change the nature of that which they affect, specific modes do so. For instance, seemingly identifying specific modes with specific differences, Licheto claims that the perfectional degree proper to humanity qua humanity changes its nature, since this perfectional degree constitutes humanity as a particular species, which would be of a different nature without it.³⁷ We can see here that the notion of ‘specific mode’ is taken in a quite different sense, leading to different conclusions in regard to its theoretical function.

Giovanni Vigerio, active in the sixteenth century, and Giacomino Malafossa († 1563), also known as Bargius, employ a similar distinction between two types of modes and defend the view – opposite to the one held by Sirect and Trombetta – that modes change the nature of the *constitutum*.³⁸ Vigerio, in particular, defends a position exactly opposite to Trombetta by claiming that a mode does not change what it affects, but only what it constitutes.

We can thus see how Trombetta’s distinction between two types of modes constitute a technical device that could be employed in different ways to build divergent accounts of the functions of modes. Trombetta did not – no more than his contemporaries – invent this distinction, which can be traced back at least to Francis of Meyronnes’s similar distinction between two types (specific

35 Sirectus, *Formalitates*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 25r: “Quando intelligitur aliqua realitas cum suo modo intrinseco ille conceptus non est ita simpliciter simplex quin possit concipi illa realitas absque modo isto, sed tunc est conceptus imperfectus illius rei, potest etiam concipi cum illo modo, et tunc est perfectus conceptus illius rei. Exemplum si esset albedo in 8 gradu intensionis, quantumcumque esset simplex omnino in re, posset tamen concipi sub ratione albedinis tante, et tunc perfecte conciperetur conceptu adequato ipsi rei, vel posset concipi precise sub ratione albedinis, et tunc conciperetur conceptu imperfecto et deficiente a perfectione rei.”

36 Arretinus, *Expositio*, a. 2, art. par. 2, com. 17, 172r–v.

37 Franciscus Lichetus, *Super primo Sententiarum*, dist. 2, q. 1, 42rb: “Alii sunt gradus perfectionales specfici id est ultimate constituentes aliquid in esse specifico, ut ultima differentia hominis, et si illi ultime differentie adderetur unus alius gradus specficus vel ipsi homini, iam non esset homo sed alia species perfectior homine. Isti enim gradus semper variant species quibus adveniunt [...]” See further *ibid.*, dist. 8, q. 2, 135ra, 140rb. Licheto is aware of the problems raised by his identification of specific modes with differences; see 131va–133va.

38 Iohannes Vigerius, *Super primo libro Sententiarum*, dist. 8, q. 3, 126va; cf. also *ibid.*, 127rb, and dist. 3, q. 3, 91va; Iacobinus Malafossus, *Super primum Sententiarum*, dist. 8, q. 3, 187raA.

vs. individual) of degrees or modes.³⁹ But these divergent ways of employing this standard distinction show that Trombetta's own use of it echoes ongoing discussions in Scotist circles regarding its potential applications for alternative accounts of the roles of modes.

2.2 The Sevenfold Distinction

Sirect's and Trombetta's classification of the modal distinction within the broader framework of types of distinctions bears notable similarities to the Pseudo-Mayronian *Treatise on Formalities*. This treatise, in fact a blend of insights from various Scotist sources, including Francis of Meyronnes and Petrus Thomae, offers a sevenfold typology of distinctions inherited from this latter author. The exact same typology is found in Sirect's and Trombetta's treatises. In order of increasing robustness, the different distinctions acknowledged by Sirect and Trombetta are: 1) distinction of reason, 2) distinction *ex natura rei*, 3) formal distinction, 4) real distinction, 5) essential distinction, 6) distinction *se totis subiective*, 7) distinction *se totis obiective*.

A reader well-versed in the Scotist tradition and the types of distinction commonly encountered within the expansive Formalitates literature will find it unsurprising to find Petrus Thomae's famous typology in this context. Peter's typology has long been acknowledged as a primary source of inspiration for subsequent typologies of distinctions, underscoring its enduring influence on philosophical discourse within the Scotist tradition.⁴⁰

An important observation is here in order. Both Sirect's and Trombetta's understanding of this sevenfold typology diverge from the original meaning of this typology in Peter's *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*, where it originates from. Recent work has shown how in Peter's original view, the seven types of distinctions are not seven items equally placed on the same level but ordered types of distinctions, some of which are more general than others.⁴¹ All types of distinctions can be divided according to the most general division between distinctions of reason and distinction in the nature of things (*ex natura rei*). Distinctions *ex natura rei* can be divided into the three next types (real, formal, essential), and the last of these types (the essential distinction) can be subdivided into distinction *se totis subiective* and distinction *se totis obiective*.

39 Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus*, dist. 18, q. 1, 72raD: "Apparet enim mihi quod oportet ponere duos modos intrinsecos in quacumque forma augmentabili et diminuibili, unus sequitur rationem specificam, alius sequitur gradus individuales." On this distinction and its origins, see also Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 430–31.

40 Hübener, "Robertus Anglicus," 336 and 339.

41 On this, see Andersen, "Introduction," 111–77.

By contrast, both Sirect and Trombetta see this typology as enumerating a list of distinctions placed on the same level, and do not regard this list as ordered into types. The seven types of distinctions are presented as a series of distinctions ordered according to their degree of robustness. This claim entails some complexity in the way these distinctions relate to one another. In particular, Sirect and Trombetta struggle to explain in what sense a stronger type of distinction allows to deduce a lesser type of distinction (for instance how, if two things are really distinct, it follows that they are also formally distinct), a rule following from the hierarchy of distinctions.⁴² At any rate, this particular understanding of Peter's sevenfold typology of distinctions, showing that Sirect and Trombetta probably did not have direct access to Peter's *Tractatus brevis*, confirms Claus A. Andersen's observation that this typology was handed down anonymously in the later Scotist tradition while undergoing distortions.⁴³ We will see, however, that Trombetta demonstrates clear awareness of the original meaning of the expression 'distinction *ex natura rei*' and differentiates two possible meanings for this expression, one of which is in line with its identification with a general *type* of distinction.

3. Nature and Name of the Modal Distinction

With this typology in mind, we are now in a better position to understand how Sirect and Trombetta envision the precise place of modes in the order of distinctions. Both of them choose to locate a special 'modal distinction,' corresponding to the distinction existing between a mode and that of which it is mode, in place of the distinction *ex natura rei*. The reasons for doing so are not explicitly stated but it is likely that Sirect and Trombetta sought to grant a special status to a 'modal distinction,' which had been proposed by different thinkers pertaining to the Scotist tradition, including Francis of Meyronnes whom Sirect and Trombetta often quote.⁴⁴ In the Mayronian classification of distinctions, the modal distinction was presented as the least type of distinction *ex natura rei*, holding not between two quiddities like the formal distinction, but rather between a quiddity and a mode.⁴⁵ However, when compared to the rational distinction, the modal distinction held an intermediary position with respect to the formal distinction, being a stronger type of distinction than the rational one (since it exists outside

⁴² Sirectus, *Formalitates*, art. 3, art. part. 2, 28v; Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 3, art. part. 2, 19vb; see also anonymous Pseudo-Mayronis, *Tractatus formalitatum*, 265raD–rbF.

⁴³ Andersen, "Introduction," 251.

⁴⁴ Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus*, dist. 8, q. 2, 43vbO. On Meyronnes's theory of modes, see Möhle, *Formalitas und modus intrinsecus*, 286–336; Caird, *The Doctrine of Quiddities and Modes*, vol. 1; Suarez-Nani, "Nature spécifique."

⁴⁵ Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus*, dist. 8, q. 2, 43vbO.

the mind), but involving a less robust term than the formal distinction. Although they follow a similar syncretic approach as regards the place of modes in the general typology of distinction, Sirect's and Trombetta's positions present notable differences and deserve to be presented separately.

3.1 Sirect

Sirect thinks that the distinction between a quiddity and its mode represents a special type of distinction. This position was not universally accepted by late fifteenth-century Scotists. To mention but just one example, Peter Tartaret (ca. 1460–1522) is inclined to reduce the modal distinction to the formal distinction and claims that a mode adds a 'reality' to the thing of which it is a mode.⁴⁶

Sirect undertakes to merge the sevenfold typology of distinction inherited from Petrus Thomae with a Mayronian-like perspective granting a special place to the modal distinction.⁴⁷ He identifies the 'modal distinction' within the distinction *ex natura rei* considered as one particular type of distinction. As will shortly appear, Trombetta makes a similar move. The main difference between Sirect and Trombetta on this point concerns the *name* to be given to this distinction. Sirect believes that the name 'distinction *ex natura rei*' is best suited for this type of distinction:

From what has been said I conclude that a quiddity and its intrinsic mode, intrinsic modes between themselves, and all things falling in the direct order of categories are distinct from one another in the nature of things (*ex natura rei*). And, similarly, being with respect to God and creatures and, in short, every thing constituted with respect to its constitution, is distinct from them independently from any operation of the intellect and not by a real distinction, taking 'real distinction' strictly, [but] therefore by a distinction in between the distinction of reason and the real distinction. I call this middle distinction a 'distinction in the nature of the thing' (*ex natura rei*), which, as evident from the very term, can only be denied by a brazen mind, although Francis [of Meyronnes] called it a modal distinction, naming it by reference to something less noble and imperfect.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Petrus Tartaretus, *Expositio, In lib. praed.*, 19vb.

⁴⁷ On Sirect's theory of distinctions, see Claus A. Andersen's contribution in this volume; cf. also, on some aspects of his conception of the rational distinction, Knebel, "Entre logique mentaliste et métaphysique conceptualiste."

⁴⁸ Sirectus, *Formalitates*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 25r: "Ex predictis infero quod quidditas et eius modus intrinsecus et modi intrinseci adinvicem, et omnia quae sunt in recta linea praedicalmentali distinguuntur ex natura rei abinvicem. Et similiter ens a Deo et creatura et breviter quodlibet constitutum a suo constituto, omnia enim ista distinguuntur secluso operatione intellectus et non distinctione reali proprie capiendi distinctionem realem, ergo aliqua distinctione media inter distinctionem rationis et realem isto modo sumptam. Hanc distinctionem mediam voco ex natura rei, quae ut patet ex vi vocabuli, nisi a protervo, negari non potest, licet

This passage calls for several comments. The first is that it clearly shows how Sirect seeks to integrate Francis of Meyronnes's modal distinction into the sevenfold typology of distinction, while he reconfigures this typology by eliminating the notion of *types* of distinctions. Secondly, this distinction *ex natura rei* is presented as intermediary between a real distinction and a distinction of reason. The distinction *ex natura rei* therefore represents what others would call a *distinctio media*. However, Sirect is adamant on the mind-independent character of this distinction. This is why he insists that it is located between the distinction of reason and the real distinction *strictly speaking*, i.e., when considering the real distinction as implying the real separability of the relata. Without doubt, Sirect sees the distinction *ex natura rei* as belonging to the real distinction taken in the broad sense, i.e., as referring to a distinction independent from all intellectual operations.

3.2 Trombetta

Trombetta's take on the distinction *ex natura rei* is different. He shares Sirect's understanding of the distinction *ex natura rei* as the least type of distinction existing independently of the mind but, at the same time, he is willing to maintain the classificatory meaning of the distinction *ex natura rei* as a general type of distinction, following its original signification within Petrus Thomae's typology.⁴⁹ Unsurprisingly, his solution consists in distinguishing two meanings for this distinction, one of which corresponds to a type (*genus*) of distinction covering all the distinctions holding independently of the intellect, the other corresponding to Sirect's distinction *ex natura rei*, i.e., the least possible distinction existing outside the mind.⁵⁰ Trombetta at times takes the distinction *ex natura*

distinctionem inter modum et quidditatem Franciscus modalem appellaverit tanquam a denominatione imperfectiori et ignobiliori."

49 Poppi, "Il contributo dei formalisti padovani," 698, footnote 32, focuses on the latter sense of this distinction in Trombetta, where the distinction *ex natura rei* is seen as a general type of distinction that comprises the formal, real, and essential ones.

50 Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 12va: "Notandum etiam quod distinctio ex natura rei potest accipi ut quoddam genus ad omnes species distinctionum que sunt praeter opus intellectus, et sic accipiendo, unaquaeque distinctio sive formalis, sive realis, sive essentialis, est distinctio ex natura rei, quia genus convenit suis speciebus, et praedicatur de illis. Alio modo capitur distinctio ex natura rei, ut est species distinctionis in communi, quae est praeter opus intellectus, et isto modo est species condistincta et disperata contra omnes alias species, sic quod distinctio ut formalis est non est distinctio ex natura rei in quantum talis, quia ut dictum est, ab alia ratione accipitur una distinctio et ab alia alia."

rei in the first sense but most of the time has the second one in mind.⁵¹ The problem remains, however, how to name the distinction *ex natura rei* in this second sense. Unlike Sirect, he believes it preferable to name it following its proper *relatum*, which is a mode:

Another – and last – difficulty arises. Is the distinction that exists between a quiddity and a mode, which is said to be in the nature of things, a modal distinction or a quidditative one? To this, it is replied that a distinction which is based on a quiddity and whose end term is a mode can be called quidditative with respect to its foundation and modal with respect to its end term (*ex parte termini*); a distinction which is based on a mode and whose end term is a quiddity is called inversely. It must be noted, however, that such a distinction appears to be better named after its end term than after its foundation because a relation (*respectus*) is more what it is by what belongs to its essence than by what is an extrinsic and accidental possession (*habitus*) of an end term [...]. Or a third response may be provided: that the denomination of the relation must come from the less noble; but a mode is less noble than a quiddity. Therefore, any distinction that exists between a mode and a quiddity will be a modal distinction.⁵²

Trombetta's preference for the designation 'modal distinction' has a clear advantage given his distinction between two meanings of the expression *ex natura rei*. Besides, his arguments make clear that he sees good philosophical reasons for this designation, having to do with the essence of an entity: in the case of a relation, the essence of the thing is the *end term*, since what a relation consists in is precisely to relate to this end term. We can also observe that Trombetta cleverly turns Sirect's argument, stating that a mode is less noble than an essence, against him. Trombetta accepts that a distinction should be named after the less noble item involved, which he sees as a compelling reason to revert to the Mayronian label of a 'modal distinction.'

51 When discussing how wholes are distinct from their constitutive parts, Trombetta clearly differentiates the distinction *ex natura rei* from the real distinction, claiming for instance that physical wholes are not only distinct from their parts *ex natura rei*, but really (*Formalitates*, art. 3, art. part. 2, 9va). At this place, the distinction *ex natura rei* is said to be "media inter distinctionem rationis et realem."

52 Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 12vb: "Insurgit alia difficultas, et ultima. Utrum distinctio que est inter quidditatem et modum que dicitur esse ex natura rei, sit modalis vel quidditativa. Ad quod respondetur, quod distinctio que fundatur in quidditate, et terminatur ad modum, potest dici quidditativa ex parte fundamenti, et modalis, et ex parte termini, et illa que fundatur in modo et terminatur ad quidditatem potest dici e converso. Advertendum tamen, quod videtur talis distinctio magis denominanda esse a termino, quam a fundamento, quia respectus videtur magis esse talis per illud quod est de essentia sui, quam per illud quod est extrinsecum et accidentale habitudo ad terminum [...]. Vel potest dari tertia responsio, quod denominatio respectus habet fieri ab ignobiliore, ignobilior autem est modum quidditate. Igitur quecumque distinctio que est inter modum [et] quidditatem erit modalis."

The disagreement between Sirect and Trombetta regarding how to call the distinction between a mode and an essence may appear somewhat verbal at first glance. However, it also indicates a deeper discord regarding the governing rule for attributing predicates to relations, particularly when these relations entail entities of varying ontological statuses. At the heart of this disagreement lies the challenge of formulating a comprehensive rule for naming relations, encompassing special types of relations such as distinctions.

4. The Order and Relations among the Modes

4.1 The Status of Existence

As already indicated, one important element of the Pseudo-Mayronian *Tractatus formalitatum*, notably absent from both Sirect's and Trombetta's own treatises, is the deduction of nine types of modes. Drawing on Francis of Meyronnes's *Conflatus*, dist. 42, q. 4, Pseudo-Meyronnes presents a deduction of the number and organization of the different types of modes, explicitly talking of their "demonstrability."⁵³

Sirect and Trombetta not only concur in leaving aside such a deduction but they also generally agree on the list of modes they provide. In particular, they do not include 'reality' as a mode, unlike the Pseudo-Mayronian *Tractatus formalitatum*. Their lists are more distant from the list of modes proposed by Francis of Meyronnes, which includes *realitas*.

One important exception is 'existence,' on the status of which Sirect and Trombetta disagree.⁵⁴ Although he includes it in the first list of modes he gives at the beginning of the relevant section of his treatise, Sirect believes that existence is not really a mode. Indeed, existence belongs according to him to the quidditative concept of God, whereas modes are completely devoid of any quidditative content:

According to some, the intrinsic modes in God are infinity, necessity, eternity and existence, although it can be seen that existence belongs to the formal and quidditative concept of God. It is predicated of God according to the first mode of *per se* predication, according to the Doctor in the second distinction on the first [book of the *Sentences*].⁵⁵

⁵³ Pseudo-Mayronis, *Tractatus formalitatum*, 263vb–64ra.

⁵⁴ As noted by Poppi, "Il contributo dei formalisti padovani," 693–94.

⁵⁵ Sirectus, *Formalitates*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 24v: "Modi intrinseci in divinis secundum aliquos sunt infinitas, necessitas, eternitas et existentia, licet existentia videatur esse de conceptu formali dei et quidditative, in primo modo dicendi per se de deo praedicetur secundum doctorem in 2a distinctione primi."

In contrast to Sirect's view, although without quoting him by name, Trombetta asserts that existence is a mode. Trombetta's stance hinges on three main arguments. First, he contends that as simple concepts being and existence do not include each other. Consequently, the concept of God as an infinite or perfect being cannot inherently include existence according to the first mode of *per se* predication (i.e., when the predicate is included in the subject) following the fourfold classification of *per se* predications inherited from Aristotle. Secondly, Trombetta argues that what is common to both God and creatures shares the same '*ratio*.' Since existence is a common attribute to both, and recognized as a mode in creatures, it logically follows that existence should also be viewed as a mode in God. Additionally, Trombetta distinguishes between existence being predicated of God according to the second mode of *per se* predication versus according to the first mode. He asserts that while existence is not predicated of God *per se secundo modo*, it does not preclude its classification as a mode. Rather, Trombetta suggests that a mode, although not entirely identical with its subject, just like predicates attributed *per se secundo modo*, is not formally distinct from its subject like predicates attributed *per se secundo modo* are.⁵⁶

This last argument presents a particular interest within the context of Scotist discussions about types of *per se* predications. A significant problem of these discussions concerns whether modes correspond to the first kind of *per se* predications or to another (if any). Scotus's position is that existence is predicated of God according to the first mode of *per se* predication, corresponding to a predicate included in the essence of a subject, seeming to imply – as Sirect indeed contends – that existence formally belongs to God's quiddity.⁵⁷ Scotus indicated that attributions according to the second mode of *per se* predications, where the subject is logically included in the predicate, denote a formal distinction between these relata. But Scotus's remarks left aside the special case of modes which, unlike formalities, lack a proper formal content.

Trombetta is well aware that this point is left undetermined by Scotus. He draws on the distinction between being formally distinct positively vs. being formally distinct negatively to show that Scotus's words do not contradict his own view, i.e., Trombetta's assertion that existence is indeed a mode of the divine essence. According to him, what is predicated *per se secundo modo* of a subject is formally distinct *positively* from this subject, which is not the way modes are distinct from their subject.⁵⁸ Like Francis of Meyronnes, Trombetta concedes

56 Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 10vb–11ra. On predication of infinity *per se secundo modo*, cf. Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus*, dist. 3, q. 5, 18vaK. These discussions revolve around Aristotle's distinction between four types of *per se* predications in the *Posterior Analytics*, I.4, 73a34–b16.

57 Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 2, pars 1, q. 2, n. 25, ed. Vat. 2, 138.

58 Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 10vb.

that absolute perfections like being, substance, and spirit, are more intimate to God than modes, for they do not express any sort of composition *in re* but merely express the divine perfections as they can be predicated of God *per se primo modo*.⁵⁹ Compared to these absolute perfections, God's existence, as a mode, represents a perfection that is posterior *ex natura rei* within the order of perfections. Modes can nonetheless be predicated of God *per se primo modo*, which reflects the fact that, although distinct in a sense from God, they do not convey any positive formal or quidditative content.⁶⁰ For this reason, Trombetta concludes that Sirect's view that existence is not a mode must be rejected.⁶¹

4.2 The Order among the Modes

Even if they do not try to deduce the organization of modes in different genera, Sirect and Trombetta are still interested in the order of modes in God and creatures, a central concern that dates back to the first generation of Scotists following Scotus's death. This problem was dealt with by Francis of Meyronnes at various places in his commentaries on the *Sentences* (of which the *Conflatus* is the latest version), where Francis proposed different possible orders of modes. It was also an important problem for Petrus Thomae, another decisive (albeit not always properly acknowledged) source for the Formalist movement to which Sirect and Trombetta belonged.

Here again, Trombetta devotes more space to the problem than Sirect, elaborating his own position as a critical commentary on Sirect's text. Sirect merely hints at this problem. However, his conception of existence, which is according to him more intimate to the divine essence than modes, implies that existence must come before modes such as necessity, eternity or infinity.⁶²

By contrast, Trombetta places infinity before existence, and seems to consider it as the first mode from which others like necessity, eternity and existence, can be derived. In any case, Trombetta holds that infinity precedes existence.⁶³ This position is of course not unique to Trombetta. In the *Tractatus de primo principio*, containing elements also present in the various versions of the proof

59 Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus*, dist. 3, q. 1, v3vbI; dist. 13, q. 1, 64vaL.

60 Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 11ra.

61 Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 11ra: "Ex quo potest haberi probabiliter, quod ipse [sc. Duns Scotus] voluerit existentiam esse modum intrinsecum, quia certum est secundum ipsum, quod infinitas est modus essentie, igitur secundum ipsum erit existentia modus eius. Consequentia probatur, quia si illud quod est intimius existentia ipsi essentie est modus intrinsecus, et non de quidditate essentie, multo magis illud quod est remotius ab essentia, et quemadmodum est existentia, ut ipse dicit."

62 Sirectus, *Formalitates*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 24v; see footnote 55.

63 Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 11ra.

for God's existence in his various commentaries on the *Sentences* (book I, dist. 2), Duns Scotus demonstrated God's infinity, from the concept of which different properties such as eternity, simplicity or omnipotency can be deduced.⁶⁴ Importantly, Scotus even established that God's existence itself may be inferred from its infinity.⁶⁵

This procedure could be taken as an indication that, in the order of things, mirrored by the way our human intellect functions, infinity is the first mode of God, from which others follow – a point seemingly in line with Scotus's consideration of 'infinite being' as the most proper name for God.⁶⁶ Similar views based on an isomorphism between the intellect and reality can be detected in Francis of Meyronnes's *Conflatus*, supporting the view that infinity comes first according to an order of priority in God. While also envisioning other ways of arranging the modes, depending on different points of view, Francis often arranged his modes starting with infinity and following the order of properties that can be demonstrated of God's essence.⁶⁷

Sirect believed that existence is prior to other modes like infinity because, in the case of an essence such as an infinite being (God), infinity modifies the quidditative *ratio* of being and, thus, introduces a type of composition not applicable in the case of existence, which is quidditatively included in the divine essence, according to him. Trombetta addresses this argument by differentiating between infinite being as it exists "fundamentally," i.e., the thing itself as it exists outside the mind, and as it exists "formally," i.e., as having objective being in an intellect.⁶⁸ It must be admitted according to Trombetta that in the latter case, a mode and its subject present a sort of composition between two separate items. However, this composition of two separate items only exists on the level of ob-

⁶⁴ On simplicity, see Duns Scotus, *De Primo Principio*, cap. 4, n. 75, 134.

⁶⁵ In the third chapter of the *De primo principio*, Scotus shows that the essence of the first cause is such that it entails its own existence; see Duns Scotus, *De Primo Principio*, c. 3, n. 19, 52. In the final chapter, he demonstrates that all the properties traditionally attributed to God by theologians may be derived from the infinite essence of God; see Duns Scotus, *De Primo Principio*, c. 4, n. 84, 142. On the role of infinity in Scotus' proof of God's existence, see Martinich, "Duns Scotus on the Possibility of an Infinite Being;" Tweedale, "Scotus and Ockham;" see also Wood, "Scotus's Argument for the Existence of God."

⁶⁶ Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 2, pars 1, qq. 1–2, n. 147, ed. Vat. 2, 215; *Ord.* I, dist. 3, pars 1, qq. 1–2, n. 58, ed. Vat. 3, 40.

⁶⁷ See, e.g., Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus*, prol., q. 16, 10rbE; dist. 2, q. 4, 17vaK; dist. 2, q. 7, 19rbG; dist. 13, 64vaM. See also Pseudo-Mayronis, *Tractatus formalitatum*, 264vaM, where infinity (and finitude) are described as *per se* modes, in contrast to all other modes.

⁶⁸ Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 10va: "Ens finitum et infinitum possunt capi duobus modis. Uno modo formaliter, alio modo fundamentaliter. Ens infinitum formaliter acceptum capitur pro conceptu obiectivo existente in anima obiective per aliquod representativum ipsius [...]. Ens infinitum fundamentaliter acceptum est ipsa essentia infinita, ut habet esse in re extra animam omnino."

jective reality, where different concepts corresponding to only one real entity can be abstracted from one another by the intellect. Fundamentally, a mode is not a thing or an entity in its own right and God conceived as an infinite being exists as one simple essence, which does not contain any type of real distinction and, for this reason, necessarily exists by itself.⁶⁹

Trombetta's defense of the order of modes in God relies thus on a fine distinction between the levels of subjective or fundamental existence and that of objective existence, which Francesco Marrone recently has emphasized as a central tenet of his doctrine.⁷⁰ This distinction is directed against Sirect's conclusions about the priority of existence over the other modes.

Conclusion

The exploration of Antoine Sirect and Antonio Trombetta's contributions to the Scotist concept of mode unveils a rich philosophical dialogue over one of the most fascinating items of the late scholastic conceptual framework. From their elucidation of the general definition of modes to their divergent perspectives on the hierarchical order and nature of modes within the divine and created realms, Sirect and Trombetta offer two different ways of integrating this concept into a general account of what it means for two things to be identical or distinct.

The elusive remarks left by Scotus about modes provided fertile ground for divergent refinements of this notion. Sirect and Trombetta, prominent figures of the Formalist tradition, undertook to articulate a doctrine of modes consistent with the other concepts proper to their framework, namely essences, quiddities, and formalities. We can note that, despite borrowing elements from eminent representatives of the earlier Scotist tradition, one can hardly detect in Sirect or Trombetta any univocal allegiance to one particular doctrine of modes. While their theory of modes takes place within a typology of distinctions inherited from Petrus Thomae, the main doctrinal stances of Petrus Thomae, who rejected the inconceivability of modes, do not find much echo in their writings. While quoting frequently the name of Francis of Meyronnes, neither Sirect nor Trombetta follow Francis in considering reality as a mode, and they do not show any interest in analyzing haecceity as a mode – a central tenet of Meyronnes's doctrine. Their lists of modes include common items like infinity, necessity, or eternity, but when it comes to existence, Sirect and Trombetta disagree considerably.

69 Trombetta, *In tract. formal.*, art. 2, art. part. 2, 10va: "Capiendo ens infinitum fundamentaliter, nihil aliud est nisi essentia et natura, cui competit esse de se et a se, hoc est esse ens per essentiam habens omnem conditionem requisitam ad esse quod est esse per se."

70 See Marrone, *Realitas obiectiva*, 35–153; see also Marrone, "Descartes e la tradizione scotista;" Marrone, "L'univocité de l'étant."

Throughout our investigation, we witnessed a convergence of thought between Siret and Trombetta on fundamental aspects of modes, such as the general definition and the principle that modes are not intrinsically conceivable. However, this consensus belies deeper divergences in their philosophical perspectives. One such divergence is manifest in their interpretations of the expression “not to change the formal *ratio*,” revealing significant differences in the effect of modes on the things they modify.

The nuanced distinction between Siret and Trombetta regarding modes is subtle yet significant. It does not simply stem from a dichotomy between a preference for a physical over a metaphysical interpretation of entities within the Scotist framework, nor does it hinge on a dichotomy between realism and conceptualism. Rather, their dissensions concerning modes lies in their approach to articulating the logical properties of modes when predicated of their subject and the actual effect of modes on their subject as it exists outside the mind. In simpler terms, Siret and Trombetta perceive the relation between modes as concepts and modes as they exist outside the mind differently.

Siret underscores the intermediary role of modes in shaping the distinctions existing outside the mind. While modes lack intrinsic formal nature, they nonetheless exert a modifying influence on the quidditative *ratio* of the things they affect. This tangible effect of modes on their subject validates the reality of the composition between the thing and its mode. From a logical point of view, this is reflected in the possibility to derive real attributes specific to a particular essence from expressions such as ‘infinite being,’ which cannot be derived solely from its isolated component notions ‘infinity’ and ‘being.’ The effect of modes on their subject outside the mind, altering their quidditative *ratio*, explains why modal properties lacking intrinsic quidditative content play nevertheless a role in what can be attributed to essences.

Trombetta, too, acknowledges the extra-mental character of the composition between a mode and its subject, but he exhibits a greater degree of precision in distinguishing between modes as they exist outside the mind and the concepts denoting them. In his framework, he delineates between modes as they exist “fundamentally” and what can be predicated “objectively” of their concepts. This distinction allows Trombetta to assert that the composition between a mode and its thing exists outside the mind while firmly maintaining that modes alter neither the formal nor the quidditative *ratio* of the thing they affect. The fact that modes, on the level of objective predication, do not change the nature of the subject to which they are connected does not undermine the reality of the modal distinction, nor does it necessitate compensation through a tangible effect of modes on their subject. These subtle differences in the way of conceiving the intermediary status of modes and, consequently, their effect and role in extra-mental reality has important implications.

Trombetta's incorporation of new distinctions to Sirect's *Formalitates* proved to be particularly influential, laying the groundwork for later Scotists to engage with and expand upon these treatises. The distinction between individual and specific modes, in particular, made it possible to refine the different ways of conceptualizing the relations between modes and what they modify. The disagreements between Sirect and Trombetta over what a mode does to its subject structured the subsequent debates in the Formalist tradition by defining different ways of interpreting these entities.

As we have seen, thinkers like Francesco Licheto, Giovanni Vigerio, and Giacomino Malafossa tended to treat modes on the model of specific differences, leading to profoundly alter the way Scotus conceived of these entities. On this point, Sirect's stance, offering a more heterodox account of modes than Trombetta, seems to have paved the way for the more important changes in the concept one can detect in the sixteenth century. To give one example, Francesco Pitigiani d'Arezzo, who in his own *Formalitates* generally follows Sirect more faithfully than Trombetta, whom he often criticizes, claims that degrees of forms, like degrees of whiteness, are not modes, but *formalities*.⁷¹ This claim, directed against Trombetta, obviously contradicts Scotus's teachings on modes, which were precisely based on the paradigmatic example of degrees of color.

Pitigiani also inquires about the possibility of 'modes of modes,' a theme absent from Sirect's and Trombetta's treatises but arising from a comparative reading of their works, and possibly from interaction with other – non-Scotist – approaches to modes.⁷² This fact reveals the broader spectrum of interpretations of modes that emerged within and beyond Scotist circles. Sirect's and Trombetta's philosophical inquiries exerted influence beyond the confines of their immediate intellectual milieu, as suggested by their occasional inclusion in subsequent debates in the Jesuit tradition. The distinction between individual and specific modes, the status of existence and infinity, as well as the place of the modal distinction, opened new avenues of inquiry for theories of distinction elaborated outside of Scotist milieus, as recalled by Mastri's comment cited at the beginning of this study.

The critical interpretation of Sirect's treatise by Trombetta and their philosophical dialogue gave rise to a multi-layered commentary tradition, engendering new lines of inquiry and prompting fresh questions on the core concepts of modal metaphysics. In tracing not only trajectories of Sirect's and Trombetta's philosophical inquiries but also these subsequent developments, we are reminded of the dynamic nature of scholastic controversies in the premodern period and their role in shaping modern philosophers's understanding of what it means for two things to 'be distinct.'

71 Franciscus Arretinus, *Expositio*, art. 2, art. par. 2, com. 17, 177v.

72 Cf. Franciscus Arretinus, *Expositio*, art. 2, art. par. 2, com. 18, 186r.

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Scoto-Lullism

Concept, Development, and Authors

Rafael Ramis-Barceló

Introduction

The tradition of Scoto-Lullism is essentially tied to the Scotist literature on multiple kinds of distinctions. This article aims to clarify the historiographical concept ‘Scoto-Lullism’ (section 1) as well as to present the development, in various stages, of the tradition that may be subsumed under this name and that, as we shall see, lasted from the late Middle Ages until the early nineteenth century (section 2).

1. The Concept of Scoto-Lullism

Occasionally in the history of ideas, concepts are born and do not make a fortune until modern historiography recovers them. The concept ‘Scoto-Lullism’ is among them. The Observant Franciscan Francesc Marçal (1591–1688; in Latin Franciscus Marzal), presented in more detail toward the end of this article, was the first to use it. In a work published in 1666, he engaged in critical dialogue with Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz (1606–1682). In a section of his *Metalogica* (1654), this polyhistor had criticized a distinction made by Duns Scotus between the propositions “items that are united in a third are identical with each other in that third” and “items that are united in a third are identical as united in that third.”¹ Caramuel informs that Ramon Llull, among others, subscribed to this

I wish to thank Claus A. Andersen for careful revision of all philosophical aspects of this primarily historiographical essay as well as for important additions; the responsibility for the theses presented in the article lies entirely with the author.

¹ Caramuel y Lobkowitz, *Metalogica*, lib. 8, princ. 23, 408: “Hoc Axioma ‘Quae sunt eadem uni tertio sunt eadem inter se in illo tertio’ aequivalet huic ‘Quae sunt eadem uni tertio sunt eadem uni tertio’ et per consequens doctrinale non est.” For this distinction, Caramuel refers to Duns Scotus and Ramon Llull (he also references the Thomists John Capreolus and Silvester of Ferrara and the critical discussion of this issue in Gabriel Vázquez). Since I am here focusing on the birth of the concept ‘Scoto-Lullism,’ Caramuel’s references shall not be scrutinized here. It may be interesting to note that Caramuel too is behind the much-cited historiographical claim that the Scotists outnumbered all the members of the other schools taken together; see Bak, “*Scoti schola*,” 159, and more recently Andersen, “Short Introduction,” 14. For Caramuel

distinction, which of course allows Scotus to posit a formal distinction between the Trinitarian persons. Caramuel, though, rejects this distinction on the grounds that the two propositions are identical in meaning.² Marçal replies, that both the Scotists and the Lullists understood the distinction, and that in order to grasp the matter, Caramuel (who according to Marçal actually did grasp it and is just playing humble) should simply do a little “Scoto-Lullizing,” or be a *ScotoLullizans*:

Dicet Caramuel, non capio distinctionem. Respondeo, capiunt Scotistae, capiunt Lullistae, capiunt et alii, Caramuele teste, capiat et ipse quod negligit. Docear obsecro, inquit humilis Caramuel. Respondeo, seu potius respondet Caramuel ScotiLullizans.³

Marçal then goes on to explain the formal distinction, referencing what he finds on the subject of distinctions in other works by Caramuel. This exchange, in itself a nice piece of Baroque polemics, is interesting as a testimony of the centrality of the Formal distinction in the Scholastic culture of the time of the application of the term ‘ScotoLullizans.’ Sebastià Trias Mercant, a renowned scholar on Llull and the Lullist tradition, picked up the term and employed it (for the first time in 1966) when referring to frequent attempts made throughout the history of Lullism to unite certain doctrines of Llull and Scotus. Trias Mercant thus used the term not only when referring to Marçal himself,⁴ but also in reference to other authors, such as the Portuguese Franciscan Manuel do Cenáculo (1724–1809?), who according to Trias Mercant is a representative of “Portuguese Scoto-Lullism.”⁵

In more recent publications, the concept has been employed by the author of this present study as well as by other scholars; generally, the concept is here used in the way suggested by Trias Mercant, namely to denote a scholastic tradition that attempted to merge philosophical and theological tenets from Ramon Llull and Duns Scotus, a tradition that lasted from the end of the Middle Ages until the modern era.⁶ Also in this study, my interest in this concept is purely

on distinctions, see Daniel Novotný’s contribution to this present volume, with references to further literature.

2 Caramuel y Lobkowitz, *Metalogica*, lib. 8, princ. 23, 409: “Docear obsecro: Quid est esse inter se in illo tertio? annon est esse eadem uni tertio? Ergo idem est ‘Quae sunt eadem uni tertio, sunt eadem inter se in illo tertio,’ ac si diceretur, ‘Quae sunt eadem uni tertio sunt eadem uni tertio.’”

3 Marçal, *Certamen*, pars 3, conferentia 2, n. 114, 152.

4 Trias Mercant, “Llull en su época,” 144; *id.*, “El lulismo barroco,” 122–23; *id.*, *Diccionari*, 275.

5 Trias Mercant, “Cartas,” 109; see further *id.*, *Diccionari*, 335 (on Joan Picornell).

6 Ramis Barceló, “En torno al escoto-lulismo”; Andersen and Ramis-Barceló, “Introduction,” 32–33 and 36–37; *iid.*, “Jaume Janer OCist,” especially 201; Cabré Duran, “El pensa-

historical. The focus is on the tradition of Scoto-Lullism. Whereas this rich tradition would merit a larger monographic treatment considering various facets, I shall here limit myself to two aspects that I consider particularly important, namely the metaphysics of distinctions and what one could call the epistemological-pedagogical synthesis of Scotism and Lullism.

As for the first of these two aspects, the interest in and application of the doctrine of seven distinctions by the Scotist Petrus Thomae († 1340) runs through the entire history of the tradition of Scoto-Lullism. A group of Lullist authors engaged with the so-called Formalist literature, and partially reformulated the doctrine of multiple kinds of distinctions they found there. As for the Lullist context of such discussions, Llull's Art was in the first place intended as a method for the conversion of non-believers. This method involved a combinatory technique capable of generating arguments for confirming or disproving of any possible assumption. One of the sets (the second one) of principles of this method, or Art, determined the possible modes of relationships between various concepts of the Art. It comprised five triangles with three concepts each: God, creature, operation; difference, concordance, contrariety; beginning, middle, end; majority, equality, minority; affirmation, doubt, negation.⁷ When the followers of Llull wrote on 'difference' in the second triangle, they established a link to the Scotist theory of 'distinctions.' One may say that Scoto-Lullism is based on this very connection between the Lullist principle of difference and the system of distinctions in the Scotist tradition from Petrus Thomae onwards. This generally goes hand-in-hand with a high esteem for metaphysics as a discipline of knowledge throughout the entire Scoto-Lullist tradition.

As for the second aspect, various Lullists from the fifteenth century considered Llull's system to be already perfect, and that one only had to follow the steps listed in his works to study it. Others believed that it was a complete system, although it could still be perfected; they did not see it as something closed, but rather as a system that still could be improved. Many fifteenth-century Lullists, therefore, embraced syncretism and, faced with the challenge of teaching Llull's thought in a University setting or in private schools, they believed that the best way to explain Llull's doctrines was to bring them closer to those of Duns Scotus. For most modern readers of these two authors, this may seem a difficult task. From a systematic point of view, the basic conceptions of Scotus and Llull may hardly seem reconcilable. Yet, as already pointed out, the perspective of this present study is historical. The concrete epistemologico-pedagogical challenge to combine Scotus and Llull was lying in the background of the entire Scoto-Lullist tradition. The interest in Scotist distinction theory and the challenge of bringing

ment"; Calpe, "Sentido historico" (note that Calpe has a more systematical-normative interest in the concept than I do).

7 See the introduction to Llull's Art in Bonner, *Art and Logic*, 32–33.

Lullism into a Scholastic synthesis with Scotism characterized Scoto-Lullism, from its birth in the fifteenth century to its decline in the nineteenth century.

2. The Development of Scoto-Lullism

The periodization of Scoto-Lullism is a task that has not yet been carried out. What follows is a novel attempt at doing so. Let me first note that the phenomenon of Scoto-Lullism is more linked to the history of Lullism than to the history of Scotism. It was always Lullist authors, with the unique exception of Fernando de Córdoba, who sought a convergence with Scotism. For this reason, it is a very little studied current in the history of Scotism. It should also be noted that Scotism and Lullism have in common that they have not, until recent times, been historically studied in depth, a fact that leaves us with an important historiographical gap concerning the relationship between the two traditions. Lastly, and somewhat paradoxically, we should note that from the point of view of periodization, Scoto-Lullism, both in its rise and decline, follows the evolution of Scotism more closely than that of Lullism.

The historical study of Scoto-Lullism has only recently begun. There are still many gaps in our knowledge of this tradition. Hence, the attempt on the following pages to establish a historical “cartography” of Scoto-Lullism may soon become obsolete, as new investigations are published. What follows is a presentation of *what we know now*. I have, partially together with Claus A. Andersen, dealt with various aspects of Scoto-Lullism in a number of publications. For reasons of space and conciseness, I shall refer to these previous studies rather than, for each of the examined authors, repeating the entire bibliographic record and archival references. Many of the publications listed in the bibliography contain references to further literature.

2.1 The First Manifestations of Scoto-Lullism (1450–1525)

The birth of Scoto-Lullism occurred in the middle of the fifteenth century, and it then developed in parallel at various places. This may be explained by reference to several circumstances: 1) the tendency toward syncretism as a characteristic feature of the autumn of the Middle Ages as well as the contact between the old Scholastic culture and the novelties of Humanism; 2) the rise, in terms of extended acceptance and influence, of the doctrines of Scotus, with important Scotist teachers throughout Europe during the second half of the fifteenth century; and 3) the flourishing of teachers with permission from the monarchs of the Crown of Aragon to lecture on the doctrines of Ramon Llull in their territories.

Regarding syncretism, now just in reference to Lullism, the importance of authors such as Nicolaus Cusanus (1401–1464) or Heymericus de Campo

(ca. 1395–1460) hardly need to be invoked. They mixed Lullism with Albertism and other doctrinal traditions.⁸ As early as the fourteenth century, Lullism had already been linked with Ockhamism by certain authors.⁹ If the synthesis with Albertism was the most common approach in the first half of the century, from ca. 1450 onwards Lullism became joined with Scotism by various thinkers. It is a well-known fact that during the second half of the fifteenth century various Scotist teachers flourished, the most part of which were Franciscans. Arguably, the most influential ones were Nicolas d’Orbelles, Antoine Sirect, Étienne Brulefer, Antonio Trombetta, Maurice O’Fihely, and Pierre Tartaret. These, and many other authors kept the torch of Scotism alive, while at the same time Scotism enjoyed support from Sixtus IV (whose papacy lasted 1471–1484), a Franciscan Pope and himself a Scotist.¹⁰

Lullism had a school dimension already in the fourteenth century.¹¹ In particular, the famous Lullian school of Barcelona flourished in the fifteenth century.¹² Among the teachers in this school, we find Tomàs Eximeno, Pere Martí, Antoni Sedacer, Joan Bulons, Bernat Frigola, Joan Llobet, Joan Ros, Gabriel Desclapés, Joan Baró, Jaume Costa, Joan Comte, and Bartomeu Far. Some former students of the school, such as Bernat Frigola, the Valencian Franciscan Joan Ros, and Joan Llobet became teachers themselves. The latter settled in Mallorca (see below). He, Joan Ros, and some others, were authorized by the king to explain Lullian doctrines anywhere in his domain. This was also the case with the Carmelite Landolfo de Columbia, who on 17 May 1446 received permission from Alfonso the Magnanimous (reign 1416–1458) to teach Lullism in his territory. For their part, Ros and Bulons headed towards the Italian Peninsula, where they taught Llull’s doctrines in Bologna, Venice, and Padua.¹³

2.1.1 Two Syncretistic Masters: Fernando de Córdoba and Joan Llobet

The first authors to work on a synthesis of Llull and Scotus did not limit themselves to just these two Medieval masters, but rather also included nominalist, Platonic, or Aristotelian elements in their synthesis. One of them was the famous eclectic thinker, more Platonic than Aristotelian, Fernando de Córdoba (1425–1486). Another was Joan Llobet (†1460), a Franciscan who taught in Mallorca.

⁸ See Reinhardt, Heymericus de Campo.

⁹ Santi, “Episodis del lul·lisme genovès.”

¹⁰ Hoenen, “Scotus and the Scotist School,” 197–210; regarding the influence of Sirect and Brulefer, see also the contribution by Claus A. Andersen to this present volume.

¹¹ On the school dimension of Lullism in general, see Ramis Barceló, “Academic Lullism.”

¹² See Perarnau, “Sobre mestre Antoni.”

¹³ See Romano, “Il primo lullismo in Italia.”

Fernando's *De artificio omnis et investigandi et inveniendi natura scibilis* is relevant in our context, and for two reasons as I think.¹⁴ 1) This work is the first attempt at an universal epistemology that is Lullian in nature, even if Fernando's project may be characterized as "anti-Lullist Lullism."¹⁵ This approach became characteristic of Lullism in subsequent centuries, when the Art of Llull and the whole Lullian system were subjected to a *sui generis* reform. 2) At the same time, this work represents an important step in the historical synthesis of Scotus and Llull.

Fernando's criticism of the philosophy of "Raimundus de Lulio catalanus orbi notissimus"¹⁶ was quite severe. He considered it ridiculous and a source of madness. This criticism targetted both its epistemology and style.¹⁷ The result that Fernando himself arrived at, however, is hardly less unintelligible than that of Llull. His extremely syncretistic proposal mixed many disparate elements in a rather incoherent artifice, displaying influences both from late Scholasticism and from Renaissance Platonism. John Monfasani has correctly stressed the importance of Scotus's work for Fernando's thought.¹⁸ The partial use of Scotus and Llull as complementary authors, as seen in some passages of *De artificio*,¹⁹ became influential toward the end of the fifteenth century. Fernando de Córdoba, accepted the ten "questions" of Lullian Art (Llull's peculiar adaptation of the ten Aristotelian categories).²⁰ One of the main points of agreement between Scotus and Llull, according to Fernando, concerns the transcendentals,²¹ a doctrine that is instrumental for the knowledge of God and his attributes. Fernando summarized the transcendentals in a *coordinatio perfectionum*, structured according to eleven divisions of the being (drawing on Scotus's doctrine of disjunctive transcendentals).²² Fernando concluded his exposition of the transcendental perfections with a list of thirty-one absolute perfections, comprising perfections discussed by both Scotus and Llull.²³

14 For this, see also Ramis Barceló, "Fernando de Córdoba," 131–42.

15 Regarding this classification, see Ramis Barceló, "Hacia una noción."

16 Fernando de Córdoba, *De artificio*, [Introductio], vii.

17 See Johnston, "The Reception of the Lullian Art," 35–37.

18 Monfasani, *Fernando of Cordova*, 34: "Scotus is the most commonly named scholastic, and the Scotists the most frequently mentioned philosophical school in the *De Artificio*."

19 Fernando de Córdoba, *De artificio*, prima partiuncula, xlii–xliii.

20 Fernando de Córdoba, *De artificio*, Prima Partiuncula, xli; for the ten "questions," Fernando referenced both Llull and al-Farabi ("animadvertendum est Aspharabium philosophum et rectè quidem distribuisse quaestiones per regulas, quem Raymundus secutus est").

21 Monfasani, *Fernando of Cordova*, 33.

22 Fernando de Córdoba, *De artificio*, prima partiuncula, xviii–xix.

23 Fernando de Córdoba, *De artificio*, prima partiuncula, xx.

Llobet, the second author I mentioned, was a Catalan Franciscan.²⁴ On 26 January 1449, Alfonso the Magnanimous granted him a privilege to teach Lullian doctrines on his territory. Llobet settled on Monte de Randa, a small mountain on Mallorca, and stayed there from 1449 until his death in 1460.²⁵ He seems to have studied both in Paris and Toulouse and was a student in the Lullian School of Barcelona. From his pen, a treatise called *Ars notativa* has survived in a manuscript held in the Public Library of Palma. The same manuscript also contains a *Metaphysica* that with high probability too may be attributed to Llobet.²⁶ According to Jordi Gayà, who has studied and edited the *Ars notativa*, this work goes in the direction of nominalism, although it also exhibits elements of Lullism, making use of cameras, combinatorics and correlatives.²⁷ Here, we seem to be dealing with a kind of Lullism that is oriented towards terminism or Ockhamism, a phenomenon also known from Italy and France at the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries. The *Metaphysica* contained in the same manuscript seems to support the doctrinal tendency of the *Ars notativa*, but also has Scotist elements. The author thus invokes and sees himself as a follower of Llull²⁸ and speaks of the Lullian “dignities” (*dignitates*) in connection with his discussion of entity.²⁹ The work begins with a Scotist-sounding definition of metaphysics as a *scientia transcendens*.³⁰

2.1.2 Pere Dagui’s School

Lullism was established as an official university doctrine in Mallorca thanks to the institution of a Lullist chair, financed by the wealthy local lady Agnès de Pacs, and the teaching privilege granted by Ferdinand the Catholic. The first professor of the General Study of Mallorca was, from 1481, the Catalan priest Pere Dagui (1435–1500).³¹ Dagui was prosecuted by the Inquisition and had to defend himself against his accusers in Rome, before a commission of experts appointed by Sixtus IV, among whom Fernando de Córdoba, finally approved of his doctrines.

In his *Opus divinum*, printed in Barcelona in 1489 (and again in Sevilla in 1500, now under the title *Metaphysica*), Pere Dagui accommodated the Art of

²⁴ On the life and works of Llobet, see Gayà, “El *Ars Notativa*.”

²⁵ Ramis Barceló, “Perfiles de la enseñanza,” 11–15.

²⁶ Biblioteca Pública del Estado en Palma de Mallorca, Ms. 1049, 60r–84v (*Ars notativa*) and 85r–88v (*Metaphysica*). Llobet is mentioned as author in the *Ars notativa*.

²⁷ Gayà, “El *Ars Notativa*,” 157.

²⁸ Biblioteca Pública del Estado en Palma de Mallorca, Ms. 1049, 60v: “meo Raymundo.”

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 61v.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 60r.

³¹ On Dagui, see Ramis Barceló, “En torno al escoto-lulismo,” and Andersen and Ramis Barceló, “Introduction.”

Llull (basically, the *Ars brevis* and other works from the same period) to a general scheme of a Neoplatonic nature, capable of integrating an ultra-realistic metaphysics. This approximation of Llull to Augustinian Neoplatonism placed the Illuminated Doctor in the same coordinates as the Subtle Doctor. With this focus on the roots of the Neoplatonic metaphysical tradition, Daguí found some ontological ground common to both Lullism and Scotism. The fact that Llull's Art already contained some Aristotelian elements also facilitated a linkage with such elements in Scotist metaphysics.³²

Daguí dealt with "difference" and "distinction" in three different works: in the fourth and final part of the *Opus divinum* and in two short treatises called *Tractatus brevis formalitatum* and *Tractatus de differentia*. Daguí drew both on Lullism, dominant especially in the latter work, and on the Scoto-Formalist tradition. He displayed particular interest in the doctrine of seven kinds of distinctions formulated by the early Scotist Petrus Thomae in his *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*. Petrus Thomae's seven distinctions are: *distinctio rationis*, *distinctio ex natura rei*, *distinctio formalis*, *distinctio realis*, *distinctio essentialis*, *distinctio se totis subiective*, *distinctio se totis obiective*. Daguí added a *distinctio numeralis*, holding between individuals,³³ and also introduced some subdivisions that his disciple Jaume Janer later developed. Daguí and Janer discuss all of the Formalist distinctions, but do not endorse all of them. With his sustained interest in Petrus Thomae's distinctions, Daguí has, as it were, a distinctly different intellectual outlook than Llobet.

Daguí's *oeuvre* cannot be understood without the Late-Medieval university context. Generally, the creation of a *studium generale* required, as a minimum, the provision of a series of chairs of the arts, philosophy, and theology. In philosophy, the students had to read Aristotle, albeit through the lense of some scholastic doctrine. In theology, the teaching should follow the Master of the Sentences, Peter the Lombard, but as interpreted with the methodology and solutions of some scholastic master. The hermeneutic margin was thus reduced and only variations in the reading of these texts were foreseen. Such variations could only stem from textual combinations or experiments made by the professors. Thus, before launching the *studium generale* on Mallorca, the question had to be settled, whether the institution should endorse an expository method faithful exclusively to Llull or rather develop a kind of scholastic curriculum with Lullian ideas.³⁴ This was not a minor issue; at stake was the question, whether the very structure of Llull's Art and the pedagogical recommendations made by the Illuminated Doctor were an essential part of Llull's doctrine, or not. Could

32 For this, see Platzeck, "De tendentia beati Johannis Duns Scoti."

33 Daguí, *Tractatus formalitatum brevis*, 80–82. For Petrus Thomae's doctrine, see the article by Claus A. Andersen in this present volume, with references to further literature.

34 See Ramis Barceló, "Els inicis de l'ensenyament."

the content of Llull's Art be studied scholastically, or did the Art include its own teaching methodology? Llull himself had expressed his thought in a novel way, but sometimes rather employed the Porphyrian tree as a structuring method. Correspondingly, while some Lullists believed that the Art was not methodologically essential for the teaching of Lullism, others thought that would be a betrayal of the ideas of the Doctor Illuminatus. Of the same sort was the question, whether the teaching in the new institution should only address problems discussed by Llull himself, or rather also address problems discussed in traditional scholastic works. Furthermore, should each course be based on one of Llull's books, or should a combination of texts be allowed? This pedagogical debate of those early years had considerable philosophical implications.

The debate resulted in the establishment of two competing schools.³⁵ Daguí, who remained professor in the studium general until his death in 1500, clearly thought that Lullism could be brought into some scholastic structure – and, more specifically, into some agreement with Scotism. When he left the island to defend himself against the charges of the Inquisition in Rome, he left the teaching in the hands of his disciples, who, due to their scholastic approach to Llull, faced problems with the authorities of the island.³⁶ But clearly not all of his students had this problem. One of them, Bartomeu Caldentey (ca. 1445–1500), subscribed to the *devotio moderna* and seems, to some extent, to have embraced Parisian humanism.³⁷ He was an admirer of Gerson and critical of scholasticism, including Scotism. He supported a mystical renewal of theology and a mystical Lullism of the kind that was cultivated, among others, by Lefèvre de Étapes. In contrast to Daguí, Caldentey was certainly not in favor of mixing Lullism with other scholastic traditions. Rather than conservative Lullism, I think we are here dealing with a Humanist Lullism. Caldentey is not conservative in the sense of dogmatic adherence to a set of ideas. His fidelity to Llull's textual corpus is rather of the kind typical for Humanists. Caldentey was a less renowned and innovative teacher than Daguí, but he did attract many students and other scholars, most of whom were locals. Thus, two kinds of Lullism existed side by side on the island, a home grown and more conservative one and one that was not only open to other currents of thought, but was also taught by foreigners from the mainland. Just how tough the confrontation was, may be seen from a polemical text, preserved in one manuscript in the Public Library of Palma, by one of Caldentey's students, Jaume d'Olesa. The text dates from between 1500 and 1503 and was thus composed soon after the death of both Daguí and Caldentey. Already the title of the text (*Fornax Jacobi Olesie civis Balearici constructa in exam-*

35 See Barceló Crespi and Ensenyat Pujol, *Els nous horitzons culturals*, 107–8.

36 See Hillgarth, *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, 30.

37 On Caldentey and his school, see Munar, "Francesc Prats i la seva obra de contemplació," vii–xxiii.

inationem non omnium sed aliquorum errorum Petri Deguini pseudo Lullistae) addresses the many errors of the “Pseudo-Lullist Dagui,” who is also repeatedly accused of heresy throughout the text.³⁸

Dagui too had students. The most prolific of them was Jaume Janer (Jacobus Januarius, † after 1506), a Cistercian monk from the Santes Creus monastery.³⁹ His *Ars methaphisicalis* from 1506 is replete with references to Lull, but it also has elements that are closer to Scotism. He thus describes metaphysics as a discipline that, due to the generality of its object, is general and transcendent – it transcends the limits of both positive theology and natural philosophy.⁴⁰ Janer further operates with a notion of an “absolute” metaphysics that is beyond the distinction between science and non-science; this notion may be seen as a radicalization of Duns Scotus’s own idea of a metaphysics that is “knowable in itself” (*secundum se scibilis*).⁴¹

Janer delved into the structure of the distinctions of his teacher. To Dagui’s eight distinctions, Janer added one more, the modal distinction, which he divided – like the distinction of reason – into a *simpliciter* and a *secundum quid* version.⁴² With this they were critically reforming the doctrine of Petrus Thomae, who had not included the modal distinction and only accepted the distinction of reason *simpliciter*. Janer’s interest in the modal distinction clearly testifies to the influence from Francis of Meyronnes, for whom this distinction was important. Notably, Dagui and Janer formulated an original doctrine of two types of beings of reason (corresponding to two types of distinctions of reason), one of which has a basis in reality, while the other is a pure product of the intellect. This distinction between the two types of beings of reason is very similar to, and may indeed be seen as a precedent of, the later division between *entia rationis ratiocinantis* and the *entia rationis ratiocinatae*.⁴³

38 Biblioteca Pública del Estado en Palma de Mallorca, Ms. BPM, Ms. 1080, 1r–40v. For details concerning this text, see Andersen and Ramis-Barceló, “Jaume Janer OCist,” 194–95. Regarding d’Olesa, see Cassanyes, “Jaume d’Olesa.”

39 For Janer’s life and works, see Andersen and Ramis-Barceló, “Jaume Janer OCist,” 168–74. See further Andersen, “A Lullist Contribution to the Formalist Literature of the Renaissance.”

40 Januarius, *Ars metaphysicalis*, met. pars 1, 8v–9r: “Methaphisica enim realis est ars generalis transcendens, et dicitur metha quod est terminus, et phisis quod est natura, quasi ars et scientia naturalis, potentie cognitive transcendens methas theologie positive et naturalis philosophie.”

41 As argued in Andersen and Ramis Barceló, “Jaume Janer OCist,” 202.

42 Januarius, *Ars metaphysicalis*, lib. 1, 50r–v and 58r–v. Note that Janer did not operate with a modal distinction in all of his works; see Andersen, “A Lullist Contribution to the Formalist Literature of the Renaissance,” 226.

43 For this, see Andersen, “The Doctrine of Beings of Reason,” 319–21.

Both Daguí and his disciple Janer believed that, for academic teaching, Lullism had to be seasoned with elements of university scholasticism. Hence their exposition of Llull's ideas was Lullism grafted onto Scotism. Scotism gave Lullism a certain patina of scholastic homogenization. One can say that Daguí and Janer attempted to "urbanize" Lullism, to tame it, and to convert it into a scholastic doctrine suited for university teaching.

2.1.3 Bernard de Lavinheta

Lavinheta († 1530), originally from Béarn, was a Franciscan and Doctor of the Arts and Theology. Having resided in Salamanca, Tolosa, and probably Barcelona, he traveled to Paris, where Lefèvre d'Étaples, who had similar interests, was active.⁴⁴ In Cologne he edited Pere Daguí's *Ianua artis* and in Paris and Lyons he contributed to the edition of Llull's most important works.

On his intellectual journey, Lavinheta became acquainted with various facets of Lullism and his work collected and synthesized almost all the interpretive approaches to Llull's work. Lavinheta inherited a complex Lullian tradition, which he tried to extract in his work *Explanatio compendiosaue applicatio artis illuminati doctoris magistri Raymundi Lulli ad omnes facultates*. This work strikes a balance between metaphysical exemplarism – combining Llull's "dignities" with rules and principles – and encyclopedism, where the Art becomes a kind of technical system for truth finding. Erhard W. Platzeck drew up a list of authors cited in Lavinheta's book. He found references to Lavinheta's contemporaries Charles de Bouvelles and Lefèvre d'Étaples. From the Franciscans, he refers to William of Ockham, Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus, and Francis of Assisi himself. Notably, he also cites the Scotists Nicholas Bonetus and Ioannes Canonicus (pseudonym for Francis of Marbres) as well as Peter Auriol. At one place, he mentions "Master Llobet" (*magister Lupetus*).⁴⁵

Lavinheta appears to have been under influence from Daguí's Scoto-Lullism and the Barcelona school of Lullism, the Augustinian (rather than Platonic) heritage of Cusanus, and some non-Thomist and non-Averroist Aristotelianism of the kind taught by Heymericus de Campo. With Janer, he had a distinctive encyclopedic vocation in common, which indeed was the basis for his reconstruction of the complete system of Llull's Art. Lavinheta's project was to find the general principles for all sciences and discover their metaphysical foundation. He subscribed to the Scotist tradition's understanding of metaphysics as

⁴⁴ Concerning Lavinheta, see Victor, "Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples"; Pereira, "Bernardo Lavinheta."

⁴⁵ Platzeck, "Einleitung," 18–19, 35–41. Regarding the identity of Ioannes Canonicus, see Schabel, "Francesc Marbres."

a transcendent science (*quasi scientia transcendens*).⁴⁶ Janer had added a *distinctio modalis* to Dagui's scheme of distinctions, and Lavinheta now adds a "generic distinction" (*distinctio generica*), a distinction obtaining between subaltern genera (his example is the genera of lions and angels).⁴⁷

Lavinheta has been called a Scotist.⁴⁸ A careful reading of his work modifies that statement. His interest in Scotist formalities probably first of all testifies to the influence from Dagui and Janer. His work is an encyclopedic presentation of Llull's Art, beginning with grammar and logic. Only in the context of the second Lullian figure, the figure "T" in the *Ars brevis* (which consists of three interlocking triangles inscribed in a circle, each one of a different color, and representing three triads of concepts, the first of which is "difference"), Lavinheta included a small discussion of distinctions. Although Lavinheta can be considered an eclectic author, unlike Fernando de Córdoba, Llobet, Dagui and Janer, he was above all a faithful expositor of Lullian doctrines. He is the first in a row of authors included under the label of Scoto-Lullism who were, nevertheless, expositors of Llull's doctrines. Notably, his *Compendious Explanation and Application* was republished by Johann Heinrich Alsted in 1612. Lavinheta clearly had metaphysical interests, but already in the sixteenth century, his work was understood as an artifice for combinatorics. Most of the encyclopedic projects with Lullian roots were continuations of Lavinheta's endeavour.⁴⁹

2.2 The Crisis of Scoto-Lullism (1525–1585)

It can be said that the success of Scotism continued until 1520. A confluence of factors (the consequences of the bull *Ite vos* of 1517, the abandonment of academic chairs held by Observant Franciscans, and the death of some great Scotist teachers) led to an almost sudden abandonment of Scotism by the Observant branch and, as a consequence, to the decline of Scotism also among secular teachers of the great European universities. Coinciding with the death of Trombetta (†1517) and Tartaret (†1522), Scotism began to wane rapidly. I have argued elsewhere, taking the idea to the extreme (though excluding some places in Italy), that Scotism had, from 1520 to 1570, fifty years of hibernation.⁵⁰ With the death of the great teachers, the division in the Franciscan Order consummated,

⁴⁶ Lavinheta, *Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio*, lib. 8, pars 2, 180v.

⁴⁷ Lavinheta, *Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio*, lib. 1, pars 3, 28v. Lavinheta's account of the Formalist doctrine of distinctions is included as an appendix to Dagui, *Tractatus formalitatum brevis – De differentia*, 201–5; see also Andersen and Ramis Barceló, "Introduction," 57.

⁴⁸ Hillgarth, *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, 289.

⁴⁹ See Angelini, *Metodo ed enciclopedia*, 239–83.

⁵⁰ Ramis Barceló, *La segunda escolástica*, 96–97.

and with the emergence of the Protestant Reformation, Scotism vanished at most places.

After Lavinheta, Scoto-Lullism too entered into difficulties. We first see this in Mallorca, where, after the death of Dagui and Caldentey, Joan Cabaspre and, later, Antoni Serra were chosen as new teachers. They essentially subscribed to a Humanist version of Lullism, dedicated to exegesis, copying, and teaching of Lullian texts. In other parts of Europe, however, Dagui's proposal still had some attraction. Let me just mention that in 1507 the Italian Lullist Mariano Accardo professed to stand in a line of teachers going back to Dagui,⁵¹ a motif that was later picked up by Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa and Pavao Skalić.⁵² In Mallorca, in 1567, Antoni Serra established a chair of Philosophy with the purpose of teaching Llull's thought.⁵³ Serra stressed the importance of a complete philosophical and theological Lullian curriculum arranged in a scholastic manner. Philosophy, with emphasis on the logical orientation of the first half of the sixteenth century, had already been taught for decades, though without full institutional integration.

In 1556, Antoni Bellver († 1585) was elected for the Chair of Arts for a two-year period; later, he held a chair from 1569 until his death. Bellver was a prominent Lullist, who considered it impossible to create a school of Lullism without at least some scholastic structure that would allow Llull to be studied in the context of current university doctrines. With Bellver as a teacher, the General Study, which until then had been immersed in economic precariousness and ideological and institutional uncertainty, found a way out of these last problems. Some harmonization with school Aristotelianism was seen as necessary in order to confront the persistent anti-Lullist criticism spurred on by new printed editions of Nicholas Eimeric's infamous *Directorium inquisitorum* from 1376 that contained 100 supposed errors committed by Llull.⁵⁴ Bellver decided that the Lullian *studium generale* should remain a school of Lullism, albeit with a formal university structure and a scholastic methodology. His goal was to achieve pontifical privileges and to have the study programme accepted by other university institutions throughout Europe. Notably, Bellver's attempt to lend a scholastic structure to Lullism had no Scotist inspiration. Bellver was rather interested in

51 Accardi, 1507, *Epistola*: "[...] Petrus Daguinus mediatu et Iacobus Ianuarius nostri optimis praeceptoris immediatus praeceptor testes sunt lucupletissimi [...]." Full quote in Andersen and Ramis Barceló, "Jaume Janer OCist," 196–97. See further Ramis Barceló, "Lulismo y derecho," 398–99.

52 Agrippa, *Epistola*, in his *In artem brevem*, unpaginated, and Skalić, *Miscellaneorum to-mus secundus*, lib. 12, 544. Both as quoted in Andersen and Ramis Barceló, "Jaume Janer OCist," 197.

53 The notarial acts of the establishment of the chair are preserved in Biblioteca Pública del Estado en Palma de Mallorca, Ms. 24, 154r–65v.

54 Regarding Eimerich's anti-Lullism, see Bonner, *Doctor illuminatus*, 57.

the logic of Petrus Hispanus and his followers, which Bellver combined with motifs from Llull's later works (open to a syllogistic methodology). With this, he inaugurated a specific Mallorcan tradition of Philosophy and Theology courses *iuxta mentem Lullii*. In his own *Axiomata in philosophia* and *Axiomata in theologia*, a series of notes on various topics preserved in manuscript in the Biblioteca del Collegio di Sant'Isidoro, Rome, Bellver advocated a direct reading of Llull and strongly censored the adulterators of authentic Lullist doctrine, explicitly calling Dagui and Janer "pseudo Lullists" (*Pseudo-Lullistae*) and also turning against Rodolphus Agricola and Cornelius Agrippa.⁵⁵

2.3 The Recovery of Scoto-Lullism (1585–1692)

In the General Congregation of the Observant Franciscans in Medina del Campo in 1560, it was decided that Scotism and Nominalism should be studied in Arts. In the Constitutions of Toledo of 1583, it was then decided that teaching both in the Arts and in Theology should follow Scotus.⁵⁶ This led to an institutional recovery of Scotism. This also had consequences for the Scoto-Lullist current, both in terms of new output and the creation of a new chair of Lullism in the Convent of San Francisco in Palma de Mallorca.

2.3.1 Valerio Valier

Valerio Valier (or de Valeriis, 1537–1596), a Venetian patrician who had resided in Augsburg,⁵⁷ published – in that same city – a commentary on Llull's *Arbor scientiae* called *Aureum sane opus*, a work indebted to Central European Lullism. This work was built on Llull's structure of the "tree," and in this it resembled Jaume Janer's *Ars metaphysicalis*, but was a much more faithful exposition of Llull's thought. Valier was clearly inspired by Agrippa, whom he quoted on several occasions throughout the book.⁵⁸ Like other Lullists before him, he discussed the Formalist doctrine of multiple distinctions. Valier accepted eight kinds of distinctions.⁵⁹ Like Janer, he accepted the *distinctio modalis*, but rejected the *distinctio numeralis*. Interestingly, his interest in Scotus and Scotism extended beyond the discussion of distinctions, referencing Scotus in numerous contexts (when

⁵⁵ Bellver, *Axiomata in theologia*, Rome, Biblioteca Collegio San Isidoro, Ms. 1/95, 58v–59r; similar passage in *Axiomata in philosophia*, Roma, BCSI, Ms. 1/95, 14r. See the quotes and references in Andersen and Ramis Barceló, "Jaume Janer OCist," 196; see further Ramis Barceló, "Antoni Bellver."

⁵⁶ For this development, see Vázquez Janeiro, "La enseñanza del escotismo."

⁵⁷ Trias Mercant, *Diccionari*, 444.

⁵⁸ See Backus, "La Survie."

⁵⁹ Valier, *Aureum sane opus*, 16.

discussing such concepts as power, concordance, principle, form, priority, quality, and the divine attributes).⁶⁰ Valier did not only quote Scotus, whom he praised as the “prince of theologians” (*Theologorum omnium Principe subtilissimo Scoto*),⁶¹ but also the early Scotists Antonius Andreae and Francis of Meyronnes. This work can be considered an attempt to expose Llull faithfully along with a continuous comparison with the Scotist tradition.

2.3.2 Francesc Marçal and the Lullism of the Convent of San Francisco de Mallorca

Bellver's scholastic model was followed by his direct and indirect disciples, among whom was the Franciscan Antoni Ferrer, who in the academic year 1599–1600 held a chair of Lullism, created specially for him, in the Convent of Saint Francis of Palma de Mallorca. The Mallorcan Franciscans were aware of their double legacy from both the Subtle Doctor and the Illuminated Doctor. A special chair for Lullian teaching was hence seen as necessary. The first course given in this Lullian chair, dictated by Ferrer and collected by his student Pere Jordi Font, have been preserved in a manuscript held at the Collegio di Sant'Isidoro in Rome. Ferrer followed Bellver's model and concentrated on Lullian logic in two courses: *Logica abbreviata Raimundi Lulli* and *Commentaria in Logicam novam*. The first is more interesting than the second, which is more periphrastic and shows the author's orientation to a lesser extent. Despite referring to Peter Lombard and Duns Scotus on the first page, the *Logica abbreviata Raimundi Lulli*, begun in the year 1600 (*incepta anno 1600*),⁶² in fact closely follows Llull in everything he took from the Logic of Petrus Hispanus and in particular highlights the similarities between the tree of Porphyry and the Lullian tree.⁶³

The contact of the Mallorcan Franciscans with the Roman convents (in which Scotus was studied and published) increased due to Llull's beatification process. Toward the end of the sixteenth and at the beginning of the seventeenth century, there was some awareness of Mallorcan Lullism in Rome, and Scotist manuals published in those years quickly arrived in Mallorca. With this, the question of a harmonization of Scotus and Llull reappeared. This happened along with a new rise of Scotism in Italy and elsewhere.⁶⁴

The most important of the professors of the chair of Lullism of the convent of San Francisco was the Menorcan Francesc Marçal (1591–1688). His extensive

⁶⁰ Valier, *Aureum sane opus*, 18, 25, 43, 50, 101.

⁶¹ Valier, *Aureum sane opus*, 16.

⁶² Ferrer, *Logica abbreviata Raimundi Lulli*, Roma, Biblioteca del Collegio de Sant'Isidoro, Ms. 1/115, 1r.

⁶³ Ferrer, *Logica abbreviata*, Roma, BCSI, Ms. 1/115, 3r.

⁶⁴ For this latter development, I refer to Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, especially 3–43, with references to further literature.

oeuvre comprises both published works and works that have been preserved in manuscript.⁶⁵ Marçal was trained both in Mallorca and in Rome and later became General Lector at the Aracoeli Convent in the Eternal City. In a certain way, Marçal was the pinnacle of “Scoto-Lullism.” More than any other, he pursued the project unifying the thought of the two Doctors. Unlike Dagui, who used Scotist ideas in certain metaphysical questions, Marçal intended to offer an institutional synthesis of the two great authorities studied in the Province of Mallorca, Scotus and Llull, although in an international perspective informed by contemporary scholastic metaphysics and theology. His project of unification took the personal and intellectual contact between the two thinkers as a point of departure.⁶⁶

In his *Select Memorial for the Teachers of the Lullian school* (*Memorial selecto para las profesores de la escuela luliana*) from 1673, he set out to show that, although Scotus had not attended the public approval of Llull’s Art in Paris, there was indeed some communication between the two authors. Here, Marçal mainly insisted on the points of agreement between them in regard to Mariology.⁶⁷ In his *Dialecticum Certamen* from 1666, Marçal had rather, as Trias Mercant has pointed out, attempted to find Scotist support for a number of problems for Lullian philosophy (mainly metaphysics) and theology, more specifically in regard to the substantial union of body and soul, teleology, contingency and necessity, Christology and, again, the proof of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary.⁶⁸ He also established eight modes of distinctions, which were the same as Dagui’s; the latter indeed seems to have been a source of inspiration to Marçal.⁶⁹ Marçal’s version of Lullism was in line with Scotism. It was not a system that had to be completed, but rather an instrument to deal with philosophical and theological issues of his time. His Scoto-Lullist synthesis constituted the background for Marçal’s debates with Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz and Sebastián Izquierdo, two authors who were critical of Llull and who may, to use a term employed above in regard to Fernando de Córdoba, be categorized as “anti-Lullist Lullists.”

The work that best displays the motif of a reconciliation between Scotus and Llull is Marçal’s *Resolutiones quaestionum egregii praeceptoris B. Raymundi Lulli* from 1673 (to which the above mentioned *Memorial* is adjoined as a prefatory text). The idea Marçal pursued in this work was very suggestive. His project

⁶⁵ For a complete list of his published and unpublished works, see Trias Mercant, *Diccionari*, 274–76.

⁶⁶ Trias Mercant, “Llull en su época.”

⁶⁷ Marçal, *Memorial selecto*, punti 3–5, 36–45.

⁶⁸ Trias Mercant, “El lulismo barroco,” 122.

⁶⁹ Marçal, *Dialecticum certamen*, pars 3, conferentia 2, n. 117, 158. For more details, see Andersen and Ramis Barceló, “Jaume Janer OCist,” 120.

was to examine Llull's own rapprochement to scholasticism in his *Disputatio eremitae et Raimundi super aliquibus dubiis quaestionibus Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, printed at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century after it had circulated in manuscript throughout Europe, and to compare that work with Scotus's views expressed in his commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. While the *Certamen dialecticum* sought to harmonize Scotus and Llull in the field of philosophy, especially in Logic, the *Resolutiones* were an attempt to reconcile Llull and Scotus theologically. The work contains many explicit expressions of this reconciliation motif.⁷⁰

Amidst all the theological issues – Christological, Trinitarian, etc. – discussed by Marçal, I think one key to understanding his project of reconciliation is, again, the question of difference or distinction. Thus, Marçal pointed out that just as the Scotists defended a formal *ex natura rei* distinction between divine attributes, Llull too accepted this in various texts. Marçal strongly emphasized their agreement on this matter.⁷¹ Faced with the objection that the Lullian *dignitates* are not distinct *ex natura rei*, Marçal responds that in the numerical identity of the divine dignities, there is a true plurality of real *rationes*, something that can be proved through the different acts the dignities perform; the dignities of *bonificare*, *magnificare*, and others are one *per essentiam*, yet multiple owing to the individual actions they perform.⁷² Marçal thus continued along the path first opened by Daguí and may be said to have gone further down that path than anyone else in the “Scoto-Lullist” tradition. After Marçal, the Franciscan professors of Palma continued his harmonization project. One piece of evidence for this is the anonymous text, preserved in a manuscript in the Public Library of Palma, *Tractatus in Symbolum Apostolorum seu de articulis fidei iuxta mentem subtilis doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti, etiamque ea quae inclitus martir Raymundus Lullus dixit in hac materia adducam*.⁷³

⁷⁰ For some examples, see Marçal, *Resolutiones quaestionum*, lib. 2, res. 41, 117: “[...] subinde conciliantur facile Scotus et Lullus”; *ibid.*, lib. 2, res. 85, 256: “[...] ponderatis rationibus Scoti, dicendum est in via Lulli [...]].”

⁷¹ Marçal, *Resolutiones quaestionum*, lib. 1, res. 4, 14: “[...] ergo Magister Raymundus Lullus eodem modo admittit in re, distinctionem formalem ex natura rei, sicut Scotus illam exponit.”

⁷² Marçal, *Resolutiones quaestionum*, lib. 1, res. 4, 15–16.

⁷³ Palma de Mallorca, Biblioteca Pública del Estado en Palma de Mallorca, Ms. 1069, ff. 112–232.

2.4 The Institutionalization of the University Chairs of Llull and Scotus (1692–1830)

Already from the beginning of the seventeenth century, academic Scoto-Lullism was cultivated in Mallorca and in some Catholic regions of the Holy Empire. The origin of this German Scoto-Lullism can be found in the Lullist school opened by the secular priest Ivo Salzinger (1669–1728) in Mainz. Several students came from there, and there was a revival of Lullian doctrines among the Jesuits and the Franciscans. In particular, the Franciscan Recollects had interests in both Scotus and Llull. In one interesting case, Scotist *theses* defended at the Recollect Convent in Kempten in 1736 were printed along with a Lullist work by the Recollect Martinianus Kempfle on the ten Aristotelian categories; the whole thing was explicitly branded as a “Lullian-Aristotelian-Scotist” publication.⁷⁴ In 1752, Honorius Cordier (1707–1778) a Recollect from Cologne, and a known Lullist, published a treatise on *The Subtle Scotist Distinction*,⁷⁵ a topic he also touched on in his later *Vera artis Lullianae principia* from 1771.⁷⁶ These Franciscan Recollects were in contact with the observant Franciscans of Mallorca, some of whom had studied in Mainz with Salzinger.

It must be remembered that the *studium generale* of Mallorca had been created in order to teach the doctrines of Ramon Llull. The Dominicans stubbornly opposed the institution, with the result that it could not issue academic degrees for two hundred years. However, toward the end of the seventeenth century, an agreement was reached that enabled university-level teaching of Thomism (in the Dominican convent), Scotism (in the Franciscan college), and Suarezianism (in the Jesuit college). The Franciscan teachers and students, now able to focus on Scotus, greatly benefited from this. On top of this, the General Chapter of the Observants, held in Rome in 1688, formally granted the province of Mallorca a chair for the teaching of Lullism. Franciscan teaching in Mallorca now had a double focus on Scotus and Llull. One can say, the Franciscans monopolized all teaching of Scotism and Lullism.

⁷⁴ See the title of Kempfle (praeses), *Categoria practica seu utilitas categoriarum per tres mentis operationes juxta principia Lulliano-Aristotelico-Scotistica praxi applicata, et proposita disputationi in Conventu Lenzfridano [...]*.

⁷⁵ See Cordier, *Distinctio subtilis scotistica ex autoritate et ratione, probata una cum positionibus theologicis ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti [...]* conformatis. Claus A. Andersen made me aware of the existence of this work; it figures in his “Catalogue of Printed Formalist Literature and Early Modern Dissertations Concerning Identity and Distinction” (www.formalitas.eu). For a profile of Cordier, though without reference to his Scotist interests, see Trias Mercant, *Diccionari*, 119–20.

⁷⁶ See Cordier, *Vera artis Lullianae principia*, pars 9, cap. 2, 488–508 (comparison of Llull and Scotus and critical discussion of the formal distinction).

The Franciscans now had two chairs for Scotist Theology (one for Prima and one for Vespers) and one for Scotist philosophy. These chairs, though formally affiliated with the university, were attached to the Convent of San Francisco.⁷⁷ Along with these chairs, the Franciscans also occupied the Lullist chairs. There were a total of four chairs of Lullist Theology and three of Lullist Philosophy. Of these, the Franciscans practically ran two of those for Theology until the closure of the University in 1830, and they also taught in the philosophical chairs.⁷⁸ Additionally, they held the chair of Moral Theology common to all scholastic traditions.⁷⁹ The Franciscans thus remained committed to the teaching of Lullism, and it would seem the Scoto-Lullist synthesis now had ideal conditions. Unfortunately, the courses are only extant in manuscripts, and correspondingly this late phase of Scoto-Lullism is hardly known. It seems, though, safe to conclude that the Scoto-Lullist tradition lasted, even if an increasingly diminished state – right until the secularisation in the 1830s through the *Desamortización de Mendizábal*. The closure of the University of Mallorca in 1830 and the confiscation of the convents brought a definitive end to the long local scholastic tradition.

Conclusions

“Scoto-Lullism” is a current that can be defined as the scholastic attempt to unite the philosophical and theological ideas of Ramon Llull and Duns Scotus. It emerged toward the end of the Middle Ages and spanned the entire Early Modern era. Historically, Fernando de Córdoba and Joan Llobet had already done pioneering work, but it fell to Dagú and his student Janer to really unfold the ambitious project of making Lullism compatible with scholasticism, in particular Scotism, one of the most successful scholastic traditions of their time. The history of Scoto-Lullism has still been little studied. Critical editions of the main works, investigations of the entire manuscript material, and a more careful analysis of the profiles of this tradition’s main authors are much needed. As work on this marginal current progresses, as I hope, the periodization I have presented in this article may need some qualification or even correction. However, let me here sum up what we know so far.

As I have explained, this tradition has four stages, one of its beginnings (1450–1525), one of crisis (1525–1585), one of recovery (1585–1692), and one final stage characterized by institutionalization of the university chairs of Llull and Scotus in Mallorca (1692–1830). This evolution has here been presented from a double perspective, one with focus on metaphysics of distinctions and another with focus on the specific epistemologico-pedagogical aim of Scoto-Lul-

⁷⁷ Ramis Barceló, “Las cátedras escotistas.”

⁷⁸ Ramis Barceló, “Las cátedras lulianas.”

⁷⁹ Ramis Barceló, “Les càtedres de Teologia moral.”

lism. I have thus highlighted, how authors from the Scoto-Lullist tradition engaged with the Formalist doctrine of multiple distinctions (in particular Petrus Thomae's doctrine of seven distinctions, and also Francis of Meyronnes's modal distinction). I have further addressed the issue of how to teach the Lullist doctrines, whether by following Llull's own teaching method or rather in combination with Scotism, as the Scoto-Lullists held.

The evolution of "Scoto-Lullism" is more linked to the development of Scotism than to Lullism. Its beginnings lie at a time when Scotist literature was at its peak and in the context of fifteenth-century syncretism. The authors discussed, especially Fernando de Córdoba, Joan Llobet and Pere Dagui, were creative thinkers who sought to combine Lullism with other traditions such as Scotism and Nominalism. From Dagui onwards, the combination of Scotism and Lullism became more stable, as can be seen in Jaume Janer, who advocated a Scoto-Lullist metaphysics, and in Bernard de Lavineta, although he was much closer to Llull than to Scotus. The crisis of Scotism in the sixteenth century also led to the crisis of Scoto-Lullism. The tradition only recovered toward the end of the century, when the Franciscan Observants decided to resume the earlier tradition of learning. The synthesis of Valerio Valier incorporated elements of Scotism and Central European Lullism. At the same time, a process of institutionalization of "Scoto-Lullism" began with the inauguration of a special chair for Lullism at the Convent of San Francisco in Palma de Mallorca. This process was the background of Francesc Marçal's Scoto-Lullist project. Later, it developed into a whole set of Lullist and Scotist chairs at the University of Mallorca.

From a doctrinal point of view, the backbone of Scoto-Lullism is the set of ideas defended by Pere Dagui, especially in regard to distinctions and how to harmonize Scotist and Lullist thought. Dagui was a Neoplatonic in his general presentation of the divine substance and angels (as were, in essence, Scotus and Llull), while in descending to the corporeal substances, he adopted a critical Aristotelianism (as did both the Subtle Doctor and the Illuminated Doctor, at least in some works). Dagui's conception of God was characterized by a Platonic-Augustinian emanantism in combination Scotus's univocity of being and Llull's theory of divine dignities. The divine substance constituted an aggregate formed by various formal parts with each their ontological entity. Llull's Art, despite using different terminology, allowed a similar result. Thus, from Dagui to Marçal, a fundamental metaphysical assumption was that a formal *ex natura rei* distinction obtains between the divine attributes (or dignities). Starting from this metaphysical foundation, our authors attempted to show further consonances between the ideas of Scotus and Llull, including in the fields of Christology and Mariology. This harmonization project was complemented with a keen interest in the Formalist doctrine of multiple distinctions. The Scoto-Lullists not only engaged with, but also actively contributed to the development of this doctrine, as may be seen in the adjacent table.

Table: The number and kinds of distinctions according to various authors

Petrus Thomae	Pere Daguí	Jaume Janer	Bernard de Lavinheta	Valerio Valier	Francesc Marçal
1. Distinctio rationis	1. Distinctio rationis	1. Distinctio rationis – simpliciter – secundum quid	1. Distinctio rationis	1. Distinctio rationis	1. Distinctio rationis
2. Distinctio ex natura rei	2. Distinctio ex natura rei	2. Distinctio ex natura rei	2. Distinctio ex natura rei	2. Distinctio ex natura rei	2. Distinctio ex natura rei
3. Distinctio formalis	3. Distinctio formalis	3. Distinctio formalis – proprie – improprie	3. Distinctio formalis	3. Distinctio formalis	3. Distinctio formalis
4. Distinctio realis	4. Distinctio realis	4. Distinctio realis – simpliciter interioris – exterioris	4. Distinctio realis	4. Distinctio modalis	4. Distinctio essentialis
5. Distinctio essentialis	5. Distinctio essentialis	5. Distinctio essentialis	5. Distinctio numerica	5. Distinctio realis	5. Distinctio numeralis
6. Distinctio se totis subjective	6. Distinctio numeralis	6. Distinctio numeralis – substantialiter – accidentaliter	6. Distinctio essentialis	6. Distinctio essentialis	6. Distinctio realis
7. Distinctio se totis objective	7. Distinctio se totis subjective	7. Distinctio modalis – simpliciter – secundum quid	7. Distinctio generica	7. Distinctio se totis subjective	7. Distinctio se totis subjective
8. Distinctio se totis objective	8. Distinctio se totis objective	8. Distinctio se totis subjective	8. Distinctio se totis subjective	8. Distinctio se totis objective	8. Distinctio se totis objective
		9. Distinctio se totis objective	9. Distinctio se totis objective		

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III. The Sixteenth Century

The Controversy over the Mutual Inclusion and the Genesis of the Doctrine of the *distinctio virtualis minor* between the Divine Attributes

Igor Agostini

Introduction

In the metaphysico-theological works of the so-called Third Scholasticism, there is a widespread thesis concerning the divine attributes: not only are they rationally distinguished from each other and from the divine essence, but they are also conceptually included in each other and in the divine essence. Thus, Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange (1877–1964) holds in his *De Deo Uno* (1938) that, since everything in God is in act, the divine attributes are distinguished from one another and from the essence by a *distinctio virtualis minor*, that is, by that kind of distinction of reasoned reason (*ratio ratiocinata*) by which they do not exclude one another and the essence (as in the *distinctio virtualis maior*), but rather are included, albeit implicitly, in each other and in the essence.¹ The same claim is made, for example, by the Benedictine Thomist Joseph August Gredt (1863–1940), to quote one more prominent author from Third Scholasticism.² The idea

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1 Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Deo Uno*, 136: “Quidquid in Deo concipitur, concipi debet ut actus purissimus. Unde attributa divina a se invicem et ab essentia distinguuntur distinctione virtuali minori, id est, non per modum excludentis et exclusi, sed per modum impliciti et expliciti.” The notion of a *distinctio virtualis* as such was already known and widely used in Sixteenth and Seventeenth scholastic debates; for some examples, see the recent article Andersen, “Javelli and the Reception of the Scotist System of Distinctions in Renaissance Thomism,” 158–59. To my knowledge, a study of the origins of the alternative of *distinctio virtualis minor* / *maior* and its possible, in fact likely, relationship with the debates around the distinction between the divine attributes remains a *desideratum*. For a recent study of the divine attributes in Early Modern scholastic theology, with some attention to the topic under investigation in the following pages, see though Marschler, “Divine Attributes,” here in particular 147. Di Vona, *I concetti trascendenti*, touches upon the problem of inclusion in regard to the transcendentals, but does not consider the mutual inclusion of the divine attributes.

2 Gredt, *Elementa philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, Metaphysica, n. 794.5, vol. 2, 201: “Thesis igitur contendit perfectiones divinas inter se distingui cum fundamento in re, ita ut

is that the divine attributes not only do not constitute different formalities in the divine essence (as in the case of the Scotist doctrine of the formal distinction), but are rather conceptually included in each other and in the divine essence. There is not only formal identity between them, but conceptual inclusion.

In this article, I shall argue that the doctrine of the *distinctio virtualis minor* between the divine attributes, a cornerstone of Neoscholastic Thomist orthodoxy, was formulated – or, at least organically elaborated – for the first time in a debate over the specific question of the inclusion of the divine attributes in one another and in the divine essence, a debate that is absent from Medieval Scholasticism and emerges only in Second Scholasticism. The debate appears to have been initiated by the Bishop of the Canaries, Bartolomé Torres (1512–1568), who later indeed was considered the initiator of this discussion. As we shall see, this debate is related to, but distinct from the more well-known debate over the distinction of the attributes; the alternative inclusion vs. exclusion, in fact, arises – as Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) first mentions, and others after him repeat it – in the context of a consideration of the distinction of reason.

1. The Thomist Background

In spite of the fact that the debate over inclusion develops in the late-sixteenth and seventeenth century commentaries on Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, which in the theological faculties had replaced Peter Lombard's *Sentences* as textbook, if one browses through the text of the *Summa*, and more generally through the entire *corpus thomisticum*, one finds no direct trace of the discussion of mutual inclusion – this in contrast to the thesis of a distinction of reason between the attributes and the related syntagma *distinctio rationis*, which we do find in Aquinas,³ albeit not as articulated into a *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* and a *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*.⁴ Certainly, some texts by Aquinas could be and in fact were cited for a position in the debate on the inclusion of the attributes.⁵ One of these texts is the second article of question 13 of the first part of the *Summa theologiae*, where Aquinas claims that God's affirmative names signify His subs-

singulae perfectiones inter se obiective non praescindant, sed in unaquaque omnes actu implicite includantur, etsi non explicantur."

³ See the classical text in Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sent.* I, dist. 2, q. 1, art. 3, ed. Mandonnet, vol. 1, 70.

⁴ The distinction between *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* and *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* was established only later and then became canonical in Second Scholasticism; see Knebel, "Entre logique mentaliste," 148.

⁵ Bartholomaeus Torres, *Commentaria*, q. 28, art. 2, disp. 2, ultimum dubium, 47ra.

tance and are predicated of Him.⁶ Another text, again in the first part of the *Summa*, is the *ad tertium* of the second article of question 27, where Aquinas affirms that the perfection of God's Being is contained in everything perfect.⁷ Even more telling is the second article of question 28, indeed the very text that prompted the debate over inclusion in Second Scholasticism. In this text, Aquinas affirms that essence and relation are identical in God.⁸ Beyond this, there is not much to be found in Aquinas. The reason is simple: Aquinas never (at any rate, not explicitly) inquired into the question of the inclusion of the attributes. The discussion in question 28 is rather focused on Gilbert of Porretan's doctrine that relations in God exist independently of the divine essence.

Within the Thomist tradition, the three most authoritative of Aquinas's commentators – John Capreolus, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara, and Thomas Cajetan – all asserted, or appeared to assert, a position which was at odds with the doctrine of the implicit inclusion as later formulated in Second Scholasticism. We must bear in mind that the context of the discussion found in these three authors of the problem of the mutual inclusion of the attributes was a reaction against Duns Scotus's doctrine of the formal distinction between divine attributes.

John Capreolus opposes Scotus in two conclusions: the first one is that the divine attributes are really identical;⁹ the second one is that they can be distinguished only by a distinction of reason.¹⁰ In spite of this, however, Capreolus says it is wrong to assume a formal (rather than real) identity between distinct (by reason) divine attributes; for this reason, he was later, in Second Scholasti-

6 Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, pars I, 13, art. 2, ed. Leon. vol. 4, 141b–42a: “huiusmodi quidem nomina significant substantiam divinam, et praedicantur de Deo substantialiter, sed deficiunt a repraesentatione ipsius.”

7 Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, pars I, 27, art. 2, ad 3um, ed. Leon. vol. 4, 311b: “In ipsa enim perfectione divini esse continetur et verbum intelligibiliter procedens, et principium verbi; sicut et quaecumque ad eius perfectionem pertinent.”

8 Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, pars I, 28, art. 2, ed. Leon., vol. 4, 321b: “Patet ergo quod in Deo non est aliud esse relationis et esse essentiae, sed unum et idem”; ad 3um, ed. Leon. vol. 4, 322a–b: “Ad tertium dicendum quod, si in perfectione divina nihil plus continetur quam quod significat nomen relativum, sequeretur quod esse eius esset imperfectum, utpote ad aliquid aliud se habens, sicut si non contineretur ibi plus quam quod nomine sapientiae significatur, non esset aliquid subsistens. Sed quia divinae essentiae perfectio est maior quam quod significatione alicuius nominis comprehendi possit, non sequitur, si nomen relativum, vel quodcumque aliud nomen dictum de Deo, non significat aliquid perfectum, quod divina essentia habeat esse imperfectum, quia divina essentia comprehendit in se omnium generum perfectionem, ut supra dictum est.”

9 Johannes Capreolus, *Defensiones theologiae* I, dist. 8, q. 4, art. 1, vol. 1, 372a: “Prima conclusio: quod sapientia, bonitas, et omnia huiusmodi attributa sunt omnino unum re in Deo, et nullatenus extra intellectum distincta.”

10 *Ibid.*, 373a: “Secunda conclusio est quod divina attributa distinguuntur ratione.”

cism, always seen as one of the most representative authorities against the doctrine of the mutual inclusion. In a third conclusion, another aspect of Capreolus's account of the divine attributes emerges: in God, there are contained not only the attributes, but also the "reasons" (*rationes*) for these attributes; when we form different concepts of the divine attributes, as we actually do by distinguishing (by reason) the divine attributes in our judgments, the multiplicity of our concepts must necessarily correspond to a plurality of "reasons" in God. If this were not so, our judgments about the divine attributes could not be true or false.¹¹

Capreolus reports Scotus's argument (such as he found it in Peter Auriol) against the distinction of reason: according to the claims of the Fathers, propositions such as 'In God truth is identical with goodness' are always considered true, not in a "formal" sense though, but in an "identical" sense; now, such claims would be in vain if nothing in God corresponds to this distinction, that is, if in God there is only a mental distinction; hence, truth and goodness (in fact, all the divine attributes) are distinguished *ex natura rei*.¹² Against this, Capreolus notes that all the theological propositions about God made by the Doctors would be destroyed if the meanings of the terms designating the divine perfections had nothing corresponding in God, or if they were synonymous. In this latter case, indeed, one would not only have to admit as formally true, for example, the proposition 'The will is the intellect,' but this proposition would in fact be equivalent to the proposition 'The will is the will.' This problem does not arise if one considers that, though all these names correspond to something simple in God, God's simplicity does not correspond in the same way to each name, for the divine names refer to God by means of different concepts (*conceptus*), in so far as the names signify firstly the concepts, and secondly the things them-

11 *Ibid.*, 375a: "Et sic omnes istae rationes sunt in intellectu nostro sicut in subjecto, sed in Deo ut in radice verificante has conceptiones."

12 *Ibid.*, 378a: "Sed doctores antiquissimi consueverunt dicere quod haec propositio: veritas est bonitas, verificatur in Deo non formaliter, sed identice; impleverunt etiam nullas membranas de attributis et habitudine quam habent inter se; quae omnia viderentur vana, si nihil corresponderet eis in Deo, sed tantum distinguerentur per intellectum. Ergo, ut videatur, distinguuntur ex natura rei". See Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 4, n. 194, ed. Vat. 4, 262: "Et istud argumentum 'de non formali identitate' dixerunt antiqui doctores ponentes in divinis aliquam esse praedicationem veram per identitatem quae tamen non esset formalis: ita concedo ego, per identitatem bonitatem esse veritatem in re, non tamen veritatem esse formaliter bonitatem." Auriol's text is quoted verbatim by Capreolus; see Petrus Aureolus, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, dist. 8, q. 3, n. 42, ed. Friedman, Nielsen, Schabel, 7: "Sed doctores antiquissimi consueverunt dicere quod haec propositio: 'bonitas est veritas' verificatur in Deo, non formaliter, sed identice. Impleverunt etiam nullas membranas de attributis et habitudine quam habent inter se; quae omnia viderentur vana, si nihil corresponderet eis in Deo, sed tantum distinguerentur per intellectum. Ergo, ut videatur, distinguuntur ex natura rei."

selves. For example, 'justice' signifies divine simplicity by means of the concept of justice, and wisdom signifies the same divine simplicity by means of another concept. Thus, the proposition 'Justice is wisdom' is not true in a formal sense, since the concepts (*rationes*) signified by the subject and the predicate are different; this, however, in no way implies a formal distinction between justice and wisdom in God. Thus, the intentional sequence involved in the act of naming of God implies both multiplicity and unity: to the plurality of names corresponds, in the thing, a single entity, i.e., God; in the intellect, each name corresponds with a distinct concept (*ratio diversa*), which prevents a formally true reciprocal predication.¹³ In later times, Capreolus's solution was always read as equivalent to the claim that the divine attributes are not conceptually included in one another – a claim with a basis in the additional (implicit) premise that if they were included, then their *rationes* would not be as manifold as their respective names. This came to be the standard doctrine opposed by the advocates of inclusion.

Francesco Silvestri took a similar stance. In his commentary on *Summa contra gentiles* I, chapter 24, he claimed that wisdom is certainly not outside the formal and quidditative reason of the essence, if one considers the divine essence in itself; but, if one considers the divine essence such as it is conceived by a human mind, wisdom is outside of the essence.¹⁴ Let me note in passing that a similar claim had already been made by Gregory of Rimini, even though he had aligned himself with the Ockhamist doctrine of the unity *re et ratione* of the divine attributes.¹⁵ Gregory denied the possibility of a *quid tertio modo* predica-

13 Capreolus, *Defensiones theologiae* I, dist. 8, q. 4, art. 2, ad arg. Scoti contra primam conclusionem, vol. 1, 394b–95a: "Ad decimumquartum dicitur quod ille qui poneret significata nominum perfectionalium non habere aliquid correspondens a parte rei in Deo, destrueret dicta Doctorum. Similiter, qui poneret omnia ista nomina idem significare et eodem modo, destrueret dicta Doctorum; quia tunc ista nomina: bonus, sapiens, essent synonyma; et ista propositio esset formalis: voluntas est intellectus, sicut ista: voluntas est voluntas. Sed ille qui ponit quod in Deo correspondet idem omnino simplex omnibus istis nominibus, sed non eodem modo, utpote quia iustitia significat talem rem mediante isto conceptu, et sapientia significat eandem rem mediante alio conceptu (nomen enim prius significat conceptum quam rem, ut dicitur 1. *Contra Gentiles*, cap. 35), non destruit dicta Sanctorum. Nec habet dicere quod ista sit formalis, iustitia est sapientia, propter diversitatem rationum significatarum per subjectum et praedicatum."

14 Franciscus de Sylvestris, *Commentaria in Summam contra gentiles* I, cap. 24, n. 3.2, in Thomas de Aquino, *Opera omnia* 13, 75b: "Quod autem additur de sapientia, non est simile. Sapientia enim non est extra formalem et quidditativam rationem essentiae, si consideraretur divina essentia secundum quod in se est: sed tantum secundum quod a nobis diversimode concipitur."

15 Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura* I, dist. 8, q. 1, art. 2, vol. 2, 32. On Gregor's position, see Agostini, "Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza and the Problem of the Distinction between the Divine Attributes."

tion of the attributes among themselves and of the divine essence.¹⁶ This is the background of Suárez's later puzzlement by the ambiguity of Gregory's position.¹⁷

Among the great Dominican commentators, Thomas Cajetan appears to have pursued a different approach. In his commentary on *De ente et essentia*, chapter six, he defends a position that later advocates of the rational inclusion doctrine came to see as an anticipation of their own view. Cajetan, referencing chapter 5 of Pseudo-Dionysius's *The Divine Names*, claims that absolute perfections in God are not limited by their own nature; they are rather co-extensive with God's infinite Being. Consequently, they constitute in God indistinctly and formally one simple formal *ratio*. And just as, for example, the divine wisdom is no more wisdom than goodness, or truth or the divine Being itself, so the formal *ratio* of the divine Being does not include Being itself in any higher degree than it includes Wisdom, Goodness, or Truth. For, if an adequate definition of that most simple thing, which is God, were possible, then everything in God would be included in this one formal *ratio*; otherwise, the definition would not equal the divine perfection. Therefore, God, when understanding himself, forms only one formal *ratio* of himself, namely, the *Word*.¹⁸

In support of this point, which is an argument against Scotus, Cajetan develops a distinction between two meanings of 'infinity,' which later, in Second Scholasticism, was universally accepted by the supporters of the doctrine of inclusion. Infinity taken *secundum propriam rationem* is not limited to any degree of perfection, but nevertheless is limited when compared with the totality of the perfection of Being taken in an absolute sense. Infinity taken *simpliciter* is not

16 Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura* I, dist. 8, q. 2, art. 3, 97.

17 See Franciscus Suárez, *Tractatus de divina substantia* I, cap. 11, n. 7, in *Opera omnia* vol. 1, 42b: "Et quod mirabile est, idem sentit ibi Gregorius [...] cum alias teneat haec attributa nec ratione distingui." See also Gabriel Vázquez, *Commentariorum ac disputationum*, q. 28, art. 2, disp. 118, cap. 2, vol. 2, 67a–b: "Imo et Gregor. in I. d. 8. q. 2. art. 2. cum doceat, attributa non distingui ratione, hoc est perfectiones in Deo, quasi ipse appellat attributales: et solum distinguat attributa per connotata; affirmat nihilominus, unum de alio formaliter non predicari."

18 Thomas De Vio [Cajetanus], *In De ente et essentia commentaria*, cap. 6, q. 12, ed. 1562, 315a: "Cum autem secundum Dionysium quinto capitulo de Divinis nominibus, perfectiones simpliciter sint in Deo non ad proprias naturas definitae, sed ad ipsius esse illimitationem elevatae; consequens est, ut sicut omnes in una simplicissima re formaliter adunantur, ita in illius simplicissima ratione formali indistincte formaliter sint. Et sicut sapientia divina non magis est sapientia, quam bonitas et veritas et ipsum esse divinum, et contra; ita ratio formalis ipsius esse divini non magis includit ipsum esse, quam sapientiam et bonitatem. Si enim adaequata diffinitio illius rei simplicissimae, quae Deus est daretur, in illa unica ratione formali quicquid est Deus, includeretur formaliter: aliter diffinitio celsitudinem infiniti non adaequaret: unde et ipse Deus gloriosus, qui seipsum per modum sui intelligitur, unicam tantum rationem formalem format, Verbum scilicet."

limited to any degree of perfection within the entire scope (*latitudo*) of Being and contains the totality of the perfections of Being (*perfectiones essendi*). The first kind of infinity, considered within the bounds of a determinate nature, has a formal limitation; the second kind of infinity, extending to the entire latitude of Being, has an infinite formal *ratio* and contains all possible perfections of Being. Thus, whereas in the first sense of infinity the formal *ratio* of infinite wisdom coincides with the formal *ratio* of wisdom, which it does not exceed in perfection, in the second sense of infinity the *ratio* of infinite wisdom contains all perfections in the absolute sense and, as a consequence, is indeed more perfect than the formal *ratio* of wisdom.¹⁹

In contrast to Capreolus, Cajetan is always cited, in the subsequent debate in Second Scholasticism, as one of the authorities supporting the doctrine of mutual inclusion. Though not explicitly mentioned, we may assume that Cajetan on this point, like on others, is also the source of Domingo Báñez. Báñez affirms that although infinite wisdom does not explicitly include the infinity of essence, it does include it implicitly and virtually.²⁰ However, in a passage of another of his works, the *Commentarii illustres in Quinque Mosaicos Libros*, Cajetan seems to follow a very different path from his commentary on *De ente et essentia*. Here, he asserts that God is named using such terms as 'being,' 'fortitude,' and 'eternity' in order to capture everything which is in or belongs to him, namely, his essence, powers, and duration without beginning or ending.²¹ It would seem that the plurality of the names of God here requires a plurality of *rationes* which these names express and among which there is, therefore, no inclusion at all.

It is clear, though, that Cajetan's insistence, in his *Commentarii*, on the plurality of the divine *rationes* can be explained in light of the simple need for him to maintain the multiplicity of the divine names used in *Holy Scripture*. Here, he is far from engaging in a metaphysical debate on the status of divine attributes. Moreover, the eventual conceptual tension between the text of the *Commentarii illustres* and the commentary on *De ente et essentia* can be explained without too much difficulty. By asserting, in his commentary on *De ente et essentia*, that the divine attributes are included in each other formally, Cajetan simply intends, like Capreolus before him, to combat the Scotist doctrine of the formal distinction. His aim is to show that the attributes do not constitute truly distinct real formalities, and in order to do that, he needs to affirm not merely their real identity

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 315b–16a.

²⁰ Dominicus Báñez, *Scholastica commentaria in universam primam partem*, vol. 1, q. 28, art. 2, 774: "Quamvis expresse infinita sapientia non importet infinitatem essentiae, tamen implicite et virtualiter importat."

²¹ Thomas De Vio [Cajetan], *Commentarii illustres*, cap. 21, 98–101: "Nominatur autem Deus a tribus: videlicet ab esse, a fortitudine et ab aeternitate ad comprahendendum omnia quae Dei sunt: essentiam, vires, et durationem sine principio et fine."

(also acknowledged by Scotus), but also their formal identity. But he neither needs nor intends to establish a conceptual inclusion among the attributes in addition to their real and formal identity. This is why he can affirm both the formal identity of the divine attributes and the plurality of their *rationes*. Inclusion is characterized by Cajetan by opposition to formal distinction, and therefore, it does not imply conceptual identity. Doubtless, Francesco Silvestri intended just this, when he spoke of the quidditative exteriority of the attributes; probably, the same can be said of Capreolus as well.

Thus, in the seventeenth-century debate, Adam Tanner, one of the major opponents of the doctrine of inclusion, went so far as to say that the claim that the divine attributes are not conceptually included in one another and in the divine essence is the position held by all the old Scholastics (“Haec sit communis sententia veterum Scholasticorum”).²² Conversely, the doctrine of inclusion was characterized as something peculiar to the moderns. Diego Granado, an advocate of the implicit inclusion, though claiming to follow Cajetan, explicitly admitted that the matter was set out more clearly by recent writers (“Idem clarius et magis ex professo amplectuntur Recentiores”).²³

Interestingly, the main authoritative source adduced in support of the doctrine of the inclusion in the later debate did not come from the Thomist tradition. It was this passage from chapter 16 of Anselm of Canterbury’s *Monologion*:

Omne namque quod iustum est, per iustitiam iustum est. Et alia huiusmodi similiter [...]. [Q]uodlibet bonum summa natura sit, summe illud est. Illa igitur est summa essentia, summa vita, summa ratio, summa salus, summa iustitia, summa sapientia, summa veritas, summa bonitas, summa magnitudo, summa pulchritudo, summa immortalitas, summa incorruptibilitas, summa beatitudo, summa aeternitas, summa potestas, summa unitas, quod non est aliud quam summe ens, summe vivens, et alia similiter.²⁴

In the light of all this, the question arises of when and how, within the long history of the Thomist tradition, the shift from the formal inclusion, found in Aquinas’s commentators, to the doctrine of the conceptual inclusion, found in Third Scholasticism, came about. This is the question I aim to answer in the following sections. As we shall see, Bartolomé Torres and Francisco Suárez are key figures in this development.

22 Adamus Tannerus, *Universa theologia scholastica*, disp. 2, q. 2, dubium 5, vol. 1, col. 209.

23 Jacobus Granadus, *Commentarii in Summam theologicam Sancti Thomae*, tract. 2, disp. 7, vol. 1, 188.

24 Anselmus Cantuariensis, *Monologion*, cap. 16, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 1, 30–31.

2. From Bartolomé Torres to Louis de Molina

The reason for the success of the doctrine of the conceptual inclusion in Second Scholasticism was that it alone could enable an assumption of a distinction of reason with a real foundation, without falling back into the Scotist doctrine of a formal distinction *ex natura rei*. In order to assert that the divine attributes are formally included in one another, it is necessary to assert that the concept of any one of these includes, in some way, the concepts of the others; the formal inclusion must, in some way, be conceived as a conceptual inclusion.

This turn was initiated by Torres, who is also the first author to formulate the problem of inclusion as an autonomous question, one that is separate from the question of distinctions. This happens at the end of the second disputation of his commentary on question 28 of the first part of the *Summa theologiae* (first published in 1567). The debate over inclusion that unfolded in Second Scholasticism originates in this text.²⁵ Torres is aware that Aquinas is here only speaking of the distinction between relations in God and the divine essence; however, since Aquinas also mentions the problem of the relationship between essence and attributes, this second problem should be addressed too.²⁶ In the context of the question posed in the first *disputatio* (*An attributa distinguantur ex natura rei a se invicem et a divina essentia*), Torres therefore finds place for a special section:

Ultimo sese offert quaestio, quae maximam in se continet difficultatem: an videlicet, Dei attributa de se invicem verificentur formaliter et essentialiter; ita ut quodlibet sit de essentia alterius.²⁷

This is a text of capital importance. Not only is the question of the mutual inclusion posed explicitly, but it is so, for the first time, independently from the question of distinction. In dealing with this new issue, Torres asserts that the position of Capreolus and other (unnamed) Thomists is dangerously close to Scotus's. Torres insists that according to Capreolus, although propositions in which one attribute is predicated of another are true *identice*, they are nevertheless false *formaliter*.²⁸ According to Torres, to assert the formal falsity of the reciprocal

25 On Torres's importance, and for a first sketch of the controversy that I reconstruct here at length, see Agostini, "Oltre la *distinctio rationis*." I quote from the 1583 edition of his *Commentaria*.

26 Bartholomaeus Torres, *Commentaria*, q. 28, art. 2, 40va: "In praesenti articulo sanctus Thomas ex professo tractat, de distinctione relationum ab essentia: sed quoniam ferme eadem est difficultas, de distinctione attributorum ab essentia, et quia eorum non nullam facit mentionem in responsione ad argumenta, ob id de utraque distinctione in praesentia agemus."

27 Torres, *Commentaria*, q. 28, art. 2, disp. 2, ultimum dubium, 46vb.

28 *Ibid.*, 47ra: "Eandem defendit Capreolus ubi supra, et plures alii doctores Thomistae, qui asserunt quod quamvis propositiones in quibus unum attributum praedicatur de alio, sint ver-

predication of the attributes is to assume a formal distinction – which, as we know, Capreolus had denied. This undesirable convergence with Scotus explains both why in Second Scholasticism Capreolus's position was looked upon with suspicion and why the doctrine of inclusion had such significant success. The distinction of reason, as such, if not supplemented by the doctrine of inclusion, is not sufficient to render formally false, contrary to what Capreolus says, the reciprocal predication of attributes which are distinguished by reason. Taken alone, it dangerously risks overlapping with the Scotist formal distinction.

Torres asserts as truer (*magis vera*) the sentence according to which there is a mutual implication between the attributes and the essence. Every attribute is included in any other attribute and in the divine essence. Thus, for example, the divine intellect belongs to the essence of the divine will, and vice versa; and eternity belongs to the essence of wisdom, and vice versa; and so on for each attribute.²⁹ Consequently, if an attribute is the subject of an essential definition, any other attribute will be included in that definition. Hence, any proposition in which one attribute is predicated of another attribute is true not only *identice*, but also *formaliter* (or, the proposition itself is “formal”).³⁰

Torres's prudence – viewing Capreolus's position as not false, but as less true than the doctrine of inclusion – was soon abandoned by others. Just a few years later, Molina sides with Torres against Scotus, renouncing all caution. Molina, too, discusses the question of the inclusion as an autonomous issue: *Utrum singulis attributis, et essentiae divinae, omnia, et singula reliqua essentialia sint*. His position is the same as Torres's:

Attributa divina, secundum esse, quod habent in Deo, ita affecta sunt inter se, et cum divina essentia, ut de ratione cujusque eorum sint caetera, ipsaque divina essentia.³¹

The argument for this, given by Molina a few lines later, is identical with Cajetan's. Torres had not considered this argument. Each attribute (and the same goes for the essence) is not simply infinite, but rather unlimited in perfection, i. e., perfect in every respect, and therefore contains, by its very nature and in an

ae identice, sunt tamen falsae formaliter et quod sola rationis distinctio inter ea sufficit ad faciendum propositiones falsas, ac si ipsa realiter distinguerentur inter se.”

29 *Ibid.*: “Nos existimamus, oppositam sententiam magis veram: videlicet, quodlibet attributum includi essentialiter in quolibet, atque esse de essentia cuiusvis alterius: ita ut intellectus divinus sit de essentia divinae voluntatis, et vice versa: atque aeternitas de essentia sapientiae, et e contrario, ac de reliquis eodem pacto.”

30 *Ibid.*: “[...] adeo ut si unum posset definiri definitione quid rei, omnia alia attributa includerentur in eius definitione: et ex consequenti omnis propositio, in qua unum attributum de altero praedicatur, formalis atque essentialis est.”

31 Ludovicus Molina, *Commentaria*, q. 28, art. 2, disp. 4, 404a–b.

absolute sense, all perfection.³² If this were not the case, then an attribute would not be unlimited in perfection by its intrinsic nature, which is perfect in every respect. Consequently, it could be made more perfect by the addition of a further perfection. This further perfection, therefore, would be outside its nature and the attribute would be in potency with respect to it – and this contradicts both the divine simplicity and the actuality of the divine perfections. The consequence is that the divine attributes and the essence belong to the intrinsic nature of one another. The essence and the attributes are all one (*omnia sint unum*) in God; they are not multiple.³³

Molina invokes the authority of both Anselm's *Monologion* and Torres, from whom, however, he distances himself on a decisive point. Torres had argued that the mutual inclusion between the attributes is always mediated by the essence: any divine attribute includes the other attributes not because of its formal reason, but because it includes the divine essence. On the contrary, Molina, following Cajetan in his commentary on *De ente et essentia*, claims that each attribute expresses the totality of perfection because of its own formal reason, and therefore it contains all the remaining attributes, even if it is conceived as distinct from them and limited to a certain kind of perfection.³⁴

Molina's move had capital consequences. Cajetan elaborated his doctrine of inclusion in opposition to Scotus's formal distinction, and therefore it only suggested a formal inclusion of the attributes. His doctrine was now adduced in support of the radical claim that the attributes are *tout court* included in each other, without further specification. The idea of such a conceptual inclusion transformed Cajetan's (but also Capreolus's and Silvestri's) doctrine of formal inclusion from being an anti-Scotistic doctrine of the distinction of reason into something very different, namely a much stronger doctrine of the distinction of reason, one that is no longer conceived merely in opposition to Scotus, but rather in opposition to the view that the distinction of reason between the attributes excludes their conceptual inclusion. The final step in this development was taken by Francisco Suárez in his *Disputationes metaphysicae*.

32 *Ibid.*, 404b: "[...] tum unumquodque attributorum, tum etiam divina essentia de sua intrinseca ratione formali est in Deo, non solum quiddam infinitum, sed etiam illimitatum quoad perfectionem, omnive ex parte perfectum, ac proinde de sua intrinseca ratione habens omnem universim perfectionem simpliciter."

33 *Ibid.*

34 *Ibid.*

3. Francisco Suárez's Decisive Step

Suárez's *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1597) attest not only to the fact that the problem of the inclusion has now become an autonomous issue, as already seen in Torres and Molina, but rather also to the transformation of the question of the inclusion into a specific problem of *conceptual* inclusion. Inclusion is here no longer defined in opposition to the Scotist formal distinction, but is rather opposed to the distinction of reason itself.

In Disputation 30, sect. 6, Suárez addresses the issue in the following terms: given that the attributes constitute the divine essence, do they also belong to the essence of God? (*Potest autem non immerito dubitari, an haec attributa non solum sint essentia, sed etiam de essentia ipsius*).³⁵ This problem arises because there are cases in which real identity does not coincide with essential inclusion. In God, relations, while constituting the divine essence, are not essential to it, and in finite being, the individual difference is not really distinguished from the individual nature and yet it is not essential to it. It is important to note that in these two cases, there is real identity, but in combination with a distinction only of reason. It is thus possible for two aspects of a thing to be rationally distinct from one another and yet not to be included in the essence of one another. Some authors, Suárez says, would like to extend this case to the relationship between the attributes themselves and their relationship to the divine essence. Their arguments, however, are weak, because all the divine perfections, insofar as they are in God, do belong to His essence.³⁶ Suárez argues for this conclusion from the premise that God by essence is a supremely perfect entity. Consequently, if conceived precisely, that is to say if conceived according to what belongs to His essence, God essentially includes every possible perfection. Hence, the attributes, which *simpliciter* signify these divine perfections, are contained in God's essence.³⁷

According to Suárez, the argument given is sufficient in itself. Nevertheless, the point can be reinforced by a more radical and deeper proof. Speaking in absolutes, being really identical with the essence (*esse in re idem cum essentia*) is not the same thing as being essentially included therein (*esse de essentia*); for real identity, the lack of real distinction suffices; for essential inclusion, more is

³⁵ Francisco Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 30, sect. 6, n. 4, in *Opera omnia*, vol. XXV, 90b. For an introduction to Suárez's discussion of divine attributes, see Marschler, "Divine Attributes," 139–44.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, n. 5, 90b: "Eodem modo certum existimo, et ratione naturali evidens, omnes has perfectiones absolutas, prout sunt in primo ente, esse de essentia ejus."

³⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 5, 91a: "Deus, ex vi sui esse necessarij, ex seipso est ens essentialiter summe perfectum; ergo praecise conceptum hoc ens secundum id quod est de essentia ejus, includit omnem possibilem perfectionem; ergo attributa quae significant has perfectiones simpliciter, ita in Deo continentur, ut sint de essentia ejus."

needed, since the essence is not fully constituted as long as any perfection belonging to the essence is not included.³⁸

Here lies the difference between the divine relations and the attributes. The relations are identical with the divine essence, but they are not also essential to it; on the other hand, in the relation of the essence to the attributes, and in the reciprocal relations between the attributes, the real identity coincides with essential inclusion. According to Suárez, the divine perfections, or attributes, thus belong to each other's essence, and the whole essence of God belongs to the essence of the individual attributes.³⁹ It follows that, on the one hand, there is a distinction of reason between the divine perfections, though on the other hand, they constitute a *simplicissima perfectio* which adequately expresses the essence of God.⁴⁰ To support this view, Suárez both has recourse to the same authority as Molina, namely Anselm, and offers a number of arguments. The first one is that if the divine essence essentially includes attributes, they must essentially be contained in one another. Another argument is one we have seen in Cajetan: every attribute is infinite not only in its own category, but in an absolute sense; therefore, it must include, in its essential *ratio*, the essence of any other attribute.⁴¹ The problem, for Suárez, is to establish what kind of inclusion is at stake here. Since the inclusion can be both *real* and *rational*, it becomes pertinent to know if one is talking about the attribute in itself or the attribute as conceived by a human mind. In the first case (*real inclusion*), to say that the essence includes the attributes and that the attributes include one another is true, but improper; it would then no longer be possible to discriminate the case of the attributes themselves from that of the relations between essence and attributes, since in the latter case too there is mutual inclusion. Further, real inclusion would render true such predications as 'God is merciful by justice and God judges by mercy' – as if two distinct attributes were mere synonyms. In the second case (*rational inclusion*), to assert that the divine essence includes the attributes would be false, because justice, as it is conceived by a human mind, is independent of all other attributes, and the same is true of God's essence.⁴²

38 *Ibid.*, n. 9, 91b: "Fateor enim in universum non converti esse in re idem cum essentia et esse de essentia, nam ad illud prius sufficit quod in re non sit distinctio, ad hoc vero posterius necesse est ut non possit rei essentia esse plene constituta praeciso eo quod dicitur esse de essentia; et consequenter ut hoc ipsum ita in ejus ratione includatur, ut in nullo possit reperiri talis essentia, quin de ejus essentia sit quidquid dicitur esse de essentia talis naturae."

39 *Ibid.*, n. 10, 92a: "Ex quo ulterius concluditur has divinas perfectiones seu attributa inter se comparari, ut omnia sint de essentiali ratione cujuslibet, et tota essentia Dei sit de essentia singulorum."

40 *Ibid.*: "Atque adeo, ut licet plura a nobis ratione distinguantur, in re solum sit una simplicissima perfectio, quae tota est adaequata essentiae Dei."

41 *Ibid.*

42 *Ibid.*, n. 10, 92b.

The solution proposed by Suárez is that statements of inclusion are, of course, about things considered as conceived by a human mind, although in a way such that these statements refer to the things themselves.⁴³ The step here taken by Suárez is decisive. The formal inclusion is transformed into a conceptual inclusion, albeit a conceptual inclusion with a real foundation. To argue his point, Suárez resorts to the traditional distinction between *modus concipiendi* and *res concepta*. Certainly, our human conception of God is imperfect, originating as it does from knowledge of imperfect things. From this structural limitation of human knowledge, however, no falsity follows, because we do not attribute to the thing known the imperfection of our conception. Beyond the imperfect mode of our conception, we do conceive true divine perfection. We thus do conceive the true nature of God, when we make statements about the inclusion of the divine attributes:

Sic igitur talem concipimus esse naturam Dei, ut judicemus, in re ipsa esse de illius essentia omnia attributa, et perfectiones, quas divisim, et per varios conceptus nos apprehendimus.⁴⁴

Suárez establishes a distinction between judgments of non-inclusion of relations in the essence and judgments of non-inclusion concerning the attributes; the first ones are always true, but not the second ones. We must further distinguish between cases where judgments refer to things in themselves, and cases where they refer to things as distinctly and expressly conceived by a human mind. It is true that a given *res* which one conceives under a given *ratio* (e.g., justice or intellect) formally and essentially includes also other *rationes* (such as mercy or the will), but it would be false to say that this inclusion also holds in regard to things as distinctly and expressly conceived by humans. The human mind rather decomposes the thing known (in itself a unity) into a plurality of inadequate concepts.⁴⁵

Any assumption of inclusion on the level of the things as conceived by humans are certainly false, albeit under one specific condition, namely that these *res* are conceived expressly and distinctly (*expresse et distincte*). In one sense, in fact, even if the attributes are considered not *secundum rem*, but as conceived by humans, the assumption of inclusion is true; this is when such inclusion is not express and distinct, or *explicit*, but rather only *implicit*. The concept of one attribute is distinguished from the concept of another by means of a *praecisio simplex*, not by means of a *praecisio exclusiva*. For example, justice as conceived by a

43 *Ibid.*, n. 11, 92b: "Respondetur, sermonem esse de rebus ipsis quae a nobis concipiuntur in Deo, prout concipiuntur a nobis, ita tamen ut illa reduplicatio non designet modum concipiendi ex parte nostra, sed ex parte rei conceptae."

44 *Ibid.*

45 *Ibid.*, n. 12, 93a.

human mind does not expressly include mercy, but neither does it exclude it.⁴⁶ The concept of one attribute is not so abstract from the others that it does not include them implicitly.⁴⁷

Here, it is no longer the Scotist formal distinction, but rather a distinction of reason that excludes rational inclusion. As Suárez himself shows at the beginning of the treatise *De divina substantia*, that the attributes do not belong to the divine essence (nor vice versa, nor one attribute to the essence of another) is in fact a point made also by some of the advocates of the distinction of reason. The problem here is how to think the very distinction of reason in God. According to Suárez, this distinction entails an implicit inclusion not simply of the *res* as conceived, but of their own proper concepts.

The notion of an *inclusio implicita* is the theoretical core around which Suárez redesigns the theory of the distinction of reason in God, both as concerns the relations between the essence and the attributes and the relations of the attributes among themselves. According to Suárez, God's attributes prescind from the explicit and distinct perfection of the divine essence; but they are nevertheless implicitly included in this essence:

Hinc facile etiam intelligitur, quo modo essentia Dei concipiatur praecisis attributis, quando eam cum illis comparamus, vel haec illi attribuimus. Praescinduntur enim ab expressa et distincta perfectione essentiae totiusque perfectionis ejus, non tamen ab implicita inclusione, ut sic dicam.⁴⁸

In this way, Suárez could overcome that difficulty, which had led not only Capreolus, but also Cajetan and Silvestri, to accept a plurality of *rationes* (though formally identical) in God, namely, the impossibility of reciprocal predication. Suárez's solution is that the impossibility of reciprocal predication does not exclude the identity of the *rationes*, because this identity is not explicit, but implicit. Suárez is aware that he is here walking along an unexplored path; he accordingly expresses himself rather cautiously (*ut sic dicam*). The path chosen, however, is for him inevitable. Only this approach allows him to think of human knowledge of the divine essence and its attributes in terms of a progressive process of making properties explicit that are initially given only implicitly. This process has two main steps. The first step concerns the constitution of the concept of the essence by adding to the common concept of entity, or essence, a negation or perfection proper to God. Though the perfections which constitute the essential *ratio* of divine nature are here not distinctly grasped, these perfections are nevertheless contained in this *ratio*. Therefore, the concept of God's

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, n. 15, 93b.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 15, 93b–94a: “Imo nec secundum abstractionem pure praecisivam ita abstrahuntur alia attributa, quin in ejus conceptus includantur saltem implicite.”

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, n. 16, 94a.

essence prescind from these perfections, albeit at the same time implicitly containing them.⁴⁹ The second step consists in the explication of the individual attributes, which are mutually predicated of themselves and of the divine essence. In order to make this predication possible, a distinction according to our *modus concipiendi* suffices. Because this difference is only in our *modus concipiendi*, the predication is nothing other than the explication of what is implicitly contained in the concept of the essence. For example, when we call God 'just' or 'wise,' we only make explicit what is implicit in the concept of the divine essence.⁵⁰

The importance of this point for the entire project of the *Disputationes metaphysicae* should not be underestimated. The *a priori* knowledge of God that Suárez, at the beginning of Disputation 30, had affirmed as possible for human beings on the basis of the distinction of reason, i.e., the deduction of one attribute from another one, and which is the basis of the inclusion of God in the subject matter of metaphysics, now reveals its deep structure. If this deduction presupposes the rational distinction, but the latter always implies inclusion, then the deduction of the attributes takes the form of a process of making explicit what is already implicit in the initial concept.

This is why that objection does not hold, according to which the attributes that pertain to God owing to the *ratio* of His essence must be deduced from it, and therefore are not conceptually included in it. The essence is the *ratio* of the attributes not *secundum se*, but according to our human *modus concipiendi*; in the light of this *modus concipiendi*, an inadequate concept of the divine essence necessarily requires that a given perfection is attributed to that essence. Thus, to deduce an attribute from God's essence is not simply to affirm that this attribute belongs to God, but that it does so essentially. The relation between the essence and the attribute is thus, in God, different from the relation between essence and property in creatures. The same applies to the reciprocal relationship between the attributes, which can be deduced from one another, under the condition that the attribute from which another one is deduced has a certain kind of priority (*ratio prioritatis vel praesuppositionis*) when compared to the other. This is the case, for example, with the relationship between intellect and will. The relation between inclusion and deduction is therefore of a completely different kind than the one intended in the objection; far from being excluded from the possibility of founding a deduction of the attributes from another, inclusion rather consti-

49 *Ibid.*: "Concipio enim essentiam Dei per communem conceptum entis vel essentiae adiungendo aliquam negationem vel perfectionem qua fiat proprius Dei, ut concipiendo essentiam simpliciter infinitam, aut ex se actuaalem, per quem conceptum distincte non considero quae perfectiones sint de ratione essentialis talis naturae; et hoc modo dicuntur praescindi per talem conceptum; tamen implicite seu confuse non possunt excludi aut praescindi, quia in perfectione illius rei conceptae essentialiter continentur."

50 *Ibid.*

tutes the more intimate structure of such deduction.⁵¹ It is because they are included in one another that the divine attributes can be essentially predicated of one another.

Because of the impossibility of grasping an adequate concept of God, the essential inclusion is not known immediately, but only by means of an inferential movement, in which one attribute is logically presupposed by another, without there being either confusion or repugnance between the attributes. There thus is no confusion *in re*, but rather essential identity and simplicity.⁵² The deduction of one attribute from another and from God's essence, far from being incompatible with the inclusion, is rooted in it. Even though Suárez affirms the *incredibilis vel admirabilis unitas* of God, whereby all the attributes are included in one another and in the divine essence, he at one and the same time thinks this unity can be illustrated by an example from the sphere of creation. Let us consider the specific *differentia* of human beings, i.e., rationality. If rationality is conceived together with the genus, then the entire essence of man is conceived. Thus, a specific difference, though one and indivisible in itself, can be conceptually divided into a plurality of concepts (*quasi per partes*, as Suárez says), which express in a distinct manner all that was confusingly contained in the single concept of this specific difference.⁵³

The case of the distinction between specific difference and essence must be distinguished from the case of the composition between specific difference and genus, which are not included in one another, since the genus does not belong to the *ratio* of the difference. A *compositio rationis* obtains here, albeit one that is founded in reality. This explains how such a composition certainly repels God, not because of divine simplicity, but because of divine infinity. Non-inclusion is compatible with a distinction of reason founded on inadequate concepts (one that can also be called a formal distinction). The distinction of reason thus applies both to cases of inclusion *secundum rationem* and to cases of non-inclusion: *Haec omnia cadunt sub latitudine distinctionis rationis*.⁵⁴ The mutual relationship of the divine attributes, and of these with the essence falls within the "latitude" of the *distinctio rationis* at the precise point where this coincides with inclusion. It is thus irreducible to the other cases where a distinction of reason applies: on the creaturely level: the composition of a category and a difference, but also of essence with existence; on the level of uncreated being: the relations which bind, in Trinitarian theology, the relations to the essence, and, in rational theology, the negative attributes.

51 *Ibid.*, n. 17, 94a–b.

52 *Ibid.*, n. 18, 94b: "Unde nulla est in re confusio, sed summa et essentialis identitas et simplicitas."

53 *Ibid.*, n. 18, 94b–95b.

54 Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 7, sect. 1, n. 22, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 26, 258a.

4. Gabriel Vázquez's Criticism – and Suárez's Response

Suárez's solution was not unanimously accepted in the Jesuit theology of his time. Some Jesuits accepted the doctrine of the rational inclusion, while others rejected it. His most radical opponent was probably, as on other issues, Gabriel Vázquez. But interestingly, even in Vázquez, the controversy over the inclusion is not only central, but is treated autonomously from that of distinction. In Disputation 119 of his *Commentaria*, he thus addresses the question, *An attributa divina mutuo de seipsis et de essentia praedicari possint*. Vázquez carefully justifies this autonomy. On the one hand, he observes, the solution to the posed question is also a clarification of how to understand the distinction of reason between the divine attributes; on the other hand, however, and exactly for this reason, the two questions do not overlap. The problem of inclusion divides the supporters of the distinction of reason; the question does not concern Scotus in any way. Those who assume a formal distinction between the divine attributes also admit *a fortiori* their non-inclusion. Hence, the question divides *only* the supporters of the distinction of reason.⁵⁵ Vázquez's justification of the autonomy of the question of the inclusion over that of the distinction follows that of Suárez. His own solution, however, is completely anti-Suárezian, even though his direct polemical target is the 'Canariensis' – as he calls Torres – who assumed, as we have seen, both a distinction of reason and mutual inclusion.

Vázquez first challenges Torres with an argument *ex autoritate*. He invokes both Capreolus's canonical doctrine of the distinction of reason, and Gregory of Rimini's assertion that the divine attributes are not distinguished rationally, but only through their extrinsic connotations and that they cannot be formally predicated of one another. Vázquez also has rational arguments to prove his thesis. The first one is that acceptance of the mutual inclusion would lead one to say that it is the will that understands and the intellect that wills.⁵⁶ Vázquez's use of this argument is significant. The argument was one of those used by the advocates of the distinction of reason against the *Nominales*, that is, against the opponents of the distinction of reason between the attributes vis-à-vis indistinct unity. Already Vázquez's use of this argument indirectly reveals an

55 Gabriel Vázquez, *Commentariorum ac disputationum*, I, q. 27, art. 2, disp. 1189, cap. 1, vol. 2, 66b: "Nunc autem cum eis solum nobis controversia est, qui docent attributa Dei sola ratione inter se, et ab essentia distingui." See also Vázquez's remark on Scotus; *ibid.*: "Mitto autem sententiam Scoti, qui locis citatis supra disputatione 116. cap. 3. cum existimet, attributa inter se, et ab essentia distingui ex natura rei, asserit non praedicari invicem, sed in sensu formali propositionem, in qua unam de alio enunciamus, esse falsam."

56 *Ibid.*, 67b: "Si in sensu formali unum attributum de essentia, vel unum de alio praedicaretur, quilibet etiam actus attributorum, de quovis attributo in sensu formali posset praedicari: diceremus ergo, intellectus vult, voluntas intelligit, iustitia miseretur, et misericordia punit."

important problematic knot in the discussion of the rational inclusion, namely the difficulty of defending the thesis of the inclusion along with the thesis of the distinction of reasoned reason.

This point emerges from Vázquez's third argument, which moves precisely from Torres's thesis that each attribute includes the others not directly in their formal *ratio*, but via the divine essence. Torres's conception has all the elements which make the rational inclusion untenable. As we have seen, already Molina tried to distance himself from Torres. However, whereas Molina aimed to offer a more solid foundation for the rational inclusion, Vázquez rather shows the weakness of Torres's position in order to overturn the doctrine of rational inclusion altogether.⁵⁷ Vázquez is aware of the undesired outcome which the doctrine of the rational inclusion potentially involves, namely, a denial of the rational distinction between the attributes. Therefore, his final argument against the inclusion is based on the incompatibility of inclusion with the distinction of reason. If the essence and each of the divine attributes "transcend" (*transcendit*), i.e., do not include, the (other) attributes, then there cannot be any distinction of reason between the essence and attributes or between the attributes; there is then rather just one concept.⁵⁸

Against this argument one could object, Vázquez notes, that inclusion does not remove the distinction because it is only implicit. I believe that, in reporting this objection, Vázquez is tacitly referring, as is often the case, to Suárez. The argument cited here by Vázquez stems from Suárez, as we have already seen. Vázquez's reply to this objection must, therefore, be seen as a reply against the radical turn that Torres's doctrine of inclusion had taken in Suárez's *Disputationes metaphysicae*. Vázquez attacks Suárez's strategy by arguing that the question is not, whether inclusion is *really* given (*in ipsa re*), in which case it cannot be denied due to the simplicity of God; the question, instead, concerns the essence and the attributes as conceived by humans. At this second level, it must be affirmed that if the apprehension of a given attribute (e.g., mercy) does not explicitly include another one (e.g., justice), then it will not include it in any other way, because what is not explicitly in our thought (*in nostra cogitatione*) cannot be included in the thing thought (*in re cogitata*) insofar as it is thought. Let me quote the crucial passage in full:

57 *Ibid.*: "Ipse Canariensis dicit, hanc propositionem concedi non posse, divinus intellectus in quantum intellectus est voluntas, quia particula, in quantum, denotat rationem formalem, et non est verum, rationem formalem intellectus divini esse rationem formalem voluntatis, ergo sine particula, in quantum, sine qua propositio accipi potest in sensu formali neganda est: nam si sensus sit, attributa suapte natura omnino idem esse inter se, et cum essentia, nullo modo neganda est, ut contra Scotum manet probatum."

58 *Ibid.*, 67b–68a: "Denique si essentia transcendit omnia attributa, et quod quolibet attributum caetera; tollitur prorsus distinctio rationis, et omnia in unum conceptum confundimus."

Verum haec solutio nihil momenti habet; hic enim non agimus de ipsa re, ut ex extra nostrum intellectum; sic enim manifestum est esse rem adeo simplicem, ut non sit aliud et aliud ullo modo; quare nec aliquid in alio dicitur includi; sed reipsa esse unum quid simplicissimum. Disserimus ergo de essentia divina et attributis, ut sunt in nostra cogitatione; an ea ita sint diversa, ut unum in alio non includatur, sed ut diversum apprehendatur et in alio non inclusum. Quod si, quando apprehendimus misericordiam Dei, cum ea in nostro conceptu expresse non est iustitia, sequitur in nostro conceptu misericordiam non esse iustitiam, licet reipsa iustitia in misericordia contineatur, vel potius sit idem; quia quod expresse non est in nostra cogitatione, non includitur in re cogitata, prout a nobis cogitatur.⁵⁹

As a result, the distinction of reason between the divine attributes, far from being compatible with the inclusion, consists exactly in the fact that the attributes do not include one another. Thus, between justice and mercy, or will and intellect, there is a distinction of reason insofar as one is not included in the concept of the other.⁶⁰ Hence, Vázquez denies any coincidence, in the case of God, between rational inclusion and rational distinction. He rejects the idea that the divine attributes and the divine essences can be *formaliter* predicated of one another, this being possible only *identice*.⁶¹

This explains why Suárez's main concern in his discussion of divine attributes in the *De divina substantia*, published in Lisbon in 1606, is to reestablish, against Vázquez, the coincidence which he had established in the *Disputationes* between inclusion and the distinction of reason. Here, Suárez begins by reiterating a thesis he had already advanced in 1597, namely that the identity between the attributes does not in itself imply their *essentialitas*.⁶² The point is confirmed by the case of the divine relations: they are not really distinguishable from God's essence, and yet they do not belong to the divine essence either. Thus, having demonstrated that the divine attributes are not distinguished *ab essentia*, the question remains whether they are so *de essentia*.⁶³ Or, conversely, whether the divine essence essentially belongs to the individual attributes.⁶⁴ Or,

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 68a.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*: "Cum expresse apprehendimus misericordiam, et iustitiam, intellectum, et voluntatem; omnino diversos conceptus de illis formamus, quorum unus nullo modo in alio est: ita erga differunt ratione, ut in nostro conceptu unum attributum aliud non comprehendat."

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 68a–b.

⁶² Franciscus Suárez, *Tractatus de divina substantia*, I, cap. 11, n. 1, in *Opera omnia* vol. 1, 33a: "Non satis est ostendisse identitatem, ut inferatur ex ea essentialitas (ut sic dicam) seu quod unum sit de essentia alterius."

⁶³ *Ibid.*: "Quamvis ergo attributa non distinguantur ab essentia, adhuc superest quaestio, an sint de essentia."

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, cap. 12, 36a–38a (title of the chapter): "An divina natura sit de essentia omnium et singulorum attributorum, ita ut de illis essentialiter dicatur."

concerning the attributes themselves, whether one belongs to the essence of the others.⁶⁵

Suárez adds, so far agreeing with Vázquez, that the question does not concern Scotus alone. That the attributes do not belong to the divine essence (nor vice versa, nor one attribute to the essence of the others) is a thesis upheld by the proponents of the distinction of reason.⁶⁶ For the distinction of reason it is sufficient that a predicate is outside of the essence of the subject when grasped as fully constituted according to a human mind's *modus intelligendi*. This is clear, for example, in the case of transcendental properties which, although rationally distinct from being (*ens*), do not belong to the essence of being as such. This is also the case with the relation between the essence of God and the attributes, where cognition of the divine essence as fully constituted precedes cognition of the attributes. Suárez notes that just one Thomist, Capreolus, inclines towards a conception from which it seems to follow that the attributes, taken formally, do not belong to the divine essence and are not essentially predicated of it; rather, whatever belongs to the essence cannot be excluded from it, not even precisely (*praecise*); nor can whatever is outside of the concept of the essence be essentially predicated of it. Since, however, affirmative attributes are actually and positively predicated of God, Capreolus must be wrong. He is not even faithful to Aquinas, who (in *Summa theologiae*, pars prima, q. 13, art. 2) had asserted that the names of the affirmative attributes signify the substance of God and are predicated of God essentially.⁶⁷ Suárez's reference to Aquinas is a part of a broader objective. Suárez needs to ground his own thesis on the broadest possible consensus of sources. What is at stake is not fidelity to Aquinas. Suárez rather needs to escape the accusation of advancing a too innovative thesis without, as his contemporaries noted, any basis in the Fathers and the Doctors. Suárez therefore invokes the authority of, among others, Pseudo-Dionysius, Augustine, and Anselm (referring in particular to his *Monologion*, chapter 16).⁶⁸

As a result of Vázquez's criticism, Suárez's aim in the *De divina substantia* is no longer the same as in his *Disputationes metaphysicae*. The crucial point is that the doctrine of the rational inclusion could seem to lead Suárez dangerously close to the Nominalist doctrine of the rational indistinction of the attributes. Suárez, of course, does refer to his *Disputationes metaphysicae*. What he expounded at length there will now be addressed "in all brevity" (*brevi discursu*). However, Vázquez's objections have changed the situation. Suárez begins with

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, cap. 13, 38a–41a (title of the chapter): "Utrum attributa invicem se includant salva distinctione rationis eorum, tam inter se quam ab essentia."

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, cap. 11, n. 1, 33a: "Videtur itaque non esse de essentia, non solum in opinione Scoti, ex qua necessario id sequitur, sed etiam supposita sola distinctione rationis."

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, cap. 11, nn. 1–2, 33a–b.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, n. 3, 33b–34a.

summarizing some of his own points made back in 1597. Predicates common to both God and creatures ('living,' 'spiritual,' 'intellectual'), he says, are essentially predicated of created substances, but "much more essentially" (*multo magis essentialiter*) of God. Such predicates constitute in God a peculiar and singular essence, distinct from all others; it includes all the essential *rationes* of these predicates. The inclusion of the attributes in the divine essence can also be clarified on the basis of the supreme perfection of the divine nature. If wisdom, for example, were not included in God's essential concept, God would not be infinite in essence, since He would not include every possible perfection in His essential concept.⁶⁹

As in 1597, Suárez's argument does not concern the purely ontological level of the attributes; he is though concerned with the essence and the attributes considered *de re ipsa*, and not only *de re ut obiecta nostro conceptui*. Thus, the essence and the attributes and their mutual relationship of inclusion are considered too as conceived in our mind. Suárez thinks that human beings can have a true concept of divine nature – but this would not be possible if this concept did not include everything essential to God.⁷⁰ Indeed, if the attributes were not included in the conceived essence, then it would follow that these perfections do not belong to the essence of that nature thus conceived. Then, either the conception is wrong, or else the inclusion does not apply to the divine nature in itself; and since these two options are excluded, we may assume that the totality of perfections is included in the concept of the divine essence.⁷¹

The argument to the opposite shows only that the inclusion cannot be understood explicitly, but not that there is no inclusion at all. In the judgment 'God is wise,' the whole essence of God is conceived in the predicate. This does not mean that the predicate attributed to the subject is outside of the essence of the subject, but only that an attribute which was confusingly conceived in the essence of the subject is made explicit and is distinctly enunciated.⁷² The concepts of the divine attributes and the essence are originally included in one another, though only implicitly. This inclusion becomes explicit on the predicative level, when the concepts of the essence and/or the attributes are predicated of one another. In other words, the concepts become distinct by lifting the confused knowledge of the predicates as included in their subject.

69 *Ibid.*, n. 4, 34a–b.

70 *Ibid.*, n. 6, 35a: "Suppono enim vere nos concipere divinam naturam veram et non fictam. Quia fieri non potest, ut in re sic concepta non includantur omnia, quae in re sunt de essentia ejus, quia secluso aliquo essentiali non manet essentia."

71 *Ibid.*

72 *Ibid.*, n. 7, 35a–b: "Explicari et distincte enuntiari, quod in essentia subjecti confuse tantum concipiebatur."

The key problem, for Suárez, consists in showing how the implicit inclusion can be compatible with the distinction of reason. Suárez insists that this is not only a problem for the advocates of the formal distinction, but also for those who advocate the distinction of reason. It seems that in order to be conceived distinctly, in any way whatsoever, even if only by reason, two concepts must be different from one another, and as a consequence cannot be included in one another. In spite of this, Suárez maintains that the distinction of reason is compatible with the mutual inclusion.⁷³ This is because the distinction of reason does not necessarily require an intrinsic diversity of the *res concepta*, but only a diversity in our *modus concipiendi*.⁷⁴ This latter diversity can hold either between what is abstract and concrete (e.g., 'God' and 'Deity'), or between what is implicit and explicit.⁷⁵ In this second sense, we distinguish between the divine attributes. They implicitly refer to the same thing (*res*), but explicitly denote two different *rationes*. For example, justice and mercy are rationally distinguished; while conceptually included in one another, they indicate different *habitudines* with respect to their effects.⁷⁶

The compatibility between distinction of reason and conceptual inclusion is based on one condition: each concept implicitly including the others contains, considered explicitly (*expressa cogitatio*), only one determinate *ratio*, namely that particular *ratio* which qualifies this concept as the concept of just one determinate attribute and not of some other attribute. Thus, the inadequacy of the inclusion, i.e., that the inclusion is explicit only with reference to one *ratio*, explains how one attribute can include the totality of the attributes while being rationally distinct from the others. In short, the feature of implicitness saves the inclusion from becoming genuine indistinction. It is not necessary that all the terms distinguished by reason from one another are included in each other (as is evident in the case of the relations between genus and difference, or between relation and divinity). Moreover, the inclusion is certainly not incompatible with the distinction of reason; the latter owes itself solely to the imperfection of our *modus intelligendi*.⁷⁷

73 *Ibid.*, cap. 13, n. 8, 40b: "Respondeo, optime salvari distinctionem rationis inter attributa et omnes enunciationes, quae de illis sunt, non obstante mutua inclusione quam explicuimus."

74 *Ibid.*: "Dico ergo, ad distinctionem rationis satis esse diversum modum concipiendi nostrum, etiamsi in re concepta nihil diversum includatur."

75 *Ibid.*: "Ille autem modus concipiendi esse potest vel concreti et abstracti, ut in exemplis positus vel explicator et distinctior conceptus secundum unam rationem, quam secundum aliam."

76 *Ibid.*

77 *Ibid.*, cap. 13, n. 10, 41a: "De distinctione autem rationis jam explicatum est, quomodo possit consistere cum inclusione essentiali: nam licet non sit necessarium omnia, quae distinguuntur ratione, ita sese includere ut de genere et differentia constat, et de relatione et Divinitate infra suo loco dicemus, tamen non propterea repugnat illa inclusio cum distinctione ratio-

In spite of Suárez's efforts, Vázquez's criticism did not remain isolated. Christovao Gil and Adam Tanner, among others, resolutely rejected the inclusion thesis.⁷⁸ Despite this reaction, the Suárezian thesis was widespread. At least two authors should be mentioned here: Pedro de Arrubal⁷⁹ and, above all, Diego Granado. In the whole post-Suárezian Jesuit tradition, the latter gave probably the most accurate elaboration of the problem of inclusion.⁸⁰ In turn, Granado attracted reactions from many other theologians, who in him saw the new chief advocate of the doctrine of inclusion. In reaction to Granado, Rodrigo de Arriaga, for example, attempted to restore the teaching of Vázquez.⁸¹

5. The Reception in Later Thomism

One of the fiercest critics of Suárez's doctrine, Adam Tanner, agreed with Suárez on a decisive point: the solution to the question of the distinction between the divine attributes, when resolved by assuming a distinction of reason, still leaves the question of the conceptual inclusion unresolved.⁸² Tanner also subscribes to Suárez's decisive point: it can be asserted that the divine attributes are not included in one another and in the essence regardless of whether one thinks they are distinct *ex parte rei*, as in Scotus's case, or whether one thinks they are distinct due only to the human *modus concipiendi*. The latter is the view of Vázquez, and basically, of the "old scholastics."⁸³ Among these "old scholastics,"

nis ex modo imperfecto concipiendi ut explicatum est, maximeque est necessarium in re et essentia simplicissima ac perfectissima quoad ea omnia, quae adaequate cum illa identificantur."

⁷⁸ Christophorus Gillus, *Commentationum theologicarum de sacra doctrina* II, tract. 2, cap. 3, n. 6, 505a–b; cap. 7, nn. 7–10, 527b–531a; cap. 8, nn. 1–11, 531a–38a; Tanner, *Universa theologia scholastica*, tomus primus, disp. 2, q. 2, dub. 5, 211."

⁷⁹ Petrus de Arrubal, *Commentariorum ac disputationum in primam partem Divi Thomae*, disp. 10, cap. 13, vol. 1, 188b.

⁸⁰ Jacobus Granadus, *Commentarii in Summam theologicam Sancio Thomae*, tomus primus, tract. 2, disp. 7, vol. 1, 88–92 (title of the disputation): "Utrum Divina attributa ita distinguantur ratione mutuo, et ab essentia Dei, ut se invicem, et Dei essentiam includant, ab eaque includantur essentialiter." Granado, *ibid.*, 88, expresses his own position as follows: "Nunc vero dicendum est Divina attributa, de quibus in superioribus disputationibus egimus, esse essentialia naturae Divinae, et hanc ipsis attributis atque adeo pertinere ad essentiam singulorum."

⁸¹ Rodrigo de Arriaga, *Disputationes theologiae in primam partem D. Thomae*, disp. 2, sect. 8, subsect. 3, vol. 1, 47.

⁸² Adamus Tannerus, *Universa theologia scholastica*, disp. 2, q. 2, dubium 5, vol. 1, col. 208: "Tametsi quidem ex dictis satis constet, attributa divina omnia, etiam positiva, esse ratione distincta ab essentia; adhuc tamen est quaestio, annon saltem haec in ratione, et conceptu adaequato essentiae includantur, seu ad eam quovis modo pertineant."

⁸³ *Ibid.*, col. 209: "Haec sit communis sententia veterum Scholasticorum."

Tanner includes not only Capreolus and Silvestri, but also Cajetan; he refers to the latter's commentary on *Genesis*, chapter 21. Tanner thus not only rejects the doctrine of rational inclusion for lack of backing in the scholastic tradition, but also believes it has no support in Cajetan's authority. In spite of Tanner's efforts, the doctrine of the formal inclusion (indeed a Thomist doctrine, as we know) was soon transformed, within the Thomist tradition, into a doctrine of rational inclusion. The Thomists contrasted this new doctrine not only with Scotus's formal distinction, but also with the rational distinction without inclusion, as advocated by Vázquez and others. We see an example of exactly this in the Dominican theologian Giovanni Domenico Montagnoli's *Summa* commentary of 1610.⁸⁴

In the same year, Giovanni Paolo Nazario too challenged the non-inclusive distinction. In his commentary on the *Prima pars*, q. 28, art. 2, controversy 1, he first presents the thesis of inclusion as directed against the Scotist doctrine and on the basis of Cajetan's authority.⁸⁵ This initial approach is substantially modified in Nazario's subsequent discussion of the objections against Cajetan by the Scotist Juan de Rada in his *Controversiae theologicae inter S. Thomam et Scotum*. Rada not only reiterated the doctrine of the formal distinction,⁸⁶ but also replied to all of Cajetan's arguments. In particular, with regard to the distinction of the two senses of infinity established by Cajetan, he observed that infinity understood in the second way implies only real identity, not formal identity. If infinite wisdom were formally identical with infinite goodness *ex natura rei*, then it would follow that God would be formally wise both owing to the *ratio* of wisdom and to the other attributes, e.g., goodness or mercy, which seems to be a contradiction.⁸⁷ According to Nazario, Cajetan already has an answer to Rada's

84 Ioannes Dominicus Montagnolius, *Defensiones theologiae angelicae* I, q. 28, art. 2, 167b–68a: “[...] Vasq. disp. 119. c. 2. quantum ad attributa divina, sic habet. Ita ratione distinguuntur attributa inter se, et ab essentia, ut unum non sit de conceptu alterius: et in sensu formali falsa est propositio in qua unum de alio praedicatur. Enimvero communis Theologorum modernorum sententia repugnat Gabrieli, praesertim Molina. Et certe si excellentiam Dei, et infinitatem consideremus, sit ut etiam in sensu formali unum de alio verificetur.”

85 Ioannes Paulus Nazarius, *Commentaria et controversiae*, q. 28, art. 2, contr. 1, vol. 2, 85b: “Prima conclusio. Essentia divina, et attributa, nullam habent inter se distinctionem actualem ex natura rei. Probatur ex Caiet. in dicto cap. 6. Quia divina essentia et attributa abstracta abstractione praecisissime, sunt formaliter, et simpliciter infinita. Ergo sunt idem formaliter, et simpliciter infinita.”

86 Ioannes de Rada, *Controversiae theologicae*, contr. 4, concl. 3, vol. 1, 88b: “Divina attributa inter se sunt non idem formaliter ex natura rei: ita quod secluso opere intellectus ex natura rei unum non est aliud formaliter, ut sapientia non est formaliter bonitas, sicut animalitas non est formaliter rationalitas. Conclusio est Scoti [...].”

87 *Ibid.*, 89b: “Et si sapientia infinita esset formaliter bonitas infinita ex natura rei, sequeretur, quod sicut Deus est formaliter sapiens ex natura rei sapientia, similiter erit formaliter sapiens bonitate, et misericordia: quod rationi contrariari videtur.”

objection. Cajetan proved very well what Rada denies, namely, that to a most simple infinite thing must correspond a most simple formal *ratio*; if this were not the case, the thing in question would not be intelligible through a single concept.⁸⁸ By asserting the existence of a single concept of God, Nazario was basing the formal inclusion on the conceptual inclusion; there is not only a single formal *ratio*, but indeed a single *concept*.

The doctrine of inclusion was defended even more resolutely, almost in the middle of the seventeenth century, by John of St. Thomas (also known as João Poinset). In his commentary on question 3, on divine simplicity, he merely asserts that the attributes are formally included in the divine essence and in one another.⁸⁹ He returns to this point, with more details, in his commentary on question 28. After summarizing the debate over inclusion, he explains that the solution depends on how one understands the divine essence. There are two options. If the divine essence is understood as identical with a nature as a specific concept distinct from its properties, operations, and persons, then the attributes and the relations are not included in the formal concept of the divine nature, and, contrariwise, the concept of the nature is not included in the formal concepts of the relations and attributes.⁹⁰ If the divine essence is instead understood as an uncreated entity, then not only the divine essence is included in the essential concepts of the persons, relations, and attributes, but the attributes and relations are vice versa included in the essential *ratio* of the divine essence.⁹¹ This reciprocal inclusion, John therefore says, concerns attributes considered not according to our human *modus significandi*, but rather as *res significata*.⁹² Far from eliminating the rational inclusion, John rather – following Suárez – shows its

88 Nazarius, *Commentaria et controversiae*, q. 28, art. 2, contr. 1, vol. 2, 88b: “Respondeo. Cajetanum optime probasse quod negat Rada, ex hoc quod uni rei infinitae ac simplicissimae debetur una ratio formalis simplicissima; alioquin non esset per se primo unum intelligibile unico verbo expresso.”

89 Ioannes a Sancto Thoma, *Cursus theologicus*, q. 3, disp. 4, art. 6, vol. 1, 118a: “Attributa formaliter includuntur in essentia Divina, et in ipso conceptu actus puri, imo unum attributum in alio.”

90 *Ibid.*, q. 28, disp. 13, art. 2, vol. 2, pars altera, 93a: “His positis duabus conclusionibus respondeo. Prima est si divinitas seu divina essentia sumatur in vi conceptus naturae, secundum quod ly *natura* dicit conceptum specificum, et proprium condistinctum a proprietatibus, operationibus, et personalitatibus, sic neque attributa, neque relationes sunt de conceptu formali naturae divinae, neque e converso conceptus naturae est de formali conceptu relationum et attributorum.”

91 *Ibid.*: “Secunda conclusio: Si essentia sumatur in vi conceptus entis increati, ut sic, seu actus puri, qui est conceptus increati, ut sic, seu actus puri, qui est conceptus transcendentalis ad omne quod in Deo est, et increatum esse habet, sic non solum divina essentia est de conceptu essentiali personarum et relationum, atque attributorum, sed etiam attributa, et relationes sunt de essentiali ratione, et connexion cum ipsa essentia divina.”

92 *Ibid.*

internal limitation. The inclusion, clearly a conceptual one, concerns our concepts, though considered in their reference to the things themselves.

The doctrine of the rational inclusion had at this point more or less explicitly penetrated Thomism. Just a few years after John of St. Thomas, we find further testimony of this in Godoy.⁹³ It is also attested by Vincent Ferre in his *Commentaria scholastica*, published in 1680. He claims, against Vázquez and his Jesuits followers, that the objective concept of every divine perfection includes, at least implicitly, the objective concepts of all other perfections. If it did not, then it would be only potential; consequently, no concept of divinity is implicitly independent of the other concepts.⁹⁴ Ferre opposes Vázquez's doctrine of the implicit inclusion. Clearly, for Ferre, the polemical objective is no longer the Scotist formal distinction, but rather the non-inclusive distinction of reason; indeed, an entire paragraph is dedicated to refuting Vázquez.⁹⁵

This position is also found in the major systematical works of Thomism that, from the second half of the seventeenth century onwards, succeeded the genre of the commentaries on the *Summa*. Pierre Labat, in his *Theologia scholastica*, begins by asserting the doctrine of the implicit inclusion against Duns Scotus's doctrine of the formal distinction.⁹⁶ He then addresses the crucial problem which had prompted the whole debate, that is, the risk that the distinction of reason, in so far as it presupposes a multiplicity of *rationes*, may end up converging with the formal distinction. He discusses the objection that two aspects are distinguished *ex natura rei* when different definitions correspond with them; now, the divine attributes do have different definitions; therefore, they are distinguished *ex natura rei*. To this objection, Labat answers that the definitions of the divine attributes are different if they are regarded as exclusive, but not if they are regarded as implicitly inclusive.⁹⁷ This was exactly the Suárezian solution to the problem, based on the idea of an implicit conceptual inclusion between the

93 Petrus de Godoy, *Disputationes theologiae in Primam Partem Divi Thomae*, vol. 3, tract. 10, disp. 77, sect. 2, 104b: "Ex dictis colligitur primo, Divinam essentiam claudere actu implicite in essentiali conceptu Attributa divina [...]. Secundo colligitur, unum attributum claudere in suo conceptu essentialiter aliud."

94 Vincentius Ferre, *Commentaria scholastica*, tract. 2, q. 5, § 8, n. 449, 218b: "Partem affirmantem defendunt Vazquez [...] et alii innumeri Jesuitae, sententia tamen negativa communis est in schola Thomistica, et tenenda a nobis, probaturque, nam si in conceptu objectivo alicujus divinae perfectionis actu non includerentur omnia divina saltem implicite, ille conceptus esset potentialis, potentialitate opposita actui puro; hoc autem non est dicendum: ergo nullus conceptus divinitatis praescindit secundum implicitum ab aliis perfectionibus divinis."

95 *Ibid.*, §. 9, nn. 451–54, 219b–21b.

96 Petrus Labat, *Theologia scholastica*, pars prima, tract. 1, disp. 3, dub. 2, § 2, 135: "Probatur 4. Attributa divina sese formaliter includunt, saltem implicite, ergo repugnat importare distinctionem ex natura rei."

97 *Ibid.*, § 4, 140.

attributes. A little further on, Labat repeats the point, when he explains that the attributes may be considered in two ways, as explicit or as implicit. In the first way, an attribute is virtually distinguished from the other attributes and opposed to them; in the second way, it rather includes them and can even be formally predicated of them.⁹⁸ The attributes, thus, *are* not only formally identical, but can be formally *predicated* of one another (a point explicitly denied by Capreo-lus, as we know).

The position of Labat's famous student, Jean Baptiste Gonet, in his *Clypeus theologiae thomisticae*, was similar. The divine attributes are included in the concept of all the other attributes and the divine essence.⁹⁹ He explains that if the divine attributes are considered as implicitly containing the concept of uncreated and infinite being, then they are identical: in fact, that concept is unique, simple and indivisible, and is included in the same way in all the attributes; if, on the contrary, they are considered explicitly by analogy to the analogous perfections found in creatures, then they are distinct from one another.¹⁰⁰ In the first case, the attributes are predicated of one another and of the divine essence – not only identically, but also formally, and both concretely and abstractly.¹⁰¹ Gonet discusses the objection that, if each attribute can be formally predicated of the others, then each attribute *is* the other, and it then becomes possible to say that the intellect loves, that the will intends, and so on. To this objection, he answers that it is only when considered explicitly that a particular attribute (e.g., *miseri-cordia*) is not formally identical with another (e.g., *iustitia*).¹⁰² Each attribute may indeed be considered in two ways, either according to its proper and explicit concept (as such, it is virtually distinct from the other attributes), or else exactly as containing all the other attributes.¹⁰³ It follows that each attribute can be predicated of the others according to its implicit *ratio*, but not according to its explicit one.¹⁰⁴

The same doctrine can be found in Gotti's influential *Theologia scholastico-dogmatica* from 1727–1735. The *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* between the essence and the persons, the essence and the attributes, and between the attributes themselves is not a distinction between terms which are related to one another as excluding and excluded (*penes excludens, et exclusum*); rather, it con-

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, § 4, 143.

⁹⁹ Ioannes Baptista Gonet, *Clypeus theologiae thomisticae*, pars prima, tract. 1, disp. 3, art. 3, n. 2, 67a: "Attributa divina, inter se, et ab essentia, ita ratione distinguuntur, quod essentia in suo conceptu implicite includit attributa, et includitur in illis, et quodlibet attributum includit caetera."

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 67a–b.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 67b.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

cerns terms which are related to one another as explicitly or implicitly included (*penes explicitum, et non explicitum*). In fact, the distinction between excluding and excluded terms implies a potency-act relationship (as found, for example, in the relationship between animality and rationality), which must be excluded from the divine essence.¹⁰⁵ Gotti's discussion illustrates the Thomist endorsement of Suárez's main point that the alternative between implicit and explicit inclusion concerns different views of the distinction of reason. Finally, we find the same doctrine in Charles-René Billuart's *Summa S. Thomae hodiernis academiarum moribus accommodata* from 1746–1751. The divine attributes are distinguished from the essence by means of a virtual distinction (i.e. a distinction of reasoned reason), though not by means of a *major* one, but rather of a *minor* one, i.e., one that is not *per modum excludentis et exclusi*, but *per modum includentis et impliciti*.¹⁰⁶ And this kind of distinction is exactly the so-called *distinctio virtualis minor*, which was used, as we have seen, in twentieth-century scholasticism in order to express the doctrine of the mutual inclusion of the divine attributes, i.e., that particular relationship that was conceived by Torres and endorsed by Suárez, and then by many a Thomist, and owing to which the divine attributes are conceptually included in one another without being, at the same time, distinguished from each other merely by a distinction of reasoning reason (*ratio ratiocinans*).

Conclusion

Let us now return to the issue addressed at the beginning of this article. The shift from Thomas Aquinas and the doctrine of his first commentators toward the doctrine of Neothomism was mediated through the extensive debate over inclusion in seventeenth-century scholastic theology. Two steps in this development may be separated: first, the transition from the indeterminacy of the question in

¹⁰⁵ Vincentius Ludovicus Gotti, *Theologia scholastico-dogmatica*, tract. 2, q. 4, dubium 1, n. 9, § 76, 108b: "Dico, Distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, quae datur, tum inter essentiam, et Personas, tum inter essentiam, et attributa, tum inter attributa invicem, non est penes excludens et exclusum, sed solum penes explicitum, et non explicitum, seu implicitum."

¹⁰⁶ Carolus Renatus Billuart, *Summa S. Thomae*, pars prima, diss. 2, art. 3, n. 3, vol. 1, 131: "Attributa divina a se invicem et ab essentia, item relationes ab essentia distinguuntur distinctione virtuali, seu rationis ratiocinatae, non quidem majori quae fit per modum excludentis et exclusi, sed minori, quae est per modum includentis et impliciti." The argument adopted was, as usual, the traditional one, coming from Cajetan, based on the infinity *simpliciter in genere entis* of every divine attribute; see *ibid.*, 132: "Distinctio rationis ratiocinatae major, seu quae se habet per modum excludentis et exclusi, est qua unum cum fundamento in re ita ab alio praescinditur, ut nullo modo etiam implicate illud in conceptu includat, sed ad illud in potentia remaneat ut quid trahibile et perfectibile per illud tanquam per aliquid extraneum: atqui talis distinctio in Deo concipi non potest."

Aquinas to the doctrine of the formal identity in Cajetan; second, the transition accomplished by Torres, Molina, and especially Suárez, from the doctrine of formal identity, i. e., real inclusion, to the doctrine of conceptual inclusion. That the Suárezian doctrine of distinction by implicit inclusion coincided with what later went by the name of a ‘virtual minor distinction’ has been noted by other scholars.¹⁰⁷ However, if my reconstruction is correct, Suárez did not only endow the Thomism of later centuries with the model of a particular type of distinction. He did much more than that: he decisively influenced the later Thomist and Neo-Thomist conception of the divine attributes. The widespread Neo-Thomist doctrine of the virtual minor distinction between God’s attributes does not come from Aquinas at all, but from Suárez.

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107 See Daniel Heider’s contribution to this present volume.

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Suárez on the Formal Distinction

A Shift in Opinion?

Daniel Heider

Introduction

Scotus's influence on Suárez's metaphysics can be regarded as an established historiographical fact. It is not necessary, here, to describe the influence from Scotus on his metaphysical system, which is guided by an ontological view of metaphysics characterized by an emphasis on the unity of the notion of being.¹ At the same time, Suárez's metaphysics has often been taken as being substantially inspired by nominalism. Some have even spoken of Suárez's "conceptualization of the Scotistic perspective," and "nominalization of Scotus."² However, while Scotus's model is often taken as a guide or significant inspiration for Suárez's project, the crucial and distinctive device of his metaphysics, namely his *distinctio formalis* conceived as an *ex natura rei* actual but less-than-real distinction, is throughout the *Disputationes metaphysicae* (*DM*, first published in 1597) consistently dismissed and replaced by the *distinctio virtualis*, which is of a lesser ontological commitment. A paradigmatic instance of the nominalizing attenuation of the formal distinction is Suárez's theory of universals, namely in the distinction between the common nature and the individual difference (*haecceitas*). In *DM* 5 and 6, in which Suárez deals with the issues of the individual and formal and universal unity, he makes clear that he is following Scotus's *status quaestionis*. At the same time, however, he "transforms" his formal distinction into the virtual distinction.³ Adherence to this reduction and the employment of the virtual distinction, generally embraced by Thomists, holds not only for Suárez-

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¹ For Scotus's influence on Suárez's metaphysics, see Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens*, 200–94; Heider, *Suárez a jeho metafyzika*, 419–31; Hoeres, "Francis Suárez and the Teaching of John Duns Scotus"; among recent works, see Novák, "Suárez's Notion of Analogy."

² For these labels, see my "The Nature of Suárez's Metaphysics" and "Suárez on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Universals"; for the talk of Suárez's nominalism, see, among others, Shields and Schwartz, "Francisco Suárez," 2.1.

³ For Suárez's metaphysics of universals, see my *Universals in Second Scholasticism*, 23–97, especially 32–5.

ez's metaphysics but also for his theology. This can be seen not only in his *DM* 30, sect. 6, where he deals with the issue of the nature of distinction between the divine nature and the divine attributes, but also in his *De deo uno et trino* (*DUT*, first published in 1606), in which he treats in detail this topic as well as the distinction between God's essence and the divine persons.

In this article, I aim to show that this seemingly universal "reductive substitution" of the formal distinction need not necessarily hold for *all* of Suárez's *opera*. My goal is to show that in his early *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima* (*CDA*, written in the first half of the 1570s, but published by Balthasar Alvarez after Suárez's death as late as 1621) we find a passage in *Quaestio* 6 of *Disputatio* 2 on the topic of the containment of lower souls in the higher soul, in which Suárez might be interpreted as embracing the formal distinction as a less than real actual distinction *ex natura rei*. At the present time, I am not going to claim that Scotus also applied the formal distinction to the soul's parts.⁴ I do not find that he would do this in respect to the unitive containment of the lower souls in the higher souls. As is well known, unlike Suárez,⁵ Scotus applies the formal distinction to the distinction between the soul and the powers that are unitively contained in it.⁶

I shall proceed in four steps. First, I am going to outline Suárez's general theory of the relevant distinctions, as introduced in *DM* 7 (*De variis distinctionum generibus*). In this section, I shall focus on the passages in which Suárez explicitly treats Scotus's *distinctio formalis*. Second, following the thrust of *DM* 7, I intend to show how Suárez elaborates two theological issues, one related to the nature of the distinction between the divine essence and the divine attributes, the second concerning the distinction between the divine essence and the divine persons. Third, I shall closely examine a passage from *CDA*, disp. 2, sect. 6, entitled *Utrum sit recta et sufficiens animae divisio in vegetativam, sensitivam et rationalem*, dealing with the issue of the inclusion of less perfect souls in the more perfect (rational) soul, in which Suárez seems to employ the formal distinction. Lastly, in the conclusion, I shall claim that should Suárez's change of mind be shown to be true it would be far from the only doctrinal shift in his philosophical and theological thought.

4 As I learnt from email communication with Vitaly Ivanov and Garrett R. Smith and other experts on Scotus's philosophy, striking as it may sound, there seems to be no passage in Scotus's *corpus* in which he would deal with the issue of the unitive containment of the lower souls in the higher (rational) soul.

5 For Suárez there is a real distinction between the soul and its powers. For this, see *CDA*, vol. 2, ed. Castellote, 1981, disp. 3, q. 1, 56–82.

6 For unitive containment based on the real identity and the formal distinction between the soul and its powers and the powers themselves, see Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition*, 146–49; for his most extensive treatment of this issue, see Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* 2, dist. 16, q. un., nn. 18–19, ed. Vivès, vol. 23, 74–75.

1. Suárez's Theory of Distinctions: Formal Distinction as Virtual Distinction (DM 7.1)

In the first section, called *Utrum praeter distinctionem realem et rationis sit aliqua alia distinctio in rebus*, of DM 7, Suárez raises the question of whether, apart from the real and the conceptual distinction (literally, the 'distinction of reason'), there is also another, "medial," distinction in things. He assumes the existence of two genera of distinctions, namely the real and the conceptual. The first distinction is defined as a distinction between two things. Really distinct things can exist either separately or as united. While the first, existing separately, applies to two substances or two accidents inherent in two distinct substances, the second, existing united, holds for matter and form of a single material substance, or for the substance and quantities of an elementary ontological aggregate – despite their unitive existence, one of these two extremes can be separated from the other, if not naturally, then at least by divine absolute power.⁷

In contrast to the real distinction, the conceptual distinction is not a distinction which exists formally and actually in a thing. It is a distinction that exists in a thing only in so far as the thing is denominated by our concepts. In line with scholastic tradition, Suárez distinguishes two kinds of this distinction. While the first is the distinction of the reasoning reason (*distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*), the second is called the distinction of the reasoned reason (*distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*). Regarding the first, it is produced by different modes of our conceiving. Its grounding is purely on the cognizer's side. One famous example is the tautological predication "Peter is Peter" in which one and the same adequate concept is predicated of itself. One side of this duplicated concept plays the role of the subject, the other of the predicate. Unlike the first distinction, the second kind of conceptual distinction can be equivocal, Suárez stresses. Its meaning varies depending on whether the term '*rationis*' or '*ratiocinatae*' is the one emphasized. If the second term ('*ratiocinatae*') is stressed, this distinction will be the (Scotist) actual less-than-real distinction that exists in a thing prior to the intellect's operation.⁸ Its only difference from the real distinction will be its lesser "visibility." If on the other hand the first term ('*rationis*') is emphasized, it will be a merely conceptual distinction. The term '*ratiocinatae*,' then, will not

⁷ Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae* (DM), disp. 7, sect. 1, n. 1, ed. Vivès, 250: "Primo enim per se notum est, dari in rebus distinctionem realem, quae ad maiorem explicationem appellari solet distinctio rei a re, quae in hoc consistit, quod una res non sit alia [...]. Solum est observandum, interdum res non solum esse sic distinctas, sed etiam non esse inter se unitas, ut sunt duo supposita, vel accidentia, quae sunt in distinctis suppositis [...]. Aliquando vero contingit, hujusmodi res sic distinctas esse inter se unitas, ut patet in materia et forma, quantitate et substantia [...]."

⁸ For the various interpretations of Scotus's *distinctio formalis* in the history of scholastic thought, see Grajewski, *The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus*, 1–101.

denote an actual distinction in a thing but only an occasion on the part of the thing. It will be caused by the intellect's formation of this distinction. This occasion for the intellect's very formation of this distinction is called by Suárez the *fundamental* or *virtual* distinction. This virtual distinction comes in two main versions. While the first virtuality is intrinsic, the second is rather extrinsic to the thing. In the latter case, the virtual distinction will denote the really distinct things (effects) which are produced by the virtually multiple items of the single thing. The intrinsic virtual distinction, then, will denote the intelligible eminence of a thing itself, which as such is capable of causing multiple effects. The sun, which is *realiter* a single unity, eminently contains the multiple features of hotness, dryness, etc. This is also why this virtual distinction is called by some the *distinctio eminentialis*.⁹ Considered on the side of the subject, this distinction is caused by our inadequate apprehension. Our concepts are imperfect and inadequate; they denote only partial aspects of an object's total (eminent) intelligibility.¹⁰

9 See Bartolomeo Mastri, *Cursus philosophicus ad mentem Scoti*, vol. 4, *Metaphysica*, disp. 6, q. 12, n. 239, Venice, 1727, 305.

10 Suárez, *DM*, disp. 7, sect. 1, n. 4, 251: "Secundo est certum dari praeter distinctionem realem, distinctionem rationis. Et est illa quae formaliter et actualiter non est in rebus, quae sic distinctae denominatur, prout in se existunt, sed solum prout substant conceptibus nostris, et ab eis denominationem aliquam accipiunt [...] Haec autem distinctio duplex distingui solet: una, quae non habet fundamentum in re, et dicitur rationis ratiocinantis, quia oritur solum ex negotiatione et operatione intellectus; alia, quae habet fundamentum in re, et a multis vocatur rationis ratiocinatae, quamvis haec vox, sicut impropria valde est, ita aequivoca esse potest. Nam distinctio rationis ratiocinatae sic dicta existimari potest, quia in re ipsa praeexistit, antequam ratiocinetur, ut quasi ex se ratiocinatae dicatur, solumque requiratur ratio ad illam cognoscendam, non vero faciendam; solumque dicatur distinctio rationis, et non realis, quia non est tanta, neque per se tam patens sicut realis, et ideo requirat attentam operationem rationis ad distinguendam illam. Sed explicata significatione hujus vocis juxta hanc etymologiam, talis distinctio non est vere distinctio rationis, de qua nunc agimus, sed coincidit cum distinctione ex natura rei, de qua statim dicemus. Alio ergo sensu dici potest distinctio rationis ratiocinatae: rationis quidem, quia actu et formaliter non est in rebus, sed per rationem fit aut excogitatur; ratiocinatae vero, quia non est omnino ex mere opere rationis, sed ex occasione, quam res ipsa praebet, circa quam mens ratiocinatur. Unde fundamentum, quod dicitur esse in re ad hanc distinctionem, non est vera et actualis distinctio inter eas res, quae sic distingui dicuntur; alias non fundamentum distinctionis, sed distinctio ipsa antecederet; sed esse debet vel eminentia ipsius rei, quam sic mens distinguit, quae a multis appellari solet virtualis distinctio, vel certe habitudo aliqua ad res alias vere et in re ipsa distinctas, penes quas talis distinctio excogitatur seu concipitur." *Ibid.*, n. 5: "[...] distinctio rationis ratiocinantis sit in ordine ad eundem conceptum adaequatum seu simplicem ejusdem rei, solum per quamdam repetitionem, vel comparisonem ejus, quae in mente fit. Sic enim distinguitur Petrus a se ipso, vel in ratione subjecti et praedicati, quando de se ipso enunciatur, vel in ratione termini et subjecti relationis, quando idem sibi dicitur [...]. At vero posterior distinctio rationis fit per conceptus inadaequatos ejusdem rei; nam, licet per utrumque eadem res concipiatur, per neutrum tamen

Is there besides these two kinds of genera also another “medial” distinction in the thing?¹¹ Notoriously, Suárez answers this question in the affirmative. This distinction is the modal distinction (*distinctio modalis*). It is the distinction that exists between a thing (*res*) and its mode (*modus*). Unlike the real distinction, it is characterized by an asymmetrical separability. Although a *res* can exist without a particular mode, no mode can exist without a thing. It requires a thing as a parasite requires its host.¹² The *a priori* reason for the existence of these modes and the modal distinction is a creatural imperfection: Creatures are dependent, composed, limited, mutable, unifiable beings that require various terminations.¹³ In *DM* Suárez finds a broad applicability for this notion of extrinsic mode. In *DM* 7 he mentions the modes of the inherence of accident and substance, the mode of the substantial unity of matter and form, the accidental modes of *ubi* and position, the mode of subsistence, and the mode of action that is the *ratio causandi* of efficient cause.¹⁴ Importantly, for him this modal distinction is not identical with the Scotist formal distinction. Like the phrase ‘the distinction of the reasoned reason,’ also the signification ‘*distinctio formalis*’ is for Suárez equivocal. It may signify (at least) three different distinctions: (i) a distinction between essentially (specifically) different and really distinct things, such as a man and dog; (ii) a distinction between numerically distinct individuals of the same species or the specific nature’s formal unities multiplied in individuals, such as the formal unities of Peter and Paul; and (iii) the Scotist formal distinction, which is for Suárez equivalent to the virtual distinction.¹⁵

Although Suárez is inclined to believe that Scotus would have agreed with this description, he is also sure that in many places Scotus’s formulations are not clear. It is not clear whether by the *distinctio formalis* he means the actual less-

exacte concipitur totum id, quod est in re, neque exhauritur tota quidditas, et ratio objectiva ejus [...].”

11 *Ibid.*, n. 9, 252: “His positis, praecipua difficultas superest, an praeter haec duo genera distinctionum, sit aliud admittendum, quod sit veluti medium inter illa.”

12 *Ibid.*, n. 16, 255.

13 *Ibid.*, n. 19, 256.

14 *Ibid.*, n. 18, 256.

15 *Ibid.*, n. 16, 255: “Nomen autem distinctionis formalis non ita mihi placet, quia est valde aequivocum; saepe enim convenit rebus realiter distinctis, quatenus inter se distinguuntur essentialiter, si specie differant; habent enim diversas unitates formales, et ita etiam formaliter differunt. Imo et individua ejusdem speciei, quatenus distinctas habent unitates formales individuas, ut supra diximus, dici possunt formaliter distingui [...]. Aliunde vero etiam potest esse minor, et ita est communior, quia frequenter applicatur ad rationes formales, ut conceptas et praecisus per intellectum nostrum, et tunc illa distinctio non transcendit gradum distinctionis rationis.” A fourth version of this distinction is, according to Suárez, applicable exclusively to the Trinitarian persons.

than-real distinction in a thing, or the virtual distinction.¹⁶ At the same time, he makes clear that some of Scotus's *sectatores* take the Subtle Doctor to argue everywhere for the formal distinction in its peculiar sense of an actual less-than-real distinction *ex natura rei*. He is sure that they do not allow for the alternative reading.¹⁷ The use of this formal distinction in its peculiar sense is based on this notorious argument: Whatever exists independently of the essential definition of a thing is *in re* distinct from it; however, there are many items that are *in re* distinct from an essence that are not distinguished as a *res ab re*. Therefore, there must be a distinction that is lesser than the full-fledged real distinction. In his assessment of this argument, Suárez makes clear that Scotus's *sectatores* who endorse this interpretation either commit the fallacy of *petitio principii* or identify the formal distinction with the virtual distinction. He is sure that essences are not defined by us according to their existence in things, but that we define them as we conceive them. We define the essence of man and thus take it as common, even though in a thing it is singular. As Suárez insists, Socrateity is not *ex natura rei* distinct from Socrates's essence, because this individual difference cannot be added to anything common in the thing; it can be added only to the specific essence as observed by our mind's objective denomination. Accordingly, if someone says that an item to which haecceity is added exists as common in the thing, this claim completely begs the question. Since the essence in a thing amounts to nothing else than its single entity and is conceived as common only when denominated by our concepts, this "formal distinction" can be nothing more than a virtual distinction; this alone is proved by the attempted argument.

16 For this note, see also Grajewski, *The Formal Distinction*, 5. Following Suárez, Mastri also agrees that in some places Scotus did employ the (Thomistic) virtual distinction. See Mastri, *Metaphysica*, vol. 4, disp. 6, q. 12, n. 238, 305. For extensive discussion, see Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 781–820, especially 785–91.

17 *Ibid.*, n. 13, 254: "Secunda sententia est, dari in rebus quamdam distinctionem actualem ante intellectum, quae proinde non est rationis, sed major illa, neque etiam est tanta distinctio quanta est realis inter rem et rem. Haec sententia communiter tribuitur Scoto [...]. Quanquam his locis non satis explicet Scotus, an haec distinctio, quam ipse formalem vocat, sit actualis in re, vel tantum fundamentalis seu virtualis; interdum enim virtualem appellat, et ita inter ejus sectatores est varius opinandi modus. Nam aliqui existimant, distinctionem formalem apud Scotum non esse aliam a distinctione rationis ratiocinatae, eo sensu et modo quo a nobis declarata est, quam dicunt vocari formalem, quia diversae definitiones seu rationes formales ibi concipiuntur; dicunt etiam appellari distinctionem ex natura rei, quia in rebus ipsis habet fundamentum, et virtualiter in ipsis est, licet actu non praecedat; in quo sensu Scotus nihil favet secundae opinioni propositae; nec videtur dubium quin in aliquibus locis Scotus ita sentire videatur, praesertim quando agit de attributis divinis. Nihilominus tamen alii Scoti discipuli intelligunt, eum esse locutum de distinctionem vera et actuali, quae in re sit ante intellectum [...]."

The Scotist formal distinction can be no “medial” distinction, since as such it is only a disguised virtual distinction.¹⁸

2. Suárez’s Theology: Formal Distinction as Virtual Distinction

Not only in his metaphysics but also in his theology Suárez finds no use for the formal distinction. In theology he replaces it with the virtual distinction too. In this respect, two theological topics are most relevant. While the first is the issue of the nature of the distinction between the divine essence and its attributes (such as justice, mercy, wisdom, will, intellect, etc.), the second is the query about the nature of the distinction between God’s essence and the divine persons. The first is discussed in the tenth chapter, called *An divina attributa distinguantur in re ab essentia Dei* (and in some subsequent chapters), of the first treatise *De divina substantia ejusque attributis in tres libros divisus*, in the first book of *De essentia et attributis Dei in communi* of his *DUT*, and as well in the sixth section, called *An attributa divina sint proprietates Dei, vel ejus essentia*, of *DM 30 (Quid Deus sit)*; the second can be found especially in the fourth chapter, *Sit-ne inter personas et essentiam aliqua distinctio in re, vel summa identitas cum sola distinctione rationis*, of the third treatise *De sanctissimo trinitatis mysterio, in duodecim libros divisus*, in the fourth book, *De unitate trium personarum*, of his *DUT*.

In *DUT*, book I, treatise 1, chapter 10, Suárez offers a preliminary note regarding the nature of attributes which are to be analyzed. These are not rational relations or negations, but only those attributes that posit something positive and real in God. First, he rejects as heretical the view advocated by Walter of Châtillon (1135–1180) according to which attributes, such as mercy, justice, intellect, etc., are really distinct from the essence of God. He is sure that this view

18 *Ibid.*, n. 15, 255: “Ratione solet potissimum haec sententia suaderi; nam quidquid est extra definitionem essentialem rei, est aliquo modo in re distinctum ab illa; sed multa sunt extra essentiam rei, quae non sunt res distinctae ab ipsa re; ergo datur distinctio in re minor distinctione reali. [...] tamen si quis recte consideret, vel in eis petitur principium, vel sumitur distinctio formalis pro distinctione rationis ratiocinatae per conceptus inadaequatos, quae virtualiter tantum seu fundamentaliter dici potest esse ex natura rei. [...] essentia rei non definitur a nobis semper prout in re est, sed prout a nobis concipitur; sic enim definimus essentiam hominis ut communem, cum in re non sit nisi singularis; et hoc modo loquendo de essentia, falsum est, quidquid est extra essentiam distingui a parte rei actualiter ab eo quod est de essentia [...], ideo cum supponitur esse in re aliquid distinctum ab essentia, quod non sit res distincta, id supponitur quod probandum est.” Shields, “Virtual Presence,” 202, note 10, confirms that “Suárez treats the formal distinction as a species of the second form of conceptual distinction [a grounded conceptual distinction or *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*; D.H.]”

cannot be *de fide* justified, since it brings composition and potentiality into God.¹⁹ Then he introduces Scotus's view, according to which these attributes differ from God's essence through the formal distinction.²⁰ As in *DM* 7, Suárez notes that the phrase 'formal distinction' is extremely equivocal, and that the meaning in which Scotus understands it is "uncertain".²¹ He also notes that most of Scotus's *sectatores* consider it to be the actual less-than-real *ex natura rei* distinction. Again, Suárez introduces Scotus's argument according to which the formal distinction is necessary to express the cause of these propositions' truth. These attributes have different definitions, and thus they have to be formally distinct from other attributes wherever their content is instantiated, even in God. These two attributes exist in God in such a way that contradictory predicates are verified about them. While justice does not forgive and punishes, mercy forgives and does not punish. While the proposition 'The Father generates through the intellect' is true, the sentence 'The Father generates through the will' is false. But if these two propositions were not verified about two distinct formalities in a thing, two contradictory propositions would have to be true about one and the same thing. This is impossible. These attributes must be not only mutually formally distinct, but they must be formally distinct also from the divine essence. If they were not, they would not be mutually formally distinct, because "Things that are the same with a third thing are mutually identical."²²

19 Suárez, *DUT*, I, cap. 10, n. 1, ed. Vivès, vol. 1, 31.

20 For Scotus's *locus classicus*, see Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 4, nn. 191–92, ed. Vat. 4, 260–61: "[...] inter perfectiones essentielles non est tantum differentia rationis, hoc est diversorum modorum concipiendi idem obiectum formale (talis enim distinctio est inter sapiens et sapientiam, et utique maior est inter sapientiam et veritatem), nec est ibi tantum distinctio obiectorum formalium in intellectu, quia ut argutum est prius, illa nusquam est in cognitione intuitiva nisi sit in obiecto intuitive cognito. Ista etiam duo membra probantur per rationes factas contra praecedentem opinionem. Est ergo ibi distinctio praecedens intellectum omni modo, et est ista, quod sapientia est in re ex natura rei, et bonitas in re ex natura rei, – sapientia autem in re, formaliter non est bonitas in re. Quod probatur, quia si infinita sapientia esset formaliter infinita bonitas, et sapientia in communi esset formaliter bonitas in communi. Infinitas enim non destruit formalem rationem illius cui additur, quia in quocumque gradu intelligatur esse aliqua perfectio (qui tamen 'gradus' est gradus illius perfectionis), non tollitur formalis ratio illius perfectionis propter istum gradum, et ita si non includit formaliter 'ut in communi, in communi', nec 'ut infinitum, infinitum'."

21 In *DM*, disp. 30, sect. 6, n. 3, 90, he also says that it is not his job to examine what Scotus really thought: "Ad nos enim nunc non spectat, quid ille [Scotus] senserit, examinare."

22 *DUT*, I, cap. 10, n. 2, 31: "Hoc ergo supposito est celebris sententia Scoti 1, distinct. 8, quaestio. 4 [...]. Ille ergo asserit, attributa distingui ab essentia, non quidem realiter actualiter nec ratione tantum, sed formaliter, quam voluit esse distinctionem mediam inter realem et rationis. Verumtamen de sensu Scoti incertum est, qualem posuerit hanc distinctionem formalem; nam verba quibus utitur aequivoca sunt et possent ad sensum meliorem trahi, quo communiter intelliguntur. Ejus tamen sectatores communiter nolunt aliquam interpretationem

Suárez's reply to this argument of Scotus follows the exposition presented in *DM* 7. Besides stating that there is no such middle distinction as the *ex natura rei* formal distinction,²³ he says that in order to affirm or negate a predicate about God we do not need an actual distinction in God. On the side of the object the virtual distinction fully suffices; on the cognizer's side it is an imperfect manner of conceiving. Mercy and justice as abstracting both from the created and the uncreated realm do not exist distinctly in a thing; as such they exist only objectively in our mind. They are defined in the way they are conceived. If the definition of *X* is different from the definition of *Y*, this holds only for the definitions as denominated by our concepts. All we thus need to guarantee their truth is the distinction of reasoned reason.²⁴ As the light of the sun eminently containing heat and dryness is not always active according to its adequate perfection, so divine perfection is not active in that manner either. Regarding God's effects *ad extra*, there is nothing that could be adequate to His eminent virtue. Accordingly, it is the virtual distinction with its relations to various effects that provides the *fundamentum* for our conceptualization of the divine attributes.²⁵ But how precisely is divine mercy distinguished from divine justice? Suárez is clear that it is not distinct in the way in which a specific nature is distinct from an individual

admittere; sed omnino volunt, hanc esse actualement distinctionem ante omne opus intellectus, ut verba Scoti interdum sonant, et illam attribuunt divinis attributis comparatione essentiae. Ut autem Scotus probet sententiam suam, prius ostendit distinctionem attributorum inter se, deinde concludit distinctionem eorum ab essentia. Fundamenta prioris partis sumuntur ex modo loquendo et concipiendi, quia negamus unum attributum de alio, ut intellectum de voluntate, justitiam de misericordia; ergo signum est, inter se distingui ante operationem intellectus. Nam affirmatio vel negatio non est vera, quia a nobis concipitur vel profertur, sed quia vera est in se, ideo vere profertur [...], si attributa inter se distinguuntur, etiam ab essentia distingui est [...].” For this argument of Scotus as presented by Suárez, see also *DUT*, I, tract. 1, cap. 13, n. 3, 39.

²³ *Ibid.*, nn. 4 ff., 32–3.

²⁴ Suárez, *DUT*, I, cap. 13, n. 5, 39: “Ad Scotum respondemus, ad omnia quae de Deo concipimus et vere affirmamus vel negamus, non esse necessariam distinctionem veram et actualement, quae in Deo praecedat, sed sufficere fundamentalem seu virtualem cum imperfecto modo loquendi nostro. Unde primum argumentum Scoti solum probat distinctionem virtualem in re ipsa.”

²⁵ Suárez, *DM*, disp. 30, sect. 6, n. 13, 93: “[...] licet perfectio divina in se una omnino sit, non tamen operatur semper secundum adaequatam suam rationem. Sicut lux solis, licet in se omnino sit eadem quatenus eminenter continet calorem, siccitatem, et alios effectus, quando tamen calefacit, non operatur secundum adaequatam perfectionem suam [...] si ratione distingueremus in luce virtutem calefaciendi, exsiccandi, etc., eisque diversa nomina imponeremus, vere diceretur lux calefacere per virtutem calefaciendi, non vero per alias virtutes; quia per eas voces et conceptus significatur lux, non secundum se, sed secundum inadaequatam habitudinem ad effectus, et prout illos virtute continet. Sic ergo intelligendum est quod de Deo dicimus.”

difference. Unlike a common nature and its haecceity, the divine attributes and the divine essence are mutually included. Every attribute (as infinite) is included in the divine essence, and the divine essence is included in the attributes. Accordingly, each attribute is included in any other attribute.²⁶ Such mutual inclusion indicates that what applies here is what was later called the *minor* virtual distinction.²⁷ Unlike the *major* virtual distinction, which is about the excluding and the excluded, such as in the case of a common nature and an individual difference, the minor virtual distinction is about the implicit and the explicit. In the way in which we conceive God's essence, it includes attributes more than a genus contains its differences. It includes them actually and implicitly. If divine justice as conceived by us is distinguished from another perfection, such as mercy, this is due only to our expressive and explicit cognition, and not to a virtual distinction existent between the potentially exclusive items, let alone by the actual *ex natura rei* distinct formalities.²⁸

In some places, Suárez stresses that if the formal distinction would have any applicability, it is in the debates about the distinction between the divine essence and persons (relations).²⁹ Interestingly, Suárez introduces Scotus's view³⁰ in the context of Durandus's position, according to which persons differ from the divine essence modally.³¹ Suárez remarks that, between God's essence and His persons, Durandus assumes the same modal distinction as one that is posited by him between the supposit of Peter and his individual nature. He introduces Scotus's view as follows: "He [Scotus] spoke more cautiously and never called it the real distinction, but formal or from the nature of the thing."³² As in the previous case, he introduces the same argument for Scotus's view. Contradictory predicates cannot be verified at the same time about the Father and the divine

26 Suárez, *DUT*, I, cap. 11–12, 33–8.

27 For this imperfect virtual distinction, see Grajewski, *The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus*, 47.

28 Suárez, *DM*, disp. 30, s. 6, n. 16, 94; see also *DUT*, I, cap. 13, n. 8, 40: "Sic distinguantur iustitia et misericordia; nam licet res omnino eadem sit, quae utroque conceptu concipitur, tamen per unum concipitur sub speciali habitudine ad talem effectum et de illo respectu est expressa cogitatio et non de aliis, licet non excludantur sed potius confuse includantur."

29 Suárez, *DM*, disp. 30, s. 6, n. 3, 90: "[...] vel si quae [arguments for the formal distinction] sunt propria et alicujus momenti, omnia attingunt Trinitatis mysterium, et ideo Theologis ea relinquimus."

30 Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 2, q. 4., n. 389, ed. Vat. 2, 349: "Et dico sine assertione et praeiudicio melioris sententiae quod ratio qua formaliter suppositum est incommunicabile (sit *a*) et ratio essentiae ut essentia (sit *b*) habent aliquam distinctionem praecedentem omnem actum intellectus creati et increati."

31 For this modal distinction in Durandus, see his *In libros Sententiarum* I, dist. 33, q. 1, ed. M. Perrone, F. Retucci, 2019, 233 ff.

32 Suárez, *DUT*, IV, cap. 4, n. 2, 624: "Ille vero cautius locutus est, nunquam enim vocavit distinctionem realem, sed formalem, vel ex natura rei."

essence. While the Father generates, God's essence does not. Therefore, the actual distinction *ex natura rei* between the divine essence and the first person of God must be posited. Without it contradictory predicates would be said of the same thing. This is impossible.³³ Again, Suárez says a conceptual distinction with a foundation in the thing is fully sufficient. Importantly, he holds that Scotus does not differ in this interpretation either.

Although most of Suárez's arguments *ex ratione* are targeted against Durandus's modal distinction between the divine essence and the divine persons, at least one can be taken as targeting Scotus's formal distinction too. According to this argument, Suárez rejects the formal distinction by reifying and taking it for the real distinction. If the formal distinction were to be posited between the divine persons and the divine essence, the divine persons would not be simple. This cannot be the case, since supreme simplicity belongs to divine perfection, and every person is the true God.³⁴ Thus there must be at most a conceptual distinction, which takes nothing away from God's simplicity. This distinction testifies to the excellence of divine simplicity, which indivisibly contains all perfections. As regards the cognizer, as mentioned, this distinction's foundation lies in our inadequate conception of *res divinas*.³⁵ Suárez notes that unlike the connotative character of the *fundamentum* in the conceptual distinctions between the divine attributes of mercy and justice, the foundation between God's essence and divine persons is *intra Deum*.³⁶

33 Suárez, *DUT*, IV, cap. 4, n. 3, 625.

34 *Ibid.*, n. 8, 626: "Prima est, quia sequitur ex contraria sententia, personam divinam non esse summe simplicem: consequens est contra fidem: ergo".

35 *Ibid.*, n. 14, 627.

36 Suárez, *DUT*, IV, cap. 4, n. 16, 627: "[...] intra DEUM ipsum sufficiens fundamentum inveniri, ut nos ratione distinguamus communia a propriis, quia ad hoc sufficit ipsa realis distinctio personarum in suis proprietatibus, cum unitate in natura communi. In quo est aliquod discrimen inter hanc distinctionem relationis et essentiae, et distinctionem plurium attributorum inter se vel ab essentia: conferendo illas distinctiones inter se. Nam licet utraque sit tantum distinctio rationis: tamen in attributis distinctio rationis frequentius sumitur per habitudinem vel proportionem ad effectus, vel proprietates habentes actualem distinctionem in creaturis. Dico autem *frequentius* et non *semper*, quia inter voluntatem et intellectum divinum, etiam concipimus distinctionem rationis, ex his tantum, quae intra DEUM invenimus, scilicet, ex reali distinctione personarum per voluntatem et intellectum procedentium."

3. Suárez on the Containment of Souls: A Case of Formal Distinction? (CDA 2.6)

It has been shown that in *DM* and *DUT* Suárez recurrently rejects the formal distinction as conceived in the sense of the actual and less than real *ex natura rei* distinction. He replaces it consequently with the virtual distinction. It is in the sixth question, *Utrum sit recta et sufficiens animae divisio in vegetativam, sensitivam, et rationalem*, the second disputation, *De substantia trium animarum in particulari*, of the *CDA*, where he formulates a view that might be interpreted as accepting the Scotist formal distinction. As in many other places,³⁷ in the fifth question, *Utrum animae sensitiva, vegetativa, et rationalis sint semper distinctae realiter*, Suárez argues for “the unicity of substantial form,” according to which there is only a single soul or single substantial form in the human supposit, which is the (remote) principle of intellectual, sensory, and vegetative acts.³⁸ As said in *DM*, disp. 15, sect. 10, the opposite view, a plurality of really distinct substantial forms, is a *sententia antiquitata*.³⁹ In *CDA* Suárez formulates three arguments *ex ratione* against this archaic view. First, if the sentient soul in the human supposit were really distinct from the rational soul, they could be separated by God. If this were so, the sentient soul would fall under a species, since everything that falls under a genus must fall under a species too. But if this were the case, man would be a brute that possesses a beastly soul. A human being would be composed both of a bestial and a rational soul. A variety of implausible consequences would be entailed by this conclusion, such as twofold generation and corruption in man. Second, there are many consonances and interferences between the acts of the really distinct powers.⁴⁰ A lengthy intellectual activity might affect our sensomotoric orientation and digestion; vice versa, digestion might negatively influence our capacity to think. In order to explain these interferences, according to Suárez, there must be a single soul in which all the operations of the really distinct capacities are rooted. Third, if two grades of forms are subordinated in such a manner that one presupposes the other, and the first is the “act” of the latter, the form that bestows the ultimate grade can also bestow the other grades, because all these grades are related as a generic to a differential

37 See, e.g., Suárez, *DM*, disp. 15, sect. 10, 536–57.

38 Suárez, *CDA*, disp. 2, q. 5, n. 4: “Sit tamen conclusio: Eadem numero anima est principium intelligendi, sentiendi, et vegetandi in homine.”

39 Suárez, *DM*, disp. 15, q. 10, n. 4, 537.

40 For Suárez, it is true that powers and the soul differ neither conceptually nor formally, but *realiter*. See Suárez, *CDA*, disp. 3, q. 1, 54–82. For a detailed interpretation of this question, see Heider, *Aristotelian Subjectivism*, 51–58.

grade. The same applies for the vegetative, sentient, and rational soul in man too.⁴¹

Having declared the unicity of the substantial form in man, Suárez introduces the sixth question of the second disputation as a reply to an objection to his theory of the unicity of forms. The caveat runs as follows: The vegetative soul is only the principle of vegetative operations, the sentient soul is only the principle of sentient operations, etc. The view of the unicity of forms claims that three souls, namely the vegetative, the sentient, and the rational, are really one and the same soul. Therefore, this division cannot be true.⁴² Importantly, Suárez must prove that this division is true since it forms the basic structure of his whole treatise of *CDA*.

In a preliminary note, Suárez points out that all authors agree that these souls are not distinct in such a way to prevent the containment of the less perfect souls (vegetative and sentient) in the more perfect (rational) soul, because the powers of the different orders flow from a single (rational) soul. Through powers, the soul causes the effects that must be somehow contained in it as in their cause. However, the crux is *how* these souls are contained in this single human soul. Are they included so weakly that they are fully absorbed within the identity of the superior soul? Or are they comprised there in such a way that each retains its own character? In other words: are they contained in it eminently (*eminenter*) / virtually (*virtualiter*) or rather formally (*formaliter*)? Are they included there in the same manner as creatures are included in God, who includes in His eminence the perfections of the creatures in a superior way? Or should it be said rather that they are contained there formally in the manner that heat is present in fire?⁴³

41 For these arguments, see Suárez, *CDA*, disp. 2, q. 5, 326–30. In the same manner, Suárez denies the existence of the really distinct form of corporeity. For this, see also Suárez, *DM*, disp. 15, sect. 10, nn. 7–15, 537–40.

42 Suárez, *CDA*, disp. 2, q. 6, n. 1, 330: “Ratio difficultatis oritur ex praecedenti quaestione, ut in primo illius argumento tetigimus. Anima enim vegetativa non est nisi principium nutriendi; sensitiva, principium sentiendi, etc. Si ergo haec [tria] principia aliquando sunt unum et idem, ergo illae animae sunt etiam una anima; divisio autem in qua membra coincidunt in unum non potest esse vera.” I retain the use of brackets in Salvador Castellote’s edition.

43 In *DM*, disp. 30, sect. 1, n. 10, 63, Suárez defines the eminent containment as follows: “Breviter [...] dicendum est continere eminenter esse habere talem perfectionem superioris rationis, quae virtute contineat quidquid est in inferiori perfectione, quod non potest melius explicari a nobis quam in ordine ad causalitatem vel effectum. Unde perfectiones omnes creaturarum, quatenus sunt eminenter in Deo, nihil aliud sunt quam ipsamet creatrix essentia Dei [...]; dicitur autem creatrix essentia esse eminenter omnia, quatenus se sola et sua eminenti virtute rebus omnibus potest illas perfectiones communicare [...]; explicamus illam continentiam per ordinem ad effectum, quia non possumus commodius et clarius id praestare.” When commenting on *DM*, disp. 15, sect. 7, John Kronen defines the virtual, alias the eminent, con-

Suárez makes clear that the common view supports eminent containment. He introduces four arguments for the theory of eminent containment, and against the view of formal containment. I shall mention only two, since two other arguments and Suárez's answer to them would lead us too far from our topic and would require a substantially wider context. First, the rational soul is specifically distinct from the sensitive and the vegetative soul. Therefore, the rational soul cannot be formally the vegetative and the sensitive soul; it cannot contain them formally. Second, referring to Aristotle's claim of a parallelism between geometrical figures and souls,⁴⁴ just as a trihedron is not formally in a quadrilateral, so the sentient and the vegetative souls are not as such included in the rational soul.⁴⁵ Importantly, presented is also a second view or, more precisely, a version of this first view. According to this position, the *rationes* of the vegetative, the sentient, and the rational soul cannot be formally (*formaliter*) distinct in the rational soul, simply because they are contained in it under a single superior formal *ratio*. Unsurprisingly, as an example Suárez introduces the attributes of justice and mercy in God. Despite these having distinct definitions or concepts (*rationes*), insofar as they are united in the superior formal *ratio* in God they are not actually distinct. The same holds true for the heating (*virtus calefactiva*) and the drying virtue (*virtus exsiccativa*) of the sun. Although these two *virtutes* are formally distinct in their effects, when unified in the sun's eminent virtue they form a single *ratio*. The same holds for the inclusion of less perfect souls in the rational soul.⁴⁶

tainment as follows: "An entity *X* virtually contains an entity *Y* iff *X* is not of the same nature as *Y*, but *X* has all the perfections of *Y* in a higher way. Thus God contains virtually the perfections of a lion, not because God is a lion, but because He has all the perfections of a lion in a higher way." Kronen, in Suárez, *On the Formal Cause of Substance. Metaphysical Disputation XV*, 97, note 28. On the contrary, he defines formal containment as follows: "*X* is formally an *F*, iff *X* is an *F*. Thus Nefer is a cat and so he is formally a cat"; *ibid.*, 172, note 94.

⁴⁴ Aristotle, *On the Soul*, II, ch. 3, 414 b28–32, 660: "The cases of figure and soul are exactly parallel; for the particulars subsumed under the common name in both cases—figures and living being—constitute a series, each successive term of which *potentially* contains its predecessor, e.g., the square the triangle, the sensory power the self-nutritive." [My italics]

⁴⁵ Suárez, *CDA*, disp. 2, q. 6, n. 2, 332: "Sed de modo huius continentiae diversitas est opinionum. Communiter dici solet quod anima inferior eminenter continet superiorem et non formaliter. Ista [pars] negativa probatur: [1^o] Nam anima rationalis specificè distinguitur a sensitiva et vegetativa; ergo non potest formaliter esse vegetativa, etc. [...] [4^o] Quia quaternarius non est formaliter ternarius, licet illum contineat; sed cum hoc modo anima perfectior continet imperfectiorem, ergo similiter non est formaliter talis."

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, n. 3, 332: "Cum hac opinione fere coincidit alia quae dicit quod in anima rationali non possunt formaliter distinguī <rationes> animae vegetativae [et sensitivae] et rationalis, sed quod comprehenduntur sub una ratione formali superiori; sicut iustitia et sapientia, quamvis ex se [habeant] rationes formales distinctas, tamen prout uniuntur in Deo in quadam ratione formali superiori non habent distinctionem. Similiter virtus exsiccativa et calefactiva in

I take Suárez here to be describing the common view of eminent containment by using the virtual distinction as applied to an efficient cause. Given Suárez's consistent application of this distinction throughout his *opera*, one should expect here nothing less than its affirmation. However, this is not the case. In fact, Suárez considers the abovementioned views (or two versions of the single view) to be most difficult (*difficillima*). He makes it clear that the opposite view, namely that of *formal* containment, is true and can be sufficiently demonstrated.⁴⁷ What are his arguments for this view? I dare say that all bear a "Scotist flavor" (though, as noted above, I do not mean to claim that Scotus himself posited a formal distinction between the *parts* of the soul). While Suárez introduces four arguments against the first view, he presents three against the second view. Regarding his objections to the first opinion, I shall mention only the first two. These two arguments against the first view are as follows:

(1) An effect of the formal cause can be produced only by a cause that is *formally* such a cause. Fire can give formally heat to a log only because it is formally hot. But in the same way, our soul produces for us humans its effects ("being sentient" or "being vegetative") formally, i. e., in the genus of the formal cause. This is why our rational soul must be formally both the sentient and the vegetative soul. Suárez is clear that for a form *X* to be eminently a form *Y*, such as for light to be eminently hot, is *not* sufficient for a form *X* to provide formally being *Y* to anything else. Despite the fact that sunlight is eminently hot, this does not make the sun formally hot. There is a repugnance between "containing something eminently" and "containing something as a form." If *X* is only eminently *Y*, it cannot give formally *Y* to anything else. In conclusion, the rational soul's eminent containment is an insufficient containment with respect to the lower souls. A more robust formal inclusion must be posited here.⁴⁸

(2) Man is formally an animal in the same way as a horse is an animal. Like a horse, man has everything needed for the *ratio animalis*. But the essence of animal is composed out

inferioribus sunt formaliter distinctae, tamen prout uniuntur in eminenti virtute solis non distinguuntur. [...] Sic igitur anima vegetativa, sensitiva et rationalis secundum se sunt formaliter distinctae, tamen prout in quadam superiori ratione animae uniuntur, non distinguuntur formaliter, sed habent illam simplicem rationem."

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 4, 334: "Utraque istarum opinionum est mihi difficillima, et imprimis quod in homine sit formaliter anima sensitiva et vegetativa videtur probari sufficienter."

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, n. 4, 334: "1.º Quia effectus causae formalis [non potest dari nisi a causa quae sit formaliter talis; sed anima nostra dat in genere causae formalis] esse sensitivum formaliter: ergo est formaliter forma sensitiva. Maior patet, nam formam aliquam esse eminenter aliam est esse quamdam formam superioris ordinis habentem virtutem alterius, quomodo lux est eminenter calor; hoc autem non sufficit ut forma eminenter det esse formaliter alterius, ut lux solis, licet eminenter sit calida, non facit solem formaliter calidum. [...] [Ergo in universum] formam aliquam esse talem formaliter non est aliud quam esse formam dantem formaliter tale esse. Implicat ergo dicere formam tantum esse eminenter talem, et tamen dare esse tale formaliter."

of the body and the sentient soul. Therefore, a human being as animal is composed of these two items, no less than is a horse. Moreover, man and horse would not be univocally animals if their sentient souls were not univocally such. And they would not be univocally such if they did not have univocally the same formal content (*ratio*) which is realized in them.⁴⁹

The second view claiming that the features of the vegetative, the sentient and the rational soul are not distinguished formally is rejected by Suárez with these three arguments:

(1) If the *rationes* of the vegetative, the sentient, and the rational soul were not distinguished formally in man, then “to be animal” and “to be rational” would not be distinguished formally in man. But the opposite was shown in the *Praedicabilibus*.⁵⁰

(2) The rational and the sentient soul as such (*secundum se*) are formally distinct. Therefore, they have to be distinct everywhere in that same way. Therefore, they have to be distinct in man, too. The antecedent is clear from the definitions. While the rational soul is the principle of intellection, the sentient soul is the principle of sentience. These two, however, are formally distinct. They can even exist as separated into two distinct beings. The soul of a horse is formally sentient, and not rational. This is why they must be distinct in man too. Since the rational and the sentient soul exist in man according to their proper formal content, they must be formally distinct there.⁵¹

(3) The soul of man and the soul of horse are in univocal agreement as regards the sentient soul. If they did not agree in this way, man and horse would not be animals univocally. Therefore, they have to possess the same formal character of the sentient soul. This is why everything that differs from the animal soul of horse must differ from the sentient

49 *Ibid.*, n. 4, 336: “2.° arguitur: Homo tam formaliter est animal, [sicut] equus; ergo tam formaliter habet haec omnia quae sunt de ratione animalis [sicut equus]; sed de essentia animalis est componi ex corpore et anima sensitiva; ergo homo inquantum animal constat ex his; alias homo et equus non esse univoce animal, nam eorum animae sensitivae non esse univoce tales, quia non haberet [univoce] eandem rationem formalem. Et confirmatur retorquendo argumentum: Anima hominis et equi convenient univoce in ratione animae sensitivae; ergo sicut equus habet formaliter animam sensitivam, ita homo; et illa non est nisi rationalis; ergo.”

50 *Ibid.*, n. 5, 338: “1.° Nam ex hoc sequitur quod in homine non distinguantur formaliter esse animal et esse rationalem. Cuius oppositum ostendimus in *Praedicabilibus*.” We can only lament that the logical treatise *Praedicabilia*, as many other commentaries on Aristotle’s *opera* that had been written at the time Suárez was teaching in Segovia, are unavailable.

51 *Ibid.*, n. 5, 338–40: “2.° arguitur: Anima rationalis et sensitiva secundum se distinguuntur formaliter; ergo [et] in homine. Antecedens est concessum ab omnibus, et patet ex definitionibus earum, quia anima rationalis est principium intelligendi; anima sensitiva est principium sentiendi; haec autem duo formaliter diversa sunt, immo separabilia. Anima enim equi est formaliter sensitiva, et non rationalis; ergo secundum se formaliter distinguuntur; ergo et in homine. Prima consequentia probatur, quia in homine reperitur formaliter anima rationalis et sensitiva, unaquaeque secundum propriam rationem formalem; ergo etiam in homine distinguuntur formaliter, ut probatum est.”

soul of man too. This consequence is clear. If two items are the same in a common character, whatever is distinguished from the first must be distinguished from the second as well.⁵²

These arguments for formal containment and, importantly, also the formal distinction in the sixth question are followed by some further distinctions that Suárez need in order to argue that the traditional division of the soul into the vegetative, the sentient, and the rational is apt (*optime tradita*); and that the CDA's overall structure of the disputations according to these parts of the soul is fully justified; and, lastly, that he can reply to the arguments for the theory of eminent containment. A most relevant distinction in this case is one between the twofold considerations of these souls. The three parts of the soul can be considered either according to their integral formal features, or according to their proper constitutive features. Only if they are considered in the second manner are they formally distinct.⁵³ On the basis of this distinction arises Suárez's reply to the arguments for eminent containment. He denies the first abovementioned reason (the rational soul differs specifically from the lower ones) by claiming that all three souls in man are distinguished according to their proper formal contents (*rationes*). He also denies that Aristotle's example of the inclusion of the trihedron in the quadrilateral is relevant to the current issue. He is clear that the analogy is not a good illustration of the inclusion of less perfect souls in the perfect soul. Although the quadrilateral includes the trihedron, it is not called trilateral; the rational soul of man is to be called an animal, because its rational soul contains formally the sentient soul.⁵⁴

No doubt, some may argue that the arguments for Suárez's thesis of formal containment and the formal distinction between the soul's *rationes* may after all be read as falling in line with the abovementioned reductive (nominalist) interpretation that was endorsed by Suárez in *DM* and *DUT*, and according to which this distinction is nothing else than the virtual distinction, and that formal containment is certainly compatible with this distinction – and all the more so, since in the whole question there is no mention of Scotus or of any Scotist. I do not rule out the possibility of this reading. But at the same time, I would like to

52 *Ibid.*, n. 5, 340: "3.º arguitur. Nam anima hominis et equi convenient univoce in ratione animae sensitivae; alias homo et equus non essent univoce animal; ergo habent eandem rationem formalem animae sensitivae; ergo a quocumque differt formaliter anima sensitiva equi, differt etiam formaliter anima sensitiva hominis. Tenet consequentia, quia si aliqua duo sunt idem in aliqua ratione, a quocumque distinguitur unum, distinguitur et aliud."

53 *Ibid.*, n. 6, 342: "Illa ergo tria praedicata sunt quae primo constituuntur per has tres animas; haec autem praedicata ita se habent quod sumendo proprium constitutivum uniuscuiusque est distinctum ab alio; animatum ergo constituitur per vegetativum, animal per sensibile, homo per rationale. Quae tres differentiae [formaliter] distinctae sunt".

54 *Ibid.*, n. 15, 354–56.

insist that my interpretation seems to be more probable, and that Suárez in this question does not give the reader many cues to interpret him as positing the virtual distinction. If the reductive account were what Suárez wants to defend, he might and would have to have expounded it much more clearly. Beside this negative argument, as shown, my reading has its textual justification too. First, in his argument Suárez explicitly contrasts formal containment and the formal distinction to eminent and virtual containment. Given his rejection of the real distinction and the theory of the plurality of substantial forms, and his denial of eminent containment with its concomitant virtual distinction (illustrated by the classical example of the sun's virtual distinctions between the heating and the drying forces), I do not see any other possibility that Suárez could have advocated than the theory of the *distinctio formalis ex natura rei*. Second, in the above-mentioned arguments Suárez clearly points out the insufficiency of efficient causality and argues for the necessity of assuming formal causality. Given that efficient causality is connected with the virtual containment of effects in a cause, and that he cannot speak about physical formal causality since there is only a single substantial form in every supposit, nothing else seem to be assumed here than the containment of the metaphysical formalities that are mutually formally distinct. Third, in all his arguments Suárez seems to assume that the objective correlate of our definitions occurs in things. In other words, he stresses that the content of our concepts is correspondingly realized in the things themselves. At the same time, Suárez repeatedly highlights the univocal character of our concepts, and implicitly also the impossibility of the verification of two contradictory statements about one and the same thing. All of these seem to suggest that the young Suárez, at the least, held an open attitude about Scotus's formal distinction. Fourth, the doctrinal distinction between the formal and the eminent containment is far from being without relevance for the whole text of *CDA*. On the contrary, this theory (having a significant impact on Suárez's anthropological system as such) represents a strong doctrinal antipode to the Thomist view according to which the view of eminent containment substantially elevates the capacities of the lower parts of the soul, especially those of the internal senses, such as memory and cogitative power (*vis cogitativa*), and makes from them the proto-intellectual capacities.⁵⁵ Unlike for Aquinas and the Thomists (and for Suárez in *DM*), for Suárez of *CDA* such an elevation of the capacities of the sensory powers is not tenable. Fifth, and lastly, my interpretation can be corroborated also by a developmental hypothesis. In his late (and unfinished) revision of *CDA*, titled *Tractatus de anima* (*TDA*), that he was working on just before his death, the following clearly formulated affirmative passage about the eminent containment of the lower souls in the higher soul can be found:

55 For Suárez's reduction of the interior sense's cognitive functions, as compared with Aquinas and Thomists, see Heider, *Aristotelian Subjectivism*, 240–54.

Since our intention is to speak *ex professo* only about the rational soul, we took it as necessary to make a division in this place: first, since a single rational soul *eminently* contains all those *rationes* [the grades of the vegetative and the sentient souls] [...] ⁵⁶ (my italics)

Conclusion

I cannot agree with Christopher Shields when he says that “[...] as Suárez would have it, the sensitive soul is only virtually contained in [Socrates’s] rational soul,”⁵⁷ and that it is only virtually present in it. Given Suárez’s identification of the virtual and the eminent containment, the contrary seems to be true. As we have shown, in *CDA* (the text to which Shields also refers) Suárez endorses a contrary position, namely that which embraces the formal (actual) containment of the lower parts of the rational soul. I agree that Suárez rejects employing the Scotist formal distinction in his solution to the issue of the soul and its powers (as has been said, he posits a real distinction between the soul and its powers). But this is for Suárez an entirely different issue, which is treated only in *CDA*, disp. 3, q. 1. Unfortunately, Shields does not seem to distinguish clearly between these two questions.⁵⁸

Now, my interpretation of Suárez’s view of the formal and actual containment of the lower souls in the more noble rational soul, and especially the complementary claim about the formal distinctions between the souls contained, may be no more than an exegetical hypothesis. To substantiate my claim consultation of further texts written at the early stage of the Jesuit’s career is required. I am not only thinking about his early commentaries on Aristotle’s *Organon* and *Metaphysics*, which unfortunately seem to have been lost, but also his *De Verbo incarnato* which was printed during Suárez’s lifetime (first published in 1590). However, I am not only ventilating a hypothesis about Suárez’s possible em-

⁵⁶ Suárez, *TDA*, I, cap. 4, n. 1, 492: “Quoniam intentionis nostras est de sola rationali anima ex professo dicere, necessarium duximus divisionem hanc hoc loco praemittere: tum quia unica rationalis anima eminenti quodam modo omnes illas rationes [*rationes* of the vegetative and the sentient souls] complectitur, ut videbimus [...]” Accordingly, in *TDA* and *DM*, we find Suárez’s arguments neither for the formal containment of the lower souls in the higher soul, nor against the elevation of the powers of the lower soul in the higher soul.

⁵⁷ Shields, “Virtual Presence,” 214, note 55.

⁵⁸ Shields, “Virtual Presence,” 213, while saying in the main text that “the soul’s capacities are present in it only virtually (*virtualiter*),” refers in note 47 to *CDA*, disp. 3, q. 6, n. 2 (should in fact be disp. 2), quoting the following sentence: “Communitur dici solet quod anima inferior eminenter continentem superiorem et non formaliter.” He makes clear that this claim is embraced by Suárez. As it has been shown, it is not: The lower souls are formally contained in the more perfect soul. Moreover (*contra* Shields), it cannot be said that the capacities are present in the soul virtually because they are items really distinct from the soul.

bracement in the early stage of his career of the Scotist formal distinction, but rather, at the same time, a suspicion of a remarkable turn in Suárez's thought regarding a central metaphysical issue. Notably, should it prove to be correct that the young Suárez in fact did employ the formal distinction as a tool for solving some philosophical problems, one which he later abandoned, then this would be far from the only time Suárez changed his mind. In theology, it suffices to mention the theory of *scientia media*, which Suárez rejected in 1580–85, when he was teaching in Rome, but which he came to embrace a couple of years later in his *De Verbo incarnato*.⁵⁹ In philosophy, we may adduce, for example, his early view of the indivisibility of the soul of perfect animals (animals with a perfect bodily integrity endowed with all the senses, such as horse or lion) that he later abandoned in favor of divisibility,⁶⁰ and the issue of whether angels through a single intelligible species can simultaneously cognize many objects, i.e., through multiple distinct acts apprehend diverse objects – and many other topics. While the young (or middle-aged) Suárez defended the indivisibility of perfect animals' souls, and the impossibility of multiple acts apprehending many objects through a single species, the aging Suárez, as he explicitly admits, accepted the opposite views.

59 The theory of *scientia media* as a solution to the issue of the harmonization of divine foreknowledge and human freedom was embraced already even at an earlier point of his career in a treatise on middle knowledge. For this treatise and the overall evolution in Suárez's thought on this issue, see Rivas, "Uno tratado inédito de Suárez sobre la ciencia media." I thank Vitaly Ivanov for alerting me to this article.

60 In his *editio princeps* of *TDA*, Balthasar Alvarez inserts the following paragraph in which he informs the reader about Suárez's change of mind: "Sententiam hanc de indivisibilitate animae perfectorum viventium [...] mutaret procul dubio ipse auctor [...]. Quippe iam olim in *Metaphysica*, hanc retractans quam prius dictarat, oppositam dixerat probabiliorē, disp. 15, sect. 10, n. 32." More precisely, it is in *DM*, disp. 15, s. 10, n. 31, 545 [bold is mine] where Suárez states: "Nullam formam materialem esse vere ac proprie indivisibilem." In *De angelis*, 1, cap. 37, n. 31, ed. Vivès, vol. 2, 359, he says, "[...] an possit Angelus simul, et per eandem speciem cognoscere plura, ut plura, ex parte objectorum, et actuum, id est, per plures actus re distinctos, et terminatos ad res absolute, ut distinctas, et sine ullo ordine inter se. Partem negantem docet Pater Vasquez, dict. disp. 221, cap. 3, in fine, solum ex hoc principio, quod unitas intellectiois, ex unitate principii sumi debet. Et haec opinio mihi placuit, cum juvenis, ab annis circiter quadraginta primum materiam hanc publice docerem." *Ibid.*, n. 32, 359: "Nunc autem censeo, probabiliter defendi posse oppositam, propter quoddam argumentum, supra, n. 17, tactum, [...]."

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IV. The Seventeenth Century

David Gorlaeus (1591–1612) on Real, Fictional, and Modal Distinctions

Gabriel Müller

Introduction

David Gorlaeus's innovative theory of distinctions merits scholarly scrutiny. The text passages in which the young Dutch *novator* discusses distinctions have not yet been closely examined by scholars, even though there have been some studies of Gorlaeus in recent years, including one monograph (Christoph Lüthy's book on Gorlaeus from 2012). For this reason, the bulk of the present paper consists in a close reading of these passages, in order to reconstruct not only that theory itself, but also to show how it fits into Gorlaeus's larger philosophical program, a kind of universal science that encompasses both metaphysics and natural philosophy. In addition, parallels in the writings of other authors will be noted when possible. Section 1 highlights a number of distinct intellectual currents that may have influenced Gorlaeus's thinking. With regard to distinctions in particular, as will become clear in section 3, there are clear parallels with the account given by Francisco Suárez in his *Metaphysical Disputations*. Apart from these parallels, interesting in their own right, much of what is notable about Gorlaeus's account of distinctions results from his general view of metaphysics. Hence, in section 2 I shall give an overview of his metaphysics.

1. Gorlaeus's Life and Works in Context

One of the few facts known about the life of Gorlaeus is that he enrolled to study theology at Leiden on 23 April 1611, having finished his *artes*-studies at Franeker probably in 1609 or 1610. We also know that he died almost exactly one year later, on 27 April 1612, at only 21 years of age. The cause of his death is not known with certainty, though it is possible that he died of malaria.¹ What we have of his doctrine is contained in two posthumous treatises: *The Idea physicae* (1651), a short treatise on natural philosophy, and the *Exercitationes philosophicae* (1620), which is longer and more systematic in its presentation and has a

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¹ Wierda, "Een trilogie," 190.

stronger focus on metaphysics. The account contained in both works, but in the *Exercitationes* in particular, is remarkably consistent and original. The texts themselves contain only very few references to any other works, but one exception is that both mention Galileo's astronomical discoveries, published in the *Starry Messenger* of 1610. They must therefore both have been written in the last two years of Gorlaeus's life. According to Christoph Lüthy, the *Idea* is probably the earlier work, while the *Exercitationes* is an unfinished attempt to put the same ideas on a more systematic footing.²

The philosophical content of these two works does not easily fit into any one category. On the one hand, Gorlaeus's tone is often anti-Aristotelian and some of his claims and arguments are unconventional and novel. The most striking physical doctrine is a sort of atomism: Gorlaeus claims that all physical things consist of indivisible and unchanging atoms of an unknown shape. Instead of the traditional four elements, there are only two according to Gorlaeus, namely Water and Earth.³ At the same time, however, his works operate with scholastic terminology and categories, and the very fact that his main treatise is divided into *exercitationes* is reminiscent of student exercises. What could be the sources and the motivations for such an idiosyncratic combination of doctrines? Although the lack of explicit citations means that there is no way to deduce any particular influence with certainty, some lines of influence have been suggested. The system presented in the *Exercitationes* can be described as combining elements from the natural philosophies of Girolamo Cardano and Julius Caesar Scaliger with German protestant metaphysics. The local and religious context in which Gorlaeus studied also plays a role: The combination of Italian physics and German metaphysics seems to originate with Gorlaeus's teacher at Franeker, Henricus de Veno, who however did not publish anything under his own name.⁴

Moreover, Lüthy has theorized that the motivation for some of the more striking features of the theory is a desire to intervene in the religious debate between the Remonstrants and the Counter-Remonstrants. Specifically, according to Lüthy, the *Exercitationes* was designed to give philosophical support to the views of Conrad Vorstius, who was appointed as Arminius's successor on the chair of theology in Leiden, but soon became embroiled in controversy. Evidence supporting this conjecture comes from two sets of associations made by contemporaries. Firstly, Vorstius was linked to the author of the controversial *Philosophiae triumphus* (1573), Nicolaus Taurellus. In a report to the synod of Holland in 1610, a group of theologians from Heidelberg wrote that Vorstius had taken a number of dangerous theses from "that atheist physician" Taurellus, among them the claim that "God is a quan-

2 Lüthy, *David Gorlaeus*, 26 and 97.

3 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes philosophicae*, Ex. 17, sect. 1, 314.

4 De Veno's views are preserved only in student exercises supervised by him, only a few of which are extant. See Lüthy and Spruit, *Henricus de Veno*, 1130–41, for a summary.

tum.”⁵ Secondly, some thirty years later, in the context of the *Querelle d’Utrecht*, the theologian Gijsbert Voetius repeated not only the association of Taurellus and Vorstius, but added Gorlaeus to the group. The *Querelle*, as is well known, was kicked off by Henricus Regius, a professor of theoretical medicine in Utrecht and a friend of Descartes. Regius presided over a series of disputations in which he had one of his students defend a number of controversial theses. Among them was the scandalous claim that the composite of human body and soul is an *ens per accidens*, rather than a true union of body and soul. This moved Voetius to organize a series of counter-disputations, from which point the controversy escalated. Descartes himself became involved, first indirectly through Regius, then directly in long letters to Voetius and to the magistrates of Utrecht.⁶ Despite Descartes’s efforts, the row ended with an official ban on the teaching of Cartesian philosophy in Utrecht.

The connection to Gorlaeus is that Regius, when asked to defend his support for the offending claim that the union of body and soul is merely accidental, testified that he had taken it from Gorlaeus. Voetius, in his response, agreed that Gorlaeus was associated with the claim, but added that its ultimate source was Taurellus. What is more, he mentioned Vorstius’s controversial work *De Deo* and its condemnation by the Heidelberg theologians in the same breath. As Lüthy has argued, it is plausible that it was sympathies to Arminianism and to the views of Vorstius in particular that motivated Gorlaeus first to compose the *Idea physicae* and then to rework it into the *Exercitationes*.⁷ The possibility that Descartes himself might have been acquainted with the *Exercitationes* is of course enticing as well, although Descartes’s notorious refusal to acknowledge any intellectual debts makes it impossible to know with any certainty – Descartes denied ever having read either Taurellus or Gorlaeus.⁸ What is certain is, firstly, that many among the first Dutch followers of Descartes knew the *Exercitationes*, and secondly that interest in Gorlaeus as a thinker in his own right rapidly declined after about 1650. It seems that the success of Cartesianism made Gorlaeus obsolete in the eyes of most contemporaries. If he was remembered at all, it was for his role in the Utrecht crisis or as a precursor to Descartes.⁹

⁵ *Bedenckingen*, 9; cf. Lüthy, *David Gorlaeus*, 123.

⁶ Contained in Descartes, *Œuvres*, ed. AT VIII/B, 3–273.

⁷ *Testimonium Academiae Ultrajectinae*, 28; Lüthy, *David Gorlaeus*, 99 and note 169. For a general account of the controversy at Utrecht, see Verbeek, *Querelle*, 38–66, specifically on the role of Gorlaeus 40–41. Verbeek, “Ens per accidens,” studies why this claim in particular caused a scandal. On Voetius and Gorlaeus, see also van Ruler, *Crisis of Causality*, 298–300.

⁸ In his letter to Dinet, AT VII, 586.

⁹ The dominance of Descartes in the reception of Gorlaeus is probably shown most directly by Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, VII, 150–61, who relies on Baillet, *Vie de Descartes*, 145–46. It is also seen in the two eighteenth-century histories of philosophy that mention Gorlaeus, i.e., Reimman, *Versuch einer Einleitung*, III, 563, and Morhof, *Polyhistor*, pars.

But back to the sources of Gorlaeus's philosophy. His reading of Vorstius and Taurellus, though important, is not sufficient to explain all of the unusual features of his physics and metaphysics. For one thing, as Andreas Blank has shown, Taurellus, though he has often been treated as an early corpuscularian by commentators, defends a spiritualist ontology that prioritizes forms over matter. With regard to atoms or corpuscles, it therefore seems unlikely that Taurellus was the deciding influence on Gorlaeus – though some of the central ideas in Gorlaeus's metaphysics occur already in Taurellus, chiefly the insistence that any *ens* must be singular, one, and actual.¹⁰ In questions touching natural philosophy, at least one part of Gorlaeus's inspiration seems to lie in the *Exotericae exercitationes* of Julius Caesar Scaliger. Scaliger, the only author Gorlaeus mentions by name, is well known to historians of early modern matter theory because he proposed an alternative to Aristotle's definition of perfect mixture that became very influential. Like a number of other seventeenth-century corpuscularians, Gorlaeus refers to Scaliger's modified definition of mixture and reads it as an antecedent of his own position, identifying the latter's "minimal bodies" with his own atoms. The influence of Scaliger also extends to metaphysical and theological questions: One of the most significant doctrinal continuities between Vorstius and Gorlaeus is their shared tendency to identify God's immensity and physical space, and as Kuni Sakamoto has recently demonstrated, both authors are indebted to Scaliger in this area.¹¹

Taurellus, Scaliger, Vorstius and De Veno are therefore the most important influences on Gorlaeus when it comes to his overall project and the obviously non-Aristotelian aspects of his writings. However, the structure and terminology of both of the Gorlaean treatises also reflects more traditional Aristotelian teaching, especially when it comes to metaphysics narrowly understood. As the sources of this aspect of Gorlaeus, the most likely candidates are the metaphysics textbooks popular at early Calvinist universities, which is why Helen Hattab has compared Gorlaeus's metaphysics with Francisco Suárez's *Disputationes metaphysicae*.¹² Among the texts written by Protestant authors, those of Clemens Timpler and Bartholo-

II, lib. II, cap. 1, sect. 3, 273. I take these references, as well as general assessment of Gorlaeus' reception, from Lüthy, *David Gorlaeus*, 153.

¹⁰ Blank, "Nicolaus Taurellus on Forms and Elements." Lüthy, "Metaphysical Roots of Physics," 93, highlights the continuities between Taurellus and Gorlaeus.

¹¹ Sakamoto, "Finite God and Infinite Space." For the mention of Scaliger's name, see Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, 323. The new definition of mixture is quoted almost verbatim on page 42 of the *Idea physicae*, and with slight variation on page 248 of the *Exercitationes*. On Gorlaeus and Scaliger, see the concise discussion in Lüthy, "David Gorlaeus' Atomism," 268–70. On Scaliger's theory of composite bodies, see Sakamoto, *Julius Caesar Scaliger*, 145–63. On the impact of Scaliger's redefinition of mixture, see Subow, "Minima naturalia und mixtio," 178, and Lüthy, "Aristotelian Watchdog."

¹² Hattab, *Descartes on Forms and Mechanisms*, 168–72; Hattab, "Gorlaeus on Universals," 295.

maeus Keckermann have the most direct connection to Gorlaeus's intellectual context: Timpler had been Vorstius's colleague at the *Gymnasium illustre* of Steinfurth before the latter's departure to Leiden and Keckermann, in his turn, had been Timpler's student in Heidelberg in the 1590s. Both of them wrote early *compendia* on metaphysics, though Keckermann is generally more interested in logic. As for other Protestants, the *Metaphysica commentatio* of Cornelius Martini was printed in 1605 and so might have made its way to the Low Countries by 1610. The famous *Lexicon* of Rudolph Goclenius, in contrast, was published only after Gorlaeus's death, as were most of the works of Johann Heinrich Alsted.¹³

On the topic of distinction, of all these authors, Suárez gives by far the most extensive exposition. What is more, parts of the structure of his account are very similar to Gorlaeus's and in at least one instance, there is even a close textual parallel. The same cannot be said about the accounts of either the Protestant authors previously mentioned or about the account given by Pedro Fonseca in his *Metaphysics* commentary.¹⁴ Though the main focus of this essay is the reconstruction of Gorlaeus's own account of distinctions, I shall point out parallels to the other authors just mentioned when relevant.

2. The Metaphysics of the *Exercitationes*

Let us now turn to the text of the *Exercitationes* itself, and the general metaphysics contained therein. The work consists of a total of eighteen chapters or exercises. A look at the table of contents reveals that it has an unconventional structure: After an introductory exercise on the definition of philosophy and some methodological questions, the first part of the *Exercitationes* is formed by a series of chapters on metaphysical topics. The second half of the work then treats natural philosophy, relying on the metaphysical principles established earlier. This "foundationalist" structure was far from typical for sixteenth-century scholastic philosophy, which tended to view natural philosophy as an introductory discipline that ought to be taught before the more advanced discipline of metaphysics.¹⁵ A second feature of Gorlaeus's conception is also already apparent from the table of contents: In his opinion, the proper subject of theoretical philosophy is *being*, which is why directly after the methodological considerations of exercise one, he begins the metaphysical

13 Some Protestant and Reformed discussions of distinctions that might have been known to Gorlaeus are Timpler, *Metaphysicae systema methodicum* (1608), III, cap. 6, q. 6, 335–36; Keckermann, *Compendiosum systema*, I, cap. 13, 81–84; Keckermann, *Systema logicae*, I, cap. 5, 273–87; Martini, *Metaphysica commentatio*, cap. *De uno*, 191. See also Goclenius, *Lexicon philosophicum*, 551–52; Alsted, *Metaphysicae brevissima delineatio*, cap. 6, 27–31.

14 Fonseca, *Commentariorum in libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*, V, cap. 6, qq. 6–7, 345–58; Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 7, sect. 1–2, 250–74.

15 Garber, "Physics and Foundations," 22; Lüthy, "Metaphysical Roots of Physics."

part of the project with an exercise on being, its definition and its subtypes. The focus on being, and on real being in particular, also structures his approach in the subsequent exercises: Each chapter focuses on one philosophical notion and examines whether, and if yes in what sense, it denotes a real being. This approach is most obvious in exercises two and 5–7, where Gorlaeus finds occasion to go through all of the ten Aristotelian categories. Whenever possible during these discussions, he avoids positing abstract entities and only acknowledges concrete, singular, localized real beings. He also often quotes the creed that “beings are not to be multiplied without reason.”¹⁶ Distinctions and universals are treated in separate exercises in between the introduction of the fundamental concept of being in exercise two and the discussion of accidents, quantity and quality in exercises 5–7. This placement suggests that Gorlaeus holds distinction and universal to be the essential notions without which the rest of the project is impossible. The entire work is structured as follows:

Exercise	Title
Ex. 1	De philosophia
Ex. 2	De ente
Ex. 3	De distinctionibus
Ex. 4	De universali et singulari
Ex. 5	De accidente
Ex. 6	De quantitate
Ex. 7	De qualitate
Ex. 8	De relatis
Ex. 9	De motu
Ex. 10	De loco
Ex. 11	De tempore
Ex. 12	De composito
Ex. 13	De atomis
Ex. 14	De materia et forma
Ex. 15	De rerum ortu et interitu
Ex. 16	De coelo
Ex. 17	De elementis
Ex. 18	De anima

The remainder of this paper will consist of two parts which map roughly to exercises two and three. I shall first give an overview of Gorlaeus’s general metaphysics, with a focus on the typology of being and on what kinds of objects fall under each type. Much of the material for this first part is contained in exercise

16 In the *Exercitationes*, versions of the phrase occur on pages 45, 99, 140, 159, 178 and 299. The expression is just as frequent in the *Idea physicae*.

two, *De ente*. In the following part of the paper, I shall then engage with Gorlaeus's explicit treatment of distinctions in exercise three.

As mentioned, 'being' is the central metaphysical notion in Gorlaeus, so let me begin by unpacking this claim. It should be noted first that Gorlaeus distances himself from "peripatetic metaphysics,"¹⁷ writing that it is not a uniform science but rather a grab-bag of subjects that ought to be treated in different disciplines. As is well known, Petrus Ramus had criticized Aristotelian metaphysics on similar grounds.¹⁸ However, whereas Ramus strove to show that metaphysics could be abolished in favor of dialectics and theology, Gorlaeus remains in clear continuity with scholastic ideas of metaphysics. The Gorlean discipline to replace peripatetic metaphysics is theoretical philosophy, which has being as its subject matter. This science must treat being "generally as well as specifically,"¹⁹ meaning that theoretical philosophy has multiple parts. Three of these parts correspond to specific kinds of being: *Theosophia* focuses on God, *Angelographia* on created intelligences, and *Physica* on the remaining created beings. There is also a general part, which treats being as such. All of these four parts, however, belong to theoretical philosophy, and the general part is not metaphysics but rather a first philosophy "even before metaphysics."²⁰ Theoretical philosophy, according to Gorlaeus, is therefore a single discipline dedicated to an investigation of being, both in general and as it is instantiated in God, intelligences and in finite beings. This conception bears some resemblance to a Scotist view of metaphysics, since two of the central criteria for such a view are the univocity of being and the definition of metaphysics as the study of *ens qua ens* (rather than as the study of substances or of God). This observation taken by itself is of limited usefulness, however, since Scotism in this wide sense was an extremely common position among early seventeenth-century scholastics in a wide variety of contexts.²¹ Moreover, Gorlaeus at one point seems to deny that "being" univocally applies to God and to creatures: "And besides, it does not follow from

¹⁷ Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 1, sect. 3, 16.

¹⁸ On Ramus, see Leinsle, *Ding und Methode*, 21–24.

¹⁹ Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 1, sect. 3, 12: "[...] tam in genere quam in specie."

²⁰ Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 1, sect. 3, 13: "Ille autem generalis tractatus non vendicat peculiare sibi nomen, neque dici potest metaphysica, sed etiam ante metaphysicam instituentus est, potest interim prima aut universalis appellari Philosophia eo quod primum sortiatur locum aut universalissimum tractet." As Lüthy, "Metaphysical Roots of Physics," note 66, points out, the division of metaphysics seems to echo that of Bartholomaeus Keckermann and Otto Casmann. Indeed, Casmann defends an *Angelographia* independent of theology, though for him it is a part of natural philosophy, whereas for Gorlaeus it is separate from physics. See Casmann, *Angelographia*, I, cap. 1, 18.

²¹ A list of criteria for seventeenth-century Scotism can be found in Ariew, *Descartes Among the Scholastics*, 83–84; see also Schmutz, "L'héritage des subtils." An example of a "Scotist" in this wide sense of the word, after Gorlaeus's time, is Johannes Clauberg, as discussed in Gellera, "Univocity of Being."

the unity of the concept that being is univocal to the creator and the creature [...] since with regard to their nature, to be a being belongs first to God and only then to creatures, such that the latter are beings only through the influx of God.”²²

What does it mean to hold that being is the subject matter of theoretical philosophy? The fact that its three parts are dedicated to the three types of actual being (i.e., God, angels, and created things) would seem to suggest that the being in question is simply the real existence of concrete, individual things. This would also be consistent with the general mode of operation pursued in the *Exercitationes*: In many of the later exercises, Gorlaeus remains interested in showing how a given notion relates to real being. In the exercise on quality, for example, he goes through all of the qualities (both the four qualities traditionally treated as primary and those associated with the five senses), and argues that some of them inhere in distinct beings, while others have some lesser ontological status.²³ At least according to one passage, however, real being is not the only object of metaphysics. As we have just seen, theoretical philosophy contains a nameless general part that deals with being qua being. Its place in the text is at the very beginning of the metaphysical part of the *Exercitationes*, after having defined the subject of metaphysics as being in general, but before discussing any of its species in particular. This is roughly congruent with exercise two, and it is only well into this section that Gorlaeus gives something resembling a definition of being:

Hence, ‘being’ is not the object of metaphysics insofar as it is taken as ‘real being,’ but insofar as it comprises everything intelligible, every something. For all these things have something in common, even have a [common] genus. For that [genus] is either the most general one or there is a superior one. And so one must come to the most general genus in the end, which is to be treated in the most general philosophy. But this ‘whatever’ is that which is most common, that is, the intelligible.²⁴

Gorlaeus therefore takes the “being” that forms the object of theoretical philosophy in the widest possible sense, despite the fact that his ultimate interest is in actually existing things and extended bodies. A possible motivation for this move is the need for a philosophical terminology that is able to delineate non-existing or merely possible things from real ones, since, as we shall see, fictional beings

22 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 2, sect. 3, 51: “Neque interim ex unitate conceptus sequitur ens esse univocum creatori & creaturae: [...] quandoquidem esse ens natura prius competit Deo, quam creaturis: utpote quibus non nisi per influxum Dei.”

23 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 7, sect. 2–10, 108–80.

24 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 2, sect. 4, 60: “Quare ens non est Metaphysices objectum, quatenus sumitur pro ente reali, sed quatenus comprehendit omne intelligibile, omne aliquid. Quum enim haec omnia habeant aliquid commune, habent etiam genus. Illud enim est aut generalissimum, aut detur adhuc superius. Atque ita tandem ad genus generalissimum deveniendum est, quod in generalissima Philosophia pertractandum est. Illud autem quicquid est communissimum, scilicet intelligibile.”

play an important role in the argument of the *Exercitationes*.²⁵ Although he defines the intelligible as the subject of theoretical philosophy and thereby includes fictional and otherwise non-existing beings as legitimate objects of metaphysical discussion, Gorlaeus still limits the role of relative or abstract notions as much as possible. For example, he excludes a number of other notions from the domain of metaphysics and shunts them off into logic, among them: “cause, effect, subject, addition, sign, designated, whole, part, same, different, equal, unequal, similar, dissimilar.”²⁶

After metaphysics as a discipline is defined to his satisfaction, Gorlaeus treats the attributes of being. An attribute of being, according to him, is a feature that any being necessarily has, but which is not expressed by the definition. In other words, an attribute is a property or *proprietas* of being in the technical sense. Gorlaeus expresses the same idea also by saying that a *proprietas* may be defined as a necessary property that a being can be understood without, or also a property that is always present without being part of the essence:

But for something to be a property of a thing, it is necessary that it always applies to every individual subject; that it also makes explicit some real habitude of being which is not expressed by the definition, but which is understood, through its essence and existence, so to speak to ‘happen to’ an already constituted essence. That those affections of being are such [properties] is to be demonstrated for each one.²⁷

The six attributes of being that he lists are unity, truth, goodness, existence, locality and durability. The first three are not surprising, since these are the conventional attributes or passions of being.²⁸ The inclusion of existence, locality and durability is much less common, however. As for existence, its inclusion is

²⁵ On this point in particular, one might also suspect the influence of Timpler, who also defines *ens* in the sense of *intelligibile* as the subject of metaphysics. Timpler, *Metaphysicae systema methodicum* (1608), 1, defines metaphysics as “ars contemplativa, quae tractat de omni intelligibili, quatenus ab homine rationis lumine sine ullo materia conceptu est intelligibile,” and on page 5 adds that the reason why the more restrictive definitions of the subject of metaphysics are inadequate is that they exclude non-being, essences and privations. According to Taurellus, *Philosophiae triumphus*, II, 97, in contrast, the subject of metaphysics are simple things, *simplicia*.

²⁶ Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 1, sect. 3, 16: “Reliqua suis quaeque reddantur disciplinis [...]. Sed illae relatae affectiones, ut caussa, effectum, subjectum adjunctum, signum, signatum, totum, pars, idem, diversum, par, impar, simile, dissimile uni soli Logicae.”

²⁷ Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 2, sect. 4, 53: “Ut vero aliquid rei sit proprietas, necesse est, ut soli, omni subjecto, semper, competat: ut quoque aliquam realem entis habitudinem explicet, quae per definitionem non exprimitur, sed essentiae jam constitutae per suam essentiam & existentiam quasi accidere intelligatur. Tales esse has entis affectiones singulatim demonstrandum est.”

²⁸ Suárez, for example, concludes that only unity, truth and goodness ought to count as *passiones entis* in the narrow sense, though he acknowledges that a number of other predicates might also fit the criteria. Notably, “durare et esse alicubi” are among the predicates considered by Suárez in *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 3, sect. 2, nn. 1–3, 107–8.

surprising because it is not counted among the transcendentals, in contrast to *ens*, *aliquid*, and *res*.²⁹ That Gorlaeus holds existence to be an attribute of being is also remarkable because it seems to imply, per his definition of “being” as “intelligible,” that anything intelligible must also exist. I will suggest a possible way to resolve the difficulties around the status of non-existing things that this entails below, after the introduction of Gorlaeus’s concept of beings of reason. The last two attributes on the list are more peculiar still: *durabilitas* and *localitas*. In his discussion, Gorlaeus explains his use of these terms:

Under durability and locality, I do not understand any kind of potencies that are separated when the act is posited, but rather *the aptitude and inclination to endure and be located*, which is no more removed when the location or the duration is posited than the active potency upon position of the action or the receptive potency upon actual reception [Emphasis G.M.].³⁰

The contrasts duration-durability and location-locality, Gorlaeus insists, are not contrasts between potencies and their acts, at least not if one understands the latter relationship as one in which going from potency to act implies losing the potency. The relationship is rather that of a general predicate to a more specific one: While to endure is to exist over some specified interval of time and to be located is to exist in some specified place, to have durability and locality is to exist at an unspecified time in an unspecified place. The claim that *durabilitas* and *localitas* are attributes of being as such therefore amounts to saying that any being whatsoever must necessarily exist over some interval of time and in some place.³¹

Now that we have an overview of the attributes that Gorlaeus holds to be common to all being, we can move on to the question of what types of beings there are. Gorlaeus answers this question by opening a series of dichotomies. The first three occur in the following passage:

²⁹ Three passages in the *Exercitationes* list the attributes of being, on pages 54, 57, and 59. Existence is mentioned in two of them, while one has essence as the fourth attribute instead, ending the list with “*essentia, duratio, locatio*” (57). I am inclined to discount this version of the list as erroneous, firstly because the very definition of “attribute” includes difference from the essence, and secondly because *locatio* and *duratio* (as opposed to *localitas* and *durabilitas*) are later declared to be modes of being rather than attributes.

³⁰ Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 2, sect. 4, 57–58: “Per durabilitatem & localitatem non intelligo potentias quasdam, quae, posito actu; separantur: sed aptitudinem & inclinationem ad durandum & locatum esse [...] quae non magis, posita locatione aut duratione, tollitur, quam posita actione potentia activa, & recepto actu potentia receptiva.”

³¹ Location and duration are introduced in most detail in Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 2, sect. 1, 29–23. Interestingly, Timpler also mentions that some authors add duration and existence to the traditional three *passiones enti*. There is no mention of location in Timpler, however. See Timpler, *Metaphysicae systema methodicum* (1608), I, cap. 4, 45.

Hence, the divisions of that being are to be made as follows: Being is fictional or not. Non-fictional being is either modal or real. Modal being is either a mode or a denomination.³²

The main two types of being are therefore real being and fictional being or being of reason. There is also a third category, namely “modal” being, which contains what Gorlaeus calls modes and denominations. Let me put modal being aside for the moment and deal with real and fictional beings first. The contrast between them is explicated as follows:

Real being is that the essence of which exists through itself. Wherefore it is neither invented by the intellect (but rather remains even when the intellect is not thinking), nor is its entire essence toward something or in something, but rather it has its own existence proper to itself, through which it exists and not through another. But the being of reason is that which is invented by the intellect.³³

A real being, in other words, is something that is independent in its existence, both with regard to the acts of any minds thinking it and with regard to the existence of anything except itself. Fictional beings, by contrast, depend in their being on a mind. Precisely how this status of being invented comes about remains rather vague, but Gorlaeus provides a sliver of epistemological theory at least:

The individual concepts of the mind have been brought to it by the senses and are real things. They have a disposition among each other and are connected in reality. But the thing that is signified by them, if it is nowhere outside [the mind], and nevertheless is signified as being, that is a fictional being. This is why we said in the definition that the being of the being [of reason] itself is invented.³⁴

The picture sketched here is something like the following: The mind contains concepts, each of them corresponding to a singular object in the world and having been generated through a process which involves direct or indirect perception of the respective object. Though they are entities in the mind, the concepts themselves are still real beings. These mental beings furthermore have a “dispo-

32 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 2, sect. 4, 60: “Quare hujus entis divisiones ita instituendae sunt: Ens est fictum vel non fictum. Non fictum, modale vel reale. Modale, vel modus vel denominatio.”

33 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 2, sect. 1, 22–23: “Ens reale est, cuius essentia per se existit. Quare neque ab intellectu fingitur; sed eo etiam non cogitante datur: neque tota ejus essentia est esse ad aliud, aut in alio, sed suam sibi propriam habet existentiam, per quam existit, non per alienam. Sed ens rationis est, quod ab intellectu esse fingitur.”

34 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 2, sect. 1, 23: “Conceptus singuli mentis per sensus ad ipsam fuere delati, & rerum sunt realium: ii inter se disponuntur, & realiter conjuncti sunt. Sed res per eos significata, si nusquam extra sit, & tamen esse significetur, haec est ens fictum. Idcirco in definitione diximus: ipsum entis esse fingi.”

sition” among one another, i.e., a certain set of relations, and it is this disposition which enables certain combinations of concepts to refer to external objects. In some cases, the things referred to in such a way do not in fact exist, and it is these empty references that Gorlaeus calls beings of reason (or, interchangeably, fictional or imagined beings). Based on this bare-bones epistemology, the initial tension between Gorlaeus’s definition of the intelligible as the object of metaphysics and his focus on real existence can be resolved: Intelligible beings without actual existence are *entia rationis*, and their diminished ontological status when compared to real beings is not explained by the introduction of a potential or mental kind of existence, but rather reduced to a certain combination of mental states, which are themselves real beings.

The discussion so far has made clear how Gorlaeus defines the two main species of being, real being and being of reason. What is arguably more important, however, are Gorlaeus’s applications of these categories, since they result in a situation in which only an extremely limited range of objects count as real beings. To see why, it will be more convenient to examine fictional being first. One type of fictional beings or beings of reason are of course imaginary or non-existing entities, which as we have seen come about through empty references created by combinations of primitive concepts. Gorlaeus’s own example is the concept of a flying donkey: The concepts ‘flying’ and ‘donkey’ are gained from experience and have a basis in reality, but when the mind combines these two concepts, they refer to nothing outside the mind. More important for his metaphysical position, however, is another type of being of reason: Gorlaeus argues that any composite body, when viewed as an entity distinct from the sum of its parts, is a fictional being as well. His reasoning is simple: However strong the union of two parts may be, as long as the parts themselves exist the composite cannot be a true unity. For this reason, he calls any aggregate of real beings an *ens per accidens*.

[Accidental being] is by accident, i.e., by aggregation. Indeed, it is properly not a being, but beings, and exists by accident, because its parts exist. But everything that is put together from multiple beings is a being by aggregation.³⁵

The paradigmatic example of an *ens per accidens* is a heap of atoms grouped together in space: Though the atoms themselves are real beings and exist in the full sense, the heap is nothing over and above its constituent parts, which is why Gorlaeus writes that “the heap, conceived as a being, is not real but fictional.”³⁶ While this characterization is not terribly controversial in the case of the loose

35 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 2, sect. 1, 25: “[ens per accidens] per accidens est, seu per aggregationem. Hoc autem proprie non est ens, sed entia: & per accidens existit, quia ejus partes existunt. Est vero illud omne ens per aggregationem, quod ex pluribus entibus conflatum est.”

36 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 2, sect. 1, 26: “[...] acervus, ut ens conceptus, non est realis, sed fictus.”

spatial aggregation of a heap, Gorlaeus extends the same account to *any* possible union between distinct entities.

In whatever way multiple beings are joined together, that whole will always be a being by aggregation. For the union does not change the essence of things, so that one thing in number can come about from two things. Those things always remain two, although they can be made so similar to each other that the mind cannot make any distinction between them except a numerical one.³⁷

Gorlaeus therefore categorically excludes the possibility of two separate entities becoming one single entity, no matter by what means. From the Aristotelian perspective, this amounts to a denial of the substantial form, since it means that any physical body is nothing more than a collection of atoms, and the defining function of the substantial form is to explain the surplus in powers and properties of composite bodies over the sum of their parts. Furthermore, Gorlaeus does not restrict the notion of accidental being to purely material composites. The union of a human soul with its body, i.e., of a spiritual being with a material aggregate, is an accidental union as well. The body is a collection of atoms, as we have just seen, and the rational soul is a real being, though spiritual instead of material. Gorlaeus lists the union between them as an example of a very intimate union, by which “one penetrates the other and acts through it,”³⁸ but nevertheless a human being is an *ens per accidens*. As mentioned in the introduction, this heretical thesis is what Gorlaeus was best known for in the seventeenth century, since it played a role in the infamous quarrel of Utrecht. In any case, since Gorlaeus classifies all composites as accidental beings, the class of things that he counts as real beings is rather small. The only material things that qualify are atoms; among spiritual or immaterial real beings, Gorlaeus mentions God and angels, in addition to the (rational) human soul. The austerity of the conception is diminished slightly by the fact that he also allows that in a small number of special cases, something that is neither material nor spiritual can also exist independently. Heat and cold are one such case, the other are *lumen* and shadow, which he holds to be the sensitive species of luminous and of opaque objects respectively.³⁹

³⁷ Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 2, sect. 1, 25: “Quomodocumque plura entia inter se jungantur totum illud semper erit ens per aggregationem. Neque enim unio mutat rerum essentiam, ut ex duabus rebus possit fieri una res numero. Quae enim illae res semper manent duae: quamvis ita similes sibi invicem reddi possint, ut mens nullam inter eas norit ponere distinctionem, nisi numericam.”

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ See Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 7, sect. 2, 112 on the status of independent *res*, 110 on visible and tactile species. On the place of real accidents in Gorlaeus’ otherwise reductive metaphysics, see Hattab, “Gorlaeus on Universals,” 288; Lüthy, *David Gorlaeus*, 42–43.

So much for the class of real beings. The class of modal beings, i.e., modes and denominations, forms a sort of intermediary between the extremes of real being, on the one hand, and being of reason, on the other. In contrast to a being of reason, a mode has mind-independent being, but it depends on something else, namely a real being in which it inheres. Ultimately, what seems to be implied is that modes are properties of real beings through which these real beings are related to other real beings. In almost all of the instances in which Gorlaeus invokes modes, the *habitus* in question is a spatial relation, notably an arrangement of atoms in space. Denominations are relational in nature too, but in their case the operation of the denominating mind plays a constitutive role.⁴⁰ All in all, the divisions of being in exercise 2, section 2, produce three main classes, represented in the following figure:




Fig. 1. Classification of being.

⁴⁰ Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 2, sect. 1, 35: "At modus entis est illa ipsa habitudo, qua ens, cuius est, refertur aut ad locum, aut ad tempus, aut ad alia entia, qua ipsi coexistunt, quae habitudo in re subjecta mutari potest, quia haec mutari possunt, ad quae refertur." Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 2, sect. 1, 28; "Atque hinc differt modus a denominatione. Haec enim non est ipsa habitudo, sed ab hac oritur: fit autem ab intellectu, quatenus ille rebus eam imponit."

3. Distinctions

We can now turn to distinctions. At the beginning of exercise three, Gorlaeus gives the following definition:

A distinction is a diversity of one being from something else, whether that other be a being, or a mode of being, or a non-being. For we treat only of that distinction by which a real being is distinguished.⁴¹

Distinctions are therefore a type of relation, specifically one by which a real being is compared to something else. This second *relatum* may fall into any of Gorlaeus's three types of being. The rest of the exercise is dedicated to showing how the ontological status of this second half determines the type of distinction at hand. The first type to be introduced, immediately following the definition of distinction itself, is the negative distinction:

[Distinction] is double, negative and positive. Negative, by which being is distinguished from non-being. By 'non-being', I also mean the being of reason.⁴²

In negative distinctions, the term of comparison denotes a non-being. In the simplest case, this might be a mental contrast between an actually existing real being and the concept of pure nothing, i.e., the insight that it is not nothing. Negative distinctions involving more concrete non-beings, however, will involve beings of reason. Gorlaeus gives no explicit examples, but we may assume that the standard case is a comparison between a given real being (e.g., a stone) and a being of reason (e.g., a fictional stone similar to the real one in all respects except its color). As an additional special case, Gorlaeus also mentions distinctions between two beings of reason, saying that they are "quasi-positively" distinct. Positive distinctions, unsurprisingly, are those in which the second half of the distinction denotes something that is not a pure negation but has some positive being.

A positive distinction is one by which the being is distinguished from something positive. It is twofold: one comes about through our mind and properly obtains between concepts of one and the same thing; the other is in the thing even when no one thinks of it. The former is commonly called distinction of reason, because it is not in the thing but comes about through reason, not because it holds between beings of reason.⁴³

41 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 3, sect. 1, 67: "Distinctio est entis ab alio diversitas, sive illud aliud sit ens, aut modus entis, sive non ens. Agimus enim de illa tantum distinctione, qua ens reale distinguitur."

42 *Ibid.*: "Ea est duplex negativa vel positiva. Negativa, qua ens distinguitur a non ente. Sub non ente comprehendo & ens rationis."

43 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 3, sect. 1, 68: "Positiva distinctio est, qua ens distinguitur ab aliquo positivo. Est autem duplex, alia fit a mente nostra, & proprie intercedit inter unius rei

As Gorlaeus explains in this passage, there are two sub-types of positive distinctions: Those that depend on the mind and those that do not. The former are called distinctions of reason and occur when the mind has two different concepts of the same real being. We have seen one example above: When introducing the attributes of being, Gorlaeus argues that there is a distinction of reason between each of them and being itself. What he seems to mean by this is that though any real being is one, true, good, and exists for some extended duration in some place, these attributes are not part of the essence of the being in question. Because of this, it is possible to conceptually grasp it without at the same time considering (for instance) its unity or truth, resulting in multiple distinct concepts.⁴⁴ It is these concepts, not the real being they are instantiated in, that are the *relata* in a distinction of reason. In this way, distinctions of reason can be made without any error, because the mind is conscious that they obtain not between two versions of the same real being, but “between the objective concepts of a thing or between ideas materially considered, and as coming about from the mind, as is the case with those concepts.”⁴⁵ Gorlaeus’s example is the distinction between God’s will and God’s intellect: Though these two attributes are the same in reality, there is no error involved when we use distinct concepts to grasp them. What is more, the two concepts of God illustrate a more general property of our cognition, namely that we almost always need multiple partial concepts in order to grasp all the properties of a given being.

Having introduced the distinction of reason, Gorlaeus delineates his own use of the term *distinctio rationis* from that of others. First, he draws attention to the fact that a distinction of reason is not the same thing as a distinction between beings of reason. As we have seen, the latter is a type of negative distinction, while in a distinction of reason, the two terms both denote the same real being. As he puts it, in a negative distinction the “mind invents what it distinguishes,” while in a distinction of reason the concepts are of a real being, but the distinction itself is invented.⁴⁶ In the former case, the concepts in question may even represent independent beings or modes, and then they are distinguished from one another “as it were really, or as it were modally,” but their distinction is a negative one nonetheless, since “just as beings of reason are not true but fictional

conceptus: alia est in re etiam nemine cogitante. Illa vulgo vocatur distinctio rationis, quia in ipsa re non sit, sed a ratione fiat. Non quod versetur inter entia rationis.”

⁴⁴ Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 2, sect. 4, 53.

⁴⁵ Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 3, sect. 1, 69: “[...] non affirmat eam in re esse, sed inter conceptus rei obiectivos, seu inter ideae materialiter consideratas, & a mente fieri, sicut hi conceptus fiunt.”

⁴⁶ Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 3, sect. 1, 68: “Neque enim mens fingit, quae ita distinguit, sed quia admodum distinctum concipit, quae in re distincta non sunt, ipsam distinctionem fingit.”

beings, so also their distinction is not true but a fictional distinction.”⁴⁷ The second way in which Gorlaeus delineates his usage of “distinction of reason” concerns (what he perceives to be) the scholastic one. He writes that he “prefer[s] to call that distinction formal rather than rational, for these concepts are as it were certain diverse forms and reasons or dispositions, with which things are grasped.”⁴⁸ In other words, he refuses to recognize the formal distinction as separate from the distinction of reason, without any indication that he is interested in or even aware of the arguments in favor of introducing a separate formal distinction.

Apart from the issue of distinctions in the narrow sense, this identification of formal and essential distinction is also of interest in another part of Gorlaeus’s theory. As Helen Hattab has pointed out in the context of Gorlaeus’s conception of universals, there is what he calls a “formal or essential unity” between the individuals from which a universal is abstracted. The universal “animal,” for example, contains what is similar about humans and lions while abstracting away any differences between individuals.⁴⁹ The fact that Gorlaeus also calls the distinction of reason “formal” and “essential” suggests that what he means in both cases is that “essence” and “form” can be reduced to a mental point of view. As he explains in the section on universals, every lion is identical to every human in so far as the criterion for belonging to the class of animals is concerned, namely having sensation.⁵⁰ In the exercise on distinction, we have seen him making the corresponding point for the opposite case, namely that one can construct a distinction between two concepts of one and the same thing (God’s will and God’s intellect). In both cases, he takes care to argue that the incomplete concepts can lead to genuine insights and need not involve any error, provided the mind is conscious of its own involvement in their production. With distinctions of reason, the key is to keep in mind that the distinction obtains between concepts, as opposed to the real beings they denote; while universals

47 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 3, sect. 1, 67–68: “Etenim entia distinguuntur inter se quasi realiter, vel quasi modaliter, vel quasi formaliter: quatenus entia rationis finguntur vel ut diversa entia, vel ut ens & modus entis, vel quatenus per diversos conceptus repraesentatur unum rationis ens. [...] Nam sicut entia rationis non sunt vera sed ficta entia: ita & illorum distinctio non est vera, sed ficta distinctio.”

48 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 3, sect. 1, 69: “Unde ego quidem malim hanc distinctionem formalem appellari, quam rationis. Sunt enim hi conceptus quasi diversae quaedam formae, & rationes seu habitudines, sub quibus res concipiuntur.”

49 Hattab, “Gorlaeus on Universals,” 292.

50 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 4, sect. 1, 79: “Sic idem conceptus numero (animal) potest & de homine & bestia praedicari: quia & haec & ille sentiunt. Sed mens sub ratione unius apprehendit, quae in re sunt tantum similia. Neque tamen ita errat, aut aliter statuit quam res est, quoniam non concipit illa sub ratione unitatis numerice, sed similitudinis, quae dicitur unitas formalis aut essentialis: proprie non unitas, sed identitas.”

can be predicated of multiple real beings without error only if one remains conscious that the similarity they denote is an identity in some aspect, not a numerical unity between the individuals themselves.⁵¹

Gorlaeus draws one further contrast between other authors’s use of the expression “distinction of reason” and his own.

The scholastics call [the distinction of reason] by another name ‘[distinctio] rationis ratiocinatae’ – distinction of reason of the considered – and add another to it, which they call ‘[distinctio] rationis ratiocinantis’ – distinction of reason of the considering.⁵²

He goes on to discuss the latter type of distinction of reason, and concludes that it is not a type of distinction at all, since it occurs only between two instances of a single concept within the mind, as in the phrase “Cato is Cato.” Though there is no mention of any particular author, the passage bears a close resemblance to Suárez’ treatment of the same issue in the *Metaphysical disputations*, using many of the same expressions with only slight variation. Compare the passages in the following table (my italics in the right column):

Gorlaeus, <i>Exercitationes</i> , Ex. 4, sect. 1, 69–70	Suárez, <i>Disputationes metaphysicae</i> , disp. 7, sect. 1, n. 5, 251
[Q]uando idem simplex conceptus distinguitur a se ipso, quod fit vel per repetitionem in mente, vel per comparisonem. Sic enim Cato distinguitur a se ipso, sive sub ratione subiecti & praedicati: sive sub ratione subiecti & termini relationis: quando Cato dicitur esse Cato, vel esse idem, qui est.	Haec autem duo distinctionum rationis genera, quamvis ab aliis aliter explicantur, commode tamen possunt in hunc modum declarari, nimirum ut distinctio rationis ratiocinantis sit in ordine ad eundem conceptum adaequatum seu simplicem eiusdem rei, solum <i>per quamdam repetitionem vel comparisonem</i> eius, quae in mente fit. Sic enim <i>distinguitur Petrus a se ipso</i> , vel in <i>ratione subiecti et praedicati</i> quando de se ipso enuntiatur, vel in <i>ratione termini et subiecti relationis</i> , quando idem sibi dicitur; in his enim et similibus distinctionibus rationis idem est atque integer conceptus Petri, solumque fit quaedam repetitio et comparatio eius.

Table: Comparison of Gorlaeus and Suárez.

51 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 4, sect. 1, 69 and 79. See notes 48 and 50.

52 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 4, sect. 1, 69–70: “Scholastici hanc alio nomine vocant rationis ratiocinatae eique addunt adhuc aliam, quam vocant rationis ratiocinantis.” For the history of the two-fold distinction of reason in general and the role played by identity statements in particular, see Knebel, “*Distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*.”

In addition to the similarities between these two passages, the description of the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* given by Suárez in the same section also involves incomplete concepts used to collectively “exhaust” the entire entity of an object – exactly as in Gorlaeus’s characterization of the distinction of reason. In light of these textual parallels, it seems likely that Gorlaeus knew at least part of the seventh disputation of Suárez’ work on metaphysics. Though the discussion of the two subtypes of distinction of reason is the only passage where I was able to find a clear textual parallel between the two works, there are further parallels between Suárez’ treatment of distinctions and Gorlaeus’s on a structural level. For instance, Suárez also divides distinctions into positive and negative ones, and modes and their distinctions play a role in his ontology as well. A comparison with the works by Protestant authors previously mentioned reveals no similar parallels to Gorlaeus. In Keckermann’s *Scientiae metaphysicae compendiosum systema*, the brief section “De ordine diversitatis” begins from an entirely different ontology and dismisses the expression “distinction of reason” as confused. Timpler, in a one-page question in his *Metaphysicae systema methodicum* of 1604, mentions most of the central terms – real, rational, modal, etc. – but ultimately supports a simple two-part division into real distinctions and distinctions of reason.⁵³

As discussed, distinctions of reason are a type of positive distinction, i.e., both of their terms denote a real being. What is distinctive about distinctions of reason is that the real beings denoted by the two terms are identical: Their difference in meaning is entirely due to the mind forming two different concepts of the same real being. This stands in contrast to the last group of distinctions, namely distinctions between a real being and something real that is not that being itself. According to whether the second term denotes another real being or a modal being, distinctions that fall under this rubric are themselves called either modal or real. The division within modal distinction then follows the division of the types of being. As we have seen, modal beings are either modes or denominations, and consequently, a modal distinction is between a real being and its modes respectively its denominations. A real distinction, in contrast, is a distinction between two real beings. Gorlaeus remarks that this distinction can also be called essential, since distinctions between real beings are precisely distinctions between essences.⁵⁴

⁵³ See Keckermann, *Compendiosum systema*, cap. 8, 81–84; Timpler, *Metaphysicae systema methodicum* (1604), IV, cap. 6., q. 6, 352–53. Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 7, sect. 1, n. 6, 251, makes a very similar point about distinctions between beings of reason as the passage in the *Exercitationes* quoted above, in note 47.

⁵⁴ Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 3, sect. 1, 71.




Fig. 2. Types of distinctions.

The criteria or *signa* of the various distinctions are the subject of the short second section of the exercise on distinctions. Though the topic of this second section are the *signa* of distinctions in general, Gorlaeus focuses almost exclusively on the modal and real distinctions, since he finds the remaining cases unproblematic. What he sets out to prove is that the mark of the mind-independent distinctions in general is separability, and that whether the separability is mutual or not decides whether a distinction is real or modal. He first proves the general claim that separation, in the counterfactual sense of one thing being able to exist in a world in which the other does not exist, is the sign of mind-independent positive distinction:

Whatever can be separated is really distinct. To be separable is the same as to be able to exist while the other does not exist, whether that can come about by created potency or by uncreated omnipotence.⁵⁵

In other words, “It is possible for A to exist in a world in which B does not exist” implies “A is modally or really distinct from B.” Gorlaeus then asks whether the reverse implication is also valid, i.e., whether separability is a necessary as well as a sufficient criterion for a mind-independent distinction. However, he ultimately concludes that a qualification is necessary for this to be the case: That “non-

⁵⁵ Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 3, sect. 2, 72–73: “Quaecumque possunt separari, illa in re distinguuntur. Separari posse idem est, quod posse unum existere non existente alio, sive hoc fieri possit per potentiam creatam, sive per omnipotentiam increatam.”

being itself is not repugnant to them.”⁵⁶ The worry is produced by two supernatural cases: Firstly, the persons of the Trinity, though they are modally and not merely conceptually distinct from God, cannot be actually separated from one another, simply because they all necessarily exist. Secondly, God and his creatures are really distinct, even though it is impossible for creatures to exist without God.⁵⁷ A similar worry also occupies Gorlaeus in the discussion of the two specific versions of the separability criterion, although there the problem arises even without involving necessarily existing entities. He proceeds by testing each of the four implications between the two signs and the two sorts of distinctions separately, and he has no difficulty convincing himself of the validity of three of them: 1) That two modally distinct entities, i.e., a mode and its subject, are non-mutually separable follows directly from the definition of a mode as something which depends in its existence on its subject. 2) Similarly, if two things are really distinct, both of them are real beings, by the definition of real distinction. As such, it is no contradiction for either one to exist without the other things. 3) Thirdly, if it is possible for A to exist without B, but not for B to exist without A, one can conclude that they are distinguished as mode from subject, because they fulfill the general criterion of distinction without being mutually separable. A difficulty occurs in the fourth case, however: One cannot generally conclude that what can be mutually separated must also be really distinct. The counter-example is the case of two modes in one subject. Since it is possible for either mode to inhere in the subject while the other is not present, they are mutually separable. At the same time, they cannot be really distinct, since they are not real beings.

In fact, the case of distinctions between multiple modes of the same real being is already mentioned towards the end of the first section, directly after the introduction of the modal and real distinctions. As Gorlaeus himself remarks, this case does not technically fall within the scope of his discussion: He had resolved at the beginning of the exercise to treat only of distinctions in which at least one of the terms denotes a real being. That Gorlaeus nevertheless introduces this pseudo-distinction seems, therefore, only to be in order for it to serve as an edge case in the later discussion on *signa*. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the comparison to the modal distinction involves the question of separability from the beginning:

In addition to this modal distinction, there is moreover the distinction of modes, by means of which two modes of the same thing are distinguished, for which this is not the place. This [latter distinction] is a little stronger than the modal one, because its terms can be mutually separated. But that separation belongs to them not in virtue of that being

⁵⁶ Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 3, sect. 2, 73: “Sed adhuc quaeritur; an hoc signum valeat reciproce, ut quaecumque distinguuntur possunt separari? Valere puto: sed cum addita hac limitatione: si ipsum non esse non repugnet iis.”

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* That the persons of the Trinity are modes is also alluded to on page 71.

modal, which they have in themselves, but in virtue of the real being that the subject has, i.e., the [subject] in which [the two modes] are. For since the thing can be without the mode, one mode can also be in the thing without the other.⁵⁸

Here in the first section, Gorlaeus is tempted to view the distinction between modes as “a little stronger” than the modal distinction. With the doctrine of the second section in mind, it is clear that this is because it would make for a more direct connection between real distinction and its *signum*, mutual separability. Ultimately, however, the classification of the distinctions themselves is more important than a neat application of signs. Rather than introducing an additional type of distinction, Gorlaeus opts to accept that there are cases in which two things are mutually separable and yet are not real beings. He ends the exercise on distinctions with a rather vague suggestion that there ought to be a way to construct a better sign of real distinction:

Besides, this axiom is not valid the other way around, as the preceding ones. For it applies to the distinction between diverse modes. Although it is nevertheless possible (from what we have explained about modes in the previous exercise) to limit it in such a way that it can be used the other way around.⁵⁹

Since the problematic case is the distinction between modes, it is not difficult to see what limitation of the criterion of mutual separation is necessary to achieve the desired result: The criterion of mutual separability is fulfilled when it is possible for each of the things denoted to exist without the other. If the sense of “existence” is narrowed to include only the independent existence enjoyed by real beings (and not the dependent existence of modes), the criterion will only apply to real distinction. Suárez, in fact, does something similar in his treatment of the case of the distinction between modes, with which he tackles the same issue as Gorlaeus does: He argues that even though two modes of the same substance do not depend on one another’s existence, they are nevertheless modally and not really distinct, since they depend on the existence of the underlying substance.⁶⁰

58 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 3, sect. 1, 71: “Praeter hanc modalem distinctionem datur adhuc distinctio modorum, quae non est hujus loci, qua duo ejusdem rei modi distinguuntur. Haec paulo major est, quam modalis, quia ejus termini mutuo possunt separari. Verum haec separatio non competit eis per illud esse modale, quod in se habent, sed per illud esse reale, quod habet subjectum, scilicet in quo sunt. Quia enim separato modo res esse potest; ideo & separato uno modo & alter esse potest in re.”

59 Gorlaeus, *Exercitationes*, Ex. 3, sect. 2, 76–77: “Caeterum hoc axioma reciproce non valet: quemadmodum illa priora. Competit enim distinctioni, quae est inter diversos modos. Quamvis interim ex iis, quae de modis explicavimus priore exercitatione, ita possit limitari, ut reciproce usurpari possit.”

60 Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 7, sect. 1, n. 26, 259–60.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have given an account of Gorlaeus's theory of distinctions, including its intellectual and philosophical context, as well as its possible sources. This theory is embedded within his philosophical project, arising out of his conception of metaphysics as the study of singular, actual, and indivisible being, which is mirrored by his refusal to recognize any other than numerical unity. The typology of distinctions is characterized by the ontological status of the *relata*. The division of distinctions into negative and positive follows from the more basic division of beings into beings of reason and mind-independent beings. The division of mind-independent being into real and modal beings is also reflected in the realm of distinctions. In his discussion of these divisions in the first section of the relevant exercise, Gorlaeus focuses especially on the distinction of reason, which is contrasted both to negative and to mind-independent distinction. This section of the text, together with what Gorlaeus writes about beings of reason in exercise two and about universals in exercise four, proves useful for a better understanding of his epistemology, on which the available texts provide only sparse information otherwise. As explained in the third section of this paper, Gorlaeus uses the last part of the exercise on distinctions to establish the *signa* of real and modal distinctions. These "signs" are metaphysical criteria that are fulfilled if and only if two entities are distinct in the relevant way. The problematic case here, and possibly the reason why Gorlaeus brings up the question of signs in the first place, is the relation between two modes inhering in one subject. The problem is that it is possible for each of two such modes to exist without the other, i.e., they seem to be mutually separable without being really distinct. Suárez solves the same problem by specifying that for two things to be mutually separable in this context requires that their existence does not depend on a third entity. Gorlaeus chooses a different option, however: Rather than modifying the criterion of mutual separability, he seemingly admits that the case of two modes in the same subject is a genuine exception.

Regarding possible sources, I have argued that for the theory of distinctions in particular, one should look to Suárez to understand Gorlaeus's terminology (though not necessarily the philosophical implications). This is made all the more interesting because in many other cases, the unconventional parts of Gorlaeus have antecedents either in the German protestant tradition (especially in Taurellus) or in Cardano and Scaliger, possibly coming together in the person of Gorlaeus's teacher De Venio. Neither these two lines nor the selection of Protestant textbooks used here seems apt to explain Gorlaeus's theory of distinctions, however. Instead, the structure of exercise three of the *Exercitationes*, together with the way in which Gorlaeus uses key terms like *modus*, suggests the influence of Suárez' *Metaphysical Disputations*. This influence might be indirect, of course, possibly through a now lost disputation under De Venio, but it is present

nevertheless. This makes it impossible, in my view, to read Gorlaeus's metaphysics as a product of a Protestant tradition not yet influenced by the famous Jesuit. Rather, the mix of doctrines that our young Dutchman absorbed and integrated into his system in one way or another includes all the authors just mentioned, and probably a few more.

As idiosyncratic and particular as the circumstances of the case here examined may be, it still provides insight into the way in which theories of distinction that are ultimately medieval in origin found their way into the seventeenth century. That the intellectual world of David Gorlaeus contains both the thought of such figures as Scaliger, Cardano and Taurellus and Suárez' version of a distinction that goes back to Aquinas is remarkable, but a similar melting together and repurposing of seemingly disparate ideas is also found in other authors from the same period. Even when pieces of individual scholastic doctrines are adopted with relatively few changes, the recontextualization itself can give them new implications, as when, as we have seen, Gorlaeus's radical views on what is an *ens reale* and what is not is directly linked to his views on unity and distinction.

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A Century of Scotistic Metaphysics in Colonial South America

Jerónimo Valera, Alfonso Briceño, and Juan de Fuica
on Being, Distinction, and Identity

Roberto Hofmeister Pich

Introduction

Latin American scholasticism is deeply characterized by the triennial *cursus philosophicus* that comprised logic, philosophy of nature, and metaphysics and was as such imported from the models of Iberian universities such as Salamanca and Alcalá de Henares (Spain) as well as Coimbra and Évora (Portugal) to the New World. The *cursus philosophicus* was lectured in Latin America by masters of the various Catholic Orders, from the mid-sixteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Institutionally, that course, as well as the teaching of theology, was offered both in universities and in several higher education schools or colleges bound to convents and seminaries (university teaching officially started on 12 May 1551, at the “Real Universidad de la Ciudad de los Reyes” in Lima, Peru, and shortly after, on 21 September 1551, also at the “Real y Pontificia Universidad de México”).¹ Thomism – or rather *Thomisms* – strongly marked philosophical and theological teaching in those Latin American institutions. But the history of colonial scholasticism as a history of philosophical and theological ideas does not simply amount to versions or variances of Thomism. Philosophy and theology *ad mentem Scoti* were consistently and thoroughly developed in Latin American colonial history too.² In this study, we attempt to provide an

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1 Pich, “Latin American Colonial Scholasticism” (especially the section “Universities, Thomism, Scotism, and Suarezianism in Colonial Latin America”). On the characteristics of the *cursus philosophicus* (especially logic) and for an overview of some important authors, see Redmond, *Bibliography*, VII–XII; Redmond, “Latin America, Colonial Thought in.”

2 See Pich and Culleton, “Introduction,” 1–25; Pich, “Latin American Colonial Scholasticism.”

overview of the history of Scotism in South America, by focusing on three key authors – the Peruvian Jerónimo Valera and the Chileans Alfonso Briceño and Juan de Fuica, who taken together represent one string of South American Scotism – and their metaphysical theories of transcendental concepts, formalities, and distinctions. Throughout the seventeenth century, these authors presented their theories in their writings on logic, metaphysics, and theology.

1. Jerónimo Valera: Being of Reason, Real Being, and Distinction

Scotism has begun in colonial South America with the masters of Jerónimo Valera at the Convent of San Francisco de Lima. But Jerónimo Valera is the first South American Scotist whose philosophical thought can be studied and whose role in disseminating Scotus's thought can be described due to the attested influence he had on future generations of Scotists on the continent. Valera was born in 1568 in Peru (in the locality of Nieva). In the Convento de San Francisco de Lima, where he also studied, Valera acted as Lector of Arts and Sacred Theology for sixteen years, between 1590 and 1607. He died in Lima in 1625.³ The only work of Jerónimo Valera known today testifies to the reception, influence, and development of Scotus's thought and Scotism in colonial Latin America. It is titled *Commentarii ac quaestiones in universam Aristotelis ac Subtilissimi Doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti logicam*.⁴ It appeared in 1610, in Lima, and was *the first work of philosophy printed* in South America. The volume was intended as a textbook of logic for Franciscan friars, thus not primarily for university classes. Although Valera touches on many metaphysical discussions in his *logica in via Scoti*, we did not find in it any formal treatment of the object of metaphysics and its properties. At any rate, his *Commentarii* do contain metaphysical doctrines and, especially by paying attention to his exposition of the object of logic and to his debate on the existence of non-particular things or universals,⁵ there are important lessons we can learn concerning his views of 'being,' 'unity,' and 'distinction.'

In order to support the view that syllogism is the appropriate object of logic, Valera discusses in Lib. I, dist. 1, q. 3 of his *Commentarii* – which is based on John Duns Scotus's *Quaestiones* on Porphyry's *Isagoge* – both (a) what the "ob-

3 For his biography, see Céspedes Agüero, "La filosofía escotista de Jerónimo de Valera (1568–1625)," 437–43; see also Céspedes Agüero, "Lógica *in via Scoti*"; Céspedes Agüero, "Jerónimo de Valera, padre del criollismo."

4 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones in universam Aristotelis ac Subtilissimi Doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti logicam*, 1610 (henceforth *Commentarii ac quaestiones*). See also Pich, "Scholastica colonialis: Notes on Jerónimo Valera's (1568–1625) Life, Work and Logic."

5 See Pich, "Jerónimo Valera (1568–1625) and His Scotist Account of Universals."

ject” of a scientific habit is and (b) what a “being of reason” is.⁶ It is not possible here to go into the many details of Valera’s exposition of the object of a scientific habit. In one set of explanations, our author focuses on the “appropriate” object (*obiectum adaequatum*)⁷ of a science. This object is the one that comprehends everything a given science is concerned with, either as “causes and principles” or as the “parts of which it is composed.” Therefore, that object is also called the “object of attribution” (*obiectum attributionis*), because everything a science considers or demonstrates somehow refers to it. Loyal to Scotus,⁸ Valera affirms that there are three conditions that an object needs to meet in order to be a science’s *appropriate object*: (i) It must be known what it is and that it is, and the object’s definition or *ratio formalis* must be *per se notum*; (ii) through the object’s *definitio*, properties are demonstrated of it, and therefore the appropriate object of a science must have properties; (iii) all things considered in a science are considered because of the object, and therefore, the object is the habit’s “principium et radix veritatum.” It is *adaequatum*, because object and science must be “equal” to each other or must “square” with one another – the verb used is ‘adaequo’ – in such a way that nothing is considered in the *habitus* that is not somehow related to the object, and there is nothing known about the object that the science does not consider.⁹

At this point, before presenting his conclusions concerning the object of logic, Valera differentiates “real being” from “being of reason.” “Real being” (*ens reale*), understood and defined by Jerónimo Valera very much in Francisco Suárez’s terms, is one that “can exist in the nature of things.”¹⁰ It amounts to the transcendental *ens qua ens* and is as such the first object of metaphysics. In its turn, “being of reason” (*ens rationis*) is understood as a “diminished being” that

6 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 3, 8a–10b.

7 Throughout this essay, I render “adaequatum” into English as “appropriate.”

8 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 3, 9a, refers to Scotus’s *Reportationes* as his source for such an account of the “obiectum adaequatum”: “Ad quas tres conditiones reducuntur aliae, quas ponit Doctor I. reporta. q. 1. ideo illas praecipuas vocat.” See also Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, q. 3, nn. 13–19, OPh 1, 14–16; Duns Scotus, *Ord.*, prol., pars 3, qq. 1–3, nn. 142–49, ed. Vat. 1, 96–101; Duns Scotus, *Lect.*, prol., pars 2, qq. 1–3, nn. 66–70, ed. Vat. 16, 26–27; Duns Scotus, *Reportata parisiensia*, prol., q. 1, art. 2, nn. 5–15, ed. Wadding 11/1, 3–6.

9 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 3, 8b–9a.

10 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 3, 9a: “Secunda vox est ‘ens rationis’, quae sic pro nunc breviter explicatur, quod ens reale dicitur illud quod potest existere in rerum natura.” See Suárez, *Disputationes metafísicas*, I, 1, 24; I, 1, 26; II, 2, 14–18; XXXI, 2, 10. Suárez’s *ens reale* does not include in its scope beings that are purely beings of reason and beings that are “completely accidental.” See Gomez Arboleya, *Francisco Suárez, S.I.*, 107–71; Francisco Yela, “La síntesis metafísica de Suárez,” 271–303; Honnfelder, *Scientia transcendens*, 205–47; Gracia, “Suárez (and Later Scholasticism),” 463–64; Doyle, “Suárez on the Reality of the Possibles,” 23–24.

a thing acquires only when and because it is being cognized. By knowing ‘man’ (*homo*), the intellect does not put anything real into its object, for ‘man’ is not really changed by being cognized. Through that act, the intellect puts, as it were, a being of reason into it, which ‘homo’ has only insofar as it is known. Therefore, that ‘homo’ is taken as a subject, a predicate, or a species is not an attribution *a parte rei*, but only due to an intellect’s reflection on ‘man.’¹¹ Valera, as a result, affirms that “real beings” have “esse factum,” whereas “beings of reason” have “esse fictum” stemming from the acts of an intellect and based on some similarity with real being.¹² Valera’s view seems to be that ‘real’ equals *extramental* or to be independent of any mental act, whereas ‘of reason’ equals *intramental* and to be dependent on both mental acts and (originally, at least) also on the existence of real beings – with the exception of such beings of reason as negations, privations, and pure chimeras or *impossibilia*, which, although they are cognized “per modum entium,” have ontological status only because they are invented by an intellect.¹³

On the basis of his detailed account of the appropriate object of a scientific habit and of the real distinction vs. distinction of reason, Valera concludes that *simpliciter et absolute* the “formal object of logic” is a being of reason.¹⁴ In the procedures of logic, everything is considered under “formalities” such as *genus*,

11 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 3, 9a: “Ens vero rationis illud esse diminutum quod res acquirit, quando est sub cognitione. Ex eo enim quod noster intellectus cognoscat, verbi gratia hominem nihil reale in illo ponit, cum homo non mutetur realiter ex eo quod intelligatur, tribuit tamen illi quoddam esse rationis quod tantum habet quandiu cognoscitur, ut quod homo sit subiectum, vel praedictum, vel species, nihil est reale a parte rei, sed solum quia intellectus id in homine fingit.”

12 See Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 3, 9a: “Et sic solet dici ens reale habere esse factum; ens vero rationis habere esse fictum ab intellectu ad similitudinem entis realis.” Valera offers a detailed account of the “being of reason” in *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 2, art. 2, q. 1 (*Quid ens rationis sit?*), 52b–56a.

13 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 2, art. 2, q. 1, 55b: “Quinta conclusio. Alia sunt entia rationis, quae fiunt, quatenus cognoscuntur per modum entium, ut privationes, negationes, et entia rationis omnino ficta, quae non habent rationem entis, nisi in quantum actu cognoscuntur, ac si essent. Ut caecitas v. g. quae in re est non esse visus, est ens rationis, quando actu cognoscitur, ac si esset forma aliqua positiva afficiens oculum. Probatio. Quia cum ista non consequantur ad cognitionem, et ante illam, a parte rei non sint entia; tunc sunt quando cognoscuntur per modum entis. Sexta conclusio. Ens rationis in tota sua latitudine, dividitur in ens rationis, quod in re non habet fundamentum; quod ens fictum, seu figmentum dicitur, ut chimaera, et tale ens rationis potest multiplicari sine numero, per omniaque predicamenta divagari. Similia enim entia rationis facile est intellectui, fingere sine fundamento, et ordine: aliud est ens rationis habens fundamentum in re”. The significance of the debates on “beings of reason” in Baroque-scholastic metaphysics and logic has already been recognized; for an overview, see Novotný, *Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel*.

14 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 3, 9b–10a.

species, differentia, propositio, etc. Under these headings, logic discusses the nature of things and deals with definitions as composed by genus and difference, as well as with syllogisms. Logic deals with things such as “man,” “animal,” “concepts,” “words,” etc., but not as participating in “real being,” for this would be a metaphysical concern. It treats them as participating (*conveniunt*) in “being of reason”; moreover, there is no middle and common term between “real being” and “being of reason.”¹⁵

Given all this, it is still necessary to know which “being of reason” has “the conditions of an [appropriate] object.”¹⁶ According to Valera, and Scotus too, the object of logic is neither the “logical being of reason” (*ens rationis logicum*) – therefore, logic is *not* a general science of beings of reason or, more precisely, of *intentiones secundae*¹⁷ – nor of *modus sciendi* taken in common (such ways of gaining knowledge of things previously unknown include “division” and “definition”),¹⁸ nor of “argumentation” (*argumentatio*) generally speaking.¹⁹ Logic does not deal with all kinds of argumentation, such as dilemma, sorites, and example [*exemplum*], which are taken here as forms of rhetorical argumentation.²⁰ Logic is about (valid) *sylogistic* argumentation only.²¹ Hence, Valera’s first conclusion in Lib. I, dist. 1, q. 4, following Scotus and the Scotists (*noster Doctor [...] et omnes eius discipuli*), is that “syllogism” is the appropriate object of logic; syllo-

15 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 3, 10a: “Confirmatur. Logica agit de rebus ipsis ut de homine, animali, etc., de conceptibus, et vocibus, ut quaestione sequenti videbitur, non quatenus conveniunt in ratione entis realis, cum de illis ut sic agat metaphysica: ergo in quantum conveniunt in ente rationis, cum non fit dari medium.”

16 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 4 (*Quod ens rationis sit obiectum logicae*), 10b.

17 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 4, 11a.

18 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 4, 11a–13a. Concerning Valera’s rejection of the “modus sciendi” as the object of logic, see Pich, “Jerónimo Valera’s (1568–1625) Scotistic Account,” 203–16.

19 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 4, 13a–b.

20 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 4, 15a: “Tertio probatur: a sufficienti partium enumeratione, obiectum logicae non est ens rationis logicum in communi sumptum, ut prima fert opinio, nec modus sciendi in communi, quia nullius istorum secundum rationem generalem habetur diffinitio in logica, nec praemittitur ut principium scientiae, nec passio aliqua de eis demonstratur in generali. [...]. Praeterea argumentatio non est obiectum logicae, quia logica non agit de omni specie argumentationis, cum dilemma, sorites et exemplum, quae species sunt argumentationis, ad rhetoricam pertineant: ergo eius obiectum non est argumentatio in communi [...].”

21 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 4, 13b: “Nobis autem, ut doctrinam nostri Doctoris tueamus, qui obiectum logicae syllogismum constituit.” See also Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones, Summulae dialecticae* III, c. 1, 31a–b.

gism meets all the conditions of the appropriate scientific object that he has previously characterized.²²

As for the metaphysical views in Valera's work, in his exposition of the division of terms, more specifically in the doctrine of "general" or "common terms," in his *Summulae dialecticae* (contained as a separate part of his logic, with its own pagination), Valera lists "unum, verum et bonum" as transcendental terms or concepts; they are not called "passiones entis" there, but they are, just like 'being,' most general (real) concepts.²³ No detailed account of them is offered in the *Summulae dialecticae*, however.²⁴ Interestingly, Valera's view of distinctions is connected to the doctrine of transcendentals. We find a clear statement of Valera's view of what a distinction is in metaphysical terms. It appears in the context of the five articles in Lib. I, dist. 2, where he explores the notion of the "real universal" or "common nature." In the background of the discussion is the metaphysical question about the nature that is a "foundation" and "subject" of universality, i.e., "the universal in the [existing] material thing."²⁵ In the *quaestio* "whether the natures which are called universals are somehow distinct from the singulars in which they are," Valera contrasts the Scotist view on this matter with the view of the "Thomists." The "Thomists" seem to say that natures by no means *really* distinguish from the singulars in which they are, they rather distinguish only *through reason*.²⁶ One argument for the Thomist position is that if it were not a distinction of reason alone, then the superior items (words and concepts) could not be predicated of the inferior items (individuals), because "when two things distinguish *a parte rei* one cannot be predicated of the other."

22 These conditions are thematized again in Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 4, 13b. See also Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 1, q. 4, 14a–15a; Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, q. 3, n. 20, OPh 1, 16–17. See Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 35–36; Pich, "Jerónimo Valera's (1568–1625) Scotistic Account," 216–29.

23 See also Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, *Summulae dialecticae* I, c. 3, 10b: "Rursus terminus communis est triplex, alius transcendens qui significat rationem illimitatam et unicuique rei in mundo existenti convenientem, et hi sunt famosissimi illi senario numero comprehensi qui hac dictione (re u bau) notari solent, scilicet, res ens, verum, bonum, aliquid, unum." In that short introduction to logic, however, Valera seems to rely on the works of Domingo de Soto and Pedro da Fonseca to offer a list of six transcendental terms / concepts. The list is heterodox to Scotus and Scotism strictly speaking; see Pich, "The Account of Transcendental Concepts," 304–13.

24 Valera here does not do anything out of the ordinary; most of the *Summulae* of his time mention the list of transcendental terms at this place of the exposition of the theory of terms, and normally without giving any deeper explanation. I thank Claus A. Andersen for this valuable observation.

25 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 2, *Commentarium*, 34b.

26 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 2, art. 1, q. 2, 36b.

In another argument, we are told that *a parte rei* it is the same “to be man” and “to be this man.”²⁷

For Valera, at this point, it is important to state what ‘distinction’ means. Distinction is a “property of being” (*passio entis*), a view that will be considered decades later by South American Scotists such as Alfonso Briceño and Juan de Fuica, as we shall see below (in the sections 2.1, 2.2., 2.4, 3.2, and 3.3). As a property of being, *distinctio* bears a division that “being” (*ens*) also has in its “broadest division.”²⁸ This remark remains here without any explanation by our Peruvian author; an explanation would have been desirable indeed, since that division probably cannot be explained under the assumption of a univocal sense of “being.”²⁹ Valera simply says that just like “being” is divided into “real being” and “being of reason,” so “distinction” too is divided into “real” and “of reason.”³⁰ A real distinction is defined as a difference (between items) *in the thing* and without any contribution from an intellect; there is a distinction *of reason* when the intellect introduces a separation into something where there *really* is no distinction.³¹ Again, real distinction itself is of a double kind. (a) One kind holds between two mutually separable things, just like a distinction between two individuals to whom we give different names, e.g., ‘Peter’ and ‘Paul.’ This is the real distinction “in the strict sense.” (b) Another kind of real distinction is the “formal distinction,” which holds between “two formal *rationes*” in one and the same entity. Building on the example offered by Valera, we can say that in the individual thing ‘Peter’ there are both the formality of ‘rational’ and the formality of ‘animal,’ which are distinct from each other and, nonetheless, “are identically the same entity,” namely the individual human being called Peter.³²

From the assumptions explained above, Valera draws two conclusions against the Thomists about the existence of common natures, the second of

27 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 2, art. 1, q. 2, 36b–37a.

28 See Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 2, art. 1, q. 2, 37a: “Pro nostra statuenda sententia observare licet: quod cum distinctio sit passio entis sicut ens in latissima sua divisione in ens reale, et ens rationis dividitur, ita etiam et distinctio.”

29 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 2, art. 1, q. 7, 74a: “Primum quod sicut ens convenit aequivoce analogice enti rationis, et enti reali; enti quidem reali principaliter, et antonomasice, enti vero rationis reductive, sic etiam intelligibilitas, quae ens sequitur.”

30 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 2, art. 1, q. 2, 37a.

31 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 2, art. 1, q. 2, 37a.

32 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 2, art. 1, q. 2, 37a: “Distinctio autem realis est duplex [sic!]; una quae datur inter duas res ad invicem separabiles ut inter Petrum et Paulum, et haec nomen generis sibi retinet, distinctioque realis stricto modo sumpta appellatur. Alia vero formalis, quae in eadem entitate reperitur inter duas rationes formales illius, ut in eadem entitate Petri, reperitur formalitas rationalis, formalitas animalis etc., quae tamen identice sunt eadem entitas Petri. Quod si bene percepisset, Murcia non ita perperam hoc falsum imposuisset Scoto, quod dixerit distinctionem formalem, nec esse realem nec rationis, sed mediam inter illas.”

which is of particular interest. Valera affirms that nature “as such of itself is not singular.” A nature in a given thing is singular only through a “singularity” that is further added to it. This additional aspect of singularity (called *quid superadditum*) is *formally* distinct from the nature itself. Valera’s point is that between the nature and the additional aspect or singularity in any individual item there is already a formal distinction. His support for this point is Scotus’s *Ordinatio* II, dist. 3, q. 1. The Peruvian master emphasizes the argument according to which, without that formal distinction, it would not be possible to *conceive* any nature without singularity, but it is clearly false that this is not possible. The only exception to this metaphysical stance is the divine nature, which is taken to be both *a nature* and of itself *singular*, i. e., the divine being is taken to be *de se* and *essentialiter* “this undivided singular.” Accordingly, both the multiplication of the divine essence (by being in many) and the proper conception of it “without this individuation” are impossible.³³

Valera brings several other reasons for accepting that since we can *conceive* a given nature without conceiving a singularity, we should accept a formal distinction between identical real items or items that really cannot exist separately. As we read in one of his arguments, *a parte rei* the singularity, e. g., of Peter does not belong to the intrinsic *ratio* and essence of human nature (existing in Peter and in other human beings), and vice-versa. As a consequence, *a parte rei* the formal *ratio* of the singularity of the human being Peter and the formal *ratio* of the essence of human nature (like in any other case of a singularity and its corresponding nature) are not mutually included in one another, and this formal separability is what to distinguish formally *a parte rei* means.³⁴

33 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 2, art. 1, q. 2, 37a–b: “Secunda Conclusio. Natura ut sic de se non est singularis, sed hoc provenit illi a singularitate, quae est quid superadditum ipsi naturae, ab ipsa natura formaliter distinctum. Sic noster Doctor in 2. Senten. d. 3. q. 1. §. ad quaestionem igitur, ubi sic ait. *Substantia materialis ex natura sua non est de se haec*. Et cum eo omnes eius discipuli. Probatur autem ratione nostri Doctoris, quam ibi subdit. *Quia non posset intellectus intelligere ipsam (scilicet naturam) sub opposito*. Quae ratio sic formatur: alias non posset natura concipi sine singularitate, quod est falsum, cum possit homo distincte concipi, imo et essentialiter diffiniri, sine aliqua singularitate. Quia enim Deus de se, et essentialiter est hoc singulare indivisum, ideo nec potest in pluribus singularibus multiplicari, nec concipi sine hac individuatione.” See also Duns Scotus, *Ord.* II, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 29, ed. Vat. 7, 402.

34 Valera, *Commentarii ac quaestiones*, I, dist. 2, art. 1, q. 2, 37b.

2. Alfonso Briceño's Metaphysical Appendixes

Valera's immediate followers, who continued his Scotist teaching, were the Franciscans Miguel Ribera³⁵ and above all Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668). Born in Santiago de Chile, Briceño belongs to the second generation of Scotists educated at the Convento de San Francisco de Lima, Peru. Briceño's career was outstanding.³⁶ His major work, consisting of two large volumes of *Controversiae* concerning key topics of Scotus's *Ordinatio* I, appeared in Madrid in 1639–1642.³⁷ In 1646 he was made Bishop of Nicaragua, and in 1649 Bishop of Caracas, in Venezuela, the country where he died in the city of Trujillo.

The spectrum and the depth of the debates in which Briceño engaged in his *Controversiae* are impressive. In the two volumes of the *Prima Pars* of his incomplete project of commenting on open disputes raised by Scotus's work, Briceño, in a total of 12 *Controversiae* of various length, both offers an exposition of what is for him the metaphysical basis of Scotus's theology and systematically constructs Scotus's theology as a metaphysical doctrine of God. We should highlight the expositions in *Controversies* 1–8, structured along the metaphysical properties of God, such as unity, truth, and goodness, and the divine “[pure] perfections” and “modes of being.”³⁸ Every interpretation of Scotus's texts is accompanied by controversies with Thomistic authors and the ‘Scotizantes,’ a word that bears the twofold meaning of authors aligned with John Duns Scotus's doctrine and authors unable to correctly render his thought. In recent publications, I have highlighted the significance of (at least) five “Metaphysical Appendixes” attached, as conceptual apparatuses, to several of Briceño's *Controversies* (these are the *Controversies* 1, 2, 11, and 12).³⁹ The purpose of these appendices is to facilitate a better understanding of the theological discussions, but they also have an importance of their own. In them, we find Briceño's most

³⁵ Céspedes Agüero, “La filosofía escotista de Jerónimo de Valera (1568–1625),” 481–82.

³⁶ On Briceño's life and works, see Hanisch Espíndola, *En torno a la filosofía*, 26–28; Urdaneta, *Alonso Briceño*; Manzano, “Alonso Briceño (1587–1668)”; Muñoz García, “Alonso Briceño”; Skariča, “Alonso Briceño”; Cenci, “Notas bibliográficas”; Pich, “Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668) and the *Controversiae*,” 65–69.

³⁷ Alfonso Briceño, *Prima pars celebriorum controversiarum in primum Sententiarum Ioannis Scoti Doctoris Subtilis*, Madrid: Typographia Regia, 2 vols., 1639–1642 (henceforth *Prima pars celeb. contr.*; met. app. stands for *Metaphysica Appendix*).

³⁸ On Briceño's metaphysics and metaphysical theology, see, e.g., Pich, “Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668) and the *Controversiae*”; Pich, “Alfonso Briceño O.F.M. (1587–1668) on John Duns Scotus's Metaphysical Groundworks”; Pich, “Alfonso Briceño on Cognition, Distinction, and the Knowledge of God.”

³⁹ See Pich, “Alfonso Briceño O.F.M. (1587–1668) sobre o ente e a distinção”; Pich, “Alfonso Briceño O.F.M. (1587–1668) sobre a distinção de razão.”

explicit statements concerning Scotus's philosophy and the ongoing controversies over the interpretation thereof.

Since the purpose of the present study is to offer a systematic overview of the doctrines of being, distinction, and identity in Latin American Scotism, our focus is on Briceño's third Metaphysical Appendix, which is about the "distinction of being in general and the specific kinds thereof."⁴⁰ It would be fair to see this Appendix as a late specimen of the so-called Formalist literature (consisting of treatises on kinds of distinctions and identities). As we might expect, due to the role it plays in the doctrine of God's ontological simplicity, Briceño pursues in that 'treatise' a defense of the formal distinction.⁴¹ I will focus on something very basic for his entire analysis, namely, (a) the metaphysical connection between *ens*, *unitas*, and *distinctio*,⁴² something that is presupposed in the more specific explanations of (b) the distinction of reason, (c) the "precising" distinction (*distinctio praecisiva*),⁴³ and the three kinds of real distinction, i.e., (d) the real distinction properly speaking, (e) the modal distinction, and (f) the formal distinction *ex natura rei*.

2.1 Being and Distinction – Distinction between "Position" and "Negation"

In the first article of his third Metaphysical Appendix, Briceño expresses his conviction that "a treatise on distinction" is a key to the interpretation of the principles of Scotus's thought.⁴⁴ He is aware of a tradition of Formalist⁴⁵ Scotists who, beginn-

⁴⁰ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2 (*Controversia secunda de unitate Dei*), "Ad Controversiam secundam de unitate Dei Metaphysica appendix; de distinctione entis in genere, et specie," aa. 1–4, 166–202.

⁴¹ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., 166.

⁴² See also Pich, "Alfonso Briceño [...] sobre o ente e a distinção."

⁴³ See also Pich, "Alfonso Briceño [...] sobre a notícia intuitiva e a distinção precisiva."

⁴⁴ This idea that it is necessary – or at least most useful – to study distinctions and formalities in order to understand Scotus's thought is found also in Ambrogio Sassi's (Ambrosius Saxius OFM, † ca. 1652) important two-volume work *Catatrofis philosophica ac theologica* from 1640/42, that is, the exact same time as Briceño's *Controversiae*. It appears to have been something the Franciscans told their students in their lectures. See Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 676 (with reference to the exact place in Sassi's work).

⁴⁵ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., 166–67: "Quia tractatus de distinctione est quasi clavis quaedam, qua Scoticae disciplinae principia referantur, quae inaccessibilia iudicari possent (sicut oblatrant adversarii) ideo in praesenti post controversiam de unitate, cui in multorum sententia distinctio adaequate opponitur, eo quod inferat distinctionem, et divisionem a quolibet alio ente, de ipsa distinctione disputationem conteximus. Ex hac enim controversa petenda est distinctionis formalis ex natura rei enodatio, ab Scoto ex Aristotele, et verae metaphysicae fontibus hausta; quam si non percalleas, reliquum est, ut in tota illius doct-

ing with the systematizations by Francis of Meyronnes and Petrus Thomae in the fourteenth century, wrote “treatises on formalities” and explained “distinction” as a key metaphysical concept.⁴⁶ His treatise is placed precisely after an exposition of ‘unity’ (*unitas*), which seems to be the right opposite of ‘distinction’ (*distinctio*). The first thing to learn is the “definition of distinction” (*ratio distinctionis*). Authors such as Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza SJ (1578–1641) affirmed that (i) the essence of *distinctio* lies, positively, in some relation of opposition of extreme terms differing from each other; thus, the quidditative concept of distinction – which expresses *what* distinction is – is “position” (of something else).⁴⁷ The central reason for this is that, if unity is a “negation of partition [or: division]” or a “non-being of distinction or of division,” and if negation (*negatio*) is not the negation of another negation, then the concept of distinction itself must be established as *something positive*.⁴⁸ Moreover, (ii) if the concept of distinction were a “non-being” (*non esse*) and did not mean any (positive) thing, then all distinctions of being – both “real” and “of reason” – would univocally convene in a unique *ratio* apprehensible in a univocal objective concept. “Real” negation and negation “of reason” would then not express any “quidditative difference” that could be separately apprehended by the human intellect.⁴⁹

This second argument for a positive account of distinction evolves around a rejection of the view that the conceptual univocity of distinction consists in negation or non-being. We can surely say (ii’) that the several distinctions, real and of reason, *do not convene* in an objective *ratio* of negation; one must consider that the adequate substrate of them is unity, which is indeed a positive

rina allucineris, quae his maxime fundamentis innititur. Quamvis autem de hac distinctionis materia plures ex nostris Theologis integros formalitatum tractatus ediderint, vel inde Formalistae appellati; brevis haec appendix cuncta ab ipsis observata, ut spero, enucleabit excusso cortice, vel ambagum involucris ab actis, quibus eae tractationes scatent.”

⁴⁶ See Möhle, *Formalitas und modus intrinsecus*, 27–41, 74–113, 286–336; Bolliger, *Infiniti contemplatio*, 218–362; Andersen, “Introduction”; Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 659–66. On the critical reception of Scotus’s formalist metaphysics in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as well as on the defense of it by Scotist authors, see Hoenen, “*Formalitates phantasticae*.”

⁴⁷ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 1, 167a.

⁴⁸ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 1, 167a: “Primo: quia unitas essentialiter est negatio quaedam partitionis; at negatio non est negatio, seu non esse, alterius non esse, vel alius negationis: igitur cum unitas essentialiter sit quoddam non esse distinctionis, vel divisionis, reliquum est, ut distinctionis conceptus in positivo constituendus sit.”

⁴⁹ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 3, 167b: “Arguitur secundo: quia si distinctionis conceptus in quodam non esse consisteret; fieret, ut omnes entium distinctiones coirent univoce in unam rationem; adeo ut distinctiones reales, et rationis, simul colligi possent ad conceptum simpliciter unum distinctionis, ut sic ab illis praecisae. Cum negationes omnes tam reales, quam rationis, eam quidditativam inaequalitatem non referant, quae per praecisivam actionem depurari nequeat, ad unitatem conceptus obiectivi.”

substrate – and unity expresses a “division from anything else” (*distinctio a quolibet alio*), that is, a kind of positive property. In other words, “the absolutely unique *ratio*” of distinction would rather have to follow the nature of “the absolutely unique *ratio*” of unity, which is something positive⁵⁰ (no matter, whether there is indeed an “absolutely unique *ratio*” of unity, or not). Secondly, (ii”) that ‘distinction’ cannot mean a negation under a univocal concept is precisely due to the fact that there is not an “absolutely unique *ratio*” of unity, which is abstracted from various existing unities. As a consequence, an “objective unique *ratio*” of distinction, which is abstracted from “real” and “fictitious” distinctions, cannot be found either.⁵¹ In fact, we see in this first opinion a discourse on distinction as “a *quasi* property” (Briceño’s terminology) of unity, and the unity of a property cannot exceed the unity of its bearer. Because of that, and because unity fundamentally has a positive status, one can conclude that neither the objective concept of ‘unity’ nor that of ‘distinction’ are absolutely one (*unus*) or common; in both cases, there is a real and a non-real component (real and rational unities, real and rational distinctions).⁵² This argumentation against the thesis that distinction is a negation ends with a kind of *reductio ad absurdum*. On the true premises (a) that one cannot abstract a unique objective *ratio* of unity based on its “real” and “of reason” versions and (b) that the univocity of *distinctio* as a *quasi* (monadic) property of unity depends on the univocity of unity itself, and assuming (c) that distinction is merely a univocal negation or a univocal non-being, it follows then (d) that distinction is something positive indeed, because premise (c) is true iff both (a) and (b) are false.⁵³

Briceño does not endorse the thesis (i) that the *ratio* of “distinction” consists in something positive; “unity,” on the contrary, as a convertible property of being consists in something positive.⁵⁴ Neither does he defend the theses (ii) that

50 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 3, 167b–68a.

51 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 3, 168a.

52 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 3, 168a: “Praeterea; quod passio alicuius subiecti non debet maiorem unitatem sortiri, quam subiectum illud, cuius est affectio; at conceptus unitatis non est simpliciter unus ad unitatem realem, et rationis: ergo nec distinctio, quae est quasi proprietates, et affectio unitatis, referre debet communem conceptum distinctionibus realibus, et rationis.”

53 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 3, 168a.

54 See Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 19, 172a: “Ad argumenta, quae contendunt, conceptum distinctionis positivum esse. Ad primum; quod, licet repugnaret, negationem opponi alteri negationi, quod in praesenti non expendimus; viderint, qui unitatem negativam autumant; nos nullatenus perstringit, qui unitatis conceptum positivum asserimus.”

distinction cannot be taken as a univocal metaphysical concept⁵⁵ and (iii) that it depends primarily on unity⁵⁶ as its basis. The decisive aim of Briceño's argument is to establish the subject of distinction.

2.2 The "Substrate" of Distinction

Whereas the first block of discussions on the metaphysical grounding of distinction in Briceño's Metaphysical Appendix was about the positive or negative status of *distinctio* as a metaphysical concept, which resulted in the thesis that distinction is something close to being a property of *unitas*, in the second block of discussions we find a debate concerning the "appropriate substrate" (*adaequatum substratum*) of distinction. The debate concerns *that from which* distinction is "proximately and appropriately" inferred. Briceño presents as the widespread opinion that unity is the substrate from which distinction is inferred.⁵⁷ But here, he says, we have to consider what this unity is that the metaphysics of being deals with. To defend the idea that unity is *the material substrate of distinction*, the subject of which distinction is a *quasi* property, we need to properly explain unity itself.

To explain what unity is, Briceño makes use of a definition he presented in *Controversy 1*.⁵⁸ Unity is found in the "integrity" (*integritas*) of being (or "being-a-whole").⁵⁹ This integrity is abstracted both from the integrity of composite and of simple being. Wherever being is found, or whenever it is validly predicated of something, it expresses a kind of "integrity" (or "being-a-whole"). And this *integritas*, "by the force of [its] own *ratio*," allows the inference of what Briceño understands as (1) the negation of partition of the thing in itself and (2) as the negation of identity of the thing with another thing.⁶⁰ "Being" thus immediately posits "unity," which in its turn is the basis of the "integrity" of being – or: unity

55 Further on, in the answers to these initial arguments, Briceño rejects that there is no possible way of abstracting a univocal *ratio* of "negation"; see Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, nn. [21]–22, 172b–73a.

56 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 24, 173b: "Cum tam ens, quam illius proprietates inferant immediate distinctionem sintque substrata illius."

57 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 4, 168a–b.

58 That transcendental unity infers a double negation, viz. of partition and of identity with another, is defended in Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, art. 1, nn. 28–30, 114b–15a.

59 This is my expression, which I take as a paraphrase of *integritas*.

60 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 4, 168b: "Et probatur; quia unitas, ut supra ostendimus in art. I. *praecedentis controversiae* posita est in quadam entis integritate, quae in tota sua communitate abstrahit ab integritate compositionis, et simplicitatis; sed integritas ista, vi propriae rationis, infert negationem partitionis rei in se, et identitatis cum alia: igitur unitas est proximum et adaequatum materiale illativum distinctionis, vel divisionis ab alio ente."

is just integrity. Unity, thus, is the *proximate* and *appropriate* material basis that generates distinction. *Unum* immediately implies to be distinct or divided from anything else (at times, Briceño indeed uses *distinctum* and *divisum* synonymously).⁶¹ Briceño adds the thesis that unity, as a “positive property of being” allows inference of the negations (1) and (2) just mentioned. This leads to the conclusion that unity is the appropriate substrate of distinction *as a negation*. The *unum* expresses the distinction and separation from another being. Therefore, “the negation of identity, which is distinction, is proximately inferred not from being insofar as it is being, but from being insofar as it is one.”⁶² We here see that negation (2) – seemingly inferred from *unity*, which in its turn posits *integrity* and, then, the two negations mentioned – is the metaphysical “distinction,” i.e., *the non-identity with another*.

But the explanation of what the substrate of distinction is turns out to be more complicated than that; the idea that unity *as such* is the foundation of distinction as negation of identity is still not accurate. For Briceño, the correct view of the appropriate grounding of distinction needs some further investigation with focus on the distinction *ex natura rei* between the properties of being and being itself, and on the distinction *ex natura rei* between the properties of being among themselves.⁶³

The strong thesis, here, is that, if the *ratio entis* is distinguished from unity, then being, which possesses unity itself, has in its own quidditative concept some kind of negation through which *being itself is distinct from unity*. Thus, the basis for *being* to be distinguished from *unity* cannot be unity itself. Briceño establishes that the distinction through which unity and being are mutually distinguished has its adequate material substrate in unity only when unity is the immediate substrate of distinction, but this could be affirmed too of the other real-formal term of that “mutual distinction,” namely being.⁶⁴ This mutual difference based

61 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 5, 168b: “Praeterea; [...] unitatem, quae est positiva passio entis immediate inferens negationes illas: ergo sola unitas est adaequatum substratum negationis distinctionis. Sicut enim unum est indivisum in se, et divisum a quolibet alio, et divisum idem sonat ac distinctum; si unum exprimit negationem divisionis in se, et negationem identitatis cum alio ente.”

62 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 5, 168b: “[C]onsequens est, ut distinctionem, et separationem ab extraneo ente exprimat, unitas tanquam immediatum materiale et adaequatum substratum talis distinctionis; ac proinde, quod negatio identitatis, quae est distinctio, inferatur proxime, non ab ente, qua ens est, sed ab ente qua unum est.”

63 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 6, 168b–69a.

64 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 6, 169a: “Si enim ratio entis ex natura rei distinguitur ab unitate; igitur vi sui quidditativi conceptus habet ut inferat negationem illam, per quam ab unitate distinguatur; cum ens non egeat unitate, ut ab eadem unitate secerni queat; immo quod prorsus inintelligibile est, solam, unitatem esse fundamentum inductivum illius negationis, per quam ratio entis ab ipsamet unitate dissideat; ita ut distinctio,

on an immediate possession (or condition) of difference through the real-formal term of comparison under consideration works for all affections of being; truth, for example, is essentially not unity, and goodness is essentially not truth. Because of their own precise concepts, entity, truth, goodness, etc., express a proper unity and a negation through which they differ from unity.⁶⁵ Interestingly, according to Briceño, some unnamed “Thomistic” authors defend this same approach to distinction among the properties of being.⁶⁶

Indirectly, at least, the concept of being, in its most common sense, is the foundation of distinction (*distinctio*) or difference (*differentia*). It is the entity (*entitas*) as such that introduces the “negation of another.” Briceño, therefore, affirms that “distinction formally taken is a certain negation that is added to the thing due to its positive constitution.” If this is true of *entitas* as the first metaphysical formality (or conceptibility), it is valid also for every other formality as some “degree of being” (*gradus essendi*), of which the real predication of that same *entitas* is always valid; each degree of being “indicates a quidditative and an intrinsic force for expressing the negation of another formality.” In the *ratio entis*, thus, lies “the foundation of distinction as such.”⁶⁷ In Peter Aureol, Briceño finds explicit traces of this same account, above all in the analysis of the proper-

qua unitas differt ab ente, et e contra, tantum afficiat unitatem tanquam adaequatum materiale, et substratum eius, et non inferatur talis negatio ab ente, tanquam a substrato immediato; cum sit mutua discretio, quae ex parte utriusque extremi se teneat.”

⁶⁵ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 6, 169a: “Quae ratio eadem vi militat in omnibus affectionibus entis, prout inter se collatis; quia veritas essentialiter non est unitas; ergo vi sui praecisi conceptus exprimit negationem eam, sive inducit non esse illud, per quod ab unitate differat.” This unity that being and the other transcendentals have of their own, which is not the *unitas* as a transcendental concept itself, is named by the same Latin word indeed – ‘unitas’ –, but we could also think of rendering it into English as “constitution” or “positive constitution,” perhaps even something’s own “quidditative and intrinsic force”; see footnote 67, below.

⁶⁶ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 7, 169a.

⁶⁷ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 8, 169a–b: “Quo fit; ut distinctio in tota sua universalitate consequatur ad quamlibet rationem entis, inquantum ens est, vel prout propriam sortitur conceptibilitatem; eo enim haec entitas inducit negationem alterius; quo talis entitas est; ac proinde distinctio formaliter est negatio quaedam accedens rei, vi positivae constitutionis suae; adeo ut eo res inferat negationem cuiuslibet alterius, quo illi propria non fiat vi suae constitutionis, vel quasi constitutionis. Unde quaelibet formalitas, seu gradus essendi, qua talis est formaliter, refert vim quidditativam, et intrinsecam, ut exprimat negationem alterius formalitatis, non expectata formae unitatis, quae essentiae rei extrinsece accedit. Habemus ergo, quamlibet conceptibilitatem entis in sua communissima acceptione, prout etiam ambit omnes entis proprietates, esse fundamentum distinctionis ut sic; et non solum unitatem praecise.”

ties of being.⁶⁸ The properties are formally distinct from quidditative being and among themselves, and for this reason both unity and any other affection of being, because they – as degrees of *being* – presuppose being *in quid*, are “the foundation that immediately produces distinction.”⁶⁹ In this sense, an “efficient argument” for the principle that formality is the foundation of distinction, just like being is the foundation of the first metaphysical distinction in comparison with the other convertible properties, lies in the perception that “the explicit concept of being” (*conceptus explicitus entis*), which is predicated *in quid* of all of its inferiors, is not “the explicit concept of unity.”⁷⁰ They are indeed different formalities.

In the most direct and fundamental way, thus, each formality or each “conceivability” (*conceptibilitas*),⁷¹ because of its own positive constitution as a determination of being, intrinsically implies the very *negation* through which it is distinct from any other formality. Due to the concept of being, each and every formality that adds a determination to being has this metaphysical function. Each and every formality expresses a negation of another formality and is fully able to be the substrate of negation-distinction. Therefore, “the formal *ratio* of distinction consists in that non-being which is left behind by the constitution or the quidditative concept of the thing.”⁷² Because of being itself, any formality is the substrate of distinction.

68 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 9, 169b–70a: “Quod in opinione Scoti asseverantis quod passiones entis formaliter dissideant ab ente in quid; et etiam ipsae passiones inter se; necessario inferatur, quod non sola unitas, sed quaelibet alia affectio entis sit fundamentum immediate illativum distinctionis, quod patet ex illis verbis: *Sed formalitates illae, secundum sic ponentes, sunt fundamenta distinctionis*; per ponentes autem, vel huius modi sentiendi assertores intelligit Aureolus assecclas Scoti.”

69 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 9, 169b–70a.

70 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 15, 171a: “Et probatur efficaci ratione, quam supra insinuavimus: quia conceptus explicitus entis, qui quidditative enuntiatur de omnibus inferioribus entis, non est conceptus explicitus unitatis; cum explicita ratio obiectiva unitatis apprehendatur per modum proprietatis in secundo modo perseitatis dictae de omnibus entibus; implicetque eundem omnino conceptum esse, et non esse, de quidditate rei: ergo conceptus entis, vi suae praecisae rationis, infert negationem unitatis; et e contra.”

71 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 15, 171a: “Assertio secunda: fundamentum distinctionis in tota sua communitate, prout est negatio, quae intercedit extrema, quae distinguuntur, non est unitas, quae est prima ex passionibus entis; sed quaelibet formalitas, seu conceptibilitas rei, quae eo ipso, quod vi suae constitutionis trahitur ad talem gradum essendi, refert negationem cuiuslibet alterius rationis.”

72 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 15, 171a–b: “Rursus; conceptus bonitatis, inquantum est ratio formalis obiecti appetitus, exprimit negationem veritatis, quae est ratio formalis obiecti intellectus; esto quod non concipiatur unitas secundum explicitam rationem eius. Quia isti conceptus a se ipsis vendicant proprium essendi gradum, qui inferat negationem alterius; ac proinde adaequatum substratum illius negationis, quae est

2.3 Can Unity Be the Foundation of Distinction?

As a conclusion of this explanation we obtain a minimal, yet important, sense of unity as indeed the appropriate foundation of distinction from another. The *passio / proprietas / affectio* of unity strictly speaking is a positive integrity or totality of being, implying therefore “indivision” in the sense of “non-multiplicity” or “non-partition.” It is *exactly* in those terms that unity, co-extensive with being in metaphysical predication, expresses something positive and something negative. Because it consists in something positive (a given or assumed integrity, i.e., everything *that is a unity* or of which the predicate ‘unum’ is true), it implies a “separative negation excluding everything that can override that integrity.”⁷³ The particular sense in which unity is the foundation of distinction “by the force of its quidditative *ratio*” is linked to the idea that unity expresses a negation of multitude, where multitude is that which may override the integrity or totality of whatever something, be it metaphysically simple or complex. In these terms, ‘being’ (*ens*) formally expresses ‘one’ (*unum*), a property of being that describes a formal aspect coextensive with being. In the case of complex beings, unity is the foundation of distinction as non-multiplicity, insofar as multitude overrides the formal integrity that arises from the union of a being’s parts.⁷⁴ Unity posits this negation of multiplicity and is, in this *specific* way, the foundation of distinction.

Let me emphasize that although two negations are involved in the talk about distinction so far (one, the negation of multitude, is explained through unity as such, the other, the negation of identity, is primarily explained through entity itself), unity as indivision does not ground distinction in the logical-metaphysical sense on which a metaphysical account of various kinds of distinctions (“real” or “of reason”) depends. Unity as such and as a *passio entis* expresses a negation, though only in the specific sense that the “fundamental *ratio*” infers that “non-being” which excludes and separates something from multitude. Again, *multitudo* as a metaphysical concept opposed to *unitas* means that which

distinctio, non est unitas; sed quaelibet formalitas, seu conceptibilitas rei. Quae eo praecise, quo alteram non imbibit per quidditativam transcendentiam secundum rationem explicitam; exprimit negationem illius, quod est ab illa distingui: igitur ratio formalis distinctionis consistit in non esse illo, quod reliquitur ex constitutione, seu quidditativo conceptu rei.”

⁷³ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 11, 170a: “Astruimus ergo, unitatem esse fundamentum illius tantum negationis distinctionis, vel divisionis, quae immediate unitati opponitur; et quia unitas consistit in quadam positiva integritate, seu totalitate entis, ideo unitas infert negationem separativam, et exclusivam omnis illius, quod integritatem istam tollere queat.”

⁷⁴ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 11, 170a: “Unde, vi suae quidditativae rationis, exprimit, inducitque unitas negationem multitudinis; non quatenus multitudo destruit quidditativam constitutionem entis compositi; sed quatenus removet formalem integritatem, a que ens dicitur unum formaliter.”

overrides the “integrity of being.” In this very *integritas entis*, we find the quidditative concept of unity, or as Briceño puts it, “unity is essentially the integrity [i.e., the being-a-whole] of being.”⁷⁵

2.4 Distinction as Negation and Its Foundation in the Formality of the Thing

It should be clear at this stage that the idea that captures distinction as a *quasi* property of being is negation of identity of a given thing or formality with another thing or formality. In the solution of the first article of his third Metaphysical Appendix, Briceño states that from a Scotist point of view the “quiddity” or “quidditative concept” of distinction consists in “mere negation” (*mera negatio*). According to Scotist doctrine, distinction is obtained “through negation” or, to be more precise, “non-identity” (*non identitas*).⁷⁶ Let me just mention one of Briceño’s proofs for this thesis: Through the “force of negation,” which is based on the constitution of any thing – indeed, *of each and any thing* – in its own degree of being, one conceives that a thing constituted in some particular way simply differs from other things; this is a result of the conception of *the thing* that is *the objective basis* of cognition. If through the constitution of a thing the proper degree of being of a certain thing is given, then a negation necessarily and “*quasi* essentially” (and in this case immediately) follows, that is, a negation of any other predicate that does not pertain to the thing thusly constituted; this means that there does not exist any other positive form “between the constitution of the thing and that negation which results [or: is left over] from the constitution.”⁷⁷ In a nutshell, the constitution of a

⁷⁵ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 18, 172a: “Assertio tertia: unitas est fundamentum negationis multitudinis, seu unitas est quaedam ratio fundamentalis inductiva illius non esse, quod exclusivum, et separativum est multitudinis, prout multitudo tollit integritatem entis, in qua quidditativus unitatis conceptus positus est. Haec est communis sententia, quae sufficienter constat ex dictis: quia cum unitas essentialiter sit integritas entis; consequens est, ut vi suae rationis, removeat multitudinem, quatenus haec formali integritati unitatis opponitur.” As in Aristotle’s metaphysics, ‘one’ / ‘integrity’ and ‘many’ / ‘multitude’ are seen as true opposite contraries; see Aristotle, *Met.* IV, cap. 1–2, 1003a20–1005a18.

⁷⁶ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 12, 170b: “Assertio prima: quidditativus distinctionis conceptus in mera negatione consistat. Haec est apud metaphysicos sententia communior, quam Scotus in multis suae doctrinae locis expressisse videtur, dum distinctionem per negationem aperuit; eam non identitatem appellans.”

⁷⁷ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 12, 170b: “Et probatur: quia, vi negationis, quae ad constitutionem rei in tali gradu entis accedit, concipimus rem taliter constitutam ab altera dissidere; ergo quidditas distinctionis in mera negatione posita esse debet. Antecedens probatur; quia, eo praecise, quo per constitutionem fit proprius rei hic gradus essendi, necessario et quasi essentialiter consequitur negatio cuiuslibet alterius praedicati,

given conceived or conceivable thing indicates a force that enables an expression of that logically posterior moment (the negation of that constitution), without any further mediating positive form being presupposed. In fact, distinction as discussed so far (a *quasi* property of being) does not posit any kind of predicamental relation either;⁷⁸ such as the “relation of opposition” between two positive realities, actually not even between two beings of reason. Negation, thus, is not a kind of relation, and distinction is “pure negation.”⁷⁹

3. Metaphysics in Juan de Fuica's *Cursus philosophicus*

Valera's and Briceño's works were influential in South-American Scotism. Evidence of this may be found in a manuscript of Juan de Fuica O.F.M. (ca. 1660–17??).⁸⁰ Fuica was born in the town of La Serena in the Northern part of colonial Chile. He worked during his entire life in the Province of the Most Holy Trinity (*Provincia de la Santísima Trinidad*). He taught philosophy at different Franciscan colleges in Chile (especially in the Colleges “Nuestra Señora del Socorro” and “San Diego de Alcalá”).⁸¹ Between 12 December 1687 and 4 June 1689, Fuica read his *cursus philosophicus ad mentem Scoti*. His *Commentaria philosophica ad mentem doctoris subtilissimi patris fratris Ioannis Duns Scoti sacratissimi Ordinis Minorum, et theologorum principis*,⁸² kept until today in the Archivo Histórico Franciscano, in Santiago de Chile, is the only complete philosophical *cursus* taught in Chile during the so-called colonial period. The manuscript con-

quod non spectat ad rei constitutionem, nulla alia forma positiva mediante inter constitutionem rei, et negationem illam, quae ex constitutione relinquitur.”

⁷⁸ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 12, 170b: “[...]: cum quidditas rei vim referat, ut negationem illam exprimere queat, nulla alia positiva, et adventitia forma expectata; ac proinde non desiderato respectu praedicamentali, qui posterius accedere intelligitur.”

⁷⁹ Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, n. 13, 170b–71a. See also *ibid.*, n. 14, 171a: “Ex dictis liquet; quod quando distinctio secari solet in positivam, et negativam; partitio ista non fiat spectata tantum ratione distinctionis, cum haec essentialiter pura negatio sit.”

⁸⁰ Examples of references to Valera and Briceño can be found in Pich, “Common Real Being.”

⁸¹ The Convent “Nuestra Señora del Socorro” was founded on 7 April 1554 by Father Martín de Robleda and his collaborators; it was the first house of the Province where the Novitiate was conducted; its library was established 1576–1580, with the works left by Father Juan de Veja when he returned to Peru, i.e., to the Province of the Twelve Apostles; see Gutiérrez, *Catálogo*, 9–10. The “Colégio de San Diego de Alcalá” operated from 1678 to 1812; see Gutiérrez, *Catálogo*, 21–27.

⁸² Fuica, *Commentaria philosophica ad mentem Doctoris Subtilissimi patris fratris Ioannis Duns Scoti Sacratissimi Ordinis Minorum, et Theologorum Principis*, Santiago de Chile 1687–1689. The manuscript comprises 297 folios.

tains commentaries *ad mentem Ioannis Duns Scoti* on logic, philosophy of nature, and metaphysics.⁸³ I shall focus on the part concerning metaphysics.

Fuica conceives metaphysics as a science of the concept of being understood as *ens reale*. He structures metaphysics as a science of transcendental concepts. After dealing with doubts about the object of metaphysics and its conceptual nature,⁸⁴ Fuica examines “real being in common,” its convertible *passiones* in general, and then each one of the abstract transcendental properties, i.e., unity, truth, and goodness. Right after unity, an account of the metaphysical concept of “distinction” follows.⁸⁵ In this present article, I will leave aside Fuica’s ingenious account of “real being,” which he sees as a “common objective concept” and as the first and appropriate object of metaphysics.⁸⁶ A few remarks on this aspect of his metaphysics must suffice. For the univocal common objective concept of the real being, Fuica proposes a kind of “relative essential definition” in terms of “not having any repugnance to existence.”⁸⁷ This *quasi* definition of ‘being’ through “non-repugnance to existence” can be extracted from the works of Scotus.⁸⁸ Juan de Fuica also defends the view that proper “real being” can be approached in a double way: first, insofar as it is actual and has actual existence, and second, insofar as it is only possible. This possible real being can be understood either “in recto” or “in obliquo”; possible real being *in recto* means a certain non-repugnance, whereas possible real being *in obliquo* connotes real exis-

83 For the life and works of Juan de Fuica, see Aravena Zamora, *Comentario “Acerca del alma”*, 13–18. The completion date of the dictation of the *Commentaries on Metaphysics* is 23 December 1688; probably, the dictation of the *Commentaries on Physics* began on the last days of December 1688. At folio 254v, we are told that the manuscript with the *Libri Physicorum* was finished on 12 May 1689. For a detailed table of contents of Fuica’s entire manuscript, see Pich, “Commission III,” 16–31.

84 See Fuica, *Commentaria philosophica ad mentem Doctoris Subtilissimi Patris Fratris Ioannis Duns Scoti Sacratissimi Ordinis Minorum, et Theologorum Principis*, Santiago de Chile 1687–1689, *Commentaria in universam Aristotelis metaphysicam una cum distinctionibus, et quaestionibus iuxta mentem, et doctrinam Nostri Subtilis Doctoris Fratris Ioannis Duns Scoti Theologorum facile Principis*, 1688 [95r–162v]: Prooemium [96r–96v]; Dubium Primum: Quodnam sit obiectum metaphysicae? [96v–97r]; Dubium Secundum: Quid sit univocum, aequivocum, et analogum? [97r–98r] (henceforth *Commentaria in met.*).

85 See Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, 99r–108v; 108v–9v; 110r–14v; 114v–20r; 120v–21v; 121v–22v.

86 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 1, q. 3, 100v–2v.

87 See Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 1, q. 1, 99r–v: “Dicendum est secundo: ens posse essentialiter declari potissima definitione essentialiter relativa in ordine ad existentiam hoc modo: ens est, ‘cui non repugnat realis existentia.’ Probatur: nam primum, quod intelligitur de ente, est quod, illi non repugnat existere: ergo haec non repugnantia est illi essentialis [...]” See also *ibid.*, dist. 1, q. 3, 101v.

88 See Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens*, 3–56; Honnefelder, *Duns Scotus*, 67–81, 137–38.

tence.⁸⁹ According to Fuica, possible real being *in recto*, meaning a certain non-repugnance, represents a univocal meaning of being common both to real being and being of reason.⁹⁰

3.1 The Transcendental Status of Unity

Fuica's account of unity and distinction is clearly indebted to Briceño, but Fuica's treatment is more didactical. In dist. 3 of his *Commentaria in metaphysicam*, our Chilean *magister* explains *unitas* as the first attribute of being.⁹¹ In the First Question, he asks whether "the transcendental unity of being consists in something positive or something negative." *Unum* as an attribute of being is usually taken as meaning (a) "undivided in itself" and (b) "divided from anything else." Thus, to be one means to be 'not divided in many' and 'separated from anything else.' *Unum* here seems to be explained through *negation* of division (as *indivisum*), just like 'spiritual' is explained through the negation of 'body,' and 'infinite' through the negation of 'finite.' This is an explanation through negation.⁹² Fuica mentions several authors who agree that the *unitas entis* consists in something negative: the Jesuits Pedro da Fonseca (1528–1599), Gabriel Vázquez (1549/1551–1604), Diego Granado (1571–1632), and others. But Fuica is clear in saying that for the Franciscans the "plausible position" is that transcendental unity adds "something formally positive" to being, something that is *ex natura rei* distinct from being. He affirms that this is the opinion of Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus, and the Scotists.⁹³

89 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 1, q. 2, 100r: "Primo, prout est actuale, et habens actualem existentiam. Secundo, prout solum est possibile, et in hoc statu duo importat, unum in recto, et alterum in obliquo, in recto dicit quandam non repugnantiam, in obliquo vero connotat realem existentiam."

90 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 1, q. 2, 100r: "[P]ossibilitas consistit in ratione non repugnantiae; sed ens reale, et rationis in ratione non repugnantiae conveniunt simpliciter: ergo talis ratio entis possibilis est univoca respectu entis realis, et rationis. Maior patet: nam possibile in recto solum importat quandam non repugnantiam, ut patet [...]." See also *ibid.*, dist. 1, q. 2, 100v: "Probatur, possibilitatem communem possibilitati entis realis, et rationis esse realem, cum non dependeat ab intellectu licet existentia ipsius entis rationis dependeat ab intellectu; sicut possumus dicere, hominem esse in tempore, et esse ab aeterno, in tempore secundum existentiam, ab aeterno secundum non repugnantiam." See further Pich, "Common Real Being," 250–64, 268–82.

91 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, 110r–14v.

92 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 1, 110r.

93 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 1, 110r. On "unum" as a transcendental property in Scotus, see Wolter, *The Transcendentals*, 101–11; Sondag, *Duns Scot*, 90–93. With regard to unity, Fuica seems to give significant weight to Duns Scotus, *Ord.* II, dist. 3, pars 1, qq. 1–2,

His explanation is based on Scotus. The “negation of partition” that unity infers is a “negation through repugnance.” Partition *contradicts* the *unum* as such. But a negation that lies in something through repugnance presupposes something positive and proper, because of which the negation belongs to the subject. The “negation of partition” that belongs to a certain being depends, thus, on something proper and positive, which unity formally consists in.⁹⁴ Fuica formulates several other arguments for this Scotist position about unity consisting in something positive. A second argument is that multitude, to which unity is opposed, is something negative; for multitude includes both ‘this’ and ‘not-this’ and hence in a sense represents something impossible and thus negative. By contrast, unity is something positive, because when two items oppose one another “privatively or contradictorily,” if one item is negative, the other one (by exclusion) must be positive.⁹⁵ In a third argument, Fuica affirms that unity is not really distinguished from being, because as a “metaphysical property” (*passio metaphysica*) it is really identical with being; being is obviously a positive real concept, and so are its convertible properties too. If unity were a negation, it would be really distinct from being, from truth, and from goodness; but this is false, and therefore, unity does not consist in something negative.⁹⁶

Presupposing, then, that indivision as a kind of negation through repugnance follows unity (as something positive), Fuica asks, in his Second Question, what this negative notion is. Is it a privation or a negation? He first explores the concept of ‘division,’ which has a threefold meaning. Correspondingly, also the negation of division (*indivisio*) must be threefold. The first negation of division is *indivisio in se*; this is “non-division of being in its parts;” for example, Peter is “undivided in himself, when he is not divided and analyzed into body and soul, of which he is composed.”⁹⁷ The second negation of division is expressed as *indivisio a se*; this is the indivision through which the thing “is not divided into many under the same name and *ratio*” – Peter is undivided *a se*, because as

nn. 29–58, ed. Vat. 7, 402–17. Concerning Bonaventure’s doctrine of transcendentals, see Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 147–61.

⁹⁴ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 1, 110r: “Hanc sententiam [...] probatur ratione Scoti: negatio partitionis, quam infert unitas, est negatio per repugnantiam, quia partitio repugnat enti uno, ut uno; sed negatio illa, quae inest alicui subiecto per repugnantiam, supponit aliquod positivum proprium, ratione cuius negatio competit subiecto: ergo negatio partitionis quae competit per repugnantiam enti uno, competit illi ratione alicuius positivi proprii, in quo unitas formaliter consistat.”

⁹⁵ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 1, 110v.

⁹⁶ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 1, 110v.

⁹⁷ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 2, 112r: “Notandum est, triplicem esse divisionem, atque adeo triplicem esse negationem divisionis cuilibet divisioni oppositam: prima est indivisio in se, quae est non divisio entis in suas partes: verbi gratia tunc manet Petrus indivisus in se, quando non dividitur, et resolvitur in corpus, et animam, ex quibus componitur.”

“one” he cannot “be multiplied into several Peters under the same name and ratio.”⁹⁸ The third negation of division may be better explained through expressions that do not contain the prefix ‘in’; this third kind of negation of division is the “division or distinction from anything else” (*divisio seu distinctio a quolibet alio*) through which something – any given determined thing – is *not* one other thing, precisely because of those aspects through which that thing is distinguished. Paul is thus said to be divided or distinct from Peter, simply because Peter is not Paul.⁹⁹

Which of these three negations of division express transcendental unity? Fuica is using *indivisio* to explain *unitas*, but at the same time *indivisio* as a negative concept somehow follows *unitas*, a positive concept. Our author offers some reflections on this. (i) The negation that follows the positive term ‘unum’ is both *indivisio in se* and *indivisio a se*, although first of all *indivisio a se*. *Divisio a se* implies multitude and thus simply destroys the formal content of unity. For Fuica, this means that the positive aspect of unity firstly and immediately – in its formal and intrinsic content – opposes any *divisio a se*. This also means that what “mainly” (*principalius*) follows – and helps explaining – unity as a positive determination is *indivisio a se*, i.e., the negation of *divisio a se*, which seems to formally be a *multitudo*.¹⁰⁰ (ii) Fuica also supports the view that unity as something positive is followed by *indivisio in se*. This seems to be the indivision that any actually un-divided complex thing has. For example, Peter ceases to be a composite thing if his physical parts are actually disunited from his soul. As an *indivisio in se*, Peter is a composite being whose physical parts are bound to the soul.¹⁰¹ Arguably, with the notions of *indivisio a se* and *indivisio in se*, Fuica comes close to Briceño’s doctrine that unity as a specific property of being is the foundation of distinction, since it is the foundation and root of the negation of the “partition of the thing,” i.e., due to exclusion of *multitudo* and *pluralitas*.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 2, 112r: “Secunda est indivisio a se, et est illa, per quam res non est divisa in plures sub eodem nomine, et ratione, ut Petrus est indivisus a se, quia ita est unus, ut non possit multiplicari in plures Petros sub eodem nomine, et ratione.”

⁹⁹ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 2, 112r: “Tertia est divisio, seu distinctio a quolibet alio, per quam res non est una ex his, a quibus distinguitur, sic Paulus dicitur divisus, seu distinctus a Petro, quia Petrus non est Paulus.”

¹⁰⁰ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 2, 112r: “Dicendum est primo negationem consequutam ad positivum unitatis esse indivisionem in se, et a se, sed principalius indivisionem a se. Probatur: quia divisio a se arguit multitudinem, et destruit rationem formalem unitatis: ergo divisioni a se primo et immediate opponitur positivum unitatis: ergo ad unitatem principalis sequitur indivisio a se, quae est negatio divisionis a se.”

¹⁰¹ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 2, 112r.

¹⁰² Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 4, q. 1, 115v: “Respondetur, quod quando dicitur communiter, distinctionem sequi ad unitatem, in illaque tanquam in radice fundari, intelligi debet

Following upon his explanation of the three kinds of *indivisio* and how they elucidate or relate to *unitas*, Fuica finally considers that division or distinction, as a *distinctio ab alio*, goes along with unity. Since any *thing* is one and undivided “from itself” (*a se*) – where *indivisio a se*, despite being a negative term with an explanative function, denotes something positive –, it must be divided or distinct from other things that are not itself; in this sense, “*divisio* or *distinctio* follow unity.”¹⁰³ Importantly, *distinctio ab alio* follows unity not as a term / concept explaining unity as such – as is the case with *indivisio a se* and *indivisio in se* –, but insofar as unity is a certain positive formality. This *distinctio ab alio* is the metaphysical distinction as a *quasi* property of being. Our author says, then, that the *indivisio* following unity as a *positivum* is not strictly a privation, but rather a “negation in the mode of privation.” This is a fine metaphysical nuance. He recalls that “proper and strict privation is a lack of form in a subject that is apt to that form”; but the negation of division, meaning the negation of being-another (which as “indivision” follows unity), is said of something that is *unable* to have that division, for every being is “inseparable and indivisible from itself (*a se*).” One example of this is that in God unity posits negation of division of the divine essence, which “in no way can be divided.”¹⁰⁴

If my reading of Fuica is correct, we may say that the metaphysical meaning of distinction as expressed by him in terms of a *divisio seu distinctio a quolibet alio* is correctly expressed by the idea of negation of difference as being-another or otherness. If difference as being-another or otherness follows a given formality, this can only mean that it follows it as something that is intrinsically denied; whenever some determined thing is posited, a difference as a being-another or otherness is *not* posited or simply denied.¹⁰⁵ To be something implies the negation of being some other thing. If distinction follows any positive thing or for-

de illa distinctione, et negatione, quae tollit rei partitionem, quaeque excludit multitudinem, et pluralitatem; non vero de negatione identitatis.”

¹⁰³ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 2, 112r: “Dicendum est secundo: ad unitatem etiam sequitur divisio, seu distinctio ab alio. Ratio est eo ipso, quod res sit una, et indivisa a se, debet esse divisa, seu distincta ab alio, quod non sit ipsa: ergo ad unitatem sequitur divisio, seu distinctio a quolibet alio.”

¹⁰⁴ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 2, 112r–v: “Dicendum est tertio: indivisionem consequutam ad positivum unitatis non esse strictam privationem, sed negationem ad modum privationis. Probatur: propria, et stricta privatio est carentia formae in subiecto apto ad talem formam; sed negatio divisionis, quae consequitur ad unitatem, convenit subiecto inapto ad talem divisionem, quia unumquodque ens est inseparabile, et indivisibile a se ipso, ut maxime patet exemplo Deus, cuius unitas negat divisionem essentiae divinae.”

¹⁰⁵ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 2, 112v: “Duplex enim est divisio ab alio: alia, quae dicit separationem unius ab alio; alia vero quae licet non dicat separationem, arguit tamen distinctionem, et negationem alterius, quod non est ipsum, et haec est, quae sequitur ad unitatem, non autem prima.”

mality, such as *entitas* and *unitas*, and it is not a consequence of two given positive items, but rather of any one *positivum*, it can only be expressed as a negation of difference and alterity. ‘Distinction,’ thus, can may be analyzed or rather explained by means of ‘negation’ and ‘otherness.’

At one place in Distinction 3, Question 2, of his *Commentaria in universam Aristotelis metaphysicam*, Fuica explicitly reflects on *unum / unitas* as a transcendental property of being. Transcendental unity follows being in its entire “extension” (*latitudo*). It is called ‘transcendental’ because it is convertible with being in every genus of being, i.e., not only in the created or predicamental genera, but also in the uncreated ones. Hence, one can affirm that “from the diversity of beings springs the diversity of unity.” Scotist metaphysicians should thus accept several kinds of *a parte rei* unity: numerical, formal, specific, and generic.¹⁰⁶

Under the assumption of such diversity of real unities, Fuica affirms that transcendental unity is unity *in common*. It is a *passio adaequata* of being and is convertible with being as such, which is the most common real quidditative concept. A unity that is convertible with beingness must inevitably be “unity in common.”¹⁰⁷ An objection can be raised that there cannot be a common *ratio* of unity separated (*praecisa*) from numerical, specific, and generic unity, for “specific unity does not agree absolutely with numerical unity, but only *secundum quid*, since they are simple formalities, just like ultimate differences.” In this objection, any principle of individuation as a formality (such as the *haecceitas* of the Apostle Paul) and the specific formality or difference (e.g., the Apostle Paul’s *rationalitas*), cannot possibly have a common unity (due to the fact that ultimate differences “are incapable of further analysis, and hence are *simpliciter simplices*”).¹⁰⁸ “Unity in common,” thus, “is not an appropriate property of be-

106 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 2, 112v: “Dubitabis, quae unitas sit, quae convertitur cum ente? Notandum est, quod unitas transcendentalis est illa, quae sequitur ens in tota sua latitudine, et ideo transcendentalis dicitur, quia recurrit et convertitur cum ente in omni genere, non solum creato, et praedicamentali, sed etiam increato. Ex quo fit, quod ex diversitate entium diversitas unitatis nascitur. Patet ex his quae diximus in logica, ubi a parte rei admittimus unitatem formalem, specificam, et genericam distinctam ab unitate numerali.”

107 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 2, 112v–13r.

108 Wolter, *The Transcendentals*, 82. See *ibid.*, 83: “[...], we may distinguish three types of ultimate differences: the *haecceitas* by which the species is ultimately differentiated, the specific differences which are irreducibly simple, and finally those transcendental differences which differentiate the various genera.” Regarding these metaphysical concepts, see also Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 2, q. 2, 109v: “Arguitur primo: passionibus entis sunt formaliter positivae et reales; sed quid positivum, et reale formaliter est ens: ergo et passionibus. Distinguo maiorem: sunt positivae, “in quid”, nego; “in quale”, concedo; ut dictum manet de ultimis differentiis: itaque ultimae differentiae sunt entia “in quale quid”, sive essentialiter, passionibus [entis] [...] sunt entia in quale accidentaliter necessario, cum sint extra essentiam rei.”

ing.”¹⁰⁹ Fuica, however, has a clear answer to this objection. He says, the reason why there is a common *ratio* of *unitas* / *unum* as a common *passio* (univocally) valid of everything of which *ens* is validly predicated is not due to any common *ratio* of unity separated from the several kinds of unity or of the unity that every different thing and formality has in itself; it is rather due to a common *ratio* of unity separated *from all beings* that have unity (this is important for the concept of metaphysical distinction too, after all distinction is a *quasi* property of being and, thus, of every further degree of being). Unity is common also to every formality that is metaphysically un-analyzable. As an example, ‘rationality’ – which is a formality and an ultimate difference (an irreducibly simple specific difference) – is not a common concept derived from many ‘rationalities,’ but is rather abstracted from the individual (rational) beings of the human species.¹¹⁰

Of course, Fuica’s explanation of *unitas* through *indivisio* and as a property of being implies that transcendental unity is not a quantitative concept. “Quantitative unity” is not a property that is convertible with being, which may be predicated of God and the angels – which are, of course, immaterial non-extensive beings. Fuica argues “against some modern authors” (*contra aliquos modernos*) that numerical unity does not equal transcendental unity. Any specific nature is of itself real being and has transcendental unity, although it is not bound to numerical unity. This presupposes Scotus’s doctrine of the common nature, according to which *ex natura rei* numerical unity (e.g., the *haecceitas* of the Apostle Paul) and unity of specific nature (e.g., the Apostle Paul’s humanity) are formally distinct.¹¹¹

3.2 Distinction as a Metaphysical Concept

The concept of distinction is granted considerable space in Fuica’s work on metaphysics. He dedicates the whole of Dist. 4, divided in four *quaestiones*, to the explanation of metaphysical distinction. Very similar to Briceño,¹¹² Fuica

¹⁰⁹ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 2, 113r: “Dices non posse dari rationem communem unitatis praecisam ab unitate numerali specifica, et generica: ergo unitas in communi non est adaequata passio entis. Probatur antecedens: unitas specifica non convenit simpliciter cum unitate numerali, sed solum secundum quid, cum sint formalitates simplices, sicut differentiae ultimae.”

¹¹⁰ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 2, 113r: “Roboratur, dari rationem communem unitatis praecisam non ab unitatibus, sed ab entibus, quae habent unitatem; quod commune est in omnibus formalitatibus metaphysice irresolubilibus: quia rationalitas non refert conceptum praecisum a rationalitatibus, quae sunt differentiae ultimae, sed ab individuis humanae speciei.”

¹¹¹ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 2, 113r.

¹¹² See footnote 45, above.

states that a “Treatise on distinction” is like a “key” (*clavis*) used by Scotist authors to formulate the principles of Scotus’s philosophical teaching. After his exposition of the concept of unity, from which the very idea of “distinction and division from any other being” was inferred, the next concept to be considered is that of ‘distinction’ itself. Distinction is seen as both a “necessary” and a “difficult” metaphysical topic.¹¹³

What does a distinction formally consist in? Like Briceño, also Fuica emphasizes initially that many authors teach that distinction consists in something positive; this could be a relation, or perhaps ‘distinction’ is analyzable into two entities themselves as extremes of a relation that are precisely *distinguished* from each other. However, Fuica, clearly following his predecessors in Latin American Scotism, argues for the view that distinction formally consists in a negation. That any possible thing is constituted “in its being apart from every positive [aspect] added” to it implies “a negation of everything else that is not itself.” This thesis of the intrinsic constitution of something should give enough support for the affirmation that distinction neither consists in a “superadded positive item” nor in a relation. Likewise, there are no formal effects “without a formal cause.” Precisely because man is (essentially) a rational being – this is *what that being is*, its *constitution* – the formality of man implies a “negation of irrational” and of everything else that is different from or simply not man. This negation of something-different or of being-another is a formal effect – *per negationem* – of any given formal constitution.¹¹⁴

In his first, epistemic, argument for the thesis that distinction is a negation, Fuica draws an important conclusion from human first-intentional cognition: We know that the specific unity ‘man’ is *distinct* from ‘irrational,’ when we perceive “that man *is not* irrational.” When the essence of man is posited and properly cognized, it is through the negation of the formal aspect ‘irrational’ that we conceive that man *is not* irrational; here, an identity is denied and, what amounts to the same, a distinction is immediately posited. Fuica holds, thus, that

113 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 4, q. 1, 114v: “Cum ‘Tractatus de distinctione’ sit quasi clavis quaedam [...], ideo in praesenti post distinctionem de unitate quae infert distinctionem, et divisionem a quolibet alio ente, de ipsa distinctione secundum ordinem doctrinae agendum est. Hoc autem in metaphysica non minus necessarium est, quam difficile.”

114 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 4, q. 1, 114v–15r: “Nobis dicendum est distinctionem formaliter consistere in negatio. [...], et probatur: quia eo ipso quod res constituatur in suo esse secluso omni positivo superaddito infert negationem cuiuscumque alterius, quod non sit ipsa: ergo distinctio non consistit in positivo superaddito, ac proinde nec in relatione. Patet consequentia: quia effectus formalis esse non potest absque causa formali. Probatur antecedens: quia eo praecise, quod homo constituatur in suo esse essentialiter per rationale, infert negationem irrationalis, et cuiuscumque alterius quod non sit homo.”

distinction formally consists in a *negation of identity*.¹¹⁵ As a metaphysical concept, 'distinction' results from knowing a negation of identity.

A second proof for the thesis that distinction is negation – also based on essential aspects of the connection between being and knowledge – is inspired from the Jesuit Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (called 'Valmasedanus'): On the epistemological premise that to understand (*intelligere*) implies that one aspect is distinct from another one, any understanding necessarily implies a "negation of identity" (*negatio identitatis*) of one aspect with another; this proves that the "formal *ratio* of distinction" consists in a negation of identity or simply in "non-identity" (*non identitas*). Fuica's simple example is that it is not possible that Peter and Paul are apprehended as two things distinct from each other unless "it is conceived that one is not the other."¹¹⁶ To prove his point, our author seems to propose an analysis of what the act of apprehending an object implies; apprehension of something implies taking something as not being something else (if *a* is apprehended, then it is taken that *a* is not *not-a* or any *x*¹¹⁷); moreover, apprehension of distinction as a metaphysical property requires the understanding of a non-identity (*a* is not *not-a* or *x*). Fuica does not seem to use 'apprehendo' and 'concipio' with different meanings. At any rate, in cases of *conceiving what something is*, there is also a *quasi* formal judgment that something is not not-itself. The negation which a distinction consists in is the condition or the founding *ratio* of the *relation* of diversity; note that this diversity among things must *not be confounded* with distinction as such, which is an absolute property. Similarly, unity is the founding *ratio* of the relation of identity of one thing or aspect with itself, when the required conditions for such a relation and its specifications ('real,' 'of reason,' 'formal,' etc.) are met.¹¹⁸ With this subtle reflection on the theory of distinctions, Fuica is moving beyond his predecessors Valera and Briceno. What he is saying to his readers is that, based on everything he exposed on

115 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 4, q. 1, 115r: "Confirmatur: tunc cognoscimus hominem distingui ab irrationali, quando percipimus hominem non esse irrationalem; sed posita essentia hominis, et negatione ad illam consequuta concipimus hominem non esse irrationalem: ergo in tali negatione identitatis consistit formaliter distinctio."

116 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 4, q. 1, 115r: "Secundo probatur recentiores sequentes Valmasedanum [...], quia implicat intelligere formaliter loquendo unum esse distinctum ab alio quin intelligatur negatio identitatis unius ab alio: ergo in negatione identitatis quae appellari potest non identitas stat ratio formalis distinctionis. Antecedens constat: quia fieri non potest ut Petrus et Paulus apprehendantur tanquam duo ad invicem distincta, quin concipiatur unum non esse alium."

117 That is, anything else, any other thing or formal aspect.

118 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 4, q. 1, 115r: "Colligitur, quod negatio, in qua consistit distinctio, est conditio seu ratio fundandi relationis [...] diversitatis, sicut unitas est ratio fundandi relationis identitatis, quando adsunt requisita ad talem relationem; unum autem ex requisitis est, quod relatio realis, debet esse inter extrema realiter distincta."

distinction as negation so far, distinctions (e.g., real, formal, modal, rational) as *relations* depend on distinction taken as the *ratio* of diversity. Distinction is first a kind of *passio entis*, and only secondarily a relation.

Fuica proceeds with a discussion of distinction as a *quasi* property and its ultimate ground seemingly drawing on ideas previously found in Alfonso Briceño.¹¹⁹ Fuica highlights the debate concerning the “proximate foundation of distinction.” Many authors defend the view that the foundation in question is unity as the first property of being. However, Fuica, again, follows Briceño and insists that unity is not the “foundation (*fundamentum*) and the root (*radix*) of distinction in its entire universality,” i.e., insofar as it is a negation obtaining between two extreme items of a distinction. Fuica’s proof resembles an argument previously put forward by Briceño. Fuica says, “being is formally *ex natura rei* distinguished from unity”; *being* taken as such “does not need unity as a foundation in order to be distinguished from unity.” As a consequence, the root of distinction taken generally can only be being due to its own formal *ratio* and with this any given degree of reality that has a formal *ratio*. Being or any formal aspect – including that of unity – posits immediately a negation through which it is distinct from something else.¹²⁰

Fuica elaborates on these last remarks in his second reflection on the *ratio* of distinction. Again, he closely follows Briceño who held that the “appropriate foundation and root” of distinction “in its entire extension” is “any formality of a thing” or any “conceptibility” of a thing. The formality of the thing as the founding *ratio* of distinction leads us to the notion of a thing’s “formal constitution,” i.e., the formal *ratio* that expresses *what* a given thing is. Any (degree of) being immediately posits a negation of anything else that is not itself. We are close here to Fuica’s talk of *divisio / distinctio ab alio* explained above.¹²¹ Now, in our present context, Fuica states – almost like a principle – that “the constitutive aspect of a thing is the distinguishing aspect of that thing.” Therefore, dis-

119 See section 2.2 above.

120 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 4, q. 1, 115v: “Dubitabis: quodnam sit fundamentum proximum distinctionis? Nobis dicendum est, quod unitas, quae est prima passio entis, non est fundamentum et radix distinctionis in tota sua universalitate, prout scilicet est negatio inter extrema, quae distinguuntur. Probatur: ens formaliter ex natura rei distinguitur ab unitate, ut tenet Noster Doctor vel, secundum explicitum, ut tenet Schola Thomistarum; sed ens non eget unitate tanquam fundamento, ut ab unitate distinguatur: ergo unitas non est fundamentum, et radix distinctionis in communi, quia ens ex vi suae rationis formalis dicit negationem illam, per quam ab unitate distinguitur, et vice versa, cum talis distinctio sit mutua.” Here, Fuica again seems to have in mind that the absolute property of distinction is the condition or the *ratio* of the foundation of the *relation* of diversity.

121 See section 3.1.

tion follows the formality or conceptibility of the thing, be it transcendental, specific, generic, individual, etc.¹²²

3.3 How Many Distinctions Are There?

In Dist. 4, q. 2, of his *Commentaries* on metaphysics, called “On the Distinction of Being,” Fuica considers the number of distinctions. To give an answer to this question seems to be the same as answering the question of the universality or extension of distinction. At this point, in fact, ‘distinction’ seems to be used as a kind of relation opposed to ‘identity.’ Distinction is said to be a “negation of identity of several [items] among each other.”¹²³ This concerns distinction as a *relational* property. Distinction as an *absolute* property – of being – is the *fundamentum* and *radix* of every other kind of distinction.

According to Fuica, the first division of distinction in this relational sense, i.e., as opposed to identity, is the one into distinction *ex natura rei* and distinction of reason. A distinction *ex natura rei* is one “which is given before every operation of the intellect,” whereas a distinction of reason is one that “the intellect makes among those things which *ex natura rei* are identical.”¹²⁴ Like Briceño before him, Fuica accepts that distinction *ex natura rei* can be divided into three: real (taken strictly), formal, and modal distinction.¹²⁵ Real distinction strictly taken is also called an “absolutely real” distinction; it is defined as a distinction “between thing and thing” and may also be called a “physical” real distinction. An example is the distinction between the individuals Peter and Paul. The modal distinction holds between a substrate and a modal form; this form is an accidental category that modifies the substrate and assymmetrically depends on the substrate for existing, such as the distinction between a body and its actual place or

122 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 4, q. 1, 115v: “Dicendum est secundo: fundamentum adaequatum, et radix, ad quam adaequate sequitur distinctio in tota sua latitudine, est quaecumque rei formalitas, seu conceptibilitas. [...]: nam quaelibet rei formalitas ex vi suae constitutionis formalis dicit negationem cuiuscumque alterius, quod sit ipsa; constitutio enim rei infert distinctionem a quocumque alio, iuxta illud ‘constitutivum rei est eius distinctivum’: ergo.”

123 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 4, q. 1, 115v: “Distinctio ut sic bene definitur sic: ‘est negatio identitatis plurium inter se’.”

124 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 4, q. 2, 115v: “Dividitur primo in distinctionem ex natura rei, et in distinctionem rationis. Distinctio ex natura rei est illa, ‘quae datur ante omnem intellectus operationem.’ Distinctio rationis est, ‘quam facit intellectus inter ea, quae ex natura rei sunt idem’.”

125 Briceño, *Prima pars celeb. contr.*, I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 3, n. 1, 186b: “Distinctio realis in tota sua communitate [...] secatur in realem distinctionem, quae est discretio inter rem et rem, prout res opponitur modo in tota sua latitudine, inquantum modus est forma quaedam, cuius quidditas in actuali substrati modificatione consistit: et in distinctionem modalem, per quam modus a re secernitur, quam modificat; et in distinctionem formalem ex natura rei.”

localization or between a thing or substrate and its *actio* or *passio*.¹²⁶ The formal distinction *ex natura rei* “is given in act *a parte rei* between formalities of the same physical [hence, composite] entity, such as between ‘animal’ and ‘rational’.” Fuica says, this formal distinction may also be labelled a “metaphysical real” distinction, although he deems this terminology improper.¹²⁷

It is not the purpose of this study to describe and analyse kinds of distinction – real or of reason¹²⁸ – as a relational property, that is, a relation of diversity between some item and another. Relational distinction belongs to any comprehensive account of distinctions, and this is the kind of distinction that is usually discussed in the schools of the religious orders. In this further sense, distinction as a relation of diversity between some item and another, i.e., as opposed to any identity between such items, is not *distinctio* as a quasi property of being, although it does depend on distinction as an absolute property that essentially means distinction-from-another, or negation (as non-position) of some different thing.

Concluding Remarks

Although Valera’s affirmation, that distinction is a *passio entis*, was not explicitly repeated by Briceño and Fuica, two Scotist thinkers influenced by him, it seems that the three authors do agree in seeing *distinctio* as *quasi* property of being, and for two reasons. First, because distinction follows being in its entire extension, just like a convertible property. Secondly, despite the view stressed by Briceño and Fuica that it is a “negation,” because it allows a positive formulation in terms of “being-different from another” (*divisio ab alio*), a property that follows *being* as a formality and as a consequence every determination or conceivable constitution of being, be it as a real being or as a being of reason.

Both in the treatises of the Formalist tradition and in the Scotist works of the Latin American authors studied above, ‘distinction’ is a key metaphysical concept. In the authors I have studied here, distinctions are treated in the context of the exposition of ‘unity’ as a transcendental concept and the first property of being; by contrast, in the Formalist treatises distinctions are typically treated as opposing kinds of *identity*, something we also find in Fuica (see section

¹²⁶ See Pich, “Alfonso Briceño O.F.M. (1587–1668) sobre a distinção modal.”

¹²⁷ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 4, q. 2, 116r. See also *ibid.*, dist. 4, q. 3, 116v–19r.

¹²⁸ Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 4, q. 2, 116r, divides the *distinctio rationis* into a “distinction of reasoned reason” (*distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*) and “distinction of reasoning reason” (*distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*), as Briceño did too (following standard practice of Early Modern scholasticism).

3.3). Unity, of course, is not identity. Unity is explained as something positive¹²⁹ that essentially implies two specific kinds of negation opposed to multitude and plurality, namely *indivisio in se* and *indivisio a se*. Although there are ways how a kind of distinction – precisely as *divisio in se* and *divisio a se* – can be taken as immediately opposed to unity, unity is not the metaphysical ground for understanding metaphysical distinction as such, but rather *ens* taken as a formality.

In Briceño and in Fuica, we find a pronounced discourse on distinction as a negative property (“pure negation”). Although they use expressions such as ‘*passio entis*’ and ‘*quasi proprietates*,’ Valera, Briceño, and Fuica – correctly, of course – do not refer to distinction as a convertible property of being, since such properties, as first transcendental determining contents, express, without properly defining it, the *ratio* of being. ‘One,’ ‘true,’ and ‘good’ are only improperly divisions of being. They are positive properties predicated *in quale* that are enumerated and, as “*entia in quale accidentaliter necessario*”, give expression to what being is.¹³⁰ Distinction as a negative property, as “not-being-another,” is grounded on being, and because of being it is true of every conceivable determination of being – be it a transcendental convertible *passio* or not.

Although there is, thus, a clear discourse on distinction as a negative property meaning “division from anything else” or “non-identity with another,” Briceño and especially Fuica seem to realize – without clearly stating it – that they use ‘distinction’ in two different ways. (i) They use ‘distinction’ in the sense of a *quasi* transcendental property – a negative transcendental property not convertible with being like *unum*, *verum*, and *bonum* since it is a negative concept, although it does not seem to mean a ‘negation of being’ (*negatio entis*) as opposed to a *positio entis*, but rather a negation of ‘being-another-thing.’ (ii) Our authors also use ‘distinction’ in the sense of a relation in the strict sense, in which identity is also a relation and precisely so opposes distinction. Fuica has this second meaning in mind, when he affirms that *distinction as a negative property* is the very *ratio* of *distinction as diversity*. Strictly speaking, when we talk of ‘real distinction’ and ‘distinction of reason,’ i. e., various kinds of distinction, we talk of ‘non-identities’ in the sense of relations opposed to identity.

129 See also Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, dist. 3, q. 1, 111v: “Roboratur, quod unitas est quid positivum distinctum formaliter ex natura rei ab ente, quod quidem in entibus compositis non est ipsa unio sed aliquod praedicatum metaphysicum desumptum ab unione.”

130 Fuica, *Commentaria in met.*, d. 1, q. 1, 99v: “Dicendum est ultimo: ens reale varias habere divisiones, illa autem, qua ens dividitur in unum, verum, et bonum, non est propria divisio, sed enumeratio passionum entis.” Being and its convertible properties, as well as the convertible properties among themselves, are distinguished formally; see *ibid.*, dist. 2, q. 2, 109v: “Dicendum est secundo: unam passionem entis non esse de conceptu formali alterius. Haec etiam est communissima, et probatur; quidquid est de essentia alterius, vel est tota essentia vel pars essentiae; sed una passio non est tota essentia, nec pars essentiae alterius passionis: ergo [...]” See also footnotes 108 and 109 above.

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Distinctions in Caramuel's *Metalogica* (1654)

A Survey of Book III

Daniel D. Novotný

Introduction

The *Metalogica* of Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz (1606–1682), published in Frankfurt in 1654, is one of the many scholastic texts that are rarely studied by contemporary historians of seventeenth-century philosophy, in spite of the fact that it is an original and highly interesting contribution to logic and metaphysics. It offers a fresh perspective on a number of topics, such as individuality/universality, impossible entities (*entia rationis*), statements, and methods of argumentation. In this chapter I provide a preliminary survey of Book III that is devoted to distinctions. I have divided it into several sections dealing with real, formal, virtual, and extrinsic distinctions, and those of reason. In the final section, I highlight the overall non-committal character of Caramuel's approach, which considers many scholastic disputes to be the results of a lack of proper understanding of language.

Caramuel, unlike his ten-years senior René Descartes (1596–1650), is still not generally known. So let me first recapitulate some basic biographical data. He was born to a Luxembourgian father and a Bohemian mother in Madrid during the reign of Philip III (1578–1621) in 1606.¹ He began his studies at the universities of Alcalá de Henares and Salamanca, joined the Cistercian order, and finished his theological doctorate in Louvain on September 2, 1638. Shortly thereafter he published one of his first major philosophical works, *Rationalis et realis philosophia* (1642), dealing with topics covered in scholastic philosophical textbooks (*cursus philosophicus*) that came to be an extremely popular philosophical genre after Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza's (1578–1641) first such comprehensive textbook published in

Some of the ideas in this paper were discussed at the conference, organized by Claus A. Andersen and Jacob Schmutz in Louvain-la-Neuve (May 17, 2023). Thanks are due to the conference participants who commented on my presentation, in particular Lukáš Novák, Andersen, and Schmutz. I also thank Jean Christian Egoavil Rios for commenting on an early draft. I am especially grateful to Andersen for his detailed and substantial comments and many useful suggestions.

¹ For bio-biographical details, see Velarde, *Juan Caramuel*; Sousedík, *Philosophie der frühen Neuzeit*, 161–74; Serrai, *Phoenix Europae*; Dvořák and Schmutz, *Juan Caramuel*. For a recent and comprehensive overview of scholarly research on Caramuel, see Schmutz, "Was Duns Scotus a Voluntarist? Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz against the Bratislava Franciscans."

1615.² It is noteworthy that from the same period (1641) we have also Caramuel's unpublished objections (*Animadversiones*) to the Descartes's forthcoming *Mediationes* (1641). Unlike many scholastic philosophers and theologians of the time, he was at home both in scholastic and the emerging non-scholastic traditions. He had keen interest in the new experimental science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, as well as in arts (especially music and architecture), languages (especially Hebrew and Chinese), history, and especially moral thought. He actively contributed to most of these disciplines, hence he has been dubbed "the last scholastic polymath."³ Geographically, he was acquainted not just with his native Spain and the Low Lands but also with Central Europe, where he spent several fruitful years in Prague, and with Italy, where he held successively two bishoprics. From the Bohemian period we have the monumental *Theologia rationalis* (1654) and from the Italian we have the highly original *Leptotatos* (1681).⁴ He died in the Italian city Vigevano in 1682.

Metalogica is the last, fourth part of Caramuel's complex work *Theologia rationalis*, first published in Frankfurt. Within *Theologia rationalis* it is preceded by the following three treatises: *Grammatica Audax*, *Logica*, and *Hercules Logici Labores Tres*.⁵ The contents of these other parts are as follows:

- Bold Grammar (*Grammatica Audax*)
 - Methodics (*Methodica*)
 - Metrics (*Metrica*)
 - Critics (*Critica*)
- Logic (*Logica*)
 - Verbal (*Vocalis*)
 - Written (*Scripta*)
 - Mental (*Mentalis*)
 - Direct (*Recta*)
 - Oblique (*Obliqua*)
- Three Herculean Labors of Logic (*Hercules Logici Labores Tres*)
 - Denying Nothing (*Nil negans*)
 - Not All (*Non-omnes*)
 - Contingent (*Contingens*)

² See Novotný and Novák, *Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza* (1578–1641).

³ Less flattering is the label "the prince of laxists," given to him by St. Alphonsus of Liguori (1696–1787), echoed until recent times even by authors such as Thomas Merton in his brief history of the Cistercian Order, *Waters of Siloe*, 32. For a more balanced and scholarly evaluation, however, see Fleming, *Defending Probabilism*.

⁴ See Novotný, "Ens rationis in Caramuel."

⁵ Caramuel, *Theologia rationalis*, 1654. The work has nothing to do with theology strictly speaking. The title *Theologia rationalis* was chosen by the publisher. In what follows I shall refer to *Metalogica* as self-standing part of *Theologia rationalis*.

Metalogica contains ten books:⁶

Book I:	Preface: On the Name, Essence, Divisions, Attributes, and Accidents of Logic
Book II:	Paralogies [on beings of reason and beings of language]
Book III:	On Distinctions
Book IV:	Comprising Universals
Book V:	On the Principle of Individuation
Book VI:	On Logical Universality, or On Predicability
Book VII:	On Statements
Book VIII:	On the Principles Known in Themselves
Book IX:	On Arguments
Book X:	On the Rigorous Method of Argumentation

Clearly, in *Metalogica* Caramuel discusses mostly standard topics of *logica materialis*. So why take avail of the unusual word ‘metalogica’? What does he mean by it? Caramuel did not invent it, there are some earlier occurrences in Latin (that Caramuel does not mention),⁷ and John of Salisbury (1115/20–1180) even called one of his works *Metalogicon* (printed in 1610 as *Metalogicus*).⁸ However, Caramuel seems to be the first to use the precise term ‘metalogica’ both as a book title and as a name for a discipline. He deals with its meaning in *Metalogica* Book I, Disputation 1. There he draws an analogy to music and metamusic, by which he means practical art of musical performance and its theoretical study, respectively, such as the one published by the German Jesuit polymath Athanasius Kirchner (1602–1680).⁹ He then enumerates the topics of meta-

⁶ Liber I Prooemialis: De nomine, essentia, divisionibus, passionibus, et accidentibus logicae; Liber II: Paralogicus; Liber III: De distinctionibus; Liber IV: Universalia complectens; Liber V: De principio individuationis; Liber VI: De universalitate logica, sive de praedicabilitate; Liber VII: De propositionibus; Liber VIII: De principiis de se notis; Liber IX: De argumentationibus; Liber X: De severa argumentandi methodo.

⁷ For instance, Jean Durell from the Order of Minims writes in *Philosophiae Christianae*, 312: “Logica Aristotelica deficiat [...]; Theologia sit hyperlogica et metalogica quae [...] longe aliis praestantior tractat.” I am grateful to Claus A. Andersen for drawing my attention to this interesting passage. See also the next footnote.

⁸ See Ioannes Saresberiensis, *Metalogicus*, 1610 (it was printed for the first time when Caramuel was four). Although there are some striking similarities between John’s and Caramuel’s fondness of surveys of contemporary debates, moderate scepticism, emphasis on grammar, and other things, John does not seem to have influenced Caramuel directly.

⁹ Caramuel, *Metalogica* I, disp. 1, n. 4, 4a: “Musica est Ars, quae concinere docet. Est ars, quae in cantu et concentu vocem dirigit: in cantu cum unus solus modulatur; in concentu, cum plures. At Athanasii Kircheri *Musurgia universalis*, sive *Ars maga consoni et dissoni* ultra cantorum cothurnum eminet, et *Metamusica* debet vocari. Multi sunt hodie magni Musici, quae omnia aut fere ignorant, quae edisserit in *Musurgia* Kircherus; illa omni sunt ulterioris

physics and concludes with the observation that metalogic is partly metaphysics, partly logic.¹⁰

Nowadays, we mean by ‘metalogic’ the study of soundness, completeness, consistency, decidability, and other metatheoretical properties of logical systems. This contemporary sense of ‘metalogica’ is, of course, largely irrelevant with respect to Caramuel’s treatise.¹¹ The history of the use of this word in Latin and in English, however, would be desirable. In English, according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the earliest use is attested in *Outline of the Laws of Thought* of William Thomson (1819–1890), published in 1842:

That a science regulating the processes and symptoms of thought which are not universal, but limited to certain minds [...] would be most useful, I will not deny: only according to our view it is not Logic. Let it be called by an old name, Metalogic, or what its constructors will.¹²

We have here a testimony of an older use of the word and also of yet another meaning that differs both from Caramuel’s and the contemporary one.¹³

To return to our main concern: Caramuel devotes the entire third book to the theory of distinctions. There are thirteen disputations in this book, with the following titles (in order to get the perspective on how much attention Caramuel pays to the topics in the title of the disputations, I indicate in parentheses the number of pages of each disputation).¹⁴

indaginis. [...] Parum aut nihil scit de auditus organo cantorum vulgus; nihil de modo audienti, nihil de organis vocis; nihil de soni essentia; nihil de proprietatibus; nihil de causis internis et externis; nihil de effectibus; et tamen, non ideo illi Musicae imperiti vocantur: haec enim omnia et alia multa, quae a Kircherio et aliis ingeniose illustrantur, ultra Musicae cancello sita, Metamusicae subsunt, et a Metamusicis, hoc est, a Musico philosophis debent tractari. Est igitur Metamusica Scholastica et Philosophica quaedam Musica, erit ergo Metagrammatica, Scholastica et Philosophia quaedam Grammatica [...]. Erit et Metaphysica [...].”

¹⁰ Caramuel, *Metalogica* I, disp. 1, n. 5, 4b: “Ergo Metalogica excitabit et discutiet quaestiones et controversias, quae ultra Logicam: nempe illa, sine quarum notitia adhuc Logica potest subsistere, licet non in statu et gradu nobili seu eminenti. [...] Et scientiam, quae est demonstrationis effectus, eiusque varias divisiones, abstractiones, et subalternationes contemplerur: et haec omnia, non pure logice, non pure metaphysice, adeoque metaphysice simul et logice, hoc est metaphysicologice, aut voce breviori metalogice.” See similarly Caramuel, *Leptotatos*, diss. prima, 1; the first part of this late work is likewise called *Metalogica*. Again, I need to express my deep gratitude to Claus A. Andersen who pointed out to me this context.

¹¹ This is not to deny that some metalogical results were known already to Aristotle, for more on the birth of metalogic, see Corcoran, “Notes on the Founding of Logics and Metalogic.”

¹² Thomson, *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, 23.

¹³ It is not easy to pin down what Thomson talks about. It appears to be whatever is not strictly speaking objective (logical, universal) but subjective and idiosyncratic, i.e., he means perhaps the psychological aspects of thought.

¹⁴ See the Appendix.

Total Synopsis of the Book	[2 pages]
Disputation I:	On Real Distinction [1 pages]
Disputation II:	On Formal Distinction [2 pages]
Disputation III:	On Found and Invented Distinction [17 pages]
Disputation IV:	On Fundamental and Potential Distinction [2 pages]
Disputation V:	On Virtual Distinction [10 pages]
Disputation VI:	On Extrinsic Actual Distinction, or Regarding Diverse Connotations [2 pages]
Disputation VII:	On Distinction of Reason [4 pages]
Disputation VIII:	On Confusive Distinction, or Objective Confusion [1 pages]
Disputation IX:	On Objective Quantity [2.5 pages]
Disputation X:	On Identification [2 pages]
Disputation XI:	On Identified Formalities [10.5 pages]
Disputation XII:	On the Concept of Dionysian Distinction and Identification [9.5 pages]
Disputation XIII:	On Hypothetical or Conditional Distinction, Priority, Composition, and Inequality [3 pages]

In my survey, I shall focus primarily on Disputations 1–7 that address the real, formal, virtual, extrinsic, and “of reason” distinctions.

1. Real Distinction

The real distinction is taken up, rather briefly, in Disputation 1.¹⁵ Most of the discussion is familiar to any readers of Scotus and post-Scotus scholasticism.¹⁶ In Caramuel's view a real distinction holds typically between real, positive, and separate entities such as Peter and Paul; it also holds between separate/separable parts, such as Peter and his hand, and inseparable/inseparable parts, such as Peter's matter and form. Interestingly, however, Caramuel acknowledges that the *real* distinction may obtain also between *modes* and even *non-beings*. Furthermore, there is *mixed* real distinction that holds between a mode and a thing. The resulting classification may be seen in figure 1.¹⁷

¹⁵ Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 1, n. 182, 80b: “[...] haec pauca de reali distinctione sufficientiant.”

¹⁶ See, for instance, King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” 21–22.

¹⁷ Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 1, n. 180, 78a, and, n. 181, 80a.

Real distinction

Negative [*inter ... entitates negativas*]

Mixed [*inter duas entitates, quarum altera positiva, altera negativa*]

Positive

Modal [*inter duos modos*]

Mixed [*inter modum et rem*]

Real [*inter duas res*]

Of inseparate/inseparable

Hypophysical [*inter natura et suppositum*]

Physical [*inter materia et forma*]

Integral [*inter partes continui*]

Of separate/separable [*partes integrales ... discretas ... continuas*]

Fig. 1. The classification of real distinction.

Caramuel's treatment of modes would probably merit further investigation. In Book III, however, he treats them only briefly; he refers the readers to his *Philosophia modalis*, which, however, I was not able to locate so far.¹⁸ Here is what he does say in Book III: modes are "little beings" (*entitatulas*) that cannot be conserved apart from their subjects, even by God's power.¹⁹ They were unknown to older Scholastics:

It is claimed that modes were denied by Durandus, Ockham, Hervaeus, John of Ghent, Soncinas, Cajetan, Scotus, Wadding and others who believe they have Aristotle on their side, and all the philosophers and scholastics of ancient times, among whom there is no mention of these modes: but it is more appropriate to infer from this that the modes were unknown to the ancients, rather than they were denied by them.²⁰

18 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 1, n. 181, 80b: "Sed de hoc uberius in mea *Modali Philosophia*, in qua omnia per modo salvo; et in expressiva etiam, in qua modos universos proscribo."

19 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 1, n. 180, 78a: "Vocamus Modos, entitatulas quasdam accidentarias (aut etiam interdum substantiales, si velis) sine quibus subjecta esse possunt et solent, quae sine subjectis non possunt conservari divinitus."

20 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 1, n. 181, 80a–b: "Dicuntur negavisse Modos Durandus [...], Ockhamus [...], Hervaeus [...], Ioannes de Gandavo [...], Soncinas [...], Cajetan [...], Scotus [...], Waddingus [...], et alii qui putant pro se habere Aristotelem, et omnes prisci aevi Philosophos et Scholasticos, apud quos istorum Modorum nulla mentio: at hinc tutius inferrent Modos fuisse antiquis ignotos, quam negatos."

Moreover, the modal distinction should not be confused with an *ex natura rei* distinction, which is what Suárez mistakenly does, perhaps even in bad faith (namely in order to discredit Scotist teachings on Trinitarian matters).²¹ Also, one should not confuse the modal distinction with a distinction between modes, for modes are distinguished really or formally, and not modally by some *sui generis* distinction. In this, Caramuel is in agreement with Scotus, who also understood the modal distinction to be a special type of real distinction – in some broader sense of “real,” i.e., holding between things independently of how we conceive the world.²²

2. Formal Distinction

The formal distinction, introduced into the scholastic tradition by Duns Scotus, is taken up in Disputations 2 and 3. It is “lesser” than the real one but “bigger” than the merely mind-dependent distinction of reason; it is compatible with real identity. It obtains between distinctly defined quiddities (“whatnesses”) within a thing.²³ In Scotus’s view it obtains, e.g., between genus and specific difference, an essence and its properties, various faculties of the soul, or between the Persons of the Trinity and the Divine Essence.²⁴ The classification of formal distinctions mirrors the classification of the real distinctions, because *formalitates* are “shades” of *res/realitates*.²⁵ Caramuel thus applies to the formal distinction the exact same scheme of divisions and subdivisions that he presented when discussing the real distinction (the formal distinction is thus divided into negative, mixed, and positive versions; the positive formal distinction is subdivided into modal, mixed, and real ones; the latter is again subdivided into one holding between inseparate or inseparable items – further subdivided into hypophysical,

21 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 1, n. 181, 80a: “Suarez disp. 7. Met. Sect. 1. num.9 [...] licet plurimos modos admitat, in exponenda modali haec distinctione varius est. Et tametsi alibi distinctionem et claritatem amet, hic summo vult nisi confundere distinctionem modalem cum distinctione ex natura rei [...], si enim distinctio ex natura rei est qualis asseritur a Suario, blasphemiae sunt pleraequae Scotistarum theologorum sententiae in sanctissimae Trinitatis materia.” For Suárez on distinctions, see the contributions by Igor Agostini and Daniel Heider to this present volume.

22 See King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” 25.

23 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 1, n. 180, 78a: “Distinctio formalis reali est minor, potestque compari cum identificatione reali. Et illa distinguuntur formaliter, quae definitione, quidditate et concepta.”

24 See King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” 22–25.

25 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 2, n. 183, 81a–b: “Inter formalitates, quae realiter non distinguuntur, solet adhuc reperiri distinctio, quae vocatur Formalis: et quia Distinctionis realis umbra est, tot habet species, quot altera.”

physical, and integral distinctions – and one holding between separate or separable items).

But are there any formal distinctions, at all? And if yes, are they mind-independent, as the Scotists hold, or mind-dependent, as the Thomists hold? Caramuel is not a committed Scotist and so for him this remains an open question, at least at this stage of his discussion. He suggests an original method to settle the controversy between the Scotists and the Thomists – by way of a detailed consideration of the physics of the continuum:

Is this distinction dependent on the intellect, or is it found in things before the operation of the mind? [...] The resolution of this question depends on the controversy in *Physics* that investigates whether in the continuum, before division, there are genuinely distinct parts?²⁶

According to the Thomists, there are no really distinct parts before the division of the continuum and hence also no formalities in the object before precision. According to the Scotists, there are really distinct parts before the division of the continuum and hence also formalities in the object before precision:

The Angelic Doctor denies that there are really distinct parts in the continuum before division, and consequently, that there are distinct formalities in the object before precision. Scotus asserts that there are really distinct parts in the continuum before any real division, and consequently, he infers that there exist in the object objectively distinct formalities formally distinct before any operation of the mind.²⁷

This brings us to D3 (*De distinctione inventa et facta*) in which Caramuel discusses this “arduous and difficult question” (*ardua et difficilis quaestio*).²⁸ It was suggested, as we have seen above, at the end of D2, that there are two competing views to consider. First, the Scotist one:

If real and physical separation [...] finds really distinct parts [...], then it seems that the parity of reason demands [...] that, pace the Thomists, the Scotists need to be heard,

26 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 1, n. 180, 78a: “Est-ne haec Distinctio pendens ab intellectu, an reperitur in rebus ante mentis operationem?... Pendet haec Resolutio a Controversia Physica, quae investigat, an in continuo ante divisionem sint realiter distinctae partes?”

27 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 1, n. 180, 78a–b: “Negat Doctor Angelicus esse in Continuo partes realiter distinctas ante divisionem: et consequenter in objecto esse formalitates distinctas ante praecisionem. Assertit Scotus esse in Continuo partes realiter distinctas ante omnem divisionem realem, et consequenter infert dari in objecto formalitate objectivas formaliter condistinctas ante omnem mentis operationem.”

28 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 3, n. 186, 83a.

who say that, through separation by the intellect or mental abstraction formal parts are not made, but rather were there before any operation of the intellect.²⁹

And secondly, the Thomist view:

If real and physical separation [...] does not find really distinct extremes, but rather such ones that are really identified [...] or, if the Continuum does not have before division actual parts but only potential ones [...], then it must be said that a simple real entity, when divided into two formalities by the intellect, is not divided into formalities or formal parts that are formally distinct before the operation of the intellect but are formally the same.³⁰

Both views have probable arguments in their favor, Caramuel says.³¹ Which one is to prefer? Before delving into the physics of continuum he praises the Thomist view as “more subtle” (*subtilior*) one but then confesses his sympathies for the Scotist view.³² He then goes on for many pages of detailed arguments discussing pros and cons of each view. It is a tour de force, covering many intricate issues, including some rather ingenious and/or fanciful: infinite man and his infinite limbs, fingers, arms, etc. (“sizes of infinities”), expansion of the soul outside of the universe (St. Theresa’s vision), mountains without valleys, the Archangel Gabriel impossibly multiplied, various types of infinitities, the epistemic status of everything being cut in half by God, Zeno’s paradoxes, etc. Besides subtle and

29 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 3, n. 186, 83a–b: “Si separatio realis et physica [...] reperit partes realiter distinctas [...] rationis paritas postulare videtur, ut [...] invitis Thomistis audiantur Scotistae, qui dicunt, per separationem intellectualem, seu abstractionem mentalem, non fieri partes formales, sed quae erant ante omnem operationem intellectus.” From this Scotist view Caramuel infers the doctrine of three distinctions (which he, however, somewhat confusingly seemed to reject in D1), *ibid.*, 83b: “Ergo stando huic doctrinae ante mentis operationem, dabuntur tres distinctiones, nimirum realis, modalis, et formalis, quae etiam dicitur realis ex natura rei.”

30 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 3, n. 186, 83b: “Si separatio realis et physica [...] non reperit extrema realiter distincta, sed realiter identificata [...] aut, si Continuum non habet partes actuales ante divisionem, sed potentiales tantum [...] dicendum est, entitatem simplicem realem, cum in duas formalitates dividitur ab intellectu, non dividi in formalitates, seu partes formales, quae erant formaliter distinctae anter operationem intellectus, sed quae formaliter erant idem.” Caramuel then adds: “Stando huic Hypothesi subsistit Thomistarum doctrina et rejicitur distinctio formalis ex natura rei, quam propugnat Scotus.”

31 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 3, n. 186, 83a: “Esse in Continuo ante divisionem partes actuales, probabiliter a multis dici, et probabiliter a multis negari.”

32 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 3, n. 186, 83b: “Sed ultra hypothesis debet admitti? In Physicis pacissimos habet defensores posterior [...]. Ergo tametsi utraque sit defensibilis, et secunda videatur subtilior, prima et faciliior et verior.”

imaginative arguments, Caramuel also occasionally takes a jab at various scholastic schools and Hurtado.³³ Here are some samples:

I have presented with great diligence and study the opinions of the Scotists [...]. I see many today who, under the name of Scotists, either do not want or cannot understand the subtleties of Scotus.³⁴

Indeed, this formal distinction *ex natura rei* is completely rejected by the Thomists, the Jesuits, and the Nominalists; it is defended by the Scotists and surprisingly by Fonseca.³⁵

Hurtado [...] complains that he did not find among the Scotists any definition or exposition of this distinction [...]. He has ascended to the heavens, having not yet fully understood the Thomists and the Scotists. Now, seeing everything in the Word (so I hope), he does not require our commentaries, which, for others [...] will be beneficial, preventing them from complaining as he did.³⁶

In the end, as already indicated, through the elusive and complex labyrinth of Caramuel's reasoning, one may glimpse sympathies for the Scotist formal distinction. This one may note already from the very structure of D3 that is divided into four articles with the concluding article dissolving the objection against the Scotist view:

33 Interestingly, he also analyzes some Theses defended at the Jesuit University of Dillingen; see Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 3, art. 1, n. 188, 84a: "Dillingae anno 1618 [...] sub P. Jacobo Bidermano D. Ioannes Fridolinus Roesler Benedictinus *Theses de Physico* extenso propugnavit." On the Austrian Jesuit Jacob Biederman (1578–1639) and his role in the condemnation of the view that the continuum consists of indivisibles, see Alexander, *Infinitesimal*, passim. Alexander's well-written and thought-provoking study suffers from insufficient attention to existing scholarship, e.g., on Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592–1667); see the volume *Rodrigo de Arriaga* (†1667), *Philosoph und Theologe*, edited by Saxlová and Sousedík. In D5, in the context of Trinitarian debates, Caramuel mentions another Jesuit related to Dillingen (and Vienna), Gregor Horstius (1578–1636). On his views in philosophy of nature, see passing remarks in Leinsle, *Dilinganae disputationes*, 367 and 399.

34 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 3, art. 3 n. 221, 96b: "Magna diligentia et studio Scotistarum et Thomistarum opinione exposui: video enim multos hodie Scotistarum nomine, qui subtilitates Scoti intelligere nolunt, aut non possunt."

35 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 3, art. 3 n. 221, 96b: "Sane distinctio ista formalis ex natura rei reicitur omnino a Thomistis, Iesuitis, Nominali-bus: defenditur a Scotistis, et curiose a Fonseca."

36 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 3, art. 3 n. 221, 96b: "Hurtadus [...] conqueritur quod non viderit apud Scoticos Distinctionis istius aliquam aut definitionem, aut expositionem [...] ad coelum ivit Hurtadus quam Thomistas et Scotistas intellexerit. Iam in Verbo (sic spero) omnia videns, non eget nostris Comentaribus, qui alii [...] proderunt ne cum Hurtado conquerant."

- Article I: The formal distinction *ex natura rei*, upheld by the Scotists, is reduced to its physical foundations.
- Article II: The formal distinction, which does not precede but follows the operation of the mind and is defended today by the Thomists, is reduced to its physical foundations.
- Article III: The distinction *ex natura rei* is proved by positive reasons.
- Article IV: Arguments against the Scotist distinction are presented and dissolved.³⁷

These sympathies, however, may not be taken as a clear commitment to the Scotist view, since Caramuel tends to view many disagreements as merely verbal.³⁸

The extensive D3 is followed by a brief D4 (*De distinctione fundamentali et potentiali*) that also concerns the formal distinction, but mostly for terminological reasons: the formal distinction may sometimes also be called 'fundamental' or 'potential,' depending on the context.³⁹

3. Virtual Distinction

In D5 Caramuel takes up the virtual distinction. The disputation is divided into four articles:

- Article I: On the virtual distinction of the Thomists.
- Article II: On the virtual distinction of the Scotists. Whether the virtual distinction of the Thomists and the distinction *ex natura rei* of the Scotists is the same?
- Article III: On the true conception of the virtual distinction.
- Article IV: On the distinction of Divine formalities.⁴⁰

The arrangement of the articles indicates Caramuel's view on virtual distinction. It consists in distinguishing two quite distinct and apparently equivocal senses of the term:

³⁷ See the Appendix, *Disputatio III*.

³⁸ Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 5, art. 1 n. 236, 101a–b: "Formalitates secundum se nec distinguuntur, nec identificantur, prout iam vidimus." Later on, in disp. 5, art. 3, n. 237, 102b, he says: "Semper credidi Scotum non differre a sententia communi; quoniam experientia me docet hodie plurimos Thomistas, Scotistasque idem sentire omnino, et solummodo labio disserre. Huic suspicioni firmius haesi, cum vidi Suarium *de Trin.* c. 4. n. 2 & 5 et *Met.* d. 7. num. 13."

³⁹ Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 4, n. 232, 100a: "Solent multi Distinctionem Formalem, iam Fundamentalem, iam Potentialem nominare, et interrogas an bene loquantur? An haec tria nomina, Formale, Fundamentale, Potentiale, sint synonyma; an etiam significatione differant: et si differant, qualiter? Respondeo semper uni et eidem distinctioni omnia haec tria nomina appropriari posse, saepe non; est enim inter illa aliqua differentia, quam breviter dilucidabo."

⁴⁰ See the Appendix, *Disputatio V*.

(1) By ‘virtual distinction’ we may mean something in logic and metaphysics. Other equivalent terms in certain contexts could be *fundamentalis*, *potentialis extrinseca*, or *radicalis, remota distinctio*.⁴¹

By the name of virtual distinction, authors commonly understand the relationship between two mutually identified formalities.⁴²

Here it is that the debate arises between the Thomists and the Scotists. According to Caramuel, however, it is a misguided debate since there is no virtual distinction properly speaking (over and above real and/or extrinsic distinctions of which some types are confusingly called ‘virtual’):

Virtualities are certain moral hypotheses, and unless we wish to misuse words in Scholastic Philosophy or even Theology, they cannot be found.⁴³

Thus, any talk of virtual distinctions in logic and metaphysics must be eliminated.

(2) We mean by ‘virtual distinction’ something related to the will:

Hence it is clear that the virtual distinction is not a distinction of reason, but a distinction of the will.⁴⁴

Here we enter the domain of Ethics and therefore, concerning this sense of virtual distinction, we should rather speak of a *distinctio moralis*.

Virtual distinction, as well as virtual identification, is a certain moral thing, not a real one. I illustrate the matter with examples. Marriage [...]. The Sacrament of Confession confirms this whole doctrine.⁴⁵

The talk of virtual distinctions, in the sense of moral distinctions is, of course, useful and necessary and Caramuel discusses them at great length in various of his works. As Jacob Schmutz has showed, Caramuel develops a dual ontology of

41 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 5, art. 1, n. 236, 102a.

42 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 5, art. 1, n. 236, 101b: “Virtualis distinctionis nomine intelligunt communiter Authores habitudinem duarum formalitatum identificatarum inter se.”

43 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 5, n. 235, 101a: “Virtualitates, quaedam sunt morales hypotheses, et si vocibus abuti nolumus in Scholastica Philosophia, aut etiam Theologia, reperi non possunt.”

44 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 5, art. 3, n. 240, 104a: “Hinc patet virtualem distinctionem non esse distinctionem rationis, sed distinctionem voluntatis.”

45 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 5, art. 3, n. 238, 103a: “Distinctio virtualis, sicut et virtualis identificatio, moralis quaedam res est, non realis [...]. Rem exemplis illustro. Matrimonium [...]; n. 239, 103b: “Confirmat totam istam doctrinam Confessionis Sacramentum.”

(real) being and moral being.⁴⁶ In D5, we see the application of this dual ontology to the concept of virtual distinction, rather than just its elimination from logic and metaphysics.

4. Extrinsic Distinction

D6 on extrinsic distinctions and connotations is rather brief. Caramuel acknowledges that some authors don't accept it:

Some people reject this distinction: do you ask why? Because it does not please them.⁴⁷

However, the extrinsic distinctions are indispensable in many contexts and disciplines, which even Hurtado acknowledges, as Caramuel is fond to point out:

Indeed, it cannot be denied without a sign of ignorance... Actual extrinsic distinction is, because the same foundation is compared to different connotations... I cite Hurtado *Met. disp.* 6. §.12.⁴⁸

Caramuel's argumentation in favor of extrinsic distinctions consists in providing a long list of examples, starting with what some logicians today would call the *office* or the *role*, e. g., of being a king:

So we correctly say that Charles V is distinguished from himself as the Emperor of the Germans and as the King of Spain; and rightfully so because being the Emperor of Germany is not the same as being the King of Spain.⁴⁹

Other examples of extrinsic distinctions concern types of room (diningroom, bedroom, classroom) or humans with different virtues. In each of these examples it is possible that, e. g., one and the same room is extrinsically distinct as a diningroom and a bedroom, or one and the same person is a wise man and a brave man.

⁴⁶ For more on moral beings in Caramuel and his "new theory of distinctions" in which identity and distinction in morality is not parallel to identity and distinction of physical acts, see Schmutz, "Caramuel on Naturalistic Fallacy," 58–63.

⁴⁷ Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 6, n. 250, 111a: "Ab aliquibus exploditur ista distinctio: petis cur? quia non placet."

⁴⁸ Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 6, n. 250, 111a: "Profecto sine ignorantiae nota negari non potest. [...] Distinctio actualis extrinseca est, quae idem fundamentum ad diversa connotata comparat. [...] Accino Hurtado *Met. disp.* 6. §. 12."

⁴⁹ Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 6, n. 250, 111a: "Sic bene dicimus Carolum V. qua Germanorum Imperatorem distinguere a se ipso qua Hispaniae Regem; et merito, quia esse Germaniae Imperatorem non est esse Rege Hispaniae." The concept of office/role has been worked out in modern logic by Pavel Tichý (1936–1994). For a short introduction to Tichý's logic, see, e. g., Raclavský, "Introduction to Pavel Tichý's Philosophy and Logic."

5. Distinction of Reason

D7 deals with distinctions of reason. Caramuel acknowledges that his colleagues commonly speak of them:

We all speak in one way, or at least we do not differ much in language; for these are common terms, but the understanding and application of them seem completely different among individuals. I have often heard that *Animal* and *Rational* are two formalities, and that they are distinguished by the distinction of reason.⁵⁰

However, when Caramuel presses his colleagues to explain what they mean by ‘distinction of reason,’ they are reportedly at a loss:

But I asked the men, even the learned and the knowledgeable ones, what these terms mean, that is, what it is to be distinguished by the distinction of reason? And I couldn’t extract any good response. So, in order to understand something, besides the words, in this subtle matter, I write this Disputation.⁵¹

Now, the main point of departure for Caramuel is this:

I have proved above that there are no relations of reason, because, as is commonly expounded by philosophers, they are truly impossible.⁵²

This elimination of distinctions of reason is consistent with what Caramuel says in Book II of *Metalogica*, which is devoted to *entia reationis*, and in other works of his, where he treats this subject.⁵³ In Book III of *Metalogica* he has little to add to these other, more extensive discussions presented elsewhere.

⁵⁰ Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 7, n. 255, 114a: “Omnes uno modo loquimur, aut saltem in labio non multum disserimus; nam termini communes sunt, at illorum acceptio et suppositio apud singulos videtur omnino diversa. Animal et Rationale esse duas formalitates, easque rationis distinctione distinguere saepe.”

⁵¹ Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 7, n. 255, 114a: “[S]ed rogavi viros, etiam eruditos et doctos, quid isti termini significant, hoc est, quid sit distinguere distinctione rationis? Et nullum potui bonum extorquere responsum. Ut igitur aliquid praeter verba in re subtili intelligamus, hanc Disputationem subscribo.”

⁵² Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 7, art. 2, n. 258, 115a: “Probavi superius non dari rationis relationes, quia ut communiter a Philosophis exponi solent, sunt revera impossibiles.”

⁵³ Novotný, “*Ens rationis* in Caramuel.” See also the division of D6 into article I (*de distinctione rationis, quae est vera et realis*) and article II (*de distinctione rationis ficta, quae ens rationis putatur*), which clearly indicates Caramuel’s eliminativism with respect to *ens rationis*. Caramuel’s eliminativism appeared to be unprecedented but newer research shows surprising older analogies, without establishing, at least so far, direct historical links; see Andersen, “The Doctrine of Beings of Reason in Renaissance Lullism,” 316–19. For Caramuel’s relation to Lullism, see also the joint contribution of Rafael Ramis Barceló and Claus A. Andersen to this present volume.

6. Other Issues

Before concluding my survey of distinctions in Caramuel's *Metalogica*, let me briefly report, for the sake of completeness, on the remaining disputations. D8 (*On confusion*) and D9 (*On quantity*) are short; Caramuel discusses these topics elsewhere, such as in Book IV (*On Universals*).⁵⁴ D10 and D11 treat the converse side of distinction, namely identification, in particular formal identification (that obtains between *gradus superiores* and *inferiores*, *subsistentia* and *natura*, *materia* and *forma*, *partes continui*, *quantitas* and *substantia*, *relationes*, *fundamenta* and *termini*, and finally *entia spiritualia*).⁵⁵ In D12 Caramuel deals with Trinitarian issues (he calls the distinctions and identities applying here "Dionysian") and in D12 with issues relating to the use of distinctions in geometry.

Conclusion

Let me summarize the results of our survey of Caramuel's theory of distinctions. First, he briefly introduces the real and formal distinctions in D1 and D2. Both are divided into several types and subtypes that exactly mirror each other. The formal distinction is controversial; while not strongly committed to it, after settling – in a highly original way (involving considerations from physics of continuum) – the dispute of its mind-dependency in D3, Caramuel seems to prefer the Scotist view that the formal distinction is found in reality (*inventa*), rather than being just made up (*facta*). Whereas there is a real modal distinction (between real modes) and a formal modal distinction (between formal modes), there is no modal distinction as such. D4 further clarifies some terminological issues concerning fundamental and potential distinctions. Let me summarize this systematically:

⁵⁴ Notably, D8 deals briefly with "objective precisions" and whether, in regard to precisions, the senses and the intellect work differently; see Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 8, n. 265, 118b: "Hic igitur doceri velim, cur non de Intellectione, sicut de Sensatione poterimus philosophari? Cur non possimus dicere Intellectum, sicut et Sensus, unam et eandem indivisibilem rem [intelligere]?" *Ibid.*: "Hanc viam ineunt, qui negant praecisiones objectivas, et Universalia omnia per actus confusas exponunt: de quorum doctrina et dogmatibus, quia plura sum inferius dicturus, quando Universale confusum exposuero, non est cur hic Lectorem meum detinere praesumam." D8 also contains a rather rich phenomenological description of the vision of Francisus approaching and the hearing of Polyphemos singing, and other sensual experiences. Caramuel discusses whether the perceptual model also applies in regard to intellection.

⁵⁵ Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 11, art. 1–7, nn. 288–293, 124a–34b.

- D1.1 There is a real distinction between real positive entities.
- D1.2 There is a real distinction between negative entities.
- D1.3 There is a real distinction between modes.
- D1.4 There is no *sui generis* modal distinctions.

- D2.1 There is a formal distinction between positive formalities.
- D2.2 There is a formal distinction between negative formalities.
- D2.3 There is a formal distinction between formal modes.

- D3.1 The resolution of the controversy about the mind-dependency of formal distinction lies in the physics of continuum.
- D3.2 It is more probable that the formal distinction is mind-independent.
- D3.3 Formal distinction may mean fundamental or potential distinction, depending on the context.

In D5 Caramuel takes up another major issue, namely virtual distinction. This disputation is followed by two brief disputations, D6 on connotation and D7 on distinction of reason. Systematically, the theses defended there are:

- D5 Whereas there is no virtual distinction (in logic and metaphysics), there is one in regard to moral matters (hence Caramuel's talk of a 'moral distinction').
- D6 Actual extrinsic distinctions are quite important for many contexts and disciplines.
- D7 There is no distinction of reason.

There is one more aspect of Caramuel's thought about distinctions that deserves to be mentioned. In his view, only an account of language (*grammatica*) may clear philosophical confusion. This he points out already at the beginning of Book III:

Few things about this most subtle matter are found among the ancients, or at least few that are clear and lucid; many are confused. And what should be considered even more remarkable, there are only a few philosophically obscure things to which Grammar does not add new and much better things.⁵⁶

What are the results of the elucidations that Caramuel promises, by applying his grammatical approach? Although Caramuel prefers and defends some claims, summarized above, he does so typically without certainty and without aligning

⁵⁶ Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, n. 179, 77a: "Pauca de hac subtilissima materia apud veteres, aut saltem pauca clare et dilucide, multa confuse; et quod mirabilius videri debet, pauca, in quibus obscuritatis Philosophicae non addat novas et multo majores Grammatica."

himself with any scholastic school.⁵⁷ At the end of his discussion of distinctions, he even explicitly points out that he does not aim to *solve or defend* any particular view but rather to *show the plausibility* of various views.

We have proposed and explained, clarified and illustrated various opinions; do you wish to know which ones you should choose from all of them? I answer again, you ought to follow the doctrines of your school... for, as of now, no school has clearly and evidently demonstrated that its foundations are certain or that the foundations of others are false.⁵⁸

We have seen that Caramuel often points out that scholastics misunderstand each other and hence many of their disputes are merely verbal. In modern parlance we could perhaps say that Caramuel comes close to the view that particular scholastic schools play their language games and the proper job of philosophy is no more nor less than to clarify confusions arising from mixing the games. As Jacob Schmutz has put it, "Caramuel's philosophy [has an] unmistakable Wittgensteinian flavour."⁵⁹ Caramuel's approach may indeed anticipate that particular Austrian philosophy out of which some strands of twentieth-century analytical philosophy grew. It would then be no accident that Caramuel's approach fits Michael Dummett's description of analytical philosophy: "What distinguishes analytical philosophy [...] from other schools is the belief, first, that a philosophical account of thought can be attained through a philosophical account of language, and, secondly, that a comprehensive account can only be so attained."⁶⁰ At any rate, and regardless of the prehistory of analytical philosophy and the aptitude of my language game analogy, I have aspired here to provide a survey and some basic insights into Caramuel's complex views and sophisticated arguments. This I hope to have accomplished. Still, it is clear that a more extensive and deeper investigation into Caramuel's *Metalogica* remains a desideratum.

57 For recent, somewhat different observations on Caramuel's overall approach, see Schmutz, "Second Scholasticism as History of Philosophy", 42–43 and Leinsle, "Scuole locali – Dottrina universale", 361–64.

58 Caramuel, *Metalogica* III, disp. 13, 145b : "Varias sententias proposuimus et exposuimus, varias dilucidavimus et illustravimus; et rescire desideras, quam debeas ex cunctis eligere? Respondeo iterum, debere Te sequi tua scholae dogmata, [...] nondum enim una schola contra caeteras, aut tua fundamenta esse certa, aut aliarum fundamenta esse falsa, clare et evidenter demonstravit."

59 Dvořák and Schmutz, *Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz*, 19.

60 Dummett, *Origins*, 5.

Appendix: The structure of Caramuel's *Metalogica*, liber III, "De distinctionibus"

Totius libri synopsis

Disputatio I. De distinctione reali

Disputatio II. De distinctione formali

Disputatio III. De distinctione inventa et facta

Articulus I. Reducitur ad sua fundamenta physica distinctio formalis ex natura rei, quam tuentur Scotici

Fundamentum I Physicum: De quantitate molis et eiusdem ingenio et quiditate

Fundamentum II Physicum: De extensionis entitativae et quantitativae distinctione

Fundamentum III Physicum: An quantitas sit simplex entitas partibus carens

Fundamentum IV Physicum: De quanti partibus. An actuales sint an potentiales?

Fundamentum V Physicum: De compositione continui

Fundamentum VI Physicum: De quantitate infinita

Articulus II. Reducitur ad sua fundamenta physica distinctio formalis, quae non praecedat sed sequitur mentis operationem et defenditur hodie a Thomistis

Fundamentum I Physicum: An continuum habeat actuales partes

Fundamentum II Physicum: Eadem assertio confirmatur

Fundamentum III Physicum: Eadem assertio probatur a priori

Fundamentum IV Physicum: Eadem assertio a posteriori roboratur

Fundamentum V Physicum: Eadem assertio contra adversarios propagatur

Fundamentum VI Physicum: Satisfit rationi scrupulosa

Articulus III. Probatur positivis rationibus dari distinctionem ex natura rei

Articulus IV. Argumenta contra distinctionem Scotisticam ponuntur dissolvunturque

Disputatio IV. De distinctione fundamentali et potentiali

Articulus I. De distinctione fundamentali

Articulus II. De distinctione potentiali

Disputatio V. De distinctione virtuali

Articulus I. De distinctione virtuali Thomistarum

Articulus II. De distinctione virtuali Scotistarum. An eadem sit virtualis Thomistica, ac Scotistica ex naturali rei?

Articulus III. De vero virtualis distinctionis conceptu

Articulus IV. De distinctione formalitatum Divinarum

Disputatio VI. De distinctione actuali extrinseca, seu penes diversa connotata

Disputatio VII. De distinctione rationis

Articulus I. De distinctione rationis, quae est vera et realis

Articulus II. De distinctione rationis ficta, quae ens rationis putatur

- Articulus III. An una possit formalitas sine altera concipi? An praecisiones obiectivae admittantur?
- Disputatio VIII. De distinctione confusiva, seu Confusione obiectiva
- Disputatio IX. De quantitate obiectiva
- Articulus I. De contractione et amplificatione obiectiva
- Disputatio X. De identificatione
- Articulus I. Rebus accedit distingui et identificari
- Articulus II. Quotuplex identitas sit?
- Articulus III. Quotuplex unio illa sit, quae vocatur identitas positiva?
- Articulus IV. Quanta sit illa unio, quae identitas positiva vocatur?
- Disputatio XI. De formalitatibus identificatis
- Articulus I. Utrum gradus superiores et inferiores identificentur?
- Articulus II. Utrum subsistentia et natura identificentur?
- Articulus III. Utrum materia et forma identificentur?
- Articulus IV. An partes continui sint realiter identificata
- Articulus V. An quantitas realiter identificetur substantiae?
- Articulus VI. Utrum relationes suis fundamentis et terminis identificentur?
- Articulus VII. De entitatum spiritualium identificatione
- Disputatio XII. De antiquo et praecipue Dionysiano distinctionis et Identificationis conceptu
- Articulus I. Scholasticorum doctrina
- Articulus II. Ostendo ad mentem veterum duo posse extrema simul distingui et identificari
- Articulus III. De distinctione Dionysiana seu prisca et sensibus propositionum
- Articulus IV. Quo sensu Deus scit omnia?
- Articulus V. De unitate specifica et multiplicatione numerica
- Articulus VI. De multiplicatione personali et sublimi Trinitatis mysterio
- Articulus VII. De unitati personali et Incarnationis mysterio
- Articulus VIII. De distinctione Divinorum attributorum et essentia
- Articulus IX. An sint infinitae perfectiones in Deo? An et ipsa distinguantur formaliter?
- Articulus X. De continentia eminenti et supereminenti. Quomodo sint omnes creabiles perfectiones in Deo? Quomodo materialia in spiritualibus?
- Articulus XI. De identificatione operationum essentialium et distinctione notionalium
- Disputatio XIII. De distinctione, prioritatem, compositione, et inaequalitate hypothetica seu conditionali

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Leibniz on Distinctions and the Simplicity of Monads

Jean-Pascal Anfray

Introduction

A central feature of the metaphysics of monads is their simplicity. Monads are “true unities” as Leibniz often says, and such unities are not only indivisible, they are absolutely simple, i. e., they are partless:

La Monade, dont nous parlerons ici, n’est autre chose qu’une substance simple, qui entre dans les composés; simple, c’est-à-dire sans parties.¹

The kind of parts that are excluded are clearly integral parts, and foremost extended parts. *Prima facie* it may be tempting to insist on their lack of metaphysical structure. However, monads are not absolutely simple in this sense; there is rather a multiplicity within monads: “I admit nothing else in monads except perceptions and the tendency toward new perceptions.”² This kind of multiplicity is perhaps not problematic insofar as one would be reluctant to maintain that the monad is constituted by its perceptions and appetites, and hold instead that they are posterior to the monad, from which they derive as modifications. Besides perceptions and appetitions, however, there is another kind of composition within monads, their hylomorphic structure. This is clearly captured in a famous passage from a letter to De Volder:

Distinguo ergo (1) Entelechiam primitivam seu Animam, (2) Materiam nempe primam seu potentiam passivam primitivam, (3) Monadam ex his duabus completam, (4) Masam seu materiam secundam, sive Machinam organicam, ad quam innumerae concurrunt Monades subordinatae, (5) Animal seu substantiam corpoream, quam Unam facit Monas dominans in Machinam.³

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¹ Leibniz, *Monadologie*, n. 1 (G VI, 607).

² Leibniz, Letter to Des Bosses, 24 January 1713 (LDB 302–3): “Nihil aliud admitto in Monadibus quam perceptiones et tendentiam ad novas perceptiones.”

³ Leibniz, Letter to De Volder, 20 June 1703 (LDV 265).

Leibniz here describes a compositional model of reality, starting from the composition of simple substance. At the basis (A), there are simple substances or monads (3), each composed of a primitive entelechy, a soul or substantial form (1) and of prime matter, which Leibniz understands as primitive passive force (2). On the next level (B), secondary matter (4) is composed of a plurality of monads. On a further and final level (C), corporeal substances, called animals (5), are composed of secondary matter; they are subordinated to one dominant monad. I shall set aside the intricacies and interpretive difficulties connected with the nature of secondary matter and of corporeal substance. Instead, I shall focus on level (A), i.e., on the relationship between monads and their constituents. I shall attempt to understand monadic simplicity, which seems to be compromised by a variety of items that Leibniz says are *in the monads*, and in particular by his accepting a plurality of *monadic constituents*. Given Leibniz's unequivocal commitment to the reality and actuality of the primitive active force, i.e., the entelechy or substantial form, the problem concerns the reality of the second constituent, i.e., primary matter or the primitive passive force of the monad. Robert Adams offers a clear statement of the problem:

Is primary matter a positive constituent of a substance, something which must be added to a substantial form to constitute a complete substance? Or is it simply the set of limitations characteristic of a particular substantial form, and thus merely the expression of something that has not been added to (or included in) the form?⁴

Commentators are divided on the answer to this “subtle question,” as Adams calls it. Some hold that primary matter is a real constituent of the monad, distinct from the substantial form. Some disagree and hold instead a deflationary view of the material constituent of substances, concluding that the substantial form is the single real constituent of the monad.⁵ Finally, some even go a step further and claim that the monad is strictly identical with the substantial form or primitive active force.⁶

⁴ Adams, *Leibniz. Determinist, Theist, Idealist*, 376.

⁵ The first kind of deflationary view is advocated among others by Antognazza, “Primary Matter, Primitive Passive Power.” Passages where Leibniz says that a substance consists in its primitive active force or entelechy offer textual evidence in favor of this view. See for instance this passage from a conversation with Fardella, dated 1690 (A VI 4, 1673): “In omni substantia nihil aliud est quam natura illa seu vis primitiva, ex qua sequitur series operationum ejus internarum” (emphasis mine). See also the first draft of the *Système nouveau* (1695), G IV 472; *De ipsa natura* (1698) G IV 508/AG 159; Letter to Jacquelot, 9 February 1704 (G III, 464): “[L]a nature de chaque substance consiste dans la force active.”

⁶ This interpretation has been put forward in Jorati, “Leibniz’s Ontology of Force.” As Pelletier, “Real Abstracts,” 12, observes, this interpretation has been dominant in the German tradition from Baumgarten to Heidegger.

I shall not attempt to articulate an original solution to this interpretive puzzle. My aim is rather to adjudicate among these competing views by evaluating them from the point of view of the theory of distinctions. One of the primary applications of distinction theory in the history of scholastic theology was God's simplicity and its reconciliation with the plurality of divine attributes. In a similar fashion, the theory of distinctions might likely shed light on the issue of monadic simplicity. The connection with the issue of divine simplicity is not a mere coincidence, for by calling monads "simple" Leibniz breaks with the received use where substances were described as unities and as indivisible, reserving simplicity for a divine attribute. Calling monads simple, then, simply seems to be incompatible with ascribing to them any kind of structure at all. The main problem can be formulated as a dilemma: (i) either entelechy and primary matter are distinct constituents, in which case the monad's simplicity is jeopardized; (ii) or they are not distinct constituents, which runs contrary to the passages where Leibniz claims that a substance includes both an active and a passive primitive force, or a substantial form and primary matter. So how do these components relate to the substance, without either compromising the monad's simplicity? To answer this question, we need a clear grasp of Leibniz's view of the various kinds of distinctions he admits and how he understands them.

Leibniz was acquainted with the main scholastic theories of distinctions, as is clear from his early dissertation *Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui*. Other early modern philosophers like Descartes or Spinoza, largely borrowing from scholastic materials, elaborated their own theories of distinction which occupy a central place in their metaphysics.⁷ By contrast, Leibniz did not include a systematic account of distinctions in his main works. This does not mean that he did not have any theory or that it did not play any role in his own metaphysics. As I will try to show, his theory can be reconstructed both from discussions of specific kinds of distinctions and from some manuscripts that provide a sketch of an alternative to the traditional Scholastic and Cartesian accounts of distinctions. I shall thus pursue a twofold objective in this article. I provide a historical and systematic overview of Leibniz's distinction theory. At the same time, the problem of monadic simplicity will serve as a guiding thread and a privileged object for applying the theory. What emerges is a shift from a mentalistic to a semantical framework for distinctions on the one hand and on the other hand a

7 The continuity between Suárez's and Descartes's theory of distinctions has been convincingly highlighted by Rozemond, *Descartes's Dualism*, 3–12 and 28–35, and more recently by Schmaltz, *The Metaphysics of the Material World*, 105–21. On Spinoza's indebtedness to the scholastic debates, see Di Vona, "Il problema delle distinzioni."

weakening of the notion of monadic simplicity which leaves room for a plurality of monadic components.⁸

I shall begin with the scholastic background to Leibniz's distinction theory, prominent in the 1663 *Disputatio de principio individui* (section 1). It turns out that in later texts, Leibniz accepts the threefold typology of distinctions into real, modal, and rational. I address each of these in turn in my central sections (sections 2–4). The analysis of the conceptual distinction (*distinctio rationis*) leads to a consideration of an original reformulation by Leibniz of the traditional late-Scholastic-Cartesian typology of distinctions in terms of a more fundamental divide between things (*res*) and concepts (*termini*). In the final part (section 5), I return to the problem of monadic simplicity and argue that Leibniz accepts a kind of 'formal' distinction between the monadic constituents, which is neither real nor merely rational, but rather shares features with the modal distinction.

1. Leibniz among the Scholastics: Distinction Theory in the *Disputatio de principio individui*

The disputation is a difficult text for commentators. Leibniz wrote this text when he was very young, in an academic context, and the views he articulates here are constrained by the obligation of complying with the kind of nominalism professed by his supervisor, the Leipzig professor Jakob Thomasius. Yet, this text is useful in so far as this is one of the rare cases where Leibniz displays his acquaintance with the standard scholastic theories of distinction.⁹

In this work, Leibniz accepts just two kinds of distinction: real (*realis*) and conceptual (*ratione*). The real distinction is linked with separability: "Whenever two things are really distinct they can be separated from each other."¹⁰ Leibniz illustrates this with the relation between essence and existence: being inseparable, they are not really distinct, hence essence is identical with existence *a parte rei*. By making separability a necessary condition of real distinction, Leibniz is in line with the nominalist tradition, whereas he differs significantly from some

8 The only study exclusively focused on the theory of distinctions is Di Bella, "*Multum interest inter terminos et res*" from 2004. One important source is a text edited and commented upon in Mugnai, "*Alia est rerum, alia terminorum divisio*." For an important discussion of a closely related topic, see Pelletier "Real Abstracts". This present chapter of mine owes much to these three studies.

9 For an overview of Leibniz's relation to the Scotist tradition, see Hoffmann, "Individuation bei Duns Scotus und bei dem jungen Leibniz"; for a comparison with Suárez, see Ariew, "Descartes and Leibniz as Readers of Suárez."

10 Leibniz, *Disputatio*, n. 14 (A VI 1, 15): "Quaecunque realiter different possunt a se invicem separari."

other scholastic approaches.¹¹ According to Suárez, for instance, mutual separability is merely a *signum realis distinctionis*, by which “sign” he means an evidential criterion, i.e., a sufficient, but not necessary, condition of real distinctness.¹² However, a few paragraphs later, Leibniz adds an important qualification to his first claim:

Omne quod ante mentis operationem realiter ab altero ita differt, ut neutrum sit pars alterius vel ex toto vel ex parte, potest ab illo separari. Nam in adaequate differentibus neutrum altero ad suum esse indiget. Ergo potest separari per potentiam Dei absolutam, et solum pars a toto ita ut id permaneat, est simpliciter inseparabilis.¹³

This passage occurs in an argument against real universals prior to the operation of the mind. Any kind of composition requires real components and real components are really distinct, which entails that they are separable. But Leibniz adds a provision with respect to mereological relations: a whole is really distinct from each of its parts, although it cannot exist without its parts (and in some cases, the parts cannot be separated from the whole). The existence of a whole requires the existence of its parts (*ad suum esse indiget*). Thus, wholes are ontologically dependent on their parts and are inseparable from them. Still, wholes are really distinct from (each of) their several parts considered singularly. In other words, the separability criterion applies only in the case of things that are “adequately distinct,” i.e., ontologically independent from each other.¹⁴ Leibniz thus concedes that real distinction does not always entail existential separability.

Besides real distinction, Leibniz devotes most of his attention in the *Disputatio* to a rejection of the Scotist formal distinction and, correspondingly, of any kind of unity lesser than numerical unity. Leibniz’s first objection against the formal distinction is based on an interpretation attributed to the Scotist Juan de Rada, according to which this distinction holds between items that are identical according to their “subject” and which differ “in relation to the intellect,” even

11 See Ockham, *Ord.* I, dist. 2, q. 4, OT, vol. 2, 15: “[O]mnis res prior alia re realiter distincta ab illa potest esse sine illa.” To generalize to cases where there is no relation of ontological priority, as with an accident and a substance, Ockham needs to restrict the rule to created things; otherwise, since no creature can exist without God, nothing would be really distinct from God.

12 See Suárez, *Disp. met.*, disp. 7, sect. 2, n. 9, 264–65. Moreover, Suárez does not distinguish between two kinds of separability: (i) with respect to union and (ii) with respect to existence. What he says in this passage would indeed apply to both kinds of separability.

13 Leibniz, *Disputatio*, n. 23 (A VI 1, 17).

14 The part-whole case as an exception to the rule seems to have been a widespread view. See Suárez, *Disp. met.* VII, sect. 1, n. 24; regarding the other exceptions from mutual separability, see *ibid.* nn. 22–24.

though *prior* to any intellectual operation.¹⁵ This conceptualist reading of the formal distinction, is then confronted with the objection that either haecceity – as an entity formally distinct from the common nature – could not provide a principle of individuation, because it would then be mind-dependent, and Leibniz assumes that individuation is mind-independent; or, if haecceity does differ from the common nature prior to the operation of the intellect (*praeciso intellectu*), then the two items cannot be numerically one (or “identical according to their subject”).¹⁶

Leibniz also rejects another version of the formal distinction, according to which this distinction holds among objective concepts mirroring different formal concepts in the mind.¹⁷ Against this weaker account, Leibniz advances an objection found in the Polish Scotist Peter from Poznan. First, formal concepts are grounded in objective concepts, not the other way around. For, if one assumes that objective concepts are grounded in formal concepts, there would then be a relation of intelligibility having some mind as its subject, a formal concept of haecceity as its *fundamentum*, and an objective concept of haecceity as its *terminus*. This leads to a dilemma: either the formal concept is identified with a divine idea or with a human concept. Not the former, because there are no real relations within God. But it cannot be identified with a human concept either, because assuming that no created intellect exists, this supposed relation would

15 Leibniz, *Disputatio*, n. 24 (A VI 1, 18): “[Distinctio formalis] tribuitur communiter Scoto ut media inter realem et rationis, unde ejus sectatores dicti Formalistae. [...] Explicat eam Rhada, quod sit inter duas realitates seu formalitates in subjecto identificatas, diversas vero in ordine ad intellectum, differre a rationis distinctione, quod haec requirat ante se operationem mentis in actu.”

16 Leibniz, *Disputatio*, n. 24 (A VI 1, 18): “[S]i haecceitas a specie solum differi, quod apta est distincte movere intellectum, quam male ad principium individui affertur, quod preciso intellectu quaeri debet?”

17 Leibniz’s description of these two versions of the formal distinction has an interesting parallel in Suárez, *Disp. met.*, disp. 7, sect. 1, n. 13, 254, who likewise differentiates between a stronger and a weaker version of the Scotist formal distinction, of which the latter in fact amounts only to a *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*. For Suárez’s view of the formal distinction, see the contribution by Daniel Heider to this present volume. Since Leibniz mentions Juan de Rada (not mentioned by Suárez in this context) and Peter of Poznan (who was later than Suárez), Suárez is hardly his source, or at least not his only source. Leibniz’s later annotations to Caramuel Lobkowitz’s *Leptotatos*, which he seems to have read in 1689, has a highly interesting note on the two versions of the formal distinction: “Omnes scholae admittunt distinctionem formalem, hanc Thomistae volunt esse rationis ratiocinatae, Scotistae esse ante mentis operationem ex natura rei, praecisiones objectivas admittunt Thomistae. Sed Nominales quia eas impossibiles judicant recurrunt ad expressiones seu ratiocinationes ratiocinantes” (A VI 4, 1336). Claus A. Andersen brought this passage to my attention; see his *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 821.

not subsist any longer, while the thing would remain unchanged. From this, Leibniz concludes that things are individuated by themselves (*seipsis*).¹⁸

Leibniz thus rejects the two main accounts of the formal distinction, both the stronger version (as a distinction in things not entailing a real distinction) and the weaker version (as a distinction between objective concepts mirroring different formal concepts). At best, the formal distinction is nothing but a purely conceptual distinction. To conclude then, in his 1663 *Disputatio*, Leibniz endorses a broadly nominalistic commitment to two kinds of distinctions – real and rational or conceptual – while rejecting the Scotist formal distinction. His own metaphysical position is hard to assess for two reasons at least. First, he offers no explicit account of the distinction of reason, and especially not of the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*. The other blind spot of his theory is his almost complete silence about the other kind of distinction *a parte rei*, the so-called ‘modal distinction.’ Finally, Leibniz foreshadows an important aspect of his account of real distinction as *not* entailing existential separability in all cases.

2. Real Distinction and Separability: Confronting the Cartesian Legacy

Leibniz agrees with Suárez that, as a general rule, separability entails real distinction. As we have already seen, for Suárez the mutual separability of *A* and *B* is a *signum distinctionis*, a sufficient but not necessary condition for *A*’s being really distinct from *B*. According to Suárez the possibility of *A* and *B* existing separately from each other is established by the separate conceivability of their objective concepts and is guaranteed by God’s absolute power.¹⁹

The idea that mutual separability is merely a sign of a real distinction contrasts with the views of Descartes and Spinoza. In some passages, Descartes seems to equate real distinction with mutual separability: “Duae substantiae re-

18 Leibniz, *Disputatio*, n. 25 (A VI 1, 18): “Posnaniensis illas formalitates interpretatur conceptus objectivos et rationes intelligibiles, seu rem cum relatione ad conceptus in mente formales. Sed id nihil est, nam conceptus potius formalis fundatur in objective, si igitur etiam objectivus in formali, daretur circulus, ac dum utrumque, fundaretur neutrum, et evanesceret utrumque. Deinde relatio illa intelligibilitatis esset vel ad conceptum divinum, scilicet ideas. Sed sic illa relatio non esset realis, non enim cadit in Deum accidens. Ergo nihil superesset distinctioni a parte rei. Vel ad verbum mentis, ut vocant creatum. Sed si omnis intellectus creatus tolleretur, illa relatio periret, et tamen res individuarentur, ergo tunc seipsis.”

19 However, it should be emphasized that the modal fact of the mutual separability of two things is not primarily based on their separate conceivability but is derivative upon a knowledge of the nature of those things; see Suárez, *Disp. met.*, disp. 7, sect. 2, n. 21, 269.

aliter distingui dicuntur, cum unaquaeque ex ipsis absque alia potest existere.”²⁰ Further, the possibility of their separate existence is established by the possibility of their separate conceivability.²¹ Descartes validates the inference from separate conceivability and the possibility of separate existence.²² If I can form a clear and distinct perception of *A* without *B* and reciprocally, then *A* and *B* can exist separately. If *A* and *B* can exist separately, they are really distinct. According to this modal approach in terms of existential separability, real distinction is a distinction between numerically distinct substances. However, it would be a mistake to restrict Descartes’s account of the real distinction to this modal approach, for he also holds that a real distinction occurs where sets of properties can be derived from different essences corresponding to the principal attribute of a substance. Thus, the various properties of bodies are modes of the attribute of extension, and the various perceptions of a mind are various modes of the attribute of thought (*cogitatio*).²³ Thought and extension are really distinct insofar as they are distinct essences. Thus the real distinction in Descartes is ambiguous. On the one hand, it picks out numerically distinct substances: two separate portions of matter and two minds are thus really distinct in this sense. But in another sense, mind and body are really distinct in virtue of their having different attributes, thought and extension, that is, in virtue of the distinctness of essences. On the latter view, it would seem that a real distinction can be found only in things that have different attributes, so that the numerical distinction between two minds or two bodies does not seem to be a real distinction. However, Descartes can avoid the difficulty raised by this twofold approach to real distinction by adding that a substance and its attribute are only conceptually distinct. A particular mind or a particular body is thus identical with a particular instance of the attribute and thought, so that two minds or two bodies can be really distinct after all.

Spinoza’s account of the real distinction looks superficially similar to Descartes’s, but it goes a step further by severing the connection between real distinction and the numerical distinction of substances. Spinoza’s much discussed definition of an attribute as that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a thing (*Ethics* I, def. 4) entails that an attribute is conceived *per se*.

20 Descartes, *Responsiones secundae* (AT VII 162). See Hoffman, “Descartes’s Theory of Distinction,” and Rozemond, “Real Distinction, Separability and Corporeal Substance in Descartes.” Rozemond in particular argues against the standard purely “modal” interpretation of the real distinction as meaning existential separability and claims that the Cartesian real distinction is grounded on the nature of the really distinct things.

21 Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, Med. 6 (AT VII 78).

22 Descartes, *Principia philosophiae* I, art. 60 (AT VIIIa 28): “[...] et has percipimus a se mutuo realiter esse distinctas, ex hoc solo quod unam absque altera clare et distincte intelligere possumus.”

23 See *Primae responsiones* (AT VII 120–21); *Objectiones tertiae et responsiones* (AT VII 176); *Responsiones quartae* (AT VII 221–23).

Thus, Spinoza arrives at the idea that *A* and *B* are really distinct only when *A* and *B* can be conceived without each other, that is, *per se*. Separate conceivability is not just a 'sign' of real distinction, but rather that which actually constitutes two things, as really distinct. Only attributes can be conceived independently, and yet, these attributes are all attributes of the same substance. As a result, real distinction does not entail numerical distinction, since there are no two numerically distinct substances.²⁴

During the last years of his stay in Paris (1672–1676), Leibniz developed an intensive interest in Spinoza's philosophy to which he had access through some of his correspondents. The influence of Spinoza is particularly manifest in a set of manuscripts written between April and December 1676 and gathered under the title *De summa rerum*. In one of the metaphysical fragments, Leibniz develops an intriguing argument for substance monism:

Res omnes non ut substantias sed modos distingui, facile demonstrari potest, ex eo quod quae radicaliter distincta sunt, eorum unum sine altero perfecte intelligi potest, id est omnia requisita unius intelligi possunt, quin omnia requisita alterius intelligantur. At vero hoc ipsum non est in rebus, quia enim Ultima ratio rerum unica est, quae sola continet aggregatum omnium requisitorum, omnium rerum, manifestum est, omnium rerum requisita esse eadem; adeoque et essentiam, posito essentiam esse aggregatum omnium requisitorum primorum, omnium ergo rerum essentia eadem, ac res non differunt nisi modo, quemadmodum Urbs spectata ex summo loco differi a spectata ex campo. Si ea tantum realiter differunt, quae possunt separari seu quorum alterum perfecte sine altero intelligi potest, sequitur nihil realiter ab altero differre, sed omnia esse unum, quemadmodum disserit et Plato in Parmenide.²⁵

The conclusion of this argument follows from a definition of two things being 'radically' distinct: *A* and *B* are radically distinct if and only if, *A* can be perfectly understood without *B* and vice versa. The context of the argument suggests that 'radical' means the same as 'real.' The notion of perfect understanding without another is glossed over in the following manner: *A* is perfectly understood without *B* if and only if all the requisites of *A* can be perfectly understood without understanding the requisites of *B* and vice versa. Now, the monistic conclusion (that any two created things are modes of a single substance) follows under the assumptions that for any two finite beings *X* and *Y*, (i) at least some of their requisites lie outside them and (ii) that these requisites find their ultimate ground in God.²⁶

²⁴ Spinoza, *Ethica* I, prop. 10, scholium, ed. Gebhardt vol. 2, 52. The following propositions (prop. 11–14) establish that there cannot be more than one substance, consisting of an infinity of attributes.

²⁵ Leibniz, *Quod ens perfectissimum sit possibile* (A VI 3, 573).

²⁶ This is an oversimplification of the argument, for the conclusion also requires one further assumption, namely that the aggregate of all requisites is a single essence corresponding to

Two things are noteworthy in this argument. First, the notions of conceptual and causal involvement are completely aligned. That is to say, one has a perfect understanding of *A* only if one knows the totality of the requisites of *A*, including its causes. Second, Leibniz argues from the conceptual involvement of *A* and *B* to a denial of their real distinction. If the concept of *A* involves the concept of *B*, then *A* and *B* are really identical. This means that *A* and *B* are really distinct only if they are both causally and conceptually independent. This is actually quite close to Spinoza's view.

This, however, is not Leibniz's considerate view. In a letter to Malebranche from 1676, he proposes a significantly different account. Malebranche had argued that an apparent vacuum is identical with a material extension from the real distinction between the parts of a supposed vacuum. One of the premises of this reasoning is that any two really distinct things are separable, i.e., can exist separately. Here is how Leibniz reconstructs what Malebranche could say in favor of this premise:

- (1) Deux choses reellement distinctes peuvent estre [entendues] parfaitement, l'une sans l'autre. J'ajoute ce mot, parfaitement, par ce que je le croy conforme à vostre sentiment.
- (2) Deux choses intelligibles parfaitement l'une sans l'autre peuvent estre l'une sans l'autre, ou sont separables.
- (3) Donc deux choses reellement distinctes sont separables.²⁷

Just as in the passage from the *De summa rerum*, Leibniz analyses the notion of 'perfect understanding' of something in terms of an understanding of the thing's requisites. He concedes premiss (2): if one is able to conceive all of *A*'s requisites without understanding *B*'s requisites, then *A* can exist separately from *B*. But he denies premiss (1): the fact that *A* and *B* are really distinct does not entail that *A* and *B* can be perfectly understood separately. And thus, real distinction does not entail separability.²⁸

one substance. For further commentary on this passage, see Adams, *Leibniz*, 129–30; Kulstad, "The One and the Many"; Lærke, "Monism, Separability and Real Distinction", *passim*.

²⁷ Leibniz, Letter to Malebranche, 1676 (A II 1, 400). Lærke, "Monism, Separability and Real Distinction," made me aware of this exchange.

²⁸ Leibniz, *ibid.* (A II 1, 400–1): "Si entendre parfaitement une chose, est entendre tous les requisits suffisans à la constituer, alors j'avoue cette proposition: sçavoir: Quand tous les requisits suffisans à constituer une chose peuvent estre entendus, sans qu'on entende tous les requisits suffisans à constituer l'autre; l'une peut estre sans l'autre. Mais ainsi je n'accorde pas la 1re proposition de ce prosyllogisme, sçavoir que deux choses estant reellement distinctes tous les requisits de l'une peuvent estre toujours entendus, sans entendre tous les requisits de l'autre." In a subsequent letter, Leibniz justifies this by claiming that finite things have external requisites; see A II 1, 404: "Chez moy, tout ce qui peut estre produit, a des requisits hors de luy, sçavoir ceux qui ont concourus à sa production."

In both the *De summa rerum* and the Malebranche letter, Leibniz consistently grants the inference from perfect understanding to separability and denies that these things can be perfectly understood by themselves. Where the letter to Malebranche differs from the former passage is that there Leibniz grants the real distinction of things despite their causal and conceptual dependence on other things. The same line of thought reappears as an objection against Spinoza's definition of substance as a being that is in itself (*in se*) and conceived by itself (*per se*) (*Ethics* I, def. 3). According to Leibniz, the two conditions are not equivalent, for some things are such that they are in themselves, that is, they do not inhere in something, although they are not conceived *per se*. Any finite thing is *in se*, but such that its concept 'needs' (*indiget*) the concept of something else and so is not conceived *per se*.²⁹

The split between the kind of ontological independence required for being a substance and the conceptual dependence of substances on other things remains a core thesis of Leibniz's metaphysics. This appears clearly in his correspondence with Burchard De Volder (1643–1709). The latter develops a broadly Cartesian account of distinctions, with some Spinozistic leanings. According to De Volder, when two concepts are inseparable, such concepts represent one single thing. Thus inseparability in thought (or the impossibility of separate conceivability) is a criterion of real and numerical identity.³⁰ This entails in particular that the properties of a single attribute, like continuity and coexistence of parts with respect to extension, are really identical and only conceptually distinct.³¹ From this, De Volder concludes that the whole extension of the world is a true unity (*unum quid*), rejecting the plurality of extended substances. His reasoning is quite similar to Spinoza's argument from the impossibility of a vacuum.³² In a nutshell, he argues that since a vacuum is impossible, no part of extension can survive the annihilation of any other part. They are therefore (i) inseparable and hence (ii) really identical with the whole *res extensa*.³³

²⁹ For Leibniz's remarks, written in 1678, see A VI 4, 1765; see Adams, *Leibniz*, 128–29.

³⁰ De Volder, Letter to Leibniz, 13 May 1699 (A II 3, 316/LDV 90); see for instance: "Una enim mihi sunt, quorum alterum absque altero nec existere nec concipi potest, et vice versa." Letter to Leibniz, 7 October 1701 (LDV 218): "Ea mihi eadem sunt, inter quae nexus necessarius et reciprocus est." De Volder applies this reasoning to attributes and concludes that they are identical with the substance (Letter to Leibniz, 3 April 1702, LDV 230).

³¹ De Volder, Letter to Leibniz, 7 October 1701 (LDV 214): "[P]roprietates cum essentia rei reciprocentur, adeoque ab ea non different, nisi nostro concipiendi modo, modi nequaquam." In good Cartesian fashion, De Volder accepts a modal distinction between a substance and its modes. Note that properties are identical with a particular attribute when they are conceived singularly, not generically, e.g., as such or such particular continuity or configuration of parts.

³² Spinoza, *Ethica* I, prop. 15, scholium, ed. Gebhardt vol. 2, 59.

³³ De Volder, Letter to Leibniz, 13 May 1699 (A II 3, 316/LDV 90): "*Unitatem extensi nullo modo esse censes, nisi in abstracto. Ego vero eam me percipere arbitror etsi extensum supponam*

Leibniz rejects both conclusions, (i) and (ii). Assuming for the sake of reasoning the impossibility of a vacuum, he denies any necessary connection between the parts of matter. More precisely, the kind of dependence of the parts of extension on every other is generic, not singular, i.e., any part of extension requires the existence of some part or other, but not of a definite part. Now, the generic dependence of the parts of extension is compatible with their being contingently connected, hence singularly separable.³⁴ Against the inference from (i) to (ii), Leibniz remarks that De Volder's equivalence between necessary connection and identity, would entail monism and argues as follows:

Cum omnem substantiam simplicem esse dico, hoc ita intelligo, ut partibus careat. Si vero omnia quae nexum inter se habent necessarium, essent una substantia, utique ex supposita exclusione vacui sequeretur, omnes partes materiae, cum necessariam habeant connexionem, unam componere substantiam: sed eo ipso confunderetur substantia cum aggregato substantiarum [...].³⁵

According to this condensed argument, even if you have a necessary connection between distinct things, they are still a plurality of things, an aggregate of unities, and not a single thing. Hence, they do not make up one substance. Leibniz thus rejects the equivalence between necessary connection and lack of real composition and accepts instead the possibility of a plurality of really distinct, yet inseparable, substantial parts of matter.³⁶

More generally, Leibniz rejects De Volder's account of substance as a conceptually independent being. He argues that conceptual dependence, or what he calls the 'need for concepts' (*conceptum indigentia*) of some particular thing does not entail any denial of its substantiality; he thus denies that conceptual independence is a requisite of substances.³⁷ God is the primary substance, and

mus in partes diversimode agitata divisum. Una enim mihi sunt, quorum alterum absque altero nec existere nec concipi potest, et vice versa. Atqui cum repugnet esse, aut concipi vacuum, repugnant, si ita loqui velimus, materiae partem aut concipi aut existere absque reliquis omnibus." See also Letter to Leibniz, 18 October 1700 (LDV 188).

³⁴ Leibniz, Letter to De Volder, 6 July 1699 (A II 3, 326/LDV 106): "[S]equitur quidem materiae unam partem non posse esse sine aliqua alia, sed minime sequitur non esse posse sine hac aut his." See also Letter to De Volder, 27 December 1701 (LDV 224): "Nexus quoque earum [sc. partium extensionis] necessarius non est, possunt enim aliquae rerum illarum tolli, nec refert quod aliae sunt substituendae." On generic vs. specific dependence, see also Harmer, "Leibniz on Plurality, Dependence, and Unity," 75–84.

³⁵ Leibniz, Letter to De Volder, April 1702 (LDV 238).

³⁶ Note that the argument is *ad hominem* against De Volder's Cartesian account of matter and does not presuppose an account, which Leibniz defends in other parts of the correspondence, of extended matter either in terms of a plurality of extensionless monads from which they result or in terms of corporeal substances united by a dominant monad.

³⁷ Leibniz, Letter to De Volder, 31 December 1700 (LDV 198).

no created substance can be conceived *per se*. In order to conceive a substance, even a merely possible substance, it is necessary to conceive an actual, or merely possible, cause.³⁸ More generally, in virtue of the universal expression among things in the actual world, no substance can be conceived independently. On the contrary, each state of any substance expresses the states of every other substance in the same world, so that all substances in a world are conceptually tied:

Mea certe opinione nihil est in universitate creaturarum, quod ad perfectum suum conceptum non indigeat alterius cujuscunque rei in rerum universitates conceptu, cum unaquaeque res influat in aliam quamcunque ita ut si ipsa sublata aut diversa esse fingetur, omnia in mundo ab iis quae nunc sunt diversa sint futura.³⁹

Here it seems that Leibniz maintains the tight connection between conceptual and causal involvement and sets it against the kind of ontological independence that marks off substances as really distinct beings. To summarize the development of Leibniz's position since the late 1670s, he first put forward the following argument (my reconstruction):

(1) *A* can be perfectly conceived without *B* and vice versa.

This entails *and* is entailed by:

(2) *A* can be separated from *B* and vice versa.

And this entails:

(3) *A* is really distinct from *B*.

In the *De summa rerum*, separability is therefore necessary for real distinction. In the letter to Malebranche, he now denies that (2) entails (3). But later, in the correspondence with De Volder, Leibniz seems to go back to the idea that, as a rule, real distinction entails both causal independence and existential separability. This corresponds to the claim that substances are “worlds apart.”⁴⁰ Things that are really distinct are both causally and ontologically independent and could thus be separated.⁴¹ But then Leibniz needs a way of reconciling the conceptu-

38 Leibniz, Letter to De Volder, 6 July 1701 (LDV 206): “[A]d concipiendam ejus [sc. substantiae] essentiam require conceptum causae possibilis; ad concipiendam ejus existentiam require conceptum causae actualis.” Against the objection that there are many possible ways of generating the same geometrical objects, Leibniz replies that they are incomplete, abstract, beings and that each complete thing as substance has a single possible cause (*ibid.*).

39 Leibniz, Letter to De Volder, 6 July 1701 (LDV 208). On universal expression, see *Discours de métaphysique* art. 9. At the most fundamental level, universal expression consists in the fact that the perceptions of all monads are in agreement, without genuine causal relations among distinct monad.

40 See Leibniz, *Discours de métaphysique*, art. 14 (A VI 4, 1550): “[C]haque substance est comme un Monde à part, independant de tout autre chose hors de Dieu.”

41 Even though each substance can be separated from the other substances in its world, it would be contrary to God's wisdom and is therefore morally impossible. See Letter to Des

al connection between really distinct things (1) with their causal and ontological independence, i.e., with the denial of (2). Although Leibniz does not directly deal with this puzzle in the letters to De Volder, a possible solution can be reconstructed from his writings. The key lies in the difference between two kinds of requisites, mediate and immediate. The distinction is formulated in several notes from the late 1680s:

Requisita rerum alia sunt mediata, quae per ratiocinationem investiganda sunt, ut causae; alia sunt immediata ut partes, extrema, et generaliter quae rei insunt. Si pluribus positus, eo ipso unum aliquod poni immediate intelligatur, illa dicuntur partes, hoc totum.⁴²

Mediate requisites correspond to the causes of that thing of which they are requisites. Immediate requisites are its internal constituents. My parents, for instance, are mediate requisites of my existence, and the impact of a ball on another is a mediate requisite of the latter's motion. By contrast, being an animal and being rational are among my immediate requisites. More generally, the immediate requisites of a thing include its intrinsic properties. Now, Leibniz's claim is that *A* can exist without *B* provided *B* is not one of *A*'s immediate requisites. Therefore, it is possible to maintain a link between separate conceivability and real distinction, provided one restricts it to a (perfect) conception of the immediate requisites of something, excluding its external requisites.⁴³

Bosses, 11 March 1706 (LDB 36): "Unam autem substantiam solam existere ex iis est, quae non conveniunt divinae sapientiae; adeoque non fient, etsi fieri possint."

⁴² Leibniz, A VI, 4, 627. See also A VI 4, 932; 990; 1002. In the latter passage, Leibniz equates the concept of an immediate requisite with the concepts of 'existing in' (*inexistens*) and of constituent (*constituens*). Further, he defines 'part' as a constituent that is (i) really distinct from the other constituents (*res inter se diversae*) and (ii) homogeneous with the whole it is a part of.

⁴³ Hence a conception of *A* in this sense does not correspond to the 'complete notion' of *A* in Leibniz's technical understanding, i.e., as a concept that is sufficient to deduce all the predicates that are true of *A*. Leibniz sometimes distinguishes a strict or thin individual concept, which contains only the 'primitive predicates' of an individual from a thick complete concept of this individual (see Letter to Arnauld, 14 July 1686, A II 2, 50). The kind of conception involved in separate conceivability seems to coincide with the thin individual concept. See Cover and O'Leary Hawthorne, *Substance and Individuation*, chap. 3, and Nachtmay, *Possibility, Agency, and Individuality*, 108–9.

3. The Modal Distinction : Accidents as *abstracta* and Leibniz's (Provisional) Nominalism

As it turns out, independent conceivability does not work as a criterion of real distinction, because it is not a necessary condition. Conversely, Leibniz does not think that the need for the concept of something else suffices for something to qualify as a mode:

Et tamen si constituamus eos [sc. modos] in sola indigentia conceptus alieni, etiam proprietates erunt modi. Est autem modis et proprietatibus commune, quod insunt. Sed eadem definitio etiam iis competet quae non insunt ut effectibus, qui causis indigent ut concipiantur [...]: et hoc modo omnes effectus forent modificationes causae [...]. Aliud ergo requiritur ad modificationem quam indigentia conceptus alieni et inesse (quod proprietatibus et modis commune est) plus est quam conceptu alterius indigere.⁴⁴

If conceptual involvement were sufficient for being a mode, then effects would be modes of their causes, and ultimately all effects of the primary cause would be its modes, and this would amount to substance monism. Modes (and properties) are thus conceptually dependent and inherent entities. This twofold characterization is not redundant. This might look strange in light of Leibniz's well-known commitment to a conception of truth as grounded on inclusion relations between various concepts, rather than on the inherence of a property in a subject. According to a widespread opinion, Leibniz would dispense completely with properties and replace inherence with conceptual inclusion. But such an interpretation would be simplistic, for Leibniz never confuses the level of concepts and the level of things, nor logic with ontology. A linguistic predicate like 'king' expresses a concept which, together with other incomplete concepts is included in a complete concept that denotes a substance. But even if our incomplete concepts do not perfectly mirror real entities, Leibniz still does not want to exclude in principle that there are only substances and that properties are nothing.⁴⁵ In his mature ontology, the properties of substances are called modes, as distinct from scholastic real accidents. Modes, or 'modifications' as Leibniz usually names them, are not ontological additions to the substance they modify, but rather particular limitations of the nature of the substance. Thus, in a letter to Bayle, Leibniz writes:

⁴⁴ Leibniz, Letter to De Volder, 6 July 1701 (LDV 208).

⁴⁵ This is well argued by Rauzy, *La Doctrine leibnizienne de la Vérité*, chap. 5, esp. 239–40. As he nicely puts it, Leibniz is confusing the two axes of the Aristotelian square, i.e., predication and inherence.

[C]e qui n'est que passif, ne sauroit avoir des modifications actives; la modification, bien loin d'ajouter quelque perfection, ne pouvant estre qu'une restriction ou limitation variable, et par consequent ne pouvant point excéder la perfection du sujet.⁴⁶

As pure limitations of the substance, Leibnizian modes seem to be ways of conceiving the substances they modify, and thus to be merely conceptually distinct from them. However, Leibniz makes it clear that modes are not beings of reason, but carve out an objective distinction in reality. This leads him to oppose his own account of the modal distinction to what he assumes to be the Cartesian view:

Distinctionem inter modos realem negare, non necessaria est usus verborum recepti mutationis. Hactenus enim et modi habiti sunt inter res, et realiter differre sunt visi, ut figura ceræ sphaerica a quadrata; certe vera est mutatio ex una figura in aliam, adeoque reale fundamentum habet.⁴⁷

This passage, taken from Leibniz's animadversions on Descartes's *Principles*, is quite revealing, and for various reasons. First, he objects to Descartes's intermediate modal distinction. According to Leibniz, modes are 'really,' not 'modally' distinct among themselves (as for instance the spherical and cubic shapes of a piece of wax). Suárez himself had claimed that a modal distinction is a distinction *a parte rei*.⁴⁸ Leibniz adds that modes are not only really distinct, but they also qualify as *res*. In this, he differs from Suárez. According to Suárez, substances and accidents like quality or quantity are genuine *res*, endowed with real essences and their own nature, whereas modes are dependent entities affecting the *res* they modify. By claiming that modes are *res* Leibniz either associates the term *res* with a deflated meaning or grants his modes with the same reality as real accidents.⁴⁹ This ambiguity is not a hapax but rather reveals some sort of hesitation within Leibniz's ontology. In order to solve this interpretive difficulty, we need to pay attention to Leibniz's argument for the conclusion that modes are *res*. In the quote from the remarks on Descartes, Leibniz hints at the importance of change: things change their modes – for instance a spherical piece of wax can become cubical. Such change is real and intrinsic to the wax and requires that something is changed in the wax (i.e., the modes of sphericity and cubicity); hence, modes are *res*.

⁴⁶ Leibniz, Letter to Bayle, G III 67.

⁴⁷ Leibniz, Animadversiones in partem generalem principiorum cartesianorum (G IV 365).

⁴⁸ Suárez, *Disp. met.*, disp. 7, sect. 1, n. 16, 255. However, Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza does not hesitate to call a mode an *ens reale*; see Hurtado, *Universa philosophia*, Metaph., disp. 6, sect. 2, subsect. 1, n. 13, 789a.

⁴⁹ Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 260, assumes the second on the basis of the preceding passage.

This is a very condensed version of a line of reasoning developed in other texts, where Leibniz deals with the ontological status of abstract terms (*abstracta*). Leibniz distinguishes two kinds of abstract terms: 'real' and 'philosophical'.⁵⁰ Philosophical *abstracta* correspond to the reduction of predicative statements to conceptual terms; e.g., the philosophical *abstractum* corresponding to 'Socrates is a human being' is expressed by 'Socrates is an animal.' Such *abstracta* are not supposed to pick out an entity and so the question of the ontological status concerns only putative real *abstracta*. Accidental properties (like 'whiteness' or 'wisdom') are just one kind of real *abstracta* which include also essential properties (like 'humanity' or 'animality').⁵¹ Real *abstracta* are defined as the 'formal grounds' (*rationes formales*) of concrete predicates.⁵² More generally, the inherence of an abstract in a subject grounds the truth of a predicative sentence: "Abstractum ut sapientia, est res quaedam quae (cum aliis) constituit subjectum A et quae est ratio immediata quod est sapiens [...]."⁵³ The use of abstract terms like 'whiteness' naturally leads to posit abstract beings (*Etres abstraits*) as their *denotata*. Accepting real *abstracta* into one's ontology thus seems to be tied to a commitment to real accidents. Leibniz was well aware of the difficulty, and describes it in the lines just following the preceding quote:

[...] scilicet ex Hypothesi Accidentium realium, aliquid praeter modos seu relationes substantiae addentium, quae hypothesis sequitur si eandem substantiam manentem mutari ponentes, aliquid reale per mutationem in ea, poni aut tolli, seu oriri et destrui concedimus: Itaque Accidens reale est Ens quod ponitur oriri et destrui eo ipso dum ponitur mutari substantia. Unde suspicari licet proprietates necessarias non esse debere nisi modos substantiae. Sed [si] omnia accidentia nihil aliud essent quam modi seu relationes, nihil unquam interiret et ex generibus relationum haberentur classes quae rationem redderent, cur quaedam abstracta de se invicem praedicentur. Non apparet quomodo mutantur relationes non mutato fundamento.⁵⁴

50 For the distinction, see especially *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain*, A VI 6, 333–34. There is a passage in which Leibniz holds that 'being' (*ens*) includes substances (human being) and accidents (heat, magnitude); see A VI 4, 400. A substance is a complete concrete being, whereas an accident is defined as an incomplete abstract and essence as a complete abstract.

51 Leibniz, Letter to Des Bosses, 20 September 1712 (LDB 270): "Nec video quomodo possumus abstractum distinguere a concreto seu subjecto cui inest, aut explicare intelligibiliter quid sit *tò* inesse vel inhaerere subjecto nisi considerando inhaerens ut modum seu statum subjecti; qui vel essentialis est, nec nisi mutata substantiae natura mutari potest, nec revera ab ea nisi respectu differt; vel est accidentalis et appellatur modificatio qui nasci et interire potest manente subjecto."

52 Leibniz, A VI 4, 987.

53 Leibniz, *De abstracto et concreto*, A VI 4, 989.

54 Leibniz, *ibid.*, 989–90.

Leibniz argues that the reality of change leads to the ‘hypothesis of real accidents’, namely to conceive of real abstracta as things distinct from the substance and which can be added or removed from it, while it persists. Conversely, if all properties were modes, then change would become purely extrinsic and relational, which is incompatible with genuine change. Consider an apple becoming red. According to the hypothesis of real accidents this change is explained by the fact that the apple first lacks a certain accident, redness and later acquires it (or more and more parts of it acquire this accident). The opposite view that substances have just ‘modes or relations’ corresponds to the mechanical account of qualitative change: the parts of an apple have various motions and changes of size and configuration.⁵⁵ When an apple turns red, its various parts change their relative positions and relative speed. Change is not intrinsic, but merely relational. Now, Leibniz does not accept a change in relations (mere ‘Cambridge changes’) without a corresponding change in the intrinsic properties of things that are the *fundamentum* of these relations. He concludes that *abstracta* are not real, but “beings of reason with a foundation in reality.” In the *De realitate accidentium*, another manuscript from the same time period, he reaches a similar conclusion:

Nec hactenus alium video modum evitandi hos scopulos, quam si abstracta non ut res, sed ut compendia loquendi considerem, ut cum calorem nomino, non opus est ut mentionem faciam subjecti alicujus vagi; seu ut dicam aliquid esse calidum, et eatenus sum nominalis, saltem per provisionem. Dicam igitur substantiam mutari, seu diversis temporibus diversa ejus esse attributa; hoc enim dubitationem non habet, an autem mutatione aliqua realitas intereat, et oriatur; et an diversae sint realitates in substantia, quae sint fundamenta diversorum praedicatorum, quaeri necesse non est, et, si quaeratur difficile est dijudicatu. Sufficit solas substantias tanquam res poni, et de ipsis enuntiari veritates.⁵⁶

Here, the solution to the problem of change is to dispense altogether with real abstract beings and treat abstract terms as *compendia loquendi*. Change requires substances as persisting entities about which various contrary truths hold successively. Thus an apple (assuming that an apple is a substance) turns red. This fact is grounded in the fact that there are two truths about this apple, call it *A*, namely that *A* is not red, but rather green (at some time), and that *A* is red (at another time). This is a kind of nominalism insofar as Leibniz accepts only particular substances in his ontology. But this nominalism is not incompatible with

⁵⁵ In earlier texts, as for instance in his remarks accompanying his edition of Mario Nizoli’s book in 1670, Leibniz had already established a link between the notions of mode and relation; see A VI 2, 417: “Nam concreta vere res sunt, abstracta non sunt res, sed rerum modi, modi autem nihil aliud sunt quam relationes rei ad intellectum, seu apparenti facilitates.” Modes involve a relation not among things but with the intellect. This is an echo of Hobbes’s deflationary definition of an accident as “a way of conceiving a body”; see Hobbes, *De corpore*, cap. 8, nn. 2–3, ed. Molesworth, 92–93.

⁵⁶ Leibniz, *De realitate accidentium*, A VI 4, 996.

the requirement that all truths need to be grounded. Leibniz's account of truth in terms of conceptual inclusion offered him a way of finding such a ground: the truth of the sentences 'A is green' and 'A is red' is grounded in the fact that the two predicates 'green' and 'red' express concepts that are both included in the complete individual notion of A which subsists in God's understanding. Yet, although inclusion relations among concepts somehow serve as a ground of truth, this is not Leibniz's final word, i.e., it does not exhaust his ontology. Notably, in the passage just quoted, he qualifies his nominalism as 'provisional' (*per provisionem*). He adopts nominalism only insofar as the difficulties in identifying the ground of change of properties can be temporarily bypassed. This does not mean that any attempt at finding a more adequate account should be given up.

Indeed, in the following years, Leibniz tries to elaborate such an account in a series of papers, where he develops the view that there is actually a plurality of *realitates* within a thing. Among these is a series of notes on a book by the contemporary Jesuit Aloysius Temmik (Kümmet). There he rehearses the contrast between the scholastic account of qualities like whiteness (and properties in general) as real accidents and his own view that they are modifications of substances. As modifications, they necessarily inhere in the particular substance which is their subject.⁵⁷ Thus, modifications have a strong ontological dependence on their subject. Leibniz stresses that modifications are produced *per se*: "Praeter substantias, seu subjecta ultima, dantur modificationes substantiarum, quae produci et destrui per se possunt."⁵⁸ Modifications are the end-term of real changes and as such they are real. Such entities are called 'forms' (*formae*). In this respect, modes differ from relations because relations are not produced themselves but result from something else.⁵⁹ Relations and similar entities are designated as 'formalities' (*formalitates*; see below section 4).⁶⁰ For instance, Socrates's whiteness is produced by a natural process and is a modification in

⁵⁷ See Leibniz's notes on Temmik, edited in Mugnai, *Leibniz's Theory of Relations*, 155: "Albedinis subjectatio seu inhaesio non potest esse sine subjecto, sed hinc non sequitur ipsam albedinem non posse esse sine subjecto, sed altiore opus est ratiocinatione ut appareat qualitates non esse nisi modificationes substantiarum, non vero Entia absoluta. Socrates et haec albedo non differunt a Socrate albo; si supponamus albedinem non posse esse sine subjecto. Secus est si contrarium supponamus cum Scholasticorum vulgo." This is ms. LH IV, 8, f. 60–61, in the Leibniz Archive.

⁵⁸ Leibniz, *ibid.*

⁵⁹ Leibniz, *ibid.*: "[D]antur denique et relationes, quae non per se producuntur, sed aliis productis resultant, et habent realitatem, citra intelligentiam nostram, vere enim insunt nemine cogitante. Accipiunt tamen eam ab intellectu divino; sine quod nihil esset verum." On relations in Leibniz, see Mugnai *Leibniz's Theory of Relations* and *id.*, "Theory of Relations and Universal Harmony."

⁶⁰ Leibniz, *ibid.*: "Talium autem praedicatorum abstracta non voco formas, sed formalitates. Formas malo de his accipere, quae produci possunt per se."

Socrates. By contrast, Socrates's similarity to Plato with respect to color results from the fact that both of them are white. The argument from real change is now used to establish the reality of modes:

Distinguuntur realiter Socrates Musicus et Socrates albus, nam sublata albedine, si atramento tingatur, potest manere Musicus. Etsi autem non nisi modo differunt; est namque modalis quoque distinctio inter reales censenda.⁶¹

Just as in the passage from the *animadversions* on Descartes, the modal distinction is here treated as a kind of real distinction. The change of one mode does not entail the change of every other mode in the same substance. The adduced examples – 'Socrates-musician' and 'white Socrates' – correspond to what Aristotle identified as accidental unities.⁶² Leibniz adds that a particular substance together with any one of its modes has the same ontological status as such accidental unities. Moreover, the existence of an accidental unity like 'white Socrates' cannot be reduced to the mere existence of Socrates and of whiteness. Something more is needed, namely whiteness's inherence in Socrates.⁶³ Putting these two claims together, it turns out that Leibniz holds both (i) that no modification can exist apart from the particular substance it modifies and (ii) that no substance can be considered independently from its modifications. The particular considered in isolation from the totality of its modes, what we might call the 'thin substance,' is an abstraction of the mind. A thick substance is a subject together with the totality of its modes (what Leibniz also calls a complete being) and any accidental unity like 'white Socrates' is an abstraction from this 'thick' substance. What the argument from change establishes is that, even if whiteness and musical skill are modes of the same substance and denote the same thick particular, they remain distinct as modes, i.e., modally distinct. And the main reason is that Socrates's being white is not sufficient to ground the truth of the proposition that Socrates is a musician.

Now that the ontological status of modes has been settled, something needs to be said about how a modal distinction is recognized. Here, Leibniz offers a new, semantical, way of approaching this question:

Albus Socrates, et Musicus Socrates, sunt unum idemque nam etsi Socrates qua Musicus bene canat, et qua albus non canat, verum tamen est album Socratem canere et quicquid de Musico Socrate, etiam de albo dici potest, nisi quod praedicationes hic excludimus reduplicativas, quibus formales rationes praedicatorum albedo scilicet et Musicae peritia

⁶¹ Leibniz, *ibid.*, 155–56.

⁶² Aristotle, *Met.* V 6, 1015b18–35.

⁶³ Leibniz, *ibid.* 155: "Plus est dicere: *datur Socrates albus*, quam dicere: *datur Socrates et datur albus*, seu *datur Socrates et albedo*, nam prius etiam dicit eundem esse Socratem et album; atque adeo albedinis subjectum, quod utique aliquod esse oportet, specificatur de Socrate. Itaque etiam quoad rem differunt Socrates albus, itemque Socrates et albedo."

distinguuntur. Et sane revera *Socrates qua Musicus bene canit*, est enuntiatio praegnans constans ex his *Socrates canit*, *Socrates est Musicus*, et *Nisi Socrates esset Musicus non bene caneret*.⁶⁴

What Leibniz has in mind here is that a phrase like ‘white Socrates’ works differently in what we would call an extensional context from the way it works in an intensional context. In the former case, ‘white Socrates’ is a denoting expression that can be substituted *salva veritate* with ‘Socrates’ or ‘Socrates the musician.’ By contrast, in an intensional context produced by the introduction of a reduplication, ‘white Socrates’ is equivalent to ‘Socrates *qua* white’ and the propositions ‘Socrates *qua* white sings well’ and ‘Socrates *qua* musician sings well’ have different truth values – respectively false and true. The novelty of Leibniz’s approach consists in this replacement of the mentalistic approach, in terms of conceivability and inconceivability of separate existence, with a semantical approach in which failures of substitutivity work as the test, i.e., as the *signum*, of a distinction of some kind.⁶⁵

4. The Distinction of Reason and Leibniz’s Semantical Account of the Theory of Distinctions

This semantical shift is even more apparent when Leibniz deals with the distinction of reason. When the mind distinguishes different aspects of the same thing, these different aspects are distinct by reason or rationally distinct. In the case of the modal distinction, we saw that Leibniz displayed a shifting attitude between a nominalist approach with an austere ontology of substances and various truths about them on the one hand and, on the other hand, a realist tendency in which accidents are modes, understood as real entities within substances. Now there is a similar ambivalence in the case of the distinction of reason between the nominalist and realist approaches. The distinction of reason is a kind of distinction between two conceptions which occur at a merely conceptual level. But there still remains the question of how such conceptions relate to the ontological side.

Again, in his notes on Temmik, Leibniz describes the distinction of reason as a kind of distinction which cannot appear to the senses, in contrast to the real distinction which can be ‘sensed’ in at least some cases (as, e.g., between Plato and Socrates). Instead, it requires some *understanding*:

Diversa realiter solent sensibus distingui, conceptualiter diversa, sola mente, seu diversa formalitibus, etsi non rebus. Velut in plano Triangulum et Trilaterum re non differunt,

⁶⁴ Leibniz, *ibid.*

⁶⁵ This aspect of Leibniz’s reshaping of distinction theory has been discussed in Di Bella, “*Multum interest*,” 45.

sed solo conceptu, itaque realiter sunt idem, non formaliter. Trilaterum qua tale latera dicit, triangulum angulos. Trigonum qua triangulum habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis; qua trilaterum habet duo latera maiora semper tertio.⁶⁶

The distinction between triangles and trilaterals is Leibniz's paradigmatic example of a distinction of reason. A triangle is really identical with a trilateral for the terms 'triangle' and 'trilateral' can always be substituted *salva veritate*.⁶⁷ Hence Leibniz concludes that they differ merely as concepts (*solo conceptu*).⁶⁸ In the same texts, these concepts are also called *formalitates*. Despite the Scotist origin of the term, Leibnizian formalities are not mind-independent constituents of a thing in the real world. Yet, neither are they mere by-products of our understanding, for they are objective insofar as they ground distinct truths. Thus the concept 'triangle' grounds the truth that the sum of the angles of a triangle amount to 180° , but not the truth that the sum of two sides of a trilateral always surpasses that of the third side – which is rather grounded in the concept 'trilateral'.⁶⁹ Formalities thus understood are objective grounds of truths.

It is helpful here to compare this with contemporary discussions. Leibniz's privileged example of a distinction of reason between 'triangle' and 'trilateral' corresponds to the paradigm case of the so-called hyperintensional predicates, in contrast to intensional predicates like 'renate' and 'cordate,' and extensional predicates like 'fox' and 'wolf'.⁷⁰ The difference between these kinds of predicates is usually framed in the idiom of possible worlds semantics: extensional predicates have different extensions in the actual world; intensional predicates have the same extension in the actual world but their extensions vary across different possible worlds; finally, hyperintensional predicates can be defined as predicates that are co-extensive in each possible world. This comparison with contemporary debates on hyperintensionality is revealing on two scores. First, with respect to the scope of the distinction of reason. Thus, in many recent accounts, hyperintensionality is understood as a purely representational phenomenon, but it also is sometimes understood as a non-representational, metaphysical phe-

⁶⁶ Leibniz, Notes on Temmik, ed. Mugnai, 158.

⁶⁷ See Leibniz, *Generales inquisitiones de analysi notionum et veritatum*, A VI 4, 746 : "Idem autem esse A ipsi B, significat alterum alteri substitui posse in propositione quacunque salva veritate." ; A VI 4, 867 : "Idem sunt duo Termini, si alter alteri substitui potest salva veritate, aliter sunt diversi." On the risk of use-mention confusion, see Mates, *The Philosophy of Leibniz*, 126–27, basing his comment on this very text. Mugnai suggests a way of avoiding the confusion, namely that a term for Leibniz is a linguistic expression associated with a meaning.

⁶⁸ See also Leibniz, *Inquirenda logico-metaphysica*, A VI 4, 999: "Termini alii significant res, alii objecta conceptuum seu notionum, sive (ut aliqui loquuntur) conceptus objectivos."

⁶⁹ Compare with Suárez, *Disp. met.*, disp. 7, sect. 1, n. 5, 251: "[...] ideo talis distinctio semper habet fundamentum in re, formaliter autem dicitur fieri per conceptus inadaequatos eiusdem rei."

⁷⁰ For an overview, see Berto and Nolan, "Hyperintensionality."

nomenon, insofar as it is supposed to carve out objective articulations of reality. The comparison with recent discussions of hyperintensionality is warranted by the fact that Leibniz tries to provide an account of the various kinds of distinctions through a semantical approach. Besides, the preceding passage provides evidence that Leibniz saw the distinction of reason in the latter, metaphysically rich, way.

This is particularly clear in a manuscript, dating probably from 1703, which has attracted the attention of commentators. This passage is remarkable to the extent that Leibniz reformulates the traditional threefold typology of distinction through the various kinds of failures of the substitutivity of terms. As Stefano Di Bella correctly emphasizes, it is “an ideal resumé of Leibniz’s reshaping from a semantic point of view the Scholastic-Cartesian table of distinctions.”⁷¹ Leibniz starts with a definition of a term (*terminus*) as a linguistic entity, the subject of a true proposition, associated with a meaning or content. Terms are either contradictory (like ‘chimera’) or real (for example ‘human’ or ‘wise’). Real terms express distinct contents of thought and correspond to possible objects.⁷² Leibniz then introduces a threefold way of considering these terms:

Rursus terminus sumitur vel materialiter, et ita est ens, cuius diversi termini sunt eadem res ut rex et propheta in Davide, nempe idem est rex qui est propheta. Vel terminus sumitur formaliter, ut rex qua rex, nempe etsi non sit alius rex quam propheta, tamen aliud est regem esse aliud prophetam esse. David qua rex differt a Davide qua propheta. Diversi ergo sunt termini sed ens idem. Interim in terminis quoque formaliter spectatis distinctio est. Interdum enim idem resolvuntur veluti figura triangula et figura trilatera, item rectangulum aequilaterum et quadrilaterum aequiforme, ubi notio est eadem; interdum vero diversa notio est, ut aureum et rotundum, etsi monetae convenient quam ducatum vocamus. Termini ergo differunt re, cum diversa entia spectant, forma cum ad diversas notiones spectant, consideratione, cum diversa dicunt seu cogitanda exhibent. Idem est quidam rex et quidam propheta, omne triangulum et omne trilaterum. Stemus ergo in rebus ipsasque notiones secundas ut res consideremus.⁷³

There are basically two ways of considering terms: *materialiter* and *formaliter*. The latter way is subdivided in turn in two subcategories; terms considered formally can denote either different contents or forms or two ways of conceiving the same form. The Aristotelian allure of the terminology employed should not obscure the crucial role played by the principle of the substitutivity of identicals

⁷¹ Di Bella, “*Multum interest*,” 44.

⁷² Leibniz, manuscript edited in Mugnai, “*Alia est rerum*,” 256–57, here at 256: “*Reale est terminus possibilis seu distincte cogitabilis*.”

⁷³ Leibniz, *ibid.*

salva veritate in the argument.⁷⁴ Thus two terms are considered ‘materially’ on any occasion where they can be substituted *salva veritate*: such terms denote the same thing (*res*). Terms refer to really distinct things (*differunt re*) whenever there is a failure of substitution *salva veritate* (as for instance proper names like ‘David’ and ‘Solomon’ or concrete terms like ‘king’ and ‘prophet’). By contrast, terms denoting the same thing are considered formally when their occurrence in a proposition does not allow for substitutivity *salva veritate*. This is the case for instance with abstract terms like ‘being a king’ and ‘being a prophet’ or ‘being gold’ and ‘being round’: such terms ultimately denote the same thing (i.e., David or a ducat), but they pick out different concepts.⁷⁵ This ‘formal’ difference (*differunt [...] forma*) corresponds to the modal distinction.

Leibniz does not develop the reason why we should admit such a distinction, but it is likely that he has in mind the argument from change that was examined above. For instance, one might suppose that at some time, it is true that David is a prophet (assuming it is a permanent property), while it is false that he is a king. That which grounds the change from its being false to its being true that he is a king must be something, a form, distinct from the form in virtue of which he is a prophet. Finally, in the case of terms like ‘triangular’ and ‘trilateral,’ both terms refer to the same thing and the same notion; the only difference resides at the level of *consideratio* (‘conceiving’), which amounts to a distinction of reason.

There is an apparent discrepancy between this passage and the former from the notes on Temmik. There, ‘triangle’ and ‘trilateral’ are said to express distinct formalities, whereas here Leibniz says that they express the same form, through different conceptions (or acts of conceiving).⁷⁶ One might be tempted to conclude that there is a conflict between the more realist approach of the notes on Temmik and a strictly nominalistic account in this passage. But this conflict is only apparent and a matter of terminology. Indeed, in the latter passage, Leibniz does not mention formalities and contents himself with claiming that distinct concepts are formally distinct, i.e., that they differ as forms. However, nothing indicates that distinct conceptions of the same *notio* or form, like triangularity

⁷⁴ For a definition of identity through substitutivity *salva veritate*, see for instance Leibniz, *Generales inquisitiones* (A VI 4 746): “Idem autem esse A ipsi B, significat alterum alteri substitui posse in propositione quacunq[ue] *salva veritate*.”

⁷⁵ These correspond to what Leibniz also defines as philosophical *abstracta*. Philosophical *abstracta* refer to distinct concepts or notions. Provisional nominalism stops here. But when Leibniz considers the argument from real change, he seems to admit real *abstracta*, i.e., real forms or modifications within things.

⁷⁶ As Mugnai, “*Alia est rerum*”, 265, notes, Leibniz’s use of *formalitas* in this passage is close to his use in the *Generales inquisitiones* (A VI 4, 746). On this view, ‘triangle’ and ‘trilateral’ are different ways of partially expressing the same formality, i.e., the essence of the same geometrical object.

and trilaterality, lack an objective ground, that which Leibniz calls a formality in the strict sense in the notes on Temmik. Thus it turns out that these two passages do not actually express conflicting views. Rather, they illustrate how Leibniz combines a kind of nominalism with respect to the commitment to entities other than substances together with a form of realism with respect to concepts insofar as they are not mere by-products of human thought but have their own reality in the “realm of ideas,” that is as ideas in God’s mind.⁷⁷

5. Matter and Form as Primitive Constituents and the Problem of Monadic Simplicity

Now, in light of this discussion of Leibniz’s reception and transformation of the theory of distinction it is time to go back to the problem of monadic simplicity that was introduced at the beginning of this article. The problem was that of reconciling the reality of the constituents of the monad with its simplicity. The reality of the substantial form or primitive active force is questioned nowhere. Thus, the problem concerns only the reality of primary matter as a constituent of the monad.

To shed light on Leibniz’s view, it is useful to sketch the main alternatives within the Scholastic tradition, since they set the stage for Leibniz’s view of the matter-form relation. There were basically two opposing views, associated respectively with Aquinas and Scotus. Both views agree that material substances, the basic kind of substances in the world, are hylomorphic compounds including (at least) one substantial form informing primary matter. According to Aquinas, matter in itself is a pure potency, lacking any actuality of its own. Every substance has a single substantial form which is its only actual constituent. Aquinas’s main argument against the actuality of matter is that it would deprive the hylomorphic compound of that kind of *per se* unity that is required for a substance.⁷⁸ Against this, Scotus argues that reducing matter to the status of a pure potency without any being of its own amounts to equating it with a mere non-being (*non ens*). Hence matter would not be a constituent of a material substance. Scotus’s own view is that matter is endowed with “subjective potentiality,” i.e., it is the indeterminate subject of various forms. Once created, matter does not have “objective potentiality,” i.e., it is not merely possible, but rather actually exists, although never without a form.⁷⁹ Ockham and Suárez sided with Scotus in rejecting Aquinas’s view. Thus Suárez maintains that matter is an entity really distinct

⁷⁷ I here follow Mugnai, “*Alia est rerum*”, 266, and Di Bella “*Multum interest*,” 46.

⁷⁸ Thomas de Aquino, *Sentencia libri De anima* II, cap. 1, ed. Leonina 45/1, 71a.

⁷⁹ Duns Scotus, *Lect.* II, 12, q. un., n. 37, ed. Vat. 19, 82.

from the substantial form and endowed with its own existence independently from form, although it never exists in separation from some substantial form.⁸⁰

Leibniz clearly does not want to say that primary matter and substantial form are two distinct things making up a composite substance, precisely because he conceives them as constituents of a simple being, the monad. 'Simple,' as I mentioned in the introduction, means that monads are not composed of really distinct parts. But this does not suffice as a characterisation of Leibniz's view. There is a tension in Leibniz's writings that gives rise to conflicting interpretations. According to Maria Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz is closer to Aquinas than to Scotus, though he at the same time accepts the consequence that Scotus draws from the pure potency view of matter, namely that matter is pure non-being. Leibniz, however, turns the objection upside down and holds a view of matter inspired by the Neoplatonic tradition, on which matter, something purely potential and passive, is a non-being. Primary matter is identical with the original limitation essential to all created monads.⁸¹ On this interpretation, primary matter is not an additional constituent of the monad, alongside the substantial form, which Leibniz also calls its entelechy or primitive active force. On the contrary, primary matter does not *do* anything, because it is literally nothing, a non-being. In terms of the theory of distinctions, matter and form would be merely conceptually distinct. Textual support in favor of Antognazza's view can be found in many passages in the textual corpus, for instance in the following one from a set of notes on Wilhelm Twisse's *Scientia media*:

Positio vel actus, et restrictio vel privatio se habent in entibus ut forma metaphysica et materia metaphysica. Et ita materia rerum est nihilum, id est limitatio; forma est perfectio.⁸²

From the perspective of this present article, the main theoretical benefit of this account of primary matter as mere non-being and not as a proper constituent of the monad is that it offers a straightforward solution to the problem of monadic simplicity. And yet, this interpretation is not without its difficulties. The main objection that can be raised against it is that this view has the consequence that a monad is actually identical with its substantial form, considered with its intrinsic limitation. Now, this consequence goes against a claim repeatedly made by Leibniz, namely that the substantial form considered in itself is an abstract being, distinct from the concrete substance. In a set of notes from 1703, Leibniz offers a division between primitive and derivative *abstracta*:

⁸⁰ Suárez, *Disp. met.*, disp. 13, sect. 4, n. 5, 410, and nn. 13–14, 412–13. See also Ockham, *Summula philosophiae naturalis* I, cap. 9, Opera phil. 6, 179–81.

⁸¹ See Antognazza, "Primary Matter."

⁸² Notes on Arnold Twisse (ca. 1695), in Leibniz, *Textes inédits*, ed. G. Grua, vol. 1, 355–56.

Abstractum est vel primitivum vel derivativum. Primitivum est constitutivum concreti cum subjecto, estque principium actionis, nempe vel activitas primitiva qua uno vocabulo Entelechiam appello, vulgus formam substantialem.⁸³

Derivative *abstracta* correspond to the accidental forms, which are subdivided into permanent and successive ones. Accidental forms – e.g., the understanding and the will in a rational monad as well as its faculties more generally – are permanent, derivative *abstracta* while actions are defined as successive, derivative *abstracta*. A monad's permanent accidental forms are its appetitions, its perceptions are its actions or successive states.⁸⁴ Primitive *abstracta* are the primitive powers of a substance. Sometimes, Leibniz claims that both primitive active power, i.e., the substantial form or entelechy, and primitive passive power, i.e., primary matter, are such primitive powers. This by itself seems to go against the deflationary account of matter, but this is not the decisive point, for one could maintain that primitive passive power is a mere privation of being.

More importantly, the primitive active power or entelechy is an *abstractum* that is distinct from and prior to the derivative *abstracta* (i.e., a monad's appetitions and perceptions). As an abstract being, the entelechy is not sufficient to constitute a substance as a concrete being. It requires in addition an ultimate subject:

Abstractum primitivum est quod cum subjecto ultimo mero (seu ab omni actu et forma vel actu praeciso) constituit Ens concretum, ex quo cum subjecto caetera ejus praedicata derivantur.⁸⁵

The entelechy thus constitutes a complete substance, a monad, only in conjunction with this 'ultimate subject.' Leibniz makes the same claim in his dialogue *Entretien d'Ariste et Philarète*:

Il s'ensuit que le sujet précis et incomplet, ou le concret simple et primitif, lequel joint à l'attribut essentiel fait la substance complète, mérite seul le nom de substance, puisque les abstraits aussi bien que les concrets complets ne sauraient être conçus ni exister sans lui.⁸⁶

A substance is thus a 'complete concrete' (*concret complet*; *concretum completum*) resulting from two distinct constituents: the abstract entelechy and the 'incomplete concrete' or 'ultimate subject.' The notion of subject functions as a kind of 'concretizer' for the abstract entelechy, turning it into a real substance.

⁸³ Leibniz, LH IV, 7C, 89v, quoted in Pelletier "Real Abstracts," 21.

⁸⁴ The same threefold division appears in the *Theodicy* n. 87 (G VI 150; see also G IV 396–97). See Pelletier "Real Abstracts," 21–24.

⁸⁵ Leibniz, LH IV, 7C, 91r, quoted in Pelletier "Real Abstracts," 25.

⁸⁶ Leibniz, GP VI, 582.

Now, in the same set of notes quoted above, this subject is identified with primary matter:

Concretum (secundum scholasticos) est vel incompletum, ipsum nempe subjectum passivum seclusa Entelechia, quod in resistentibus dicitur Materia prima, vel est completum quod non est sine Entelechia.⁸⁷

Thus, primary matter cannot be completely reduced to pure non-being for it plays a role as a constituent of the substance, distinct from the entelechy or substantial form.

The final question is: in which sense of distinctness is the entelechy distinct from the subject or primary matter? Leibniz is clear that they are inseparable; an entelechy is never separated from matter. Thus, in a letter to Bernoulli, Leibniz writes:

Recte judicas, passivum ab activo in creaturis nunquam actu sejunctum esse [...]. Deus haud dubie est purus actus, quia est perfectissimus; sed imperfecta sunt passiva, et si aliter concipias, sumuntur incomplete.⁸⁸

A similar claim is made a few years later in a letter to Des Bosses:

Materia prima cuivis Entelechia est essentialis, neque unquam ab ea separatur cum eam compleat et sit ipsa Potentia passiva totius substantiae completae. [...] Deus per potentiam absolutam [...] non tamen potest eam [sc. substantiam] privare Materia prima, nam faceret inde Actum purum, qualis ipse est solus.⁸⁹

Active powers cannot be separated from primary matter. God is the only exception to this general rule, because God's entelechy is a subject through itself. Conversely, as Leibniz explains to Des Bosses, God cannot separate a limited entelechy from its matter, for that would turn it into a pure act, just like God himself. This leads Leibniz to doubt that entelechy and primary matter are really distinct and suggest that they are distinct in reason only. This development is evidenced in the following passage from a text written in the 1690s:

Et quod me constituit abstractum, et ab alio distinguit forma est substantialis, neque a subjecto suo avelli potest. Unde dubitari potest, an hic revera duo sint Entia incompleta subjectum, et Forma substantialis ei inhaerens. Cum principium id comprobandi non appareat, possumus tamen duo concipere, principium passionis tanquam subjectum, et principium actionis tanquam formam.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Leibniz, LH IV, 7C, 95r, quoted in Pelletier "Real Abstracts," 25.

⁸⁸ Leibniz, Letter to Jacob Bernoulli, 17 December 1698 (GM III 560).

⁸⁹ Leibniz, Letter to Des Bosses, 16 October 1706 (LDB 78).

⁹⁰ Leibniz, LH IV, 7C, 85–86, quoted in Pelletier "Real Abstracts," 27.

According to Leibniz, it is possible to have two conceptions (*duo concipere*) of a complete substance: a conception of its subject or primary matter, and a conception of its principle of action or substantial form. Since he indicates that a real distinction is doubtful in this case, it is tempting to conclude, as some commentators do, that there is no real distinction in this case and that we have two ways of conceiving a single thing rather than two conceptions of distinct entities. Although natural, this reading does not impose itself, for as I have shown in section 2 Leibniz accepts cases of real distinction without separability.

However, a real distinction in the strict sense (as a distinction between two different complete *res*) cannot apply to our case, because both the entelechy and the subject are incomplete, the latter as an incomplete concrete thing, the former as an abstract. A modal distinction might then be a better option. Indeed, as we have seen in section 3, a modal distinction is usually the kind of distinction that Leibniz accepts among *abstracta*. However, it applies to modifications of a substance, which Leibniz also calls derivative *abstracta*. It thus cannot be the right kind of distinction between the primitive abstract constituents of a monad. Leibniz would, therefore, seem to have no other option than to consider the entelechy (as a primitive *abstractum*) and primary matter (as the incomplete concrete subject) as merely conceptually distinct.

Conclusion

Nevertheless, the latter interpretation, according to which Leibniz ends up with a merely conceptual distinction, can be resisted. Leibniz's reshaping of the traditional typology of distinctions rather seems to allow a more robust distinction between the constituents of a monad. Indeed, as I have pointed out, Leibniz does admit cases of a 'distinction by form,' which can be understood as a kind of formal distinction. Although the primary examples of this formal distinction involve accidental forms (like wisdom and kingship), primitive *abstracta* are not ruled out. Thus, the entelechy may legitimately count as such a *forma*. Primary matter might seem more problematic. However, primary matter is also the concrete subject. And this concrete subject in its role as a concretizer of the entelechy can be regarded as a kind of 'form.' Accepting this 'formal' distinction as a kind of distinction grounded in reality and as holding among the constituents of a monad offers the means of reconciling the indivisible unity of monads with the distinction of their internal constituents. But this is only a partial solution to the problem of monadic simplicity, since it comes at the price of a less strict, one

could even say more relaxed, account of simplicity.⁹¹ Historically, this was in fact always the problem with the formal distinction.

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⁹¹ My own approach to the question differs from the interpretation defended by Pelletier in his recent article, in particular with regard to the account of primary matter, which on his reading is constituted from perceptions of other things and is thus not a constituent *within* the monad; see Pelletier, “Real Abstracts,” 32. Nevertheless, I completely agree with his conclusion regarding the nature of entelechy or active force: “[F]orce is not a real thing, it is a real abstract” (*ibid.*, 41).

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Index of Names

- Accardo, Mariano 249, 258
Achillini, Alessandro 26
Adams, Robert M. 406, 414 f., 435
Aertsen, Jan A. 368, 379
Agostini, Igor 29, 40, 269, 275, 296, 389
Agricola, Rudolph 250
Agrippa, Heinrich Cornelius 249 f., 258
Alexander, Amir 392, 402
Alnwick, William of 19, 51, 54, 57, 62, 75, 77, 84, 87, 109
Alsted, Johann Heinrich 30, 32–34, 41, 248, 325, 344
Amico, Bartolomeo 25, 41, 172, 203
Andersen, Claus A. 11 f., 16, 19, 22, 25–29, 31 f., 34 f., 37, 40–42, 49, 53, 63, 76, 79, 102 f., 110, 113, 127 f., 136, 140, 143, 148, 151, 158, 159, 164, 169–173, 175, 177, 180, 185, 189, 192, 195, 197–199, 201 f., 205, 207–209, 211–213, 216, 221–223, 234, 237 f., 240 f., 243 f., 246, 248 f., 250–252, 254, 259, 265, 296 f., 302, 317, 347, 352, 356 f., 379, 383, 386 f., 396, 402, 405, 410, 435
Andrews, Robert 9, 169, 192, 198, 297
Anfray, Jean-Pascal 34 f.
Angelini, Annarita 248, 259
Anselm of Canterbury 272, 277, 285, 294
Antognazza, Maria Rosa 406, 430, 435
Antonius Andreae 19, 140, 148, 157–159, 163 f., 185, 195, 201, 203, 251
Appamiis, Iacobus de (Jacques de Pamiers) 51, 75
Aquila, Peter of 52, 75
Aquinas, Thomas 26, 266 f., 269, 272 f., 285, 293 f., 314, 344, 429 f., 434
Aravena Zamora, Abel 366, 379
Ariew, Roger 35, 42, 327, 345, 408, 435
Aristotle 17, 31, 34, 66, 79, 116–120, 132–136, 139, 157, 173 f., 177, 180–182, 192, 196, 201, 207 f., 227, 244, 310, 312 f., 315, 317, 324, 364, 386, 388, 424
Arnauld, Antoine 414 f., 417
Arriaga, Rodrigo de 288, 294, 392
Arrubal, Pedro de 288, 294
Aschbach, Joseph 144, 164
Augustine 13, 21, 150, 160, 187, 203, 285
Auriol, Peter (Aureolus) 26, 65, 137, 153, 158, 247, 268, 294, 361 f.
Averroes 26, 135
Avicenna 13, 71, 135, 140
Backus, Irena 250, 259
Bacon, Francis 12, 42
Baillet, Adrien 323, 344
Bağ, Felix 237, 259
Bañes, Domingo 271, 294
Barber, Kenneth F. 35, 42
Barbet, Jeanne 49, 70, 76
Barbò da Soncino, Paolo 388
Barceló Crespi, Maria 245, 259
Barcelona, Martin de 116, 140
Bartholin, Caspar 30, 32–34, 42
Bassols (Bassolis), John of 52 f., 75
Bayle, Pierre 323, 344, 419 f.
Beck, Andreas 34, 42
Belluto, Bonaventura 26, 136, 202
Bellver, Antonius 249–251, 258
Bender, Sebastian 35, 42
Bernard, Guillaume 172, 203
Berto, Francesco 426, 435
Biderman, Jacob 392
Biel, Gabriel 26
Billuart, Charles-René 293 f.
Blank, Andreas 324, 345
Bollbuck, Harald 31, 42

- Bolliger, Daniel 11, 30f., 42, 79, 110, 121, 140, 172, 201, 205, 208, 234, 357, 379
 Bonetus, Nicholas 24, 26, 35, 52, 75, 79, 113–140, 151, 164, 211, 247
 Bonner, Anthony 239, 249, 260
 Bos, Egbert P. 22, 63, 65, 173, 185, 197
 Briceño, Alfonso 30, 347f., 353, 355–369, 372–379
 Bridges, Geoffrey G. 17, 42, 63, 65, 68f., 76, 79f., 96, 110, 148f., 153f., 164, 169, 173, 175, 205, 212, 234
 Brinzei, Monica 144, 164
 Brulefer, Étienne 24, 26, 30, 34, 169–173, 175–194, 196–203, 241
 Buffenoir, Aude 116, 141
 Burton, Simon 31, 42
 Butler, Ronald J. 39, 42
 Buytaert, Eligius M. 22
 Bychkov, Oleg 19, 56, 69

 Cabré Duran, Maria 238f., 260
 Caird, Alfred P. 222, 234
 Cajetan de Vio, Tomasso 33, 267, 270–272, 274f., 277, 279, 289f., 293f., 388
 Calpe, Xavier 238f., 260
 Calvin, Jean 30
 Canonicus, Joannes see Marbres, Francis of
 Capreolus, John 232, 267–269, 271–275, 279, 282, 285, 289, 292, 294
 Capri, Marco 25, 43
 Caracciolo, Landulph 50–52, 75, 217, 233
 Caramuel y Lobkowitz, Juan 28, 30, 34, 40, 237f., 252, 358, 383–402, 410
 Cardano, Girolamo 322, 343f.
 Casmann, Otto 327, 344
 Cassanyes Roig, Albert 246, 260
 Cassinensis, Samuel 172, 203
 Cenci, Márcio Paulo 355, 379
 Céspedes Agüero, Víctor Santiago 348, 355, 379
 Chatton, Walter 52, 57, 75
 Chiodinus, Iohannes Baptista 214, 233
 Clauberg, Johannes 38, 43, 327
 Corcoran, John 386, 402
 Cordier, Honorius 254, 258
 Courtenay, William 19, 43, 53, 76
 Cover, Jan A. 418, 435

 Crane, Judith K. 38, 43
 Cross, Richard 25, 43, 210, 234, 298, 317

 Dagui, Pere 169, 204, 243–250, 252f., 255–258
 D'Angelo, Antonello 208, 234
 De Pascalis, Alessandro 54
 Des Bosses, Barthélemy 405, 421, 432
 Descartes, René 35–38, 43, 153, 164, 323f., 327, 344, 383f., 407f., 411f., 420, 424, 434
 De Volder, Burchard 405, 415–419
 Di Bella, Stefano 408, 425, 427, 429, 435
 Di Vona, Piero 265, 296, 407, 435
 Döring, Matthias 52, 75
 Doyle, John P. 349, 380
 Duba, William 17, 20f., 24, 43, 49, 51, 53, 58, 66, 69, 76f., 113, 115–117, 119f., 127, 135–137, 139, 141, 169, 190, 205, 211
 Du Douet (Dovetus), Jean 26, 172, 202, 204
 Dummett, Michael 399, 402
 Dumont, Stephen 19, 43, 49, 51f., 54–57, 76, 79, 84, 109f., 210, 234
 Duns Scotus, John 10–13, 16–21, 24, 26, 30f., 33f., 34, 38, 40, 43, 49–57, 60–62, 64–71, 73–75, 79, 84, 86, 89f., 92–94, 96, 100, 104, 106–109, 113, 115f., 127, 137, 148, 150, 153, 163f., 169, 171f., 175f., 179f., 182f., 185f., 191f., 196f., 201, 204f., 208–213, 218, 227–230, 232f., 237–242, 246f., 250–256, 267f., 270, 272–275, 282, 285, 288f., 291, 295, 297–299, 301f., 304–307, 311, 313f., 317, 348f., 351f., 354–357, 364, 366–368, 372f., 279, 387–392, 429f., 434
 Durandus of Saint-Pourçain 306f., 317, 388
 Durell, Jean 385, 402
 Dvořák, Petr. 383, 399, 402

 Egoavil Rios, Jean Christian 383
 Emery Jr., Kent 19, 55f., 62
 Ensenyat Pujol, Gabriel 245, 259
 Erasmus of Rotterdam 11, 43
 Erfurt, Thomas of 171
 Etzkorn, Girard J. 52, 70, 76

- Fabri, Filippo 26, 171
 Fardella, Michelangelo 406
 Fernando de Córdoba 240–243, 248, 252, 255 f., 258
 Ferre, Vicente 291, 295
 Ferrer, Antonius 251, 258
 Fink-Jensen, Morten 32, 43
 Fiorentino, Francesco 51, 58, 76
 Fonseca, Pedro da 31–33, 35, 38, 43, 209, 235, 325, 344, 352, 367, 392
 Fontaines, Godfrey of 18, 153, 164
 Forlivesi, Marco 26, 43, 208, 234
 Fleming, Julia 384, 402
 Flood, John L. 145, 164
 Francisco Yela, J. 349, 380
 Friedman, Russell L. 13 f., 30, 43, 137, 141, 268
 Galilei, Galileo 322
 Garber, Daniel 325, 345
 Garrigou-Lagrange, Réginald 265, 295
 Gayà, Jordi 243, 260
 Gelber, Hester 49, 69, 77
 Gellera, Giovanni 38, 43, 327, 345
 Wierda, Gerben 321, 346
 Gerson, Jean 145, 201, 245
 Gibboni from Aquara (Aquarius), Mattia 26, 40, 42
 Giles of Rome 25 f., 146
 Gil (Gillus), Christovao 288, 295
 Girolamo of Pistoia 26
 Göckl (Goclenius), Rudolph 31, 325, 344
 Godoy, Pedro de 291, 295
 Gomez Arboleya, Enrique 349, 380
 Gonet, Jean-Baptiste 292, 295
 Goris, Wouter 54, 121, 141, 158, 164
 Gorlaeus, David 34, 321–344
 Gothutius, Augustinus 171, 199, 202, 204
 Gotti, Vicenzio Ludovico 292 f., 295
 Gracia, Jorge J.E. 35, 42, 349, 380
 Granado, Diego 272, 288, 295, 367
 Grajewski, Maurice 10 f., 43, 210, 234, 299, 302, 306, 317
 Gredt, Joseph August 265, 295
 Grellard, Christophe 113, 141
 Grütsch, Conrad 116
 Gutiérrez, Bernardino 365, 380
 Hamesse, Jacqueline 192, 205
 Hanisch Espíndola, Walter 355, 380
 Harclay, Henry of 51, 76
 Harmer, Adam 416, 435
 Hattab, Helen 324, 333, 337, 345
 Hawthorne, John O'Leary 418, 435
 Heereboord, Adriaan 38, 43
 Heider, Daniel 30, 265, 294, 297, 308, 314, 317, 389, 410
 Henninger, Mark 51, 76
 Henry of Ghent 13–16, 18, 24, 40, 43
 Hervaeus Natalis 388
 Hillgarth, Jocelyn N. 245, 248, 260
 Hobbes, Thomas 422, 434
 Hoenen, Maarten J.F.M. 201, 205, 241, 260, 357, 380
 Hoeres, Walter 297, 318
 Hoffman, Paul 39, 43, 412, 435
 Hoffmann, Tobias 13, 44, 408, 435
 Honnefelder, Ludger 297, 318, 349, 366, 380
 Hooper, M. Rachel 22
 Horstius, Gregor 392
 Huet, Guillaume 171, 204
 Hübener, Wolfgang 11, 20, 24, 32, 35, 44, 79 f., 96, 110, 159, 165, 195, 205, 221, 234
 Hume, David 35, 39, 44
 Hurtado de Mendoza, Pedro 357, 374, 383 f., 392, 395, 420, 434
 Ivanov, Vitaly 21 f., 24, 32, 41, 44, 79, 110, 121, 198, 207, 212, 234, 247, 298, 316
 Janer, Jaume 244, 246–248, 250, 255–258
 Javelli, Chrysostomo 33 f., 197
 John of Ghent 388
 John of Naples 18
 Johnston, Mark D. 242, 260
 Jorati, Julia 406, 435
 Juan de Fuica 30, 347 f., 353, 365–379
 Kant, Immanuel 12, 39 f., 44
 Karlstadt, Andreas Bodenstein von 30 f., 40, 44
 Keckermann, Bartholomeus 325, 327, 339, 345

- Kempfle, Martinianus 254, 258
 King, Peter 387, 389, 402
 Koblinger, Stephan 145 f.
 Knebel, Sven K. 12, 25, 44, 153, 158, 165,
 177, 205, 223, 235, 266, 296, 338, 345
 Knutzen, Martin 12, 44
 Knuuttila, Simo 185, 205
 Kulstad, Mark 414, 435

 Labat, Pierre 291 f., 295
 Lærke, Mogens 414, 435
 Langella, Simona 25, 44, 402
 Lavinheta, Bernard de 247–249, 256 f., 259
 Lay, Ruprecht 32, 44
 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 12, 27 f., 34 f.,
 41, 44, 405–434
 Leinsle, Ulrich G. 31–33, 44, 327, 345, 392,
 399, 402
 Leroy, François 26, 172, 202, 204
 Lichetus, Franciscus 220, 232 f.
 Llull, Ramon 237–256
 Locherer, Alipius 25, 44
 Lohr, Charles H. 116, 141
 Lohs, Jacopo 49
 López Alcalde, Celia 22 f., 63, 173
 Lorenzo of Brescia 26
 Luther, Martin 30
 Lüthy, Christoph 321–325, 327, 333, 345 f.

 Machado, Apaoan 9, 24, 40, 103, 183,
 198 f., 202, 208
 Malafossa, Giacomino (also called Bargius)
 219 f., 232 f.
 Mahoney, Edward P. 208, 235
 Malebranche, Nicolas 414 f., 417
 Mandrella, Isabelle 121, 141
 Manzano, Isidoro 355, 380
 Manzoli, Bartolomeo 18, 26, 31, 40, 44
 Marbres, Francis of (a.k.a. Joannes Canon-
 icus) 191, 203, 247
 Marçal, Francesc 237 f., 251–253, 256 f.,
 259
 Marchia, Francis of 19
 Marrone, Francesco 35, 45, 172, 205, 208,
 210, 230, 235
 Marschler, Thomas 265, 276, 296
 Martini, Cornelius 325, 345

 Martinich, Aloysius P. 229, 235
 Mastri, Bartolomeo 25–31, 37, 40, 45, 128,
 136, 202, 207, 214, 232 f., 300, 302, 317
 Mertens, Benedikt 169
 Merton, Thomas 384, 402
 Meyger, Johannes 143–164, 183, 197 f., 204
 Meyronnes (Mayronis), Francis of 19–22,
 24, 26, 27, 36, 45, 49 f., 53 f., 57–63, 68–
 76, 79 f., 87 f., 91, 94–96, 100, 108–110,
 114, 127, 148–151, 154, 157, 159, 163 f.,
 169, 175, 179, 190, 195, 199, 203 f., 211,
 213, 216, 220–224, 226–230, 233, 246,
 251, 256 f.
 Möhle, Hannes 19, 21, 45, 49 f., 58, 69 f., 73,
 77, 88, 91, 94, 110, 199, 205, 211, 222,
 235, 357, 380
 Molina, Luis de 25, 273–278, 283, 289,
 294 f.
 Monfasani, John 242, 260
 Montagnoli, Giovanni Domenico 289, 295
 Monte Rochen, Guido de 145
 Morhof, Daniel Georg 323, 345
 Mosberger, Alois Karl 116, 141
 Mugnai, Massimo 408, 423, 426–429, 435
 Mühlberger, Kurt 144, 165
 Müller, Gabriel 34
 Munar, Gaspar 245, 260
 Muñoz García, Ángel 355, 380
 Murith, André 116, 141
 Museo (da Treviso), Agostino 26

 Nachatomy, Ohad 418, 435
 Navarra sive de Atarrabia, Petrus de 51 f.,
 76, 82
 Nazario, Giovanni Paolo 289 f., 295
 Ney, Alyssa 9, 45
 Nielsen, Lauge O. 51, 77, 268, 294
 Nolan, Daniel 426, 435
 Noone, Timothy B. 13, 18 f., 45, 51, 77
 Novák, Lukáš 18, 27, 29, 45, 297, 318,
 383 f., 403
 Novocastro, Hugo de 53, 75
 Novotný, Daniel 28, 30, 350, 380, 384, 396,
 402 f.

 Ockham, William of 26, 30, 199, 247, 388,
 409, 429 f., 434

- Odonis, Gerald 113
 O'Fihely (de Portu), Maurice 26, 171, 241
 Olesius, Jacobus 245 f., 258
 Orbellis, Nicolaus de 171, 201, 241

 Palazzo, Alessandro 171, 203
 Para, Pedro 25
 Pasnau, Robert 420, 435
 Pelletier, Arnaud 406, 408, 431 f., 436
 Perarnau, Josep 241, 260
 Pereira, Michela 247, 260
 Perrone, Benigno Francesco 172, 206
 Pertusa, Franciscus 198, 203
 Petagine, Antonio 116, 141
 Petrus Hispanus 250 f.
 Petrus Lombardus 16, 144, 244, 251, 253, 266
 Petrus Thomae 19 f., 22–27, 29, 33, 39, 41, 46, 49 f., 52 f., 57 f., 65–70, 73–76, 79–110, 148 f., 152–154, 157, 160, 163 f., 169 f., 172–181, 183–186, 188 f., 191 f., 195–198, 200–202, 204, 212, 221–224, 228, 230, 233, 239, 244, 246, 256 f., 259, 357
 Philip III 383
 Piana, Celestino 171, 206
 Pich, Roberto Hofmeister 30, 50, 70, 73, 88, 347 f., 351 f., 355 f., 365–367, 377, 380 f.
 Pini, Giorgio 16, 19, 45, 352, 381
 Pitigiani d'Arezzo (also called Arretino), Francesco 26, 172, 203, 217, 219 f., 232 f.
 Plato 413
 Platzeck, Erhard Wolfram 244, 247, 260
 Poincot, João (Ioannes a Sancto Thoma) 290, 295
 Pomplun, Trent 12, 45
 Poppi, Antonino 11, 26, 45, 79, 110, 172, 195, 206, 208, 210, 217, 224, 226, 235
 Poznan, Peter of (Piotr Bielinski) 410 f.
 Proietti, Omero 38, 45
 Pseudo-Mayronis 195, 216 f., 221 f., 226, 229, 233
 Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite 285

 Raclavský, Jiří 395, 403
 Rada, Juan de 289 f., 295, 409 f.

 Ramis Barceló, Rafael 24 f., 34, 37, 44 f., 103, 140, 238, 241–244, 246, 248–250, 252, 255, 259–261, 396, 402
 Ramus, Peter 31, 327
 Rapine, Charles (Rapinaeus) 202, 204
 Rauzy, Jean-Baptiste 419, 436
 Reading (Radingia), John of 51, 76
 Recupito, Giulio Cesare 25, 45, 209, 233
 Redmond, Walter B. 347, 381
 Regius, Henricus 323
 Reimman, Jacob Friedrich 323 f., 345
 Reinhardt, Klaus 241, 261
 Rimini (Ariminensis), Gregory of 26, 269 f., 282, 282, 294
 Rivas, González S. 316, 318
 Roger, Pierre (Pope Clement VI) 49, 70
 Romano, Marta M.M. 241, 261
 Roßmann, Heribert 49, 53, 58, 71, 77
 Roth, Bartholomäus 58, 69, 77
 Roudaut, Sylvain 24, 173, 199
 Rozemond, Marleen 405, 407, 412, 436
 Ruello, Francis 49, 77

 Salisbury, John of 385, 402
 Sakamoto, Kuni 324, 346
 Sandler, Ronald 38, 43
 Sannig, Bernhard 11
 Santi, Francesco 241, 261
 Sarnano, Constanzo 171
 Sassi (Saxius), Ambrogio 27, 45, 356
 Saxlová, Tereza 392, 403
 Sbaraglia, Giovanni Giacinto 171, 206
 Scaliger, Julius Caesar 31, 33, 322, 324, 343 f.
 Schabel, Christopher D. 53, 77, 79, 96, 110, 127, 141, 191, 206, 247, 261, 268, 294
 Shank, Michael H. 143, 165
 Scapin, Pietro 208, 235
 Schegk, Jakob 33
 Schmaltz, Tad 407, 436
 Schmutz, Jacob 9, 13, 25, 45, 143, 172, 206, 208, 265, 327, 346, 383, 394 f., 399, 402 f.
 Schneider, Richard 18, 45
 Schwartz, Daniel 297, 318
 Scriptor, Paul 219, 233
 Serrai, Alfredo 383, 403

- Shields, Christopher 297, 303, 315, 318
Silvestri of Ferrara, Francesco 237, 267,
272, 275, 279, 289, 295
Sirect, Antoine 24, 26 f., 31, 103, 110, 169–
173, 175–184, 187–191, 194 f., 197,
199–202, 204, 207–217, 219–233, 241
Skalic, Pavao 249, 259
Skariča, Mirko 355, 381
Smith, Garrett R. 11 f., 16, 19, 20, 24, 29,
46, 53–57, 62 f., 77, 79, 94–96, 110 f.,
115 f., 141, 148, 165, 169, 172, 212, 235,
297 f.
Sondag, Gérard 367, 381
Sousedík, Stanislav 201, 206, 383, 392,
402 f.
Spinoza, Baruch de 35, 38, 46, 407, 411–
415, 434
Spruit, Leen 322, 346
Starck, Werner 145, 165
Subow, Walter 324, 346
Suárez, Francisco 25, 30, 209, 253, 266, 270,
272, 275–288, 290, 293–295, 297–317,
321, 324 f., 329, 338 f., 342–345, 349,
379, 389, 407–411, 420, 426, 429 f., 434
Suarez-Nani, Tiziana 218, 222, 235
- Tanner, Adam 272, 288 f., 295
Tartaret, Pierre 31, 201, 223, 241, 248
Taurellus, Nicolaus 322–324, 329, 343–345
Temmik (a.k.a. Kümme), Aloysius 423
Teske, Roland 13, 15, 46
Thomson, William 386, 403
Thornton, Ryan 210, 235
Timpler, Clemens 324 f., 329 f., 339, 345
Torres, Bartolomé 266, 272–276, 282 f.,
293–295
Tortelli, Giovanni 145
Trias Mercant, Sebastià 238, 250, 252, 254,
261
- Trifogli, Cecilia 51, 77
Trombetta, Antonio 24, 26, 171 f., 204,
207–212, 214–232, 241
Tweedale, Martin 66, 77, 229, 235
- Urdaneta, Ramón 355, 381
Ursinus, Wilhelm 31, 38, 46
Utino, Leonardo da 145
- Valera, Jerónimo 30, 347–355, 365, 374,
377 f.
Valier, Valerio 250 f., 256 f., 259
Vallone, Giovanni 26, 171 f., 204
van Ruler, Han 323, 346
Vázquez, Gabriel 237, 270, 282–285, 288 f.,
291, 295, 367
Vázquez Janeiro, Isaac 250, 261
Vdovina, Galina 79, 111
Velarde Lombrana, Julián 383, 403
Veno, Henricus de 322, 324, 343
Verbeek, Theo 323, 346
Vigerio, Giovanni 220, 232, 234
Vignaux, Paul 30, 46
Voetius, Gisbert 323
Vorstius, Conrad 322–325
- Wadding, Luke 185, 349, 388
Wengert, Robert G. 54, 77
Wilson, Gordon 13, 46
Wolter, Allan B. 19, 56, 69, 75, 210, 235,
367, 371, 381
Wood, Rega 229, 235
Wylton, Thomas 51
- Zabarella, Jacopo 31
Zahnd, Ueli 30, 46, 170, 201, 206
Zerbi, Gabriele 26, 32
Zwingli, Huldrych 30



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Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy

Julia Jorati/Dominik Perler/Stephan Schmid (eds.)

DISTINCTION AND IDENTITY IN LATE-SCHOLASTIC THOUGHT AND BEYOND

This volume aims to document the historical emergence of the various types of distinctions in medieval philosophy, highlighting in particular the emergence of the Formalist tradition that had its roots in the works of the Franciscan John Duns Scotus († 1308) and his early followers. This literature enjoyed vast diffusion during the Renaissance and still played a significant role in textbooks of scholastic philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It framed the early-modern debates about the distinction between body and mind or matter and extension. This book provides an important case for a much-needed revision of the relationship between “Medieval” and “Early Modern” philosophy – these categories are too often used to signal some fundamental divide in intellectual history, where in fact there was continuity.

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