



Gender-Critical or Gender-Inclusive?: Radical Feminism is Associated with Positive Attitudes toward Trans* People and Their Rights

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Abstract

Identifying as a feminist and endorsing liberal feminist values are associated with positive attitudes toward trans* people and their rights. However, since the late 1970s, one branch of radical feminism has argued for a biological essentialist definition of binary gender categories. More recently *gender-critical* feminism has appealed to radical feminism when describing trans* rights as a threat to biologically-defined women's politics and safety. To understand debates around the evolution of trans* rights, three studies ($N=502$), examined the associations between diverse feminist perspectives and identifications, gender binary beliefs, and attitudes toward trans* people and their rights. Study 1 updated an existing measure of different feminist perspectives. Study 2 showed that endorsements of intersectional, and radical feminist perspectives were associated with positive attitudes toward trans* people and their rights. Study 3 revealed that both intersectional and radical feminist identifications were also associated with positive attitudes, whilst endorsing gender binary beliefs was associated with negative attitudes. These results challenge the assumption that support for trans* rights is inconsistent with either general feminist or specifically radical feminist positions and inform both debates around the evolution of trans* rights and existing tensions within feminist movements.

Keywords Transgender · Transphobia · Feminism · Social identity · Threat

In recent decades, the rights of trans* people have progressed considerably and debates and pushbacks against those rights are common. For example, between 2017 and 2021, 81% of proposed policies related to trans* people in the United States aimed at advancing trans* rights, whilst 19% aimed at restricting these rights (Kline et al., 2023). In March 2022, a Gender Recognition Reform Bill was introduced by the Scottish Parliament in the United Kingdom. This bill aimed at simplifying the process through which trans* people can change the mention of gender on their official documents and followed two public consultations in July 2018 and in December 2019 (Government Equalities Office, 2020; Scottish Government, 2021). Even though

public opinion was broadly in favour of the reform, the bill received backlash, mainly from some religious bodies and some women's groups (Government Equalities Office, 2020; Scottish Government, 2021). These women's groups used an essentialist definition of sex and gender to call into question whether trans* women were really women (Hodges, 2022). They argued that by supporting trans* people's – and especially trans* women's – rights, the Scottish Government “risks increasing the discrimination faced by cis women” (Hodges, 2022, p. 64) and jeopardizes rights that cisgender women have because of their biological sex.

Feminists who oppose trans inclusion conceptualize gender identity as an “ideology” (Lawford-Smith, 2022) and often label themselves as “gender-critical feminists.” In contrast, their opponents call them “TERFs” (Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminists) and accuse them of endorsing transphobic views (Pearce et al., 2020). Debates between these two perspectives are amplified in the media, as seen with the British author J.K. Rowling, who opposes trans* rights, and the actress Emma Watson, who would favour the inclusion of trans* women in feminist movements. These increasingly common and polarized views present a puzzle

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for social psychologists. Feminism has been a movement historically built around the goal of attenuating social hierarchies related to gender and its intersections. Yet gender-critical feminism opposes the rights of a small minority group seemingly due to essentialist views of gender. In the current research, we examined whether radical feminists in general hold negative attitudes towards trans* people because of a binary, biological and essentialist conceptualization of gender and gender categories. To examine this possibility, three studies examined the relationships between diverse feminist identifications and perspectives, gender binary beliefs, and attitudes toward trans* people and their rights.

Transphobia

Research on attitudes toward trans* people and their rights in psychology dates from the early 2000s (i.e., Hill & Willoughby, 2005; Lombardi et al., 2002). Transphobia is defined by social psychologists as “stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination directed toward individuals that are or are perceived to be transgender” (Morrison et al., 2017, p. 395, see also Hegarty & Sarter, 2021). Transphobia shares many correlates and predictors with heterosexism, including political conservatism, authoritarianism, sexism, and being a cisgender man (i.e., Nagoshi et al., 2008, 2019; Norton & Herek, 2013; Tee & Hegarty, 2006). Early studies of transphobia included measures of *gender binary beliefs*; the related beliefs that there are only two gender categories “in which all individuals can be sorted”, that are “biologically determined, apparent at birth, stable over time, salient and meaningful to the self, and a powerful predictor of a host of psychological variables” (Hyde et al., 2019, p. 1). Gender binary beliefs are associated with negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights (Morgenroth et al., 2021; Norton & Herek, 2013; Tee & Hegarty, 2006). The recognition of trans* people whose gender identities do not match the sex assigned at birth may challenge the belief that gender must be grounded in biological sex and that there are two and only two gender categories (Morgenroth et al., 2021).

More recent research has shown a complex association between gender identification and transphobia. Gender identification, in this context how central gender is to one’s identity, is associated with negative attitudes toward non-binary people among both cisgender women and men (Morgenroth et al., 2021), meaning that the more central gender is to who they are, the more negative cisgender women and men are toward non-binary people. Consistent with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), these associations have been interpreted as consequences of individuals’ motivations to maintain distinct gender identities (Brassel & Anderson, 2020; Morgenroth et al., 2021). However,

gender self-esteem, understood as the importance of gender identity to one’s definition of self-worth, is associated with negative attitudes toward trans* and non-binary individuals for cisgender men, but not for women (Brassel & Anderson, 2020). Similarly, feeling that one’s gender identity is being threatened is a significant predictor of transphobia for cisgender men, but not for women (Konopka et al., 2021). These results are usually interpreted through the precarious manhood perspective (Vandello & Bosson, 2013): cisgender men express negative attitudes toward trans* people in part to maintain a distinct masculine (cis)gender identity and the social privileges it brings.

Feminist Identification and Perspectives

Some research indicates that feminism in general, the philosophy and politics that centres women’s interests, would be conducive to positive attitudes toward trans* people and their rights. Feminist identification and liberal feminist attitudes are indeed associated with positive attitudes (Brassel & Anderson, 2020; Platt & Szoka, 2021; Worthen, 2012, 2022; Worthen et al., 2017), which renders the emergence of gender-critical feminism which opposes certain trans* rights an ideological puzzle. Our work particularly addresses the associations between diverse feminist perspectives and identifications, informed by contemporary debates about the logical relationships between feminism, gender binary beliefs and attitudes toward trans* people and their rights.

Diverse feminist perspectives have been conceptualized since the 1970s and adopt different views on the legitimacy of trans* identities, support for trans* rights, and the integration of trans* women within feminist movements (Stryker, 2007). First, liberal feminism can be described as a fight for gender equality (Morgan, 1996), and is sometimes perceived as the “default” form of feminism for several reasons. First, liberal feminists are evaluated the same way as “general” (unspecified) feminists (Zhang & Rios, 2022). Second, liberal feminism is also widely known and accepted by the public (Lindsey, 2014). Finally, liberal feminists can focus on individual choice more than on structural domination minimizing the need to restructure society to achieve gender equality (Pape, 2022).

Liberal feminism has been criticized for representing only a certain type of women—white, heterosexual, middle-class—and for not giving enough visibility to other forms of oppression (Bassi & LaFleur, 2022). Intersectional feminism emerged in the 1980s to centre the needs of women who remained invisible within the white and middle-class liberal feminist movements (Afshar & Maynard, 1994). The concept of intersectionality was crystalized by Crenshaw (1989) to address the intersecting forms of oppression faced

by women of colour as well as the failure of feminist movements focused solely on gender to address these experiences (see also Anzaldúa & Moraga, 1981). Since then, intersectional feminism focuses on how and where multiple forms of oppression and differences meet. Intersectional feminists acknowledge the legitimacy of trans* identities, and the specific oppressions trans* people face (Koyama, 2003). Indeed, intersectional feminist theories and movements are foundational to both trans* studies and transfeminism. Intersectional feminism illustrates how some feminist positions are strongly critical of the liberal feminist mainstream. For example, transfeminism refers to the “movement made by, and for, trans women who see their liberation as intrinsically linked to the liberation of all women, and beyond” (Koyama, 2003, p. 244). This term emerged from Diana Couvant and Emi Koyama’s intersectional works on trans* and intersex issues (Stryker & Bettcher, 2016).

A “conservative feminism” movement also emerged in the 1970s (Posner, 1989; Stacey, 1983). Led by women such as Phyllis Schlafly, conservative feminists described other feminist movements for gender equality and expansions of women’s rights as threats to the more secure freedoms and rights that women enjoyed in their roles as mothers and housewives (Miller, 2015). Phyllis Schlafly argued that feminism would protect the “preferences” of “career women” while depriving housewives of theirs (Schlafly, 1994). According to her reasoning, achieving liberal feminist goals of gender equality would also endanger the distinction between women and men’s gender identities:

Feminists are split by a curious dichotomy. Do they really want a totally gender-neutral society in which we are all forced to pretend there is no difference between men and women? Do they really want to compel everything from Boy and Girl Scouts to prisons to abandon their gender identity and integrate the sexes? (Schlafly, 1994, p. 71)

Although Schlafly did not refer to trans* people here, her use of gender binary concepts illustrates how conservative feminism is opposed to the social inclusion of people who might identify with gender identities beyond those prescribed by gender binary beliefs.

Finally, radical feminist scholars, such as Catharine MacKinnon, theorized male sexual violence as the result of gender inequality (Pape, 2022). In MacKinnon’s (1989) radical feminist theory, women are understood as a distinct political group, defined not according to biological criteria, but on the basis that all women face the threat of male violence (Williams, 2016). However, radical feminist Raymond (1979) considered this threat of male violence to be inseparable from “male biology.” In her book *The Transsexual*

Empire: The Making of The She-Male, Raymond (1979), presents trans* women as a threat to cisgender women and feminism, conceptualizes sex as immutable and binary and gender as an expression of this biological sex:

Can we call a person transsexed, biologically speaking, whose anatomical structure and hormonal balance have changed but who is still genetically XX or XY? If we don’t recognize chromosomal sex as determinative... what are we really talking about when we say female or male? (Raymond, 1979, p. 11)

In this conceptualization, the threat of violence against women is rooted in immutable male biology, such that the recognition of trans* women by feminism raises the risk of this violence (Raymond, 1979). Raymond (1979) argued that as one cannot “change sex,” that trans* women are men who are intent on destroying feminist spaces and accomplishments.

This tension about the category of “women” that radical feminism claims to represent led to a lasting division (Page, 2022; Stone, 2006; Williams, 2016). Even though the biological essentialist position was always strongly debated in radical feminism, the works of Janice Raymond had an important influence on later writers (Stryker, 2008). For example, in her book *The Whole Woman*, Greer (1999) reiterates the idea that gender is biologically fixed by genes and that both trans* women and women with androgen insensitivity syndrome are men by virtue of having XY chromosomes. Similarly to Raymond, Greer (1999) asserts that trans* women are a threat to cisgender women’s physical safety as they are truly “biological males.” In the 21st century, trans* people gained new rights in the UK, particularly under the 2004 Gender Recognition Act (Pape, 2022; Withers, 2010). However, within national debates about trans* rights and more specific debates about inclusion of trans* women in feminist movements, some radical feminists still argued that sex was a binary variable that should be the grounding for social gender categories and feminist politics (e.g., Jeffreys, 2014). These feminists, who grounded their ideas in radical feminism and labelled themselves *gender-critical* feminists rejected psychological gender identity as a meaningful construct and asserted that biological sex must remain the basis for theorizing women’s oppression (Lawford-Smith, 2022; Stock, 2018). As evidenced by Thurlow (2024), gender-critical feminists also dismiss conceptualisations of sex and gender as fluid constructs (i.e., Butler, 1990). Some gender-critical feminists claim that simplifying the process through which trans* people can change the mention of gender on their official documents could be dangerous for cisgender women (Stock, 2018).

Following this reasoning, some radical feminists defend the idea that access to physical and symbolic spaces reserved for women should be based on biological criteria (i.e., Jeffreys, 2014; Stock, 2018). Some argue that as trans* identities rely on the idea of gender as a useful category, they are incompatible with radical feminist goals of eradicating gender itself (Jeffreys, 2014). However, gender-critical feminists often argue that their position is not transphobic. Acknowledging that transphobia is real, gender-critical feminists assert that their position is not “anti-trans*” but “pro-women” as their goal is to protect (cisgender) women’s interests (Thurlow, 2024). Indeed, recent legislation in the UK protects gender-critical beliefs under Sect. 10 of the Equality Act. Accordingly, it is now unlawful to describe a person as transphobic based on them espousing a gender-critical feminist position.

Feminist Perspectives and Attitudes Toward Trans* People

Social psychologists have studied the association between endorsement of feminist perspectives and beliefs and attitudes towards trans* people. A few scattered studies on feminism and transphobia, mainly conducted in the United States, show that feminist identification and liberal feminist attitudes are associated with positive attitudes toward trans* people (Brassel & Anderson, 2020; Platt & Szoka, 2021; Worthen, 2012, 2022; Worthen et al., 2017), whereas traditional views of gender and gender roles are associated with greater transphobia (Brassel & Anderson, 2020). Further, conservative perspectives on gender issues are more strongly endorsed by men (Henley et al., 1998). To our knowledge, quantitative studies on the associations between feminism and transphobia have not examined the potential effects of intersectional feminism or radical feminism. The emergence of gender-critical views raises the question of whether feminist perspectives and identification in general, or radical feminist perspective and identification specifically, are aligned with negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights. The present set of studies aims to clarify the association between different feminist perspectives, feminist identifications, and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights in the current British context.

The Current Research

Opposing arguments about trans* people’s rights and the inclusion of trans* women in feminism underlie different views of both feminism and the basis of gender. The present set of studies aims to clarify the association between

endorsing diverse feminist perspectives and identifications, gender binary beliefs, attitudes toward trans* people, and reluctance to support their rights. First, we tested the reliability of an updated measure of diverse feminist perspectives to enable us to measure these perspectives reliably (Study 1). Next, we assessed the associations between those perspectives and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights (Study 2). Third, we examined the associations between specific feminist identifications, gender binary beliefs, and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights (Study 3). By assessing the correlation between various measures across multiple studies we mean to inform the question of whether gender-critical feminism is best understood as a broadly liberal feminist movement that appeals to more feminist people, or if it is more akin to “conservative feminism,” an ideology that uses the term feminism whilst appealing to people who endorse traditional gender roles and gender inequality. The studies presented below received approval from the ethics committee of the university where this research was conducted (Projet2020-53).

Study 1: Adaptation of the Feminist Perspectives Scale

Some measures of feminist beliefs only include items representing the liberal feminist perspective (e.g., Morgan, 1996). However, Henley et al.’s (1998) Feminist Perspectives Scale was designed to assess six perspectives about women’s issues, each with 10 items: *conservative* perspective, *liberal*, *womanist*, *radical*, *socialist* and *cultural* feminism. The aim of Study 1 was to adapt and update Henley et al.’s (1998) original measure of liberal, womanist, conservative, and radical feminism to address recent feminist perspectives. Indeed, Henley et al.’s (1998) scale was developed in the 1990s in the United States while we aimed to use the scale in the 2020s in the United Kingdom. Some items of the Feminist Perspectives Scale clearly reference the American context (i.e., “The tradition of Afro-American women who are strong family leaders has strengthened the Afro-American community as a whole”). Moreover, since the 1990s, women’s rights have advanced (Alexander & Welzel, 2015). Finally, since the beginning of 2010s, we are witnessing a shift from third wave to fourth wave feminism as well as an increasing attention paid to intersectionality (Munro, 2013). Even though intersectionality was already a concern in third-wave feminism (Snyder, 2008), it is taking centre stage in the fourth wave (Zimmermann, 2017). Indeed, the Feminist Perspectives Scale addressed concerns about intersectionality without naming it as such within the womanist subscale, which aimed to measure adherence to a perspective centred on the goals and needs of women of

colour and the critique of White feminism. As such, it is semantically related to intersectional feminism.

The theorizing of radical feminism operationalized by the radical subscale is centred around the belief that oppression of women is the most widespread and deep-rooted oppression. In this theorization, “women are defined as a politically oppressed class” (Henley et al., 1998, p. 320). This conceptualization of radical feminism is similar to the early, “historical” conceptualization of radical feminism, as theorized by MacKinnon (1989), for example. However, even though gender-critical feminists propose a different definition of women, based on biological sex, they ground their discourse in radical feminist values and theorizations. Indeed, gender-critical feminists differ from “historical” radical feminists in their beliefs about sex and gender, but they resemble them in their adherence to the radical feminist ideas operationalized by Henley et al. (1998); and otherwise, making the Feminist Perspectives Scale well suited for examining the association between core radical feminist beliefs and attitudes toward trans* people and their rights.

In Henley et al. (1998), the overall Feminist Perspectives Scale had satisfactory psychometric qualities, but the liberal feminist subscale lacked factorial evidence and was unreliable (Cronbach’s α range = [0.46, 0.62] in different samples). Endorsement of liberal, intersectional, and radical perspectives were positively correlated with each other, and all were negatively correlated with endorsing the conservative perspective. Women scored higher on the liberal and radical feminist subscales, but men scored higher on the conservative subscale. These correlational patterns and gender differences suggest that conservative feminism is not truly a feminist perspective despite its name. Rather it appears empirically to be a perspective that is more favourable to men’s interests and worldviews.

In the first study, we expected the items to cluster consistently on four factors, relating to these four perspectives (Hypothesis 1). We also expected to replicate Henley’s pattern of correlations between the four feminist perspectives such that liberal, intersectional and radical feminist perspectives would have (a) positive correlations with each other and (b) negative correlations with the conservative perspective (Hypothesis 2). Finally, we expected to replicate Henley’s pattern of gender differences in endorsing these perspectives, with higher scores for women on both liberal and radical perspectives, higher scores for men on the conservative perspective and no significant difference on the intersectional perspective (Hypothesis 3).

Study 1 Method

Participants

Participants were 148 residents of the United Kingdom who spoke English fluently (age range = 18–69 years, $M = 33.49$, $SD = 13.42$). Two participants did not report age. A total of 102 (68.9%) identified as women, 43 (29.1%) as men, one (0.7%) as non-binary, one (0.7%) as genderqueer and one (0.7%) identified as a different gender identity. Four (2.7%) participants indicated that their current gender identity did not match the gender that was assigned to them at birth. One hundred and twenty-two (82.4%) participants identified as heterosexual, 17 (11.5%) identified as bisexual, three (2%) as lesbian, two (1.4%) as asexual, one (0.7%) as pansexual, and three (2%) reported an “other” sexual orientation. None identified as gay. Forty-four (29.7%) participants obtained a professional certificate, 33 (22.3%) an undergraduate degree, 15 (10.1%) a graduate degree, 36 (24.3%) a bachelor’s degree, 14 (9.5%) a master degree and 4 (2.7%) a doctoral degree. Two participants did not report their highest degree.

Measures

Feminist Perspectives

The feminist perspectives measure included 43 items presented on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from *totally disagree* (1) to *totally agree* (7). Forty items were retrieved from Henley et al.’s (1998) scale, with ten items each addressing a *conservative perspective* (e.g., “Women should not be assertive like men because men are the natural leaders on earth”), *liberal feminism* (e.g., “Whether one chooses a traditional or alternative family form should be a matter of personal choice”), *radical feminism* (e.g., “Using “man” to mean both men and women is one of many ways sexist language destroys women’s existence”), and *womanist/intersectional feminism* (e.g., “Discrimination in the workplace is worse for women of color than for all men and White women”). All the items were administered exactly as they appear in the original scale for these four factors. Given the importance of intersectionality concerns within fourth-wave feminism and the fact that some items of the womanist subscale are centred on the North American context, three additional items were added to update this subscale: (1) Some women face more inequality than others; (2) No matter which groups they belong to, all women deal with the same discrimination (reversed coded); (3) Gender equality programs should pay more attention to the specific types of prejudice women who belong to minority groups must face.

Sociodemographic Information

Participants reported the following sociodemographic information: age (responses were given via an open-ended text box), highest degree obtained (six response options: professional certificate, undergraduate, graduate, bachelor, master, doctoral), country of residence (responses were given via an open-ended text box), and sexual orientation (six response options: asexual, bisexual, heterosexual, lesbian, other, pansexual). Gender identity was reported with two separate questions: (1) “How would you describe your gender?” (with five response options: genderqueer, man, non-binary, other, woman) and (2) “Does your current gender match the gender that was assigned to you at birth?” (with two response options: yes or no).

Procedure

The participants were recruited on Prolific to participate in a study titled, “The perception of social groups.” Prolific is an online platform created specifically to enable researchers to recruit participants for scientific studies. The rigorous participant selection process guarantees researchers precise targeting and reliable samples for their studies. Prolific prioritizes transparent ethical procedures and fair compensation, fostering a motivated and engaged participant community that contributes to the reliability of collected data (Palan & Schitter, 2018). Indeed, recent studies have shown that the quality of the data collected by Prolific is very good in absolute terms and superior to that obtained via other similar platforms (Douglas et al., 2023; Peer et al., 2022). For each study presented in this paper, participants were paid £9 an hour which resulted in £2.25 for 15 min of participation in Study 1, £1.80 for 12 min of participation in Study 2, and £1.50 for 10 min of participation in Study 3.

For the present study, after recruitment, participants were redirected to a survey hosted on Qualtrics. They were asked to provide informed consent, after which they completed the 43 feminist ideology items in a randomized order, followed by the sociodemographic questions. Finally, participants were thanked and fully debriefed.

Data Analysis Plan

First, Hypothesis 1 will be tested by conducting an initial principal axis factoring with oblimin rotation on the 43 feminist perspectives items. Depending on the number of factors extracted from this analysis, a subsequent principal axis factoring with oblimin rotation constrained to four factors will be performed to find out how the items cluster. Reliability analysis using Cronbach’s α as an indicator will be performed on each initial subscale. Then, based on (1)

which items load the highest on each of the four factors, (2) which items contribute the most to the overall reliability of the subscales and (3) the face validity of each item, 24 items (6 items per subscale) will be selected to compose the final scale. The same analyses will be repeated on these 24 items. Then, Hypothesis 2 will be tested by calculating averaged-mean scores for each subscale and by conducting correlational analyses among these four subscales. Finally, Hypothesis 3 will be tested by performing independent samples t-tests, comparing women and men’s scores on the final conservative, liberal, radical, and intersectional subscales.

Study 1 Results

Factor Analysis

Table 1 presents the results of the EFA on the feminist perspectives items. An initial principal axis factoring with oblimin rotation of the 43 items revealed 10 factors. A subsequent analysis with oblimin rotation, constrained to four factors, was conducted. The four factors had eigenvalues of 10.74, 4.41, 2.43 and 2.03 and explained 24.98%, 10.25%, 5.64%, and 4.73% of variance, respectively. Nine of the ten original womanist items and two of the additional intersectional items loaded (>0.30) on the first factor (Intersectional Feminism). The ten conservative items loaded on the second factor (Conservative Perspective). Nine radical feminism items loaded on the third factor (Radical Feminism). Two liberal feminism items loaded on the first factor, four items loaded negatively on the second factor, one item loaded on the third factor, and three items loaded on the fourth factor. Thus, partially supporting Hypothesis 1, conservative, intersectional, and radical items consistently clustered on three distinct factors. However, as in Henley et al.’s (1998) original research, liberal feminism was a less distinct perspective than the others.

Item Selection

Based on Hinkin et al.’s (1997) recommendations, six items were selected for each perspective. These decisions were made based on (1) which items loaded the highest on each of the four factors, (2) which items contributed the most to the overall reliability of the subscales and (3) the face validity of each item.

All items selected for the radical and conservative perspectives were from Henley et al.’s (1998) original scale. The intersectionality subscale included five of Henley et al.’s (1998) original womanist items and one of the new intersectional feminist items. Finally, the liberal subscale also included six items that appeared on Henley et al.’s (1998)

Table 1 Exploratory factor analysis on the 43 items for the adapted feminist perspectives scale (study 1)

Item	Factor loading			
	1	2	3	4
Women of color are oppressed by White standards of beauty (intersectional)	0.868	−0.076	−0.006	−0.174
Being put on a pedestal, which White women have protested, is a luxury that women of color have not had (intersectional)	0.860	0.000	0.141	−0.033
Racism and sexism make double the oppression for women of color in the work environment (intersectional)	0.811	−0.080	0.012	0.152
Gender equality programs should pay more attention to the specific types of prejudice women who belong to minority groups have to face (intersectional)	0.795	0.004	0.082	0.164
Discrimination in the workplace is worse for women of color than for all men and White women (intersectional)	0.779	0.007	0.036	0.048
Women of color have less legal and social service protection from being battered than White women have (intersectional)	0.746	−0.029	−0.068	−0.022
In rape programs and workshops, not enough attention has been given to the special needs of women of color (intersectional)	0.657	0.016	−0.297	−0.191
Antigay and racist prejudice act together to make it more difficult for gay male and lesbian people of color to maintain relationships (intersectional)	0.588	−0.090	−0.188	0.019
Some women face more inequality than others (intersectional)	0.476	−0.053	0.126	0.128
Pornography exploits female sexuality and degrades all women (radical)	0.429	0.310	−0.120	−0.206
Much of the talk about power for women overlooks the need to empower people of all races and colors first (intersectional)	0.402	0.137	−0.211	0.023
In education and legislation to stop rape, ethnicity and race must be treated sensitively to ensure that women of color are protected equally (intersectional)	0.350	−0.071	−0.137	0.220
Social change for sexual equality will best come about by acting through government (liberal)	0.344	−0.056	−0.273	0.209
Legislation is the best means to ensure a woman's choice of whether or not to have an abortion (liberal)	0.341	−0.027	−0.134	0.280
Women should not be assertive like men because men are the natural leaders on earth (conservative)	0.220	0.731	0.108	−0.037
It is a man's right and duty to maintain order in his family by whatever means necessary (conservative)	0.087	0.727	0.183	0.130
A man's first responsibility is to obtain economic success, while his wife should care for the family's needs (conservative)	−0.028	0.697	0.107	0.111
Heterosexuality is the only natural sexual preference (conservative)	−0.080	0.689	0.121	−0.019
Given the way that men are, women have a responsibility not to arouse them by their dress and actions (conservative)	0.090	0.628	−0.075	−0.088
The breakdown of the traditional family structure is responsible for the evils in our society (conservative)	−0.106	0.622	−0.118	0.030
Women should not be direct participants in government because they are too emotional (conservative)	−0.071	0.525	−0.033	−0.031
Homosexuals need to be rehabilitated into normal members of society (conservative)	0.051	0.525	−0.041	0.079
People should define their marriage and family roles in ways that make them feel most comfortable (liberal)	0.082	−0.404	0.191	0.150
The world is a more attractive place because women pay attention to their appearance and smiles (conservative)	−0.261	0.386	0.106	0.339
Women should have the freedom to sell their sexual services (liberal)	0.230	−0.374	0.057	0.101
Whether one chooses a traditional or alternative family form should be a matter of personal choice (liberal)	0.009	−0.339	0.038	0.302
Homosexuality is not a moral issue, but rather a question of liberty and freedom of expression (liberal)	0.024	−0.326	−0.106	0.234
Marriage is a perfect example of men's physical, economic, and sexual oppression of women (radical)	0.019	−0.080	−0.676	−0.028
Men's control over women forces women to be the primary caretakers of children (radical)	0.120	−0.082	−0.589	0.094
Romantic love brainwashes women and forms the basis for their subordination (radical)	−0.062	0.256	−0.585	0.021
The workplace is organized around men's physical, economic, and sexual oppression of women (radical)	0.250	−0.121	−0.527	−0.027
No matter which groups they belong to, all women deal with the same discrimination (intersectional)	0.186	−0.016	0.487	−0.006
Men prevent women from becoming political leaders through their control of economic and political institutions (radical)	0.344	−0.134	−0.475	0.064
Sex role stereotypes are only one symptom of the larger system of patriarchal power, which is the true source of women's subordination (radical)	0.308	−0.185	−0.470	0.034
Men use abortion laws and reproductive technology to control women's lives (radical)	0.343	−0.231	−0.450	−0.009

Table 1 (continued)

Item	Factor loading			
	1	2	3	4
Using “man” to mean both men and women is one of many ways sexist language destroys women’s existence (radical)	0.198	−0.108	−0.386	−0.206
The government is responsible for making sure that all women receive an equal chance at education and employment (liberal)	0.131	−0.048	−0.321	0.300
Rape is ultimately a powerful tool that keeps women in their place, subservient to and terrorized by men (radical)	0.233	0.048	−0.305	0.185
The tradition of Afro-American women who are strong family leaders has strengthened the Afro-American community as a whole (intersectional)	0.121	−0.014	−0.214	0.434
Men need to be liberated from oppressive sex role stereotypes as much as women do (liberal)	0.014	−0.178	0.127	0.421
Women should try to influence legislation in order to gain the right to make their own decisions and choices (liberal)	0.244	−0.041	−0.220	0.364
Using “he” for “he or she” is convenient and harmless to men and women (conservative)	−0.154	0.302	0.114	0.339
The availability of adequate child care is central to a woman’s right to work outside the home (liberal)	0.105	0.040	−0.074	0.217

Note. $N = 148$. The extraction method was principal axis factoring with an Oblimin rotation. The analysis was constrained to four factors. Factor loadings above 0.40 are in bold

original liberal subscale. Three of these items loaded on the fourth factor (including one which slightly cross-loaded on the first factor), one marginally loaded on the fourth factor but did not cross-load on any other factor. The last two items (“Social change for sexual equality will best come about by acting through government” and “Legislation is the best means to ensure a woman’s choice of whether or not to have an abortion”) marginally loaded on the fourth factor and were selected despite loading slightly better on the first one. These two items were still selected because they correlated with the other liberal items and contributed to the overall reliability of the liberal subscale, whilst the liberal item “The availability of adequate child care is central to a woman’s right to work outside the home”, which also marginally loaded on the fourth factor, affected the overall reliability of the scale, and was the least strongly correlated to the other liberal items. Moreover, the items “Social change for sexual equality will best come about by acting through government” and “Legislation is the best means to ensure a woman’s choice of whether or not to have an abortion” have good face validity as they are about the role played by the government in achieving gender equality, which is central to liberal feminism (but not intersectional feminism, whose items mostly loaded on the first factor). Finally, the decision was made to keep “Social change for sexual equality will best come about by acting through government” and “Legislation is the best means to ensure a woman’s choice of whether or not to have an abortion”. An a priori reliability analysis conducted on the six liberal items revealed that dropping these two items would reduce Cronbach’s α from 0.62 to 0.47.

A principal axis factoring of the 24 final items constrained to four factors showed that the intersectional, radical, conservative, and liberal factors had eigenvalues of 7.30, 3.23, 1.90 and 1.35, and explained 30.42%, 13.48%, 7.93% and

5.64% of variance, respectively. All items on the first three subscales loaded above 0.40 and did not load on any other factors, except for three radical items that cross-loaded on the intersectional factor (see Table 2). Five of the liberal items cross-loaded on other factors above 0.30. The intersectional, radical and conservative subscales were highly reliable (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.92$, 0.81 and 0.83, respectively) whereas the reliability of the liberal feminism subscale was below the acceptable threshold (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.62$). These findings mirror Henley et al.’s (1998) difficulty in constructing a distinct measure of a liberal feminist perspective.

Correlations Between Perspectives and Gender Differences

Table 3 presents the correlations among the feminist perspectives as well as the mean and standard deviation for each subscale, both in Study 1 (above the diagonal) and Study 2 (below the diagonal). Supporting Hypothesis 2, Study 1 found that the intersectional, radical, and liberal perspectives were significantly positively correlated with each other and significantly negatively correlated with the conservative perspective. An exploratory repeated-measures ANOVA was performed to evaluate differences in the levels of endorsement of the liberal, intersectional, radical and conservative perspectives. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, $\chi^2(5) = 64.92$, $p < .001$, and therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity ($\epsilon = 0.75$). There was a statistically significant difference in levels of endorsement, $F(3,441) = 277.69$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = 0.654$. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with a Tukey adjustment indicated that the levels of endorsement of the four perspectives were all significantly different from each other (all $ps < 0.001$). Ranging from highest to lowest,

Table 2 Exploratory factor analysis on the 24 items retained for the adapted feminist perspectives scale (study 1)

Item	Factor loading			
	1	2	3	4
Racism and sexism make double the oppression for women of color in the work environment (intersectional)	0.845			
Being put on a pedestal, which White women have protested, is a luxury that women of color have not had (intersectional)	0.832			
Women of color are oppressed by White standards of beauty (intersectional)	0.819			
Discrimination in the workplace is worse for women of color than for all men and White women (intersectional)	0.783			
Gender equality programs should pay more attention to the specific types of prejudice women who belong to minority groups have to face (intersectional)	0.770			
Women of color have less legal and social service protection from being battered than White women have (intersectional)	0.769			
Women should not be assertive like men because men are the natural leaders on earth (conservative)		0.792		
It is a man's right and duty to maintain order in his family by whatever means necessary (conservative)		0.749		
A man's first responsibility is to obtain economic success, while his wife should care for the family's needs (conservative)		0.688		
Heterosexuality is the only natural sexual preference (conservative)		0.617		
Given the way that men are, women have a responsibility not to arouse them by their dress and actions (conservative)		0.609		
The breakdown of the traditional family structure is responsible for the evils in our society (conservative)		0.580		
Whether one chooses a traditional or alternative family form should be a matter of personal choice (liberal)		−0.324		
Romantic love brainwashes women and forms the basis for their subordination (radical)			0.662	
Marriage is a perfect example of men's physical, economic, and sexual oppression of women (radical)			0.660	
Men's control over women forces women to be the primary caretakers of children (radical)			0.613	
The workplace is organized around men's physical, economic, and sexual oppression of women (radical)	0.285		0.550	
Men prevent women from becoming political leaders through their control of economic and political institutions (radical)	0.392		0.438	
Sex role stereotypes are only one symptom of the larger system of patriarchal power, which is the true source of women's subordination (radical)	0.351		0.428	
Homosexuality is not a moral issue, but rather a question of liberty and freedom of expression (liberal)				0.564
Legislation is the best means to ensure a woman's choice of whether or not to have an abortion (liberal)	0.344			0.447
Social change for sexual equality will best come about by acting through government (liberal)	0.273		0.275	0.322
Men need to be liberated from oppressive sex role stereotypes as much as women do (liberal)				0.319
Women should try to influence legislation in order to gain the right to make their own decisions and choices (liberal)	0.269			0.283

Note. $N=148$. The extraction method was principal axis factoring with an Oblimin rotation. The analysis was constrained to four factors. Only factor loadings above 0.25 are presented

participants endorsed liberal ($M=5.08$, $SD=0.85$), intersectional ($M=4.63$, $SD=1.26$), radical ($M=3.63$, $SD=1.07$), and conservative ($M=2.00$, $SD=1.01$) perspectives to significantly different extents.

Gender differences in levels of endorsement were examined with t -tests. Four participants who indicated that their

gender identity did not match that assigned at birth were excluded from these analyses. Cisgender women endorsed the radical feminist perspective ($M=3.87$, $SD=0.96$) significantly more than cisgender men did ($M=2.98$, $SD=0.98$), $t(142)=5.09$, $p<.001$, and cisgender women endorsed the intersectional perspective ($M=4.79$, $SD=1.20$)

Table 3 Correlations among different feminist perspectives in studies 1 and 2

Perspective	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1.	2.	3.	4.
1. Liberal	5.08	0.85	-	.39**	.49**	-.37**
2. Radical	3.63	1.07		-	.53**	-.20*
3. Intersectional	4.63	1.26		.28**	-	-.25**
4. Conservative	2.00	1.01		-.21**	-.35**	-
<i>M</i>				3.51	4.36	2.03
<i>SD</i>				1.24	1.49	0.96

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. Results from Study 1 above the diagonal ($N = 148$), results from Study 2 below the diagonal ($N = 153$). The liberal subscale was dropped in Study 2, which is why the correlations, mean and standard deviation of this subscale in Study 2 are not presented

significantly more than cisgender men did ($M = 4.10$, $SD = 1.22$), $t(142) = 3.12$, $p = .002$. No differences were observed between women ($M = 5.11$, $SD = 0.82$) and men ($M = 4.90$, $SD = 0.88$) in their endorsement of the liberal perspective, $t(142) = 1.43$, $p = .156$, or between women ($M = 1.94$, $SD = 0.94$) and men ($M = 2.26$, $SD = 1.20$) in their endorsement of the conservative perspective, $t(142) = -1.71$, $p = .089$. While the trend was consistent with Henley et al. (1998), these t -tests supported Hypothesis 3 only for the radical feminist perspective.

Study 1 Discussion

Study 1 adapted and updated a measure of conservative, liberal, intersectional, and radical feminist perspectives (Henley et al., 1998), leading to the selection of reliable measures of conservative, radical, and intersectional feminist perspectives, as well as a less-reliable liberal subscale. Replicating Henley et al.'s (1998) findings, liberal, intersectional, and radical feminist perspectives were positively correlated with each other and negatively correlated with the conservative perspective. Liberal feminism was strongly endorsed by women and men, intersectional and radical feminism were more strongly endorsed by women, and the conservative perspective was weakly endorsed by both groups. Liberal feminism still appears to be the generic or hegemonic form of feminism, and intersectional and radical feminism seem to be genuinely oriented around women's interests.

However, Study 1 is not exempt of limitations. The low reliability of the liberal subscale replicates previous results (i.e., Henley et al., 1998; Szymanski, 2004) but constitutes a limitation. Moreover, the lack of factorial distinctiveness of the liberal perspective questions whether liberal feminism is still a distinct perspective in the current social landscape. Instead, as discussed by Zhang and Rios (2022), liberal feminism could constitute a "default" kind of feminism. Having clarified and operationalised these diverse feminist perspectives, we next examined their relationship with negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights in Study 2.

Study 2: Associations Between Feminist Perspectives and Trans* Attitudes

Study 2 examined the relationship between four specific feminist perspectives, general feminist identification, and two measures that assess attitudes toward trans* people and reluctance to support trans* rights. All hypotheses were preregistered (<https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/U5XNW>). Notably, we intentionally measured both endorsement of feminist perspectives and identification as feminist. While self-identifying as a feminist is strongly associated with endorsing feminist beliefs and values (Liss et al., 2000), these two concepts are not identical. Indeed, adopting versus rejecting a feminist identity while endorsing feminist beliefs and values is associated with different visions of women's movements (Liss et al., 2001), different understandings of the causes of gender inequality (McCabe, 2005), and different views of the world (Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). For example, women who endorse feminist beliefs but who do not identify as feminists report significantly higher social dominance orientation than identified feminists (Fitz et al., 2012), and SDO is positively associated with transphobia (Makwana et al., 2018). As the association between feminism and attitudes towards trans* people and their rights has rarely been investigated, we examined feminist identification and endorsement of feminist perspectives in Study 2.

Informed by the preceding literature review, cisgender women were expected to report less negative trans* attitudes than cisgender men (Hypothesis 1) and feminist identification was expected to negatively correlate with negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights (Hypothesis 2). We also hypothesized specific associations between feminist perspectives and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights. Based on past research in social psychology (Brassel & Anderson, 2020; Platt & Szoka, 2021) and trans* studies (Stryker & Bettcher, 2016), endorsement of liberal and intersectional feminist perspectives were expected to correlate negatively with negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights (Hypothesis 3). However, the gender-critical perspective describes radical feminism as a basis for considering trans* rights as a threat to cisgender women's

safety and interests. Thus, although a branch of radical feminism is trans-inclusive (Williams, 2016), the endorsement of the radical feminist perspective was predicted to correlate positively with negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights (Hypothesis 4). Past research has shown that transphobia is associated with adherence to traditional gender role beliefs (Brassel & Anderson, 2020) and benevolent sexism (Nagoshi et al., 2008, 2019), thus endorsement of the conservative perspective was expected to be positively correlated with negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights (Hypothesis 5).

Finally, the correlation between feminist identification and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights might vary significantly depending on the kind of feminist perspective that a person endorses. We predicted a negative correlation between feminist identification and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights to the extent that people endorse intersectional and liberal perspectives. Informed by accounts of gender-critical feminism, we predicted that any positive relationship between feminist identification and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights would be moderated by the extent to which people endorse radical feminist perspectives (Hypothesis 6). Further, because the conservative perspective is not a true feminist position, Hypothesis 6 did not refer to conservative perspective. In instances where the hypothesized moderation effects were significant, we also conducted exploratory analyses to test three-way interactions and verify if these effects were specific to one gender group or consistent among both groups.

Study 2 Method

Participants

An a priori power analysis using G*Power 3.1.9.7 ($\alpha=0.05$, power=0.80, medium effect size=0.15) recommended a sample size of $N=139$ for multiple linear regression including 15 predictors. One hundred sixty individuals filled out the questionnaire. Two did not provide their informed consent, three were excluded from the analyses because they failed to answer the attention-check question, and two were excluded because they did not answer the reluctance to support trans* rights item. The final sample ($N=153$) included 75 (49%) cisgender women and 78 (51%) cisgender men residing in the United Kingdom who spoke English fluently. They ranged in age from 18 to 78 years ($M=36.32$, $SD=12.88$). Two participants did not report their age. A total of 128 (83.7%) participants reported a heterosexual orientation, three (2%) participants self-defined as gay, five (3.3%) as lesbian, 13 (8.5%) as bisexual, two (1.3%)

as pansexual, and two (1.3%) as asexual. As for education, 40 (26.1%) participants obtained a professional certificate, 38 (24.8%) an undergraduate degree, 46 (30%) a graduate or bachelor's degree and 28 (18.3%) a master or doctoral degree. One participant did not report the highest obtained degree. Missing data on age and education were replaced by the mean and mode of these variables, respectively.

Measures

Except where noted, all items used a 7-point Likert-type response scale ranging from *totally disagree* (1) to *totally agree* (7).

Feminist Perspectives

Feminist perspectives were assessed with the 24 items selected from Study 1 and four subscale scores were created. Higher scores indicated higher levels of endorsement of the respective feminist perspective. As in Study 1, the conservative, radical and intersectional subscales were more reliable (Cronbach's α 's=0.75, 0.84, 0.92, respectively) than the liberal subscale (Cronbach's $\alpha=0.48$). A CFA was conducted on the liberal, intersectional, radical, and conservative perspective items. Results revealed that the four-factor model fit the data well, $\chi^2(246)=370$; root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)=0.057; standardized root mean square residual (SRMR)=0.074; comparative fit index (CFI)=0.921; Tucker-Lewis index (TLI)=0.912. Even though the results of the CFA were satisfying, the reliability of the liberal subscale was overly poor ($\alpha=0.48$). Therefore, this subscale was not used in subsequent analyses. The factor loadings resulting from these analyses are presented in Table 4.

Feminist Identification

Feminist identification was assessed with a single item adapted from Postmes et al. (2013): "I identify as a feminist". Higher scores indicated a stronger feminist identification.

Negative Trans* Attitudes

Negative attitudes toward trans* people were measured using the Attitudes toward Transgender Men and Women (ATTMW) Scale (Billard, 2018). This 24-item scale includes 12 items referring to trans* men (e.g., "Transgender men will never really be men") and 12 items referring to trans* women (e.g., "Transgender women are only able to look like women, but not be women"). Higher scores indicate more negative attitudes. Before reading the items, participants were given the following definitions (adapted

Table 4 Confirmatory factor analysis loadings of the conservative, liberal, radical and intersectional perspectives items in study 2

Factor	Item	Standard estimate
Conservative	Given the way that men are, women have a responsibility not to arouse them by their dress and actions	0.455
	A man's first responsibility is to obtain economic success, while his wife should care for the family's needs	0.647
	The breakdown of the traditional family structure is responsible for the evils in our society	0.626
	It is a man's right and duty to maintain order in his family by whatever means necessary	0.543
	Women should not be assertive like men because men are the natural leaders on earth	0.625
	Heterosexuality is the only natural sexual preference	0.634
Liberal	Whether one chooses a traditional or alternative family form should be a matter of personal choice	0.341
	Homosexuality is not a moral issue, but rather a question of liberty and freedom of expression	0.516
	Social change for sexual equality will best come about by acting through government	0.301
	Legislation is the best means to ensure a woman's choice of whether or not to have an abortion	0.201
	Women should try to influence legislation in order to gain the right to make their own decisions and choices	0.570
	Men need to be liberated from oppressive sex role stereotypes as much as women do	0.224
Radical	Sex role stereotypes are only one symptom of the larger system of patriarchal power, which is the true source of women's subordination	0.757
	The workplace is organized around men's physical, economic, and sexual oppression of women	0.854
	Men's control over women forces women to be the primary caretakers of children	0.763
	Men prevent women from becoming political leaders through their control of economic and political institutions	0.770
	Marriage is a perfect example of men's physical, economic, and sexual oppression of women	0.776
	Romantic love brainwashes women and forms the basis for their subordination	0.188
Intersectional	Gender equality programs should pay more attention to the specific types of prejudice women who belong to minority groups have to face	0.731
	Discrimination in the workplace is worse for women of color than for all men and White women	0.874
	Being put on a pedestal, which White women have protested, is a luxury that women of color have not had	0.773
	Women of color are oppressed by White standards of beauty	0.872
	Women of color have less legal and social service protection from being battered than White women have	0.815
	Racism and sexism make double the oppression for women of color in the work environment	0.866

from Billard, 2018): “The term “transgender man” is used to describe people who were assigned female at the time of their birth but who currently identify and live their daily lives as men.” and “The term “transgender woman” is used to describe people who were assigned male at the time of their birth but who currently identify and live their daily lives as women.” The 24 items formed a reliable measure (Cronbach's $\alpha=0.97$).

Reluctance to Support Trans* Rights

Reluctance to support trans* rights was assessed with a single item: “I would sign a petition in support of trans* rights.” This item was then reverse coded so that a higher score indicated greater reluctance to support trans rights.

Contact with Trans* People

Contact with trans* people was added as a control variable in the regression analyses and assessed with three separate items with two response options: yes or no. Participants had to indicate if they knew at least one trans* person among their family (item 1), friends (item 2), and co-workers (item 3).

Gender Identity

Participants reported their gender identity through two separate questions: “How would you describe your gender?” and “Does your current gender match the gender that was assigned to you at birth?” Participants who answered “yes” to the second question were categorised as cisgender and participants who answered “no” were categorised as trans*. Participants indicated their age, the highest school degree they obtained, their country of residence, and how they would describe their sexual orientation, using the same measures as in Study 1.

Procedure

Participants were recruited via the Prolific platform to participate in a study on “the perception of social groups.” Participants were preselected for English fluency, being cisgender, and being at least 18 years old. After giving their informed consent, the participants reported their gender. The scales were then presented in a randomised order. At the end of the study, the participants reported their sexual orientation, age, level of education, and country of residence. They were then fully debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Study 2 Results

Preliminary Analyses

Replicating Study 1, the radical and intersectional perspectives were positively correlated with each other and negatively correlated with the conservative perspective (see Table 3). An exploratory repeated-measures ANOVA was performed to evaluate differences in the levels of endorsement for the intersectional, radical, and conservative perspectives. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, $p < .001$, and therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity ($\epsilon = 0.70$). There was a statistically significant difference in levels of endorsement, $F(2,304) = 156$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = 0.506$. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with a Tukey adjustment indicated that the levels of

endorsement for the four perspectives were all significantly different from each other (all $ps < 0.001$). As in Study 1, ranging from highest to lowest, participants endorsed intersectional ($M = 4.36$, $SD = 1.49$), radical ($M = 3.51$, $SD = 1.24$), and conservative ($M = 2.03$, $SD = 0.96$) perspectives to significantly different extents.

As in Study 1, women endorsed a radical feminist perspective ($M = 3.92$, $SD = 1.29$) significantly more than men did, ($M = 3.12$, $SD = 1.11$), $t(151) = 4.19$, $p < .001$, and women also endorsed intersectional feminism ($M = 4.74$, $SD = 1.62$) significantly more than men did ($M = 3.99$, $SD = 1.27$), $t(151) = 3.20$, $p = .002$. Women ($M = 1.88$, $SD = 0.90$) and men ($M = 2.16$, $SD = 1.00$) reported similar endorsement of the conservative perspective, $t(151) = -1.80$, $p = .074$. Women’s self-reported feminist identification ($M = 4.87$, $SD = 1.74$) was significantly stronger than men’s, ($M = 3.76$, $SD = 1.90$), $t(151) = 3.78$, $p < .001$. Finally, self-reported feminist identification was significantly positively correlated with endorsement of a radical feminist perspective, $r(151) = 0.58$, $p < .01$, and intersectional feminist perspective, $r(151) = 0.59$, $p < .01$, and significantly negatively correlated with the conservative perspective, $r(151) = -0.46$, $p < .01$. These correlational patterns and gender differences broadly replicate and extend those of Study 1.

Hypotheses Testing

Hypothesis 1 predicted that negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights would be lower among women than men. *T*-tests supported this hypothesis with regard to negative attitudes to trans* people among women and men, $M = 2.79$, $SD = 1.60$, $M = 3.35$, $SD = 1.62$, respectively, $t(151) = -2.14$, $p = .034$. However, women and men reported a similarly low reluctance to support trans* rights, $M = 2.75$, $SD = 1.82$, $M = 2.94$, $SD = 1.74$, $t(151) = -0.66$, $p = .512$.

Hypotheses 2 through 4 referred to correlations between feminist identification and feminist perspectives on the one hand and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights on the other. First, feminist identification was significantly negatively correlated with both negative attitudes, $r(151) = -0.45$, $p < .001$, and reluctance to support trans* rights, $r(151) = -0.43$, $p < .001$, supporting Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 predicted a negative correlation between liberal and intersectional feminism on the one hand and negative attitudes and reluctance to support trans* rights on the other. Given the low reliability of the liberal feminism scale, resulting in the withdrawal of this variable, the first part of this hypothesis could not be tested. However, the second part of Hypothesis 3 was supported. Indeed, endorsing intersectional feminism was negatively correlated with negative attitudes, $r(151) = -0.44$ respectively, $p < .001$, and reluctance to support trans* rights, $r(151) = -0.40$, $p < .001$.

Table 5 Hierarchical regression results for negative attitudes toward trans* people in study 2

Variable	Negative attitudes toward trans* people				
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>R</i> ²	ΔR^2
Step 1				.20	.20***
Constant	1.29	.49			
Contact	-.61**	.20	-.23		
Orientation	.29	.35	.07		
Age	.04***	.01	.34		
Education	.10	.08	.10		
Step 2				.43	.23***
Constant	2.02	.43			
Contact	-.21	.18	-.08		
Orientation	.07	.31	.02		
Age	.02*	.01	.18		
Education	.10	.07	.10		
Feminist	.00	.08	.00		
Cons	.74***	.13	.43		
Radical	-.24	.14	-.18		
Inter	-.08	.11	-.07		
Step 3				.44	.01
Constant	1.89	.46			
Contact	-.22	.18	-.09		
Orientation	.09	.31	.02		
Age	.02*	.01	.19		
Education	.11	.07	.11		
Feminist	.01	.08	.01		
Cons	.73***	.13	.43		
Radical	-.26	.14	-.19		
Inter	-.06	.11	-.06		
Feminist x Radical	-.04	.07	-.07		
Feminist x Inter	.06	.06	.10		

Note. Orientation=sexual orientation with LGB coded as 0 and heterosexual coded as 1, feminist=feminist identification, cons=endorsement of conservative perspective, radical=endorsement of radical perspective, inter=endorsement of intersectional perspective

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

However, contrary to Hypothesis 4, endorsement of radical feminism was also negatively correlated with negative attitudes, $r(151) = -0.37$, $p < .001$, and reluctance to support trans* rights, $r(151) = -0.39$, $p < .001$.

Supporting Hypothesis 5, endorsement of the conservative perspective was positively correlated with negative attitudes, $r(151) = 0.57$, $p < .001$, and reluctance to support trans* rights, $r(151) = 0.41$, $p < .001$.

Two hierarchical regression analyses tested Hypothesis 6 that the association between feminist identification and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights would be moderated by the type of feminist perspective endorsed (see Tables 5 and 6). In both models, Step 1 included sociodemographic variables, Step 2 included the intersectional perspective, radical perspective, conservative perspective, and feminist identification, and Step 3 included interaction terms between feminist identification and the two different

Table 6 Hierarchical regression results for reluctance to support trans* rights in study 2

Variable	Reluctance to support trans* rights				
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>R</i> ²	ΔR^2
Step 1				.16	.16***
Constant	1.02	.55			
Contact	-.61**	.23	-.21		
Orientation	.23	.40	.05		
Age	.04**	.01	.27		
Education	.19*	.09	.17		
Step 2				.32	.16***
Constant	1.80	.53			
Contact	-.21	.22	-.07		
Orientation	-.05	.37	-.01		
Age	.02	.01	.12		
Education	.21*	.09	.18		
Feminist	-.11	.10	-.11		
Cons	.48*	.16	.25		
Radical	-.33	.17	-.22		
Inter	-.03	.14	-.03		
Step 3				.33	.01
Constant	1.54	.55			
Contact	-.24	.22	-.08		
Orientation	-.01	.37	.00		
Age	.02	.01	.13		
Education	.23*	.09	.20		
Feminist	-.10	.10	-.10		
Cons	.47**	.16	.25		
Radical	-.36*	.17	-.24		
Inter	-.01	.14	-.01		
Feminist x Radical	-.03	.09	-.03		
Feminist x Inter	.09	.07	.14		

Note. Orientation=sexual orientation with LGB coded as 0 and heterosexual coded as 1, feminist=feminist identification, cons=endorsement of conservative perspective, radical=endorsement of radical perspective, inter=endorsement of intersectional perspective

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

feminist perspectives. In both models, the three perspectives (i.e., intersectional, radical, conservative) and the feminist identification scores were centered around the mean.

In Step 1, age and contact with trans* people predicted significant additional variance in both models. In Step 2, conservative perspective predicted significant additional variance in both negative attitudes and reluctance to support trans* rights. The radical perspective predicted significant additional variance in reluctance to support trans* rights as it was negatively associated with reluctance to support trans* rights. In Step 3, none of the interaction terms predicted additional variance in either model, meaning that the association between feminist identification and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights was consistent across levels of endorsement of all feminist perspectives. Hypothesis 6 was not supported.

Study 2 Discussion

Study 2 suggested that, as compared to women, men could be more negative toward trans* people, and that positive attitudes toward trans* people and support of their rights could be favoured by the endorsement of intersectional and radical feminist perspectives and the rejection of a conservative perspective on gender issues. The association between feminist identification and trans* attitudes and support for trans* rights was invariant across endorsement of specific feminist perspectives. These findings trouble the description of radical feminism as a basis for excluding trans* individuals from feminism and for fearing that their rights are a threat to women's group interests (e.g., Jeffreys, 2014). Rather, radical feminism appears to be a perspective that is as conducive to positive attitudes towards trans people as intersectional feminism.

Earlier we described tensions within radical feminism as to whether biological characteristics should be used to ground gender categories and whether trans* rights could represent a threat to women in general. Gender-critical feminists are characterized by an identification with radical feminism, an adherence to some of the principles of "historical" radical feminism, and by endorsement of binary essentialist definitions of gender categories (i.e., Jeffreys, 2014). The next study examined how identifying as a radical feminist specifically and endorsing gender binary beliefs are associated with how trans* people and their rights are perceived. More specifically, Study 3 examined the associations between more specific feminist identifications, gender centrality, gender binary beliefs, perceived trans* threat, and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights.

Study 3: Does the Kind of Feminist Identification Matter for Trans* Attitudes?

As explained above, feminist self-identification and endorsement of feminist beliefs and values are associated but distinct from each other (Fitz et al., 2012; Liss et al., 2001; McCabe, 2005; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). People can also identify as different types of feminists. Indeed, gender-critical feminists identify as radical feminists, despite not sharing the definition of women and gender that was originally adopted by early radical feminists (i.e., Jeffreys, 2014). For this reason and because of the disjunctions between feminist self-identification and endorsement of feminist beliefs and values (Fitz et al., 2012; Liss et al., 2001; McCabe, 2005; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010), endorsing a radical feminist perspective and identifying as a radical feminist could be differently associated with attitudes toward trans* people and trans* rights. Study 3 examines the associations between general

feminist self-identification, two specific feminist self-identifications (i.e., radical and intersectional feminist), gender centrality, gender binary beliefs, perceived trans* threat, and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights. The conservative perspective was not included in Study 3. All hypotheses were preregistered (<https://osf.io/5vu8w>).

Of note, in the preregistration, a mistake was made in the phrasing of the hypothesis about the interaction between radical feminist identification and gender binary beliefs. In the introduction of Study 3, the corrected version of the hypothesis is presented.

Based on the results of Study 2, general feminist self-identification (Hypothesis 1a) and intersectional feminist self-identification (Hypothesis 1b) were expected to be negatively correlated with negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights and the perception of threat. Radical feminist self-identification was expected to be positively correlated with negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights and perceived trans* threat (Hypothesis 1c). Based on previous literature (Morgenroth et al., 2021; Norton & Herek, 2013; Tee & Hegarty, 2006), gender binary beliefs were expected to be positively correlated with negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights and perceived trans* threat (Hypothesis 2).

Perceptions of trans* people as a threat was conceptualized as the fear that trans* people and the defence of trans* rights might blur the distinction between the "women" and "men" categories (distinctiveness threat; Branscombe et al., 1999), pose a physical, economic or political threat to cisgender women (realistic threat; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), and/or share values and beliefs that are incompatible with women's movements (symbolic threat; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Knowing that individuals and groups who are perceived as threatening to one's group tend to be evaluated negatively (for example, Stephan & Stephan, 2000), perceived trans* threat was expected to be positively correlated with negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights (Hypothesis 3).

Based on recent literature (i.e., Brassel & Anderson, 2020; Morgenroth et al., 2021), gender centrality was expected to be positively correlated with negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights for cisgender men, but not for women (Hypothesis 4). People who endorse gender binary beliefs might be motivated to maintain a distinct gender identity (for example, an identity as a "woman" that would be very distinct from the "man" category, and vice-versa). Because trans* people are sometimes perceived as "blurring" and threatening this distinction (Hyde et al., 2019; Morgenroth et al., 2021), they might be evaluated negatively by cisgender people who strongly identify with their own gender. Accordingly, gender binary beliefs were expected to moderate the association between gender

centrality and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights (Hypothesis 5), whereby the association would be non-significant for people who oppose the gender binary and positive for people who endorse the gender binary.

As mentioned in the general introduction, there is a clear divide in the conceptualization of sex and gender in radical feminism. Radical feminists who oppose the gender binary and adopt a definition of gender identity based on self-determination tend to be inclusive of trans* people (Williams, 2016). However, radical feminists who oppose the inclusion of trans* individuals in the feminist movements argue that the “woman” category relies on sex assigned at birth (e.g., Raymond, 1979) and that access to women-only spaces must be determined by biological sex and not gender identity (Jeffreys, 2014; McQueen, 2016; for a critical analysis, see Hines, 2019). For instance, gender-critical feminists identify as radical feminists and endorse some radical feminist values and beliefs while endorsing a binary and essentialist definition of gender (i.e., Jeffreys, 2014). Accordingly, gender binary beliefs were also expected to moderate the association between radical feminist self-identification and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights (Hypothesis 6), whereby the association would be negative for people who oppose the gender binary and positive for people who endorse the gender binary.

In instances where the hypothesized moderation effects were significant, we also conducted exploratory analyses to test three-way interactions and verify if these effects were specific to one gender group or consistent among both groups.

Study 3 Method

Participants and Procedure

An a priori power analysis using G*Power 3.1.9.7 suggests that, for a multiple linear regression including seven predictors, a sample size of $N=103$ is recommended to detect a medium effect size of 0.15 with $\alpha=0.05$, power=0.80. As certain analyses will be run separately for each gender group, the sample required 103 women and 103 men.

Two hundred and fifteen individuals filled out the questionnaire. Fourteen were excluded for the following reasons: failing at least one attention-check question ($n=12$), leaving most items blank ($n=1$), and leaving an entire scale blank ($n=1$). The final sample was composed of 102 (50.7%) cisgender women and 99 (49.3%) cisgender men. As the final sample size is below what was recommended by the power analysis, two post hoc power analyses were conducted using G*Power 3.1.9.7. To detect a medium effect size of 0.15 with $\alpha=0.05$, the power of a multiple

linear regression including seven predictors and conducted on a sample of 102 cisgender women would be 0.795. Similarly, to detect a medium effect size of 0.15 with $\alpha=0.05$, the power of a multiple linear regression including seven predictors and conducted on a sample of 99 cisgender men would be 0.780. Both values are very close to 0.80, which is why data collection was not extended.

The participants resided in the United Kingdom and spoke English fluently. They ranged in age from 18 to 77 years ($M=44.01$, $SD=14.85$). Three participants did not report their age. They identified as heterosexual ($n=184$, 91.5%), bisexual ($n=8$, 4%), lesbian ($n=4$, 2%), gay ($n=2$, 1%), pansexual ($n=1$, 0.5%), or other ($n=2$, 1%). As for education, 61 (30.3%) participants obtained a professional certificate, 47 (23.4%) an undergraduate degree, 68 (33.8%) a graduate or bachelor's degree and 22 (11%) a master or doctoral degree. Three participants did not report their level of education. Missing data on age and education were replaced by the mean and mode of these variables, respectively. The procedure was identical to Study 2.

Measures

The same measures were used as Study 2 to assess negative attitudes toward trans* people (Cronbach's $\alpha=0.99$), feminist self-identification (one item), gender binary beliefs (Cronbach's $\alpha=0.93$), contact with trans* people (three items), and sociodemographic information. Except where noted, all items used a 7-point Likert-type response scale ranging from *totally disagree* (1) to *totally agree* (7).

Radical and Intersectional Self-Identification

Radical and intersectional feminist identifications were both assessed with single-item measures of social identification (Postmes et al., 2013). The radical feminist item was preceded by the following definition: “Radical feminism considers that there is a systemic oppression of women for the benefit of men, namely patriarchy, and that it must be abolished by frontal opposition.” Participants then indicate their agreement with the item: “I identify as a radical feminist.” The intersectional feminist item was preceded by the following definition: “Intersectional feminism considers that several forms of oppression and discrimination intersect (for example, sexism, racism, ableism...) and that they must be confronted all together.” Participants then indicate their agreement with the item: “I identify as an intersectional feminist.”

Gender Centrality

Gender centrality, or the importance of gender to one's overall self-concept, was assessed with the centrality subscale of the social identification measure developed by Leach et al. (2008) and composed of three items: (1) "I often think of the fact that I am [a woman/a man]"; (2) "The fact that I am [a woman/a man] is an important part of how I see myself"; (3) "Being [a woman/a man] is an important part of how I see myself." The items were averaged to form a mean score. The items formed a reliable measure (Cronbach's $\alpha=0.82$) with higher scores indicating higher gender centrality.

Gender Binary Beliefs

Gender binary beliefs were assessed with five items developed by Tee and Hegarty (2006): (1) "There are only two genders, male or female"; (2) "Only these two genders are morally acceptable and legitimate in our society"; (3) "All adults identify either as male or female"; (4) "If you are either male or female, then you are that gender for all time"; (5) "Even a person with ambiguous genitalia is still either male or female." The items were averaged to form a mean score. The items formed a reliable measure (Cronbach's $\alpha=0.91$) with higher scores indicating stronger gender binary beliefs.

Perceived Threat from Trans* People

Perception of threat from trans* people was assessed with eight items. Two were adapted from Warner et al. (2007): (1) "Trans* people blur the distinction between women and men"; (2) "Trans* people's actions threaten the differences between women and men"; and six were adapted from Stephan and Stephan (2000): (1) "The inclusion of trans* women in women-only spaces (toilets, locker rooms...) does not present any risk for other women's safety" [reversed item]; (2) "Trans* rights may put at risk some of the laws that protect women"; (3) "The rise in the number of associations fighting for trans* rights might diminish the funding

allocated to women organizations"; (4) "The trans* movement is taking the light away from the women's movement's achievements"; (5) "Trans* women and cisgender women both experience oppression from the patriarchal system" [reversed item]; (6) "Transactivism and women's movement share the same values" [reversed item]. The items were averaged to form a mean score. They formed a reliable measure (Cronbach's $\alpha=0.90$) with higher scores indicating greater perceived threat.

Reluctance to Support Trans* Rights

Reluctance to support trans* rights was assessed with seven items. Six items were developed by Flores et al. (2016): (1) "Trans* people should be able to undergo gender-reassignment surgery"; (2) "Trans* people should be protected from discrimination in employment, public accommodations, housing and military service"; (3) "Trans* people should be able to adopt children"; (4) "Trans* people should be allowed to use the restroom corresponding to their gender identity"; (5) "Trans* people should be allowed to give birth"; (6) "Trans* people should be allowed to get married." One item was developed for the purpose of this study: (1) "Trans* people should be allowed to change their gender on government identity documents." All the items were reversed and then averaged to form a mean score of reluctance to support trans* rights. They formed a reliable measure such that higher scores indicate higher reluctance to support trans* rights (Cronbach's $\alpha=0.92$).

Study 3 Results

Preliminary Analyses

Zero-order correlations for all study variables are presented by gender in Table 7. Consistent with Studies 1 and 2 and as shown in Table 8, women reported stronger general feminist self-identification, radical feminism identification, and intersectional feminist identification than men. Women also

Table 7 Correlations among the key variables in study 3

Variable	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
1. Negative attitudes	-	0.72**	0.83**	0.80**	-0.42**	-0.17	-0.38**	0.05
2. Reluctance to support trans* rights	0.74**	-	0.70**	0.71**	-0.55**	-0.30**	-0.49**	-0.01
3. Perception of threat	0.83**	0.64**	-	0.70**	-0.49**	-0.23*	-0.49**	0.04
4. Gender binary beliefs	0.82**	0.62**	0.67**	-	-0.56**	-0.28**	-0.54**	0.11
5. Feminist identification	-0.40**	-0.40**	0.20*	-0.45**	-	0.53**	0.66**	0.15
6. Radical feminist identification	-0.45**	-0.36**	-0.37**	-0.47**	0.61**	-	0.57**	0.20*
7. Intersectional feminist identification	-0.40**	-0.38**	-0.33**	-0.41**	0.66**	0.66**	-	0.13
8. Gender identification	0.31**	0.29**	0.20	0.38**	-0.23*	-0.23*	-0.21*	-

Note. Results for cisgender women above the diagonal ($N=102$), results for cisgender men below the diagonal ($N=99$)

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 8 Means, standard deviations and T-values of gender differences in endorsement of the main variables of study 3

Variable	Women		Men		t
	M	SD	M	SD	
Feminist identification	4.86	1.50	3.56	1.91	5.41
Radical identification	3.28	1.65	2.53	1.63	3.29
Intersectional identification	4.43	1.58	3.15	1.83	5.14
Gender centrality	5.18	1.22	4.82	1.50	1.92
Gender binary beliefs	2.95	1.55	4.04	1.80	-4.61
Perceived threat	3.38	1.27	4.12	1.15	-4.34
Negative attitudes toward trans* people	2.78	1.53	3.91	1.69	-4.96
Reluctance to support trans* rights	2.17	1.25	2.92	1.33	-4.17

Note. $N=201$, $df=199$. All the differences between women and men are significant ($p<.001$), except for the difference in gender centrality ($p=.057$)

reported significantly less negative attitudes toward trans* people as compared to men and less reluctance to support trans* rights. Women also showed lower endorsement of gender binary beliefs, and lower perceived threat from trans* people than men. However, women and men did not differ in their degree of gender centrality.

Hypotheses Testing

General feminist self-identification was negatively correlated with negative attitudes toward trans* people, $r(199)=-0.48$, $p<.001$, reluctance to support trans* rights, $r(199)=-0.51$, $p<.001$, and perception of trans* people as a threat, $r(199)=-0.408$, $p<.001$. Intersectional feminist self-identification was negatively correlated with negative attitudes, $r(199)=-0.47$, $p<.001$, reluctance to support trans* rights, $r(199)=-0.48$, $p<.001$, and perception of threat, $r(199)=-0.47$, $p<.001$. Radical feminist self-identification was also negatively correlated with negative attitudes, $r(199)=-0.36$, $p<.001$, reluctance to support trans* rights, $r(199)=-0.37$, $p<.001$, and perceived trans* threat, $r(199)=-0.34$, $p<.001$. Thus, these results support Hypothesis 1 for general and intersectional feminist self-identification, but not for radical feminist self-identification.

Supporting Hypothesis 2, gender binary beliefs were positively correlated with negative attitudes toward trans* people, $r(199)=0.83$, $p<.001$, reluctance to support trans* rights, $r(199)=0.69$, $p<.001$, and perceived trans* threat, $r(199)=0.71$, $p<.001$. Supporting Hypothesis 3, perceived trans* threat was positively correlated with negative attitudes, $r(199)=0.84$, $p<.001$, and reluctance to support trans* rights, $r(199)=0.70$, $p<.001$. Supporting Hypothesis 4, women's gender centrality was not significantly correlated with negative attitudes, $r(100)=0.05$, $p=.620$, nor reluctance to support trans* rights, $r(100)=0.01$, $p=.938$; however, men's gender centrality was positively correlated

Table 9 Hierarchical regression results for negative attitudes toward trans* people in study 3

Variable	Negative attitudes toward trans* people				
	B	SE B	β	R^2	ΔR^2
Step 1				.04	.04
Constant	2.15	.55			
Contact	-.23	.20	-.08		
Orientation	.57	.44	.09		
Age	.02*	.01	.15		
Education	.01	.08	.01		
Step 2				.71	.67***
Constant	2.88	.30			
Contact	.23*	.11	.08		
Orientation	-.12	.24	-.02		
Age	.01*	.01	.10		
Education	-.02	.05	-.01		
Gender	-.04	.05	-.03		
Binary	.82***	.04	.85		
Step 3				.71	.00
Constant	2.89	.31			
Contact	.23	.11	.08*		
Orientation	-.14	.25	-.02		
Age	.01	.01	.10*		
Education	-.02	.05	-.01		
Gender	-.04	.05	-.03		
Binary	.82***	.04	.85		
Gender x Binary	.01	.03	.02		

Note. Orientation = sexual orientation with LGB coded as 0 and heterosexual coded as 1, gender = gender identification, binary = belief in the gender binary

* $p<.05$. ** $p<.01$. *** $p<.001$

with negative attitudes, $r(97)=0.31$, $p=.002$, and reluctance to support trans* rights, $r(97)=0.29$, $p=.004$.

Next, we tested Hypothesis 5 that the association between gender centrality and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights is moderated by gender binary beliefs. Tables 9 and 10 present the results of two hierarchical regression models predicting negative attitudes and reluctance to support trans* rights. In both models, sociodemographic variables were added in Step 1, centered gender centrality and gender binary beliefs were added in Step 2, and the interaction terms between gender centrality and gender binary beliefs was added in Step 3. In Step 1, age predicted additional variance in both models, and contact with trans* people was a negative predictor of reluctance to support trans* rights. In Step 2, gender binary beliefs positively predicted additional variance in both models, and gender centrality did not. In Step 3, the interaction terms did not predict additional variance, indicating that gender binary beliefs did not moderate the association between gender centrality and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights, and thus Hypothesis 5 was not supported.

Next, we tested Hypothesis 6 that the association between radical feminist self-identification and negative attitudes

Table 10 Hierarchical regression results for reluctance to support trans* rights in study 3

Variable	Reluctance to support trans* rights				
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β	<i>R</i> ²	ΔR^2
Step 1				.09	.09**
Constant	1.52	.42			
Contact	-.31*	.15	-.15		
Orientation	.53	.34	.11		
Age	.02**	.01	.20		
Education	-.05	.06	-.05		
Step 2				.51	.43***
Constant	1.98	.31			
Contact	-.03	.11	-.01		
Orientation	.10	.25	.02		
Age	.02**	.01	.17		
Education	-.07	.05	-.07		
Gender	-.01	.05	-.01		
Binary	.51***	.04	.68		
Step 3				.52	.01
Constant	2.01	.31			
Contact	-.01	.11	.00		
Orientation	.03	.25	.01		
Age	.02**	.01	.16		
Education	-.06	.05	-.07		
Gender	.01	.05	.01		
Binary	.51***	.04	.68		
Gender x Binary	.04	.03	.08		

Note. Orientation=sexual orientation with LGB coded as 0 and heterosexual coded as 1, gender=gender identification, binary=belief in the gender binary

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

toward trans* people and their rights is moderated by gender binary beliefs. Tables 11 and 12 present the results of two hierarchical regression models predicting negative attitudes and reluctance to support trans* rights. In both models, sociodemographic variables were added as predictors in Step 1, centered radical feminist self-identification, and gender binary beliefs were added in Step 2, and the interaction term between radical feminist self-identification and gender binary beliefs was added in Step 3. In Step 1, age predicted additional variance in both models, and contact with trans* people was a negative predictor of reluctance to support trans* rights. In Step 2, gender binary beliefs positively predicted additional variance in both models, and radical feminist self-identification did not predict additional variance in either model. In Step 3, the interaction term did not predict additional variance in either model, indicating that gender binary beliefs did not moderate the association between radical feminist self-identification and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights, thus Hypothesis 6 was not supported.

Table 11 Hierarchical regression results for negative attitudes toward trans* people in study 3

Variable	Negative attitudes toward trans* people				
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β	<i>R</i> ²	ΔR^2
Step 1				.04	.04
Constant	2.15	.55			
Contact	-.23	.20	-.08		
Orientation	.57	.43	.09		
Age	.02*	.01	.15		
Education	.01	.01	.01		
Step 2				.71	.67***
Constant	2.85	.31			
Contact	.23*	.11	.08		
Orientation	-.10	.24	-.02		
Age	.01*	.01	.10		
Education	-.02	.05	-.01		
Radical	-.03	.04	-.03		
Binary	.81***	.04	.83		
Step 3				.71	.00
Constant	2.85	.32			
Contact	.23*	.11	.08		
Orientation	-.10	.25	-.02		
Age	.01*	.01	.10		
Education	-.02	.05	-.01		
Radical	-.03	.04	-.03		
Binary	.81***	.04	.83		
Radical x Binary	-.00	.02	-.00		

Note Orientation=sexual orientation with LGB coded as 0 and heterosexual coded as 1, radical=radical feminist identification, binary=belief in the gender binary

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

Study 3 Discussion

Study 3 replicated the pattern of results from Study 1 and 2, suggesting that feminism, and specifically the endorsement of radical feminism, is not associated with negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights. In addition, the results from Study 3 indicated that men, people who do not identify as feminists, and people who endorse gender binary beliefs were more likely to consider trans* people and trans* rights as a threat. Gender centrality was positively associated with negative attitudes and reluctance to support trans* rights only among cisgender men. As such, Study 3 does not support the hypothesis that beliefs that trans* people and trans* rights constitute a threat are held by people who identify with radical feminism. Rather, in Study 3, these views were associated with being a cisgender man, dis-identifying with feminism and endorsing gender binary beliefs.

The association between radical feminist self-identification and reluctance to support trans* rights was not moderated by gender binary beliefs. This means that people who identify as radical feminists tend to be positive toward trans* people and trans* rights, irrespective of their personal conceptualization of sex and gender. Overall, Study

Table 12 Hierarchical regression results for reluctance to support trans* rights in study 3

Variable	Reluctance to support trans* rights			R^2	ΔR^2
	B	$SE\ B$	β		
Step 1				.09	.09**
Constant	1.52	.42			
Contact	-.31*	.15	-.15		
Orientation	.53	.34	.11		
Age	.02**	.01	.20		
Education	-.05	.01	-.05		
Step 2				.52	.44***
Constant	1.91	.31			
Contact	-.01	.11	.00		
Orientation	.15	.25	.03		
Age	.02**	.01	.17		
Education	-.07	.05	-.07		
Radical	-.08	.04	-.10		
Binary	.48***	.04	.63		
Step 3				.52	.00
Constant	1.88	.32			
Contact	-.01	.11	-.01		
Orientation	.15	.25	.03		
Age	.02**	.01	.17		
Education	-.07	.05	-.07		
Radical	-.08	.05	-.11		
Binary	.48***	.04	.63		
Radical x Binary	-.01	.02	-.03		

Note. Orientation=sexual orientation with LGB coded as 0 and heterosexual coded as 1, radical=radical feminist identification, binary=belief in the gender binary

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

3 suggests that women and feminists – of any sort – tend to be more positive toward trans* people and their rights. Far from being the ground for transphobia, radical feminist self-identification is associated with support for trans* people and trans* rights, even among people who endorse gender binary beliefs.

General Discussion

Taken together, these findings show that being a feminist is associated with positive attitudes toward trans* people and their rights, and thus question the rhetoric that opposition to trans* rights is a feminist stance in women's interests. Although the endorsement of gender binary beliefs and a conservative perspective on gender issues are associated with more negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights, people who identify as feminists and adhere to feminist values of any kind tend to be more positive toward trans* people (Studies 2 and 3). Radical and intersectional feminism are associated with more positive attitudes toward trans* people and their rights, whereas the conservative perspective is associated with more negative attitudes toward

trans* people and their rights (Studies 2 and 3). Relatedly, as per Henley et al.'s (1998) original conception, liberal, radical and intersectional feminist perspectives are all associated with each other and negatively associated with the conservative perspective (Studies 1 and 2).

The findings regarding radical feminism are consistent with Henley's original theorization but are at odds with gender-critical feminist constructions of radical feminism. The association between radical feminism identification and attitudes toward trans* people and trans* rights is not moderated by the endorsement of gender binary beliefs, meaning that radical feminists tend to be supportive of trans* people and their rights, irrespective of how they conceptualize sex and gender (Study 3). Relatedly, Studies 2 and 3 show that being a cisgender man and giving importance to one's "male identity" are associated with negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights, which questions the gender-critical feminist position that opposing trans* rights is in cisgender women's specific group-related interests. The implications of these findings for the conceptualization and measurement of feminist perspectives, the literature on transphobia and the relationship between gender-critical feminism and social psychological attitudes will be discussed next.

Measures of Feminist Perspectives

The adaptation of Henley et al.'s (1998) measure showed that participants agreed more strongly with liberal feminist views were more endorsed than with radical and intersectional perspectives. Moreover, cisgender women and men both agreed equally with liberal feminism, confirming its status as a "default" kind of feminism (Zhang & Rios, 2022). Liberal feminism was a less distinct perspective than the other perspectives, as shown in Study 1 and as in the initial study by Henley et al. (1998). Replicating previous results (i.e., Henley et al., 1998; Szymanski, 2004), the liberal subscale's reliability was below the acceptable threshold in Study 1 ($\alpha = 0.62$) and poor in Study 2 ($\alpha = 0.48$), which is why the liberal subscale could not be used in the analyses. These findings question the relevance and specificity of liberal feminism measures in the current feminist landscape (see Siegel & Calogero, 2021).

Study 2 suggests that beliefs such as conservative feminism can be feminist "in name only." In Study 2, the conservative perspective explained variance in negative attitudes toward trans* people and reluctance to support trans* rights when the other feminist perspectives did not. This finding may have been observed because endorsing a perspective that opposes the "default" liberal feminist perspective (e.g., a conservative perspective) could be more informative about one's beliefs than endorsing perspectives aligned with liberal feminism (e.g., radical and intersectional feminism).

Explaining Attitudes Toward Trans* People and Their Rights

Studies 2 and 3 found positive associations between feminist identification and positive attitudes toward trans* people, even though the positive relationship between liberal feminism and support for trans* people and trans* rights could not be tested and thus not replicated for methodological reasons (Brassel & Anderson, 2020; Platt & Szoka, 2021; Worthen, 2012, 2022; Worthen et al., 2017). These studies also showed that radical and intersectional self-identifications and perspectives are associated with more positive attitudes toward trans* people and their rights. These studies replicated several previously published results in the transphobia literature with regard to gender differences (i.e., Nagoshi et al., 2008, 2019; Norton & Herek, 2013), and – in Study 3 – gender centrality (i.e. Konopka et al., 2021; Nagoshi et al., 2008, 2019). Finally, gender binary beliefs were found to be strongly associated with negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights, as in past studies (Morgenroth et al., 2021; Norton & Herek, 2013; Tee & Hegarty, 2006). In sum, the studies found no form of feminist identification or perspective that was positively associated with negative attitudes toward trans* people or reluctance to support trans* rights. The meaning of these findings for gender-critical feminism are discussed next.

Conceptualizing Radical and Gender-Critical Feminism

Gender-critical feminists justify their opposition to trans* rights with arguments embedded in gender binary beliefs such as a sex-based definition of the “woman” category (i.e., Jeffreys, 2014) and a fear of male violence (i.e., Greer, 1999). In contrast, Morgenroth et al. (2024) evidenced that fear of male violence, that is deeply connected to gender binary beliefs in gender-critical feminist discourses, is not the main predictor of opposition to trans* rights. Rather, negative attitudes toward trans* people are. The present studies add to this picture by refuting the hypothesis that opposition to trans* rights could be grounded in radical feminist perspective or identification. The endorsement of gender binary beliefs did not moderate the positive relation between radical feminist self-identification and support for trans* people and trans* rights (Study 3).

These findings have implications for the conceptualization of radical feminism. Gender-critical feminists usually identify as radical feminists (i.e. Jeffreys, 2014). However, as noted in the introduction, many forms of radical feminism do not define women by biological characteristics but by subordination to men within patriarchy (i.e., MacKinnon, 1989). The findings of Studies 2 and 3 suggest that

this understanding of radical feminism – as grounded in the social dynamics of power rather than biological sex characteristics might be the dominant understanding of radical feminism among our participants. Indeed, the items composing the radical feminist subscale in Study 2 are representative of this understanding. The current findings suggest that from such perspective on radical feminism, “Many trans-opposed feminists could hardly be described as “radical”” (Pape, 2022, p. 221). It seems parsimonious to conclude that feminists share a desire for social justice (Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010), which might lead them to support trans* rights, even when they endorse gender binary beliefs.

To conclude, the current set of studies underline the need for more nuance in the claim that gender-critical feminism is rooted in radical feminism (Williams, 2016), as radical feminism was consistently associated with support for trans* rights across measures, studies, and among both women and men. One possibility is that gender-critical feminism might be a perspective with a family resemblance to “conservative feminism” in the sense that it articulates a position on women’s interests while opposing new advances in gender equality. While conservative feminists opposed liberal feminism in the 1970s, gender critical feminists might oppose the push for trans* rights now. As such, these results suggest that the term “feminism” in the label “gender-critical feminism” might have the effect of appealing to those endorsing a radical feminist perspective who might reject arguments against trans* people’s rights that are based on other grounds.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

Although this set of studies adds to the understanding of the relations between feminism and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights, it is not exempt of limitations. First, correlational designs were used in these studies, and therefore causal claims are severely limited. Causality should be tested through experimental manipulations or longitudinal analyses of public opinion data. Moreover, although the measure of reluctance to support trans* rights was a measure of the intention to sign a petition in Study 2, this set of studies did not examine how feminist perspectives and identifications impact behavioural intentions. An additional limitation related to the design of the studies is that the measures of negative attitudes toward trans* people and reluctance to support trans* rights assessed general attitudes toward trans* people rather than specific concerns. For example, washrooms as a sex-segregated space are an important concern of gender-critical feminists (see Jones & Slater, 2020, for an analysis of the debate) and a study has shown that, compared to cisgender men, cisgender women were more likely to experience discomfort when meeting a trans* person in public bathrooms (Callahan & Zukowski,

2019). A last design limitation is that the participants were provided with a definition of radical and intersectional identifications in Study 3. These definitions might not have fully captured these feminist identities, nor how everyone might understand them, which may have affected how participants responded to these two feminist identification items.

Second, the samples of the studies presented in this article were recruited through Prolific whose participants pool is characterized by the WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic) bias (Henrich et al., 2010). Indeed, even though Prolific provides quality data (Peer et al., 2022), its participant pool leans toward a younger, more educated, and more liberal bias (Douglas et al., 2023). This might explain why the scores were high on the liberal feminism measure and low on the negativity measures. It would be relevant to research the relations between feminism and negative attitudes toward trans* people and their rights using more representative samples. However, a survey using a representative sample of 1751 adults in Great Britain showed that women are generally more supportive of trans* rights than men (YouGov, 2022). These results suggest that the gender differences obtained in our studies might be replicated on more representative samples.

In relation to the sampling, these studies were conducted in 2021 and 2022 in the United Kingdom, country where trans* people enjoy some rights to freedom from discrimination, but so too do gender-critical feminists. At that point in time, gender-critical feminists were offered a strong representation in the media as debates about the Gender Recognition Reform Bill, introduced to the UK Parliament by the Scottish Government, were raging. It would be important to replicate these studies in countries where the socio-political climate shapes the debate differently.

Moreover, future research should focus on what makes the gender-critical feminist arguments convincing to the general public, integrating literature on the relations between perception of realistic and symbolic threat and prejudice (Stephan et al., 2000) and the literature on social identity and gender discrimination (i.e., Cameron, 2001). As cisgender women have a higher status in society than trans* women, increasingly visible arguments for trans* rights might be perceived as a realistic threat to cisgender women's status, leading to an opposition to trans* rights. Another potential explanation might be related to the perception of symbolic threat and competitive victimhood (Young & Sullivan, 2016). Some cisgender women might think that their social group has comparatively (or more) suffered relatively to trans* people.

Practice Implications

The findings from this set of studies can inform debates about the evolution of trans* rights by helping policymakers

better understand and target the sources of both support for and pushbacks against trans* rights (Government Equalities Office, 2020; Scottish Government, 2021). These findings can also inform debates within and around feminist movements. As mentioned in the introduction of the paper, tensions about the definitions of the “woman” category led to deep divisions within radical feminist movements (Page, 2022; Stone, 2006; Williams, 2016). Even though this article does not specifically address the “divisive issues” (Stryker & Bettcher, 2016, p. 6) around trans* rights and the inclusion of trans* people in feminist movements, it shows that, overall, people in these studies who endorsed radical feminism tended to be inclusive of trans* people. Far from minimizing existing divisions and conflicts within feminism, this set of studies highlights the shared support for trans* people and trans* rights within different feminist movements and conflicts with the assertion that trans* identities are irreconcilable with feminist goals (Jeffreys, 2014). Moreover, our results nuance the frequent narrative that radical feminism, as a movement, is conducive of negative attitudes and opposition to trans* rights (Williams, 2016), which could have a positive impact on how radical feminists are depicted in the media.

Conclusion

The current research found that, contrary to what can be relayed in the media, opposing trans* rights is not a for-gone radical feminist position. Being a cisgender woman, identifying as a feminist, and endorsing feminist perspectives – including radical ones – was associated with positive attitudes toward trans* people and their rights. Instead, the endorsement of gender binary beliefs was linked to holding transphobic attitudes and views. While gender-critical feminism offers a highly visible construction of what constitutes radical feminism, this discourse was not wholly reflected in the individual psychological identification with radical feminism by participants in these studies.

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Data Availability The data that support the findings of these studies are available from the corresponding author upon request. The hypotheses, methods and analyses plans for Studies 2 and 3 were preregistered on OSF.

Declarations

Ethical Approval and Consent to Participate All the studies presented in this article have been approved by the first author's institutional ethics committee (Project2020-53) before data collection. Participants were presented with a digital informed consent form before taking part in any of the studies.

Consent for Publication All three authors agreed with the content of the paper, the authorship and gave explicit consent to submit the work.

Human and Animal Ethics All three authors agreed with the content of the paper, the authorship and gave explicit consent to submit the work.

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