

Metaphors of sensory experience in ancient Egyptian texts

Emotion, personality, and social interaction

Camilla Di Biase-Dyson and Gaëlle Chantrain

Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to describe how emotional states and personal characteristics are described in terms of sensory experience in ancient Egyptian texts. Since the contribution in this volume by our colleague Elisabeth Steinbach-Eicke (see Chapter 27) concerns itself explicitly with the depiction of cognition in ancient Egyptian using the primary senses (what is often called “embodied cognition”),¹ our chapter can be seen as taking these ideas in a different direction: we consider specifically the processing of human emotion and temperament and we show that these features are depicted in ancient Egyptian texts with reference to a wide range of sensory phenomena, particularly external impulses like temperatures, textures, colours and shades, sounds, tastes, and smells. Many such metaphorical and metonymic transfers are cross-linguistically well attested,² perhaps because they share a metonymic basis, namely, that an emotional state and the physical instantiation of that state—be it a sensation within the body (like temperature) or one outside the body (like colours, smells, tastes, and textures, as well as the general environment)—are contiguous, and dependent on each other (cf. Di Biase-Dyson 2018: 40; also Toro Rueda 2003: 86–89).

Theoretical bases: emotion research, historical semantics, and sensory studies

Emotion and metaphor

For our research into emotion and temperament we were inspired by the definitional framework established by Klaus Scherer, who defines an emotion as an organism’s affective response to specific situations (of loss, frustration, danger, or success, for instance). As such, emotion is to be distinguished from feeling, which is “the subjective emotional experience component of emotion” (Scherer 2013: 25). Emotional responses are characterised by physiological changes, facial expressions, and shifts in behavioural attention and direction (Scherer 2013: 8). An emotion is moreover a “bounded event” in the life of an individual that involves an appraisal of the event

plus synchronised changes in a series of mental and somatic subsystems leading to expression and reaction (Frijda and Scherer 2009; also Scherer 2013: 24–25; Bender 2009: 300). These definitional features are crucial, as many lexical units describing emotion are additionally used to portray the temperament of a person, what Scherer (2005: 705) calls an “affect disposition.” Affect dispositions, or temperaments, “describe the tendency of a person to experience certain moods more frequently or to be prone to react with certain types of emotions” and they may also influence emotion regulation.³ Both emotions and temperaments are interesting for our research,⁴ and the extent to which the two are distinguishable from each other at the textual level will be a factor in our discussion.

From a methodological perspective, Scherer’s (2013: 8) research, like ours, is fundamentally lexical in scope, but of course benefits from the possibility of eliciting data. A questionnaire-based operationalisation of five emotion components across 24 modern languages allowed Scherer and his team to model the semantic space covered by all emotion terms in a four-dimensional structure, including VALENCE, POWER, AROUSAL, and NOVELTY. The metaphorical descriptions of emotion that use a type of sensory perception as their source domain (see Lakoff and Johnson 2003 [1980]: 265) are specifically related to AROUSAL (Soriano 2013: 418). Cross-linguistically well-documented examples of this type (which, as we shall see, certainly include ancient Egyptian) include emotions and personalities based on opposing pairs like warm/cold and sweet/bitter. Such conceptual metaphors, to which Eve Sweetser (1990: 30) gives the overarching term MIND-AS-BODY, are well-attested because they are incredibly effective. Though highly conventionalised, they carry a greater affective load than other comparable expressions, indicated by the fact that they can evoke an affective response in the brain and lead to physical reactions evoking the source domain. In the case of the research of Francesca Citron and Adele Goldberg (2014), this involved taste metaphors (like “sweet”) activating primary and secondary gustatory areas more than literal language (like “kind”). One might suggest that this factor can be modelled as a metonymic basis for the MIND-AS-BODY metaphor, namely, THE EFFECT OF AN EMOTION FOR AN EMOTION,⁵ a subcategory of EFFECT FOR CAUSE.⁶ The MIND-AS-BODY conceptual metaphor has a number of instantiations, which can be seen in the Egyptian corpus, as well as elsewhere, such as EXPERIENCING IS SENSING, MENTAL ACTIVITY IS A PHYSICAL ACTIVITY, MENTAL STATE IS A PHYSICAL STATE, EMOTION IS A NATURAL SOURCE (with the subcategories ANGER IS HEAT [Kövecses 2010: 108] and RESTRAINT IS COLD [Kövecses 2010: 21]) and THE SOCIAL WORLD IS THE PHYSICAL WORLD (Kövecses 2010: 255) (with the subcategory RESTRAINT IS SILENCE) (Di Biase-Dyson 2018). We can see from this list that, though many metaphors may be seen as being culturally specific, or having culturally specific instantiations, a majority, even Egyptian, follow tendencies visible also in other world languages (cf. Kövecses 2005).⁷

All degrees of cross-cultural applicability notwithstanding, we must nevertheless account for the role of a specific cultural context and how it “filters” experience. With respect to emotion, for instance, it must be considered whether different cultures have the same emotions and, in the case that similarities appear, whether they are expressed in ways we can understand (Bender 2009: 299). Andrea Bender (2009: 316) concludes that even if there is a biological basis for a range of emotions across cultural boundaries, the way the emotion is appraised, the expression of emotion in speech and behaviour and also the curbing of emotional expression from external forces is often culturally constrained.

This cautionary note is exemplified by research into the expression of emotion in another ancient language, namely, biblical Hebrew, in which the conceptual metaphors describing emotion show a different relationship between the body and the emotions and also a different basic understanding of emotions than many Western languages. Emotions are rarely internalised, but rather come from outside the body; they are also not as spontaneous, being more connected

to specific causes (Wagner 2017: 216–217). Love, for instance, is rarely understood in relation to the common Western mapping THE BODY IS A CONTAINER, but is more often described as an external force, like fire. It is moreover something that can be demanded of others, and is thus not unmanageable, as emotions are often perceived to be (Müller 2014: 236–237).⁸ When it comes to anger, however, the BODY IS A CONTAINER metaphor is certainly attestable in Hebrew (Wagner 2012: 40–42), as are metaphors from the sensory realm that provide parallels for our Egyptian sources (see section “Heat/warmth”): rage is depicted in terms of hot, fluid, and fiery elements (Wagner 2012: 47–54; 2017: 216). Equally, “bitterness” and “darkness” are used to describe emotional distress (King 2010).

We can also see cultural differences from modern Western metaphors in the textual record of ancient Egypt, in both image and text. Firstly, our cultural distance may mean that we do not understand the subtle cues of emotion (via, for instance, particular gestures). Secondly, the cultural distance is exacerbated by the fact that, in the case of images, their purported function, linked to permanence of the image in a funerary context, would prohibit depictions of anger or distress, at least for elites (Baines 2017: 266–267). As John Baines (2017: 265) in his discussion of the depiction of emotion in Egyptian visual representations shows, “social conventions restricted the expression of emotion on both elite faces and bodies.” We will see this idea mirrored in textual evidence: the concept of passivity, via the sensory phenomenon of silence, is key to elite conceptions of good behaviour (see section “Quiet”). Nevertheless, Alexandra Verbovsek (2011: 237) makes a case for the application of theories of emotion to ancient Egyptian material, despite the fact that the theory, and even the concept of emotion itself, is entirely modern. She scrutinises a wide array of different source types—text, image, the built environment—in order to find “the traces that emotions leave in cultural materials” (Verbovsek 2011: 238) and looks at the way well-attested emotions like joy and sadness are evoked, performed, but also overcome in rituals, such as mourning and coronation. Research into a wider span of emotional states is of course more fraught and requires a great deal of contextual and co-textual comparison on the basis of a substantial corpus.

Historical semantics: metaphor and semantic change

Another theoretical tenet upon which our research draws is that figuration, including metaphor, plays a structuring role in semantic change (Sweetser 1990: 18–22; Traugott and Dasher 2001). The general path for semantic change is modelled as movement from a more concrete meaning to a more abstract one (Sweetser 1990: 21, 31), which in our case would comprise the change from the description of more or less concrete sensory phenomena to that of an emotional domain. We shall be testing this alleged shift on the basis of our data.

Sensory studies

Sensory research, particularly with a historical basis, is of course also key to our work, as sensory phenomena dominate the source domains used to describe emotion and temperament metaphorically. This is likely the case, as Yannis Hamilakis points out, because “[s]ensoriality shapes and organises social life and, perhaps more importantly, activates and evokes affectivity” (Hamilakis 2013: 124). Although “logocentric” approaches, such as ours, have been justly accused of being limiting to studies of the senses (Hamilakis 2013: 68), it must nonetheless be conceded that language is also key to the “differential importance of specific senses across cultures” (Majid and Levinson 2011: 7). Another issue raised by scholars involved with sensory research concerns the cultural boundedness of sensory representation: that the five senses are part of “a Western

folk taxonomy, bequeathed to us since classical antiquity. It is a way of imagining the self and the body” (Hamilakis 2013: 113). Though this argument is also compelling, and in many respects true, this “Procrustean bed” has also provided scholars, especially linguists, with a taxonomic apparatus with which to conduct research that expands our knowledge of what these five senses—in cross-linguistic comparative perspective—can actually mean (Majid and Levinson 2011: 10). Thus, we too orient ourselves in our research towards the five senses, in order to see the potential and limits of this paradigm. The last justifiable criticism concerns the so-called hierarchy of the senses (as proposed by Viberg 1984: 136, 147; discussed by Howes and Classen 2014: 1, 3). Eve Sweetser’s diachronic study of Indo-European languages certainly supported the primacy of vision in the depiction of cognition, or better, intellection and it was justified on the basis that “vision ... is our primary source of objective data about the world” (Sweetser 1990: 39). However, Martine Vanhove (2008: 360) has also shown that non-Indo-European languages show hearing and vision to be used in roughly equal amounts in the depiction of internal and/or intellectual perception. Although it is outside the scope of the current study, it would be interesting to see if a sensory hierarchy in ancient Egyptian (cf. Chapter 27, this volume) has any effect on cases such as ours, in which particular sensory stimuli represent emotional state and temperament.

Research questions

Our research questions take on these theoretical frameworks and confront them with the potential of Egyptian linguistic data:

1. What kinds of sensory phenomena are used to depict specific emotions and temperaments?
2. Can lexemes of emotion and temperament be distinguished semantically from each other? Do compounds play a role here?
3. Do these emotion terms exist in complementary distribution with each other? Are there relationships of synonymy, antonymy, even asymmetry, that we need to take into account?
4. Are diachronic forces of language change at work? If so, what effect do they have?
5. What is the role of genre in the appearance and use of emotion terms?

Method

Our approach hinges on a few different methodological approaches. Our main approach derives from lexical semantics, an approach that takes into consideration two key perspectives: semasiology, which “considers the isolated word and the way its meanings are manifested,” and onomasiology, which “looks at the designations of a particular concept, that is, at a multiplicity of expressions which form a whole” (Baldinger 1980 [1977]: 278). Our approach is a mixture of both, looking first for the words in particular semantic groups then considering the semantic span of each individual lexeme, in order to understand on what semantic basis they were imbued with metaphorical and/or metonymic meaning. Of course, this line of inquiry also has an indisputable formal dimension: the lexical semantic method often rests on specific grammatical features that engender that meaning (see Vanhove 2008: 357; for Egyptian, Winand 2016).

Our approach is moreover historical, focusing on usages of lexemes throughout the entire pharaonic period of Egypt (c. 2700–1070 BCE), and it considers the contexts of use (medium, genre, register) as well as the co-text (presence of matching or asymmetrical pairs, synonymy, antonymy). A diachronic approach is interesting, even just within the pre-classical or pharaonic period of Egyptian history, because there is an increased use of pertinent locutions during the

New Kingdom. This may be due in part to the substantially higher number of sources available, but is nevertheless an interesting feature that we shall explore in detail here. Where relevant, we comment on changes in spelling, particularly the use of classifiers (semantic markers for several classes of Egyptian words),⁹ in cases where the classifier marks a specification of or shift in the meaning towards representing an emotional state. These changes may reflect changing modes of classification due to semantic change (Chantrain 2014; 2019), but may also show alterations according to ad hoc medial or rhetorical needs (Chantrain and Di Biase-Dyson 2017).

Our corpora range from the analogue to the digital. The lexicographical work of all Egyptologists starts with the *Wörterbuch der ägyptischen Sprache* of Adolf Erman and Hermann Grapow (*Wb.*), which is based on massive amounts of data collected around the turn of the twentieth century. The sources on which every meaning is based are accessible via the published *Belegstellen* (references) and the digitised card catalogue used to assemble the dictionary, the *Digitalisiertes Zettelarchiv* (*DZA*). However, the search can never end there: in the last 20 years, two major digital text corpora have been created to vastly increase the data set on which lexical analysis can be conducted and to interrogate the findings of the *Wb.* We have availed ourselves of both: the online diachronic corpus of Ancient Egyptian hosted by the Berlin-Brandenburg and Saxon Academies of Sciences (Germany), the *Thesaurus Linguae Aegyptiae* (*TLA*), as well as the corpus of Late Egyptian Texts based at the Université de Liège, *Projet Ramsès* (*Ramsès*). In its current state (soon to be updated with many more texts via a new database, called Berlin Text System [BTS] Version 3), the *TLA* boasts a corpus of texts of approximately 1.4 million text words from a range of genres (funerary, ritual, epistolary, monumental-rhetorical, literary, poetic, medical and magical texts) spanning over 3,000 years. The *Projet Ramsès* database comprises a corpus of texts from literary, poetic, epistolary, administrative, but also monumental-rhetorical genres (510,000+ tokens; 65,000+ hieroglyphic spellings; 10,000+ lemmata; 4,000+ texts) from the Egyptian New Kingdom–Third Intermediate Period (c. 1550–712 BCE). Though these sources in total reflect massive amounts of diachronic data, they still suffer from being partial, due on the one hand to the ancient Egyptian textual record being very unevenly distributed and on the other hand due to the corpora reflecting the expertise and interests of their compilers.

We searched both corpora for all uses of selected key words for sensory phenomena. For some, the description of an emotional state or temperament was visible at the lexical level in context, for others, emotion was expressed via compounding (or at least collocating) one of these lexemes with a body part like the heart (*ḥ3.tj, jb*),¹⁰ the face (*ḥr*), the mouth (*r'*), or the body/belly (*ḥ.t*), which in a metonymic transfer of INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION shows the body part in question to be a conduit for an emotional state or temperament. The body parts in question are of course not coincidental: the heart was considered the locus of emotion and intelligence (see especially el-Kholy 2003; Toro Rueda 2003; Nyord 2009a: 86–113), the face the medium of expression, the mouth the conduit of enunciation, and the belly the receptacle of emotional load (Nyord 2009a: 55–67).

Findings

Our case studies consider and compare the semantic breadth, use-life, and frequency of lexemes for sensory stimuli that additionally convey meanings relating to emotion and temperament. The consideration of use-life takes in the kinds of contexts (textual, generic, and chronological) in which each lexeme appeared. Often we have taken opposing stimuli and compared them to each other, in order to note where complementarity and where asymmetry exist.

Sounds

There is a natural opposition in Egyptian texts between the presence and absence of sound. The absence of sound, incarnated by the lexeme *gr*, “to be quiet, silent” (*Wb.* V 179.9–180.7), is generally positively connoted, especially in its substantivised form of *gr.w*, “the silent one” (*Wb.* V 180.10–11), whereas phrases such as *jri hrv*, “making noise,” are mostly connected to the actions of intemperate people.

Quiet

The verb *gr*, “to be quiet,” colexifies two kinds of quietness: one referring to an absence of sound but also (when used in reference to the heart) one referring to an absence of motion (or very slow, controlled motion). *gr* moreover refers both to a temperament and to an emotion, since the fact of being quiet (*gr*) means both “to be calm” and “to be peaceful” (*Wb.* V 180.6–7).¹¹ It is attested from the Old Kingdom *Pyramid Texts* (*Wb.* V 179.9) and can be used metaphorically to describe a temperament from the Middle Kingdom on¹² and an emotion (in rarer cases) from the New Kingdom at the latest.¹³ The substantivised form “the silent one” appears around the same time (*Wb.* V 180.10–11) (Di Biase-Dyson 2018: 39–40). *gr* appears in metaphorical collocations with *jb* and *h3.tj* (both lexemes meaning “heart”) to express controlled or absent emotion from the New Kingdom on (*Wb.* V 179.16).

gr, “to be quiet,” is attested in metaphors based on a system of opposition with lexemes from other sensory domains from the Middle Kingdom on (*Wb.* V 180.6–7): it is a synonym of *qb(b)*, “to be cool” (*Wb.* V 180.7),¹⁴ and an antonym not only of *jri hrv*, “to make noise,” (amongst others) but also of *sf*, “to be warm,” and to an extent *3s* “to be fast.” This conceptual asymmetry may emerge because both the metaphors ANGER IS HEAT and RESTRAINT IS SILENCE (the latter being tied to the more general metaphor THE SOCIAL WORLD IS THE PHYSICAL WORLD) have a shared metonymic background: EFFECT OF AN EMOTION FOR AN EMOTION (Di Biase-Dyson 2018: 40–41), which will also be discussed below in relation to heat (see section “Heat/warmth”). Asymmetry might also be tied to the high degree of conventionality of both metaphors (Kimmel 2010: 99).

Quiet versus noise is best illustrated by this classic example from the *Teachings of Ani* (P. Boulaq 4, 17.1–2; Quack 1994: 289):

m-dy.t 33.wt md.wt gr tw hpr=k m nfr m-jr jry hrv <m> hnw n ntr bw.t=f pw sbh.w

Do not allow (yourself) to be one of many words, be quiet, and you will be a good man. Do not make noise <in> the resting place of the god, shouting is his abomination.

The asymmetric (but nevertheless antonymic) pairing of quiet versus hot can be seen in a *Hymn to Thoth* (P. Sallier I, 8.5 = LEM 86.5–7):

dhw.tj t3 hnm.t ndm.t {mj}<n> z jb <hr> h3s.t sw htm.tj n p3 gm(j) r'=f sw wn.tj n p3 gr.w

Thoth, pleasant well <for> the man who is thirsty <in> the desert! It is sealed for the chatty one (lit. he who has found his mouth), but it is open for the silent one.

The asymmetric pairing of quiet versus motion seems to be strictly in relation to the heart being fast. The personification of the “racing heart” when agitated or impatient is of course recognisable to English speakers and can be seen in the *Teaching of a Man for his Son* (O. Michaelides 16, 6–8, § 20.3–6; Fischer-Elfert 1999: Tafelband § 20, 3–6):

nn šs jb šw(j) m ḥrw.w=f [...] jr gr=k ḥpr n=k ph.w(y)

There is no impatient person (lit. one fast of heart) who is free of enemies [...] If you remain quiet, you will have a good outcome (lit: an end will happen for you).

A combination of these properties—and more—can be seen in a highly conventionalised and metaphorically-laden, self-laudatory inscription from the tomb of the noble Amenemope, called Tjanefer (Theban Tomb 297, 18th Dynasty; *DZA* 30.668.130):

jnk gr qb šf ndm jb dns šhr.w qb dd md.t

I am a calm (lit. silent) one, who soothes tempers (lit. cools warmth), one kind of intentions (lit. sweet of heart), serious (lit. heavy) of plans, cool (i.e. calm) when he makes speeches.

The sheer amount of multisensory metaphors, of sound, temperature, taste, and touch, are key to metaphors for personality in autobiographical texts like this one from the Middle Kingdom on.

Just like in modern languages, however, silence is not always a good quality to have: being silent and (inherently) subscribing to a mob mentality was considered as dangerous in ancient Egypt as it is now. In *The Teachings of Ani* (P. Boulaq 4, 21.19–20; Quack 1994: 323), the sage warns:

j.jr <tw> ruw r rml rgy jw ḥš.tj gr m-ḥmw pš ms^c

Keep <yourself> away from rebellious people when the heart is silent in the middle of a crowd (or: an army).¹⁵

The lack of opposition (for good or bad) seems to be key to the semantics of *gr*, “quiet”: it is a state of non-marked emotion, a state of balance, without alarm.

Noise

We have already addressed noise in its antonymic relation to quiet, where it is tied to a disruptive temperament. However, two things need to be mentioned here. Firstly, whereas the idea of “silence” is generated by a single lexeme, as we have seen by the prior examples, no such coherence exists when it comes to noise, so already there is a significant degree of lexical asymmetry in the metaphor.¹⁶ Secondly, making sound is not always an indication of a negative emotion or temperament. Two lexemes are worth a look in this respect: *jḥj*, “to make a loud noise,” and, by extension, “to express a strong emotion” (*Wb.* I, 118.2) and *ḥḏḏ*, “to cheer” but also “to be happy (in a loud way)” (*Wb.* I, 241.11–14). Such cases are best characterised as metonyms, such as EXPRESSION OF AN EMOTION FOR AN EMOTION. Other cases of this same metonymy exist outside of the realm of sounds: *tm*, “to look down” also means “to be ashamed,” but being a non-sensory metonym it falls outside the purview of this chapter.

jḥj, “to make a loud noise” and “to express a strong emotion,” is attested from the Old Kingdom. In the *Pyramid Texts* (e.g., *Pyramid Text* 359 [§ 594a T]; Sethe 1908: 316) it carries the meaning of “complaining.”¹⁷ However, the sound is clearly linked to emotion in a magical papyrus from the New Kingdom (P. Leiden I 348, rto 13.11, Spell 29; Borghouts 1971: 28, pl. 13):

ḥnw sgšbw n(.j) šhm.t jḥj m-ḥmw ḥw.t-ḥ.t

The sound of the shrieking of [the goddess] Sachmet, who is rejoicing (*jḥj*) inside the great temple.

ꜥꜥꜥꜥ, “to cheer” and “to be happy (in a loud way),” is attested somewhat later, in the New Kingdom. A person and also their personified heart (*jb*) can be presented as being happy in this way. When a person does it, it often comes with *ꜥꜥꜥꜥ* (“to be pleased,” which makes it likely that the more literal “to cheer” is meant by ꜥꜥꜥꜥ.¹⁸ With the heart as the agent, however, only the more metaphorical sense of emotion can be meant, as seen in a love poem (O. Cairo CGC 25218 + O. DeM 1266, 14, Group A, Song 20; Mathieu 2008: pl. 18):

sn.t jy.tj jb=j hr ꜥꜥꜥꜥ

My lover (lit. sister) has arrived! My heart is rejoicing.

Temperatures

Temperatures (cold/cool and hot/warm) are very commonly used in the expression of emotions and temperaments.¹⁹ Psychological tests (Gibbs 1994) and cross-linguistic studies (Kövecses 2000b; Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2011) have indicated fairly conclusively that anger is commonly described metaphorically in terms of heat across a range of cultures and languages. The studies conducted by Benjamin Wilkowski et al. (2009: 474) go even further, supporting Ray Gibbs’ (2006) hypothesis that “the conceptualization of anger involves a cognitive simulation of heat.” This suggests at the descriptive level of the conceptual path that the expressions are more than metaphors. They are rather metaphonymies,²⁰ since the metonym EFFECT OF AN EMOTION FOR AN EMOTION lies at the basis of the metaphors ANGER IS HEAT and RESTRAINT IS COLD. However, as the surface form of the passages is metaphorical, we shall be referring to these tropes as “metaphors” in the chapter.

Heat/warmth

Hot temperatures, expressed by lexemes like *tꜥ*, “to be hot, to burn”; *šmm*, “to be hot”; and to a limited extent also the less intense *stꜥ*, “to be warm,” and the noun *nsr*, “fire,”²¹ are associated with anger and impulsivity, a transfer that is well-attested cross-linguistically (Lakoff and Kövecses 1987).

The verb *tꜥ*, “to be hot” (*Wb. V*, 229.1–15), attested from the Old Kingdom, in later periods carries also the metaphorical meaning of “to be angry” (*Wb. V*, 229.11–14) and is either used alone²² or in relation to *r*, “mouth, speech.”²³ These rare usages are found in the so-called *Negative Confessions* (Chapter 125) in the *Book of the Dead*, which appeared in tombs from the New Kingdom on.

More commonly, *tꜥ* is to be found in compounds with body parts, such as the body/belly (*h.t*), heart (*jb*), and mouth (*r*) (*Wb. V*, 229.12–14), whereby it generates linguistic metaphors based around ANGER IS HEAT (IN A CONTAINER) (see also Effland 2003: 76; Köhler 2016: 119–126). However, though these compounds depicting heat inside the body reflect an angry temperament, they are not used to express a more transient emotion. The phrase *tꜥ-h.t*, “hot of body/belly,” is rare, and is perhaps exclusive to the Middle Kingdom wisdom text *The Teachings of Ptahhotep* (P. Prisse = P. BN 186–194, 11.5; Zába 1956: 44; and P. BM EA 10509, 6.4–5; Caminos 1956: pl. 28)²⁴ to refer (as a substantive) to someone with a violent temper.²⁵ Heat in relation to the heart, in the composite *tꜥ-jb*, “hot of heart,” to describe an aggressive antagonist, also occurs first in the Middle Kingdom *Teachings of Ptahhotep* (P. Prisse = P. BN 186–194, 12.2–3 and P. BM EA 10509, 4.9; Zába 1956: 46 and 35)²⁶ and after the New Kingdom in the *Book of the Dead*, Chapter 28 II (P. BM 10793, 16.16; Munro 1996: Tf. 17). However, it is not frequently attested.²⁷ Lastly, the compound involving the mouth, the substantive *tꜥ-r*, “hot of mouth,”²⁸ is found in

the New Kingdom *Teachings of Amenemope* (P. BM 10474, 5.10; Laisney 2007: 331) to refer to someone impulsive and choleric:

m jr(j) nhb tttt irm p3 t3-r'

Do not start an argument with the hot-mouth.

šmm, “to be hot, warm” (*Wb.* IV, 468.1–15), similarly to the expressions based on *β*, can be used for the expression of temperament, but in contrast to *β*, the metaphorical use is only attested from the New Kingdom on, though the lexeme itself is attested from the Old Kingdom. The verbal usage, “to be hot” (*Wb.* IV, 468.1–15), can refer to being argumentative, even litigious, as seen in legal documents from the late 18th Dynasty (P. Berlin P 9784, 8–9; Gardiner 1906: 28–29):

ḥḥ.n p3 hrw 2 ḥr šm m ḥm(.t) ḥmw.t

Then the two work days were contested (lit. hot) with the servant Henut.

The substantive form, *šmm*, “the hot one” (*Wb.* IV, 469.1–2), attested only from the late New Kingdom, is someone with a choleric, impulsive temper (see Di Biase-Dyson 2018: 34; also Effland 2003: 76; Toro Rueda 2003: 103). *šmm* can be used with this meaning both alone or in the expression *šmm-r*, “hot-mouth.”²⁹ In the following invocation, someone demands the “hot-mouth” in question to go to a cold place in winter and a hot place in summer—to be damned, in other words (O. Leipzig 8, 1–5, Černý and Gardiner 1957: pl. 7.5; Fischer-Elfert 1986b: 8–12):

yh šm(j)=k r j3bt.t p3 šm(m)-r' nn jn(j).tw=k wnn=k n šw.t qb.y m tr n pr.t wnn=k n qḥ šmm m tr n {pw(?) n} šmw

Oh, may you go off East, o hot-mouth! You should not be brought back, but rather belong to the cool shade in the wintertime and belong to the warm corner in the summertime!³⁰

Seven of the eleven attestations of the “hot-mouth” in the New Kingdom corpus (*Ramsès*) are from *The Teachings of Amenemope*, where he is associated with loud storms and animals of prey,³¹ storms and fires,³² and perhaps because of this, he is contrasted with a quiet person, a pairing which would otherwise seem asymmetrical.³³

The verb *stf*, “to be warm, to make warm” (*Wb.* IV, 195.6–13), does not have any clearly attested metaphorical cases relating to emotion, though one fragmentary case, linking being warm (*stf*), quiet (*gr*), and cool (*qb*), makes it very likely that in this case we simply lack good sources.³⁴ On the other hand, the substantive form, “warmth” (*Wb.* IV, 196.1–5), is clearly linked to emotion (*Wb.* IV, 196.7–10), appearing commonly with *d3r*, “to control,” to mean “restrained” (*Wb.* V, 478.11). This phrase can also appear in relation to silence,³⁵ as seen on the statue of Amenemope, Cairo TN 8/6/24/10, 10–11; Ockinga 2004: 91):

gr.w m3c d3r stf

A truly reserved person (lit. silent one), whose temper (lit. warmth) was under control.

The expression *stf-jb*, “warm of heart” (*Wb.* IV, 195.10), is used to express the temperament of being “zealous.” This expression seems to be chiefly attested from the Old Kingdom, in the context of captions on tomb walls portraying discussions between workers who are carrying out tasks for the tomb owner (Chapel of Sekhem-ankh-ptah in Saqqara, south wall, 1; Simpson 1976: 10–16, fig. 5–10, pl. D):

jšst pw rf t3y srf-jb

Who is the zealous man?

The only other attested cases within this scope of meaning from the pharaonic period come from the New Kingdom tomb autobiography of the vizier Rekhmire, lines 36 and 41 (*Urk.* IV 1082.8 and 1084.5). We can conclude that this lexeme, which indicates less intensity of temperature compared to its counterparts, is also semantically more ambivalent: as in English, “warmth” can relate to being excitable, but also carries the positive meaning of being zealous. More intense heat-based metaphors of the Old and Middle Kingdoms that are more closely linked to excessive emotion or temperament, based on the lexemes *nsr* and *tš*, were eclipsed in the second half of the New Kingdom by *šm(m)* (Di Biase-Dyson 2018: 37). All cases are decisively linked more to temperament than to emotion.

Cold/coolness

As opposed to warmth, which expresses rather negative behaviours and states of mind, coolness can be associated to positive ideas, to temperance and ease. That being said, we shall see that a negative association can also be made, which in English and in other languages is associated with the more extreme temperature of “cold.” Unfortunately, unlike the lexical gradations of warm/hot temperatures, Egyptian does not disambiguate lexically between “cool” and “cold,” so it is harder to distinguish the level of intensity. In any case, as regards the positive aspect, the association of cool temperatures with positive features seems natural in a country where the climate is very hot and dry. The verb *qbb*, “to be cool, fresh,” can be used metaphorically with the meaning “to be quiet, calm” already from the Old Kingdom on. A further metaphorical meaning develops in the New Kingdom, as we shall see presently.

The earlier cases of *qbb* in relation to emotion are as adjectives in expressions with *jb*, “heart,” already from the Old Kingdom, as seen in *Pyramid Text* 32 (§ 22b W) (Sethe 1908: 15):

jw(j).n(=j) jn(j).n(=j) n=k jr.t-hr.w qb jb=k hr=s

That (I) came and that (I) brought you the Eye of Horus was so your heart could be calm (lit. cool) because of it.

Metaphorical usage of *qbb* in autobiographies of the Middle Kingdom goes in two directions. It appears in relation to speech, as we see on the stela of Ibi (Cairo JE 46200, 7; Kubisch 2008: 235–236): *qb r' hr(w) tš.w*, “Calm (lit. cool) of speech (lit. mouth) and comforting of words,” and it manifests in relation to temperate behaviour, being connected with the aforementioned *srf*, “heat:” *qb(b) srf*, “one who cools warmth” (*Wb.* V, 23.B.17).³⁶

Once the verb *qb(b)* comes to be used alone and metaphorically, it seems to have shifted somewhat in its semantic value, no longer simply meaning “calm” but also “without passion” (*Wb.* V, 23.B.4–8). For instance, a passage in the New Kingdom *Teaching of Amunakht* criticises the attitude of the one who wants to be left to his own devices (O. Lacau = HO III/3, rto 8–9; Dorn 2004: 41):

šb(j)=k [tw=tw] hr šnh qbb nn mtr.t

You wish that one could live detached (lit. cool, perhaps cold?) without being watched over (lit. witnessed).

The negative connotation of the word seems in any case to have grown, which could explain why there is no personification of a “cool man” in later Ramesside wisdom literature and also why “coolness” (in particular in contrast to heat) seems to be used less to represent a positive attribute (Di Biase-Dyson 2018: 39).

The lexeme *qbḥ*, like *qbb*, is used in relation to being “cool,” “pleasant”³⁷ or, relating even more to temperament and emotion, “calm”/“quiet,” as seen in the example directly below. The difference between *qbb* and *qbḥ* is not clear, but it seems that *qbḥ* was not used as often for metaphorical expressions. In general, *qbḥ* is less often attested³⁸ and has no adjective linked to it. One case, however, can be seen here from an early source, a letter to the dead from the Old Kingdom (Cairo Linen = JdE 25975, K7–8; Gardiner and Sethe 1928: pl. I, IA):

j<w>=s hr jt(j).t ḥt.(w) nb n.y ḥm=k r-sḏ jt(j).t wn.t nb m pr(w)=k jn wnn jb=k qbḥ r=s

She is taking all the attendants of your lordship away, after taking everything from your house—are you going to be calm (lit. cool) about it?

Visual stimuli

Emotion and temperament are encoded via particular visual stimuli, such as colours, shades, and also physical beauty—though apparently not ugliness, for which there seems to be no lexeme in Egyptian, perhaps because it did not conform to the kind of visual and textual discourse key to Egyptian cultural output. Our research indicates that colours per se seem only very rarely to be tied to specific emotional states. Egyptian thought is tied more to shades and luminosity rather than different colours, which might have to do with the solar ideology key to Egyptian religion, since the link between sun/light versus not-sun/darkness is to an extent the link between life and death, between well-being and danger, that is tied to visibility and by extension to joy, as we see in a whole range of solar hymns (Assmann 1995: 75) as well as in a love song (P. Harris 500, 7.4, Grapow 1924: 43). That being said, the argument for cultural specificity may be saying too much—psychological studies linking brightness and happiness indicate that this is a fundamental feature of human perception (Meier and Robinson 2004).

Colour

There has been quite a bit of work done with colour from the perspective of linguistic typology, but comparatively little has been done with the semantic span of colour terms, particularly extending to what else a colour term could mean besides colour. To sketch briefly what is a complex and contentious issue, Egyptian language used four basic colour terms, all of which are derived from verbs: “black/dark” (*kmm*), “white/light” (*ḥd*), “red/yellow, with the focus on red” (*dšr*),³⁹ and “green/blue, with the focus on green” (*wḏd*)⁴⁰ as well as a range of non-basic colour terms that, as adjectives derived from nouns, refer to colours of specific objects, like “turquoise-like” (*mḥk3.ty*) (Schenkel 2007: 226; 2019: 43).⁴¹ Interestingly, the four basic colour terms are also the same four colour terms used together in ritual (Baines 2007 [1985]: 244; Pinch 2001: 183). It must be noted that *kmm* and *ḥd* are best regarded as shades, establishing degrees of luminosity, rather than as colours proper (Schenkel 2019: 38), which shall be discussed more in detail in the section “Shade and luminosity.”

Unfortunately, considering the impressive research being undertaken into colour and emotion in relation to modern languages (for instance Soriano and Valenzuela 2009), our analysis suggests that the only colour clearly tied to an emotion or personality characteristic in Egyptian is *dšr*, “red.” Although *wḏd*, “green,” has positive connotations, these references are exclusively tied to

“flourishing,” showing an etymological link with the fecundity of the natural environment, and are not emotive.⁴² On the other hand, the semantic pathways of *dšr*, “to be red,” in relation to anger are significant (cf. Köhler 2016: 115). The semantics of “being red” in relation to “raging” and “anger” is closely linked to heat, fire, and perhaps also blood, which shows that even basic colour terms, which are supposed to be “abstract,” have a close semantic connection to coloured objects and phenomena. The meaning may moreover go even deeper into an embodied reaction to an emotion: an angry person does indeed become red and warm (because of heightened blood pressure). Thus, a physical symptom is used to refer to the emotion triggering it. Red is also tied to a number of mythical antecedents, which very likely have an impact on the semantics. The *Pyramid Texts* of the Old Kingdom refer to the chaotic “red land, desert” (*dšr.t*), living quarters of the god Seth, in contrast to the fertile valley, the “black land” (*km.t*) (Mathieu 2009: 29–30). Red symbolises danger in magical texts, in the form of (*j*)*h.t dšr.t*, “red things” (Ebers 2 = P. Ebers 1.14), as well as in execration ritual texts, where enemies’ names were written in red (Pinch 2001: 184). The injured red eye (in ritual made of carnelian) contrasts the blue eye (lapis lazuli) in the myth of the Eye of Horus.⁴³

All that being said, the first clear connection between redness and emotion comes in the form of a compound with *jb* (the heart) in the Middle Kingdom, and it seems that the semantics does not significantly change until the Greco-Roman period, when both red (*dšr*) and carnelian-coloured (*hrs*) can mean “angry”⁴⁴ and “evil”⁴⁵ (Schenkel 2007: 219). The “red heart” in the pharaonic period clearly refers to an emotion, contingent on a specific situation (Tomb of Hapidjefai/Djefaihapi in Asyut, hall, east wall, south, 230):

dšr jb m33=f tkr

One who is angry (lit. red of heart) when he sees an opponent.

Shade and luminosity

Much more abundant in relation to emotion and temperament are shades or degrees of luminosity. This is apparently common in pre-industrial societies: “It would seem that natural languages develop their terms for dark and light, dry or dusty and moist or fresh before they developed a supplementary set of colour terms” (Quirke 2001: 187, based on Lyons 1995: 212). If this is the case, it is understandable why conventionalised metaphors relating to emotion or temperament would derive from these qualities instead. Moreover, psychological research has indicated clearly that not only are light and dark useful and common metaphors for positive and negative polarity in discourse, but also that these light/dark metaphors actually shape the automatic conceptual representation of good and bad qualities (Meier et al. 2007: 374).

Lightness, brightness

In Egyptian, in the case of *hḏ*, the colour “white,” the shade “light,” and the degree of luminosity “bright, shiny” seem to be conflated with each other. The fact that not colour, but rather “to be clear, light” can be attributed to the Afroasiatic cognates of *hḏ*, Hebrew *šḥw*, and Syrian *šḥy*, *šḥḥ* “to be clear, light/bright” (Osing 2001: 579) indicates that the use as a colour term at all is an Egyptian development, and perhaps even in Egyptian a subsidiary to the other meanings. In any case, the shade/degree of luminosity continues to be profiled in the semantics of the colour term (Schenkel 2007: 225). The finding significant for our research is that the cases bearing metaphorical meaning (of which there are many) seem to be profiling not the colour white but rather brightness and luminosity to depict the emotion of joy. That being said, though there are several words (verbs and adjectives) for “bright,” only *hḏ*, “to be bright, light, white” (*Wb*.

III, 207.17–208.6), together with its causative counterpart *shd*, “to brighten” (*Wb.* IV, 224.16–226.6), are in any way connected to emotion or temperament.⁴⁶

From the 11th Dynasty on (Middle Kingdom), when in combination with *hr* (face), i.e., “bright of face,” it can mean (as a compounded adjective, but more often as a looser collocation) “joyful, happy, generous” (*Wb.* III 207.16). In contrast to other comparable constructions, and contrary to appearances in the *TLA* corpus, there seems to be no compound with *jb* (heart), at least in texts from the pharaonic period.⁴⁷ The earliest attestation, from the Old Kingdom *Pyramid Texts*, seems to describe a transient emotion of “being happy” in relation to a specific event (*Pyramid Text* 581 (§ 1554b P); Sethe 1910: 332):

h3(j) htp.wt-ntr.w hḏ hr rmt.(w) h3(j) jb ntr.w

Divine offerings will descend—the face of the people will be happy (lit. bright) and the heart of the gods will rejoice.

Sources from the Middle Kingdom attest the meaning of the temperament “to be generous, kind” for the first time, as we see in *The Teachings of Ptahhotep* (P. Prisse = P. BN 186–194, 14.12, § 481; Žába 1956: 54):

hḏ hr=k tr n wnn=k

May you be friendly (lit. may your face be bright) for the duration of your existence.⁴⁸

hḏ can be tied to other body parts too, such as the intestines (*jmy.wt-h.t*), but the subsequent meaning is not related to emotion or temperament, but rather to brilliant thoughts.⁴⁹ The shade bright/shiny seems thus inherently linked to positive states and emotions. That being said, light can take a negative connotation in relation to (very welcome) shade.⁵⁰

Darkness

Whereas light and brightness are generally positively connotated, darkness, conversely, is linked to negative contexts, states, and emotions (Salmas 2013: 199; Hsu 2021: 80). However, this general connotation is reflected on a semi-literal level. Physical darkness (lack of sun or light) can be associated with danger and difficulty, but, like noise discussed above (section “Noise”), it is not fully lexicalised, and is instead rather suggested by the context. None of the verbs for “to be dark”—*wḥ* (*Wb.* I, 352.3–4), *snk* (*Wb.* IV, 175.11–13), and *kmm* (*Wb.* V, 124.6–8)—are clearly connected to metaphorical meaning.⁵¹

Of the substantives, the colour *kmm*, “black, darkness,” is never metaphorical, and *wh3* (*Wb.* I, 352.5–10; *TLA* 49060), a term for “darkness” attested from the New Kingdom, has an uncertain metaphorical usage.⁵²

kkw (*Wb.* V, 142–143.15; *TLA* 165680), though it often refers to “darkness” as a negative experience, always sits on the border between literal and figurative meaning. The lexeme is attested from the Old Kingdom and adopts a metaphorical meaning from the New Kingdom, in which “seeing darkness by day” (*m33 kk.w hr.t/m hrw*), is tied to being neglected, even punished, by the god.⁵³ In magical texts, putting someone in darkness means having power over them (P. mag. Harris 501 = pBM EA 10042, vso 1.10–2.1; Leitz 1999: pl. 21–22):

juw=j <r?> sth3=k nhm msdr.t=k dj.t n=k kk.w tm dj.t hḏ

I <will>⁵⁴ drive you away and take away your hearing and give you darkness—there being no light!

By comparison, another term for “darkness,” *snk.t* (*Wb.* IV, 176.4–10), is well-attested in connection with a negative temperament. It is used in relation to a person being *šw m snk.t*, “free from darkness” (e.g., the Inscription of Kai, Hatnub Graffito 24, 3; Anthes 1928: 54–55), and links darkness with obscurity and untrustworthiness. The lexeme is attested from the early Middle Kingdom, but in this case immediately in connection with the metaphorical meaning of “untrustworthiness.” Perhaps the lack of data from the Old Kingdom is a hindrance here.⁵⁵

Physical beauty

The verb *‘n(j)* and the corresponding adjective mean “to be beautiful, kind, pleasing” (*Wb.* I, 190.1–18; *TLA* 38070). Both the more basic meaning of “beauty” and the more metaphorical meaning of “kindness” seem, according to the corpus, to emerge around the same time in the Middle Kingdom. On its own, *‘n(j)* expresses a personal characteristic, “being pleasant,” rather than an emotion, as seen in the tomb biography of Sarenput I (Qubbet el-Hawa 36, façade, right side, 2; *Urk.* VII 6.12):

‘n(j) n nzw mry qnb.t=f rh.n rmt.(w) hz(w).t=f

One pleasing (lit. beautiful) to the king, whose council is beloved, whose favour people have known.

However, in specific compounds the meaning can also express emotion: *‘n(j) hr* (“to be beautiful of face”) means “to be happy” (*Wb.* I, 190.13–14; *TLA* 38200) whereas *‘n(j) jb* (“to be beautiful of heart”) means “to be kind” (*Wb.* I, 190.15). Both of them are attested from the New Kingdom. Thus, the expression *‘n(j)*, used alone or with *jb*, refers to the character of a person, as we see in the reference to the Bedouin in the satirical *Letter of Hori* (P. Anastasi I, 23.8; Fischer-Elfert 1983: 140):

bw ‘n jb=sn

Their hearts are not kind (lit. beautiful).

On the other hand, *‘n(j) hr* seems to refer to a temporary state of mind (emotion), which makes sense because it may be referring to a facial expression in the text of the Great Stela of the Sphinx (*Urk.* IV 1280.8):

hr.w ‘n m m33 n=f

The faces were joyful (lit. beautiful) while looking at him.

The highly polysemous verb *nfr*, which can mean “beautiful,” “good,” “perfect,” “effective,” and so forth (*Wb.* II, 253.1–256.15),⁵⁶ has a tendency, like *‘n(j)*, of forming compounds to indicate emotion or temperament. With *jb*, “heart,” it can indicate both a temperament (the first example) and an emotion (the second example).

In the Giza mastaba of Kai-Her-Ptah (G 5560, burial chamber, east wall, legend of scene, l.4, Junker, Giza VIII, Abb. 56) we read:

jnk sh3.w jqr n(.j)-mrw.t nfr(.w)-jb hr(w)-s.t-jb juw.tj sdr.n rmt nb špty (j)r=f

I am an effective, beloved, contented (lit. beautiful of heart) and completely happy scribe, about whom no-one spends the night angry.

In the fantastic narrative cycle of *Papyrus Westcar* from the Second Intermediate Period, the king's mood is described thus (P. Berlin P 3033, 12.7–8; de Buck 1948: 87.9).⁵⁷

wn.jn jb=f nfr r (j)h.t nb.t

Then he was overjoyed (lit. his heart was beautiful) more than anything.

The association of *nfr* and *jb* for expressing a temperament is attested very early, already from the Old Kingdom. However, the expression *nfr hr*, “beautiful of face,” appears later, in the Second Intermediate Period, for the expression of a temperament. It is not considered as a compound by the databases, but is a known collocation (*Wb.* II, 255.5–9). The corpus attests the metaphorical usage, “friendly face/expression,” only from the New Kingdom in the *Book of the Dead* 141/2 (P. BM EA 10477 = P. Nu), 62; Lapp 1997: pl. 44):

n jr.jw zmy.t dd.yw hr nfr

For the protectors (lit. those pertaining to) of the necropolis, who put on a friendly (lit. beautiful) face/expression.

It seems thus that there is a degree of complementarity between *nfr jb* and *nfr hr*, though the first case expresses both emotion (joyful) and temperament (contented) and the second one only a temperament (friendly).

Tastes

Sweetness and bitterness are closely associated to the expression of positive and negative emotions respectively. The lexemes used to express the idea of sweetness are *bnj* (early spelling *bnr*) (*Wb.* I, 462.7–463.6) and *ndm* (*Wb.* II, 380.1–18). In a metaphorical sense, they can refer to a pleasant emotion, to something or someone that brings joy. Bitterness is expressed by two lexemes as well: *jen* (*Wb.* I, 140.4–5) and *dhr* (*Wb.* V, 482.14–483.4). The association of the source domains of sweetness and bitterness to positive and negative elements respectively is attested cross-linguistically,⁵⁸ which may be tied to the fact that the metaphorical activation of this source domain has shown to be more engaging than similar literal expressions.⁵⁹ The opposing concepts of sweetness and bitterness appear together in some rhetorically forceful Ramesside texts to form an antonymic semantic system, as we shall also see below (section “Bitterness”).

Sweetness

bnj, “sweet,” appears in the Old Kingdom and is attested in a metaphorical way for “pleasant” from the Middle Kingdom at the latest.⁶⁰ It does not seem to be part of specific compounds or idioms nor does it seem to ever refer to an emotion per se, but represents either the element potentially triggering an emotion (sweet of charm,⁶¹ sweet of love⁶²), or the character of a person.⁶³

Though not a compound like the cases above, *bnj* can also be used in relation to a single body part, namely the lips. It seems to express the pleasantness (however superficial) of a social encounter⁶⁴ or the promise of romantic love.⁶⁵ The latter case we find in a love poem (P. Chester Beatty I, vso C 1.2–3; Mathieu 2008: pl. 1):

ḥn(j){.t} ir.ty<=s> (hr) gmlh bnj sp.t=s (hr) md.t

<Her> eyes are beautiful when glancing, her lips are pleasant/inviting (lit. sweet) when talking.

Sweetness (both *bnj* and *ndm*) can also refer attributively to words,⁶⁶ to plans,⁶⁷ or substantively to refer to “sweet people.”⁶⁸ Of course, it can also refer to things being pleasant,⁶⁹ which is not the focus of this chapter.

The lexeme *ndm* is used many times in a metaphorical way with the meaning “pleasant,” “friendly” or “useful, beneficial”; it is less specific in reference to sweetness (as a taste) than *bnj*. The meaning of “pleasant” can refer to situations⁷⁰ (*Wb.* II, 380.15–16) or words (*Wb.* II, 379.4),⁷¹ but, in contrast to *bnj*, it cannot refer to a “sweet person.” However, in collocations with *jb* and *h3.tj* (both meaning “heart”),⁷² the lexeme expresses the emotion of “joy” (*Wb.* II, 379.15–17), as seen in a *Hymn to Amun* (P. Leiden I 350, 2.23; Zandee 1947: pl. II):

js.wt m hnw jb=sn ndm

The crew is in exaltation; they are joyful (lit. their hearts are sweet).⁷³

Bitterness

The lexeme *jkn* seems to appear exclusively in *The Teachings of Amenemope*,⁷⁴ so our translation is based on parallels with another lexeme for bitterness, *dhr*, which was, like *jkn*, placed in parallel to the potential antonyms for sweetness, *bnj* and *ndm* (Laisney 2007: 130).⁷⁵ A paradigmatic example for *jkn* in *Amenemope* associates *bnj* (sweet, pleasant) to *jkn* (bitter, unpleasant), both lexemes being used in a metaphorical way. It illustrates the contrast between the form and the content of speech, highlights the lack of sincerity of the speaker, who speaks out of repressed anger (here figuratively realised as “fire”). Moreover, in a metaphorical way, it shows that the further from the surface that the body part is in the body, the truer the emotion (*Amenemope*, P. BM 10474, 13.6; Laisney 2007: 342):

sp.ty=f bnj ns.t=f jkn t3 h.t rkh.tw m h.t=f

His lips are sweet, but his tongue is bitter. The anger (lit. fire) burns in his body.

The other lexeme for bitterness, *dhr*, has very little attestation of a metaphorical usage in relation to people’s temperaments or emotions. Nevertheless, the causative form of the verb, *sdhr*, “to make bitter,” is attested in a single case (with two parallels), in *The Teachings of Ptahhotep*, from the Middle Kingdom (P. BM EA 10509, 4.16; also P. BM EA 10371+10435, a.7, § D305; Žába 1956: 40):

juw=f sdhr=f hnms bj

He makes the kind (lit. sweet) friend angry (lit. bitter).

In the New Kingdom, *dhr* is used attributively to describe unpleasant talk, especially in contrast to *bnj* and *ndm*: in *Amenemope* (P. BM 10474, 25.12–13; Laisney 2007: 360), the “man who says the pleasant (lit. sweet) thing (*p3 ndm*)” is contrasted to the rich man with “unpleasant (lit. bitter) utterances (*hn dhr*),” and almost the same thing appears in *Ani*, in the satirical *Letter of Hori*⁷⁶ and in the *Oracular Amuletic Decrees* (P. BM 10083 [L1], 26).

Tactile stimuli

A range of sensory phenomena related to touch, such as textures, weights, and surfaces, come into play to represent temperaments metaphorically, but it must be noted that very few of these metaphors seem to be used to portray emotions (*nh3*, “uneven,” is the standout case here). In

relation to textures, three oppositions are considered here: uneven versus smooth/even, heavy versus light and firm versus soft.⁷⁷ Only the second pairing, heavy and light, are brought into metaphorical opposition in Egyptian texts and will be discussed together. The first group we observe is the concept of being “uneven,” expressed by *nh3* (*Wb.* II, 290.5–140) and “smooth, even,” expressed by the verb *n^{cc}* (*Wb.* II, 208.2–9).

Unevenness

The lexeme *nh3*, “to be uneven,” often rendered nominally as *nh3.t*, “unevenness,” attested from the Old Kingdom, is used in the emotional sphere either to refer to someone of uneven or angry behaviour, presumably connected to unpredictability,⁷⁸ or, in connection with *jb*, in relation to “heartbreak,” or some other kind of emotional instability (*Wb.* II, 291.4). The usage of the lexeme with *jb* seems to be attested from the Middle Kingdom, an early attestation coming from *The Discourse of a Man with his Ba* (P. Berlin P 3024, 56–57; Faulkner 1956: 23):

jr sh3k qrs nh3.t-jb pw

As for you remembering a burial—it only means (lit. is) heartbreak.⁷⁹

From the New Kingdom, the emotional sense of the lexeme on its own is also attested (*Teachings of Ani*, P. Boulaq 4, 22.9; Quack 1994: 328):

pn^{cc}=f h3z(j).t=f 3s m-s3 wnw.t=f nh3.t

He will change his favour quickly after his moment of anger (lit. unevenness).

Earlier cases, such as from Old Kingdom offering lists⁸⁰ or medical texts from the Second Intermediate Period and New Kingdom, show that the basic meaning can be related to physical abnormality.⁸¹ This is supported by the fact that the classifier used for *nh3* is often the one of the pustules (Gardiner Sign Aa2 𓂏), used for negative things in general, but also, more precisely, for negative elements in relation with the body: diseases, putrefaction, fluids, and so on.

Smoothness

Used alone, *n^{cc}*, “smooth,” can be read metaphorically as “free” in the sense of being a “libertine.”⁸² When used in a compound with *jb*, “heart,” *n^{cc}* takes on the more positive, and more emotionally driven connotation of being “calm.”⁸³ *n^{cc} jb* and its associated metaphorical meaning are attested from the First Intermediate Period, in autobiographical texts, like the stela of Rediwickhnum (Cairo CG 20543, A4; Landgráfová 2011: 74):

rh tp-h3sb n(j) jr(j).t n^{cc} jb dmj n sr.(w)

One who knows the correct method of doing (things), one calm (lit. smooth of heart), who associates with (lit. connects to) officials.

Heaviness and lightness

A true metaphorical opposition in the realm of touch is between “heavy” and “light.” “Heavy” is expressed in Egyptian by *dns* (*Wb.* V, 468.3–469.8) and *wdn* (*Wb.* I, 390.1–15) and its causative counterpart *sudn*, “make heavy” (*Wb.* IV, 78.5), both from at least the Old Kingdom. *dns* can mean “serious” or “difficult” in reference to a situation,⁸⁴ but it can also be used to refer to a person being “important”⁸⁵ or “serious,” also in an ironic way.⁸⁶ *wdn*, in its metaphorical usage, means “difficult,” in the sense that a situation weighs a person down,⁸⁷ but in reference to

personal qualities it means “important.” The metaphorical meanings of both lexemes had already developed by the end of the First Intermediate Period (for *wdn*) and the early Middle Kingdom (for *dns*), as we see in autobiographical texts (stela of Djari, Cairo JE 41437, 5; Landgráfová 2011: 8):

jnk wdn m-m sr.w w3(j) jb 3<.t> z3(j).t

I was one important (lit. weighty) amongst the officials, one with a planning mind (lit. heart) (at) the moment of striking.

The verb *jzj*, “to be light” (*Wb.* I, 128.4), can refer to a low degree of difficulty of a task,⁸⁸ as in English, but it can also refer to being “careless” or “weak” (of character), also “insignificant,”⁸⁹ and the compound *jzj jb*, “light of heart,” can refer to a “careless person.”⁹⁰ The lexeme is attested from the Middle Kingdom, and the meaning relating to character dates to around the same time, as we see from the following example from the *Eloquent Peasant* (P. Berlin P 3023, 191; Parkinson 1991: 29.4–5), which contrasts both weights metaphorically to great rhetorical effect:

m jzj jw=k dns.t(j)—m dd grg

Don’t be careless (lit. light), because you are important (lit. heavy)—don’t tell lies!

Heaviness and lightness are thus to a certain extent a symmetrical pair, since heaviness is more linked to seriousness and importance, whereas lightness is tied to carelessness.

Firmness

Another opposition envisaged, still associated with touch, is the one between firm/stable and soft. Firmness is associated with strength, physical and psychological, while softness is linked to weakness. The lexeme used for the expression of stability is *smn* (*Wb.* IV, 131–134.22), attested from the First Intermediate Period. In particular, the expressions *smn h3.tj* and *smn jb*, “to stabilise the heart,” attested from the New Kingdom, mean “to fortify, to make courageous.” The meaning is more related to temperament than emotion and does not really seem to be attested outside of the expressions with *jb* and *h3.tj*, as exemplified in *The Teachings of Amenemope* (P. BM 10474, 20.3; Laisney 2007: 351):

dns tw m jb=k smn h3.tj=k

Be serious (lit. heavy) in your *jb*-heart; be courageous (lit. stable) in your *h3.tj*-heart!

Softness

The lexemes for “soft” used to express softness but also physical and psychological weakness, lack of courage or resolution are *gnn*, “to be weak, to be soft” (*Wb.* V, 174–175.17), and its causative form *sgnn*, “to weaken” (*Wb.* IV, 321–322.8). Though *gnn* and *sgnn* are attested from the Old Kingdom, metaphorical implicatures are extremely rare and attested only from the early New Kingdom, as seen in *The Teaching for Merikare* (P. Petersburg 1116 A, vso 7.7–8, § 76–77; Quack 1992: 180):

jm3 n=k n gnn=sn n=k

(It) is pleasant for you, on account of their being lenient (lit. weak) towards you!

Summing up, firmness is tied to steadfastness and weakness more to leniency. They do not stand in metaphorical opposition to each other, as far as our data indicates, but both are used for the expression of temperament rather than emotion.

Smells

Stinkiness

The lexeme *ḥnš* is attested from the New Kingdom (see also Chapter 29, this volume). Its first meaning is “to stink, to have a bad smell” and it can be used metaphorically in two contexts. The first metaphor is in association with *m*, “name,” whereby “a stinky name” expresses the idea of a tarnished reputation. The *The Teachings of Ani* (P. Boulaq 4, 16.17–17.1; Quack 1994: 289) also links reputation to the domain of quiet versus noisy:

jmj=k šm(j) ʿq r qnb.t tm rn=k ḥnš ḥpr šht m-dj ʿš3.t md.wt gr tw ḥpr=k m nfr

May you not come and go in the tribunal, so that your reputation shall not be tarnished (lit. that your name shall not stink) and become a trap. Do not be one of many words, be silent, and you will stand in good stead.⁹¹

In the Late Period, which lies somewhat outside of our data set, *ḥnš* takes on the meaning “recalcitrant, rebellious,” as seen in a wisdom text (P. Brooklyn 47.218.135, 2.9–10; Jasnow 1992: fig. 4–5, for commentary, 54):

jn-jw k3.w ḥnš p3y=w mnjw p3 nty (ḥr) qnb[=w] [m] r' n t3y=f dr.t

Are the bulls recalcitrant (lit. smelly)? Their herdsman is the one that tames (lit. binds) [them] [with] the tip (lit. mouth) of his cattle-prod.

As we can see, the metaphorical use of *ḥnš* is more related to a character feature (recalcitrant) or to a condition in the opinion of society, but is not really tied to a specific emotion or temperament.

Discussion and conclusion

Our study has considered a range of sense-based lexemes according to their semantic breadth (with specific focus on the kinds of emotional state or reaction they convey), the manner in which they are used with respect to each other, their relationship to specific genres, and their use-life in chronological perspective. So, to come back to the research questions, we can see that our study offers new insights into a number of issues.

1. What kinds of sensory phenomena are used to depict specific emotions and temperaments?

Specific emotions do indeed seem to be tied to particular sensory domains, though there is some crossover, which we find interesting:

- calm (as a temperament and occasionally an emotion) is tied to low sound (*gr*), cool temperature (*qbb*, *qbbḥ*, also *d3r sff* and *qbb sff*), smooth texture (*nʿ*), and (in a compound) physical beauty (*ʿn(j)-ḥr*)

- the connected temperament of kindness is tied, as we would expect, to sweetness (*ndm*, *bnj*) and also physical beauty (*ʿn(jj)*)
- the temperament of seriousness is portrayed as heaviness (*dns*)
- the temperament of steadfastness is firmness (*smn*)
- happiness of the more dynamic kind (often an emotion, also a temperament) is to be found in loud sounds, presumably of cheering (*jhlj* and *ʿdʿd*), but also with visual cues of brightness (the compound *hḏ-hr*) and beauty (*nfr*)
- the temperament of jealousy is also more dramatic, being tied (via a compound) to heat (*stf-jb*)
- of the more ambivalent temperaments, carelessness is light (*jzj*), but it can also be cool (*qbb*), and perhaps even quiet (*qr*)
- the temperament of leniency is softness (*gmn*)
- the temperament of untrustworthiness is darkness (*snk.t*)
- sadness is poorly lexicalised, but predominantly linked to darkness
- agitation is also poorly lexicalised, but predominantly linked to loud sounds
- anger is well-lexicalised and very diverse, tied to a high temperature in the case of temperament (*tʃ*, *nsr*, *stf*, *šmm*) and in relation to emotion more to the colour red (*dšr*), a rough texture (*nḥʃ*), as well as a bitter taste (*dḥr*, *jkn*)

A key element for the expression of emotion via sensory experience in Egyptian seems to be the intensity of the stimulus, and of its potential effect on the body. For some of the sensory experiences, the effect impacts the body to a greater extent, especially in cases of excess. For example, something too hot burns, bad taste can be a sign of inedible food, and so on. Excess, in general, is perceived as negative and the sensory domains that can express emotions (sounds, temperatures—and one related colour—tastes, and some textures) play on the intensity in the expression of positive or negative emotions. What is too close to one pole or the other of the continuum for the sensory experiences measurable in their intensity is seen as being negative. For example, *qbb*, “cool/quiet,” is positive, but the same lexeme taken with a stronger meaning “cold/indifferent” is negative. The same can be seen on the other side of the continuum: *stf-jb*, “warm of heart/zealous,” can be seen as positive because it is moderate, while *tʃ* and *šmm*, “hot/angry,” as well as the closely related colour *dšr*, “red,” are seen as negative, because they express an intense, an excessive heat and therefore an excessive emotion.

Compared to the sensory stimuli that directly impact the body, shades have a less direct role, which may also affect the kinds of meaning to which they relate. Brightness is a sensory stimulus, but does not affect the body by touching it. Therefore, there is also no emotional trigger and it is thus understandable that the metaphors are used instead to describe temperament. Darkness refers to a lack of sensory stimulus and highlights this lack by indicating negative states or temperaments that are opaque. Silence is also a lack of sensory stimulus. Where there is a low amount, silence indicates a positive temperament, but where there is an excess, even silence can be negative, indicative perhaps of someone passively following a mob mentality. The same can be said for the remaining sensory phenomena—textures, surfaces, and weights—that cannot really be measured in terms of stimulus intensity: their impact on the body and on its functioning is minimal. They are thus predominantly used for metaphors of temperament rather than of emotion.

Within a paradigm of this nature, the case of smell appears as an exception. One could indeed expect it to be part of the first category (of intense stimuli), but interestingly it does not seem to trigger a real embodiment/internalisation process here, even though the criterion of intensity could apply. Smell rather expresses a mental perception of and reaction towards a situation as

calibrated by interaction with the outside world (for instance, “having bad reputation” or, later, “being rebellious”).

2. Can lexemes of emotion and temperament be distinguished semantically from each other? Do compounds play a role here?

The differentiation between emotion and temperament is based on a combination of factors. In the expression of emotion, a specific event usually acts as a trigger. The stimulus and the degree of intensity are the key difference between an emotion and a temperament. Co-textual elements referring to the transient nature of the emotion by explicitly referring to short time periods are also of help in asserting its expression in a text (e.g., *wnw.t=f nhʔ.t*, “his moment of anger,” cf. supra section “Smoothness”).

According to our hypothesis, the compounds would have been lexically transparent had compounds with one body part (like the face) always indicated emotion and one (like the heart) always indicated temperament. Interestingly enough, this is not the case: the choice of body part does not follow the same pattern across all compound combinations. The complementary opposition between expressions built with *hʔr* and *jb* for emotions and character is nonetheless a recurrent strategy. However, the meaning of *hʔr* or *jb* in the compound depends on the lexeme that constitutes the other part of the expression. This means that for some lexemes (e.g., *ʔn(j)*) [*lex* + *jb* = temperament] and [*lex* + *hʔr* = emotion], while for others (e.g., *nfr*) it is the opposite, or only one of the patterns is attested.

The compounds with *jb* and *hʔr*, though they often appear in complementary distribution, can also undergo chronological change, especially when one of the compounds undergoes a semantic shift or new elements are introduced (as often happens in the New Kingdom). For example, *nfr jb*, “beautiful of heart,” appears very early in the Old Kingdom and expresses a temperament. Around the same time, the expression *nfr hʔr*, “beautiful of face,” enters the lexicon and is used to refer to a temperament in the New Kingdom. It overlaps with *jb* for the expression of temperament and, as a consequence, *nfr jb* starts being used more for the expression of emotion (joy), either as a way of accommodating the new term or as an indication of a subtle shift in the meaning of *nfr jb*.

3. Do these terms exist in complementary distribution with each other? Are there relationships of synonymy, antonymy, even asymmetry that we need to take into account?

As we saw in our discussion of Question 1, similar kinds of emotions and temperaments can be expressed by metaphors from different sensory domains, but even if they do, they are nevertheless not real synonyms. Rather, they complement each other to cover the spectrum of nuances linked to this affect disposition or emotional domain. For example, the affect disposition of being happy (state, temperament) or the emotion of joy can be expressed by using metaphors of sound (highlighting the vocal expression of joy), luminescence (suggesting a visual embodiment of joy), and beauty (indicating the positive aspect of joy).

Antonymy is well represented, as we can see with heavy (*dns*) and light (*jzʔ*), bitter (*dlhʔ, jkn*) and sweet (*ndm, bnj*). Another case concerns lexemes that usually do not have a metaphorical meaning for emotion/temperament but are linked to it in some specific co-textual associations. *sʔf*, “to be warm, to burn,” is an example of this kind: it is used as an antonym of *qbb* for the literal meaning of this lexeme “to be cool.” Since *qbb* is used in this collocation also in its metaphorical meaning, *sʔf* becomes part of the metaphor in this specific context.⁹² However, *sʔf* is not used alone metaphorically: its metaphorical meaning comes only from specific contexts of use.

Semantic asymmetry is certainly visible in the data set, for various, connected reasons. In some cases, asymmetry is due to the semantic span of a single lexeme. For instance, *gr*, “to be quiet,” implies the absence of noise (and movement) and thus absence of trouble, so everything and anything that indicates trouble (from whichever sensory stimulus) could stand in an antonymic relationship to it: noise, heat, and motion (in relation to the heart). The other side of the issue of asymmetry concerns genre and decorum. In Egyptian texts, there is a focus on the positive: there is no ugliness, there is little darkness that is not cosmic, and there are no clear cases of lexicalised agitation, because people just did not want to show it, in text or image (cf. Baines 2017).

4. Are diachronic forces of language change at work? If so, what effect do they have?

Looking at the diachronic span of textual material, several main conclusions can be drawn. The late First Intermediate Period–early Middle Kingdom ushers in the appearance of most of the first metaphorical meanings tied to temperament/character for the lexemes that appear in the Old Kingdom, First Intermediate Period, and Middle Kingdom. Autobiographies play a very important role in this respect. They use metaphors to describe the character of a person and, since their function is self-presentation and auto-eulogy, they display an important number of metaphors referring to positive character features.

In most cases, the metaphorical meaning referring to a temperament appears before the one referring to emotion (if any)—at least in the texts at our disposal in this large digital corpus. There are very few exceptions to this in our corpus (such as *hḏ*, “bright, joyful”). However, this may simply be an indication of insufficient evidence. The fact that some of our metaphorical meanings are attested at the same time as the literal meanings (for instance *qbb* and *snk.t*) indicates that our data is not always able to show the kind of semantic change from literal to figurative that Sweetser (1990) and Traugott and Dasher (2001) proposed.

The second key moment is the New Kingdom, which witnesses many changes on several levels. First, a whole range of new genres appear in the textual record, such as scribal texts, literary letters, and love poetry. Second, texts seem to express a new awareness about the world and its limits, leading to a marked surge in the amount of negative metaphors drawing on the sensory domain. They seem to be key to wisdom literature of the late New Kingdom. Moreover, there was a substantial degree of linguistic change at this time. One can clearly see the appearance of a far higher number of compounds and recurring collocations and an increased diversity in their composition: they become associated with a greater number of body parts, or to a lexical variant referring to the same body part (*jb* and *h3.tj*).⁹³ It is likely that a semantic loss on the level of the metaphorical meaning (or perhaps also a loss of transparency in the link between the different meanings colexified by a same lexeme) was one of the elements that triggered the increased use of compounds. This great increase may also be due to a general tendency in this period to develop analytic structures, particularly in the case of prepositions, which develop ever more compounds with body parts (Junge 2005: 89).

An increased polysemy can also be seen for lexemes used alone (i.e., beside their use in compounds) from the New Kingdom on. Indeed, the semantics of several lexemes keeps actively evolving and the end of the New Kingdom/Third Intermediate Period seems to be a new turning point in this respect. One of the factors of this evolution seems precisely to be the metaphorical use of some lexemes, leading them toward a higher or different degree of abstraction (such the aforementioned case of *qbb*, “cool,” which becomes less positively connoted over time).

5. What is the role of genre in the appearance and use of emotion terms?

Genre seems to be working closely with diachronic factors, so most of our response has been dealt with in the last section. It merely bears noting that, as mentioned above, the autobiographical genre clearly influenced the development of these emotive, sense-based metaphors, being used to describe positive character features from the late First Intermediate Period on. This tendency was continued in the New Kingdom, where these metaphors flourish most in normative genres like wisdom texts and scribal miscellanies. In general, these metaphors appear in texts that are literary in style and rhetorical, even persuasive, in function.

In sum, this study is indicative of the confluence of a number of phenomena: sensory impulses, metaphorical language, decorum, and rhetorical exigency, which come together in a range of primarily normative genres to explain human behaviour in increasingly complex ways. Ancient Egyptian, the longest-attested language in the world, is a prime candidate for such a study, providing a rich diachronic sample to test the theories of modern psychologists and linguists. In general, this dead language behaves exactly as we would expect, using metaphors mirrored in our own languages, though it must also be noted that some concepts, such as “silence,” had a much more positive connotation than they do in contemporary Western society.

Notes

1. Barsalou (1999) defines embodied cognition as the process by which thinking involves constructing “simulations” of bodily experiences. However, the term “embodied cognition” in relation to metaphor is being met with increasing scepticism (cf. Casasanto and Gijssels 2015: 327–328).
2. See Kövecses (2000a; 2005). Aside from approaches from the perspective of metaphor analysis and emotion and affect studies, some philosophical approaches, such as Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) “phenomenology of perception,” establish the role of metaphor in cognition and show how the senses are interrelated aspects of human bodily engagement with the world. That being said, we would do well to heed the warning of Bergson (1911: 170), who remarked that “[p]erception is never a mere contact of the mind with the object present; it is impregnated with memory-images which complete it as they interpret it.”
3. Affective phenomena are explained in Scherer (2005: especially 704, table 2). Scherer (2009: 1328, table 4) outlines the potential sources of systematic individual differences in event appraisal and response dispositions of emotional stimuli, which are either hardwired (here temperament is a factor), learned (concerning judgement), or transient (concerning momentary regulation).
4. The appraisal of both is also present in other works on emotion from an Egyptological perspective. See also McDonald 2020: 1.
5. See Radden and Kövecses 1999: 39; Kövecses 2010: 108. This metonymic basis has also been identified for Egyptian by Toro Rueda (2003: 84).
6. Köhler (2016: 118) sees it as rather being a PART FOR WHOLE metonymy.
7. For recent research in this area, see Hsu and Llop Raduà 2021.
8. That being said, one might wonder whether the evidence does not suggest that the semantics of LOVE in Hebrew is not somewhat broader than in English, for example “caring for,” which is more pastoral and less emotional.
9. The identification of “determinatives” as “classifiers,” defined by Allan (1977: 285) as bound morphemes that classify with respect to semantic features of the classified entity, has been promoted and supported by, amongst others, Goldwasser (1995), Lincke (2011), Lincke and Kammerzell (2012), Goldwasser and Grinevald (2012), and Chantraine (2014). By way of example, a classifier depicting a crocodile (Gardiner Sign I3, for which see Gardiner 1957) categorises some lexemes relating to “being angry,” such as *ʒd*, or “being greedy,” such as *f(j)*, *hnt(j)* and *skn*, because, following Lincke (2011: 53), the crocodile is being portrayed as a prototypical experiencer of this emotion or characteristic.
10. Bardinet (1995) makes a case, on the basis of the medical texts, for there to be a semantic distinction between *jb*, which refers more generally to the “interior” of the body, particularly the torso region, where the heart resides, and *h3.tj*, which refers to the organ of the heart itself. This point does not,

- however, undermine the translation of *jb* in literary texts as “heart,” since it is the only one of the two terms to occur in compounds. *ḥḥ.tj* occurs in our corpus only in collocations and predominantly from the New Kingdom on, as *ḥḥ.tj* came to encroach upon the semantic territory of *jb*, indicating, as Nyord (2009b: 67) argues, that *ḥḥ.tj*, though relating to the bodily organ, is also “a part of the felt body.”
11. However, there might be even more to “silence” than this. As McDonald (2020: 2) says, “For the Egyptians, the quality of being ‘silent’ (*gr*) or being ‘efficient’ (*mnḥ*) may have had particular emotional resonance that is lacking in the English-speaking world.”
 12. Stela of Montuhotep, University College, London 14333, 12 (12th Dynasty).
 13. *ph.w ph.t(w)=f gr.w gr.t(w)*, “The one who attacks when he is attacked; the one who is silent when one is silent” (Uronarti Stela of Thutmose III, Khartoum Nr. 3 = Inv. 451, 6).
 14. Stela of Intef, son of Senet, BM EA 581 (12th Dynasty).
 15. The parallel text, P. Louvre E 30144, 1.3 (cf. for translation, Quack 1994: 143) has for the latter section: *ndm ḥḥ.tj gr m qn(j).t pḥ ms^c*, “angenehm ist ein schweigsames Herz in der Macht der Menge” (“a silent heart is pleasant in the strength of a crowd”).
 16. The kinds of variation apparent when comparing quiet (*gr*) and all types of noise can be seen paradigmatically in the *Teaching of Amenemope* (P. BM 10474, 26.1–3; Laisney 2007: 360–361). One case describes: *šrj jw=f (ḥr) šḥwr ʿ3 jmj jry=f qnqn=k jw dr.t=k m qnj=k jmj jry=f šḥwr=k jw=k gr.tw*, “The small person who insults the great one: let him beat you, while your hand is in your lap. Let him insult you, while you remain quiet.” In other cases, metaphor scenarios play on an opposition between silence (often embodied by the “silent one”) and all manner of noise-producing and dynamic phenomena, including storms (*d^c*, 3.15 and 5.14; *qrj*, 4.16 and *šn^c*, 13.2), as well as wild animals, all of which are personifications of the *šmm*, “hot one,” or antagonist. The idea of a storm (*d^c*) relating to a temper tantrum is also evident in earlier wisdom literature, like the *Teachings of Ptahhotep* (P. Prisse = P. BN 186–194, 10.11; Žába 1956: 42).
 17. This diachronic data may be misleading, however. The idea that *jhj* was actually used to refer to an emotion already in the Old Kingdom is indicated indirectly in the contemporary substantive form, *jhy*, “joy, jubilation” (*Wb.* I, 117.15–118.1; *TLA* 30170).
 18. For example, the miscellany text about a charioteer (P. Anastasi III = P. BM EA 10246, 6.6 = *LEM* 27.7); a laudation hymn to a king (O. DeM 1223, rto 10; Fischer-Elfert 1997: 73); and a love poem (P. Turin Cat. 1966, rto 2.8; Mathieu 2008: pl. 16).
 19. For Egyptian texts, see Brunner 1975: 809.
 20. Goossens (1990: 323) describes metaphonymy as being the case where metonymy interacts with metaphor in figurative language. These cases correspond to his category “metaphor from metonymy” (1990: 328), whereby the figurative expression extends from a metonym but has the surface form of a metaphor. See also, in relation to Egyptian material, Di Biase-Dyson 2018: 40–41.
 21. A single interesting case in *The Teachings of Ptahhotep* (P. Prisse = P. BN 186–194, 12.1–2, § 375–6; Žába 1956: 46) deserves our attention: *m gr zḥw ḥn<d>=k wšb=k md.t m {n}nsr*, “Do not be silent (*gr*)! And stop yourself offending (lit. your treading) and answering a speech with anger(?) (lit. fire, *nsr*).” In this case, *nsr* bears the classifier of a man with a hand to his mouth (Gardiner Sign A2, see Gardiner 1957), unusual for this lexeme but commonly used for emotions, rather than the usual torch (Gardiner Sign Q7). This change of classifier seems to highlight the metaphorical use of *nsr*, from physical, actual heat to anger. The dictionary (*Wb.* II, 335.2) presents the lexeme *nsr* as an unknown verb, different from *nsr*, “to burn” (*Wb.* II, 335.4–10), which Köhler (2011: 87) suggests means “to be hot tempered.” The *TLA* translates this lexeme as a substantive, “anger,” but confusingly categorises this key example under *nsr*, “fire, flame” (*Wb.* II, 335.13–18), which is not otherwise attested as having metaphorical scope.
 22. Though the *Belegstellen* of *Wb.* V, 229.11 negate the validity of *ḥ* appearing alone in relation to anger, two cases from *Book of the Dead* Chapter 125 are present in the current version of the *TLA* (accessed 09.10.2019): P. Cairo CG 24095 (P. Maiherperi), 431 and P. Cairo CG 51189 (P. Yuya), 744, which read *n(j) ḥ=j*, “I was not angry (lit. hot).”
 23. See, for instance, P. BM EA 10477 (P. Nu), 45: *n(j) ḥ r=j*, “My speech (lit. mouth) was not angry (lit. hot).”
 24. In the former, we read *pr(j).w pw n ḥ-h.t*, “it is what comes forth from a hot-belly,” and in the latter, *n(j) /// [t]ḥ-h.t d d (j)ḥ.t n(j) [m33] n(j) s d m*, “not /// a hot-belly, who says things that have neither been [seen] nor heard.”
 25. The only other case of a “hot belly” in the corpus is describing a physical symptom in the medical P. Ebers, 36.8 (Recipe Eb 188; Wreszinski 1913: 50).

26. In the former it is realised as *jw nsw.t n.(j)t β jb šhr={f}<s>*, “The flame of the hot-heart spreads(?),” and in the latter as *β jb hr dd ntr*, “the hot-heart suffers (lit. is) under what the god causes.”
27. The only other reference to a “hot heart” from the pharaonic period comes from the medical P. Ebers, 42.10 (Recipe Eb 207a; Wreszinski 1913: 61) to refer to a symptom of disease. All other cases from the corpus come from the Ptolemaic period. Another meaning relating heart and heat, where the heart burns with care and worry (*Wb.* V 229.9–10), is attested only in the Greco-Roman period, for instance, P. BM 10188 (P. Bremner Rhind), 7.5, 7.6 and 7.22; Faulkner 1933: 13–14.
28. For the potential connection between *β-r'* and *βr*, “enemy” (*Wb.* V, 233.4–7), see Di Biase-Dyson 2018: 34.
29. The compound form can sometimes be seen by the spelling, since the classifier to mark the end of the word, in the case of P. Berlin P 9784, 8–9, the seated man (Gardiner Sign A1), comes only at the end of the whole compound, *šmm-r'*.
30. A parallel of sorts can be found in P. Kahun II, 17–18, a hymn to the king, in which the qualities are more flatteringly inverted—shade in summer, warm corner in winter (Fischer-Elfert 1986b: 10).
31. *p3 qrf hy n3 msh.w bjn p3 šmm tw=k mj jh*, “the storm is high, the crocodiles are evil, o hot one, how are you?” (*Amenemope*, P. BM 10474, 4.16–17; Laisney 2007: 330).
32. *d^c pr(j)=f mj h.t m nwy.t p3 šmm m wnw.t=f*, “the storm, it comes forth like fire in straw, (so is) the hot one in his moment (lit. hour)” (*Amenemope*, P. BM 10474, 5.17; Laisney 2007: 331). Other attestations of *šmm*, “hot one,” in *The Teachings of Amenemope* appear in P. BM 10474, 6.1; 11.12; 13.11 (= P. Stockholm MM 18416, 2.11) and 15.13 (Laisney 2007: 331, 339, 342, 345).
33. In the *Teachings of Amenemope*, P. BM 10474, 6.1–12 (Laisney 2007: 331–332), the antagonistic “hot one” in the temple is described as being a tree that ends up as firewood and the “quiet one” as the tree that ends up flourishing in the garden. Another case in which the *šmm*, “hot one,” is compared with *gr.w*, “the silent one,” is in P. Sallier I, 8.6 = *LEM* 86.7, in a prayer to the god Thoth. For a possible reading of this passage, see Di Biase-Dyson 2018: 40.
34. *Teaching of a Man for his Son*, Fischer-Elfert (1999, Tafelband), for (fragmentary) references to *sf* (§ 10.7–8, O. DeM 1818 = O. IFAO Inv. 2719, rto x+4), *gr(.w)* (§ 10.5, O. Gardiner 343, 4) and *qb* (§ 19.9, O. Michaelides 16.4).
35. Earlier, Middle Kingdom examples include the stela of Intef, Louvre C 167 = E 3111, 8 (Landgráfová 2011: 138) and the stela of Samontu, BM EA 828, 11 (Landgráfová 2011: 272).
36. The expression *m qbb*, “in peace (lit. coolness)” (*Wb.* V, 24.II.3–5), also has two attestations in the corpus, both from the New Kingdom: the tomb of Sennefer (*DZA* 30.329.540) and P. Lansing (*DZA* 30.329.550).
37. *Pyramid Text* 375 (§ 660b T) (Sethe 1908: 363) has *jn(j) wp.t=k qbh.tj*, “Bring your message, it being pleasant (lit. cool)! ”
38. Quantitatively, the distribution of the lexemes (taken from the *TLA* and *Ramsès* database) is as follows: *qbb*, “to be fresh” (104 tokens); *qbb*, “fresh” (36 tokens); *qbh*, “to be fresh, to refresh” (30 tokens). Moreover, the nouns derived from the two verbs are also different: on the one hand there is *qbb*, “freshness;” *qbb*, “fresh wind;” and *qbh.t* (fresh water, feminine); and on the other hand *qbh*, “freshness,” and *qbh*, “libation.” There is also a verbal lemma *qbh*, “to make a libation,” which might indeed comprise the first meaning of *qbh*, primarily associated with fresh water, which established the derived meaning “to be fresh.” Both meanings are attested from the Old Kingdom.
39. Schenkel (2007; also 2019: 42) abandons his earlier (1963) hypothesis that *dšr* means both “red” and “yellow,” in line with the findings of Berlin and Kay (1969) and more modern typological research, which argue that “yellow” is usually not linguistically attested in a language before “blue.” On this basis, Egyptian is allegedly at Stage IIIa of colour terminology (Baines 2007 [1985]: 253). Schenkel (2019: 51) stipulates most recently that “the focus of ‘red’ lies in the red range.”
40. “Green” (*w3d*) is not clearly attested as a colour verb, though the alternate meaning of “to be fresh, to prosper” is attested as a verb, so Schenkel (2007: 218) assumes that the verb exists, making “green” a basic colour term. Schenkel (2019: 40, 52) has now abandoned the reading of *w3d* as “grue” (Schenkel 1963: 142; Baines 2007 [1985]: 242) and offers now the following translation: “‘green,’ ‘blue,’ with the focus in green.”
41. Warburton (2004; 2007) argues that even basic colour terms were originally also concrete and not abstract, and he therefore groups all colour terms together. However, Schenkel (2007: 225) has, we feel conclusively, shown, on the basis of comparative etymology, that since the Egyptian basic colour terms (or BCTs) are also mirrored in *verbs* with similar meanings in other Afroasiatic languages, they are very likely *not* derivatives of nouns for coloured objects and rather originally verbs of colour. The distinction

- Schenkel establishes is thus very likely valid. Schenkel (2019: 46) moreover emphasises that the kinds of things referred to with non-BCT colours in the blue range are “devoid of significance in daily life and do not belong to the general vocabulary of colour terms and are, therefore, not Basic Color Terms.”
42. For instance, in the coronation story of Hatshepsut from her mortuary temple in Deir el-Bahari, 27–28 (*Urk.* IV 260.8–11): *jr z(j) nb mrr sy m jb=f du3 s(y) r' nb s. {t} h^c(j)=f w3d=f r (j) h.t nb.t*, “As for any man who loves her in his heart and praises her (i.e. Hatshepsut) every day—he will be made to appear (in glory) and he will flourish (lit. be green) more than anything.”
 43. Here, “red of eye” (*dšr-jr.t*) in relation to the god Horus refers (in a ritual sense) to the carnelian stone that was used as an inlay in eye amulets, to contrast the lapis lazuli inlay of the other eye of Horus, “blue of eye” (*hsbdd-jr.t*). On the mythical plane, the red right eye is linked to the sun and the blue left eye to the moon. Additionally, the redness may also refer to the fact that the eye was injured. See *Pyramid Text* 246 (§ 253a–b W); Sethe 1908: 139: “The blue-eyed Horus comes against you! Protect yourselves from the red-eyed Horus, terrible/painful(?) of power—his Ba cannot be repelled!” This is paralleled in the Middle Kingdom *Dramatic Ramesseum Papyrus*, 75 (*DZA* 27.266.850), where Horus tells Seth he has a carnelian-coloured eye (*jr.t(=j) hrs.t*). See also Hussein 2010: 3–4.
 44. From texts in the temples of Edfu (e.g., *DZA* 27.266.800) and Philae (e.g., *DZA* 27.266.810). The connection made by Köhler (2016: 116), that the earlier references to carnelian eyes (for instance in the *Dramatic Ramesseum Papyrus*) also indicate anger, is, we feel, not explicit enough to be unequivocal. It is more likely to be red in relation to being injured, a state which may trigger aggressiveness. The meaning of anger seems to have appeared much later.
 45. *Wb.* III, 150.9–15, for instance in the temple of Edfu (e.g., *DZA* 27.267.000).
 46. The other possible candidate, *b3g*, “to be bright, light, clear, well” (*Wb.* I, 424.12–425.17; *TLA* 53730), all of which meanings are attested in the Old Kingdom, refers rather to a general state of well-being, like *w3d*, “green,” mentioned above (*Pyramid Text* 476 (§ 955b P); Sethe 1910: 33).
 47. The compound is cited in *Wb.* III, 207.26, but the *DZA* provides only a single attestation, from a Ptolemaic temple in Karnak (*DZA* 27.557.750). It is moreover suggested that even this case could just as easily be read as *hr=f h^d* (rather than *jb=f h^d*, see *DZA* 27.557.750).
 48. The parallel (*Ptahhotep*, P. BM EA 10509, 7.17–8.1; Caminos 1956: pl. 29–30), which is almost completely reconstructed, may read *[h^d] [hr]=[k] [r] tr*. Translated, this means “[may you be generous (lit. may your face be bright) at the (right) time].” Though there is more immediacy in this case, it seems nonetheless to refer to a temperament (revealed at a certain time) and not an emotion. However, given the state of reconstruction, the passage cannot be taken as a reliable source. This meaning of “friendliness” seems to extend to the New Kingdom. Some interesting examples from the *Kadesh Poem* of Ramesses II (S, § 218–219, *KRI* 2, 70.5 and 10) refer to being “unkind”: *hs.wsy m hm.yt ntr nty bw h^d hr=j n h^h.w m-jm=sn*, “How weak, namely, those ignorant of god, to millions of whom I have been unfriendly (lit. my face has not been bright).”
 49. *jnk [...]* *pg3 jb h^d jmy.wt-h.t*, “I am [...] one open-hearted, one with brilliant thoughts (lit. bright of intestines)” (stela of Henwen, Cairo JE 36346, 2).
 50. In the *Eloquent Peasant*, P. Berlin P 3023 (= B1), 254; Parkinson 1991: 33.7–8, the peasant cries: *šw.yt m jr(j) m šw*, “O shade, don’t act as sunlight!” (also Parkinson 2012: 209).
 51. Peter Dils (*TLA*) in his reading of *The Teaching of a Man for his Son* (O. Moskau 4478 + oBerlin P 9026, 1, § 24.2) tries to read *snk*, “dark,” as “unergründlich,” but the classifier I3 clearly indicates that the word *skn*, “greedy,” is intended instead. This case (the only potentially metaphorical case of *snk*) is thus untenable. Fischer-Elfert (1999: 248) proposes “beherrsche dich(?)” but states that the translation is provisional.
 52. The potential example comes from a love Song (P. Chester Beatty I, rto 17.7–8; Mathieu 2008: pl. 7): *sn{n}j{=k} <j> pr(w)=s w3wt.k(w)*, “<I> passed by her house, while I was in a dark mood.” However, a literal reading, which does not take the Resultative ending *kw* seriously, is also possible: *sn{n}j{=k} <j> pr(w)=s <m> w3wt{=k}*, “<I> passed by her house <in> the darkness,” proposed by Lutz Popko (*TLA*). Though all other cases of the Resultative *kw* in the Chester Beatty cycle are fitting, many of the personal pronouns are incorrect.
 53. For examples and discussion of this concept, see Luiselli 2011: 162–168.
 54. Leitz (1999: 48) translates rather “I cause you to move back and take away your hearing, to give you darkness and refuse light,” but does not justify the syntactic basis for the translation. In any case, a <hr> would be missing for his reading to work, just like the <r> would be required for the translation proposed here.
 55. Indeed, the *Wb.* dates it only from the New Kingdom on, in both its literal and metaphorical meaning.

56. In the *TLA* corpus, only one example is encoded under the compound *nfr.w-jb*, “to satisfy” (*TLA* 853734), and four attestations under the noun *nfr-jb*, “satisfaction” (*TLA* 650060), but the amount of fitting collocations of the two lexemes in the same corpus seems to be far greater.
57. Another example: *jw jr=f hm nfr r(m)t.w th.w swrj=sn {my.t} <mjn.t> jb.w=sn nfr*, “Indeed it is good when people are drunk, when they drink *mjnt*-beverage and their hearts are happy (lit. beautiful)” (*Admonitions of Ipuwer*, P. Leiden I 344, rto 13.13–14; Enmarch 2005: 53).
58. The object of love, for example, is associated with sweet food, and sexual desire is likened to hunger (Kövecses 1990: 130–131). Other tastes appear in other languages: in Beja, to suffer is to taste something hot (Vanhove and Hamid Ahmed forthcoming: e.g., p. 31), a bitter voice is an unpleasant voice (Vanhove and Hamid Ahmed forthcoming: p. 26 of the manuscript), and a bitter character is a bad character (Vanhove and Hamid Ahmed forthcoming: e.g., p. 33).
59. This statement may be true for other source domains as well, but the study investigated the taste domain only (Citron and Goldberg 2014).
60. See the stela of Intef, son of Senet from Abydos, BM EA 581, B9 (Landgráfová 2011: 112–114).
61. For *bnj βm.t*, see the stela of Intef, son of Senet, BM EA 581, B9 (Landgráfová 2011: 112–114).
62. For *bnj mru.t*, see the stela of Mery (Louvre C 3 = AE 3; Landgráfová 2011: 134–137).
63. For *bnj bj.t*, see the stela of Hor (Cairo JE 71901, 6; Landgráfová 2011: 256–258).
64. *The Teachings of Amenemope*, P. BM 10474, 13.6; Laisney 2007: 342.
65. This fits the theory posited by Kövecses (1990: 130–131).
66. *jw md.(w)t=j nb bnj ndm [...] β^c=k{w} r=j m shwjrj m zp tpy*, “Because all my words are nice (lit. sweet) and pleasant (lit. sweet) [...] (whereas) you began with insults against me from the first moment” (*Letter of Hori*, P. Anastasi I, 8.1–2; Fischer-Elfert 1983: 77–78; 1986a: 71).
67. *bnj shr.w=f m r' n rmt.w nty m upwtj-nzw*, “his [the King’s] decisions were pleasant in the mouth of the people who were royal messengers (Gebel el-Silsileh stela, 10 = KRI 1, 61.2).
68. *jt(j)=tw bnj r msdd.w*, “One prefers (lit. takes) the sweet person to the hater” (*Teaching of a Man for his Son*, O. Gardiner 343, x+7, § 12.3; Fischer-Elfert 1999: Tafelband § 12.3).
69. P. Chester Beatty 9, daily offering ritual, rto 9.16; Gardiner 1935: pl. 50–58.
70. *ndm sp-sn gm(j) z(j) jp m k3.t nb.t*, “It is very pleasant to find a man who is diligent in all tasks” (*The Teaching of Amunnakht*, O. BM EA 41541, 4–5; Dorn 2004: 40).
71. We refer again to the passage in the *Letter of Hori* (P. Anastasi I, 8.1–2; Fischer-Elfert 1983: 77), where *ndm* and *bnj* occur together as parasyonyms: *md.(w)t=j nb bnj ndm*, “all my words are nice (lit. sweet) and pleasant (lit. sweet).”
72. While the collocation with *jb* is attested very early, from the Old Kingdom, the one with *h3.tj* appears much later, in the New Kingdom, which fits with the increased preference for this lexeme over *jb*. The *Wb.* does not mention *h3.tj*, though in our corpus it is well-attested.
73. Another example from a love song: *gm(j).n=j sn m βy=f hnk.t{=j} h3.tj=j ndm m h3w*, “I found the brother in his room and my heart was excessively happy” (P. Harris 500, rto 5.7; Mathieu 2008: pl. 12).
74. Laisney (2007: 130) makes a case for etymological links to *skn.tj*, “to turn (someone) against (another)” (*Wb.* IV, 318.12), which is only attested in the Middle Kingdom *Teachings of Ptahhotep* (P. Prisse = P. BN 186–194, 7.4 and its parallel BM EA 10509, 3.4; Žába 1956: 28) and/or to *knj*, “to complain” (*Wb.* V, 131.11), which is also attested from the Middle Kingdom.
75. *The Teachings of Amenemope* (P. BM EA 10474) contain a range of opposing terms for sweetness and bitterness (*bnj* with *ndm* 6.11; *bnj* vs *jkn* 13.6; *ndm* vs *dhṛ* 25.12–13; *ndm* alone 9.7, 16.5 and *jkn* alone 24.3, Laisney 2007: 332, 342, 360, 336, 346, 357); *The Teachings of Ani* (P. Boulaq 4) also have *ndm* vs *dhṛ* in 22.7 and *ndm* alone in 20.11 (Quack 1994: 327, 309–310); *The Letter of Hori* (P. Anastasi I = P. BM EA 10247, 5.2–3; Fischer-Elfert 1983: 57–58) has *bnj* and *ndm* vs *dhṛ*, as well as a range of related lexemes which play on the metaphor: *hm3.t(?)* (a bitter herb – fenugreek?) and *bj.t* (honey), *šdh* (shedeh–wine) and *p3wr* (vinegar).
76. From *Ani* (P. Boulaq 4, 22.7; Quack 1994: 327): *j-dd p3 ndm jw=f (hr) dd p3 dh{ 3j} <r>*, “Say what is pleasant (lit. sweet) when he says something unpleasant (lit. bitter).” From the *Letter of Hori* (P. Anastasi I, 5.2–3; Fischer-Elfert 1983: 57): *[bn] tp.j(w)t-r' bjn bn st dhṛj*, “Your utterances are [neither] sweet nor are they bitter.”
77. Another texture *spd*, “sharp,” has a range of metaphorical meanings, related to “being effective” or “being skilled” (*Wb.* IV, 108.15–109.13). The collocation with *hr*, “sharp of face,” indicates the character trait “being alert” (*Wb.* IV, 109.14–16), a collocation with *jb*, “sharp of heart,” indicates “being effective,” one with *r'*, “sharp of mouth,” means “being erudite” (*Wb.* IV, 109.17) and with *db^c.w*, “sharp

- of fingers,” “being dextrous” (*Wb.* IV, 109.18). However, these meanings describe intellectual qualities rather than clear indications of emotion or temperament.
78. In other contexts, alone or in compounds with *hr*, “face,” *nh3* takes on the meaning “wild, dangerous,” a meaning attested in the Second Intermediate Period: *smun msh p<w> nh3*, “Surely that crocodile is something dangerous!” (P. Westcar, 4.1; Blackman 1988: 4).
 79. The other two cases of the compound *nh3.t-jb* in the *TLA* are P. Ebers, 39.11–12 = Recipe Eb 197b; Wreszinski 1913: 56 (though this may refer to symptoms more physical than emotional, for which see Nyord 2009a: 91, n. 507) and *The Admonitions of Ipuwer* (P. Leiden I 344, rto 12.3; Enmarch 2005: 51). Additionally, a case emerges in *Coffin Text* 848, CT VII, 52m, discussed in Nyord 2009a: 88–89.
 80. Talking about *hmw.t*-vessels, it is remarked: *nh3 r'=sn 3*, “Their rims are often uneven” (P. Louvre E 25280 (22 A), e: 7.2; De Cenival and Posener-Krieger 1968: pl. XXII, fragment A).
 81. When conducting a physical examination, it is noted: *gmm=k (j)h.t jm nh3 hr db<w>k*, “Under your fingers you find something there that is uneven” (P. Edwin Smith, 2.3–4; Breasted 1930: pl. II).
 82. This (rare) meaning is attested in the New Kingdom (*The Teachings of Ani*, P. Boulaq 4, 16.14–15; Quack 1994: 288): *mw md bw rh=tw phr={s}<f> s.t-hm.t w3(j).tw <r> h3y=s jnk n< hr(w)=s n=k r< nb*, “A deep water, which one cannot fathom (lit. go around) is the wife far away <from> her husband. ‘I am free (lit. smooth),’ so she says to you daily.”
 83. An example from the New Kingdom is to be found in the *Teaching of Amunnaht* (O. Lacau = HO III/3, rto 4; Dorn 2004: 41): *wn jb=i 3n hwrw*, “My heart is (sometimes) calm (lit. smooth), (sometimes) wretched (lit. weak).”
 84. *The Trials of the Soldier* (P. Chester Beatty 5 = P. BM EA 10685, rto 7.1–2 = Gardiner 1935: pl. 25): *juw n3 3jn.w 33{.t} hr dns*, “and the numerous bushes are burdensome.”
 85. See the example from *The Eloquent Peasant* (P. Berlin P 3023, 191; Parkinson 1991: 29.4–5) directly below.
 86. As seen in a rhetorical question in the *Tale of Wenamun*, P. Moscow 120, 1.17 = *LES* 62.11: *(j)n dns=k (j)n mnh=k*, “Are you serious (lit. heavy)? Are you right in the head (lit. effective)?”
 87. As in the *Lamentations of Khakheperreseneb*, it is said: *3uw wdn mn(.t)=j*, “Extended and difficult (lit. heavy) is my suffering” (T. BM EA 5645, vso 4; Gardiner 1969: pl. 18).
 88. Neferhotep says in his letter to the vizier To: *bn jzj 3(j).t n wdn* “lifting a block of stone is not insignificant” (O. OIC 16991, vso 9 = *KRI* 5, 560.10; Wente 1961).
 89. The meaning “weak” or “insignificant” is further confirmed with this example: *3.w nb.w fit jzj n-hr=f* “All lands are ridiculed and insignificant before him (the Pharaoh)” (Medinet Habu I, 46.6 = *KRI* 5, 38.5).
 90. *The Dialogue of Sasobek* (P. Ramesseum I = P. BM EA 10754, B1, 22; Barns 1956: pl. 2).
 91. We see something similar in the satirical *Letter of Hori* (P. Anastasi I, 28.7; Fischer-Elfert 1983: 157) which provides a unique causative use of *hn3*: *tm=k dd hn3=k rn=j n kywy hr-nb{t}.w*, “... that you cannot say ‘You tarnished my reputation (lit. you made my name stink)!’ to the crowd and everyone!”
 92. As mentioned earlier (section “Heat/Warmth”), the association of *qbb*, “cool,” and *sf*, “warm,” gives the meaning “quiet, cool-blooded” (*Wb.* V, 23.B.17), in stelae of the 11th Dynasty (e.g., *DZA* 30.327.750).
 93. Nevertheless, this conclusion is to be considered with all due precaution, because the amount of data available for the New Kingdom is disproportionately large.

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