

Parental Education and Expensive Consumption Habits¹

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to investigate the general and special obligations of parents with respect to the shaping of consumption habits, from a liberal egalitarian perspective. The paper argues that, in virtue of them being well placed to shape the next generation's consumption habits, parents have a duty of justice to prevent their children from developing expensive consumption habits in order to enable them to leave their fair share to others. In virtue of the special relationship they have with their children, parents have a duty of care, and this may also require parents to prevent their children from developing expensive consumption habits. Then the paper discusses whether and under which conditions these duties hold in unjust circumstances, where a consumerist ethos is predominant and where other parents and educational agents do not collaborate effectively.

Introduction

Philippe Van Parijs has an interesting parenting style. He writes:

"I [...] regard at least a modicum of conspicuous frugality as an intrinsic component of my parental responsibilities. Hence my resolute policy of wearing a watch which my children would not dream of wearing, and clothes which my sons have grown of – admittedly not those my daughters have decided to give up: there are, after all, some limits to what parents can reasonably be expected to do for the good of their children." ²

In a world threatened by the environmental crisis, where many households are in extreme debt, Van Parijs's view is worth considering. Shouldn't parents pick up the slack and follow his parenting style? Are there reasons for parents to inculcate frugal consumption habits in their children? The aim of this paper is to investigate the general and special obligations of parents with respect to the shaping of consumption habits, from a liberal egalitarian perspective. I will distinguish the general obligations of justice parents have in virtue of their capacity to shape consumption habits from their special duty to care for their children's present and future interests. I will examine their obligations with respect to consumption habits shaping in just circumstances and in unjust circumstances. In unjust circumstances, expensive consumption habits are widespread and other educational agents do not collaborate with parents.

The paper is in three sections. Section 1 develops a society-centred argument against the cultivation of expensive consumption habits in children and suggests parents may have a responsibility for these habits since they have a significant influence on them. Section 2 complements the society-centred argument with a child-centred argument, based on parents' duty of care. Section 3 discusses whether the duty to prevent expensive consumption habits still holds in unjust circumstances characterised by a widespread consumerist ethos.

1. Egalitarian distributive justice and expensive consumption habits

In order to determine what, if anything, is wrong with expensive consumption habits, we must clarify our normative principles. I shall take Rawls's egalitarian principles as a starting point. According to Rawls, inequalities are just if and only if (i) they are attached to positions and offices open to all under the principle of fair equality of opportunities and (ii) they are for the greatest benefit of the least advantaged position (the difference principle).³ Rawls conceived these principles as applying only to the domestic realm. But, following Beitz and Moellendorf, many liberals extend the scope of the Rawlsian domestic egalitarian principles to the international realm.⁴ Regarding the intergenerational realm, Rawls's principle of just savings requires enough material, environmental and human capital to be saved or invested in order to maintain just institutions for future generations.⁵ Once a society is wealthy enough to maintain just institutions, justice does not require further savings.

Expensive consumption habits are consumption habits that threaten other people's access to their fair share, as defined by egalitarian principles. Adopting a justice-based framework implies that the expensiveness that matters here must be assessed on the basis of that framework.⁶ Expensiveness so understood is often inadequately reflected by actual market prices. The acquisition of (market-based) cheap commodities may sometimes involve a significant threat to other people's access to their fair share. For example, even if plastic toys are cheap (in the market price sense), they are produced from petroleum, a finite resource, whose production is likely to decline before 2030⁷ and for which there is no easy substitute. Justice-based expensiveness is based on the idea of fair shares. The "currency of justice" we need to assess these fair shares does not strictly correspond to existing market exchange currencies. Political philosophers have proposed a variety of currencies of justice, resources, welfare, opportunities, or any combination of those. In this paper, I will use Rawls's primary goods as a currency of justice.

Hence the kind of expensive consumption I am concerned with in this paper is the consumption that renders or is likely to render contemporary and future humans unable to get their fair share of resources. Their fair share comprises the rival resources they need to enjoy the social primary goods they are entitled to. Rival resources include natural resources and ecosystems, material resources and real capital, private and public investments in human capital. The kind of expensive consumption justice is

concerned with includes consumption that endangers the long-term capacity of ecosystems to provide services to humans. And it includes a taste for a luxurious and lavish lifestyle even when it is not necessarily environmentally damaging (for example, a passion for collecting artworks by Jeff Koons), insofar as such taste may sustain the unwillingness to contribute to redistributive tax-and-transfer schemes and other solidarity mechanisms. Another instance of expensive consumption is the propensity to take unnecessary medication, which threatens the long-term stability of health insurance systems and thus basic access to health care for everyone. Environmentally damaging consumption behaviours are only one illustration of the kind of consumption that threatens distributive justice.

Regarding finite and static resources like petroleum, it is easy to grasp how the consumption of some affects others' opportunity to consume. Unless we reach a state of abundance, a significant proportion of people will have to renounce high levels of consumption for society to be able to transfer their fair share of finite and static resources to less advantaged individuals and to future generations. However, the mechanisms through which expensive consumption habits affect others' ability to consume their fair share may be more complex.

A first family of mechanisms encompasses mechanisms that link expensive consumption habits to the weakening of the willingness to leave their fair share to others. When expensive consumption habits originate in a propensity to get satisfaction from more expensive consumption behaviours, giving up these behaviours will involve lack of satisfaction and frustration, and we can reasonably assume most humans tend to shun frustration. Recent attention has been paid to the connection between attitudes towards consumption and pro-environmental behaviours, that is, behaviours that deliberately aim to reduce the negative impact of one's action on the natural environment. Since environmental goods are part of the fair share we ought to leave to the present and future inhabitants of the world, these works are of interest for those who aim to determine which consumption patterns are compatible with the realisation of distributive justice. Researchers have attempted to explain the gap between the possession of environmental knowledge and values, on one hand, and the display of pro-environmental behaviour, on the other hand.⁸ Some of the mechanisms they identify to explain this gap suggest expensive consumption habits hamper the willingness to leave their fair share of environmental goods to others. Let me present these mechanisms briefly.

The first mechanism is a potential conflict between primary motives, such as altruistic and social values, and more immediate, selective motives, "which evolve around one's own needs (e.g. being comfortable, saving money and time)."⁹ The more a person aspires to be comfortable, the more she will display expensive consumption behaviours, and the more likely the conflict with her willingness to behave in a pro-environmental or a pro-justice way is.

The second mechanism is related to the psychological costs of revising one's consumption habits. In market-based economies, where there are few legal restrictions on consumption, and where prices do not always adequately reflect the justice-based expensiveness of commodities, it is a challenge for those who have acquired these expensive consumption habits to get rid of them, unless their personal income

constrains them to do so. Diekmann and Preisendoerfer¹⁰ hypothesise that the more costly a pro-environmental behaviour is, the less likely people will adopt it, the “costs” in question being assessed in monetary and psychological terms. In other words, expensive consumption habits increase the effort and the costs of living in compliance with just distributive rules.

The third mechanism involves cognitive dissonance.¹¹ We tend to ignore information that is not consistent with our values, desires and beliefs. This implies that, in a society like ours, where a consumerist ethos is widespread, there will be a general tendency to ignore or minimise information about environmental problems requiring major consumption behaviour changes. For example, a study conducted on a sample of British tourists’ travel decisions shows that, even when tourists are aware of climate change issues, this does not affect their decision to travel by plane for their holidays.¹² The authors suggest cognitive dissonance theory provides a possible explanation for the failure of these tourists’ awareness of climate change issues to translate into behavioural changes.¹³ Since the participants attached high value to holidays and international travel, they just denied climate issues when making travel decisions. Had they not cultivated a taste for international travel, they might have been able to align their awareness of climate change with their consumption behaviours.

The fourth mechanism relates to the collective action problems raised by heightened consumption standards. Expensive consumption habits may be due to factors other than the pursuit of individual satisfaction, such as keeping up with a referent group, signalling one’s status and gaining social recognition.¹⁴ In fact, these factors alter our capacity to derive satisfaction from consumption. Our capacity to be satisfied and therefore our propensity to consume depend on the living conditions of other people around us. And we often do not just want to align with these standards. We also compete through consumption. Robert Frank illustrates this issue with the example of Stavros Niarchos, who spent lavishly on his yacht to outdo the luxuries of Aristotle Onassis’s own extravagant yacht:

“The barstools aboard the late Aristotle Onassis’s yacht, the Christina, were covered with the buttery soft – and jarringly expensive – foreskin of the sperm whale penis. The vessel’s faucets were of solid gold, [...]. [Stavros Niarchos’ yacht], the 375-foot Atlantis, was designed by an architect whose explicit instructions were to make it 50 feet longer than the Onassis vessel.”¹⁵

Onassis and Niarchos were annoyed with the idea of falling behind and put themselves in a rat race to secure their position in the conspicuous consumption competition. This competition brought about suboptimal outcomes because the resources, time and effort Onassis and Niarchos spent on their yacht could have been spent on something that would have brought about more collective satisfaction. Conspicuous consumption wastes resources because it brings about outcomes where the aggregated preferences are less satisfied than they could be.¹⁶

Now, liberal egalitarians may object this mechanism is not a problem for their theory since they do not necessarily expect just institutions to achieve Pareto-optimal states of affairs. Suppose Niarchos and Onassis acquired their wealth in a way conform to the combination of fair equality of opportunities and the difference principle. If they wish to spend their money inefficiently – that is, in a way that is less

conducive to satisfaction than it could be –, this is their own business and the state should not meddle with that. In response, defenders of Pareto-optimality may point out that the problem is that Niarchos's satisfaction does not only depends on his own mental capacities but also on how much Onassis consumes, which is something Niarchos cannot control. In other words, Onassis's consumption decisions generate negative externalities for Niarchos.¹⁷ But a liberal can reply that, if individuals cannot control what others consume, they can control the extent to which the display of others' consumption behaviours affects their own subjective satisfaction level. Autonomous citizens are supposedly able to deliberately plan their character. As Rawls puts it: “as moral persons citizens have some part in forming and cultivating their final ends and preferences”.¹⁸

Sometimes, however, the conspicuous consumption of some does not just affect the subjective well-being of others but also their social and economic opportunities. Frank gives the example of “the job seeker who gains a leg up on his rivals by showing up for his interview in a custom-tailored suit”.¹⁹ When and insofar as conspicuous consumption threatens fair equality of opportunities, there is a reason of justice to prevent people from developing a propensity to appreciate conspicuous consumption to the point that they select applicants on the basis of their consumption patterns.

And if liberal political philosophy does not necessarily imply that public policies should promote Pareto-optimal states of affairs, it requires at least equipping prospective citizens with the tools they need to control the extent to which they are subjectively affected by others' consumption behaviours. To be meaningfully held responsible for their preferences, individuals should be genuinely able to choose between a life structured by the need to keep up with their reference group in terms of consumption and a life structured by other aims.

The mechanisms I have just described suggest expensive consumption habits threaten distributive justice within and across generations and countries. But a Rawlsian might object that the difference principle may actually require the cultivation of expensive consumption habits. Those who have expensive consumption habits are willing to put a lot of effort and time in the production of economic and social goods in order to be able to consume more. Some of the benefits they contribute to produce could be redirected to the least advantaged through a just tax-and-transfer scheme. As Rawls puts it, “the greater returns to the more advantaged serve, among other things, to cover the costs of training and education, to mark positions of responsibility and encourage persons to fill them, and to act as incentives.”²⁰ Material incentives will become ineffective if the next generation has cheap consumption habits.

However, future generations are likely to need some natural capital to maintain just institutions. Expensive consumption habits threaten the preservation of this natural capital. And should there be a trade-off between natural and material capital, let us note that Rawls insists that the difference principle does not require a continuous economic growth across generations in order to maximise the prospects of the least well off in the future.²¹ The difference principle must be understood as a constraint on

intragenerational inequalities, and not as a principle directing our productive efforts for the future. Rawls even suggests that institutions shouldn't encourage the indefinite creation of wealth.

Moreover, one might wonder whether, and to what extent, acquisitiveness is compatible with maintaining just institutions. As G.A. Cohen has argued, the assumption that members of a just society are self-interested maximisers is consistent with the Rawlsian project only insofar as acquisitiveness – being disposed towards financial incentives – does not come under the purview of the basic structure.²² By contrast with Cohen, Rawlsians do not consider acquisitiveness as a disposition to be criticised and design institutions so as to exploit it for the benefit of the worst off. However, as a disposition that threatens our sense of justice and our willingness to abide by just regulations, acquisitiveness should be problematic even for a Rawlsian, institution-based, approach to justice.²³ A strictly Rawlsian solution to this problem might consist in asking parents to cultivate acquisitiveness and the propensity to consume only to the extent that it serves just institutions. But, in practice, it seems difficult to determine to what extent acquisitiveness will work as a justice-promoting disposition and stop the development of expensive consumption habits right there. In a world of scarce resources, it might be wiser, or easier, to rely on an egalitarian ethos or on non-material incentives like positive social regard in order to improve the prospects of the worst-off.

If expensive consumption habits are incompatible with meeting the demands of justice, then just institutions should attempt to make sure that individuals do not develop such habits. The influence of parents (understood as primary caregivers, who hold and discharge parental rights and responsibilities) on consumption habits is likely to be extremely important. Parents acquire a general duty to cultivate inexpensive consumption habits in their children in virtue of the parental ability to shape the consumption behaviours of the next generation. As educators, parents are well placed to minimise the extent to which the next generation of consumers will affect the world poor's and future people's access to their fair share of resources.

To summarise, the society-centred argument in favour of parental education that prevents the development of expensive consumption habits runs as follows:

The society-centred argument

1. Distributive justice requires actions to be taken in order to make sure every human being has access to her fair share of resources, whatever her place and time of birth are.
2. Expensive consumption habits undermine individuals' propensity to leave their fair share of resources to others.
3. Our propensity to leave their fair share of resources to others has a significant impact on the final distribution of resources.
4. Parental education strongly influences the extent to which children develop expensive consumption habits.

5. Conclusion: Therefore, distributive justice requires actions to be taken so as to make sure parental education and upbringing prevent children from developing expensive consumption habits.

The society-centred argument assumes parents acquire general duties, that is, duties they owe to other humans as a whole, in virtue of them being well placed to shape the behaviours of the next generation. However, parents also have duties *qua parents*, that is, in virtue of the special relationship they have with their children.²⁴ Insofar as a theory of justice accepts the existence and function of parents, it must account for the expectations society has towards them. In virtue of the special relationship they have with their children, parents acquire a legal but also a moral duty to care for their children's needs, well-being and opportunities for flourishing. Is training their children to be frugal compatible with the duty of care?

2. Expensive consumption habits and parents' duty of care

Beyond the duty not to abuse or neglect one's child, parents' duty of care to their children involves protecting their children's rights. Drawing from Brighouse's and Swift's theory of parent-child relationships, a plausible account of these interests-based rights includes:²⁵

- a right to the means adequate to healthy physical development (nutrition, shelter, clothing and health care);
- a right to an education adequate to the development of their autonomy as well as of their economic self-reliance;
- a right to an upbringing adequate to their healthy emotional development;
- a right to an education adequate to their moral development;
- a right to enjoy their childhood.

To push a concern aside, any plausible account of frugal upbringing must exclude neglecting children's survival needs. But one might worry that parental attempts to prevent expensive consumption habits would focus too much on the fourth category of interests, that is, on ensuring that they would develop into moral persons capable of regulating their consumption according to the demands of justice. Can the promotion of inexpensive consumption habits meet the remaining categories of interests?

Expensive consumption habits and the intrinsic goods of childhood

The right to enjoy one's childhood is the right to access to the "intrinsic goods of childhood", that is, the goods whose value is not solely derived from their contribution to a good adult life.²⁶ At a first glance, the carefree attitude that makes childhood so enjoyable involves being free from financial worries, budgeting tasks and ecological footprint worries.

However, there are reasons to doubt the conclusion that expensive consumption behaviours are part of a good childhood. Juliet Schor cites a study showing that, overall, American children born in 1981 spent more time on playing, household conversations and other passive leisure than children born in 1997.²⁷ As Schor points out, children born in 1997 did considerably more shopping than those born in 1981. Children are also more and more involved in consumer research, either directly or through data mining in websites aimed at a young audience. Consumer activities tend to involve children in economic and worklike activities at the expense of the goods of childhood.

Expensive consumption habits and healthy emotional development

Would an upbringing aiming at inculcating inexpensive consumption habits affect emotional development? Here, it is worth mentioning empirical research suggesting that children, adolescents and adults who endorse materialistic values are less happy than those who endorse values such as social relationships and self-realisation.²⁸ Juliet Schor's survey on Children, Media and Consumer Culture, conducted on a sample of 300 children, consisted of 157 questions covering measures of consumer involvement (media use, consumerist preferences and values) and of well-being.²⁹ Well-being was assessed by three scales: depression, anxiety and self-esteem. Schor and her team found a strong correlation between high levels of consumer involvement and depression and anxiety. Testing these data provided support for the hypothesis that consumer involvement caused depression, anxiety and low self-esteem. In addition, expensive consumption habits increase the risk of developing mental disorders like compulsive shopping addiction, which seems to stimulate the same dopamine reward system as cocaine or heroin do.³⁰ If these researchers are right, then parents' duty of care might involve an upbringing that prevents children from developing materialistic values.

Expensive consumption habits and economic self-reliance

Economic self-reliance is the ability to deal with the economy in such a way as to live well. Economic self-reliance is often understood as the ability to get an income sufficient to achieve a good standard of living and consumption. When we attempt to define an education that enables children to become economically self-reliant, we tend to focus mainly on marketable skills, skills one needs to make money on the market. But being able to spare money and being able to do with less money also matter. Philippe Van Parijs thinks "the most precious asset [he] could bequeath to [his] children in order to secure their future material welfare" is instilling "a propensity to consume less than their income (and access to credit) would allow".³¹ In a market economy, the value of the property and the income paid work generates depends on a variety of mechanisms that lie beyond individual control. Whilst consumption levels are truly within our control, at least to the extent that our survival needs are met and that we've been instilled the capacity to live well with less.

Moreover, inexpensive consumption habits help to operate successfully in the economy in more indirect ways. They increase bargaining skills. In case of conflict with her employer, the threat point (the value she can expect if negotiations fail) of a frugal worker is higher, since her well-being would be less affected by the loss of the income she is offered. Inexpensive consumption habits make economic agents, especially the least well off, less likely to fall into the credit trap. Inexpensive consumption habits increase economic and social opportunities because they decrease the costs of exiting an economic position to enter another. Those who stay stuck in a job they dislike because of expensive consumption habits are not fully able to deal well with the contemporary economy.

Too perfectionist?

At this point, political liberals may worry that this account of the parental duty of care is too perfectionist. Perfectionism stipulates that some ways of living are objectively better than others and that the promotion of objectively good ways of living by coercive organisations (like the state) is legitimate. Anti-perfectionist liberals affirm coercive organisations should not exercise power in a way that is justified by appealing to the objective merits of controversial ideals of the good life. Anti-perfectionists may worry that, first, if we derive policy implications from the substantial account of the parental duty of care I have just developed, this amounts to an illegitimate use of the coercive power of the state. The state would coerce parents into realising and passing on a controversial ideal of the good life. And, second, since the parent-child relationship is also characterised by coercion and non-voluntariness,³² parents who follow Schor and Kasser's recommendations might actually be illegitimately enrolling their children in one of these controversial ideals of the good life.

One might be tempted to reply to the anti-perfectionist objection that this account of the duty of care is justified by appealing to empirical evidence that meets academic and scientific standards. It does not appeal to controversial comprehensive doctrines. However, this reply is not so easy to make and raises the difficult problem of the extent to which liberal public reason can rely on empirical conjecture. Public reason requires justifications to be acceptable to reasonable citizens who regard themselves and each other as free and equal. But must citizens accept the validity of the empirical claims Schor makes to be deemed reasonable? According to Rawls, reasonable persons are willing to accept the "burdens of judgments", that is, the fact that different persons who engage in a serious rational and critical reflection on the nature of the good may end up disagreeing on it.³³ One source of reasonable disagreement is that "the evidence - empirical and scientific - bearing on the case is conflicting and complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate."³⁴ Indeed the evidence on the impact of consumption on well-being is conflicting and complex. Hence the anti-perfectionist concern that the state would act illegitimately if it attempted to enforce the parental duty to shape consumption habits remains. At least the anti-perfectionist could agree on reading this section of the paper as a piece of advice for parents and not as a draft bill.

But parents who follow these recommendations might also fail to take into account their children's interest in forming their own conception of the good life. However, Clayton's discussion of perfectionism offers a way out of this difficulty by pointing out that anti-perfectionism does not prohibit any appeal to ideals of the good life to justify the use of coercive power. Anti-perfectionism rather draws a principled limit to the extent to which controversial ideals can permissibly be invoked to legitimate coercion.³⁵ Respect for autonomy, and more precisely for children's future capacity for autonomy, provides a reason to limit the extent to which parents can justifiably appeal to controversial evidence on well-being.

(In)expensive consumption habits and autonomy

An autonomous person has the capacity to pursue higher order goals she can, on reflection, truly deem her own. This capacity is predicated on the capacity to reassess and revise these goals if the autonomous person finds she does not embrace them anymore. And it is also predicated on the capacity to act upon these autonomously chosen goals, which means autonomy must be supported by an array of cognitive, emotional and habitual dispositions, as well as by external conditions, such as the availability of adequate options and the absence of coercion.³⁶ Children develop their capacities for autonomy gradually. If the duty of care involves a duty to secure the development of children's capacities for autonomy, then parental upbringing and education should be delineated so that, when children reach adulthood, they fully enjoy these capacities. Or at least parental education should be such that, should children not become fully capable of autonomy when they reach adulthood, this lack of autonomy cannot be attributed to parental education, and preventing this lack of autonomy was beyond the reach of what parents could reasonably be expected to do.

One might worry that shaping children's value so as to inculcate inexpensive consumption habits for the sake of justice may jeopardise their capacity for autonomy. Aren't we running the risk of some sort of "green brainwashing"? Let us observe that the problem is not that inexpensive consumption habits are, by themselves, incompatible with the pursuit of autonomous goals. The problem is that the society-centred argument requires children to be trained to live inexpensively without them being able to object to such training or at least to identify the reasons that speak in favour of inexpensive habits. A way out of this difficulty is to conceive autonomy as an end-state.³⁷ Even if at a first stage (childhood) people acquire inexpensive habits in a non-autonomous way, at a second stage (adulthood) they could still subject them to rational criticism, provided that parents also attend to the development of their rational and critical thinking skills.

Many liberal egalitarians are likely to stay content with the end-state view. However, Clayton defends a more demanding view of autonomy in education. On this view, parental conduct should be constrained by the ideal of liberal legitimacy, in the same way as the authority of the liberal state upon individuals is. The legitimate authority of parents is conditional upon parents not seeking to impart particular

comprehensive beliefs or to enrol children into particular comprehensive practices before children have fully developed their capacity for autonomy. Autonomy, on this view, is not just an end-state, but also “a precondition of being treated in certain ways”.³⁸ Clayton’s case for the precondition view relies on at least two arguments. First, regarding the child as a future autonomous agent involves treating her as a self-governing agent, as the author of her life.³⁹ This means upbringing should not aim at shaping the child’s future higher order goals, regardless of whether the child’s future capacities for autonomy are actually affected by comprehensive enrolment. It is a matter of respect for the child as a self-governing agent rather than a matter of facilitating the development of her capacity for autonomy. Second, comprehensive enrollment is likely to increase the costs of revising the higher order goals the child has been enrolled into.⁴⁰

Even on this demanding understanding of the requirement to secure one’s child’s autonomy, a case for preventing children from developing expensive consumption habits can be made. The precondition view does not imply that parents should not cultivate inexpensive consumption habits. Clayton also argues that parents have a duty to develop or to allow others to develop their children’s sense of justice, and some techniques of motivation shaping are permissible for this purpose.⁴¹

Moreover, on the basis of the second argument in favour of the precondition view, parents might actually be encouraged and perhaps even required to inculcate inexpensive consumption habits. As it has already been noted, inexpensive consumption habits diminish the material costs and also the psychological costs of revising one’s goals. We can conjecture that shifting from inexpensive to expensive consumption habits is less demanding than the reverse.

What about Clayton’s first argument? It is not concerned with the uncalculated results of parental behaviour, but with the conducts parents deliberately adopt in order to inculcate certain evaluative dispositions. Clayton illustrates this point with the example of meat-based diets:

“If parents provide their children with a balanced diet, expose them to a variety of different conceptions of eating, and display a sensitivity to the emerging gastronomic conceptions of their children, then on the precondition view they do not violate their autonomy. They would violate their autonomy if they fed meat to their children with the aim of cultivating another meat eater.”⁴²

If Clayton’s view is correct, then, out of their duty to protect their children’s autonomy, parents should not aim at cultivating particular consumption habits, including inexpensive ones. Otherwise, they would fail to respect them as future self-governing agents.

However, a difficulty with the requirement of ruling out deliberate consumption habits-shaping has to do with the fact that the conduct one needs to adopt to achieve a specific aim depends on the context. An education that conforms to the ideal of autonomy should aim at exposing the child to a meaningfully wide and varied range of options.⁴³ With respect to consumption, it should thus aim at exposing the child to an adequate variety of consumption patterns. But the pursuit of this aim will not necessitate the same parental conduct in a consumerist society as in a non-consumerist society. Once parents start to reflect on the kind of aims the education they give to their children can legitimately pursue, in good conscience

they cannot overlook non-parental influences on their children's consumption behaviour. They must take into account the fact that, in our society, it is not as if the default option in terms of consumption habits formation was a neutral option. When parents decide not to actively shape their children's consumption habits, companies and the advertising industry take care of this aspect of upbringing and they strongly bias children to prefer expensive, consumerist lifestyles. If parents actively seek to impart frugal ideals to their children in our societies, their children are likely to be exposed to a wider range of lifestyles than if they are exposed to a wide range of consumption patterns at home (analogously, providing one's child with a vegetarian diet is more conducive to autonomy in a predominantly meat-eater society than in a society characterised by a plurality of conceptions of eating). Otherwise, the exposure to the frugal alternative will be too superficial to effectively treat children as autonomous choosers.

To summarise, the discussion of the duty of care suggests there is a child-centred argument for the claim that parental education should prevent the formation of expensive consumption habits:

The child-centred argument

6. Justice requires actions to be taken in order to make sure parents fulfil their duty of care.
 7. The duty of care involves an education and an upbringing adequate to healthy physical, emotional and moral development, to the development of autonomy and economic self-reliance and to access to the goods of childhood.
 8. Expensive consumption habits may be harmful to healthy emotional and moral development, to the development of autonomy and economic self-reliance and to access to the goods of childhood.
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9. Conclusion: Therefore, justice may⁴⁴ require actions to be taken to make sure parents prevent the development of expensive consumption habits in their children.

The society-centred argument and the child-centred argument overlap. This overlap may look too convenient to be true. Both arguments are contingent on the validity of a collection of empirical claims. The validity of the empirical research propositions (2), (3) and (8) rely on can always be re-assessed on the basis of empirical evidence and other proven methods of parenting. This means that the coincidence between the child-centred argument and the society-centred argument is accidental. Philosophers must also envisage possible conflicts. If (2) was true and (8) false, then, for the sake of benefitting their children by encouraging or letting them develop expensive consumption habits, parents would harm others' children, since expensive consumption habits reduce the global poor's and future people's access to their fair share. What should then parents do all things considered? Should they give priority to their general obligations of justice or to their special duty of care?

I have suggested that the division of moral labour between various educational institutions should pay attention to the specific expectations society has towards these institutions. Since society expects parents

to fulfil their duty of care, if another educational agent could be as effective as parents in teaching children inexpensive habits, it might be preferable to displace this burden on this other educational agent. But if there was no such agent, justice could impose restrictions on the extent to which the responsibility to care for one's child well-being can be carried out.⁴⁵ Parents' special duties can be justified on pragmatic grounds, that is, on the grounds that the most efficient way of securing children's legitimate interests is by assigning parents the duty to care for these interests. If this pragmatic justification is correct, then, as McLeod puts it, "there can be no fundamental normative conflict between justice and parental responsibilities because parental duties are warranted only to the degree to which they actually serve justice".⁴⁶ And even if parental duties are justified on the ground that parent-child relationships are constitutive of a flourishing life, justice-based constraints on parental duties so understood remain legitimate, in the same way as legal constraints on these duties are.⁴⁷ For example, teaching one's child to evade taxes (without being caught) is beneficial to her. But people placed in the Rawlsian original position might agree that it is desirable to place constraints on parents who wish to advance the interests of their children to this extent. The same line of reasoning applies to the cultivation of expensive consumption habits.

3. Should parents teach their child to be frugal when schools and other parents don't?

There is, however, a crucial limitation to both the society-centred argument and the child-centred argument. Their validity hinges on the assumption that educational agents, parents and non-parents, will collaborate to make the cultivation of inexpensive habits through parental upbringing effective.

Is the society-centred argument valid in unjust circumstances?

In our societies, characterised by a consumerist ethos and a lack of concern for the fate of the global poor and of future generations, it is likely that only a few parents will prevent their children from developing expensive consumption habits. And it is also likely that other educational agents, like schools and the marketing industry, will not go along with parents. With these considerations in mind, it is time to re-assess propositions (3) and (4). The propensity of all to leave their fair share of resources to others has a positive impact on the final distribution of resources, but the propensity of some does not. Chances are that parental attempts to prevent the development of expensive consumption habits will fail in a consumerist environment. Is the society-centred argument invalid, then?

To answer, let us start by distinguishing two types of situations, situations where a frugal upbringing has no impact on the just distribution of resources and situations where it has some, albeit little, impact. A frugal upbringing may have no effect with respect to the distribution of certain goods either because

the upbringing is ineffective due to the consumerist environment or because the low-consumption lifestyle of the minority of frugal children does not suffice to mitigate the impact of the consumption of others on the distribution of these goods. To recall Sinnott-Armstrong's example, the choice of an individual not to drive on a Sunday afternoon might affect the global temperature by a very little amount, but it will not counter the harms anthropogenic climate change is causing.⁴⁸ But, insofar as a frugal upbringing is sometimes effective, it may have some, albeit little, impact on the distribution of other goods. For example, thanks to their inexpensive lifestyle, frugally educated citizens might be willing to donate a significant percentage of their savings to the homeless begging on street corners or to effective charitable organisations. These actions would not bring about a fully just order at once, but they could be steps in the right direction. Moreover, in addition to prevent their children from developing expensive consumption habits, parents could render the distributive effects of a frugal education more significant by voting for political parties that take social, global and intergenerational justice concerns seriously, by giving money to humanitarian and environmental organisations or, as Elizabeth Cripps proposes, by organising with other parents for collective action.⁴⁹ The Rawlsian justice principles could thus provide normative guidance to individuals or small groups who are disposed to act so as to bring about a state of affairs that is closer to a just order,⁵⁰ provided these principles are action-guiding enough in unjust circumstances. Assuming the pursuit of self-interest is, to a reasonable extent, legitimate,⁵¹ inexpensive consumption habits mitigate the effects of such pursuit on others' ability to pursue their own interests. Hence the modest rather than significant improvements low-consumption lifestyles bring about in unjust circumstances weaken the society-centred argument, but do not invalidate it.

In unjust circumstances, the society-centred argument may be further reinforced by reading parental educational duties as part of the duty to transition to just institutions. Rawls noted "that in a well-ordered society the public knowledge that citizens generally have an effective sense of justice is a very great social asset. It tends to stabilise just social arrangements."⁵² In particular, to be willing to comply with just institutions, citizens generally need to believe others will comply too.⁵³ Building just institutions in less than fortunate circumstances may thus require acting so as to sustain and reinforce the belief that each citizen has an effective sense of justice, supported by political virtues and justice-promoting dispositions. One way parental education can sustain this belief is by cultivating such dispositions in their children. The society-centred argument can thus be reinforced by adding the premise that the belief that others have expensive consumption habits undermines individuals' propensity to leave their fair share of resources to others, and that parental promotion of inexpensive consumption habits combats this belief. This parental duty is related to the intergenerational duty to save enough capital to create and maintain just institutions in the future,⁵⁴ the capital in question here being the accumulated capital of mutual trust.

Now, one could point out that the Rawlsian liberal view implies parents should impart justice-promoting dispositions, or political virtues, regardless of the immediate effects of such dispositions on the actual distribution of advantages.⁵⁵ Rawls's later works stress his justice principles are meant to be appropriate

for a society where citizens are assumed to be free and equal.⁵⁶ Free and equal persons are regarded as having the “two moral powers”, the two capacities for a conception of the good and for a sense of justice.⁵⁷ The point here is neither that all the actual citizens of any just society do have these fully developed capacities, nor that they must have it, as a matter of conceptual necessity. The point is rather that justice principles should be devised as if actual citizens could develop and exercise such capacities. If this reading of Rawls’s later works is correct, then, the educational endeavours required by the society-centred argument should not be affected by the belief that others parents won’t meet their own educational obligations. The principles that regulate just educational actions should be devised as if other parents and children were willing to develop and exercise the dispositions that support their sense of justice.

Is the child-centred argument valid in unjust circumstances?

What about the child-centred argument? In a society where expensive consumption habits are widely spread, there are reasons to question proposition (8). In such circumstances, having expensive consumption habits might facilitate the pursuit of certain goods, such as jobs and friendship goods, and thus contribute to economic reliance, healthy emotional development and the goods of childhood.

Even the children of parents who adhere to inexpensive consumption patterns are not impervious to widespread consumerist values and their impact on social norms. These children might interpret the failure of their parents to indulge their desire for material goods as a lack of love. This might affect the relationship as well as children’s self-esteem.

Moreover, parents could reasonably worry that, if they prevent their children from developing a taste for material consumption (smartphones, fashionable brands, etc), their children might become too countercultural and thus unable to befriend peers. The teenager who does not have a smartphone cannot connect on Facebook and Twitters and thus misses a lot of interactions with her friends. And how can a child establish contacts if she does not share her peer’s cultural codes and values and does not even know the name of the brands her age mates are continuously referring to in their conversations? Living well, as a child, as a teenager and as an adult, involves being able to make friends and to escape ostracism. In a consumerist society, inexpensive consumption habits lessen this ability.⁵⁸

Perhaps more importantly, in consumerist societies, inexpensive consumption habits tend to diminish social and economic opportunities. Recall the case of the job-seeker who succeeds in the interview thanks to his custom-tailored suit. Or, as French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu points out, spending lavishly on an engagement party may actually be a wise investment.⁵⁹ Bourdieu shows that those who come from low-income social background maintain frugal consumption patterns, even when they can afford to spend more. He suggests that keeping these spendthrift habits prevents them from adopting consumption patterns that would enable them to access better social positions.⁶⁰ This implies having expensive consumption patterns can be a gateway to valuable social and economic positions. In unjust

societies, where access to social positions is not solely determined by competencies and talents, but also by consumption patterns insofar as they display the detention of cultural capital, parents who seek to prevent their children from acquiring these consumption patterns may actually jeopardise their children's economic and social prospects.

These considerations question the validity of (8) as far as emotional development, economic self-reliance and access to the goods of childhood are concerned. But still, they might be outweighed by the considerations I have brought forward in support of (8). Whether a disposition to buy costly custom-tailored suits (that enable to succeed at job interviews) or the ability to make do without 'custom-tailored suits jobs' is the best way to become economically self-reliant will vary according to the context. We need to specify further the kinds of unjust circumstances we are in to decide.

To this tentative conclusion, let us add that a wise strategy to mitigate the negative effects of countercultural attitudes consists in cultivating dispositions like the abilities to switch cultural codes and to use contrepied strategies. The ability to switch codes is "the ability to adapt one's behaviour as a response to a change in social context".⁶¹ A contrepied strategy, a term coined by Bourdieu and Boltanski,⁶² is a strategy that consists in deliberately adopting a behaviour pattern opposite to what other people expect and in making people understand this is deliberate. The countercultural child becomes cool in being different. Additionally, to mitigate further the considerations that question the validity of (8), recall that, if a countercultural education may hamper the development of the ability to join a social group by signalling certain consumption patterns, it favours the development of autonomy since it increases the variety of the ways of living children are exposed to.

Parents as secondary agents of justice

The discussion of the society-centred argument and of the child-centred argument in unjust circumstances shows that, when the predominant culture is consumerist, parental endeavours to prevent their children from developing expensive consumption habits may not have the desired outcome. But parents are the only, or the primary, agents of justice, as far as upbringing is concerned. Neither the society-centred argument nor the child-centred one specifies who should act in the first place to make sure parental education prevents the development of expensive consumption habits. One might think only parents are able to prevent their children from developing expensive consumption habits through parental upbringing and education. But this is inexact. The way society and institutions are organised has a profound impact on the range of educational decisions parents can take. What children learn at school, who they socialise with, the way advertising campaigns frame the environment, the kind of social and economic opportunities they can expect, how much time each parent can devote to care activities, all of this has a deep impact on the set of options parents have with respect to the kind of education they will provide to their children.

Onora O'Neill's distinction between primary and secondary agents of justice is helpful to articulate the principles that should regulate the division of educational effort among parents and other institutions.⁶³ Primary agents of justice define, distribute and control the contributions of secondary agents to the realisation of justice. They can build capacities in existing agents so as to transform them into secondary agents of justice. Or they can build specific agents and endow them with the necessary capacities to secure the realisation of justice. Secondary agents contribute to justice by complying with the obligations defined by primary agents. Primary agents typically have means of coercion at their disposal to secure such compliance. In many countries in the contemporary world, states seem the fittest to act as primary agents of justice.

States, as primary agents of justice, can help parents and families to contribute as secondary agents to justice. O'Neill employs the useful distinction between capacities and capabilities to conceptualise the power of agents to realise justice.⁶⁴ Capacities can only be deployed when circumstances are favourable, while capabilities can be deployed in actual circumstances. Notwithstanding current social and economic circumstances, parents have the capacity to prevent their children from developing inexpensive habits. They have the required influence and moral authority. But they may not have the specific capabilities one needs to make sure children actually avoid developing such habits in unfavourable circumstances. States, but also schools and firms, can help parents to develop these capabilities.

One way states can increase the chances parental attempts to prevent expensive habits succeed is to make sure the messages parents and schools send with respect to consumption habits align.⁶⁵ States can require that at least publicly funded schools encourage inexpensive consumption habits, for example by asking students and teachers to wear school uniforms, limiting school trips abroad, teaching environmental history and offering courses about money, saving and spending. Another possible policy is to prohibit advertising campaigns aimed at children, as Sweden and Quebec already do. More indirect solutions, such as working time regulations, might also be considered. Marketers believe parents who work long hours indulge their children out of a feeling of guilt.⁶⁶ If their belief is correct, overworked parents have a tendency to shower their children with material gifts as a compensation for the time they cannot spend with them. Working time regulations might thus address this issue by freeing overworked parents from guilt and thus endowing them with the capability to prevent their children from developing expensive consumption habits.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have addressed the following question: from a liberal egalitarian perspective, should parents prevent their children from developing expensive consumption habits? I have argued that, in a just or almost just world, where parents and other educational agents collaborate effectively, parents have a general obligation of justice and a special duty of care to prevent their children from developing

expensive consumption habits. In an unjust world, where expensive consumption habits are widespread, and where other parents and educational agents do not collaborate effectively, scattered parental attempts to make their children more frugal are likely to have little distributive impact. Yet parents retain a general obligation of justice to prevent their children from developing expensive consumption habits in order to combat the belief that others are not disposed to downgrade their consumption to meet the demands of distributive justice. Combatting such belief enables society to build a capital of mutual trust necessary to establish just institutions. Regarding the duty of care in unjust circumstances, if the potential counterproductive effects of a frugal upbringing on children's emotional development and economic capacities prove significant, parents should pay attention to these effects, and attempt to mitigate them. Hence the conclusion that the duty of care involves inculcating inexpensive consumption habits may be less straightforward in unjust circumstances. Finally, regarding the division of moral labour, states and other educational agents have a general duty to endow parents with the capability to effectively prevent their children from developing expensive consumption habits.

Notes

¹ The research reported on in this paper owes a lot to a discussion I had with Adam Swift in June 2015. A first draft of this article was presented at the Political Theory Workshop "Justice, Freedom and the Good Life", Aarhus University, December 2016. The feedback from the participants was very helpful. I am also very grateful to Lasse Nielsen, Liam Shields and to two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier version. All errors are my own.

² Philippe Van Parijs, 'Frugal Tastes and Frugal Conduct', *Ethical Perspectives* 10, 2 (2003): 151–155, at p. 152.

³ John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* in E. Kelly (ed.) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 59–60.

⁴ Charles R. Beitz, 'Bounded morality: justice and the state in world politics', *International Organization* 33, 03 (1979): 405–24; Darrel Moellendorf, *Cosmopolitan Justice* (Westview Press, 2002).

⁵ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), para. 44; Rawls, *Justice as Fairness* op. cit., para.49.

⁶ Works discussing overconsumption may assume other normative framework, such as a utilitarian framework (e.g. Kenneth J. Arrow et al., *Are We Consuming Too Much?* (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2 November 2004) <<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=611907>>) or an environmental ethics framework (e.g. Mark Sagoff, 'Do We Consume Too Much?', *The Ruffin Series of the Society for Business Ethics* 2000 (2000): 53–74.).

⁷ E.g. Steve Sorrell et al., 'Oil futures: A comparison of global supply forecasts', *Energy Policy* 38, 9 (2010): 4990–5003.

⁸ Anja Kollmuss and Julian Agyeman, 'Mind the Gap: Why do people act environmentally and what are the barriers to pro-environmental behavior?', *Environmental Education Research* 8, 3 (2002): 239–60.

⁹ Kollmuss and Agyeman op. cit., p.250.

¹⁰ Andreas Diekmann and Peter Preisendörfer, 'Persönliches umweltverhalten: Diskrepanzen zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit. / Ecology in everyday life: Inconsistencies between environmental attitudes and behavior.', *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 44, 2 (1992): 226–51.

¹¹ Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford University Press, 1962).

¹² Andrew Hares, Janet Dickinson and Keith Wilkes, 'Climate change and the air travel decisions of UK tourists', *Journal of Transport Geography* 18, 3 (2010): 466–73.

¹³ Hares, Dickinson and Wilkes op. cit., p.472.

¹⁴ Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions*. (New York; London: The Macmillan Company ; Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1899); Pierre Bourdieu, *La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement* (Paris: Éd. de Minuit, 1979); Juliet Schor, *The Overspent American: Upscaling, Downshifting,*

and the New Consumer (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1998); Robert H. Frank, *Luxury Fever: Weighing the Cost of Excess* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

¹⁵ Frank op. cit., p.5-6.

¹⁶ Veblen op. cit., pp.97–100; John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Boston: Mariner Books, 1998), pp. 124–31; Frank op. cit.; Van Parijs op. cit., p.153; Joseph Heath, ‘Liberal Autonomy and Consumer Sovereignty’ in J. Christman and J. Anderson (eds.) *Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism* (Cambridge University Press, 2005): 204–25.

¹⁷ Heath op. cit., p.222.

¹⁸ John Rawls, ‘Social unity and primary goods’ in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds.) *Utilitarianism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982): 159–85, at pp. 168–9.

¹⁹ Frank op. cit., p.196.

²⁰ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness* op. cit., p.63, emphasis added.

²¹ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness* op. cit., pp.63–4; Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* op. cit., pp.257–8.

²² G. A. Cohen, *If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re so Rich?* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 117–47.

²³ I thank an anonymous reviewer for having helped me to clarify this point.

²⁴ On the distinction between these two different ways in which parents may acquire duties in the context of climate ethics, see: Elizabeth Cripps, ‘(How) should we be “green” parents? Climate justice, collective action and special duties’ *JWI Working Paper* (Just World Institute, University of Edinburgh, 2014) <http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/jwi/knowledge_exchange/events/2014_2015/political_theory_research_group3>.

²⁵ Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, *Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child Relationships* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 63–4.

²⁶ Samantha Brennan, ‘The goods of childhood, children’s rights, and the role of parents as advocates and interpreters’ in F. Baylis and C. McLeod (eds.) *Family-Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Anca Gheaus, ‘The “Intrinsic Goods of Childhood” and the Just Society’ in A. Bagattini and C. Macleod (eds.) *The Nature of Children’s Well-being: Theory and Practice* (Springer, 2014).

²⁷ Juliet B. Schor, *Born to Buy: The Commercialized Child and the New Consumer Culture* (New York: Scribner, 2005), chap. 5.

²⁸ Patricia Cohen and Jacob Cohen, *Life Values and Adolescent Mental Health* (Psychology Press, 1996); Tim Kasser, *The High Price of Materialism* (MIT Press, 2003).

²⁹ Juliet B. Schor op. cit., pp.141–75.

³⁰ Heidi Hartston, ‘The Case for Compulsive Shopping as an Addiction’, *Journal of Psychoactive Drugs* 44, 1 (2012): 64–7.

³¹ Van Parijs op. cit., p.152.

³² Matthew Clayton, ‘Debate: The Case against the Comprehensive Enrolment of Children’, *Journal of Political Philosophy* 20, 3 (2012): 353–64, at p. 355.

³³ John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 48–58.

³⁴ Rawls, *Political Liberalism* op. cit., p.56.

³⁵ Matthew Clayton, *Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 26–7.

³⁶ Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford : New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 373–8.

³⁷ Clayton, *Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing* op. cit., pp.88–91.

³⁸ Clayton, *Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing* op. cit., pp.91–2.

³⁹ Clayton, *Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing* op. cit., pp.103–5; Matthew Clayton, ‘Debate: The Case against the Comprehensive Enrolment of Children’, *Journal of Political Philosophy* 20, 3 (2012): 353–64.

⁴⁰ Clayton, *Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing* op. cit., pp.106–9.

⁴¹ Clayton, *Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing* op. cit., pp.144–55.

⁴² Clayton, *Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing* op. cit., pp.109–10.

⁴³ Joel Feinberg, ‘The child’s right to an open future’ *Whose child*, 1980: 124–53.

⁴⁴ The conclusion of the child-centred argument is less strong than the conclusion of the society-centred argument because the empirical considerations I have provided in support of (8) are subject to revision.

⁴⁵ See Colin McLeod, ‘Parental Responsibilities in an Unjust World’ in D. Archard and D. Benatar (eds.) *Procreation and Parenthood: The Ethics of Bearing and Rearing Children* (Oxford University Press, 2010): 129–51.

⁴⁶ McLeod op. cit., pp.136–7.

⁴⁷ McLeod op. cit.; Brighouse and Swift op. cit., pp.144–6.

⁴⁸ Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ‘It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations’ in W. Sinnott-Armstrong and R. Howarth (eds.) *Perspectives on Climate Change* (Elsevier, 2005): 221–253.

⁴⁹ Cripps op. cit.

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- ⁵⁰ Adam Swift, 'The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances', *Social Theory and Practice* 34, 3 (2008): 363–87, at pp. 379–81.
- ⁵¹ Swift op. cit., p.380.
- ⁵² Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* op. cit., p.293.
- ⁵³ Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* op. cit., p.295.
- ⁵⁴ Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* op. cit., pp.252–8.
- ⁵⁵ I thank Liam Shields and two anonymous reviewers for having drawn my attention to this possibility.
- ⁵⁶ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness* op. cit., p.39.
- ⁵⁷ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness* op. cit., pp.18–9.
- ⁵⁸ Although one reviewer suggested it is better for children to avoid friendships defined by brands.
- ⁵⁹ Bourdieu op. cit., p.437.
- ⁶⁰ Bourdieu op. cit., pp.433–8.
- ⁶¹ Jennifer M. Morton, 'Cultural Code-Switching: Straddling the Achievement Gap', *Journal of Political Philosophy* 22, 3 (2014): 259–81.
- ⁶² Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski, 'Le fétichisme de la langue', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 1, 4 (1975): 2–32, at p. 21.
- ⁶³ Onora O'Neill, *Justice Across Boundaries* (Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 177–92.
- ⁶⁴ O'Neill op. cit., p.187.
- ⁶⁵ Cf. Danielle Zwarthoed, 'Creating frugal citizens: The liberal egalitarian case for teaching frugality', *Theory and Research in Education* 13, 3 (2015): 286–307.
- ⁶⁶ Juliet B. Schor op. cit., p.25.