

RAMON LLULL Y LOS LULISTAS
(SIGLOS XIV-XX)

COLECCIÓN

INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS HISPÁNICOS EN LA MODERNIDAD (IEHM)

Esta colección pretende recoger estudios que analicen desde las perspectivas filosófica, filológica, histórica, jurídica y teológica la historia de las ideas de origen hispánico desde el Renacimiento hasta la primera mitad del siglo XVIII. Por su naturaleza interdisciplinar, da cabida a trabajos de diferente orientación. Publica, de manera preferente, aquellas contribuciones propias de las líneas de investigación del Instituto de Estudios Hispánicos en la Modernidad. Además de los grandes temas del hispanismo moderno, la colección contempla también algunos estudios particulares sobre el caso balear.

CONSEJO EDITOR – EDITOR ADVICE

Jaume GARAU AMENGUAL (Director)

Rafael RAMIS BARCELÓ (Subdirector)

Fernando RODRÍGUEZ-GALLEGO (Secretario)

COMITÉ ACADÉMICO ASESOR – ACADEMIC ADVISORY BOARD

Juan CRUZ CRUZ (Universidad de Navarra)

José Luis FUERTES HERREROS (Universidad de Salamanca)

José JUAN VIDAL (Universitat de les Illes Balears)

Jose MEIRINHOS (Universidade do Porto)

Tomàs de MONTAGUT i ESTRAGUÉS (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

Pere J. QUETGLAS NICOLAU (Universitat de Barcelona)

Josep-Ignasi SARANYANA CLOSA (Pontificio Comité de Ciencias Históricas)

† Lía SCHWARTZ (The Graduate Center, City University of New York)

Edwin WILLIAMSON (University of Oxford)

RAFAEL RAMIS BARCELÓ

(ED.)

**RAMON LLULL Y LOS LULISTAS
(SIGLOS XIV-XX)**

EDITORIAL SINDÉRESIS

2022

1ª edición, 2022

© Rafael Ramis Barceló (ed.)

© 2022, editorial Sindéresis

Venancio Martín, 45 – 28038 Madrid, España

Rua Diogo Botelho, 1327 – 4169-004 Porto, Portugal

info@editorialsinderesis.com

www.editorialsinderesis.com

ISBN: 978-84-19199-36-2

Depósito Legal: M-28982-2022

Produce: Óscar Alba Ramos

Impreso en España / Printed in Spain

**Este libro ha sido financiado gracias a la ayuda de la Vicepresidència
i Conselleria d'Innovació, Recerca i Turisme y cofinanciado por
el Fondo Social Europeo.**

Direcció General d'Innovació i Recerca, del Govern Balear



GOVERN
ILLES
BALEARS



UNIÓN EUROPEA
FONDO SOCIAL EUROPEO
El FSE invierte en tu futuro

Reservado todos los derechos. De acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el código Penal, podrán ser castigados con penas de multa y privación de libertad quienes, sin la preceptiva autorización, reproduzcan o plagien, en todo o en parte, una obra literaria, artística o científica, fijada en cualquier tipo de soporte.

ÍNDICE

INTRODUCCIÓN.....	11
COLABORADORES	19

I. LOS LULISTAS EN EL OTOÑO MEDIEVAL Y EL RENACIMIENTO

1. CONSTANTIN TELEANU: Le solutionnement artificiel des <i>Quaestiones Attrebatenses</i> de Raymond Lulle à l'intention de Thomas Le Myésier	25
2. ÓSCAR DE LA CRUZ: Roger Bacon dintre de Ramon Llull: una relació textual.....	43
3. JAUME MENSA I VALLS: Agostino d'Ancona, antilul·lista	57
4. JAUME DE PUIG: Nicolau Eimeric versus Ramon Llull: Perquè?.....	73
5. MICHELA PEREIRA: Il paradosso degli alchimisti 'lullisti'. Ritornando sulle origini dell'alchimia pseudolulliana	81
6. FRANCESCO SANTI: Beltramo della Cervara, promotore di Ramon Llull?.....	97
7. PATRIZIO RIGOBON: Momenti della storia della fortuna veneziana di Raimondo Lullo: da Pietro ad Apostolo Zeno	109
8. FRANCISCO DÍAZ MARCILLA: El lulismo de Diego de Anaya y Maldonado (1357-1437) y el Colegio de San Bartolomé de Salamanca: estado de la cuestión.....	135
9. SIMONE SARI: I manoscritti lulliani e il lullismo all'abbazia di San Vittore presso Parigi	151
10. MAURICIO BEUCHOT: El lulismo de Nicolás de Cusa y la filosofía del lenguaje	167
11. JOSEP AMENGUAL I BATLE, M.SS.CC.: El <i>Directorium Inquisitorum</i> i el seu editor Guillem Caselles.....	183
12. MARIA CABRÉ DURAN: El pensament escoto-lul·lista de Pere Dagú: De les formalitats a les dignitats	207
13. CLAUS A. ANDERSEN: A Lullist Contribution to the Formalist Literature of the Renaissance: Jaume Janer's <i>Tractatulus de distinctionibus omnium rerum</i> (1491).....	221
14. ELEONORA BUONOCORE: Imaginary Journeys: The Literary Sources of Bartolomeo Gentile da Fallamonica's <i>Canti</i> between Ramon Lull, Dante and Petrarch.....	241

15.	GABRIEL ENSENYAT – MARIA BARCELÓ: Joan Cabaspre, ‘ciudadà honrat’ i lul·lista (1455-1529).....	257
16.	ALBERT CASSANYES ROIG: Jaume d’Olesa: un poeta lul·lista i antiluterà	271
17.	FLAVIA BUZZETTA: Pierleone da Spoleto un lullista cabbalista della fine del XV secolo.....	287
18.	ROBERTA J. ALBRECHT: Ramon Llull, Martin Luther, and the Dignities of God.....	303
19.	LINDA BÁEZ RUBÍ: La estética de la belleza divina en las figuras lulianas: del <i>Llibre de meravelles</i> al franciscanismo novohispano ...	323
20.	DARIO GURASHI: Dall’angelo all’uomo. Agrippa lettore di Lullo ...	345
21.	FRANCESC TOUS: Ramon Llull entre los papeles de Gian Vincenzo Pinelli (1535-1601).....	361
22.	NOEL BLANCO MOURELLE: Herrera y su programa de enseñanza para la <i>Real Academia Mathematica</i> (1584). Sobre los silencios del archivo luliano	377
23.	PERE JOAN PLANAS MULET: El lulismo del arquitecto Juan de Herrera	393
24.	ROGER FRIEDLEIN: João de Barros y el diálogo en el lulismo.....	409
25.	JULIÁN BARENSTEIN: Giordano Bruno como maestro lulista: hacia una nueva interpretación	423
26.	MARCO MATTEOLI: Raimondo Lullo fonte di Giordano Bruno: dalla mnemotecnica alla matematica	439
27.	PAUL R. BLUM: Lullism as an Antidote to Pantheism in Cusanus and Bruno.....	455

II. LOS LULISTAS EN LA ÉPOCA MODERNA

28.	DEBORAH MIGLIETTA: Campanella lecteur de Lulle.....	477
29.	ALESSANDRO TESSARI – ALBERTO PAVANATO: Petro Hieronymo Sanchez de Lizarazo	503
30.	ROBERTA J. ALBRECHT: The Divine Circle in Emerson, Donne, and Crashaw.....	507
31.	ANNA SERRA ZAMORA: La <i>Breve y fácil declaración del artificio luliano</i> , d’Agustín Núñez Delgadillo. Presentació i transcripció.....	527
32.	JORGE USCATESCU BARRÓN: Sebastián Izquierdo: el <i>Pharus Scientiarum</i> de 1659 en la tradición del <i>Ars Generalis Ultima</i> (1308) de Lulio	537

33.	JOSEP M. RUIZ SIMON: « <i>Messieurs les Lullistes.</i> » La recepció de Llull i el lul·lisme durant les guerres de religió franceses	555
34.	MANUELA ÁGUEDA GARCÍA GARRIDO: <i>En vez de minas, hallaua incendios</i> : la campaña antiluliana del padre Ribas (O.P.) en la España del siglo XVII.....	577
35.	PERE VILLALBA: <i>Arbol de la Ciencia</i> de el iluminado Maestro Raymundo Lulio Alonso de Cepeda y Adrada, en Brusselas, 1663....	603
36.	ROBERT HUGHES: Patrons, Publishers and Plagiarism: The Society of Astrologers as an «Epistemic Context» for Richard Saunders's <i>Physiognomie, Chiromancie, Metoposcopia</i> (1653).....	639
37.	ROSA PLANAS: Sor Anna Maria del Santíssim Sagrament, una lul·lista perseguida.....	667
38.	MIQUELA SACARÈS TABERNER: La venerable Anna Maria del Santíssim Sagrament i les iconografies lul·lianes	679
39.	LINO TEMPERINI, TOR: Jean-Marie De Vernon (†1695), storico e teologo religioso del Terzo Ordine Regolare Franciscano	697
40.	FRANCESCO FIORENTINO: Hyacinthus Gimma and Lullism.....	717
41.	MIGUEL G. GARÍ PALLICER: Joan Antoni Ferrando, SI: un jesuïta lulista de Mallorca entre el segle XVII y el XVIII	733
42.	JOSEP ENRIC RUBIO: El lul·lisme de Salzinger i l'alquímia	751
43.	JOAN SANTANACH I SUÑOL: El lul·lisme abrandat de fra Bartomeu Forners (1691/5-1788)	769
44.	NICOLÁS MARTÍNEZ BEJARANO: Teatro de las variaciones de Proteo. Algo sobre los encuentros y desencuentros, respecto a Ramon Llull, entre tradicionalistas y novatores (1729-1789).....	785
45.	FRANCISCO JOSÉ GARCÍA PÉREZ: El Dr. Juan Bautista Roca i Mora (1733-1795): reinterpretación biográfica de un líder antilulista	807
46.	LUCIO M. NONTOL, TOR: Frei Manuel do Cenáculo, TOR. (1724-1814) ¿discípulo de Ramon Llull?	823

III. LOS LULISTAS EN LA ÉPOCA CONTEMPORÁNEA

47.	ANNA FERNÁNDEZ CLOT: Ramon d'Alòs-Moner, editor de poesia lul·liana	841
48.	MARIBEL RIPOLL PERELLÓ: Mateu Obrador, Antoni M. Alcover i Bernhard Schädel o la connexió europea del lul·lisme insular (1900-1932).....	855

49.	MARK JOHNSTON: Protestant Missions, Orientalism, and the First English Biography of Ramon Llull: Samuel Zwemer's <i>Raymund Lull: First Missionary to the Moslems</i> (1902)	871
50.	VALENTÍ SERRA DE MANRESA, OFMCap.: Fra Andreu de Palma i l'aportació dels caputxins als estudis lul·lians.....	889
51.	JOAN ANDREU: La superación del Llull inexplicable: su ubicación en el contexto neoplatónico-agustiniano y en la filosofía transcendental del siglo XIII según E. W. Platzeck	905
52.	FERNANDO DOMÍNGUEZ REBOIRAS: Friedrich Stegmüller (1901-1980), medievalista y lulista	919
53.	VIOLA TENGE-WOLF: A brief history of the Raimundus-Lullus-Institut	931
54.	NÚRIA GÓMEZ LLAUGER: Armand Llinarès i els estudis lul·lians a França.....	963
55.	PERE ROSSELLÓ BOVER: La poesia del P. Miquel Colom Mateu i Ramon Llull	977
56.	JOSEP M. BENÍTEZ RIERA, S.J.: Presencia textual de Ramon Llull en Ignacio de Loyola. (La guía magisterial del padre Batllori)	995
57.	JULIA BUTINYÀ: L'aportació de Martí de Riquer a Ramon Llull	1017
58.	CARLES LLINÀS PUENTE: Francisco Canals Vidal: una perspectiva tomista sobre Llull	1031
59.	PEDRO RAMIS SERRA: Sebastià Trias Mercant i el lul·lisme.....	1051
60.	PAMELA BEATTIE: J.N. Hillgarth, <i>Ramon Lull and Lullism</i> , and Questions of Context.....	1069
61.	MARTA ROMANO – CARLA COMPAGNO: Alessandro Musco e Raimondo Lullo	1083
62.	JAUME MEDINA: Record de Charles Lohr	1091
63.	ALEXANDER FIDORA: Kurt Flasch, hereu de l'escola lul·liana maguntina.....	1111
64.	LLUÍS CABRÉ: Pierre Menard o Borges, lul·lista (amb un apèndix sobre Jonathan Swift).....	1119
65.	SERGI CASTELLÀ MARTÍNEZ: J. V. Foix: esbozo de lulismo poético.	1133
66.	DOMINIQUE DE COURCELLES: Raymond Lulle au XXème siècle: le Grand Art d'une cinétique lumineuse	1149
COLOFÓN		
	RAFAEL RAMIS BARCELÓ: Hacia una noción crítica de 'lulista'	1169
	ÍNDICE ONOMÁSTICO.....	1195

13. A LULLIST CONTRIBUTION TO THE FORMALIST LITERATURE OF THE RENAISSANCE: JAUME JANER'S *TRACTATULUS DE DISTINCTIONIBUS OMNIUM RERUM* (1491)¹

CLAUS A. ANDERSEN

University of South Bohemia, České Budějovice (Czech Republic)

1. Introduction

One of the most significant results of John Duns Scotus's (ca. 1265–1308) novel doctrine of a special «formal distinction» (*distinctio formalis*), applicable in both metaphysical and theological discussions, was a new interest in the plurality of ways one may distinguish between items on various levels of reality. Early Scotists, here especially Petrus Thomae († 1340) and Franciscus de Mayronis (1285–1328), were quick to develop whole systems of distinctions designed to capture all sorts of differences in the domains of both created and divine being.² A new literary genre, the so-called *Tractatus formalitatum*, named after this literature's occupation with Scotus's formal distinction, was one outcome of this new interest. During the 15th and 16th centuries, this today widely understudied literature became part of the scholastic mainstream. Toward the middle of the 17th century, the famous Scotist philosopher and theologian Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673) remarked that all of the scholastic schools had developed their own doctrines regarding the number of distinctions, listing Scotist, Thomist, Aristotelian, and Nominalist authors as well as followers of Giles of Rome.³ Missing in Mastri's list is the Lullist tradition. Mastri is not alone in this. That Lullist authors were influenced by, and indeed in their own eclectic and transformative way contributed to, the Formalist tradition has only recently received proper scholarly attention. Notably, an edition of two Formalist works of Pere Dagui (1435–1500), the first professor in the Lullist *Studium Generale* on Majorca, has recently been published within the *Bibliotheca Philosophorum Medii Aevii Cataloniae* series.⁴ Dagui's most prolific student, Jaume Janer O.Cist. († after 1506), contributed to the Formalist literature as well. In this present article, I

¹ Work on this article was funded by the Czech Science Foundation (project *Theory of Cognition in Baroque Scotism*, no. GAČR 20-01710S). To some extent, the article draws on research that I have published elsewhere, partially in cooperation with Rafael Ramis Barceló, whom I wish to thank at this place for directing my attention to the eclectic Lullist tradition and its surprising and understudied affiliations with Scotism. I also thank Gabriella Wietlisbach from the Zentral- und Hochschulbibliothek, Luzern, for providing photo material of the main text studied in this present article, and Robert Andrews for careful proofreading and valuable suggestions.

² Cf. Andersen, 2011, pp. 81–93, with references to further literature.

³ Mastri's doxography is extensively quoted in Poppi, 1966, p. 615, and Andersen, 2016, pp. 687–688.

⁴ Dagui, 2018; cf. also Ramis Barceló, 2013.

shall shed light on Janer's interest in Formalist distinction theory. I shall first briefly introduce this fairly unknown Renaissance Lullist and then focus on his early opusculum *Tractatulus de distinctionibus omnium rerum* (henceforth called *Tractatulus*) and its main philosophical motifs. This indeed very short opusculum itself is appended to the article.

2. Jaume Janer and his *Tractatulus de distinctionibus*

Despite being a prominent figure in Renaissance Lullism, only very little is known about Janer's life.⁵ He is assumed to have been born at some date during the second half of the 1450s and to have died after the publication of his last work in 1506. Based on the frequency of his family name Janer (also Gener, Giner, Januarius) at that place, he is believed to have been born in Cabra del Camp in the present-day Province of Tarragona. He certainly later entered the nearby Cistercian monastery Santes Creus. At the age of thirty, he went to Majorca to study with Pere Dagui, who had only recently become the first professor of the island's new Lullist *Studium Generale* (founded 1481), which at the time when Janer studied there (the late 1480s) was situated in the Franciscan monastery on the small mountain Puig de Randa. In 1489 we find him in Barcelona, engaged in the publication of two of his Master's works as well as a short introduction to logic falsely attributed to Ramon Llull. Janer appears to have stayed some years, possibly more than a decade, in Barcelona, during which time he published his pocket-size introduction to philosophy *Naturae ordo studentium pauperum* (1491) as well as his much more substantial *Ingressus facilis rerum intelligibilium* (1492), an introduction to all of the disciplines in the scholastic curriculum, from logic to theology. During these years, he must also have earned his doctorate, the circumstances of which however remain unknown, and probably taught in the Lullist Studium of Barcelona. In 1500, King Ferdinand, who had previously also supported Dagui, granted him a privilege to teach Lullist doctrines within the Crown of Aragon, and specifically to lead the new Lullist *Studium* in Valencia.⁶ At that same place, Janer published his second major work, the *Ars methaphisicalis naturalis ordinis cuiuslibet rei intelligibilis arboris naturae* (1506), again an introduction to the whole scholastic curriculum, but this time with much more overt adherence to Ramon Llull, whose *Ars* is thus constantly referenced. No notice as to Janer's life beyond 1506 has come down to us.

⁵ The following sketch of his life is based on Andersen and Ramis Barceló, forthcoming; cf. also the older biographical study by Miquel (pseudonym for Fort i Cogul), 1954-1956.

⁶ The privilege is included as an appendix in Janer, 1506, ff. 278v-279r; it is reproduced in Miquel (Fort i Cogul), 1954-1956, pp. 132-135.

The *Tractatulus* is contained in an exceedingly rare printed volume of thirty leaves in quarto. The volume also includes the above-mentioned *Logica abbreviata* falsely attributed to Llull as well as Janer's own *Naturae ordo* (now called *Tractatus de ordine naturae*). The volume itself carries no indications as to its place or time of printing, but appears to have been printed between 1505 and 1510 by Jacobo Cromberger in Sevilla.⁷ The *Tractatulus* is placed at the end of the volume. This opuscle is not known to have ever been printed separately, although its colophon states that it was completed (not printed) in Barcelona on 14 May 1491, that is, just five days prior to the *Naturae ordo*, which makes the opuscle the earliest of Janer's works. The colophon further states that the work was completed while Janer stayed with the Benedictines (in St. Paul's Monastery) in Barcelona.⁸ The whole Sevilla volume has gone almost unnoticed in the bibliographical literature, and the *Tractatulus* has thus so far remained unknown. Its authenticity is beyond doubt, though, since Janer explicitly refers to it once in his *Naturae ordo*.⁹

It is not difficult to guess why the *Tractatulus* was added to the Sevilla volume. Both of Janer's major works are philosophical encyclopedias. The *Naturae ordo* that is intended as a textbook of the whole curriculum does have sections on metaphysics, theology, and natural philosophy. But whereas both logic (or at least some aspects of logic) and a long discussion of the doctrine of distinctions (as a part of metaphysics) are included in the *Ingressus facilis* and the *Ars methaphisicalis*, corresponding sections are lacking in the *Naturae ordo*.¹⁰ The *Logica abbreviata* and our *Tractatulus* have been included in the Sevilla print in order to cover the whole curriculum. This fact demonstrates how important formalist distinction theory was to Janer and those in his milieu. Discussions of distinction theory indeed played a central role in Renaissance Lullism. Janer's own teacher Daguí, besides treating the subject in two separate treatises, had included a long discussion of the various kinds of distinctions in his encyclopedic presentation of philosophy (called *Opus divinum* in the first and *Metaphisica* in the second edition). The slightly later Lullist Bernard de Lavinheta included a corresponding

⁷ For a discussion of the bibliographical details, see Andersen and Ramis Barceló, forthcoming. Only one copy of this volume is presently known to exist, the one held in the Zentral- und Hochschulbibliothek, Luzern, Ink. 630.8. The title *Tractatulus de distinctionibus omnium rerum* is found on f. 1r, whereas the opuscle is simply called *Distinctiones* in the headline of the treatise itself (f. 28r). Since the exact year of publication is uncertain, I shall refer to this work by its title.

⁸ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 30r.

⁹ Janer, 1491, f. 34v. The titulus (Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 28r) presents the work as one that is «edited» by Janer; this does not impact upon its authenticity, since what is meant is that Janer here gives his version of a widespread scholarly genre.

¹⁰ For a discussion of Janer's view on the curriculum of disciplines, see Andersen and Ramis Barceló, forthcoming.

section in his discussion of the term *differentia* in the Lullist system, the so-called «angle of difference» in the second figure (called «T») in Llull's general Art.¹¹ At least until the second half of the 17th century, a number of Lullists and authors with Lullist leanings continued to discuss Formalist distinction theory.¹² Janer and his teacher Dagui stood at the beginning of this long, and long since forgotten, tradition within Lullism.

3. The main motifs of the *Tractatulus de distinctionibus*

3.1. A quest for clarity: the foundational aspect of distinction theory

The presentation of eight different kinds of distinctions, and their subdivisions, constitutes the core of the *Tractatulus*. Before discussing the individual distinctions, Janer gives a general introduction to the topic of difference and distinction, these two terms here being used synonymously (at other places Janer also employs the term «otherness», *alietas*). The importance of difference and distinction lies in their capacity to bring clarity to other concepts, including in particular key concepts of the Lullist Ars:

Difference is that formality to which it properly pertains to differentiate one concept from another concept. Or difference is that because of which goodness, magnitude, and so on, are clear and unconfused notions. And it certainly is manifold, as our Doctor claims in the *Tree of Science*, due to eight modes of distinctions: For one is of reason, another from the nature of the thing, another formal, another real, another essential, another numerical, another totally subjective, another totally objective. In the *General Art*, however, the Doctor formulates three kinds of difference in its triangle, namely between sensual and sensual, sensual and intellectual, intellectual and intellectual, which differ by difference. Indeed, the concept of distinction figures among the interior [notions], and it is defined thusly: Distinction in general is the clarity of concepts. As for the particulars, I intend to provide a definition of each kind, so that their truth may be better understood.¹³

In his later works, Janer repeats this general definition of *distinction* as «clarity of concepts» (*claritas conceptuum*).¹⁴ The same definition is found in Dagui's writings on distinction theory.¹⁵ According to Dagui, although all being is

¹¹ Cf. Andersen and Ramis Barceló, 2018, pp. 43-57. Lavinheta's discussion of the distinctions is included as an appendix in Dagui, 2018, pp. 201-205. Prior to Dagui, the eclectic Lullist Fernando of Córdoba had briefly reported, but not in any detail discussed, the Formalist system of distinctions; cf. Córdoba, 1911, p. 33.

¹² For references to such discussions in works of Valerio Valier, Johann Heinrich Alsted, Athanasius Kircher, and Francesc Marçal, see Andersen and Ramis Barceló, forthcoming.

¹³ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 28r.

¹⁴ Janer, 1492, f. 6va, and 1506, f. 55r.

¹⁵ Dagui, 2018, p. 78. Cf. Dagui, 2018, pp. 118 and 120. The definition has echoes in the later tradition

knowable (*scibile*), in fact nothing can be known if not for difference, which thus is a *causa sine qua non* for all knowledge.¹⁶ Llull himself talked of difference as «the light of reason».¹⁷ On various occasions, Llull emphasizes the function of difference in clarifying other concepts.¹⁸ Distinctions have a foundational function in the sense that they enable knowledge of other things. They support the general Lullist methodology, the *Ars*, in Lullist understanding a God-given instrument for knowledge of all things, natural and super-natural. In the *Ars methaphisicalis*, Janer brings out this connection in clear words: «God made a rational creature, so that it could understand the highest good with clarity and distinction through the angle of difference, not with confusion through the angle of contrariety».¹⁹ Distinction theory thus becomes a means of human knowledge even of God, the highest good. At the same place, Janer also emphasizes the usefulness of distinctions when dealing with the natural world; they bring clarity – that is, the «clarity of distinctions» (*claritas distinctionum*) – into the created world.²⁰ It would seem that a highly detailed doctrine of distinctions would best suit this high purpose. For Janer, as well as for his teacher Dagui, this is the very attraction of the Formalist doctrine of a series of neatly defined distinctions. From the quote above it would seem that Janer ascribes the eight distinctions to Llull; however, the point he is making is simply that Llull operated with a plurality of distinctions, namely the three kinds of distinctions Janer mentions later in the quote (Llull discusses them both in the *Arbor scientiae* and in his *Ars generalis*). The Formalist doctrine as such is not of Lullist origin, but it is imported into a distinctly Lullist methodological framework.

3.2. Eight kinds of distinctions: the influence from Petrus Thomae

The list of distinctions discussed by Janer, for the most part, goes back to the early Scotist Petrus Thomae, a professor of theology in the Franciscan Studium of Barcelona in the 1320s. This Franciscan master is the earliest presently known author to talk explicitly of a «Scotist school» (*schola Scotica*).²¹ Curiously, he does

of eclectic Lullism; for references, see Andersen and Ramis Barceló, forthcoming.

¹⁶ Dagui, 2018, p. 118.

¹⁷ Llull, 1998, p. 46: «[D]ifferentia est ita lumen intellectus, ut cognoscat res; sicut lux est uisus, ut attingat entia uisibilia».

¹⁸ Llull, 1984, p. 213: «Differentia est id, ratione cuius bonitas, etc. sunt rationes inconfusae siue clarae». Cf. similarly Llull, 2001, p. 20.

¹⁹ Janer, 1506, f. 60r: «Ideo fecit deus rationalem creaturam, ut summum bonum intelligeret cum claritate et distinctione per angulum differentie et non cum confusione per angulum contrarietatis». Cf. again Andersen and Ramis Barceló, forthcoming.

²⁰ Janer, 1506, f. 60r.

²¹ Thomae, 2018, p. 13. General introduction to this author in Smith, 2010. For his doctrine of distinctions, see also Bridges, 1957.

not identify with this school, although he is himself deeply indebted to Scotus, whose works he at one point claims to have seen in Scotus's own handwriting.²² He clearly qualifies as a Scotist. His lasting influence first of all is due to his system of distinctions developed in a short treatise, edited as *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*, devoted exclusively to this topic.²³ It was not his only discussion of distinctions, nor was Petrus the only one to offer a differentiated system of ways to distinguish between various items of reality. It is his list of seven kinds of distinctions as presented in his short treatise, though, that echoes down through the long history of the Scotist tradition, even long after their author was forgotten. The list was often accompanied with references to a special «modal distinction» (*distinctio modalis*) that is often ascribed to Franciscus de Mayronis, author of a competing list of four kinds of distinctions, though the modal distinction also figured among the kinds of distinctions discussed by Petrus Thomae in his *Quodlibetal Questions*, quaest. 7.²⁴ Janer himself discusses this modal distinction in his *Ars methaphisicalis*, but not in his other works.²⁵ In the *Tractatulus*, another distinction, a special «numerical distinction» (*distinctio numeralis*), is added to Petrus Thomae's original list. However, the fact that Janer essentially elaborates on Petrus Thomae's list is easily seen from the following schematic presentation (fig. 1).

Petrus Thomae's list of seven distinctions	Distinctions discussed by Jaume Janer
Distinctio rationis	Distinctio rationis simpliciter Distinctio rationis secundum quid
Distinctio ex natura rei	Distinctio ex natura rei
Distinctio formalis	Distinctio formalis simpliciter Distinctio formalis secundum quid
Distinctio realis	Distinctio realis simpliciter Distinctio realis secundum quid
Distinctio essentialis	Distinctio essentialis Distinctio numeralis (Distinctio modalis; 1506 only)
Distinctio se totis subiective	Distinctio se tota subiectiva
Distinctio se totis obiective	Distinctio se tota obiectiva

Fig. 1. Lists of distinctions in Petrus Thomae and Jaume Janer.

Petrus Thomae arranged his distinctions such that they represent a certain order: Whereas the first one, the rational distinction, posits only a minimal difference, one

²² Thomae, 1957, p. 53.

²³ This treatise exists in two different versions; for a discussion of the relationship between these versions, see Andersen, 2011, pp. 47-81.

²⁴ Thomae, 1957, pp. 119-122. Cf. Andersen, 2011, p. 99.

²⁵ Janer, 1506, f. 58r-v.

that is due to the workings of an intellect, the next distinction in the list holds among real items. The farther one goes down the list, the larger is the gap between the items distinguished, the last and strongest kind of distinction being the «totally objective distinction» (*distinctio se totis obiective*) that holds between things that do not concur in any *objective* reality and thus do not even have a real univocal concept in common. Petrus explains that when one turns to the counter-concept of *identity* it is the other way around: the objective identity is the weakest one possible, for not all things that are objectively identical, i.e., have an objective reality (concept) in common, are identical in any other way; the rational identity is the strongest one, since all items that are rationally identical are also identical in other ways. Certain kinds of distinction are thus combinable with certain kinds of identity.²⁶

Important at this place is that Janer adheres to the truly *systematic* character of the original list. Going down the list, he repeatedly remarks that a given kind of distinction is included in the «superior», i.e., earlier mentioned, ones (though always emphasizing that the distinctions that occur in reality do not participate in the rational distinction). He deviates from Petrus Thomae, though, by not explicitly discussing the relationship between identity and distinction. It is uncertain whether Janer was directly acquainted with Petrus Thomae's treatise, which goes unmentioned throughout the *Tractatulus*. In the *Ars methaphisicalis* he does explicitly refer to the latter, but the references are vague and do not allow for any definite conclusion regarding direct influence.²⁷ Janer is certainly directly influenced by his teacher Daguí, whose *Tractatus formalitatum brevis* he had prepared for press only shortly before composing his own piece. Daguí too has the whole list of distinctions, and his understanding of the individual distinctions is close to Janer's. At least Petrus Thomae's name as well as essential features of his list of distinctions were known in the eclectic Lullist circles of Janer and Daguí.

3.3. Beings and distinctions of reason: false statements and real monsters

Whenever Janer discusses the rational distinction (*distinctio rationis*), he bases his argument on a differentiation between two kinds of beings of reason (*entia rationis*), one of which is a pure product of an intellectual activity, whereas the other has some foundation in reality. In the *Tractatulus*, this differentiation is stated thusly:

²⁶ Thomae, 2011, pp. 310-314.

²⁷ Janer, 1506, ff. 55v, 56v, 58r, and 59r, mentions a certain *Petrus*, undoubtedly Petrus Thomae, in the printed marginal notes. For the character and significance of these and similar marginalia, see Andersen and Ramis Barceló, forthcoming.

The distinction of reason is an otherness of concepts that either simply or in a qualified sense depend on an intellectual power and that either simply or in a qualified sense are impossible. Concerning them there is a rule about how to cognize them: all those that by themselves include impossibility either simply or in a qualified sense are said to be beings of reason simply or in a qualified sense.²⁸

Janer does not say that the distinction of reason is one that is either «simply» (*simpliciter*) or «in a qualified sense» (*secundum quid*) dependent on an «intellectual power» (*potentia intellectiva*), but rather only that it holds among items that in one of these ways depend on such a power. The remainder of his discussion then focuses on these items, rather than on the rational distinction itself. To illustrate how he understands beings of reason in an *unqualified* or simple sense, Janer gives the following list of sentences that represent such beings:

- «Man is not an animal»
- «God is not infinite»
- «An angel is not spiritual»
- «Man is an irrational animal»
- «A donkey is a man»
- «God is a donkey»
- «The Antichrist is God».

Janer says that these sentences are due to either composition or division.²⁹ The meaning clearly is that composition applies in the positive sentences, whereas division applies where a negation is involved. We further learn that these sentences «only exist in a cognitive power» (*solummodo sunt in potentia cognitiva*), since «nothing corresponds to them in reality» (*non correspondeat eis aliquid a parte rei*).³⁰ Since these sentences represent simple or unqualified beings of reason, they in an unqualified way include impossibility. Janer, however, does not explicitly state whether this is because they *necessarily* represent falsehoods, or whether any falsehood, including *contingent* ones, could be included in the list. In his discussion in the *Ingressus facilis*, he includes such statements as «Being as being is not the subject matter of metaphysics», «God is the subject matter of metaphysics», and «Ramon is ignorant».³¹ Thus, both a false conception of metaphysics and an unjust estimation of Ramon Llull's intellectual brilliance result in simple beings of reason. From these examples, it would seem that the distinction between necessary and contingent falsehoods is not really crucial to Janer. It rather seems that in his

²⁸ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 28r. Cf. similarly Janer, 1492, f. 5vb, and 1506, f. 55r-v. Regarding Janer's and Dagui's discussions of beings of reason, see in more detail Andersen, forthcoming.

²⁹ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 28r.

³⁰ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 28r-v.

³¹ Janer, 1492, f. 6ra.

opinion *all* false representations of reality belong under items that are due exclusively to the workings of an intellect.

Also qualified beings of reason, those with a foundation in reality, include impossibility, though apparently in a less crass way as the others. Janer's explanation of this kind of beings of reason has some surprising elements. The chimera is usually seen as a standard example of an absolutely impossible entity. Janer understands it as an example of beings of reason that do correspond to something in reality. A chimera, being an animal consisting of the tail of a lion, the head of an ox, and the body of a man, according to Janer in the *Tractatulus* (or the head of a lion, the body of a man, the legs of a wolf, and the forepaws of a leopard, according to his description in the *Ingressus facilis*),³² may be resolved into its parts. These are real things. Chimeras, and like them golden mountains as well as goatstags, have a foundation in reality and thus are not beings of reason in an unqualified sense. Janer adds that nature, due to a superabundance of matter, is in fact capable of producing chimera-like monsters (*natura possibilitatem habet propter materie illimitationem producendi monstrum unum et plura*).³³ This point is stated rather obscurely in the *Tractatulus*. In the *Ingressus facilis*, Janer is somewhat clearer that chimeric monstrosity, though not intended by nature, does not lie wholly outside of nature. In that work he even quotes a historical record of a pair of conjoined twins to illustrate his assumption that something that would seem to be a mere being of reason may in fact enter into reality.³⁴ The main difference between the two kinds of beings of reason is thus simply that the one kind may *de facto* become real, whereas the other may not.

Janer's reasoning makes beings of reason in a qualified sense an issue for natural history or biology, rather than for logic (for a long time, the usual context for discussing beings of reason).³⁵ In this, he is actually only taking a route already charted by his teacher Dagui, who in his *Tractatus formalitatum brevis* has a similar account of the two kinds of beings of reason as well as their corresponding kinds of distinctions of reason.³⁶ By contrast, Petrus Thomae did not discuss beings of reason in general in the context of distinction theory. He also only assumed one

³² Janer, 1492, f. 6ra. For a survey of traditional views of the chimera, see Ebbesen, 1985.

³³ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 28v.

³⁴ Janer, 1492, f. 6ra. In the background clearly lies Aristotle's explanation of nature's acceptance of deformity in *De generatione animalium* IV.4 769b10-770b26, where Aristotle suggests form's lack of control over matter as the cause of natural deformity. Aristotle, however, is clear that nature is only capable of deformity, not of chimeric monstrosity, a distinction that collapses in Janer's account. Cf. again Andersen, forthcoming.

³⁵ For a survey of discussions of chimeras in the context of logic among Janer's contemporaries, see Ashworth, 1977. In later times, beings of reason were frequently discussed in metaphysics as well. Cf. Andersen, 2016, pp. 239-242.

³⁶ Dagui, 2018, pp. 80 and 84-86. Cf. Andersen and Ramis Barceló, 2018, pp. 49-51.

type of distinction of reason, namely the *simpliciter* version, which he even understood quite differently than Daguí and Janer. Most importantly, he described this distinction itself as a fabrication of an intellect, or of some other faculty of the soul capable of drawing comparisons and thus establishing some distinction not available in reality (his example, at this place, being the distinction between a definition and something that is defined).³⁷ The idea that a distinction of reason must obtain between beings of reason, and that the kind of distinction of reason depends on the kind of beings of reason among which it holds, seems to be peculiar to our eclectic Lullists.

3.4. The kinds of real distinctions: a formal ontology *in nuce*

A fairly recent introduction to formal ontology as a philosophical discipline states that, «Formal ontology studies the most general features of real objects by reflecting on the forms by virtue of which we identify them».³⁸ This is exactly what the late-scholastic Formalist literature is about, even though the features of things by which we *distinguish* them are its primary focus (distinction of course being the flipside of identity). Both Janer and his teacher Daguí subscribe to the view that the standard genre of this literature (*tractatus formalitatum*) owes its very name to its preoccupation with Duns Scotus's formal distinction.³⁹ Some Formalists considered their extensive discussions of distinction theory worthy of a separate science, for which the name «science of formalities» (*scientia formalitatum*) was invented.⁴⁰ This science of formalities may be seen as a forgotten forerunner of formal ontology. Especially the discussion of those distinctions not due to the workings of an intellect is committed to investigating the general features of various levels of reality.

Introducing the first of these distinctions, the *distinctio ex natura rei*, which Janer here seems to be taking as a genus that comprises all other non-rational distinctions, he points to its three domains (called «formalities») of application:

³⁷ Thomae, 2011, pp. 286-290.

³⁸ Hennig, 2008, p. 54.

³⁹ Note that Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 29r, seems to begin a sentence that would lead to an explanation of the name of this literature («Et quia haec distinctio difficilior est aliis...»), but then breaks off; the sentence simply seems to be incomplete. Compare with the parallel *loci* in Janer, 1492, f. 7va («Et quia hec distinctio difficilior perfectior et nobilior est aliis igitur ab ea tractatus sumit nomen quia formalitas: ideo tractatus formalitatum seu distinctionum»), and Daguí, 2018, pp. 80-82 («Et quia difficilior est omnium, quia formalitas, ideo ab ista tractatus sumit nomen formalitatum»). For examples from 16th- and 17th-century authors' discussions of the name of the genre of *treatises of the formalities*, see Andersen, 2016, pp. 662-665.

⁴⁰ Du Dovet, 1587, pp. 12-13. Cf. Andersen, 2016, p. 664.

infinite being, finite being, and such being that is indifferent to this dichotomy.⁴¹ It would seem we may translate this tripartition into divine, created, and transcendental being. These then are the levels of reality to which not merely rational distinctions may apply. The formal distinction, we learn shortly later, also applies to three domains; these domains are here left without any description, but it seems safe to assume that Janer is alluding to the same three domains that he mentioned in connection with the *distinctio ex natura rei*.⁴² This is confirmed by Janer's discussion of the formal distinction in the *Ingressus facilis*, where he explicitly says that the formal distinction applies to common, divine, and created being.⁴³ Both of these two kinds of distinctions, then, are characterized by their shared broad scope.

The formal distinction, however, particularly has to do with «formalities» (*formalitates*). Janer has a rather flexible understanding of this concept, but in connection with the formal distinction, both in the *Tractatulus* and in the *Ingressus facilis*, he quotes Franciscus de Mayronis's definition: «A formality is the quiddity of whatever has a quiddity, be it definable or not».⁴⁴ Accordingly, all quiddities are formally distinguished. In both works Janer, following Dagui, then differentiates among proper and improper uses of the formal distinction, depending whether one applies the distinction to formalities taken properly or improperly.⁴⁵ The importance of this differentiation at first sight is less than obvious; its main attraction seems to lie in that it enables the application of the formal distinction to key terms of the Lullist Ars, e.g., goodness and magnitude taken as whole items (*tota bonitas*, *tota magnitudo*) rather than as Scotist quiddities. The mentioned differentiation indeed is peculiar to the eclectic Lullists; it has no correspondence in Petrus Thomae's or Mayronis's discussions. When Janer, however, emphasizes that the formal distinction (now properly understood) allows us to arrive at some «primitive concept» (*conceptum primitivum*) in the intrinsic order of things, without which concept an infinite regress would endanger all scientific certainty,⁴⁶ then this seems to echo Petrus Thomae's talk of an «ultimate abstraction» (*abstractio ultimata*) that strips off everything that does not belong to a quiddity, so that the abstract quiddity

⁴¹ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 28v. Cf. similarly Janer, 1492, f. 6va.

⁴² Janer, *Tractatulus*, ff. 28v-29r.

⁴³ Janer, 1492, f. 7ra-b.

⁴⁴ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 29r, and 1492, f. 7rb, quotes Mayronis, 1520, f. 48vbQ: «Dico ergo quod formalitas est quidditas uniuscuiusque habentis quidditatem, sive diffinibile sit sive non».

⁴⁵ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 29r (mentions only the improper senses of «formality»), and 1492, f. 7rb (mentions also the proper ones, such as the «quiddity of goodness» and the «quiddity of man»); Dagui, 2018, pp. 86-90.

⁴⁶ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 29r. It is not entirely clear whether Janer here has just *one* first concept in mind or rather the first concept in various orders of things. I suspect the latter is the case, since Janer in his metaphysics generally operates with a plurality of first abstract concepts. Cf. especially Janer, 1492, f. 2rb, and 1506, f. 9v.

alone remains.⁴⁷ For both authors, the formal distinction helps us finding first concepts.

The «real distinction» (*distinctio realis*) is said to hold among interior features of a substance (called «substantial formality».⁴⁸ In *Ingressus facilis*, Janer again says it has three domains of application; it has the same large scope as the two preceding distinctions.⁴⁹ Its special focus, however, is on *res*, since it always holds between things (*inter rem et rem*).⁵⁰ That is, the features in question are correspondingly conceived as things (*res*), which again allows for a differentiation between a proper and an improper use of this distinction, apparently depending on one's notion of *res* (the criterion for this differentiation is not spelled out, though). In the *Tractatulus* there is no talk of the divine Trinity in this context (the same is the case in the *Ars methaphisicalis*), but in the *Ingressus facilis* Janer has a discussion of how this distinction holds among the divine persons that are seen as «three real existing things» (*tres res reales existentes*).⁵¹ That a real distinction holds among the Trinitarian persons is not a particularly Lullist assumption; it is also common in the Scotist tradition, where the real distinction is often said to differ from the essential one exactly by its Trinitarian application.⁵²

In connection with the real distinction, Janer introduces a specific Lullian motif. He refers to the Lullian «tree of nature» (*arbor naturae*), which may be seen as a rather extravagantly expanded version of the classical Porphyrian tree. Both of his major works include depictions of the tree of nature, of which each work has its own version; the version from the *Ars methaphisicalis* is reproduced below (fig. 2). Like the Porphyrian tree, the tree of nature plots the relationship among concepts of various degrees of commonness. In the *Tractatulus*, Janer refers to the tree to illustrate his point that a given distinction not only holds between universal concepts or common natures, but rather also between their singular instances at the roots of the tree (exemplified with *Jesus Christus* and other persons in fig. 2). Besides the real distinction, this applies to the essential, the numerical, and the subjective distinctions, all of which Janer restricts to the domain of created being.⁵³

⁴⁷ Thomae, 2011, p. 296. This ultimate abstraction is applied in various contexts in Janer, 1492, f. 11vb, and 1506, ff. 59r and 75v.

⁴⁸ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 29r.

⁴⁹ Janer, 1492, f. 7va.

⁵⁰ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 29r.

⁵¹ Janer, 1492, f. 7vb.

⁵² For examples from 14th- and 15th-century Scotism, see Andersen, 2011, pp. 91, 149-151, 215, 219, 231.

⁵³ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 29r-v. Cf. similarly as regards these distinctions Janer, 1492, ff. 7va-8vb.




Fig. 2. The *arbor naturae* as depicted in Janer, 1506; identical tree printed on ff. 2v, 95v, 116v, 205v. Original held in the Biblioteca Fundación Bartolomé March, Palma. [With permission].

In the *Tractatulus*, Janer does not have much to say about the «essential distinction» (*distinctio essentialis*), besides that it only holds within the domain of created being. The same goes for the «numerical distinction» (*distinctio numeralis*), which nevertheless deserves some attention, since this distinction is among the Lullist innovations within the system of distinctions. Daguí had introduced it, and Janer and other eclectic Lullists followed him.⁵⁴ Janer says that it holds among «items that include diverse numbers» and he illustrates this with appeal to created goodness and magnitude, seemingly referring to created individual instances of these concepts. Subsequently, we learn that the «totally subjective distinction» (*distinctio se tota subiectiva*), holding among individualized instances of such concepts, coincides with the numerical distinction.⁵⁵ It was indeed Petrus Thomae's intention that this latter kind of distinction should hold among individuals – his example being individual persons – that share some generic or specific reality (belonging as they do

⁵⁴ Daguí, 2018, p. 82. Cf. Andersen and Ramis Barceló, 2018, pp. 55-57, and Andersen and Ramis Barceló, forthcoming.

⁵⁵ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 29v. Cf. similarly Janer, 1506, f. 58v.

to one and the same *genus* and *species*), but not a subjective reality, being the kind of reality that pertains to actually existent singulars. The *objective* counterpart to this distinction, according to Petrus, holds among such items that in addition to this do not even share any objective reality, which is the kind of reality pertaining to concepts in the mind. Hence the strangely sounding terminology of the final two distinctions in his list.⁵⁶ Now, if the subjective and the numerical distinctions coincide, one may wonder what the point was in introducing the latter. In the *Ingressus facilis*, Janer explicitly says that he only discusses the subjective distinction lest his readers be ignorant of the complete list of distinctions.⁵⁷ That is close to admitting that there is no significant difference between the numerical and the subjective distinctions.

The objective distinction (*distinctio se tota obiectiva*) holds, as Janer repeatedly points out, between items «that do not convene in any common reality, that is, from them no common and univocal real concept can be abstracted».⁵⁸ This description clearly echoes Petrus Thomae's own understanding just mentioned.⁵⁹ Up for debate is only the application of this distinction: to which items might it be applied? Petrus Thomae mentions being and the good; this makes sense, since the good as a transcendental concept qualifies being and is therefore not included under the concept of being itself. He also mentions the individualizing differences of individuals; being radically individual they do not participate in anything universal. Janer rather holds that this distinction obtains among key concepts of the Lullist Ars, e.g., goodness and magnitude, which are then clearly seen as notions that cannot be reduced to any more universal concepts.⁶⁰ Janer also mentions non-individual differences as examples of items that are objectively distinguished; he explicitly refuses that this should also apply to individualizing differences. Following Dagui, he says that being «simply distinctive» (*simpliciter distinctiva*) they cannot be

⁵⁶ Thomae, 2011, pp. 308-310. Note further the discussion in *ibid.*, p. 344, whether two categories are subjectively distinct when they pertain to one individual and thus share some reality *in numero*; they are indeed as such individually distinct. Petrus Thomae has thus already discussed what the Lullists call a «numerical distinction» in the context of his subjective distinction and apparently saw no reason to assume one further distinct distinction. As for terminology, note that Petrus Thomae speaks of distinctions that are due to items that are «wholly subjectively» or «wholly objectively» distinct (*subiective* and *obiective* are here used as adverbs), whereas Janer's terminology in the *Tractatulus* rather qualifies the distinctions themselves as wholly subjective or wholly objective (these terms being here used as adjectives). Both approaches are frequent throughout the Formalist literature. Janer, 1492, ff. 8va-9ra, has the same terminology as Petrus Thomae, whereas Janer, 1506, ff. 58v-59r, rather has the terminology of the *Tractatulus*.

⁵⁷ Janer, 1492, f. 8vb. For other aspects of his discussion of the subjective distinction in this work, see Andersen and Ramis Barceló, forthcoming.

⁵⁸ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 30r. Cf. similarly Janer, 1492, f. 9ra, and 1506, f. 59r.

⁵⁹ Thomae, 2011, pp. 310 and 346. For a detailed discussion, see Andersen, 2011, pp. 147-177.

⁶⁰ Janer, 1492, f. 9ra, and 1506, f. 59r. This example is not mentioned in the *Tractatulus*.

distinct themselves.⁶¹ In our opuscle, the criticism is stated rather obscurely. The result is clear, though: individual differences (called *haecceitates* by the Scotists) have no place in Janer's, and Daguí's, version of the Formalist system of distinctions.

Conclusion

The synthesis of Lullism and Scotism brought about by Pere Daguí and Jaume Janer's interest in Formalist distinction theory is quite remarkable. For these authors, the elaborate Formalist system of distinctions, first outlined by the early Scotist Petrus Thomae, is an attractive doctrinal complement to their own Lullist thought. It provides them with a framework both for discussing beings of reason and for presenting key elements of their ontology. In abbreviated form, Janer's *Tractatulus* contains many essential features of his and his teacher's doctrinal synthesis. It exhibits how tenets from the Scotist tradition have been accommodated to Lullism, to some extent though at the cost of both conceptual and argumentative clarity. This lack of clarity is somewhat ironic given the emphasis both Daguí and Janer put on what they call «clarity of distinctions». Janer is generally dependent on Daguí, whose *Tractatus formalitatum brevis* he had redacted before writing his own short piece. With their writings on distinction theory, both of these eclectic Lullists inscribe themselves into the Formalist tradition that, in their time, seems to have possessed a much broader appeal than previous philosophical historiography has recognized.

Appendix

Jacobus Januarius

*Tractatulus de distinctionibus omnium rerum*⁶²

[fol. 28r] [1.] Immobilis substantia et infinita trina et una consubstantialis potestas tua cum benedictione nec non gratia atque perfectione, breviter copulate editeque a reverendo Jacobo Ianer in sacra theologia Cistierciensis ordinis inclyto professore distinctiones feliciter incipiunt.

[2.] Differentia est illa formalitas cui proprie competit differentiare unum ab alio conceptum, vel differentia est id ratione cuius bonitas, magnitudo etc. sunt rationes

⁶¹ Janer, *Tractatulus*, f. 30r. Somewhat fuller discussion in Janer, 1492, f. 9rb, and 1506, f. 59r. Cf. also Daguí, 2018, p. 114. For the latter, see Andersen and Ramis Barceló, 2018, p. 55.

⁶² The appendix reproduces the original text printed, presumably, by Jacobo Cromberger in Sevilla at some point between 1505 and 1510. While I have retained the original spelling, I have simplified the punctuation and added capital letters at the beginning of proper names. All (in total, very few) emendations are signaled in the footnotes. Paragraph numbers as well as indications of the folios in the original print have been inserted in square brackets. The headings are as in the original print.

clare et inconfuse. Que quidem plurificabilis⁶³ est, ut vult doctor in *Arbore scientie*,⁶⁴ per octo modos distinctionum. Nam alia rationis, alia ex natura rei, alia formalis, alia realis, alia essentialis, alia numeralis, alia se tota subiectiva, altera se tota obiectiva. Doctor vero tres in *Arte generali* ponit differentie species in eius triangulo, videlicet inter sensuale et sensuale, sensuale et intellectuale, intellectuale et intellectuale, que differunt per differentiam.⁶⁵ Que quidem inter interiores reperitur conceptus distinctio dicitur que sic diffinitur. Distinctio enim in communi est claritas conceptuum, in particulari vero de earum qualibet diffinitionem elargiri intendo, ut earum veritas melius intelligatur.

De distinctione rationis simpliciter et secundum quid

[3.] Distinctio rationis est alietas conceptuum simpliciter dependentium vel secundum quid a potentia intellectiva in se impossibilitatum⁶⁶ simpliciter vel secundum quid, de quibus habetur regula et secundum se eorum cognitiva: Omnia illa que includunt de se impossibilitatem simpliciter vel secundum quid, talia entia rationis simpliciter vel secundum quid dicuntur, que quidem formatur per divisionem aut compositionem, ut sunt homo non est animal, deus non est infinitus, angelus non est spiritus etc.; homo est animal irrationale, asinus est homo, deus est asinus, antichristus⁶⁷ est deus, quia solummodo [fol. 28v] sunt in potentia cognitiva et non in obiectis, quia non sunt talia a quibus abstrahat talia que simpliciter sunt entia rationis, cum non correspondeat eis aliquid a parte rei.

[4.] Secundum quid vero formatur ut sunt animal formatum ex cauda leonis et capite bovis corpore hominis, quia correspondet eis aliquid a parte rei obiectorum, et a quibus abstrahitur talis similitudo et quando resolvuntur tendit ad sua priora, et sic intelligendum est de monte aureo, hircocervo et chimera, que quamvis non sit quantum ad existentiam tamen natura possibilitatem habet, propter materie illimitationem, producendi monstrum unum et plura, que quamquam sit preter eius intentum, non tamen posse, et non solum repugnat nature et eius intentioni ac etiam intellectui, inter que cadit distinctio rationis secundum quid. Aliud est ens rationis, que sumitur a ratione rei, et tale ens est reale cum sit a natura reali realiter sumptum, quod quidem non est de presenti speculatione, cum sit ratio realis sine qua res foret nihil, et cum qua res est id quod est etc.

De distinctione ex natura rei

⁶³ The original has «purificabilis».

⁶⁴ Cf. Llull, 2001, p. 20.

⁶⁵ Cf. similarly in the *Arbor scientiae*: Llull, 2001, p. 21.

⁶⁶ The original has «impossibilitatem».

⁶⁷ The original has «antechristus».

[5.] *Distinctio ex natura rei est alietas conceptuum unius unidentice essentie nature et quiditatis, que reperitur in triplici⁶⁸ formalitate, videlicet indifferenti, infinita et finita; inter conceptus realiter ordinatos in prioritatem nature, que est presuppositio huius ab hoc, igitur inter conceptum priorem et posteriorem, concretum et abstractum, est ex natura rei distinctio etc.*

De distinctione formali secundum quid et simpliciter

[6.] *Distinctio formalis simpliciter est alietas quiditatum seu rationum includens superiorem distinctionem, excludendo rationis distinctionem que duntaxat est per intellectum simpliciter vel secundum quid, alia vero in re manent propter ipsum. Que reperitur in triplici formalitate, que quidem formalitas est simpliciter primus conceptus quidicus⁶⁹ cuiuslibet formalitatis. Ut est sententia Francisci octava distinctione: formalitas est quiditas cuiuscumque entis habentis quiditatem [fol. 29r] sive sit diffinibilis, sive non,⁷⁰ igitur formalitas dicit quiditatem cuiuslibet rei et est alietas a forma, cum prescindendat ab ea; unde omnes quiditates, sive sint simplices sive composite sive transcendentes sive determinate, simpliciter formaliter distinguuntur inter se proprie.*

[7.] *Improprie vero tota bonitas, tota magnitudo a quiditate inclusive usque ad singularitatem exclusive inter se formaliter distinguuntur in primo modo improprietatis; totus homo totus angelus et sic de ceteris. Improprie secundo modo activitas et passionalitas, in quacumque formalitate dicuntur formalitates; ideo inter se formaliter distinguuntur ac etiam ab essentia, si in se considerentur. Improprie vero in tertio modo improprietatis dicuntur formalitates omnes conceptus interiores quidici vel non ac etiam omnia accidentia igitur inter se formaliter distinguuntur.*

[8.] *Et quia hec distinctio difficilior est aliis quia formalitas que a nullo priori distingui potest cum non habeat.⁷¹ Nam in ordine essentiali deveniendum est ad unum primitivum conceptum, supra quem non est aliter evitando processum in infinitum in rebus mirabiliter intrinsece ordinatis aliter non foret noticia certa de aliqua scientia.*

De distinctione reali simpliciter et secundum quid

[9.] *Distinctio realis simpliciter est alietas relativorum interiorum qui sunt unius et eiusdem essentie nature et quiditatis. Et reperitur in formalitate substantiali interius, ut puta in bonitate, in magnitudine per se sumpte et in se et ceteris cum sint exemplum et speculum ad omnia que sub eis continentur. Secus autem dicitur*

⁶⁸ The original has «triplici».

⁶⁹ The adjective «quidicus, -a, -um» is frequent in Janer's works; cf., e.g., Janer, 1506, f. 78r: «Ens est subiectum quidicum cui proprie competit entificare [...]». It is synonymous with «quidditativus, -a, -um».

⁷⁰ Mayronis, 1520, f. 48vbQ.

⁷¹ This sentence is incomplete; cf. footnote 39 above.

distinctio realis secundum quid est alietas formalitatum includentium interiorum et superiorem substantialem et realem relationem, includens superiorem, preter illam que rationis per intellectum simpliciter vel secundum quid nuncupatur. Et dicitur realis quia semper inter rem et rem cadit seu reperitur, et descendit per arborem nature usque ad bonitatem et magnitudinem individuales comparate adinvicem existentes singularizatas ultimata individuatione incommunicabili.

[fol. 29v] De distinctione essentiali

[10.] Distinctio essentialis est alietas essentialium ordinarum inter se comparate, includens superiores utique quiditative distinctiones, que duntaxat in creaturas mediatas vel immediatas invenitur a bonitate immediate creata per arborem nature descendendo usque ad individua eiusdem per comparisonem earum.

De distinctione numerali

[11.] Distinctio numeralis est alietas numerorum in diversis essentiis discretorum inter se comparatorum includens superiores distinctiones que solum reperitur in rebus creatis et factis descendendo per nature arborem incipiendo a prima creatura usque ad ultimam facturam etc. Nam includentia diversos numeros ad invicem comparata numero distinguuntur ut bonitas et magnitudo prout sunt create et sic de aliis usque ad individuales formalitates singulares et existentes ultimate per arborem nature descendendo.

De distinctione se tota subiectiva

[12.] Distinctio se tota subiectiva est alietas subiectorum adinvicem comparata subiective distinguuntur. Ut est bonitas et magnitudo prout sunt create et accidentibus substantie, et sic de aliis eis inferioribus, per arborem nature descendendo usque ad bonitatem individuatam, que quidem distinctio vitalis ac sensualis videtur distinguendi modus, cum habeat coincidentiam cum numerali igitur etc., cum sint entia de per accidens de quibus non habetur scientia neque diffinitio nec per consequens distinctio, cum sint res duorum predicamentorum, ideo in predicamento poni non possunt, si⁷² per abstractionem etc.

De distinctione se tota obiectiva

[13.] Distinctio se tota obiectiva est alietas obiectantium adinvicem et non in aliquo communi convenientium. Per hanc quidem duntaxat substantie formalitates distinguuntur: et omnes differentie [fol. 30r] laterales que immediate creature appellantur, de quibus collata est nobis regula: illa distinguuntur se totis obiective que non conveniunt in aliqua realitate communi, a quibus non potest abstrahi aliquis conceptus realis communis et univocus. Nec refert illa opinio que dicit quod ultime

⁷² Possibly, this a mistake for «nisi»; the meaning of the subclause remains obscure in either case.

differentie seu gradus individuales distinguuntur tali distinctione. Et ratio est nam illa que sunt simpliciter distinctiva non possunt aliquo modo distincta esse, et cum ultime differentie sint huiusmodi, ergo non distinguuntur obiective; etiam quia non sunt formalitates cum careant conceptibus quidicis; nec conveniunt in aliqua realitate communi licet conveniant in secunda intentione seu unitate, non tamen in prima, etc.

[14.] Ad infinite trinitatis et unitatis laudem obsequiumque brevium distinctionum finis adest in nobili civitate Barchinone in divique Pauli cenobio beati Benedicti ordinis. xiiii. kalendas. Madii. Anno nativitatis domini nostri Iesu Christi. M.cccc.xc.i.

Bibliography

- ANDERSEN, Claus A., «Introduction», in Pere Tomàs, *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*, ed. Celia López Alcalde, Santa Coloma de Queralt: Obrador edendum, 2011, pp. 13-271.
- , *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus. Untersuchungen zum Metaphysikwerk des Bartholomaeus Mastrius. Mit Dokumentation der Metaphysik in der scotistischen Tradition ca. 1620–1750*, Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 2016.
- , «The Doctrine of Beings of Reason in Renaissance Lullism – Its Late-Medieval Background and Early-Modern Repercussions», *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, forthcoming.
- ANDERSEN, Claus A. and RAMIS BARCELÓ, Rafael, «Introduction», in Pere Dagui, *Tractatus formalitatum brevis, Tractatus de differentia*, ed. Claus A. Andersen and Rafael Ramis Barceló, Santa Coloma de Queralt: Obrador Edendum, 2018, pp. 11-73.
- , «Jaume Janer OCist († after 1506) and the Tradition of Scoto-Lullist Metaphysics», *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale*, forthcoming.
- ASHWORTH, Elisabeth J., «Chimeras and Imaginary Objects: A Study in the Post-Medieval Theory of Signification», *Vivarium*, 15, 1977, pp. 57-77.
- BRIDGES, Geoffrey G., *Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae, O.F.M.*, St. Bonaventure, New York: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1959.
- CÓRDOBA, Fernando de, «De artificio omnis et investigandi et inveniendi natura scibilis», in Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín, *Fernando de Córdoba (¿1425-1486?) y los Orígenes del Renacimiento filosófico en España*, Madrid: S.n. [Establecimiento tipográfico de Fortanet], 1911, Appendix I, pp. 3-74.
- DAGUI, Pere, *Tractatus formalitatum brevis, Tractatus de differentia*, ed. Claus A. Andersen and Rafael Ramis Barceló, Santa Coloma de Queralt: Obrador Edendum, 2018.
- DU DOVET, Jean [Ioannes DOVETUS], *Formalitatum Doctoris Subtilis Scoti, Antonii Sirecti, Antonii Trombetæ, et Stephani Bruliferi Monotessera*, Venice: Melchior Sessa, 1587.
- EBBESEN, Sten, «The Chimera's Diary», in *The Logic of Being. Historical Studies*, eds. Simo Knuuttila and Jaakko Hintikka, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster/Tokyo: Reidel, 1986, pp. 115-143.
- HENNIG, Boris, «What is Formal Ontology?», in *Applied Ontology. An Introduction*, eds. Katherine Munn and Barry Smith, Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 2008, pp. 39-56.

- JANER, Jaume, *Ordo naturae studentium pauperum*, Barcelona: Pere Miquel, 1491.
- , *Ingressus facilis rerum intelligibilium*, Barcelona: Pere Miquel, 1492.
- , *Tractatus de ordine nature qui bene merito opus divinum nuncupari debet et dividitur in hos libellos, videlicet methaphisicam, theologiam et philosophiam ac tractatulo de logica, et de distinctionibus rerum omnium a sapientissimo, nec non facundissimo magistro Jacobus Ianer, in sacra pagina professore cisterciensis ordinis editus*, s.l. (Sevilla: Cromberger), s.a. (probably 1505–10).
- , *Ars metaphisicalis naturalis ordinis cuiuslibet rei intelligibilis arboris*, Valencia: Leonard Hutz, 1506.
- LLULL, Ramon, *Ars brevis* (op. 126), in *Opera latina* XII (123-127), ed. Alois Madre (CCCM 38), Brepols: Turnhout, 1984.
- , *Logica nova* (op. 101), in *Opera latina* XXIII (101-105), ed. Walther Euler (CCCM 115), Brepols: Turnhout, 1998.
- , *Arbor scientiae* (op. 65, pars I), *Opera latina* XXIV (65, pars I), ed. Pere Villalba-Varneda (CCCM 180A), Brepols: Turnhout, 2001.
- MAYRONIS, Franciscus de, *In libros Sententiarum, Quodlibeta, Tractatus formalitatum, De primo principio, Terminorum theologialium declarationes, De univocatione*, Venice: Haeredes Octaviani Scoti, 1520 (reprint Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1966).
- MIQUEL, Francesc [pseudonym for FORT I COGUL, Eufemià], «Un gran lul·lista de Santes Creus: Fra Jaume Gener», *Boletín del Archivo Bibliográfico de Santes Creus*, 1, 1954-1956, pp. 117-156.
- POPPI, Antonino, «Il contributo dei formalisti padovani al problema delle distinzioni», in *Problemi e figure della scuola scotista del Santo*, Padova: Edizioni Messagero, 1966, pp. 601-790.
- RAMIS BARCELÓ, Rafael, «En torno al escoto-lulismo de Pere Dagú», *Medievalia*, 16, 2013, pp. 235-264.
- SMITH, Garrett R., «Bibliotheca manuscripta Petri Thomae», *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*, 52, 2010, pp. 161-200.
- THOMAE, Petrus, *Quodlibet*, ed. Eligius Buytaert and M. Rachel Hooper, St. Bonaventure, New York: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1957.
- [Pere Tomàs], *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*, ed. Celia López Alcalde, Obrador edendum: Santa Coloma de Queralt, 2011.
- , *Quaestiones de ente*, ed. Garrett R. Smith, Leuven University Press, Leuven 2018.