




CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

A Journal Devoted to Research in Classical Antiquity

VOLUME 115

NUMBER 3

JULY 2020

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

This content downloaded from 138.251.014.035 on July 13, 2020 02:50:35 AM

All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c>).

- Nussbaum, Martha C. 1986. *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*. Cambridge.
- Obdrzalek, Suzanne. 2013. Socrates on Love. In *The Bloomsbury Companion to Socrates*, ed. John Bussanich and Nicholas D. Smith, 210–32. London.
- Penner, Terry, and Christopher Rowe. 2005. *Plato's "Lysis."* Cambridge.
- Reeve, C. D. C., ed. 2006. *Plato on Love*. Indianapolis.
- Rider, Benjamin A. 2013. A Socratic Seduction: Philosophical Protreptic in Plato's *Lysis*. *Apeiron* 44: 40–66.
- Scott, Gary Alan. 2000. *Plato's Socrates as Educator*. Albany, NY.
- Tessitore, Aristide. 1990. Plato's *Lysis*: An Introduction to Philosophical Friendship. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 28: 115–32.
- Trivigno, Franco V. 2011. Philosophy and the Ordinary: On the Setting of Plato's *Lysis*. *GRBS* 51: 61–85.
- Tsantsanoglou, K. 1973. The Memoirs of a Lady from Samos. *ZPE* 12: 183–95.
- Versenyi, Laszlo. 1975. Plato's *Lysis*. *Phronesis* 20: 185–98.
- Walker, Matthew D. 2016. The Functions of Apollodorus. In *Plato in Symposium: Selected Papers from the Tenth Symposium Platonicum*, ed. Mauro Tulli and Michael Erler, 110–16. Sankt Augustin.
- Zuckert, Catherine. 2009. *Plato's Philosophers*. Chicago.

WHO IS PLATO'S SOLDIER ER? A NOTE ON ΗΡΟΣ ΤΟΥ
ΑΡΜΕΝΙΟΥ, ΤΟ ΓΕΝΟΣ ΠΑΜΦΥΛΟΥ (RESP. 614B3–4)

Among the numerous names of the characters we find in Plato's dialogues, only two of them seem to have been totally invented: Philebus and Er. If we trust the *Lexicon for Greek Proper Names*, no such ancient Greek name as *Philēbos* seems to have existed and, indeed, (unlike the usual way Plato introduces most of Socrates' interlocutors) that character is given no patronymic, demotic, or ethnic name.¹ But the meaning of that name is obvious, and it refers to exactly what he is: a "lover of attractive youth"—the perfect name for Socrates' interlocutor, who is meant to represent sheer hedonism.² By contrast, the name of Er remains rather mysterious as it in no obvious way corresponds or refers to any Greek name or word.

As far as I can see, four main interpretations have been proposed in modern scholarship, which I shall reject before offering a new, hopefully more plausible, proposal.³

1. According to *LGN*, the name Φῆλος only appears in Plato's *Philebus*, and then (as an echo to Plato?) in Ps.-Lucian (*Asinus* 36) and Alciphron (III 50). (Curiously enough, if the *LGN* explicitly acknowledges the fictionality of the Philebus of Lucian and Alciphron, it does not do so for Plato's, but I do not see any good reason why we should not take Plato's to be fictional, too).

2. This meaning is also obvious in the passages of Ps.-Lucian and Alciphron.

3. As to ancient commentators, they were apparently not puzzled by the name of Er itself, but wondered who Er was (whom they apparently take to be a real person). As Proclus reports (2.109.10–110.1), he himself saw a book of Zoroaster that begun with the words: "Zoroaster, son of Armenios, from Pamphylia, says this . . ." (Ζωροάστρης ὁ Ἀρμενίου Πάμφυλος τάδε λέγει), which provided the Epicurean philosopher Colotes an opportunity to accuse Plato of plagiarizing Zoroastrian sources, which Proclus rejects vehemently. In modern times, the possible links to Zoroastrian doctrines or texts have been defended by Bidez (1945), but see Kerschensteiner 1945 and Koster 1951 for a definitive refutation of such "orientalizing" approaches (on Er, see esp. Koster 1951, 74).

*

In his important commentary on the *Republic*, James Adam suggests that (referring to Ἡρὸς τοῦ Ἀρμενίου) “the names point to the East,” and cites the *Suda*: <Ἡρ> ὄνομα κύριον Ἑβραϊκόν (446, line 1).⁴ One example of this name in Greek literature is to be found in the Gospel of Luke, which mentions an Ἡρ among the ancestors of Joseph, the husband of Mary, the mother of Jesus (3.28.2). But even if *per impossibile* Plato was aware of such a name, it is hard to imagine why he would have adopted it. A second, similar reading consists in claiming that strangeness is precisely what Plato may have wanted to convey through such an un-Greek name, especially if we relate the name of Ἡρ to his patronymic: τοῦ Ἀρμενίου. Armenios was a Greek, male name, and it (most probably) meant “the Armenian.”⁵ And since Plato adds his ethnic name, τὸ γένος Παμφύλου, and Armenia was part of Pamphylia at that time (a subregion of Persia), we can easily understand the name Ἡρ as deriving from, or at least consonant with, his patronymic and ethnic name (with perhaps a pun between Ἡρ and Ἀρμένιος?): Ἡρ would be the strange, barbarian name for a soldier of the Persian army.⁶ But if Plato certainly wanted the name to sound “strange” or “foreign” to his Greek readers’ ears, which would correspond to the “strange” story they would soon be listening to, we fail to see exactly what role it might have had. What would the name of Ἡρ add to his patronymic and ethnic names? And additionally, it is interesting, and I think crucial, to note that not only does Plato not use the nominative Ἡρ, but actually the genitive Ἡρός is the only form, and indeed the only instance, of that name in the *Republic*, and the whole *corpus platonicum*. To be sure, ancient readers would have been expected to infer that in its nominative form the name of the soldier was Ἡρ, which indeed must have sounded like a foreign name.⁷ But, at the same time, since Plato only uses it once in the genitive form Ἡρός, he must presumably also have intended that his readers “hear” it as it stands.⁸ (At the very beginning of the *Symposium*, there is an evident pun between the genitive ἀγαθῶν and the poet Agathon’s name: ὥς ἄρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαίτας ἵασιν αὐτόματοι ἀγαθοί, 174b4–5.)

So what might the name Ἡρός mean? Or, more precisely, since puns on names are not uncommon in Plato, especially when he wants to introduce a character with some emphasis, what sort of pun are we readers supposed to hear in the name Ἡρός?⁹

The closest word one finds to Ἡρός is ἥρος, the genitive, contracted form of ἥαρ, “spring” (and, interestingly enough, the reading ἥρος is to be found in our MS tradition, notably in

4. Adam 1902, ad loc.

5. Adam (1902) denies that, but I do not see any good reason for it. In Herodotus, as well as Xenophon, the adjective (often pronominalized) Ἀρμένιος refers to the Armenian king, or used in the plural, to the Armenians. Proclus also read Ἀρμόνιος in MSS he had access to, but rejected the reading (110.11–14). Interestingly, Ἀρμόνιος—note the rough breathing—is the reading Plutarch reports, which he interprets as being linked to ἀρμονία (τὸν αὐτάγγελον τῶν ἐν Αἰδοῦ Πάμφυλον γένος Ἀρμονίου πατρὸς Ἡρα δ’ αὐτὸν ὀνομάζειν, αἰνιττόμενον ὅτι γεννῶνται μὲν αἱ ψυχαὶ καθ’ ἀρμονίαν καὶ συναρμόττονται τοῖς σώμασιν, *Quaest. conv.* 740b9–c1).

6. Platt (1911) has suggested that Er came from the Armenian name Ara, but this is dubious: why would Plato have transformed it into Er?

7. It should be noted that both Plutarch (740b10) and Proclus (2.110.15) use the accusative as well (Ἡρα), obviously taking the name to be Ἡρ.

8. Note that when they refer to the Jewish name Ἡρ, Greek authors use it as a non-declinable word: see, e.g., Luke 3.28.2, where Ἡρ stands for a genitive (τοῦ Ἡρ); similarly in J. Chrysostomus, *Synopsis scripturae sacrae* 56.323.15: Ἀποθανόντος δὲ τοῦ Ἡρ.

9. Besides the case of Philebus, the most famous case is of course the demotic of Diotima, Μαντικὴ, where readers are urged to hear μαντικὴ (*Symp.* 201d2).

MS F).¹⁰ Plato does not use the word *ἔαρ* elsewhere—except once, in the dative form *ἥρι*, in a quotation from Homer (*Hipp. min.* 370b7). But *ἔαρ*, or rather its contracted form, *ἦρ* (esp. in its genitive and dative forms), was commonly used in late fifth- and early fourth-century Attic prose, especially by historians (notably Xenophon and Thucydides), which might indicate that it was in common usage in oral language too.¹¹ Thus Plato may have implicitly used it here to make an easy pun. This might seem to make perfect sense when one reads the description of the soldier coming back to life just before being burned on the pyre (ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ κείμενος ἀνεβίω, 614b7). Connoting the return of life after winter, “spring” would seem to be the perfect name for a man who comes back to life after being thought dead. Despite its apparent obviousness, such a suggestion is, I think, misleading. Both in poetry and in Attic prose the term is quite naturally associated with the mating and birthing season; and, relatedly, it very commonly connotes the idea of youth and beauty. It is also very often associated, or even equivalent, to the term *ῥα*, of which the adjective *ῥαῖος* often means “in the spring-time of life,” or “in the bloom of youth,” and hence “beautiful” or “sexually attractive.” Needless to say, such connotations are fairly absent from the description of the soldier himself, who in fact lacks any characterization, except that he is a “courageous man”—hardly something that would immediately evoke the image of an attractive, adolescent youth.¹² Admittedly, *ἔαρ* can also in some cases be associated with the idea of “birth,” as in *Iliad* 6.147–49: “Even as are the generations of leaves, such are those also of men. As for the leaves, the wind scattereth some upon the earth, but the forest, as it burgeons, putteth forth others when the season of spring is come [*ἔαρος δ’ ἐπιγίγνεται ῥρη*]; even so of men one generation springeth up and another passeth away” (trans. Murray). But the idea is that of spring coming on (indicated by the preverb: *epi-*), and not its coming back—thus, the idea of birth and burgeoning, not the idea of “rebirth.”¹³

Another possible pun might bear on *ἔρως*. This has been suggested by at least one commentator.¹⁴ But, if in theory nothing prohibits that possibility, there seems to be no plausible reason why Plato would have intended it. The argument that has been given for such a proposal comes from a connection with the *Symposium*: since *erōs* there is considered to stand for any desire, *Er/Hrōs* as *ἔρως* could be linked to the way one chooses one’s future life, that is, one’s future core desire—whether for money, honor, or wisdom. But in the myth of Er, the soldier *Er/Hrōs* himself does not take part in the choice of life but remains a mere spectator of the scenes he reports. Thus, *Er/Hrōs* can hardly be seen as representing human beings who have to choose their next life, or as personifying their core desire.

10. This pun has been suggested by Halliwell (2007, 448 n. 6), although agnostically (“Er might suggest spring”).

11. See, e.g., Thuc. 2.2.1.7, 2.103.1.2, 4.2.1.1; Xen. *Cyn.* 5.6.3, 9.1.4; *Hell.* 5.4.58.1.

12. Actually, two lines in the *Odyssey* make an explicit distinction between being young and beautiful, and being courageous; it is Athena in one passage (1.301–2), and Nestor in another (3.199–200), who speaks to the young Telemachus: σὺ, φίλος, μάλα γάρ σ’ ὀρώω καλὸν τε μέγαν τε, / ἄλκιμος ἔσσι, ἵνα τίς σε καὶ ὀνητόνων εἰδῇ εἴπῃ.

13. It may be noted that some translators have been tempted to express the idea of “rebirth,” such as Butler (“when the season of spring returns the forest buds forth with fresh vines”), and Lombardo (“the tree / Sprouts new ones when spring comes again”). But this is an anachronistic understanding of the text. At *Od.* 19.518–20, we do find the idea of the return of spring, but the specification “new” is explicitly added in the text: ὥς δ’ ὅτε Πανδάρου κοῦρη, χλωρῆς ἀηδὼν, / καλὸν ἀειδῆσιν ἔαρος νέον ἱσταμένοιο. (The same image, and the same second hemistich of the second verse reappear in Hes. *Op.* 568–69: τὸν δὲ μέτ’ ὀρθογὴ Πανδίωνις ὄρτο χελιδὼν / ἐς φάος ἀνθρώποις ἔαρος νέον ἱσταμένοιο). The idea also emerges in Pindar, but here the word *ἔαρ* is not actually used: “Yet now in its turn, after the darkness of winter’s months, it is as if the variegated earth has by the gods’ design flowered with red roses” (νῦν δ’ αὖ μετὰ χειμέριον ποικῖα μηνῶν ζόφον / χθὼν ὅτε φοινικῶν εἰσιν ἄνθησεν ῥόδοις/δαιμόνων βουλαῖς,” *Isth.* 3/4, 36–37).

14. See Dorter 2003, 131.

Perhaps a better argument would have been to bring out the idea that Er/Hrós is described as the “messenger” of Hades (ἄγγελον ἀνθρώποις γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ, 614d2; ὁ ἐκεῖθεν ἄγγελος, 619b2; ἐκ τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαγγελλομένων, 619e2), while in Diotima’s speech the *daimōn* Erōs is described as establishing the link between the gods and humans, and being in charge of interpreting what they have to say to one another (Ἑρμηνεῦον καὶ διαπορθμεῦον θεοῖς τὰ παρ’ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, *Symp.* 202e3–4). But again, this would only constitute a very vague connection since the term ἄγγελος (or any other term related to it) does not appear in the description of Erōs in the *Symposium*, while the idea of being an intermediary between the two worlds, and an “interpreter” between them, does not seem to be what Plato wants to convey in our passage of the *Republic*. By repeatedly calling Er/Hrós an ἄγγελος, Plato presumably wants to mean that he is the “reporter” of something he has attended to (and in which he did not directly participate) which he has been sent out to tell the living. If there is an implicit comparison to be made, it might well be with messengers in tragedies who are charged with a message they have to transmit, which will mark the turning point in the plot, typically leading to the main character’s misfortune and hopeless unhappiness. Similarly here, the message that Er is charged with transmitting is of crucial importance as regards one’s fortune, except that here the message should lead to good fortune and happiness: as Socrates will emphatically add, Er’s story he has reported should “save us if we trust it” (ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν, ἂν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, 621c1), that is, it should help its listeners to fare well (εὖ πράττωμεν, 621d2–3).

*

I propose interpreting the name of Er/Hrós from the background of Plato’s text. The whole sentence that introduces our soldier is obviously meant to be read from a Homeric context: Ἀλλ’ οὐ μέντοι σοι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, Ἀλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον ἐρῶ, ἀλλ’ ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός (614b2–3). As Proclus has rightly seen (Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος δηλοῖ τὴν ἐν Ἀλκίνου τοῦ Ὀδυσσεύος νέκυιαν, 2.111.18–19), the whole tale is meant to be a re-writing of Homer’s *Nekuia*, which is one of the stories Odysseus tells Alcinous in *Odyssey* 9–12.¹⁵ And, as I said, the only characterization that Socrates offers of the soldier he is supposed to have heard the story from is his being an ἄλκιμος man, an adjective mostly used in poetry, especially in Homer—and which, like the name of Er/Hrós, is a hapax in Plato. This background is, of course, not chosen by random: here we have a poetical tale, a Homeric-like *muthos*, which, contrary to what Plato reproached Homer’s *muthoi* with earlier in his *Republic*, will prove both pleasant (as Glaucon explicitly recognizes: οὐ πολλὰ ἄλλ’ ἥδιον ἀκούοντι, 614b1) and useful (i.e., helping them to make the right choice of life, and hence to fare well).¹⁶

15. See also what Proclus said much earlier in his commentary: ἐν δὲ τῇ <Πολιτεία> τῆς νεκυίας ἀρχόμενος οὐκ Ἀλκίνου φησὶν ἀπόλογον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀλκίμου τινὸς ἀνδρὸς Ἡρὸς τοῦ Ἀρμενίου τὸ γένος Παμφύλου, μονονοχὶ λέγων σαφῶς, ὅτι τὴν παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ νέκυιαν ἑαυτῷ προθεῖς καὶ ἐκείνην παράδειγμα ποιησάμενος μέλλει καὶ περὶ τούτων διαλέγεσθαι τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ μύθῳ προκειμένων εἰς ἀφήγησιν (1.169.18–24). Adam (1902, ad loc.) underlines the fact that “a tale told to Alcinous” was a proverbial expression for a long account, but I agree with Halliwell (1988, ad loc.) that even if it may be present here, this is certainly not what Plato wants to emphasize. (Actually, the myth of Er is one of the longest myths Plato ever wrote!)

16. As Morgan (2000, 208) rightly says, one can consider the myth of Er as a “replacement” of the *Nekuia*. In the same spirit, Halliwell (2007, 448) speaks of a “philosophical recomposition,” not an “outright rejection of poetry,” what all too many interpreters have accused Plato of. On how Plato rewrites Homeric poetry in the *Resp.*, see O’Connor 2007. And on the “usefulness” of Plato’s myths in the *Republic*, see Segal 1978.

If one takes this background into serious consideration, another pun offers itself with Ἡρός: the pun on the Homeric word that typically describes such a soldier, ἥρως, “hero.” It is true, of course, that Ἡρός and ἥρως must have been pronounced quite differently. But in the *Cratylus*, Socrates claims that the origin of the word ἥρως is easy to understand “through a little alteration of the name” (σμικρὸν γὰρ παρῆκται αὐτῶν τὸ ὄνομα): “it expresses the fact that the heroes were born out of love [ἐκ τοῦ ἔρωτος]” (398c6–9). Plato intends an (allegedly) etymological link between the two terms, but given what he says, “a little alteration of the name,” a pun between ἥρως and ἔρως, would have sounded evident and been grasped immediately. Thus, there is no reason why a pun between Ἡρός and ἥρως, with both a variation of breathing and vowel length as well, would have been too demanding a task for Plato to impose on his readers. Additionally, it is also arguable that in fact the word ἥρως could have been heard as a genitive form (as a contracted form for ἥρωος).¹⁷ For contracted forms were not uncommon for that word, as quite a few instances testify, both in poetry and prose; we even find one case in Homer where ἥρως is the contracted form of the singular genitive, δόμος Ἀλκινόοιο ἥρως (*Od.* 6.302–3).¹⁸

Some puns on names may be directly and immediately grasped by an audience, such as the pun between the name of the poet Ἀγάθων and the adjective ἀγαθός in the *Symposium*.¹⁹ When such puns are not self-evident, readers may well need a more or less firm nod in the right direction if the author wants them to make the connection between the two words. Take the example of Diotima’s demotic: since Διοτίμα Μαντινική (201d2) cannot but obviously mean “Diotima, from the city of Mantinea,” with readers easily missing the pun on μαντική, Plato makes sure they get it a little further down when he has Socrates humorously reply to Diotima, who asks him a question he cannot answer: “If I could [answer that question], Diotima, I wouldn’t be so amazed at your wisdom . . . One would need to be a seer to interpret what you’re saying, and I don’t understand it [Μαντείας . . . δέεται ὅτι ποτε λέγεις, καὶ οὐ μανθάνω]” (206b5–10)—where μανθάνω presumably is a further nod to making the correspondence between Diotima’s demotic and the theme of mantic.

Where do we have such a nod in our passage of the *Republic*, one might wonder? Admittedly, the word ἥρως is not used in the vicinity of our passage, and there does not seem to be any other wordplay that may directly relate to it in a way similar to that wordplay we find in the *Symposium*. But, as mentioned above, the first words that introduce the passage under consideration give readers the Homeric tone and context in which the myth is supposed to be read. For us modern readers, this may only alert us that Plato is going to rewrite and somehow replace Homer’s poetry, which he has so harshly criticized earlier. But for ancient readers, such an emphatic link to Homer must have had a further function as well: the very emphatic way Plato introduces the tale could not but very directly

17. Actually, it is rather striking that, according to Burnet’s (1902) OCT edition, one MS reads ἥρωος! Should this be interpreted as a sheer misreading by a copyist, or as a correction (perhaps first made in the margin, and later inserted into the text) a copyist or reader suggested?

18. In Plato’s *Republic* itself, at 391d2, the contracted form ἥρω is used for the sg. acc. ἥρωα. Other examples include ἥρως for the pl. nom. ἥρωες (*Ar. frag.* 304: οἱ γὰρ ἥρως ἐγγύς εἰσιν), as well as for the pl. acc. ἥρωας (*Aesch. Ag.* 516: ἥρως τε τοὺς πέμψαντας).

19. 174b4–5 (quoted p. 567). Interestingly enough, this pun appears again, in a similar setting, at the end of the *Symposium* when the uninvited and quite drunk Alcibiades bursts into Agathon’s house, shouting out loudly (μέγα βοῶντος: which is perhaps meant to urge readers to open their ears?): ὅπου Ἀγάθων καὶ κελεύοντος ἄγειν παρ’ Ἀγάθωνα (212d6–7), where readers are to understand both “Where is Agathon? Do lead me to Agathon!” but also “Where is the good—I definitely want to be led to the good!” (on this, see Hunter, 2004, 98).

and vividly evoke the Nekuia they all knew so well. Ancient readers must thus have begun reading this new, Platonic tale with Homer's Nekuia as a vivid background.

In the case of Homer's Nekuia, the storyteller is Odysseus himself. So when Plato introduces Er/Hrós, readers certainly took him as the storyteller who is going to take the place of Odysseus, or to play the role of Odysseus, as it were, in this new Nekuia. And as I said, the only characterization of Er/Hrós is that he is a "courageous man" (ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός). But not any sort of courageous man: ἄλκιμος is a typical Homeric adjective that applies to the great heroes of the Trojan war, and the name ἀνὴρ may be used in Homer as meaning something very similar to being a ἥρω, such as in the expressions: ἀνὴρ βασιλεύς (*Od.* 24.253), or ἡγήτορες ἄνδρες (*Il.* 11.687). Actually, we find it used as a complete synonym with ἥρω in the formulaic phrase δόμον ἀνέρος Ἀλκινόου (*Od.* 7.22–23), of which δόμος Ἀλκινόοιο ἥρω (*Od.* 6.302–3) is a variant. Thus, since Plato goes so far as to underline his phrase ἄλκιμος ἀνὴρ with a pun on Alkinous, and to be an ἄλκιμος ἀνὴρ precisely amounts to being a ἥρω, hearing a pun with the word ἥρω while reading the word Ἡρός (aloud) would seem to be a rather natural, smooth process.

One may perhaps object that neither the characterization of being ἄλκιμος nor the name ἥρω are typical of Odysseus; indeed, ἥρω is used for many other heroes or kings (including Alcinous himself, e.g., at *Od.* 6.302–3, just quoted), while ἄλκιμος is not only used for various heroes, but also for their weapons. There would then be no particular, strong reason why readers may have been nodded toward hearing ἥρω when they read that the storyteller of the new Nekuia, Er/Hrós, is introduced to replace Odysseus. But, as a matter of fact, it is exactly with that very word, ἥρω, that Homer introduces the Nekuia to his audience, when Circe tells Odysseus how to summon the dead: ἔνθα δ' ἔπειθ', ἥρω, χριμφεῖς πέλας, ὥς σε κελεύω (10.516). And if the term ἄλκιμος is not used specifically for Odysseus, numerous passages in the *Odyssey* underline his exceptional strength and courage (see notably 22.226–32, where μένος, ἀλκή, and ἄλκιμος are used for Odysseus), and πολύτλας, "much enduring," is his epithet (*Il.* 8.97; *Od.* 7.1, 16.90). As to the term ἀνὴρ, one does not to be remembered the very first words of the *Odyssey* where Odysseus' endurance and courage are first alluded to: Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, ὃς μάλα πολλὰ / πλάγχθη, [. . .] πολλὰ δ' ὃ γ' ἐν πόντῳ πάθεν ἄλγεα ὃν κατὰ θυμόν, / ἀρνύμενος ἦν τε ψυχὴν καὶ νόστον ἐταίρων (1.1–5). Thus, when Socrates so emphatically introduces the storyteller Er/Hrós as an ἄλκιμος ἀνὴρ, Plato's readers can hardly have missed the clear allusion to Odysseus.

If Er/Hrós is presented with a clear reference to Odysseus, he is also, most importantly, due to replace Odysseus. This is what Plato firmly has Socrates saying: "It is not a tale to Alcinous I'm going to tell you, I said, but that of a particularly brave man" (Ἀλλ' οὐ μέντοι σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Ἀλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον ἐρῶ, ἀλλ' ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός, 614b2–3) where the ἀλλά μὲν clause, as J. D. Denniston states, "is contrasted with what precedes, not with what follows," and where (as various examples of the same construction in Plato attest) μὲν does also emphasize the word that precedes it.²⁰ Thus, drawing the conclusion the pun (οὐ μέντοι . . . Ἀλκίνου . . . ἀλλ' ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός) urges them to draw, readers could not help but understand that the soldier introduced by Socrates must be, as Stephen

20. Denniston 1959, 377–78. Among other examples from Plato Denniston provides, see esp. *Gorg.* 462e2–4: "Polus: 'So oratory is the same thing as pastry baking?' Soc.: 'Oh no—although it is a part of the very same practice'" (Ταυτόν ἤρ' ἐστὶν ὀψοποιία καὶ ῥητορικὴ; Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως μέρειον).

Halliwell rightly writes, “standing for a deeper courage than the traditional paradigm of endurance, Odysseus.”²¹ In other words, Er/Ἡρός/ἥρωες is presented as the truly “heroic” figure, or the new Platonic “hero,” who is going to deliver an important message from Hades that is meant to replace the report we got from Odysseus.²²

At this point, one may perhaps raise the following objection. When Plato uses the word ἥρωες in the *Republic* (mostly in *Resp.* 3: 391d2, 392a5; and in the same context: 10.605d1), he has in mind a great figure who should work as a role model for the young.²³ That is, after all, why he is so keen on criticizing what he considers wrong representations of such heroes, like Achilles, who is (mis)represented by Homer not only as weeping and lamenting (387d1–2; 605c10–d4), but also as a money-lover (φιλοχρήματον, 390e7–8)—both traits being typical of women and people caring only to satisfy their bodily desires (see *Phd.* 82c), respectively. So, if Plato aimed to replace such a rich and sophisticated figure as Odysseus, shouldn’t he have represented a more forceful and vivid “hero” than the shadowy, rather characterless, Er?

In fact, Er himself should probably be seen as a sort of double of Socrates himself. True, the tale of Er is constantly interrupted by Socrates’ comments, which may give readers the impression they are dealing with two clearly distinct characters. But Plato gives two very clear hints that that is not the case, both at the beginning of the tale and at its end. Socrates introduces it in saying that he, Socrates, will not be telling the story to Alcinoüs, but the story of Er (Ἄλλ’ οὐ μέντοι σοι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, Ἀλκίνοῦ γε ἀπόλογον ἐρῶ, ἀλλ’ ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός, Ἡρός), without implying that he had actually met that soldier. But it is at the end of our text that the blurring between the two characters appears at its clearest: in the conclusion, ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν, ἂν πειθόμεθα αὐτῷ is repeated as ἂν ἐμοὶ πειθόμεθα . . . τῆς ἄνω ὁδοῦ αἰεὶ ἐξόμεθα καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπιτηδεύσομεν, ἵνα [. . .] εὖ πράττωμεν (621b–d), αὐτῷ (= the tale of Er) is explicitly considered as equivalent to ἐμοί, that is, Socrates’ own voice. Thus, the “new hero,” who is meant to replace Odysseus, actually amounts to none other than Socrates himself—and indeed, scholars have often noticed the parallel between the figure of Odysseus, who is praised in *Republic* 3 (390d) for his exemplary endurance (καρτερία), and Alcibiades’ description of Socrates in the *Symposium*, where endurance is the virtue Alcibiades seems to praise most (*Symp.* 219d, 220a; see esp. 220c where Alcibiades does indeed apply two

21. Halliwell 1988, ad loc. Actually, Proclus already had a similar interpretation, if for other reasons (2.111.23–112.16; see esp. 112.13–14: ταύτην [Plato’s own Nekuia] δὲ ὄντως ἀνδρικοῦ φησιν ἀνδρὸς εἶναι. Reeve (2004, 319 n. 25) has suggested that a more sophisticated pun might be involved between the two words: “Alkinou might be taken as a compound of *alkê* + *nous* and *alkimou* as a compound of *alkê* + *Mousa*. Socrates would then be saying something like: it isn’t a tale that shows strength of understanding that I’m going to tell but one that shows the strength of the Muse of storytelling.” However interesting, this suggestion seems rather overstretched as nothing alludes to the word Μοῦσα in the context.

22. And indeed, when criticizing the Homeric vision of Hades at the beginning of *Resp.* 3, Plato began by citing three verses from the *Nekuia*—the famous ones where Achilles boldly admits that he would prefer farming the land for another man, however poor, than being king of the dead: βουλοίμην κ’ ἐπάρουρος ἔων θητεύεμεν ἄλλῳ / ἀνδρὶ παρ’ ἀκλήρῳ, ὃ μὴ βίωτος πολὺς εἴη / ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν (*Od.* 11.489–91, cited at 386c).

23. See esp. 378b2–5: οὐδὲ λεκτέον νέῳ ἀκούοντι ὡς ἀδικῶν τὰ ἔσχατα οὐδὲν ἂν θαυμαστὸν ποιῶι, οὐδ’ αὖ ἀδικοῦντα πατέρα κολάζων παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἀλλὰ δρῶν ἂν ὅπερ θεῶν οἱ πρῶτοί τε καὶ μέγιστοι. Admittedly, here in Book 2, Plato is merely evoking the gods as role models for the young, but in Book 3 he will apply those criticisms to the heroes, whom he regularly associates with the gods (using the phrase “the gods and heroes”: 377e, 378c).

lines of the *Odyssey* to Socrates, wherein Helen begins her tale of Odysseus' deeds in Troy: οἷον τόδ' ἔρεξε καὶ ἔτλη καρτερὸς ἀνὴρ, 4.242).²⁴

But how shall we understand Socrates' special courage, or endurance? In the speech of Alcibiades, where an ultimate defense of Socrates against his accusers is (also, among other things) at stake, such praise of courage is perfectly understandable: Alcibiades' portrait of Socrates here depicts him as a true and remarkable citizen who showed not a moment's hesitation in saving his fellow fighter Alcibiades from certain death at Potidea. But such a reading hardly fits our case: obviously, what must be remarkable in Er's, or actually Socrates', courage or endurance has nothing to do with war duties in the literal sense of the term. Here, courage and endurance must have a rather metaphorical meaning, such as the one we find in the description of the philosophical nature in Book 6 (490a–b):

Ἄρ' οὖν δὴ οὐ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα ὅτι πρὸς τὸ δὴ πεφυκὼς εἶη ἀμιλλᾶσθαι ὃ γε ὄντως φιλομαθής, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμένει ἐπὶ τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι πολλοῖς ἐκάστοις, ἀλλ' ἴοι καὶ οὐκ ἀμβλύνειτο οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἐκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἄψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου – προσήκει δὲ συγγενεῖ

So won't it reasonable, then, for us to plead in his defense that it is the nature of a true lover of learning to keep struggling towards what is? He does not linger over each of the many things that are believed to be, but keeps on going, without losing or lessening his passion, until he grasps what the nature of each thing itself is with the part of his soul that is fitted to grasp a thing of that sort because of its kinship with it. (Trans. Reeve, modified)

Neither the word ἀνδρεία or καρτερία are actually used in this passage, but the idea is certainly there: the person who is by nature a philosopher is courageous and resilient in the sense that he or she never gives up on his or her passion for wisdom. Thus, exactly like Odysseus, who never gave up on his desire to return home, the philosopher, and first of all Socrates, who is of course the model of the philosopher, never gives up on his desire to know and understand things as they truly are—except that, since philosophical wisdom is the most valuable in obtaining happiness, it is no surprise that Er as the mythical voice of Socrates is introduced as a more truly courageous and resilient character than even Odysseus could ever be.

Now, how would my proposal fit with Er's ethnic name, τὸ γένος Παμφύλου? Given the two previous puns, one on his characterization, and (if my proposal works) one on his name, it is probable that it, too, should be understood as a pun. And, of course, the pun that immediately comes to mind is etymological, “from the whole human tribe,”²⁵ which can hardly mean anything other than that what the new Platonic “hero” is going to deliver

24. I borrow the phrase “new hero” from Angela Hobbs (2000, 245; but the idea of Socrates being a “hero” was already claimed by Eisner 1982), who also emphasizes that, explicitly or implicitly, Socrates often gets presented as the new hero due to replace Homeric heroes, especially Odysseus. On the figure of Odysseus and its multi-leveled links with that of Socrates, whose usages of trickery are most likely to remind ancient readers of the figure of Odysseus, well known for his *mētis*, see also Eisner 1982, 115; Blondell 2002, 137–62; LévyStone 2005, 208–11.

25. Platt 1911, 14. Interpreters have doubted that that pun would be intended by Plato (e.g., Halliwell 1988, ad loc.; but see Halliwell 2007, n. 6, where he asks: “Pamphylian means ‘of the whole human race’: a hint of universalism?”), but, rather strikingly, just a few pages earlier in the same book of the *Republic*, Socrates underlined the etymology of a similar name of a man linked to Homer: ὁ γὰρ Κρεώφυλος . . . ὁ τοῦ Ὀμήρου ἑταῖρος, τοῦ ὀνόματος ἂν γελοιότερος ἔτι πρὸς παιδείαν φανεῖν (600b6–8). On the other hand, note that at *Politicus* 291a7, the similar phrase πάμφυλον γένος is intended with its etymological meaning, “a class mixed out of all sorts” (trans. Rowe).

is intended for humankind as such. Even if Proclus did not suggest it, he interestingly explains this rather unexpected ethnic name by linking it to the case of “Ardiaeus the Great,” who was “a tyrant of a certain city in Pamphylia” (Ἀρδιαῖος ὁ μέγας [. . .] τῆς Παμφυλίας ἐν τινὶ πόλει τύραννος, 615c6–7), and who at the beginning of Er’s tale, represents the quintessentially bad person condemned to Hades forever. The appellation, “the Great,” does undoubtedly echo the title Greeks usually gave the king of Persia (see, e.g., *Gorg.* 470e4, 524e3), by which Plato signals the back-reference to his description of Er.²⁶ The existence of a tyrant called Ardiaeus is not known otherwise, and it is likely that it has raised some dispute among ancient interpreters given Proclus’ reaction that the search for truth in this case is off the mark: εἴτε δὲ ἔχει τὰ τῆς ἱστορίας οὕτως εἴτε καὶ μὴ, ζητεῖν ἄτοπον (2.110.24–25). Thus, if the existence of a king Ardiaeus is an invention as well (while the word itself used in the plural, Ἀρδιαῖοι, is the name of an Illyrian tribe), it is hard not to see him as the placeholder for something important for each and every human being. And, indeed, since tyranny is repeatedly described by Socrates to be the direst temptation everyone—even the best of us, he says at the beginning of Book 9 (see esp. 572b)—must resist, it is not surprising that Ardiaeus is described as a Pamphylian, that is, the representative “of all mankind.” According to Proclus, Er must have been of Pamphylian origin if Plato considered him able to know about the tyrant Ardiaeus (110.21–24). But while he may be a pure figment of Plato’s imagination, what we are to understand is that Er is a messenger bearing important news about tyranny. It is indeed the state of mind, or way of life, every human being should try to avoid if she wants to be truly happy (and, indeed, the myth’s central scene will deal primarily with tyranny and the worst possible choices for a new life one can make).

Even if Er’s ethnic name denotes that humanity as a whole is referred to as the myth’s addressee, the fact remains that, as the name “Ardiaeus the Great” reminds us, Er’s ethnic and patronymic names evidently refer to Persia. Persia represented the country of otherness, as it were; so having an important message delivered by a foreigner would merely amount to providing the poetic landscape for unheard-of things, or, more precisely, the “strangeness” of the tale, and of the delivered message.²⁷ In the framework of the *Republic*, especially if one links the work’s end to its beginning, this comes as no surprise: the whole meeting between Socrates and Plato’s own brothers takes place outside Athens in the house of a metic, during a festival in honor of a new and foreign goddess (i.e., the Thracian Bendis)—an evident way of announcing that something new and unheard-of will take place at this meeting (among other things, the *theōria* of the Form of the Good that is meant to be the new, philosophical “festival”).²⁸

*

To conclude, just a word on the difference between Odysseus’ tale to Alcinous, and the new Platonic “hero’s” message addressed to everyone who wants, as Socrates says in

26. As Halliwell (1988, ad loc.) has astutely noted.

27. Compare this, again, to the *Symposium* where Diotima is repeatedly called “foreigner” (201e3, 204c7, 211d2) to underline her message’s radical novelty as compared to the other speeches. But of course, as Socrates remarks about the myth of Theuth he has just told Phaedrus, exactly where the myth is supposed to come from, or take place in, is of no philosophical importance—only the truth of its message counts (*Phdr.* 275b–c).

28. Admittedly, that interpretation of the unspecified τῇ θεῷ at 327a2 is not universally accepted (some have proposed Athena, instead), but it seems to me to be the most probable: see Thrasymachus’ humorous εἰστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενεδίοις at 354a10–11, which would be odd if Athena was meant.

wrapping up this all night long discussion, “to fare well,” or “to be happy” (note that the verb εὖ πράττωμεν at 621d2–3 is the very last word of the *Republic*). In Homer’s *Nekuia*, Odysseus offers Alcinous a dreadful description of the underworld, where the heroes he meets are nothing but tragic figures who grievously lament their fate. The world of Hades depicted by Plato is in its own way a dreadful world too, where people are making the worst possible choices, like the first one in the queue before Lachesis, who chooses a tyrannical life and is bound to end up his eating his own children (619b–c). This is a description typical of a tragedy, and indeed that chooser is meant to refer to Thyestes—an especially grim story that was the subject of many tragedies. But the story of those people choosing their next life is not meant to be tragic in the usual sense of the word: as Er/Ἡρός himself comments on how we should listen to his report, “the choice each soul was making of its life was a sight really worth seeing—a show that was pitiable, ridiculous, amazing” (Ταύτην γὰρ δὴ ἔφη τὴν θέαν ἀξίαν εἶναι ἰδεῖν, ὥς ἕκασται αἱ ψυχαὶ ἤρουντο τοὺς βίους· ἐλαινὴν τε γὰρ ἰδεῖν εἶναι καὶ γελοίαν καὶ θαυμασίαν, 619e6–620a2). As the repetition of words referring to the viewing suggest, Er/Ἡρός presents his tale as if he were reporting on a theater show he had been a spectator of.²⁹

Commanding both pity and laughter, this play is a sort of mix of tragedy and comedy, we would say a tragi-comedy, where we spectators in our turn are not meant to pity those people (who are, after all, responsible for their bad choices), but to consider them as ridiculous, however terrible their fate may be. One may suppose that, in Plato’s eyes, in the case of Homer’s *Nekuia* readers are meant to participate, *sumpathein* (as Plato famously put it earlier)³⁰ in the grieving and lamenting of the people in Hades—and Odysseus indeed seems to urge Alcinous and his court to do just that. Here, on the contrary, Er/Ἡρός explicitly invites us to look at the scene of people lamenting the fates they have just chosen with a sort of detachment: we readers-cum-spectators of that scene should not *sumpathein*, but take all of it as a comic, ridiculous show of typically irrational behavior, and thus reflect upon it in order to avoid doing so in making our own choices.

And finally, what about the description of the last character who chooses his next life, Odysseus himself being here one of the dead in Hades instead of the Homeric messenger? How would this rather emphatic mention of Odysseus at the very end of the myth of Er fit with my proposal (620c–d)?

κατὰ τύχην δὲ τὴν Ὀδυσσέως λαχοῦσαν πασῶν ὑστάτην αἵρησομένην ἰέναι, μνήμη δὲ τῶν προτέρων πόνων φιλοτιμίας λελωφικυῖαν ζητεῖν περιουῶσαν χρόνον πολὺν βίον ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἀπράγμονος, καὶ μόγις εὐρεῖν κείμενόν που καὶ παρημελημένον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ εἰπεῖν ἰδοῦσαν ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἔπραξεν καὶ πρῶτη λαχοῦσα, καὶ ἀσμένην ἐλέσθαι.

Now it chanced that Odysseus’s soul drew the last lot of all, and came to make its choice. Remembering its former sufferings, it rejected love of honor, and went around for a long time looking for the life of a private individual who took no part in politics, and with difficulty it found one lying off somewhere neglected by the others. When it saw it, it said that it would have done the same even if it had drawn the first-place lot, and chose it gladly. (Trans. Reeve)

29. On this aspect, see Nightingale (2004, 76–77), who also notes that τὴν θέαν ἀξίαν εἶναι ἰδεῖν repeats what we found at the beginning of the *Resp.* when Polemarchos describes the new, nightly festival that is going to take place as a παννυχίδα that is ἄξιον θεάσασθαι (328a6–7).

30. οἱ γὰρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροόμενοι Ὀμήρου [. . .] τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὁδομοῖς ἢ καὶ ἄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἷσθ’ ὅτι χαίρομεν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες (605c10–d4).

There seem to be several reasons why one may be tempted, as indeed many interpreters have been, to see this last case with a very favorable eye. As Mark McPherran writes, “Odysseus the Cunning, it seems, has been transformed into a virtuous and philosophically reflective individual by means of the purification that suffering and punishment provide.”³¹ Indeed, Odysseus has now understood, so it seems, that honor is not the good he should pursue in order to be happy, at least if those honors might turn out to be a source of trouble, as Socrates warned at the end of Book 9 (592a). And note also Plato’s emphasis on Odysseus’ being allotted the last place in the queue, which is meant to remind his reader of the priest’s words of encouragement: “Even for the one who comes last, if he chooses wisely and lives earnestly, there is a satisfactory life available, not a bad one available. Let not the first to choose be careless nor the last discouraged” (619b3–6). So, Odysseus is a courageous hero who can even cope with his share of hard luck. Thus, it may be difficult to escape the conclusion that indeed, there we have an Odysseus finally realizing that going after honors is not worth it, and who firmly decides to become a more reasonable, philosophical hero.

But one may wonder if this picture is to be taken seriously. Despite his final realization, Odysseus can hardly be Glaucon’s new role model, as it were. First of all, it seems that his decision is rather a sort of ersatz choice: it is because his trip was so tough that he decided to retreat from any sort of public business; his retreat appears to be what is left when one tires of honors. Strikingly enough, we find here an echo of the figure of Cephalus when Odysseus’ *psuchē* is said to be “glad” (ἁσμένῃ) to have found and chosen her new life: this is also the adjective Plato used when he had Cephalus report his friend Sophocles’ answering the question of whether he was still able to have sex: “I am very glad [ἁσμενέστατα] to have escaped from all that, like a slave who has escaped from a degraded and savage master” (329c3–4). Thus, while Cephalus has become temperate by default since he is now too old to have sex, Odysseus has become “philosophically reflective” (as McPherran says) because he is simply exhausted from looking for honor—not a very promising picture of Odysseus. Let us remember that this whole scene of the choices, indeed “how each of those souls choose their lives” (ὥς ἕκασται αἱ ψυχαὶ ἤρουντο τοὺς βίους) is described by Plato as “ridiculous” (θέαν [. . .] γελοίαν, 619e6–620a2), and I do not see why Odysseus should be any exception. All of these supposedly great heroes, Agamemnon, Ajax, and Odysseus, make their choices in “automatic reaction” (as McPherran rightly says)³² to what they have lived previously, which is certainly not how Plato wants us to turn to philosophy. So perhaps mentioning Odysseus as an inhabitant of Hades, from where Er reports his message is, after all, nothing more than the final reminder that Homer is definitely a poor guide for people if they want to become philosophers (and therefore reach true happiness). Or to say it in other words, by explicitly naming Odysseus at the end of his myth, it seems that Plato wanted to repeat one last time that Homer’s message from Hades through Odysseus’ voice should be replaced by a message that has a true (platonic) philosophical impetus. In creating the name of Er/Ἡρός at the beginning of his myth, Plato wanted to alert us readers to how we should read

31. McPherran 2010, 141; but see Reeve 2013, 45 for a more qualified view: “The portrait of Odysseus might with some justice also be called equivocal.”

32. McPherran 2010, 136.

his rewriting of the Nekuia—it is a tale reported by a truly courageous, Platonic “hero” which is meant to be helpful in our reflecting on how we should choose and lead our (future) lives if we want to be happy (forever).³³

PIERRE DESTRIÉE
FNRS/Louvain

33. I’m grateful to Adeline Grand-Clément, Glenn Most, Marco Zingano, and Arnaud Zucker for their helpful remarks and suggestions. I would also like to extend heartfelt thanks to the *CP* reviewer who revealed himself to be Alex Long: his comments and questions were of significant help in improving this note.

LITERATURE CITED

- Adam, James, ed., comm. 1902. *The “Republic” of Plato*. Cambridge.
- Bidez, Joseph. 1945. *Eos; ou, Platon et l’Orient*. Brussels.
- Blondell, Ruby. 2002. *The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues*. Cambridge.
- Burnet, John. 1902. *Platonis Opera*. Vol. 4, *Tetralogia VIII*. Oxford Classical Texts. Oxford.
- Butler, Samuel, trans. 1898. *The “Iliad” of Homer*. London.
- Denniston, J. D. 1959. *The Greek Particles*². London.
- Dorter, Kenneth. 2003. Free Will, Luck, and Happiness in the Myth of Er. *Journal of Philosophical Research* 28: 129–42.
- Eisner, Robert. 1982. Socrates as Hero. *Philosophy and Literature* 6: 106–18.
- Halliwel, Stephen, trans., comm. 1988. *Plato: “Republic” 10*. Oxford.
- . 2007. The Life-and-Death Journey of the Soul: Interpreting the Myth of Er. In *The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s “Republic,”* ed. G. R. F. Ferrari, 445–73. Cambridge.
- Hobbs, Angela. 2000. *Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness and the Impersonal Good*. Cambridge.
- Hunter, Richard. 2004. *Plato’s “Symposium.”* Oxford.
- Kerschenshteiner, Julia. 1945. *Platon und der Orient*. Stuttgart.
- Koster, W. J. W. 1951. *Le mythe de Platon, de Zarathoustra et des chaldéens: Etude critique sur les relations intellectuelles entre Platon et l’Orient*. Leiden.
- Lévystone, David. 2005. La Figure d’Ulysse chez les Socratiques: Socrate Polutropos. *Phronesis* 50: 181–214.
- Lombardo, Stanley, trans. 1997. *Homer, “Iliad.”* Indianapolis.
- McPherran, Mark L. 2010. Virtue, Luck, and Choice at the End of the *Republic*. In *Plato’s “Republic”: A Critical Guide*, ed. Mark L. McPherran, 132–46. Cambridge.
- Morgan, Kathryn. 2000. *Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato*. Cambridge.
- Nightingale, Andrea Wilson. 2004. *Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context*. Cambridge.
- O’Connor, David K. 2007. Rewriting the Poets in Plato’s Characters. In *The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s “Republic,”* ed. G. R. F. Ferrari, 55–89. Cambridge.
- Platt, Arthur. 1911. Plato, *Republic* 614b. *Classical Review* 25: 13–14.
- Reeve, C. D. C., trans. 2004. *Plato: “Republic.”* Indianapolis.
- . 2013. *Blindness and Reorientation: Problems in Plato’s “Republic.”* Oxford.
- Rowe, Christopher, ed., trans., comm. 1995. *Plato, “Politicus.”* Warminster.
- Segal, Charles. 1978. “The Myth Was Saved”: Reflections on Homer and the Mythology of Plato’s *Republic*. *Hermes* 106: 315–36.