Does the work environment in social enterprises foster workers' pro-social motivation and value congruence?

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Abstract

Social enterprises (SEs) employ pro-socially motivated workers who are ready to provide a high level of effort to work to achieve a social mission in which they believe. Both attraction/selection and exposure effects have been identified as possible explanation mechanisms. However, no study was able to disentangle both effects to prove their actual existences. This article aims to test the existence of the exposure effect in SEs, and the way in which this impacts workers' pro-social motivation and perception of value congruence with their enterprise. A longitudinal study was performed on new workers hired in for-profit organizations (control group) and in two types of SEs (treatment group) with different social missions (work integration social enterprises and home care service organizations) in the Belgian quasi-market of service-vouchers. The results show, first, that SEs' workers are more pro-socially motivated and perceive a better match between their values and their organization's values than their counterparts in for-profit organizations after having been exposed for a while to a SE working context. Secondly, we show that this exposition effect has not the same magnitude in both types of SEs. Thirdly, we put forward some clues that tend to indicate that both results might be (partially) explained by some work environment characteristics.

Keywords**:** Social enterprise, pro-social motivation, value congruence, incentive structure, panel data

1. Introduction

Nowadays, social enterprises (SEs)[1] are often drawn into competition with for-profit organizations (FPOs) through, for instance, the emergence of a quasi-market in the social service sector.

One of SEs' main strengths to deal with this competitive context is their capacity to employ pro-socially motivated workers, who share the organization's values. These workers care about the social impact of their job because they want to make a positive difference in other people's lives (see e.g. Grant 2008; Frank 2007) and they place great importance on altruistic values, such as concern for others (De Dreu 2006; Grant 2007; Meglino and Korsgaard 2004), empathy and helpfulness (Penner *et al.* 2005).

The labor donation theory (Preston 1989) highlights that these pro-socially motivated workers are ready to sacrifice a significant part of their wages (see e.g. Cassar 2018) and to provide a high level of effort in order to accomplish the social mission in which they believe (see e.g. Preston 1989; Steinberg 1990; Valentinov 2007). Nevertheless, SEs are often reluctant to offer wages that would be below a fair threshold, because of fairness considerations (Cassar 2018). In addition, SEs and pro-socially motivated workers are both mission-orientated, and this induces a better match between the organization's and the workers' values (value congruence), which in turn leads to longer job tenure and higher job satisfaction, productivity, organizational commitment and organizational support (see e.g. Andersson *et al.* 2016; Besley and Ghatak 2005; Valentinov 2007).

How can we explain the presence of pro-socially motivated workers in social enterprises?

First, it can be explained by an attraction/selection phenomenon (see e.g. Besley and Ghatak, 2005).

On the one hand, pro-socially motivated workers are attracted by social enterprises because such enterprises may share their altruistic values and pro-social goals. Indeed, pro-socially motivated workers look for an organization that shares their own altruistic values and aspirations (Judge and Bretz 1992; Maierhofer *et al.* 2002), and enterprises with a social mission are more likely to support values and goals that meet these workers' expectations (see e.g. Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Ben-Ner *et al.* 2011; Francois 2007; Handy and Katz 1998). Moreover, the limitation of profit distribution in SEs may work as a signal of confidence for workers as it gives them more insurance that their efforts will increase the quality and/or the quantity of the

[1] The concepts used to describe organizations with a social mission vary from country to country: "*économie sociale et solidaire*" in France; "*économie sociale*" in Belgium; "nonprofit sector" in the US; "voluntary sector" in the UK, etc. Unlike scholars from the Anglosphere, most social scientists with roots in the European tradition consider the "third sector" to include not only nonprofit organizations (associations) but also cooperatives, mutual societies, foundations and even new forms of social enterprise—in other words, all organizations whose primary purpose is not profit maximization for their shareholders. Since the purpose of this paper is not to address the debates underlying these different concepts, we made the choice to use the generic term "social enterprise" (SE). We define social enterprises as not-for-profit organizations that combine an entrepreneurial dynamic to provide goods or services with the primacy of social aims.

good or the service and not be converted into profit for the owner(s) (Francois 2007; Leete 2006; Roomkin and Weisbrod 1999). These SE features also explain the massive presence of volunteers in such enterprises (Degli Antoni 2009).

On the other hand, SEs try to select pro-socially motivated workers, who have values and motivations that fit with their own social mission, in order to ensure that they will adopt the expected work behavior. How can SE employers select the most pro-socially motivated workers among all people applying for a job in their organization? Beyond selection processes and procedures, and in line with the labor donation theory, Handy and Katz (1998) highlight that SEs might offer lower wages to attract only those workers who best match the organization's mission. Indeed, only that kind of workers would be ready to sacrifice a significant part of their wages with a view to satisfying their pro-social motivation; other workers will seek employment elsewhere (Lewis and Frank 2002). Therefore, beyond cost-effectiveness, paying lower wages increases SEs output by generating a negative adverse selection mechanism (Handy and Katz 1998).

Secondly, beyond the attraction/selection effect, the presence, in social enterprises, of pro-socially motivated workers who share the organization's values can also be explained by an exposure effect.

The work environment in SEs favors and sustains the workers' pro-social motivation (Speckbacher 2013; Ben-Ner and Ren 2015). Indeed, any type of enterprise must ensure that its workers adopt a behavior that is consistent with its mission by encouraging their efforts through incentives structure (Ben-Ner and Ren 2015; Borzaga and Tortia 2006). Merchant *et al.* (2003) highlight two main types of incentives: explicit incentives and implicit ones. Explicit incentives refer to an enforceable contract that defines the conditions under which a reward is provided. In addition to wage and monetary bonuses, promotion and even threat of dismissal could be used as explicit incentives. Conversely, implicit incentives are not explicitly and contractually defined; they are rather perceived as "relational contracts" or "psychological contracts" (e.g. Rousseau 1995). Such incentives are thus not based on a formal contractual relationship but on trust in receiving some kind of rewards for the effort given.

Explicit incentives are not recommended for SEs because they require to define performance metrics, which is challenging in the case of social performance (Speckbacher 2013; Nair and Bhatnagar 2011; Theuvsen 2004), and because they might crowd out pro-social motivation (Exley 2018; Frey and Jegen 2001; Valentinov 2007). Therefore, SEs usually have to rely on implicit incentives.

According to the literature, two implicit incentives favoring workers' pro-social motivation are present and effective in most SEs' work environment (Austin *et al.* 2006; Devaro and Brookshire 2007). First, the type of relationships between the SE's stakeholders (within the organization, among colleagues and with the managers, and outside the organization, in producer/consumer relationships) is characterized by a mutual trust that everyone shares similar values and goals (Mosca et al. 2007). These trust-based relationships foster

workers' pro-social motivation by playing the role of implicit incentives: the more a worker produces efforts to achieve the organization's mission, the more s/he earns, not only—as observed in all types of enterprises—the approbation of his/her superiors but also, in the case of social enterprises, the social recognition and esteem of his/her colleagues and of the enterprise's users, and even self-esteem (Speckbacher 2013). In other words, SEs' workers are pro-socially motivated to contribute to the enterprise's social aim because they trust that it will help them gain respect and recognition from all stakeholders. A second type of implicit incentive is based on the fact that workers can have a social impact of their own and perceive it; this is critical in directing, sustaining and energizing the pro-social motivation (Grant 2007). Put in another way, when SEs' work environment allows workers to perceive that their actions have a positive impact on beneficiaries, they experience their behavior as being meaningfully connected to these people and they are more likely to put further effort into continuing to make a pro-social difference, because they feel able to do so (Besley and Ghatak 2005; Nair and Bhatnagar 2011).

Not only do the features of SEs' work environment nurture the workers' pro-social motivation; they can also foster the congruence between SEs' values and their workers'.

First, a fair working environment (governance mechanisms implemented through fair procedures, fair distribution of material and non-material rewards) provides good conditions to align workers' pro-social goals with those of the organization (Korsgaard and Sapienza 2002) while increasing their ethical behavior (Anke and Schminke 2011). Moreover, such an environment addresses the workers' values and preferences (Lewis and Ng 2013; Salim *et al.* 2011; Tortia 2008).

Secondly, the democratic participative governance implemented by some SEs through direct/indirect and formal/informal participation of various stakeholders (users, workers, donors, etc.) (Defourny and Nyssens 2011) favors a good adequacy in the long run between workers' (and all stakeholders') values and those defended by the organization (see e.g. Cawley *et al.* 1998; Lee and Bang 2012) for three main reasons. The first reason is that important decisions may be influenced by workers' opinions or even be taken collectively. The second reason is linked to participative management practices: these favor the process of socialization that makes workers understand the organization's practices and values (instead of the organization adapting its practices to fit the workers' values) which allows in turn to improve the workers' perception of the match between their values and the organization's values (Kammeyer-Mueller 2007). Finally, participation reduces the possibility for leaders to deviate from the original mission without the stakeholders' agreement (Cheverton 2007).

In summary, both the attraction/selection effect and the exposure effect are well recognized by the literature to explain the presence in SEs of pro-socially motivated workers, whose values are consistent with those of the organization. Nevertheless, no study so far has been able to isolate the exposure effect from the

attraction/selection effect. There is thus a gap in the literature, to the extent that there is no empirical proof of the existence of the exposure effect and of its importance. The main objective of this study was then to analyze the influence of the SE's work environment on the evolution of workers' pro-social motivation and value congruence (between individual and organizational values). We hypothesized that the work environment developed in SEs sustained and strengthened the workers' pro-social motivation and perception of congruence between their values and the SE's values.

H1.1: The SE's work environment positively affects the workers' pro-social motivation.

H1.2: The SE's work environment positively affects the workers' perception of congruence between their own values and the values of their enterprise.

With a view to testing these hypotheses, we developed a longitudinal study that analyzed the differences in pro-social motivation and the evolution of the perceived value congruence among SEs' workers (treatment group) and FPOs' workers (used as control group).

2. Methodology and data

Data collection and sample composition

The Belgian service voucher scheme in the field of personal services, which can be characterized as a quasi-market, constituted the empirical field of this research. In this field, the consumer's demand is channeled through a "voucher" (which corresponds to a given price), and the consumer then chooses an accredited firm, which sends a worker to the customer's home. Workers are, therefore, hired by the providers and not directly by the households, which are clients of the providers (Defourny *et al.* 2010). The state reimburses the value of the vouchers to the provider and pays an additional subsidy per voucher to the provider to cover the costs of social insurance, administration, training and supervision. This system only applies to housework services (not care), which can be provided either in the home or outside of the home (in ironing centers).

From a methodological point of view, the Belgian quasi-market of service vouchers offers a unique context to test our hypothesis. Indeed, even though the state contributes towards the cost of the services, the provision of these services is open to all kinds of organizations: a variety of for-profit and not-for-profit providers (both public and social enterprises) compete on this market, which includes 50% of FPOs and 15% of SEs.[2] Hence, this empirical field allows us to compare the evolution of workers' motivation and perception of value congruence in both FPOs and SEs, for workers performing exactly the same job and in

[2] Public organizations (21.5%) and individuals (13.5%) also operate in this quasi-market, but they were not taken into account in the context of this study, whose objective was to compare SEs and FPOs.

the same industry. We can therefore consider FPOs' workers as a control group in order to easily attribute to the treatment effect (working in a SE's work environment) the observed differences between these workers and SEs' workers. In this study, in order to distinguish between for-profit and SE providers, we rely on the organizations' legal status: providers with a legal status which does not constrain profit distribution are considered to pursue a mission of profit maximization, while the others are expected to pursue a social mission.

Moreover, this field allows us to compare FPOs with two types of SEs with different social missions: work-integration social enterprises (WISEs) and home care service organizations (HCSOs). In order to specify the type of social mission of each SE, we took into account the type of accreditation granted to it by public authorities. Accredited WISEs are social cooperatives that aim to create temporary or long-term jobs for the most disadvantaged workers (worker-oriented mission). Accredited HCSOs are nonprofit organizations that exclusively focus on serving vulnerable families and elderly people (client-oriented mission). Distinguishing between these two types of SEs, rather than considering them as equivalent, allows the observation of the "specific mission effect", and not only the "for-profit or social mission effect". Moreover, an organization with a social mission centered on internal stakeholders (workers in this case) may, perhaps, differ significantly, in terms of work motivation, from an organization with a social mission that focuses on users' well-being, and this should be taken into consideration. Workers helping a disadvantaged group (elderly and vulnerable people) might be expected to be more pro-socially motivated than workers helping their own group (low-skilled workers).

However, the most important reason why we chose this empirical field is because we have already demonstrated, in a previous study, that the attraction-selection effect does not exist in this quasi-market (Anonymous 2017).[3] In other words, SEs do not attract workers who would be more pro-socially motivated or who would perceive a higher value congruence between their values and their enterprise's values than their colleagues attracted by FPOs.[4]

We collected data by submitting a questionnaire to all the new workers hired by the 52 participating organizations. This questionnaire was submitted to them before their first day of work to ensure that their motivations had not been already affected by their new work environment. The confidentiality of their

[3] Details omitted for double-blind reviewing.

[4] This can be accounted for by the fact that the mechanisms allowing SEs to attract and select the most pro-socially motivated workers do not seem to work properly in this quasi-market. On the one hand, the more pro-socially motivated workers are not specifically attracted by SEs, due to an asymmetric information issue. Indeed, Defourny *et al.* (2010) highlight that job seekers are not aware that there exist different types of enterprise in this quasi-market, due to the lack of information at their disposal. On the other hand, given their usually low pay (often close to the minimum allowed), workers in low-skilled jobs do not have the necessary margins to give up a significant part of their wages to express their pro-social motivation. If the labor donation theory does not work for low-skilled jobs, this means that the negative adverse selection mechanism is not applicable in this case (see Handy and Katz 1998).

answers and their anonymity was, of course, guaranteed. The questionnaire included questions about work motivations, value congruence, socio-demographic characteristics and previous working experience and status on the labor market. The final sample included 217 workers, distributed among FPOs (77), WISEs (86) and HCSOs (54). Based on the triangulation procedure developed by Cortina and Folger (1998), we showed that, for this same sample, no difference could be identified between SEs' and FPOs' workers in terms of pro-social motivation and value congruence before their first day of work. Regarding the comparison between FPOs, WISEs and HCSOs, we reached the exact same conclusion.

There is, however, one exception to this observation: the workers hired by a WISE and who were not previously unemployed were more pro-socially motivated and demonstrated a better value congruence, on average, than the other workers. In other words, WISEs sometimes chose to hire workers who were not unemployed because of the high congruence of these workers' values with the organization's values, even though hiring a person who is not unemployed is not part of a WISEs' core social mission. Even though these workers only represented a small part of the sample (22 workers out of 217), we had to take this difference into account when testing our hypotheses.

Due to the various elements explained above, this sample offered a unique opportunity to compare the evolution of work motivation and value congruence in SEs and FPOs respectively, for similar workers, doing the same job and in the same market. Indeed, due to the characteristics of the sample, we could consider that any difference observed between SEs' workers and FPOs' workers was very likely to be an effect of their specific work environment. In order to observe the evolution over time of workers' motivations and value congruence perception, we submitted the same questionnaire to the same workers eight months after their first day of work. Questions about their work environment and job characteristics had been added to the "second wave" questionnaire.

Measures

Pro-social motivation. We used one of Grant's scales (2008) to measure pro-social motivation. This measure consists of three items (namely "I want to help others through my work", "I care about benefiting others through my work" and "I want to have positive impact on others"), about which workers indicate their agreement (or disagreement) based on a seven-level Likert scale ranging from "do not agree at all" to "totally agree". The value used to measure pro-social motivation is the average score obtained on these three items. Cronbach's alpha of the 3-item scale is .86.

Person-organization fit (P-O fit)**.** We apprehended the value congruence between workers and organizations through the workers' degree of agreement with a single item, used by De Cooman *et al.* (2011): "I think that my values are very close to those of my organization". Again, participants had to indicate their degree of agreement with this statement using a seven-level Likert scale.

Potential threats to the integrity of the experiment to test the exposition effect

Attrition is the first main issue in panel data analysis. 174 workers participated in the second phase of the study. This corresponds to an attrition rate of roughly 20%. Attrition was slightly higher in SEs (23% in WISEs, 19% in HCSOs) than in FPOs (17%). Workers who did not participate in the whole process were those who had left the organization before the second wave of the investigation or those whose organization had gone bankrupt. Since the attrition rate was not negligible, it was important to ensure that the composition of the whole sample and the groups' comparability had not been affected. For instance, it would seem plausible that SEs' workers who had stayed in the organization for a longer time were the most pro-socially motivated workers, while this would not be the case in FPOs (ex-post selection). Therefore, we thus carried out again the same analysis as the one that had been performed in the first stage, but taking into account only the answers provided by the 174 workers who had participated in the two waves of the survey (see appendix 1). In terms of dependent variables (individual characteristics are treated below), the results showed that attrition had affected neither the sample composition nor the groups' comparability. We even noticed that the non-significant difference in perceived value congruence that had been observed in the first step of the study between new workers in WISEs and their counterparts in FPOs was smaller when carrying out the analysis on the sub-sample of workers who had participated in both waves of the study (coefficient of 0.17 instead of 0.27).

Secondly, even though we did not observe any significant difference in terms of motivational profile between the groups during the first step, we had to take into account in the analysis the minor differences that had been observed (all the participants did not have exactly the same level of pro-social motivation, for instance). Indeed, due to these minor differences, differences between groups in wave 2 may not have perfectly reflected the treatment effects (that is to say the real differences between the treatment group and the control group in terms of evolution of motivation between wave 1 and 2). In order to control for these initial differences and to eliminate at least part of the effect of selection bias, we used a difference-in-differences (DD) estimation (specification (1)). This specification allowed us to measure the treatment effect by comparing the average change over time on the dependent variable for the treatment group (SEs) to the average change over time for the control group (FPOs). In order to do this, we considered two observations for each worker in the sample (the outcome at both first and second waves). The following specification was considered:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \gamma_0 SE_i + \theta_1 t_t + \gamma_1 (SE \times t)_{it} + \delta X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where *i* denotes the individual and *t* the period (wave 1 or 2). $Y_{i,t}$ is the intensity of the pro-social motivation of individual i at time *t*. SE_i is a dummy for the affiliation of individual i in an SE (which captures the selection effect to be in a SE on the outcome). t_i is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the

observation is made in wave 2 (and 0 otherwise) and represents the average evolution in outcome for the control group. Finally, the interaction term $(SE \times t)_{it}$ measures the effect of being in an SE (compared to that of being in an FPO) during 8 months on the outcome (treatment effect). X_i is a vector of non-variant control variables. Standard errors were clustered at the enterprise level. Regarding P-O fit, we used both ordered logistic regression (because it was the best adapted to the variable structure) and OLS specification (to be able to compare the coefficient magnitude with the other variables of interest in other OLS specifications). The results are given in Table 1, specification (1).

Thirdly, in order to obtain reliable results while using a difference-in-differences specification, we had to make sure that the identification assumption was respected, i.e. that the control group reproduced the counterfactual outcome trajectory that the affected units would have experienced in the absence of the treatment. In other words, we had to assume that the trends in workers' motivations would have been the same in all groups in the absence of treatment. It may not be the case if they are some differences between groups that can affect the dependent variable. Then, we still had to take into account any potential difference between workers in the first wave in terms of individual characteristics (see appendix 2). Compared to FPOs, SEs hired more workers who were previously unemployed and supported in their efforts to find a job by a public employment agency, and workers with no previous experience on the quasi-market of service vouchers. The workers hired by FPOs had fewer children and were more often of foreign origin than their counterparts in SEs. WISEs hired more unskilled workers (which is coherent with their mission), while HCSOs hired more workers living with a partner than any other type of organization.[5] As a result of these imbalances, we used a second DD specification in which observable individual characteristics were controlled (see table 1, specification (2)). However, we still had to take into account the existence of non-observed and non-measurable individual characteristics. Indeed, if omitted variables that compose the error term are correlated to the treatment, it creates an endogeneity issue that in turn biases OLS estimator. Panel data allowed us to deal with the omitted variables problem by using the fixed effect model.[6] We thus used a within estimator to eliminate the effect of omitted time-invariant variables that causes the error term to be correlated with the regressors (see table 1, specification (3)).

We used the same three types of specification to analyze the treatment effect on workers' perception of value congruence with their organization (see table 1) and to test the effect of being in a WISE or in an HCSO (as compared to being in an FPO) on workers' pro-social motivation and perceived value congruence

[5] We analyzed the composition of the sample and compared the groups' composition in terms of individual characteristics after the attrition effect (see appendix 5). We also performed a logit regression to ensure that the group comparability was not affected in terms of individual characteristics (see appendix 3). The attrition effect does not seem to have affected the composition of the sample nor the groups' comparability in terms of individual characteristics.

[6] Note that fixed effect model cannot eliminate the effect of time-variant omitted variables.

(the results are given in table 2).

3. Results

The literature highlights that the work environment of SEs sustains and favors employees' pro-social motivation and perception of value congruence. Regarding this argument, we expected to observe that the fact of being in an SE would have a positive effect over time on workers' pro-social motivation and perceived value congruence.

Let us start by analyzing the results about the evolution of the perceived congruence between the workers' values and their organization's values. We observe in table 1 that working in an SE has a largely positive effect on the evolution of value congruence, significant at 1% in all specifications. The results presented in table 2, which compares WISEs' and HCSOs' workers with their counterparts from FPOs, confirm a positive effect of working in any of these two types of SEs on value congruence. However, this positive effect is much higher for HCSOs' workers than for WISEs' workers. The treatment effect of being in an HCSO is significant at 5% in the first specification and at 1% in the other ones, while the treatment effect of working in a WISE is smaller, and only significant at 10%.

With regard to pro-social motivation, we first observed that the effect of being in an SE was positive but only significant in the specification with fixed effect (table 1). The same result was observed for HCSOs' workers (table 2). The non-significance in the DD specifications might be explained by the presence of higher standard errors, since we observed that the value of the coefficients of the interaction term were similar between the three specifications. Hence, we may reasonably have thought that the exposition effect would have been significant in the three types of specifications with a larger sample. Therefore, the presence of more pro-socially motivated workers in wave 2 in SEs, and more particularly in HCSOs, than in FPO (appendix 4) could probably be explained by an exposition effect. Secondly, a positive effect of being in WISE on pro-social motivation was observed at the sample level, but this effect was non-significant in all specifications (see table 2). Based on these results and on the fact that a selection effect had previously been observed for workers who were not unemployed before being hired by a WISE (see appendix 4), we could not disentangle, at this stage, exposition and selection effects on WISEs workers' pro-social motivation.

Table 1 -- Exposition effect on value congruence and prosocial motivation, DD and panel data specifications (SE Vs FPO)

	P-O Fit (Ologit)		**P-O Fit** (OLS)			**Prosocial motivation (OLS)**		
	(1)	*(3)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*
Coefficient estimates								
Constant	--	--	5.54*** (0.15)	5.61*** (0.09)	5.34*** (0.73)	5.73*** (0.15)	5.82*** (0.07)	5.40*** (0.69)
SE_i (γ_0)	0.19 (0.27)	0.46 (0.30)	0.10 (0.19)	--	0.26 (0.19)	0.14 (0.20)	--	0.09 (0.19)
time (θ_1)	-0.85*** (0.22)	-0.93*** (0.23)	-0.63*** (0.17)	-0.63*** (0.20)	-0.66*** (0.18)	-0.57*** (0.18)	-0.57*** (0.16)	-0.62*** (0.22)
$(SE \times time)_{it}$	0.89*** (0.32)	0.97*** (0.35)	0.67*** (0.23)	0.67*** (0.25)	0.70*** (0.24)	0.36 (0.22)	0.36* (0.20)	0.41 (0.26)
Woman	–	-0.77 (1.02)	--	–	-0.37 (0.64)	–	–	-0.02 (0.54)
Age	–	0.03** (0.01)	--	–	0.01 (0.01)	–	–	0.00 (0.01)
Education level	–	0.29* (0.16)	--	–	0.24** (0.10)	–	–	-0.05 (0.08)
Foreign origin	–	-0.47 (0.98)	--	–	-0.36 (0.24)	–	–	-0.31* (0.17)
Home cleaning	–	-0.37* (0.19)	--	–	-0.34*** (0.12)	–	–	0.24** (0.11)
Unemployed	–	-0.36 (0.24)	--	–	-0.22 (0.15)	–	–	0.04 (0.13)
Sent by a public placement agency	–	0.38 (0.23)	--	–	0.17 (0.15)	–	–	0.01 (0.17)
Previous experience	--	0.20 (0.23)	--	–	0.19 (0.15)	–	–	0.32*** (0.10)
Couple	–	0.13 (0.20)	--	–	0.07 (0.13)	–	–	0.30*** (0.10)
Number of kids	–	-0.23*** (0.08)	--	–	-0.14** (0.05)	–	–	-0.05 (0.06)
N	174	171[1]	174	174	171[1]	173[2]	173[2]	170[12]

Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01.
(1) DD model, (2) DD model with covariates, (3) Fixed effect model.

[1] Values are missing in terms of individual characteristics for three observations; they have then not been considered.

Table 2. Exposition effect on value congruence and pro-social motivation, panel data and DD specification (WISE *vs.* FPO; HCSO *vs.* FPO)

	P-O Fit (Ologit)		**P-O Fit** (OLS)			**Prosocial motivation (OLS)**		
	(1)	*(3)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*
Coefficient estimates								
Constant	--	--	5.54*** (0.15)	5.61*** (0.09)	5.37*** (0.74)	5.73*** (0.15)	5.82*** (0.07)	5.42*** (0.71)
WISE (γ_{01})	0.25 (0.34)	0.52 (0.33)	0.17 (0.23)	--	0.33 (0.21)	0.13 (0.22)	--	0.10 (0.21)
HCSO (γ_{02})	0.11 (0.30)	0.39 (0.36)	0.01 (0.21)	--	0.17 (0.23)	0.14 (0.25)	--	0.09 (0.24)
time (θ_1)	-0.85*** (0.22)	-0.93*** (0.23)	-0.63*** (0.17)	-0.63*** (0.20)	-0.66*** (0.18)	-0.57*** (0.18)	-0.57*** (0.16)	-0.62*** (0.22)
$(WISE \times time)_{it}$	0.69* (0.37)	0.74* (0.40)	0.49* (0.26)	0.49* (0.28)	0.52* (0.26)	0.30 (0.24)	0.30 (0.23)	0.35 (0.27)
$(HCSO \times time)_{it}$	1.17** (0.46)	1.30*** (0.51)	0.95*** (0.32)	0.95*** (0.28)	0.98*** (0.33)	0.46 (0.30)	0.46* (0.26)	0.51 (0.33)
Woman	–	-0.78 (1.03)	--	–	-0.37 (0.64)	–	–	-0.03 (0.55)
Age	–	0.03** (0.01)	--	–	0.01 (0.01)	–	–	0.0 0 (0.01)
Education level	–	0.28* (0.16)	--	–	0.23** (0.10)	–	–	-0.05 (0.08)
Foreign origin	–	-0.46 (0.39)	--	–	-0.36 (0.25)	–	–	-0.31* (0.18)
Home cleaning	–	-0.40** (0.19)	--	–	-0.36*** (0.12)	–	–	0.22 (0.14)
Unemployed	–	-0.36 (0.24)	--	--	-0.22 (0.15)	--	–	0.04 (0.13)
Sent by a public placement agency	–	0.39* (0.23)	--	–	0.17 (0.15)	–	–	0.04 (0.15)
Previous experience	--	0.20 (0.23)	--	–	0.19 (0.15)	–	–	0.32*** (0.10)
Couple	–	0.12 (0.20)	--	–	0.07 (0.13)	–	–	0.29*** (0.10)
Number of kids	--	-0.24*** (0.08)	--	–	-0.14*** (0.05)	–	–	-0.05 (0.07)
N	174	171[1]	174	174	171[1]	173[2]	173[2]	170[12]

Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01.
(1) DD model, (2) DD model with covariates, (3) Fixed effect model.

[1] Values are missing in terms of individual characteristics for three observations; they have then not been considered.

In order to try to solve this problem, we reproduced the same DD and fixed effect specifications to test the exposition hypothesis on the sub-sample of WISEs' workers who were unemployed before their actual job (see appendix 5). For that subsample, the WISE exposition effect on perceived value congruence was significant and stronger than for the full sample. Regarding pro-social motivation, the effect was also stronger and even became significant in the fixed effect specifications. On the contrary, we did not observe an exposition effect on perceived value congruence and pro-social motivation when we considered the sample of people who were not previously unemployed. Hence, it seems that the WISE exposition effect only exists for people who were previously unemployed, and not for the others. We can conclude that, on the one hand, WISEs attract some workers who are more pro-socially motivated (the ones who were not previously unemployed) than workers in FPOs (selection effect) and that they foster the development of the pro-social motivation of the workers who were previously unemployed (exposition effect).

Finally, these results show that the exposition effect of SEs' working environment is higher on perceived value congruence than on pro-social motivation. The most likely interpretation of these results is that SEs' workers, in this specific market of housework, realize with time (like their counterparts in FPOs)—and even though they still believe in the importance of their organization's mission—that they have very few opportunities to have a real social impact by performing their tasks. Indeed, as their task is strictly regulated, they can only provide housework duties; they do not care for elderly or vulnerable people.

How to explain the observed exposition effect?

We tried to identify the mechanisms that account for the exposition effect in SEs (and its higher intensity in HCSOs than in WISEs) on workers' pro-social motivation and perceived value congruence. We compared the workers' job characteristics and work environment in each type of provider organization on the basis of seven variables (see table 3): a seven-level Likert scale measuring the frequency of the meetings with vulnerable users (old or disabled person); validated psychological scales to measure autonomy at work (Parker 2003; five items; $\alpha = .87$); the quality of the relationship with supervisors (Barnett and Brennan 1995; five items; $\alpha = .96$) and colleagues (Morgeson and Humphrey 2006; three items; $\alpha = .90$); perceived job security (De Witte 2000; four items; $\alpha = .72$); and the six-item scale of the European Survey on Working Conditions questionnaire about workers' participation (2010; $\alpha = .95$).

We observe in table 3 that workers in both types of SE have a better relationship with their supervisor(s), more opportunities to give advice and to participate in decision-making and a better access to professional training than workers in FPOs. These SEs' specificities might account for the observed exposition effect, as explained in the first part of the paper: Trust-based relationships in SEs foster workers' pro-social motivation by playing the role of implicit incentives. Participative policies favor congruence between SEs' values and their workers' values through ensuring adequacy in the long run between workers' values and those

defended by all the stakeholders of the organization.

Table 3. OLS regressions on the characteristics of the work environment (WISE *vs.* FPO; HCSO *vs.* FPO)

	Relation with supervisors	Relation with colleagues	Autonomy	Participa -tion	Perceived job security	Contact with vulnerable users
Coefficient estimates						
Constant	6.70*** (0.75)	6.61*** (1.02)	5.68*** (0.69)	3.21** (1.54)	4.78*** (0.85)	5.39*** (0.90)
WISE	0.57* (0.29)	0.31 (0.34)	0.19 (0.23)	1.92*** (0.35)	0.28 (0.17)	-0.44** (0.20)
HCSO	1.31*** (0.30)	1.12*** (0.40)	0.66*** (0.17)	2.88*** (0.38)	-0.22 (0.22)	0.56*** (0.18)
Woman	-0.53 (0.46)	-0.13 (0.75)	-0.39 (0.29)	-0.14 (1.46)	0.70 (0.60)	0.15 (0.78)
Age	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Education level	0.01 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.00 (0.08)	0.10 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.11)
Foreign origin	-0.45 (0.48)	0.09 (0.29)	-0.34 (0.23)	-0.27 (0.41)	-0.07 (0.24)	-0.15 (0.24)
Home Cleaning	-1.21*** (0.25)	-1.20*** (0.34)	-0.47 (0.60)	-1.15*** (0.28)	-1.10*** (0.17)	-0.30 (0.24)
Unemployed	-0.02 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.20)	0.22 (0.21)	-0.13 (0.23)	0.09 (0.20)	0.15 (0.21)
CPAS/ FOREM	0.29 (0.22)	0.11 (0.28)	-0.12 (0.20)	0.61* (0.35)	0.06 (0.24)	-0.29 (0.26)
Previous experience	-0.13 (0.23)	0.08 (0.22)	-0.07 (0.16)	0.27 (0.23)	0.12 (0.16)	0.06 (0.18)
Couple	-0.03 (0.18)	0.18 (0.20)	-0.13 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.27)	0.13 (0.15)	-0.21 (0.20)
Number of kids	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.17** (0.08)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.06)	0.08 (0.08)
N	171	171	171	171	171	171

Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Values are missing in terms of individual characteristics for three observations; they have then not been considered

Some differences are also observed between HCSOs and WISEs in terms of job characteristics and work environment. In particular, HCSOs workers benefit from a better relationship with their colleagues and from a higher degree of autonomy at work than FPOs' workers (see table 3). In addition to the nature of their social mission (centered on internal stakeholders for WISEs and focused on users' well-being for HCSOs), these observed differences might (partially) explain why the exposition effect on workers' pro-social motivation and perceived value congruence is higher in HCSOs than in WISEs. Indeed, while a good relationship with colleagues constitutes an implicit incentive fostering SE workers' pro-social motivation, providing autonomy in the job is a good channel for workers to have a social impact of their own and perceive it, and therefore to strengthen their pro-social motivation (Gagné 2003). In addition, less autonomy implies a higher degree of control, which might reduce the workers' feeling that they are in a trust-based relationship with their organization (Ploner 2007). What it is of upmost importance is the fact that HCSOs' workers are those in the sample who are most often in contact with users while, conversely, WISEs' workers are those who have the smallest number of contacts with users (see table 3), and regular contacts with beneficiaries are crucial for the workers to feel that their work is important, appreciated and impactful, which in turn sustains and develops their pro-social motivation and their willingness to make more efforts (Buell *et al.* 2016; Grant 2007).

4. Discussion

It is well documented in the literature that social enterprises employ pro-socially motivated workers, who are ready to sacrifice a significant part of their wages and/or to provide a high level of effort to work for a social mission in which they believe. Both attraction/selection and exposure effects have been identified as possible explanation mechanisms, but no study so far had been able to disentangle both effects to prove their actual existence.

Our results first show the existence of an exposition effect in SEs, by isolating it from the selection/attraction effect through a longitudinal analysis. We demonstrate the fact that the exposure of workers to a SE's working context results in these workers becoming more pro-socially motivated and perceiving a better congruence between their values and their organization's values than their counterparts in FPOs. Secondly, we show that this exposition effect has not the same magnitude in all types of SE evolving in the same industry and producing the same services. Thirdly, we hypothesize that this latter observation may be linked to the type of social mission developed by these SEs. On the one hand, the nature of the social mission might directly impact workers' motivation and adhesion. For instance, it should be easier to be pro-socially motivated to help a disadvantaged outgroup (elderly and vulnerable people) than to help one's own group. On the other hand, the nature of the social mission may have an indirect impact on workers' pro-social motivation and perception of value congruence through the implementation of specific work environment

characteristics. Indeed, we know that the opportunity given to workers to have a social impact of their own and to perceive it, first, and trust-based relationships with all the organization's stakeholders, secondly, could work as implicit incentives favoring workers' pro-social motivation. To ensure the effective functioning of these incentives, our empirical evidence suggest that a good level of autonomy at work, regular contacts with beneficiaries and a positive climate in terms of relationship inside (with colleagues, managers and owners) and outside the organization (mainly with beneficiaries) may be important elements. The latter two elements, as well as workers' involvement in the decision-making process (participative policies), also seem to favor workers' perception of congruence between their values and SEs' values.

Although these observations are interesting and in line with the literature, future investigation should be dedicated to this question to identify with more precision the work environment characteristics and managerial practices that positively affect workers' pro-social motivation and perceived value congruence over time in SEs.

Several possible biases of this study should be acknowledged and future research also needs to address these limitations by carrying out experiments in perfectly controlled environments, so as to provide clear indications about workers' motivations through the observation of their behaviors. Two major biases can be identified. First, individuals belonging to the different groups (treatment and control) are not exactly the same; this may lead to a selection bias and to the non-respect of the identification assumption. Indeed, if we were able to control for the main individual differences between groups, it was not the case for time-variant omitted variables (some events which could impact differently SEs' and FPOs' workers). This is the reason why it would be interesting to lead experiments into controlled environment. Secondly, it is also possible that our data suffered from a social desirability bias, since the issue of motivation at work is sensitive. However, the computed data analysis followed a comparative approach, which implies that, if desirability bias did occur, we can be reasonably confident that it occurred in the same way in each organizational type. Moreover, this study was not interested in the absolute level of motivation, but in its evolution over time, and there is no reason to believe that the desirability bias affecting an individual's answers would be different during the first-wave and the second-wave surveys. Consequently, this bias was not likely to significantly influence our results; still, it might be useful to also analyze workers' motivations through the observation of workers' behaviors.

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TABLES

Table I. – Sample's characteristics

	FPO	WISE	HCSO	Anova p-value
N	132	341	127	
Organization's characteristics				
Organization size (number of workers)	71.18 (56.87)	54.40 (22.33)	100.43 (75.21)	.000[BF]
Tenure (in months)	63.39 (24.13)	75.75 (25.67)	107.35 (6.28)	.000[BF]
Localization (Brussels, %)	26.52	5.55	0.00	.000[BF]
Job characteristics				
Main task (%)				
Ironing	17	10	02	.001[BF]
Domestic help	83	90	98	
User (Likert7)				
Users with not enough time to carry out their housework duties	5.22 (1.40)	4.93 (1.37)	4.86 (1.54)	.112
Elderly users	4.72 (1.72)	5.22 (1.38)	5.54 (1.16)	.000[BF]
Disabled users	3.16 (2.00)	3.98 (5.81)	4.35 (3.09)	.143
Organizational tenure (in months)	28.24 (22.05)	45.08 (30.76)	61.21 (31.81)	.000[BF]
Worker characteristics				
Gender (% of women)	98	97	99	.309[BF]
Age (in years)	38.61 (10.28)	39.69 (8.78)	40.77 (8.61)	.180[BF]
Education (%)				
< High school	40	54	37	.001[BF]
= High school	37	37	50	.041[BF]
> High school	23	09	13	.001[BF]
Origin (%)				
Belgium	46	72	85	.000[BF]
E.U.	24	20	10	.007[BF]
Outside E.U.	30	08	05	.000[BF]
Couple status (% of workers being in couple)	65	62	76	.024[BF]

Number of dependent children	1.44 (1.33)	1.46 (1.25)	1.48 (1.10)	.968
Previous situation (%)				
Employed	45	25	44	.000[BF]
Unemployed	51	70	52	.000[BF]
Student	02	01	02	.414 [BF]

For continuous variables, standard-deviations appear brackets. For binary variables, the results are given in %. Likert scales have 7 levels ranging from «never» to «always»).

Table II. – Factorial analysis results

Physical working conditions			
Items	**Factor 1** Physical exposure to risk and risk of accidents	**Factor 2** Risk prevention policy	**Mean score**
	Item weight		
When performing my task, I am not exposed to…(L)			
…noise	.16	.00	5.87
…too high or too low temp or dampness	.20	.00	4.71
…risk of accidents	.20	.00	4.47
…tiring or painful positions	.22	.00	3.22
…the obligation to carry heavy loads	.21	.00	3.86
My organization provides me…(L)			
…enough protective clothes	.01	.29	5.40
…the material that I need to perform my job in safe conditions	.00	.38	4.45
…information about the risks related to my job	.01	.32	5.20
Factor weight	.62	.38	
Selection criteria **Eigen value** **Explained variance (%)**	 2.49 31.12	 1.52 19.04	
Skill development			
Items	**Factor 1** Formal training	**Factor 2** On-the-job training	**Mean score**
	Item weight		
I have participated in at least one formal training during the last year (Y/N)	.39	.00	57%
Number of training hours	.29	.00	16h34
The formal trainings are not always related to my actual job (L)	.30	.07	2.40
On-the-job-training (scale of Edwards, Scully, & Brtek, 1999 ; α = .86)	.02	.93	3.47
Factor weight	.63	.37	
Selection criteria			

Eigen value	1.75	1.01	
Explained variance (%)	43.68	25.19	

Relational aspects		
Items	**Factor 1** Relational aspects	**Mean score**
	Item weight	
I have the opportunity to talk with my colleagues (L)	.31	4.12
I have the opportunity to talk with my organization's leader(s) and manager(s) (L)	.27	4.52
Quality of the relationship with colleagues (scale proposed by Morgeson & Humphrey, 2006; α = .65)	.27	5.03
Quality of the relationship with managers and leaders (scale proposed by Barnett & Brennan, 1995; α = .91)	.14	5.50
Selection criteria **Eigen value** **Explained variance (%)**	 2.12 53.15	

Participation			
Items	**Factor 1** Direct and representative participation	**Factor 2** Collective meetings	**Mean score**
	Item weight		
I have the opportunity to freely give my opinion (L)	.40	.00	5.72
Union representation (L)	.34	.00	4.94
Important decisions are previously discussed collectively with all the organization's members. (L)	.26	.00	4.39
I participate in meetings where I and my colleagues have the opportunity to share our opinions (Y/N)	.00	1.00	62%
Factor weight	.57	.43	
Selection criteria **Eigen value** **Explained variance (%)**	 1.15 38.61	 0.85 28.75	

Job security			
Items	**Factor 1** Tenure	**Factor 2** Contract and perceived job security	**Mean score**
	Item weight		
Tenure (in months)	.62	.01	44
Perceived job security (scale proposed by De Witte, 2000; α = .70)	.25	.43	5.61
Open-ended contract as first contract (Y/N)	.13	.56	75%
Factor weight	.51	.49	

Selection criteria			
Eigen value	1.09	1.06	
Explained variance (%)	36.36	35.36	

Work schedules and time flexibility			
Items	**Factor 1** Work family balance and no scheduling flexibility	**Factor 2** No unsocial working hours	**Mean score**
	Item weight		
My organization usually asks me to adjust my working schedule (Y/N)	.12	.00	68%
Clients usually ask me to adjust my working schedule (Y/N)	.11	.00	76%
Work family balance (scale proposed by Netemeyer, Boles & McMurrian, 1996; α = .87)	.45	.07	5.24
No change in…			
…working hours (Y/N)	.11	.00	71%
…work schedules (Y/N)	.10	.00	85%
…work planning (Y/N)	.11	.00	78%
I do not work…			
…in the evening (<18h) (L)	.00	.48	6.84
…during the weekend (L)	.00	.47	6.79
Factor weight	.67	.33	
Selection criteria			
Eigen value	2.03	0.99	
Explained variance (%)	40.71	19.92	
Social or fringe benefits			
Items	**Factor 1** Bonuses and in-kind benefits	**Factor 2** Transport costs	**Mean score**
	Item weight		
I have the opportunity to get financial bonuses	.49	.00	52%
I have access to in-kind benefits (car, insurance, etc.)	.36	.28	11%
My work travel is paid by my organization	.16	.72	90%
Factor weight	.55	.45	
Selection criteria			
Eigen value	0.40	0.33	
Explained variance (%)	40.09	33.00	

(Y/N) = binary variable YES/NO. (L) = 7-levels Likert scale from (1) « do not agree at all » (or « never ») to (7) « strongly agree » (or « always»).

Table III. -- Regression (OLS) of mission on hourly wage, social or fringe benefits, career opportunities and working hours

	Hourly wage		**Social or fringe benefits**		Bonuses and in-kind benefits		Transport cost		**Career opportunities**		**# of working hours (H)**		**|#H effective - #H wanted|** (R)	
	(1)	**(2)**	**(1)**	**(2)**	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(1)**	**(2)**
	B(SE)	**B(SE)**	**B(SE)**	**B(SE)**	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	**B(SE)**	**B(SE)**	**B(SE)**	**B(SE)**	**B(SE)**	**B(SE)**
WISE	**0.01**	--	**0.58*** **	--	0.47***	--	0.72***	--	**0.17**	--	**0.06**	--	**-1.16***	--
	(0.03)		**(0.16)**		(0.16)		(0.25)		**(0.19)**		**(0.32)**		**(0.70)**	
HCSO	**1.08*** **	**1.00*** **	**0.41***	**-0.17**	0.12	-0.35**	0.77**	0.05	**0.52** **	**0.35***	**-3.70** **	**-3.64*** **	**-2.01** **	**-0.85**
	(0.07)	**(0.07)**	**(0.22)**	**(0.10)**	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.31)	(0.11)	**(0.21)**	**(0.19)**	**(1.66)**	**(1.29)**	**(0.81)**	**(0.57)**
FPO	--	**-0.08**	--	**-0.58*** **	--	-0.47***	--	-0.72***	--	**-0.17**	--	**0.06**	--	**1.16***
		(0.05)		**(0.19)**		(0.16)		(0.25)		**(0.19)**		**(0.32)**		**(0.70)**
Control variables	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**

SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significant at. * p < .10. ** p < .05. or *** p < .01.

Table IV. -- Regression (OLS) of mission on participation, skills development and physical working conditions

	Participation		Direct and representative participation		Meetings		**Skills development**		On-the-job training		Formal training		**Physical working conditions**		Physical exposure to risk and risk of accidents		Risk prevention policy	
	(1)	**(2)**	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	**(1)**	**(2)**	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	**(1)**	**(2)**	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
	B(SE)	**B(SE)**	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	**B(SE)**	**B(SE)**	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	**B(SE)**	**B(SE)**	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)
WISE	**0.47*** (0.12)**	--	0.17 (0.15)	--	0.96*** (0.12)	--	**0.43*** (0.09)**	--	0.11 (0.13)	--	0.89*** (0.10)	--	**0.22** (0.10)**	--	-0.08 (0.11)	--	0.71*** (0.15)	--
HCSO	**0.43*** (0.14)**	**-0.04 (0.10)**	0.21 (0.18)	0.04 (0.11)	0.79*** (0.15)	-0.17 (0.14)	**0.13 (0.14)**	**-0.30** (0.13)**	-0.17 (0.18)	-0.28* (0.14)	0.56*** (0.17)	-0.33** (0.17)	**0.28** (0.12)**	**0.06 (0.09)**	0.01 (0.12)	0.09 (0.10)	0.74*** (0.21)	0.02 (0.20)
FPO	--	**-0.47*** (0.12)**	--	-0.17 (0.15)	--	-0.96*** (0.12)	--	**-0.43*** (0.09)**	--	-0.08 (0.12)	--	-0.89*** (0.10)	--	**-0.22** (0.10)**	--	0.08 (0.11)	--	-0.71*** (0.15)
Control variables	**YES**	**YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES	**YES**	**YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES	**YES**	**YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES

(R) = the higher the score is, the lower the job quality. SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significant at. * p < .10. ** p < .05. or *** p < .01.

Table V. -- Regression (OLS) of mission on job security, working schedules and time flexibility, relational aspects, autonomy, and intensity.

	Job security		Tenure		Contract and perceived job security		**Work schedules and time flexibility**		Work family balance and no time flexibility		No unsocial working hours		**Relational aspects**		**Autonomy**		**Intensity** (R)	
	(1)	**(2)**	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	**(1)**	**(2)**	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(1)**	**(2)**
	B(SE)	**B(SE)**	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	**B(SE)**	**B(SE)**	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	B(SE)	**B(SE)**	**B(SE)**	**B(SE)**	**B(SE)**	**B(SE)**	**B(SE)**
WISE	**0.43*** (0.09)**	--	0.37*** (0.08)	--	0.40*** (0.11)	--	**-0.09 (0.08)**	--	-0.16* (0.08)	--	0.05 (0.22)	--	**0.29** (0.13)**	--	**-0.36 (0.29)**	--	**0.34 (0.22)**	--
HCSO	**0.27*** (0.09)**	**-0.16** (0.06)**	0.31*** (0.11)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.19 (0.13)	-0.59*** (0.10)	**0.17 (0.10)**	**0.26*** (0.07)**	0.09 (0.11)	0.25** (0.09)	0.33 (0.26)	0.28*** (0.09)	**-0.15 (0.19)**	**-0.44*** (0.16)**	**-0.12 (0.35)**	**0.24 (0.16)**	**0.17 (0.23)**	**-0.17 (0.17)**
FPO	--	**0.43*** (0.09)**	--	-0.37*** (0.08)	--	-0.40*** (0.11)	--	**0.09 (0.08)**	--	0.16* (0.08)	--	-0.05 (0.22)	--	**-0.29** (0.13)**	--	**0.36 (0.29)**	--	**-0.34 (0.22)**
Control variables	**YES**	**YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES	**YES**	**YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**

(R) = The higher the score is, the lower the job quality. SE = robust standard error. B = coefficient, significant at. * p < .10. ** p < .05. or *** p < .01.

FIGURES

Figure 1 – Hourly wage, career opportunities, and social or fringe benefits



Figure 2 -- Participation, skills development, physical working environment, and number of working hours



Figure 3 – Job security, relational aspects, autonomy, work schedules and time flexibility, and intensity.